Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional research reportNov 21, 2005

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:

Background and Issues for Congress

Updated November 21, 2005

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:

Background and Issues for Congress

Summary

The war on terrorism has put a high premium on a primary mission of UAVs,

intelligence gathering. Furthermore, the military effectiveness of UAVs in recent

conflicts such as Iraq (1990) and Kosovo (1999) opened the eyes of many to both the

advantages and disadvantages provided by unmanned aircraft. Long relegated to the

sidelines in military operations, UAVs are now making national headlines as they are

used in ways normally reserved for manned aircraft. Conventional wisdom states

that UAVs offer two main advantages over manned aircraft: they are considered

more cost-effective, and they minimize the risk to a pilot’s life. However, the current

UAV accident rate (the rate at which the aircraft are lost or damaged) is 100 times

that of manned aircraft.

UAVs range from the size of an insect to that of a commercial airliner. DOD

currently possesses five major UAVs: the Air Force’s Predator and Global Hawk,

the Navy and Marine Corps’s Pioneer, and the Army’s Hunter and Shadow. Other

key UAV developmental efforts include the Air Force and Navy’s unmanned combat

air vehicle (UCAV), Navy’s vertical takeoff and landing UAV (VTUAV), and the

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV(BAMS), and the Marine Corps’s Dragon

Eye and Dragon Warrior. The services continue to be innovative in their use of

UAVs. Recent examples include arming UAVs (Predator, Hunter), using UAVs to

extend the eyes of submarines, and teaming UAVs with strike aircraft and armed

helicopters to improve targeting.

In the past, tension has existed between the services’ efforts to acquire UAVs

and congressional initiatives to encourage a consolidated DOD approach. Some

observers argue that the result has been a less than stellar track record for the UAV.

However, reflecting the growing awareness and support in Congress and the

Department of Defense for UAVs, investments in unmanned aerial vehicles have

been increasing every year. DoD spending on UAVs has increased from $284

million in Fiscal Year 2000 to $2.1 billion in FY2005.

Congressional considerations include the proper pace, scope, and management

of DoD UAV procurement; appropriate investment priorities for UAVs versus

manned aircraft; UAV future roles and applications; personnel issues; industrial base

issues; and technology proliferation. This report will be updated as necessary.

Contents

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Congressional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Pace of UAV Acquisition and Scope of Missions or Applications . . . . . . . . 4

UAV Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

UAVs and Investment Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

UAV Roles and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Recruitment and Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Industrial Base Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

UAV Proliferation and Export Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Current DOD UAV Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

MQ-1 Predator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

System Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Mission and Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

RQ-2 Pioneer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

System Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Mission and Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

RQ-4 Global Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

System Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Mission and Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

RQ-5A Hunter / MQ-5B Hunter II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

System Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Mission and Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

RQ-7 Shadow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

System Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Mission and Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

System Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Potential Mission and Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

RQ-8B Fire Scout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

System Characteristics and Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Eagle Eye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

“Small UAVs” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

List of Figures

Figure 1. Current and Planned UAV Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Figure 2. Manned Aircraft Inventory vs. UAV Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Figure 7. ISR UAV Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

List of Tables

Table 1. UAV Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Table 2. Select Mishap Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Table 3. Autonomous Capability Levels (ACL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Table 4. ISR UAVs with E-O/IR Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Table 5. Predator A & B Combined Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Table 6. Pioneer Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Table 7. Global Hawk Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Table 8. RQ-7 Shadow Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Table 9. J-UCAS Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:

Background and Issues for Congress

Background

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been referred to in many ways: RPVs

(remotely piloted vehicle), drones, robot planes, and pilotless aircraft are a few of the

terms that have been used. Most often called UAVs, they are defined by the

Department of Defense (DOD) as powered, aerial vehicles that do not carry a human

operator, use aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be

piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or

nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery

projectiles are not considered UAVs by the DOD definition.1 Drones differ from

RPVs in that they are designed to fly autonomously. UAVs are either described as

a single air vehicle (with associated surveillance sensors), or a UAV system (UAS),

which usually consists of three to six air vehicles, a ground control station, and

support equipment.

The military use of UAVs in recent conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Afghanistan

(2001), and Kosovo (1999) has opened the eyes of many to the advantages and

disadvantages provided by unmanned aircraft. UAVs regularly make national

headlines as they are used to perform tasks historically performed by manned aircraft.

UAVs are thought to offer two main advantages over manned aircraft: they eliminate

the risk to a pilot’s life, and their aeronautical capabilities, such as endurance, are not

bound by human limitations. UAVs may also be cheaper to procure and operate than

manned aircraft. UAVs protect the lives of pilots by performing the “3-D” missions those dull, dirty, or dangerous missions that do not require a pilot in the cockpit.

However, the lower procurement cost of UAVs must be weighed against their greater

proclivity to crash, while the minimized risk should be weighed against the dangers

inherent in having an unmanned vehicle flying in airspace shared with manned assets.

There are a number of reasons why the employment of UAVs has recently

grown. Navigation and communication technology is now available that wasn’t

available just a few short years ago. Some say that the services’ so-called “silk scarf

syndrome” of preferring manned aviation over unmanned, has diminished as UAVs

entered the mainstream.

Although only recently procured in significant numbers by the United States,

UAVs have had a century-old history in aviation. First included in Jane’s All the

World’s Aircraft in 1920, UAVs were tested during World War I, but not used in

combat by the United States during that war. However, it was not until the Vietnam

Joint Publication 1-02, “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

CRS-2

War that UAVs such as the AQM-34 Firebee were used in a surveillance role. The

Firebee exemplifies the versatility of UAVs — initially flown in the 1970s, it was

modified to deliver payloads and flew its first flight test as an armed UAV on

December 20, 2002.2

The Israeli Air Force pioneered several UAVs in the late 1970s and 1980s that

were eventually integrated into the United States’s UAV inventory. U.S. observers

noticed Israel’s successful use of UAVs during operations in Lebanon in 1982,

encouraging then-Navy Secretary John Lehman to acquire a UAV capability for the

Navy. Interest also grew in other parts of the Pentagon, and the Reagan

Administration’s FY1987 budget requested notably higher levels of UAV funding.3

This marked the transition of UAVs in the United States from experimental projects

to acquisition programs.

One of the UAVs acquired from Israel, Pioneer, emerged as a useful source of

intelligence at the tactical level during Operation Desert Storm. Pioneer was used by

Navy battleships to locate Iraqi targets for its 16-inch guns. Following the Gulf War,

military officials recognized the potential value of UAVs, and the Air Force’s

Predator became a UAV on a fast track, quickly adding new capabilities.4 Debuting

in the Balkans conflict, the Predator performed surveillance missions such as

monitoring area roads for weapons movements and conducting battle damage

assessment. Operations in Afghanistan have featured the Air Force’s Global Hawk,

as well as adding a new mission for Predator that allows the UAV to live up to its

name — armed reconnaissance. There are currently five major UAVs in the U.S.

inventory: the Navy and Marine Corps’s Pioneer, the Air Force’s Global Hawk and

Predator, and the Army’s Hunter and Shadow UAVs.

Reflecting a growing awareness and support in Congress for UAVs, investment

in unmanned aerial vehicles has increased annually. The FY2001 investment in

UAVs was approximately $667 million, while the FY2003 funding totaled over $1.1

billion dollars. The Pentagon has asked for $1.6 billion in procurement and

development funding for FY2006, with much more planned for the out years.

Congress’s role in UAV development has been one of strong encouragement

tempered with concern. Taking a proactive stance in UAV program management,

Congress has in the past directed the formation of joint program offices to ensure

commonality between the services’ UAV programs. Congress has also expressed

concern that DOD’s “growing enthusiasm may well lead to a situation in which there

is no clear path toward the future of UAVs”, and so has required DOD to submit a

Jefferson Morris. “Northrop Grumman Modifies BQM-34 Firebee To Drop Payloads.”

Aerospace Daily, January 22, 2003.

For more on the early history of UAV use, CRS Report 93-686 F, Intelligence Technology

in the Post-Cold War Era: The Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), by Richard A.

Best, Jr., 1993, p. 7-10, is available from author on request.

Jim Garamone. “From U.S. Civil War To Afghanistan: A Short History Of UAVs.”

American Forces Information Service, Defenselink.mil, April 16, 2002.

CRS-3

UAV roadmap.5 In some instances, Congress has advocated a more aggressive

approach to fielding UAVs. For example, in 1996, the House Armed Services

Committee (HASC) supported legislation directing DOD to weaponize both the

Predator and Hunter, but DOD opposed the initiative.6 The scope of Congress’s

support and confidence in UAV technology can be gleaned from a prediction in the

report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,

which stated that, “Within ten years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep

strike aircraft will be unmanned.”7

Congressional Considerations

In recent years, the pace of UAV development has accelerated, and the scope of

UAV missions and applications has expanded. How should these efforts be managed

so that they are cost-efficient, effective, and interoperable? In its eagerness to deploy

UAVs, does DoD risk duplication of effort between various programs? Are DOD

UAV acquisition plans responsive to congressional direction?

Investment priorities could change as the introduction of UAVs into the U.S.

inventory shifts the balance between manned and unmanned capabilities. Congress,

as part of its defense oversight responsibilities, may assess DOD’s current UAV

efforts to verify that they match up with new investment goals and strategies.

Conventional wisdom states that UAVs are cheap, or cost-effective. Is this true

today? How do UAV costs compare to manned aircraft costs?

UAVs have traditionally been used for reconnaissance and surveillance, but

today they are being employed in roles and applications that their designers never

envisioned. The unanticipated flexibility and capability of UAVs has led some

analysts to suggest that more, if not most, of the missions currently undertaken by

manned aircraft could be turned over to unmanned aerial platforms, and that manned

and unmanned aircraft could operate together. Congress may have to contemplate

the replacement of a significant portion of the manned aircraft fleet with unmanned

aircraft that have yet to be designed.

The defining characteristic of UAVs is that they are “unmanned.” If UAVs are

introduced into the force in large numbers, might personnel issues arise?

Recruitment and retention is a perennial congressional issue, that may be receiving

increased attention due to the operational stresses associated with the Global War on

Terrorism. What impact might wide spread deployment of UAVs have on military

personnel?

U.S. Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations,

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2003, H.Rept. 107-532, p.207.

Hearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services

Committee. “Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles and

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs.” March 26, 2003.

U.S. Congress, 106th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S.Rept 106-292, p.141.

CRS-4

Industrial base issues also need to be considered. If defense companies devote

more of their time and expenses to develop unmanned aircraft, will the skills and

technologies needed for manned aircraft design erode? Those who argue that UAVs

will replace manned aircraft in the future are not as concerned with the industrial

base issue as those who feel manned aircraft will still be needed to combat future

threats.

As U.S. companies compete for business in a growing international UAV

marketplace, concerns about the proliferation of these systems may grow. Are steps

required — and if so, what might they be — to control the spread of UAVs? As part

of its defense and foreign policy oversight, Congress may examine whether a balance

must be struck between supporting legitimate U.S. exports and curbing the spread of

UAV technologies to dangerous groups or countries.

Pace of UAV Acquisition and Scope of Missions or

Applications

Undeniably, UAVs are being developed, procured and fielded in growing

numbers. The diversity of designs and applications is also accelerating. Considering

this growth, many in Congress may wish to evaluate the management of UAVs: Are

UAVs being developed fast enough? Are they being developed too fast? Has DoD

developed an appropriate plan and structure for incorporating UAVs into future

military capabilities?

UAV programs range from the combat tested — Pioneer, Hunter, Predator and

Global Hawk — to the not yet tested — the Air Force and Navy’s Unmanned

Combat Air Vehicles. Sizes and ranges of UAVs also vary greatly: the Wasp Micro

UAV at 8 inches long has a combat radius of 5 nautical miles, while the Global

Hawk at 44 feet long (the size of a medium sized corporate jet) has a combat radius

of 5,400 nm. Figure 1 shows the evolution of UAVs and demonstrates the recent

initiation of several UAV programs.8

Similarly, Table 1 outlines the total UAV inventory.9 When compared to the

inventory of February 2003,which only included five major platforms yeilding an

inventory of 163 unmanned aircraft, the acceleration and expansion becomes clear.

The 604 UAVs includes many 2nd generation derivatives, such as Predator B and IGnat-ER, and several non-traditional vehicles, such as Snow Goose, Onyx and

Neptune.

For a more comprehensive treatment of these UAV programs, see the “Current DoD UAV

Programs” section below.

Note that to avoid accounting issues, these inventories do not include small UAVs, micro

UAVs or lighter-than-air platforms.

CRS-5

Figure 1. Current and Planned UAV Programs

Source: OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, Section 2, p. 3.

Table 1. UAV Platforms

UAV

User or Sponsor

Predator A

Predator B

Global Hawk

Hunter

Shadow

Pioneer

Fire Scout

I-Gnat-ER

J-UCAS

Hummingbird

Neptune

Maverick

XPV-1 Tern

XPV-2 Mako

CQ-10 Snow Goose

Onyx

Total

Air Force

Air Force/Navy

Army

Navy/Marine Corps

Army

Air

Army/Navy/DARPA

SOCOM-Navy

SOCOM-Army/Navy

SOCOM

SOCOM-Army

Estimated Inventorya

(Feb 05)

120

100

175

624

CRS-6

Source: OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005; Safety and accident reports from each

service’s website.

Note: For comparison purposes, table does not include Mini/Small, Micro, or Lighter-than-Air UAVs.

a. Estimate Inventories calculated by subtracting number of UAVs lost to attrition from the total

number of UAVs delivered. Attrition numbers were taken from Class A accidents reported by

each service; Total UAVs delivered for each platform were drawn from the OSD’s UAS

Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005.

The increase in DoD’s UAV inventory appears largely due to the rising demand

for UAVs to conduct a wide variety of missions and to branch out from the typical

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) applications. Predator B is

equipped with a strike capability, and many Predator As have been modified to carry

weapons. The Joint-Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) final product will

target air defenses (missiles, artillery, air bases, and command-and-control facilities).

Additionally, mine detection, border patrol, medical resupply, and force perimeter

protection are increasingly considered as roles for UAVs.10

DOD’s UAV research and development (R&D) funding has also grown, for a

variety of reasons: UAVs are considered a growth industry, many UAVs are

relatively inexpensive to produce and new technology in miniaturization has helped

accelerate the development of many UAV types. R&D funding in FY2006 for UAVs

is more than double the total procurement funding for UAVs. This suggests that

accelerated acquisition of UAVs is likely to continue in the future.

In order to understand fully the pace and scope of UAV acquisition, a

comparison between manned aircraft inventories and unmanned inventories may

prove to be a useful tool. Figure 2 shows the ratio of manned to unmanned aircraft.

Despite the recent acceleration in UAV production, manned aircraft still represent

95% of all DoD aircraft, which suggests that UAVs replacing manned aircraft in the

foreseeable future is not likely. Rather UAV programs have quite frequently been

described as complements to, or augmentation of manned aircraft.

As it appears from statements and internal recommendations, the pace of UAV

production will either continue or accelerate in the coming years. When asked to

study DoD’s UAV programs, the Defense Science Board (DSB) found that “the

single most important recommendation is to accelerate the introduction of UAVs into

the force structure.”11

For an more in-depth analysis of UAV capabilities, see Role and Applications in the later

end of this section.

Defense Science Board Study on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Uninhabited Combat

Aerial Vehicles. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and

Logistics. February 2004. p.V.

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Figure 2. Manned Aircraft Inventory vs. UAV

Inventory

604 UAVs

12,229 Manned Aircraft

Source: The Military Balance 2004-2005; 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap

Further, some describe Air Force plans to grow UAV operations in the Air

National Guard and Air Force Reserve as a “massive introduction” of the

technology.12 Former Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper indicated a

significantly faster pace of production of UAVs, specifically of the Predator, when

he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “we’re going to tell General Atomics

to build every Predator they can possibly build.”13

These statements raise the question of whether the current and anticipated pace

of UAV development is appropriate. Historically, Congress has chastened DoD for

what it saw as a leisurely rate of UAV acquisition and encouraged it to speed up this

pace, or speed up the incorporation of certain capabilities. For example, the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 expressed the Senate’s desire that

“Within ten years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft will be

unmanned.”14 This goal was seen at the time as very challenging, because DoD had

no unmanned deep strike aircraft. In 1996, the House Armed Services Committee

(HASC) supported legislation directing DoD to weaponize both the Predator and

David Fulghum. “Rapid Expansion of UAV Units Planned.” Aviation Week & Space

Technology. September 26, 2005.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “The Defense Fiscal Year 2006

Budget.” February 10, 2005. Federal News Service.

U.S. Congress, 106th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S.Rept 106-292, p.141.

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Hunter, but DoD opposed the initiative.15 Some in the 109th Congress have

advocated increased procurement and application of UAVs for non-military roles.

For example, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman, Representative Peter

King was reported to have said that UAVs are “‘underutilized’ by the Department of

Homeland Security, and should play a larger role in border security.”16

On the other hand, Congress has also expressed concern that DoD’s “growing

enthusiasm may well lead to a situation in which there is no clear path toward the

future of UAVs.”17 Some critics have expressed concern that an overly ambitious

pace could affect the quality of the end product and the efficiency of the acquisition

process. A fast pace could make congressional oversight much more difficult, which

could allow UAV programs to exceed cost or to stray from the design objective. As

Representative Curt Weldon cautioned,

Aggressively fielding new types of vehicles and even building more of the

same type of vehicle may be premature. We must feel confident that we

have adequately addressed some of the fundamentals to ensure that

unmanned air systems are designed and fielded consistent with the common

communications architecture and that common standards are established for

operations. ... Some services are buying million dollar UAVs using

operations and maintenance funding that has never been specifically

authorized for UAVs and for which appropriations have never been made.

... Other services are leasing UAV services for combat operations using

operations and maintenance accounts. And some services have effectively

reduced congressional oversight by establishing UAV projects within

multi-billion dollar, multi-project aggregated program requests. 18

The Global Hawk’s ambitious pace may be an example of the dilemma

Representative Weldon described. A 2004 Government Accountability Office

(GAO) report cites a crowded production schedule and aggressive funding strategy

as one reason for the “immaturity” of several critical technologies for the Global

Hawk program.19 The report indicates that a deceleration of pace — possibly even

a temporary halt in production — must be coupled with management changes in

order to preserve the quality and efficiency of the Global Hawk development process.

Many, in DoD and in Congress, may argue that the pace is appropriate and the Global

Hearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services

Committee. “Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles and

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs.” March 26, 2003.

George Cahlink. “New Homeland Security Chairman Sees Larger Role for UAVs in

Border Security.” Defense Daily. October 14, 2005.

U.S. Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations,

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2003, H.Rept. 107-532, p.207.

Rep. Curt Weldon. “House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land

Forces Holds Hearing on FY2006 Defense Budget.” House of Representatives. March 9,

2005.

Government Accountability Office. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global

Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks.” GAO -05-6. November

2004.

CRS-9

Hawk’s problems are exceptional. They could argue that the rapid rate of production

of the Hunter in the past and the Predator currently are evidence that a fast pace can

be extremely efficient and produce high quality aircraft.

While supporting UAV programs in general, and even challenging DoD to

pursue UAVs more aggressively, many in Congress appear to want assurances that

tax-payer dollars are being well spent. For example, Section 142 of the FY2006

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1815, H. Rept. 109-89, p.123) “would preclude

procurement of new unmanned aerial vehicle systems by the military services without

the written approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics.”

UAV Management Issues

In addition to establishing acquisition pace, and scope of application, one crucial

Congressional task may be to determine whether DoD’s administrative processes and

lines of authority within the acquisition process are effective for UAV development

and acquisition. The management of DoD’s development and acquisition programs

has received heightened attention in the 108th and 109th Congresses. The Air Force’s

attempt to lease 100 KC-767 tanker aircraft, and many aspects of the Army’s Future

Combat System (FCS) have focused congressional scrutiny on the mechanics of

DoD’s acquisition process.20 Because UAVs are acquired by all four of the military

services, and the U.S. Special Operations Command, and because UAVs appear to

be acquired at an accelerated rate, and for a growing list of applications, it appears

that great potential exists for duplication of effort. This leads many to call for

centralization of UAV acquisition authority, to ensure unity of effort, and reduce

chances for wasteful duplication of effort. On the other hand, if UAV efforts are too

centralized, some fear that competition and innovation may be repressed.

Another management issue pertains to cost. UAVs are developed and procured

through the same acquisition system as manned aircraft, and they appear to suffer

from similar cost growth. Once viewed as a cheap alternative to manned aircraft, or

even a “poor man’s airforce,” some UAVs are beginning to rival manned aircraft in

cost. According to DoD’s most recent estimate, the Global Hawk program will cost

$6.5 billion to purchase 51 aircraft; a program unit acquisition cost of $128 million

per UAV. The program has seen $194 million in development cost overruns,

triggering a Nunn-McCurdy breach due to an average unit cost growth of 18 percent

per airframe and has prompted appropriators to voice their concern (H.R. 2863, 109119, p.174).21

See, for example, CRS Report RL32056, The Air Force KC-767 Tanker Lease Proposal:

Key Issues For Congress, by (name redacted) (coor

dinator) and CRS Report RL32888,

The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by (name

redacted).

The Nunn-McCurdy provision requires DoD to notify Congress when cost growth on a

major acquisition program reaches 15%. If the cost growth hits 25%, Nunn-McCurdy

requires DoD to justify continuing the program based on three main criteria: its importance

to U.S. national security; the lack of a viable alternative; and evidence that the problems that

(continued...)

CRS-10

Much of UAV cost growth appears to be attributable to factors that have

plagued manned aircraft programs, such as “mission creep,” and inconsistent

management practices. Global Hawk costs, for example, have been driven up by

adding multiple sensors, which themselves increase cost, but also require larger

wings and more powerful engines to carry the increased weight, which also increases

cost. Originally, Global Hawk was intended to carry one primary kind of sensor at

a time, a fleet of these UAVs would provide a mix of sensors. To make Global

Hawk more analogous to the U-2 aircraft, DoD changed the requirement so that

Global Hawk is to carry two or more primary sensors, which has increased the

UAV’s price.22

Originally considered a relatively modest UAV, the Joint Unmanned Combat

Air System (JUCAS) has evolved into a large, long range aircraft with a heavy

payload, which has increased cost. Further, DoD has cut over $1 billion from the

JUCAS budget, and has moved management of the program from the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to the Air Force. Cutting the JUCAS

budget topline may reduce the total number or aircraft to be procured, but can also

increase the cost per aircraft. Changing management responsibility can also

contribute to cost growth via a lack of coherent direction, and changes in

requirements and priority.

The frequent change and realignment of DoD’s organizations with a role in

UAV development illustrates the difficulties of establishing a comprehensive UAV

management system. Over the years, management of UAV programs has gone full

circle from the military services, to a Navy-run Joint Program Office (JPO), to the

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) and then back to the services,

under the auspices of OSD. The JPO was established in 1988, but met criticism in

Congress. In 1992, Congress expressed its...

serious reservations over the management of these [UAV] programs by the joint

program office. Remarkably little progress has been registered during the past

five years in this area. The conferees believe the Secretary of Defense should

undertake a comprehensive review of the joint [project] office.23

The JPO was replaced by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

(DARO), created in 1993 to more effectively manage DoD’s disparate airborne

reconnaissance programs, including UAVs. DARO was disbanded in 1998, amid

further criticism of problems, redesigns, and accidents with the family of systems that

(...continued)

led to the cost growth are under control. H.R. 1815 (P.L. 109-89 sec. 802) would amend

Nunn-McCurdy to lower the cost-growth threshold for providing detailed information on

problem programs from 25 to 15 percent.

For more information, see CRS Report RL30727: Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance (ISR): The U-2 Aircraft and Global Hawk UAV Programs, by Richard A.

Best, Jr. and (name redacted).

U.S. Congress, 102d Congress, 2d Session, Committee of Conference, National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, H.Rept. 102-966, p.635.

CRS-11

it was formed to develop.24 It is unclear whether this criticism was completely

legitimate, or whether it was generated by advocates of manned aviation, who sought

to protect these established programs.

Since DARO’s demise, there has been no single procurement focal point to

manage DOD UAV efforts. General oversight authority resides within the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and

Intelligence (OASD(C3I)), while the military services manage program development

and acquisition.

In an effort to increase joint coordination of UAV programs operated by the

services, the OSD established the Joint UAV Planning Task Force in 2001. The task

force, which falls under the authority of the Pentagon’s acquisition chief (Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), works to help

standardize payload development, establish uniform interfaces, and promote a

common vision for future UAV-related efforts. Subsequently, the Joint UAV

Planning Task Force has been viewed by many in the defense community as the top

rung on the UAV management ladder. Dr. Glenn Lamartin, Director of Defense

Systems in the OSD, argued that the Joint UAV Task Force was empowered through

the Joint Staff to institute requirements, satisfy joint needs and to provide discipline

and structure to individual programs.25 In order to help a common UAV vision

become a reality, the task force has, through the OSD, published three UAV

Roadmaps: April 2001, December 2002, and August 2005.

In spite of the creation of the UAV Task Force, Congressional concerns with

UAV acquisition management, program duplication, interoperability, and other issues

continued. For example, in 2002, the House Committee on Armed Services noted:

“The committee expresses its concern about proper program management elsewhere

in this report, and is specifically concerned that UAV programs adhere to the same

standards as other acquisition programs.”26

Several other management mechanisms have recently been initiated in addition

to the UAV Task Force. In 2003 the U.S. Joint Forces Command announced that it

would take the lead in conducting experimentation in UAV interoperability and

flexibility for the Joint UAV Task Force.27 Also in 2003, DoD created the UAV

Interoperability Working Group to pursue joint-service and international cooperation

in UAV programs to support systems development. The Joint Requirement

Bill Sweetman. “DARO Leaves A Solid Legacy,” Journal of Electronic Defense, June

1998, p.43.

Glenn LaMartin, testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical

Air and Land Forces. “House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land

Forces Holds Hearing on FY2006 Defense Budget.” U.S. House of Representatives, March

9, 2005.

U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Committee on

Armed Services, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2003,

H.Rept. 107-436, p.243.

Jefferson Morris. “JFCOM Taking Lead Role in Joint UAV Experimentation.” Aerospace

Daily. July 18, 2003.

CRS-12

Oversight Council (JROC), which “reviews operational requirements representing

the interests of the operational or warfighting community” and its combatant

commanders,28 established a UAV Special Studies Group, which serves as the stafflevel advisory and action organization concerning all UAV issues under JROC’s

purview. 29

In what appeared to be a move toward further management restructuring, reports

in the spring of 2005 indicated that OSD was considering appointing one of the

services as the executive agent and coordinator for UAV programs, a position for

which Air Force actively petitioned.30 However, in late June 2005, the JROC

announced that DoD had abandoned the notion of an executive agent in favor of two

smaller organizations focusing on interoperability.31 The first, entitled the Joint UAV

Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT), provides a forum for identification and

problem solving of major interoperability and standardization issues between the

services.32 In compliment, the Joint UAV Center of Excellence coordinates with the

OIPT to improve interoperability and enhance UAV applications through the

examination of sensor technologies, UAV intelligence collection assets, system

technologies, training and tactics.33

Over the past three years, management initiatives to increase system uniformity

and interoperability have been equally as numerous as the overall management

structure initiatives. Most recently, JROC established two organizations to promote

joint coordination of production.

The constant organizational changes has led to mounting concern over UAV

management. These fluctuations suggest that DoD has not yet landed on a final UAV

development and oversight structure to meet the needs of the military. Instead, the

recent establishment of the Joint UAV OIPT and Joint UAV COE have lead many

to believe that these bodies are not a final solution, but a step in the right direction.

The March 2005 testimony by the GAO to the House Armed Services Subcommittee

on Tactical Air and Land Forces most likely played a role in facilitating the OSD’s

creation of these management groups. The testimony criticized DoD for the lack of

an “...oversight body to guide UAV development efforts and related investment

decisions,” which ultimately does not allow DoD “...to make sound program

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquistion & Technology) (OUSD(A&T))

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). “UAV Management and Oversight.”

UAV Annual Report FY1997, [http://www.fas.org].

Ibid.

John A. Tirpak. “The UAV Skirmishes.” Air Force Magazine. June 2005, pg. 11.

“JROC Cans UAV Executive Agent Idea, Back Joint Excellence Center.” Inside the

Pentagon. June 30, 2005.

Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, “Joint Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle Team, Center of Excellence Announced.” July 8, 2005.

Ibid.

CRS-13

decisions or establish funding priorities."34 From the testimony, it would appear that

the GAO envisioned a central authority or body to satisfy this role. However, DoD’s

intended purpose for this oversight body may differ from the GAO’s concept. Air

Force Major General Stephen M. Goldfein, commander of the Air Warfare Center

at Nellis Air Force Base, NV, described the UAV Center of Excellence as a

“...one-stop shop that takes a look at all the possibilities for common operating

systems and the best ways to use UAVs”.35 If the intent of these bodies are simply

to serve as ‘one-stop’ checkpoints in the UAV development process instead of the

centralized monitoring and oversight authority envisioned by the GAO, then

questions may arise over where the final management authority resides — within

these bodies or with each of the services? The task of finding adequate answers to

these problems may fall on the shoulders of Congress in the coming years.

Outside of the current management structure, does our defense establishment

have an adequate plan or framework for how UAVs will fit into the future of U.S.

warfighting? The Joint UAV Task Force released in 2001 and 2002 the UAV

Roadmap and a follow up in 2005, entitled the 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap for the

purpose of providing guidance on the future roles for UAVs, the technological

progress and opportunities for UAVs, and the potential UAV investment needs. In

March of 2005, prior to the release of the updated UAS Roadmap, the GAO called

upon the Department of Defense to establish a binding and authoritative strategic

plan, citing the 2002 Roadmap failure to outline the inter-service strategic goals for

UAVs and its lack of clearly defined investment priorities.36

The 2005 UAS Roadmap reiterates its predecessor’s mandate and scope. It

states that its purpose is part of an oversight service in which the intent is to give

strong guidance “...in such cross-program areas as standards development and other

interoperability solutions.”37 Furthermore, the Roadmap neither, “....authorizes

specific UAS nor prioritizes the requirements.... It does, however, identify future

windows when technology should become available to enable new capabilities,

linked to warfighters’ needs, to be incorporated into current or planned UAS.”38 Like

its predecessor, the Roadmap only provides guidance and refrains from establishing

a authoritative blueprint for the future of UAV development paths and approaches.

Most likely, the discrepancy between the DoD’s approach to the Roadmap’s authority

and the GAO’s vision of strategic UAV plan will generate significant debate in the

Sharon Pickup and Michael J. Sullivan, written testimony before the House Armed

Services subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges.”

Government Accountability Office. GAO-05-395T. March 9, 2005, p. 1.

David A. Fulghum. “UAVs, Views From Nellis.”Aviation Week & Space Technology.

September 26, 2005, p. 56.

Sharon Pickup and Michael J. Sullivan, written testimony before the House Armed

Services subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges.”

Government Accountability Office. GAO-05-395T. March 9, 2005, p. 1.

OSD. 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap. August, 2005, p. 1.

Ibid.

CRS-14

discussion of future UAV management. Consequently, in the wake of the

establishment of the Joint UAV OIPT and COE, Congress may decide to revisit the

recommendations of the GAO and to evaluate the adequacy of the Roadmap mandate

in order to determine the best way to integrate UAVs into our future warfighting

capabilities.

UAVs and Investment Priorities

All four military services, the U.S. Special Operations command (SOCOM),

and the U.S. Coast Guard are developing and fielding UAVs. Developing a

coordinated, DOD-wide UAV investment strategy appears key to ensuring

duplication is avoided, and scarce resources are maximized. As part of its defense

oversight role, Congress is positioned to arbitrate between competing UAV

investments, or impact DOD’s overarching investment plan. Several relevant

questions seem apparent: How is UAV cost quantified? What is the most effective

balance in spending between UAVs and manned aircraft? How should DoD,

Congress and the UAV manufacturers balance cost with capability? Finally, what

areas of investment are the most important to maximize UAV capabilities?

Quantifying and characterizing cost has proven to be a complicated task for the

members of the UAV community, yet would need to be assessed in an exploration

of UAV cost efficiency.39 As with most aircraft, UAV costs can be depicted by

different measurements. Two of the most frequently cited cost descriptions are

flyaway cost, and program acquisition unit cost (PAUC). According to the Air

Force’s System Command (AFSC) Cost Estimating Handbook, an air vehicle’s

flyaway cost includes “prime mission equipment (sensor payload, propulsion

mechanics, and body design), systems engineering, program management, and

allowances for engineering changes and warranties.”40 In contrast, the PAUC, as

described by the Government Accountability Office, is the “total of all

acquisition-related appropriations divided by the total quantity of fully configured

end items”, which takes into account acquisition cost from previous years that tend

to be more than the current year acquisition cost.41 The difference between Global

Hawk’s PAUC and flyaway cost demonstrates the wide discrepancy between these

UAV cost can either be defined by unit cost of an individual air vehicle, or by system cost.

System cost could include one to six air vehicles, the sensor package, the ground control

station, and various support equipment. Acquisition cost is one measure, to include research

and development and procurement costs, but operation and maintenance (O&M) cost is

another factor. Costs stated are acquisition costs unless otherwise noted.

“AFSC Cost Estimating Handbook Series.” Reading, MA. Prepared for the U.S. Air

Forces Systems Command. p. 1986: 217.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Defense Acquisitions: Information for

Congress on Performance of Major Programs Can Be More Complete, Timely, and

Accessible.” Report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S.

Senate. March 2005, GAO-05-182.

CRS-15

cost descriptions: Global Hawk’s flyaway cost for FY2005 was $64.1 million, while

its PAUC is $128.7 million.42

When compared to other aircraft, the cost of an individual remotely piloted

vehicle can be misleading. UAVs operate as part of a system, which generally

consist of a ground control station, a ground crew including remote pilots and sensor

operators, communication links and often other air vehicles. Unlike a manned aircraft

such as an F-16, these supporting elements are a requisite for the vehicle’s flight.43

Consequently, analysts comparing UAV costs to manned aircraft may need to

consider the cost of the supporting elements and operational infrastructure that make

up the complete unmanned aviation system.

Monitoring or evaluating UAV costs can also be complicated by budgeting

conventions. While UAVs can be found in the “Aircraft Procurement, Air Force”

account in that service’s budget request documentation, the Army includes its UAV

funding requests in “Other Procurement, Army.” This account contains a broad

range of dissimilar items to be procured. Also, because most UAVs conduct

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance missions, some portion of their costs

are covered in the Intelligence budget rather than the DOD budget, which

complicates building a complete picture of cost.

Once an adequate and uniform cost comparison mechanism or definition has

been established, the next step for Congress may be to identify an appropriate balance

in spending between UAVs and manned aircraft. As a result of the apparent

ascension of UAVs to a permanent position in the US’s military aircraft inventory,

one logical question should be, “How much should be spent on UAVs in relation to

manned aircraft?.” If the upward trend in UAV funding continues through 2010, as

shown in Figure 3, DoD is projected to have spent upwards of $18 billion on

procurement, RDT&E, operations and maintenance for UAVs from 2001-2010. This

number far exceeds the $3.5 billion spent on UAVs in the preceding decade.

Flyaway cost: OSD. Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, BA 04: Other Aircraft FY2005,

February 2004, High Altitude Endurance - UAV, Item No. 17, p. 4 of 39. PAUC: OSD.

Selected Acquisition Report. December 31, 2004, p. 11.

Manned aircraft like the F-16 do require a ground crew for takeoff/landing, radar

operators and air traffic controllers in order to maximize their performance, yet none of

these are requisite for flight. Feasibly, an F-16 needs a pilot in the cockpit and little-else.

UAVs, with the exception of the few autonomous flight models, require constant

intervention and control from a ground crew. The probability that an F-16 could sustain

flight without communication from its ground crew is relatively high, whereas the lack of

communication between the ground operators and the UAV yields a significantly low

probability of sustained flight.

CRS-16

2952

2845

2074

2249

2166

1946

1631

1448

359

420

388

284

2000

763

430

225

267

272

553

1995

363

252

1990

144

165

3200

3000

2800

2600

2400

2200

2000

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

1985

106

$M (TY$)

Figure 3. UAV Annual Funding Profile

2005

2010

Source: OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p.37.

Figure 4 illustrates the funding by platform requested and expected to be

requested by the executive branch from FY2005 to FY2011. While funding for many

of these programs will remain steady through the decade, the Presidential Budget

Requests for the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System is expected to break $1 billion

by FY2011, which could be an indicator of where the Department of Defense plans

to go with UAV funding.

Figure 4. President's Budget Request For UAV

(By Platform)

1100.0

1000.0

900.0

Dragon Eye

800.0

Predator

700.0

Global Hawk

600.0

Shadow

500.0

Pioneer

400.0

Fire Scout

J-UCAS

300.0

200.0

100.0

0.0

FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11

Source: OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p.38.

CRS-17

Figure 5 compares manned to unmanned funding from FY2006 through

FY2011. The chart reveals that UAV will remain somewhere under 10% of the total

spending on all military aviation.44 Figure 6 demonstrates the total funding for

UAVs as a percentage of the total military aviation funding. As the pie chart shows,

UAV funding only represents three percent of all military aviation funding.

Figure 5. Manned versus Unmanned Aircraft Funding

100%

80%

UAV Spending

60%

Manned Aircraft

Spending

40%

20%

FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11

Figure 6. Manned vs. Unmanned

Aircraft Spending

(FY06-FY11)

Total Manned

Spending

Total UAV

Spending

97%

Source for Figs 5 & 6: DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030; FY2006 DoD Justification Books for

procurement and RDT&E of manned aircraft. Does not include small UAVs, micro-UAVs or lighterthan-air platforms.

Note that the funding ratios do not include funding for small UAVs, Micro-UAVs and

lighter-than-air vehicles.

CRS-18

Cost savings have long been touted by UAV advocates as one of the advantages

offered by unmanned aircraft over manned aircraft. However, critics point out that

the acquisition cost savings are often negligible if one considers that money saved by

not having a pilot in the cockpit must be applied to the “ground cockpit” of the UAV

aircrew operating the UAV from the ground control station. Another cost question

concerns personnel. Do UAV “pilots” cost less to train and keep proficient than

pilots of manned aircraft?45 So although the air vehicle might be cheaper than a

manned aircraft, the UAV system as a whole is not always less expensive.46

Additionally, UAVs have a higher attrition rate and lower reliability rate than

manned aircraft, which means that the operation and maintenance costs can be

higher. On the other hand, UAV ground control stations are capable of

simultaneously flying multiple UAVs, somewhat restoring the advantage in cost to

the unmanned system.47 Congress has noted that, “while the acquisition per unit cost

may be relatively small, in the aggregate, the acquisition cost rivals the investment

in other larger weapon systems.”48

Two studies have addressed the head-to head manned vs. unmanned cost issue.

The first, a CBO study, showed that replacing Army manned attack helicopters with

UCAVs would produce no significant savings in steady-state procurement costs

relative to current plans.49 DoD also studied the comparative costs of manned vs.

unmanned aircraft in their UAV Roadmap 2000. It found that development costs

were essentially the same while there was a cost savings in procurement costs when

an F-16 was compared to an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).50

Assuming that a funding balance is struck between manned and unmanned

vehicles, how then will DoD juggle cost with capability? The OSD has cited this

question as one of its most pressing challenges. A significant concern with some

UAVs is their rising price tag. In a March 9, 2005 hearing, for example, members

of the House Armed Services Committee Tactical Air and Land Forces

Subcommittee expressed their concern over cost growth of not just “high-tech”

UAVs like Global Hawk and JUCAS, but also relatively less technologically

ambitious UAVs. 51

For more on personnel issues, see Recruitment and Retention section below.

As an example, the Predator air vehicle costs $4.5 million while the Predator system,

including four air vehicles, cost $30 million.

OSD. UAV Roadmap 2000, p.53.

U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Bob Stump

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H.Rept. 107-436, p.243.

A CBO Study. “The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans.” January 2003,

p.94.

OSD. UAV Roadmap 2000, p. 51-54.

House Armed Services Committee: Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces.

Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request for Defense Department Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle Systems. March 9, 2005. See especially, Rep. Weldon’s opening statement.

CRS-19

At what threshold does an “expendable” UAV cost too much to lose? Sensors

have consistently increased the cost of the air vehicle, according to Former Air Force

Secretary James Roche.52 The inexpensive design of small UAV air vehicles like the

Desert Hawk and Dragon Eye are dwarfed by the cost of the lightweight electrooptical/infrared cameras that make up their payloads. On the other end of the size

spectrum, the RQ-4 B second generation Global Hawk’s sensor payload represents

approximately 54 percent of the vehicles flyaway cost, which does not include the

cost of the increased wingspan that shoulders the extra 1000 pounds of sensor

suites.53 These costs are increasing due to the basic law of supply and demand.

Growing demand, matched with a lack of commercial sensor equivalents, means that

UAV sensor producers face little competition, which would help keep costs down.

Growing sensor costs have prompted some to recommend equipping UAVs

with self-protection devices, suggesting those UAVs are no longer considered

expendable. Consequently, there are two schools of thought for UAV employment

that could help balance cost with capability. One is to field many smaller, less

expensive and less capable UAVs controlled through a highly interconnected

communications network.54 One example of this investment approach is the

developmental Army’s Future Combat System, which networks several relatively

inexpensive UAVs like the Raven, the Shadow and the Fire Scout with 18 other

weapons platforms. None of these UAVs can individually shoulder all of the air

duties required by the system, yet the robust communications network is expected to

distribute the mission duties to allow each platform to provide its specialized task.55

A second approach advocates fielding fewer, more expensive and more capable

UAVs that are less networked with other systems, such as the autonomous Global

Hawk. The Global Hawk serves as a high altitude, “all-in-one” surveillance platform

capable of staying aloft for days at a time, yet does not operate in concert with any

of its fellow UAV peers. Since 2003, programs at both ends of this spectrum have

experienced delays and a reduction in funding. The Army’s Future Combat System

has experienced delays due to significant management and technology issues.

Similarly, the highly capable Global Hawk and the J-UCAS program have risen in

cost and been consumed by apparent management struggles, which have prompted

funding cuts for both.56

U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,

“Department of Defense Policies and Programs to Transform the Armed Forces to Meet the

Challenges of the 21st Century,” Senate Hearing 107-771, April 9, 2002, p.124.

For more information on the second generation RQ-4 B and its difference from the RQ-4

A, please seen section 3; OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030. August 2005, Appendix B, p.

B-1.

Some have referred to this option as the “swarming UAV” concept.

See CRS Report RL32888. The Army’s Future Combat System: Background and Issues

for Congress, by (name redacted).

See the “Current DOD UAV Programs” section starting on p. 37 for more information

about the Global Hawk and J-UCAS programs.

CRS-20

Finally, what areas of investment will yield the maximum effectiveness out of

these UAVs? Four specific issues stand out as the most pressing: interoperability,

reliability, force multiplication/autonomy, and engine systems.

Over the past three years of the UAV evolution, one the most worrisome issues

for UAVs has been the slow pace of the advancement of interoperability. Recently,

acting chief of acquisitions for the Department of Defense Michael Wynne declared

that the lack of interoperability could be one of the pitfalls that causes DoD to “fall

out of love with UAVs” unless the matter was resolved soon.57 The future plans for

UAV usage within the framework of larger battlefield operations and more

interconnected and potentially joint-service combat systems require UAVs to

seamlessly communicate between each other and numerous different ground

components, and to also be compatible with as equally numerous ground control

systems. The lack of interconnectivity at these levels have often complicated

missions to the point of reducing their effectiveness, as Dyke Weatherington, head

of DoD’s UAV planning taskforce, noted in 2004; “There have been cases where a

service’s UAV, if it could have gotten data to another service, another component,

it may have provided better situational awareness on a specific threat in a specific

area that might have resulted in different measures being taken.”58

Advancing the interoperability of UAVs has been a critical part of the OSD’s

investment plans. The Department of Defense has pushed forward with the

establishment of inter-communication between similar UAVs as a vehicle to help

facilitate interoperability among four categories.59 First, DoD hopes to integrate an

adequate interface for situational awareness, which will relay the objective, position,

payload composition, service operator and mission tasking procedure to other

unmanned aircraft and potentially to ground elements. Second, a payload interface

will allow the coherent transfer of surveillance data while the third category, the

weapons interface, will constitute a separate transfer medium by which operators can

coordinate these platform’s offensive capabilities. Finally, the air vehicle control

interface will enable navigation and positioning from the ground with respect to other

aircraft.

Although the framework for these categories of interoperability has been

established, the technology has been slow to catch up.

The House of

Representatives version of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1815,

House Report 109-89) took a major step to encourage inter-platform communication.

The members of the House Armed Services Committee included a clause that called

for the requirement of all tactical unmanned aerial vehicles throughout the services

to be equipped with the Tactical Common Data Link, which has become the services’

standardized communication tool for providing “critical wideband data link required

Marc Selinger. “Wynne Warns UAV Industry About Cost, Networking.” Aerospace

Daily. December 16, 2004, p. 3.

Michael Peck. “Pentagon Setting Guidelines For Aircraft Interoperability”. National

Defense. July 2004, p. 47.

Four categories as outlined by Dyke Weatherington and reported by Michael Peck. “

Pentagon Setting Guidelines For Aircraft Interoperability”. National Defense. July 2004,

p. 47.

CRS-21

for real-time situational awareness, as well as real time sensor and targeting data to

tactical commanders."60 The 2005 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Roadmap61

endeavors to take a step further; it intends to field the Common Data Link

communications systems for not only tactical UAVs, but for all large UAVs as well.62

If UAVs are to achieve the level of interoperability envisioned by the OSD, the

services and industry must will likely need to keep focused on achieving the

Common Data Link communications system goal and invest appropriately to

facilitate an expedited and efficient development process.

The finite bandwidth that currently exists for all military aircraft, and the

resulting competition for existing bandwidth, may render the expansion of UAV

applications infeasible and leave many platforms grounded. Ultimately, the

requirement for bandwidth grows with every war the U.S. fights.63 The increased use

of UAVs in the Iraq war indicates that remotely pilotted platform and their mass

consumption of bandwitdth will require a more robust information transfer system

in the coming years. Some sources say that the military currently does not have

enough bandwidth to download video and radar images via satellite communications

from more than one UAV at a time. In a hearing of the House Armed Services

Committee’s subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Representative Curt

Weldon noted that while the United States possesses an extensive fleet of UAVs,

“many sit on many sit on the ground because there is inadequate bandwidth for them

to be used effectively."64 As confirmed by an OSD official in the same hearing, an

unspecified number of UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan are incapable of operations

because the information transfer capacity connecting UAVs to the ground operators

are simply not large enough to manage multiple UAVs.

One program designed to alleviate the bandwidth concern is the Transformation

Satellite Communications (TSAT) project. DoD intends to use the laser and satellite

communications system to the provide U.S. armed forces with an unlimited and

uninhibited ability to send and receive messages and critical information around the

world without data traffic jams.65 However, the multibillion dollar project,

For text of congressional clause see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2006, Report of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Armed Services, H. Report

109-89, Section 141 of Legislative Provisions, May 20, 2005. For citation of TCDL

purpose, see “Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) Overview.” BAE Systems,

[http://www.cnir.na.baesystems.com/cnir_tcdl_overview.htm]. 2005.

In 2005, DoD changed the name of the UAV road map to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

(UAS) road map, to reflect the importance of, and increase awareness of the the overall

UAV system, which includes command, control, communications, sensors, and often

weapons.

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p. 75.

Bandwidth is defined as the amount of data that can be transmitted over a communications

link in a fixed amount of time.

VHearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed

Services Committee. “Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request.” March 9, 2005.

Sandra Erwin. “Multibillion-Dollar ‘Internet in the Sky’ Could Help Ease Bandwidth

(continued...)

CRS-22

nicknamed “the internet in the sky”, is expected to be the subject of funding cutbacks

and, at earliest, will be deployed between 2015 and 2016. 66 As another interim

option, DOD has testified that a more autonomous UAV would require less

bandwidth, since more data are processed on board and less data are being moved.67

However, it is unclear that autonomy will actually decrease bandwidth requirements

since Global Hawk, an autonomous UAV, is currently the most aggressive bandwidth

user.

One solution to alleviating the bandwidth problem is allowing UAVs to be

operated from a manned stand-off aircraft such as a command and control aircraft.

Stationing the mission control element of the UAV system in another aircraft instead

of on the ground would reduce the reliance on satellites for beyond line of sight

communication, simplifying command and control. Not only would this help

overcome the bandwidth issue, but it would also address another potential problem

area, which is pilot manpower and retention. Pilots in this case would still get to

“fly” while operating the UAV. Experimentation is currently ongoing in this area,

with the first step being controlling the UAV’s sensor payload from the air.

Investment in reliability upgrades appear to be another high priority for UAVs

in recent years. In 2004 the Defense Science Board indicated that relatively high

UAV mishap rates might impede the widespread fielding of UAVs.68 The 2005

UAS Roadmap indicates that UAV mishap rates appear to be much higher than the

mishap rates of many manned aircraft. Table 2 shows the number of Class A Mishap

per 100,000 hours of major UAVs and comparable manned aircraft.69

(...continued)

Crunch.” National Defense. June 2005, p. 24.

Ibid.

Hearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services

Committee. “Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles and

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs.” March 26, 2003.

Defense Science Board. “Defense Science Board Study on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

and Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles.” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for

Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics. February 2004, p.vii-viii.

Note that Class A Mishaps, according to the Army Safety Center are considered to be

damage costs of $1,000,000 or more and/or destruction of aircraft, missile or spacecraft

and/or fatality or permanent total disability. Similar definitions for the Air Force, Navy and

Marine Corp can be found at their respective safety center websites. Also note the

performance capabilities of the manned versus unmanned vary greatly and may have an

impact on the mishap rate. Additionally, the underlying assumption is that the UAVs and

the manned aircraft will perform the same missions and operate under the same

circumstance as the manned aircraft, which may not hold for all missions and all platforms.

For more on military aviation safety, see CRS Report RL31571, Military Aviation Safety,

by (name redacted).

CRS-23

Table 2. Select Mishap Rates

Vehicle Type

Class A Mishaps

(per 100,000 hrs)

UAV

Predator

Hunter

Global Hawk

Pioneer

281

Shadow

191

Manned

U-2

6.8

F-16

4.1

Source: DoD’s UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, p. 75.

In its recent UAV study, the Defense Science Board (DSB) notes that manned

aircraft over the past five decades have moved from the relatively high mishap rate

to relatively low rates through the advancement of system design, weather durability

improvements and reliability upgrades.70 It should be pointed out, however, that the

UAVs, with the exception of Predator, have total flight times that are significantly

less the than the 100,000 hours used to calculate the mishap rate. Most aircraft tend

to have a much higher mishap rate in their first 50,000 hours of flight than their

second 50,000 hours of flight. Further, some of the UAVs in Table 2, have flown

numerous missions while still under development. Predator and Global Hawk, for

instance, were rushed into combat well prior to the aircrafts’ initial operational

capability: 2005 for Predator, and a projected FY2006 for Global Hawk. It is unfair,

some might argue, to compare the mishap rates of developmental UAVs with

manned aircraft that have completed development and been modernized and refined

over decades of use.

The DSB’s report also suggests that nominal upgrades and investment —

arguing even that many UAVs will need little change — could produce substantial

reductions in the UAV mishap rates. The 2005 UAS Roadmap proposes investments

into emerging technologies, such as self-repairing “smart” flight control systems,

auto take-off and recovery instruments, and heavy fuel engines, to enhance

reliability.71 Also the incorporation of advanced materials — such as high

temperature components, light-weight structures, shape memory alloys and cold

Defense Science Board. “Defense Science Board Study on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and

Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles.” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for

Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics. February 2004, p.viii.

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p. H-8 and H-9.

CRS-24

weather tolerance designs that include significant de-icing agent — will also be

expected to improve the survivability of UAVs in adverse environments.72

One of the most attractive and innovative technological priorities in the industry

is to enable one ground operator to pilot several UAVs at once. At the 2003 Paris

Airshow, Vice President of Boeing’s Integrated Defense Advanced Systems, Mike

Heinz said, “We have to reduce operator workload. That’s been a real thorn in our

side. Typically, we have had multiple operators per vehicle, ...but where we want to

go is multiple vehicles per operator.”73 Currently most UAVs require at least two

ground operators; one to pilot the vehicle and another control the sensors. The end

goal for UAV manufactures and users is to reduce the to 2:1 operator-vehicle ratio

and eventually to elevate the autonomy and interoperability of UAV to the point

where two or more vehicles can be controlled by one operator. If this technological

feat is established, the advantage of UAVs as a force-multiplier on the battle field

could provide a dramatic change in combat capability.

Many believe that the process of achieving this goal would most likely require

significant time and investments. As the 2005 UAS Roadmap notes, “Getting

groups of UA to team (or swarm) in order to accomplish an objective will require

significant investment in control technologies” with specific reference to distributed

control technologies. 74 Considering the two operator system currently in place for

most UAVs, the logical approach to reaching this technological advancement is to

first invest in the autonomous flight capabilities of the UAVs, so as to reduce the

workload for UAVs. The Global Hawk and the Scan Eagle possess significant

automate flight capabilities, but their degree of actual flight autonomy can be debated

due to the UAV’s need for continuous operator intervention in poor weather

conditions. The OSD quantifies the degree of UAV autonomy in on a scale of one

to ten. Table 3 shows the OSD’s Autonomous Capability Levels for UAVs.

Ibid.

Bill Sweetman. “Boeing’s IDeAS Group Moving Ahead Wth UAVs.” Aviation Now. May

26, 2003.

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p. D-7.

CRS-25

Table 3. Autonomous Capability Levels (ACL)

Level

Capability

Fully Autonomous Swarms

Group Strategic Goals

Distributed Controls

Group Tactical Goal

Group Tactical Replan

Group Coordination

Onboard Route Replan

Adapt to Failures & Flight Conditions

Real Time Health/Diagnosis

Remotely Guided

Source: Data taken from DoD’s UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, p. D-10.

Note: OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p. D-7.

In order for UAVs to achieve maximum use when being controlled by a single

pilot, the UAV ACL must achieve a level of at least eight. Currently, the Global

Hawk, which is considered by many as the most autonomous UAV presently in

service, maintains an ACL of approximately 2.5. J-UCAS plans hope to make the

combat UAV capable of autonomous flight levels of six, yet the timetable for this

level is fairly far off. FAA and the UAV industry are working with the Department

of Defense in order to facilitate the universal development of “see and avoid”

technology that would allow a UAV to operate autonomously and avoid approaching

aircraft, potentially increasing the standard ACL for UAVs to four. Additionally,

inter-UAV communication and the coordination associated with interoperability (see

interoperability above) must match the autonomous flight abilities. Full automation

of sensor capabilities would enable the lone operator to control a network of

intelligence collecting drones.

The first steps towards the “one-operator-per-several-UAVs” advancement are

already underway. Recently, the Air Force evaluated a Predator upgrade that allowed

one operator to pilot up two four UAVs.75 The Multi-Aircraft Control (MAC) system

allowed one ground pilot to control the flight plan of four Predator UAVs during an

exercise in which one UAV engages a target and the other three hover nearby on

standby status. The next step is to consolidate the tasks of the four mission payload

operator, each manning the sensors or weapons system on the four Predators, into one

or fewer operators.

One key area of investment interest may be heavy fuel burning engines. The

OSD’s 2005-2030 Unmanned Aviation System Roadmap outlined the development

of heavy fuel engine (HEF) in order to replace gasoline-powered internal combustion

“Predators Fly First Four-Ship Sortie.” Air Force Print News. September 26, 2005.

CRS-26

engines as a top priority for UAV investment. 76 (Heavy fuel refers to diesel or JP-8

fuel, used by the Army and Air Force.77) The Defense Science Board urged DoD to

take the lead in investing in the rapid development and acquisition of heavy fuel

engines for Predator, Shadow, Hunter and Fire Scout primarily because of the lack

of commercial demand for these engines. Enrique J. Enriguez, President of the

Locust USA, Inc. testified that the

...military has clearly established their need for heavy fuel burning engines for

UAVs, but industry has been slow to respond to this need. In the small size

range that we are working in, the military requirements are in place requiring

heavy fuel burning engines; however, these requirements are being placed on the

aircraft developer.78

The incorporation of heavy fuel engines onto UAVs could help the vehicle to

climb faster, operate at more lofty altitudes and to reduce the amount of time spent

servicing the engine on the ground. Proponent of heavy fuel engines argue that the

integration of heavy fuel engines would not only increase performance capabilities

and reduce servicing time, but would make the UAVs flight system more reliable and

significantly reduce operations and maintenance costs. Furthermore, heavy fuel is

cheaper and more abundant than the gasoline used in standard internal combustion

engines.

However, some drawbacks may exist when applying HFE to UAVs. The

targeted unmanned platforms for this engine are the medium-sized and less complex

UAVs such as Shadow, Pioneer and Predator. Although the operations and

maintenance costs may lessened by the heavy fuel engine, the initial acquisition cost

is much greater than traditional engines and could burden these relatively cheap

UAVs with increased production costs. Furthermore, developers are experiencing

difficulties in designing an engine light enough and small enough to accommodate

the flight requirements of this lighter UAV.

Another alternative being considered is a modified fuel cell under development

by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Supporters of fuel cells note that these

devices could double the efficiency of mid-sized UAVs and could reduce the acoustic

and thermal signatures of the UAVs, effectively making them more difficult to detect

and target. 79 Air Combat Command is sponsoring the project with the idea in mind

to use the fuel cells in many of its smaller UAVs and expects a flight test in 2010.

OSD. 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap. August 2005, p. 76.

[http://www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/a160_eng_dev.html]

Enrique J. Enriquez. Statement to the House Armed Service’s Committee’s Subcommittee

on Tactical Air and Land Forces. U.S. House of Representatives, July 21, 2004.

Libby John. “Fuel Cell Project Could Help Make UAVs Less Detectable, More

Efficient.” Inside the Air Force. September 23, 2005.

CRS-27

UAV Roles and Applications

Considering the growing abundance of remotely-piloted platforms and the rapid

growth of the UAV industry, some may question whether DoD has a coherent plan

for determining UAV roles and applications. Specifically, are UAVs being applied

to new roles aggressively enough? Conversely, is DoD too eager to use UAVs? Are

there alternatives that should be considered for their missions? Under what

circumstances does it make more sense to add missions to a single-mission UAV,

rather than develop a new UAV for the new mission?

Traditionally, and contemporaneously, most UAVs are designed and used

primarily for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.80 Some

project that ISR UAVs will be the dominant UAV role until at least 2014.81 ISR

applications range from multi-intelligence, high altitude and long endurance

missions conducted by the Global Hawk over Iraq and Afghanistan, or “over-the-hill”

reconnaissance and sniper spotting performed by the Army’s Raven UAV. In 2003

100 percent of DoD’s major UAV programs (five of five programs) conducted ISR

missions.82 In 2005, 87 percent (12 of 16 major programs) are designed for ISR

missions. This two year comparison indicates some diversification of UAV missions,

and a rapid growth in overall programs.

With this rapid growth in ISR UAVs may come the concern that production of

numerous aircraft with the same basic mission could yield unnecessary duplication.

Some contend that DoD has had a difficult time building joint manned aircraft in the

past.83 The Services’ desire to optimally satisfy their unique operational requirements

have often made them unwilling to compromise and accept an aircraft developed by

another service. Might UAV development be equally vulnerable to this dynamic?

Why, some in Congress have asked, for example, does the Navy require a new

maritime surveillance UAV? Why can’t they purchase the Global Hawk?84 The

Specialized UAVs have been developed and used extensively as decoys. Decoys are

autonomously guided. They have been used in numerous conflicts to attract the attention

of enemy air defenses while manned aircraft either avoid these defenses, or attack them. It

is anticipated that DoD will continue to develop and produce decoys. Operational goals

would include decreasing price, and improving abilities to mimic friendly aircraft and thus

reduce the ability of enemy air defenses to different between the decoy, and the real aircraft.

Steven Zaloga. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Market Overview.” World Missiles Briefing.

Teal Group Inc. Fairfax, VA. January 2005.

Of the 12 platforms, five vehicles (Predator A, Hunter, Fire Scout, I-Gnat-ER and

Neptune) are considered multi-mission UAVs because of their ability to carry-out significant

non-ISR missions. Also statistic does not include small UAV inventory, lighter-thanair/Aerostat vehicles, or micro-UAVs.

See CRS Report RL30563 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status,

and Issues, by (name redacted), for more information on this subject.

See for example Q&A between Rep. Neil Abercrombie and Mr. Dyke Weatherington,

UAV Planning Task Force DoD during House Armed Services Committee, Tactical Air and

Land Forces Subcommittee Hearing on the FY’04 Defense Authorization: Unmanned Aerial

Vehicles. FDCH Political Transcripts. March 26, 2003 Wednesday.

CRS-28

majority of ISR UAVs possess apparently similar electro-optical and infrared

sensors. They are differentiated, however, by the altitude reached, their

communications range, their flight endurance and their landing/takeoff procedure.

In the future, Congress may act to decide when a new UAV program is justified, and

when it is duplicative.

Table 4. ISR UAVs with E-O/IR Sensors

Eagle Eye

Max

Altitude

Speed (kt)

(ft)

5.5

20000

210

I-Gnat-ER

Maverick

MQ-1

MQ-5B

Neptune

RQ-2

RQ-4A

RQ-4B

25000

10300

25000

18000

8000

15000

65000

60000

120

118

106

110

350

340

RQ-5A

RQ-7A

RQ-7B

RQ-8

XPN-1

XPN-2

8.5

15000

14000

15000

20000

10000

106

110

105

125

Vehicle

Endurance

(hrs)

Range

(nm)

110

Additional

Sensor

MMR

User

Coast

Guard

Army

SOCOM

Army

SOCOM

Navy/MC

150

None

175

None

500

SAR

144

None

100

None

5400 SAR/MTI

5400 SAR/MTI,

SIGNIT

144

None

Army

None

Army

None

Army

150

LDFR Army/Navy

None

SOCOM

None

SOCOM

Source: OSD. 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap. August 2005, p.4-25.

Figure 7 shows a comparison of the performance specifications of ISR-capable

UAVs. The chart indicates that a majority of UAVs feature an endurance of 4 to 8

hours, an altitude of 10,000 - 20,000 ft, max speeds between 105 and 125 knots and

radiuses of 100 to 150 nm.

CRS-29

Figure 7. ISR UAV Characteristics

MaxEndurance

hrs <5

5- 10

10- 15

15- 20

20- 25

25- 30

hrs >30

25- 30

30- 35

<35

Hours

Number of UAVs

MaxAltitude

>10

10- 15

15- 20

20- 25

Thousandsof ft.

MaxSpeed

<75

75- 100 100- 125 125- 150 150- 175 175- 200 200- 225 >225

mph

Congress may ask if the production of different UAVs with relatively similar

performance capabilities constitutes unnecessary duplication. Critics of these

expanded UAV roles often argue that the production of these similar platforms is

unnecessary, considering that a consolidated inventory — hypothetically consisting

of only the RQ-4B Global Hawk, the RQ/MQ-1 Predator and the RQ-2 Pioneer —

could perform and fulfill the same duties as the expanded inventory. However,

proponents of the more varied platform inventory often argue that these basic

performance capabilities cannot alone qualify the necessity of these UAVs, and that

CRS-30

the variety of UAVs reflects the specific need of the mission or user-services and not

unnecessary duplication. Furthermore, they argue that landing/takeoff capabilities,

durability, storage requirements and overall cost all play additional roles in

determining the necessity of the vehicle.

In recent years, the UAV’s role in combat missions has significantly increased.

The first public acknowledgment that UAVs were being used for combat operations

was in 2002 when a Predator UAV outfitted with a Hellfire missile attacked and

killed several Al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen.85 Now the UAV combat landscape has

changed: the majority of the Predator A UAVs have been equipped with Hellfire

missiles; Predator B comes off the assembly line with a large array of munitions; the

Maverick, I-Gnat-ER, Fire Scout and Hunter UAVs are undergoing armament

evaluations; and the J-UCAS program endeavors to create the first UAV primarily

designed for offensive applications.

Using UAVs to deliver air-to-ground munitions appears inherently useful.

UAVs can loiter over the battlefield to attack emerging targets, at no risk to flight

crew. Yet, UAVs are not without limitations. While cost and effectiveness

comparisons between manned and unmanned aircraft must be made cautiously, doing

so can help determine when using UAVs for combat operations is more attractive

than using manned aircraft.

The 2006 actual current year cost for the MQ-9 Predator B is $11.7 million,

about one-third the $35.5 million estimate for the F-16 Falcon. A simple payload

comparison shows that the F-16 can carry approximately four times the payload of

the Predator B (10,750 lbs vs 2,500 lbs).86 This means that the cost per one pound

of munitions delivered is $4,680 for the Predator and $3,302 for the F-16.87 Further,

the F-16 is a versatile combat aircraft that can be used to perform many missions that

the Predator B cannot. This may suggest that using manned aircraft for air-to-ground

combat may generally prove more cost effective than using UAVs, and that he

UAV’s unique combat capabilities may be most valued in niche circumstances, such

as when manned aircraft would be in extreme danger.

Other missions for which UAVs appear useful, or are being considered in the

near-term, include electronic attack (also called stand-off jamming, or escort

jamming), and psychological operations, such dropping leaflets. On the medical side,

UAVs such as the Army’s Shadow have been studied and evaluated for its capability

to deliver critical medical supplies needed on the battlefield.

Walter Pincus. “U.S. Strike Kills Six in Al Qaeda.” The Washington Post, November 1,

2002.

Payload based on the maneuvering capability of an F-16 flying at 9 g with a center fuel

tank , see Jane’s All the World Aircraft 2005-2006. 96th edition, edited by Paul Jackson, p.

728. OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2003. August, 2005, Section 2, p.10

It is important to point out that the operating costs, RDT&E costs, logistics cost and

personnel cost are not factored into this comparison. Furthermore, flight performance and

specific combat missions, which are critical to the distinction of between these two vehicles,

are also not factored into this comparison.

CRS-31

While UAV use in foreign theaters is well established, one of the most

commonly discussed new mission areas for UAVs is homeland defense and

homeland security. The Coast Guard and U.S. Border Patrol already have plans to

deploy UAVs such as the Eagle Eye to watch coastal waters, patrol the nation’s

borders, and protect major oil and gas pipelines. Congressional support exists for

using UAVs like the Predator for border security. During a Senate Armed Services

Committee hearing on homeland defense, several members agreed that although it

would not be appropriate or constitutional for the military to patrol the border,

domestic agencies using UAVs could carry out this mission.88

It appears that interest is growing in using UAVs for a variety of domestic, and

often non-defense roles. Long-duration law enforcement surveillance, a task

performed by manned aircraft during the October 2002 sniper incident near

Washington, D.C. is one example. The U.S. Department of Transportation has

studied possible security roles for UAVs, such as following trucks with hazardous

cargo, while the Energy Department has been developing high-altitude instruments

to measure radiation in the atmosphere.89 The inexpensive vertical take-off and

landing GoldenEye 100 UAV is expected to serve as a medium-range, small-package

transport and may be affordable enough for local law enforcement use during events

of large-scale civil unrest.90 UAVs might also be used in sparsely populated areas of

the western United States to search for forest fires. Following the wide-spread

destruction of Hurricane Katrina, some suggest that a UAV like Global Hawk could

play roles in “consequence management” and relief efforts.91 Also, UAV advocates

note that countries like South Korea and Japan have used UAVs for decades for crop

dusting and other agricultural purposes.92

Not all of these new applications have are uncontroversial — UAV advocates

state that in order for UAVs to take an active role in homeland security, Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations and UAV flight requirements must

approach a common ground. According to FAA spokeman William Shumann, the

primary challenge in meeting this common ground is “to develop vehicles that meet

FAA safety requirements if they want to fly in crowded airspace”.93 The August 2003

announcement that the FAA had granted the Air Force a certificate of authorization

for national airspace operation signifies the first steps in the reconciliation of these

Marc Selinger. “Sen. McCain Says Predator May Be Useful For Border Security,”

Aerospace Daily, April 9, 2003.

National Journal’s Congress Daily. “Pilotless Aircraft Makers Seek Role For Domestic

Uses,” December 17, 2002.

“GoldenEye in the Sky.” The Economist. July 5th, 2003.

Martin Matishak. “Global Hawk Could Perform Multiple Tasks in Relief Efforts, Study

Finds.” Inside the Air Force. September 23, 2005.

See, for example Statement of (name redacted). Analyst in National Defense

Congressional Research Service. Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. Hearing On

Cruise Missile Proliferation. June 11, 2002. [http://hsgac.senate.gov/061102bolkcom.pdf]

Greta Wodele, “Firms to showcase unmanned planes for Border Patrol,” National

Journal’s Technology Daily, Aug. 11, 2003.

CRS-32

discrepancies. 94 Upgrading UAVs collision avoidance capabilities appears to be a

critical part in the next step of reaching the UAV-airspace common ground. The

FAA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working Group indicates it will work with the

Department of Defense, specifically through the new UAV OIPT and Center of

Excellence to facilitate safe UAV operations and the adequacy of flight

requirements.95

The schedule for integrating UAVs into the national airspace may become

contentious. A February 2004 study by the Defense Science Board found that “DoD

has an urgent need to allow UAVs unencumbered access to the National Airspace

System...here in the United States and around the world.”96 In September 2005 it was

reported, however, that NASA planned to cancel funding for Access 5, a

government/industry partnership created to facilitate the incorporation of UAVs into

the national airspace system. UAV advocates bemoaned this development, arguing

that disbanding Access 5 would severely hamper the forecasted development of

UAVs and their numerous global applications.97

Further in the future, large UAVs could take on the aerial refueling task now

performed by KC-10 and KC-135 tanker aircraft. Although DOD has not expressed

plans for exploring the aerial refueling role, it appears to some to be a mission well

suited for unmanned aircraft. The flight profiles flown by KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft

are relatively benign compared to many other aircraft, and they tend to operate far

from enemy air defenses. Except for operating the refueling boom (to refuel Air

Force aircraft), the refueling crew’s primary job is to keep the aircraft flying straight,

level, and at a steady speed. The Global Hawk’s 2001 trans-oceanic flights (from the

United States to Australia and from the United States to Portugal) demonstrate the

ability of current UAVs to fly missions analogous to aerial refueling missions.

Another, far more difficult future task, could be air-to-air combat. DOD is

experimenting with outfitting today’s UAVs with the sensors and weapons required

to conduct such a mission. In fact, a Predator has reportedly already engaged in air

to-air combat with an Iraqi fighter aircraft. In March, 2003 it was reported that a

Predator launched a Stinger air-to-air missile at an Iraqi MiG before the Iraqi aircraft

shot it down.98 While this operational encounter may be a “baby step” on the way

toward an aerial combat capability, it appears significant. Aerial combat is often

described as the most challenging mission for manned aircraft to perform, and, some

Sue Baker. “FAA Authorizes Global Hawk Flights.” Aeronautical Systems Center Public

Affairs. August 21, 2003.

“UAV Sense-And-Avoid Technologies Not Just A Military Concern.” Defense Daily.

August 2, 2005.

Defense Science Board Study on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Uninhabited Combat

Aerial Vehicles. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitino, Technology, and

Logistics. February 2004. P.XII

B.C. Kessner. “International UAS Organization Protests To NASA Over Potential Cut.”

Helicopter News. September 20, 2005.

David Fulghum. “Predator’s Progress.” Aviation Week & Space Technology. March 3,

2003.

CRS-33

say, one that UAVs will never be able to accomplish. Though embryonic, the recent

Predator launch of an air-to-air missile will likely hearten UAV advocates who wish

to see more aggressive missions for unmanned aircraft.

Are UAVs always the preferred platforms for these new roles and applications?

Other options could include manned aircraft, blimps, and space satellites.99 Each

platform offers both advantages and disadvantages. Manned aircraft provide a

flexible platform, but risk a pilot’s life. Some of the country’s largest defense

contractors are competing to develop unmanned blimps that may be capable of

floating months at a time at an altitude of 70,000 feet and carrying 4,000 pounds of

payload. OSD’s 2005 UAS Roadmap includes a section on lighter-than-air blimps

and tethered “aerostat” platforms, which OSD indicates to be important for a variety

of roles, including psychological operations, spot incoming enemy missiles and

border monitoring. Furthermore, these platforms could provide services equivalent

to many border surveillance UAVs, but their decreased dependency on fuel could

minimize operations costs. One drawback to these lighter-than-air platforms is their

lack of maneuverability and speed relative to UAVs like the Global Hawk. Nonethe-less, the goal of many major UAV manufacturers is to develop an operational

system by 2010 that could carry out a variety of missions for homeland security.100

Space satellites offer many benefits — they are thought to be relatively

invulnerable to attack, and field many advanced capabilities. However, tasking the

satellites can be cumbersome, especially with competing national priorities. The

limited number of systems can only serve so many customers at one time.

Additionally, some satellites lack the loitering capability of UAVs, only passing over

the same spot on Earth about once every three days. Due to the high costs of space

launches, UAVs like Global Hawk are being considered for communication relays

as substitutes for low-orbiting satellite constellations.101

Recruitment and Retention

One commonly voiced concern with the pace of UAV production is that these

remotely piloted planes will replace manned aircraft in large numbers.102 Critics of

mass UAV production warn that a reliance on unmanned vehicles degrades pilot

skills and takes away the tactical flexibility and adaptability that manned aircraft

bring to combat operations.

For more information on blimps (airships) and aerostats, see CRS Report RS21886:

Potential Military Use of Airships and Aerostats

100

Peter Pae. “A Rebirth For Blimps; Military Has Plan For Cousin of Hindenburg,” Los

Angeles Times, November 4, 2002.

101

David Fulghum. “Air Force Chief Predicts Growth of UAV Use By Military,” Aviation

Week and Space Technology. March 17, 2003.

102

See, for example. David Bond. “As RPVs Deliver Sigint, Pentagon Officials Question

Manned Platforms.” Aviation Week & Space Technology. October 17, 2005.

CRS-34

It has not always been easy for the aviation culture to adapt to flying aircraft

from the ground. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, during a hearing on

transformation, stated that:

Not long ago, an Air Force F-15 pilot had to be persuaded to forego a rated

pilot’s job to fly Predator. Now Air Force leadership is working hard to

encourage this pilot and others to think of piloting UAVs as a major mission and

to become trail blazers in defining new concepts of operations.103

The Air Force has realized the retention implications of requiring rated pilots to fly

their UAVs104, and has offered enticements such as plum assignments after flying the

UAV, and allowing pilots to keep up their manned flying hours during their UAV

tour of duty.

Historically, many believed that as more UAVs were fielded, recruitment and

retention would suffer because those inclined to join the military would prefer to fly

manned aircraft instead of unmanned aircraft. This may be the case in some

instances. The future impact of DoD’s UAV programs on recruitment, however is

more complicated than this argument suggests.

The recruitment and retention situation varies among the services and for

different types of personnel. While the Army appears to be having some difficulty

with recent recruitment, the Air Force and Navy are actively trying to reduce their

number of uniformed personnel. Thus, reduced enlistments due to increased UAV

use, if that turns out to be the case, might not have the anticipated impact.105

A central question related to the potential impact of increased UAV employment

on personnel, is “what qualifications are required to operate UAVs?” Currently, the

Air Force require Predator and Global Hawk operators to be pilot-rated officers.

Other services do not require UAV operators to be pilot-rated officers. This means

that, in the other services, there is no competition between manned and un-manned

aircraft for potentially scarce pilots.

Many enlist in military service with no desire, or intention to fly manned

aircraft. Some wish to fly, but lack physical qualifications, such as good eyesight.

The increased fielding of UAVs may encourage some to enlist because it offers them

an opportunity to “fly” that they may not have had otherwise. Further, those inclined

to fly manned aircraft may not be as disinclined to fly UAVs as was believed in the

past. Flying armed UAVs may be more appealing to these personnel than is flying

non-armed UAVs. Also, flying UAVs may be an attractive compromise for certain

103

U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d Session, Hearing Before the Committee On Armed

Services United States Senate.”Department of Defense Policies And Programs To

Transform The Armed Forces To Meet The Challenges Of The 21st Century.” April 9, 2002,

p.10.

104

105

Currently the Air Force is the only service to require rated pilots to fly their UAVs.

For more information on recruitment issues see CRS Report RL32965 Recruiting and

Retention: An Overview of FY2004 and FY2005 Results for Active and Reserve Component

Enlisted Personnel, by (name redacted).

CRS-35

personnel. While it may not confer all the excitement of flying a manned aircraft, it

also avoids many of the hardships (e.g. arduous deployments and potential harm).

The Air Force believes that flying UAVs from control stations in the United States

will be attractive to some Reservists and Guardsmen who may already be disinclined

to experience an active duty lifestyle consistent with flying manned aircraft. Also,

not all UAVs compete with manned aircraft for pilots. Those UAVs that are preprogrammed and operate autonomously (like Global Hawk) do not require a pilot,

like the Predator and other remotely piloted vehicles.

The Air Force maintains that their UAVs are more technologically and

operationally sophisticated than other UAVs, and a trained pilot is required to employ

these UAVs most effectively. As UAV autonomy, or command and control matures,

or if personnel issues for the Air Force become more troublesome, it, or Congress,

may decide to review the policy of requiring pilot-rated officers to operate UAVs.

Increased employment of UAVs could potentially boost enlistment in other

specialties, if they are perceived as being effective in their missions. If, for example,

those inclined to enlist in infantry positions perceive UAVs to offer improved force

protection and CAS capabilities over today’s manned aircraft, these potential recruits

may have fewer qualms about the potential hazards of combat.

Industrial Base Considerations

Congress is perennially confronted with a spate of defense industrial base issues.

Is U.S. industry becoming too dependent on foreign suppliers? Do foreign

competitors get government subsidies that put U.S. firms at a competitive

disadvantage? Should Congress take steps to encourage or discourage defense

industry consolidation? Should Congress take steps to promote competition in the

defense industrial base? Should Congress takes steps to protect U.S. defense

industries in order to safeguard technologies or processes critical to national

defense?106 It appears that DoD’s pursuit of UAVs presents several inter-related

issues relevant to the defense industrial base.

Some are concerned, that if UAVs are increasingly designed and built, funding

for manned aircraft programs is likely to wane, and the technical expertise required

to design, and perhaps build manned combat aircraft could erode. Many point out

that the ability to produce world class combat aircraft is a distinct U.S. comparative

advantage, and should be guarded closely. Others disagree that the pursuit of UAVs

could harm the industrial base. They argue that the Joint Strike Fighter is likely to be

the last manned tactical fighter, and that the industrial base is naturally evolving

toward the skills and processes required to make increasingly advanced UAVs.

Those who fear manned industrial base atrophy argue that the future of UAVs

is overrated, and that there will be a demand for tactical manned aircraft in the postJSF timeframe. In their eyes, crucial skills and technologies could thus be lost by

concentrating only on unmanned aircraft design, possibly causing U.S. dominance

106

See, for example, CRS Report RL31236 The Berry Amendment: Requiring Defense

Procurement to Come from Domestic Sources, by (name redacted).

CRS-36

in tactical aircraft design to wane. These proponents point out that UAVs have been

around for almost a century, yet only recently became operationally effective, and are

not likely to replace manned aircraft in the near future.107

Some disagree, and believe that critical manned aircraft design skills are not

jeopardized by increased pursuit of UAVs because there is considerable commonality

between manned and unmanned combat aircraft. Except for the obvious lack of a

cockpit, unmanned combat aircraft may require stealthy airframes, advanced

avionics, and high performance engines just like manned combat aircraft. Also, major

defense contractors have already begun to shift to unmanned aircraft design in order

to stay competitive. This is because UAVs are beginning to play a prominent role in

warfare, as seen in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and Operation Iraqi

Freedom in 2003. The same skills and technologies required for building manned

aircraft will likely lend themselves to unmanned aviation design as well. Companies

that have lost out in recent aviation contracts, such as Boeing and the Joint Strike

Fighter (JSF) in 2001, are looking towards unmanned bombers and fighters as

prospects for growth.108 Northrop Grumman Corp., as another example, has created

a new business unit to aggressively pursue UAV business.109 If Boeing were to design

manned aircraft in the future, the critical skills needed would still be present,

according to this argument.

Others would argue that maintaining a healthy U.S. defense industrial base

depends, in part, on how well U.S. firms compete for the global UAV market. One

survey finds that in 2005, there are 195 different UAV programs world wide.110 Some

estimate that global UAV expenditures double from $2.1 billion in 2005 to $5 billion

in 2014.111 The global market for combat aircraft alone, at approximately $12.5

billion in 2005, dwarfs the UAV market. But the rate of growth is projected to be

much slower, peaking at approximately $16 billion in 2013, and dropping to

approximately $14 billion in 2014.112 Thus, some would argue that much new

business is likely to be generated in the UAV market, and if U.S. companies don’t

capture this market share, European, Russian, Israeli, Chinese, or South African

companies will. From this perspective, capturing this new business, and nurturing

industrial expertise in UAV challenge areas (e.g. autonomous flight, control of

multiple vehicles, command and control, communications bandwidth) would be an

effective way to keep U.S. industry competitive and healthy.

107

For more information on the arguments for and against future demand of tactical aircraft,

see CRS Report RL31360, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): Potential National Security Questions

Pertaining to a Single Production Line, by (name redacted) and Daniel Else.

108

Andy Pasztor. “Boeing Aims For Slice Of Fighter-Jet Contract Awarded to Lockheed,

But Blow Still Stings,” Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2001.

109

David Fulghum. “New Northrop Grumman Unit Focuses on Unmanned Aircraft.”

Aviation Week & Space Technology. April 30, 2001.

110

“Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Directory.” Flight International. June 21-27, 2005.

111

“Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Market Overview.” World Missiles Briefing. Teal Group

Inc. Fairfax, VA. January 2005.

112

“Fighter/Attack Aircraft market Overview.” World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing.

Teal Group Inc. Fairfax, VA. February 2005.

CRS-37

UAV Proliferation and Export Control Considerations

This apparent and projected global growth of UAVs presents the related policy

issue of UAV proliferation and export controls. Both the 108th and 109th Congresses

have held hearings to express concern and explore the policy dimensions of UAV and

cruise missile proliferation.113

UAVs and cruise missiles (essentially a UAV with a weapon payload) are

concerns for policy makers for two reasons. First, because their proliferation appears

difficult to control. The majority of UAV components are indistinguishable from

components found in civil manned aviation.114 Therefore, many believe that it is

relatively easy to divert legitimate civilian or military exports of aviation technology

into a covert UAV or cruise missile program.115 UAVs could be accessible to many

countries or even non-state actors (Hizbollah militants, for example, have flown

UAVs over Israel, and Al Qaeda has used UAVs to monitor Pakistani soldiers 116),

that might not otherwise have access to long range aircraft or ballistic missiles.

Second, UAV proliferation is a concern because, if armed, they appear to be cost

effective weapons. It cost much more to effectively defend against these threats than

it costs to create the threat.117 Cruise missiles and UAVs, it is feared, could become

the “poor man’s air force.” The George W. Bush Administration has expressed

concern over the potential military effectiveness of UAVs in the wrong hands. Prior

to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, both White House and

DoD officials focused on Iraq’s UAVs and how they could be used to attack

neighboring countries with weapons of mass destruction.118 Foreign companies are

increasingly gaining access to key technologies that could make future UAVs even

more effective. 119 Policy makers may become particularly mindful of potential

113

See “U.S. Representative Christopher Shays Holds a Hearing on Missile Technology and

Export Controls.” U.S. House of Representatives. Government Reform Committee, National

Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Subcommittee. FDCH Political

Transcripts. March 9, 2004. And, “U.S. Senator Daniel Akaka Holds Hearing on Cruise

Missile Threats.” U.S. Senate. Government Affairs Committee, Proliferation and Federal

Services Subcommittee. FDCH Political Transcripts. June 11, 2002

114

Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, are composed of many components that are virtually

unique.

115

For more information, see CRS Report RS21252 Cruise Missile Proliferation, by

(name redacted).

116

Riad Kahwaji. “Hizbollah’s UAV.” Defense News. November 15, 2004. And

Iqbal Khattak. “Troops find ‘spy drone’ in Al Qaeda hideout.” Daily Times (Pakistan).

September 27, 2005.

117

For more information, see CRS Report RS21921, Cruise Missile Defense, by Ravi R.

Hichkad and (name redacted),and CRS Report RS21394,

Homeland Security:

Defending U.S. Airspace, by (name redacted).

118

“ Wolfowitz Reinforces Threat From Iraqi Chem-Bio-Carrying UAVs.” Defense Daily.

October 17, 2002.

119

See for example, Robert Hewson. “EADS readies new stealth facility for UAVs.” Jane’s

Defence Weekly. October 12, 2005.

CRS-38

exports of stealth technology, efficient turbofan engines, and terrain avoidance/terrain

following guidance systems that could be incorporated in foreign UAVs.

As DoD employs UAVs more aggressively, and as U.S. companies pursue a

growing body of international business opportunities, some in Congress may wish

to address policy issues related to the potential for UAV proliferation, and its

consequences: What steps might be taken to ensure the pursuit by U.S. companies

of domestic and international UAV export success doesn’t lead to the dissemination

of critical UAV technologies? What balance should be struck between supporting

legitimate military aid to U.S. allies, which may include UAVs, and concerns about

the proliferation of these weapon systems?

Another complicating issue is that UAVs, when used for ISR, can be very

effective in enabling the discriminating use of military force. UAVs can help

positively identify enemy combatants, and reduce the accidental targeting of friendly

forces or innocent civilians.120 How might overseers weigh the potential benefits of

reducing collateral damage versus the potential acquisition of UAVs by enemy

groups and their use against the United States? What revisions might be considered

to existing non-proliferation accords such as the Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR), to more effectively control the spread of UAVs and their technology?

Would tighter controls on UAVs be a detriment to industry?121

Current DOD UAV Programs

This section addresses the program status and funding of some of the most

prominent UAV programs being pursued by DoD, and most likely to compete for

congressional attention. This section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive

survey of all UAV programs, nor to develop a classification system for different types

of UAVs (e.g. operational vs developmental, single mission vs multi mission, long

range vs short range). One exception is a short subsection below titled “Small

UAVs.” The UAVs described in this section are distinguished from the proceeding

UAVs by being man-portable and of short range and loiter time. These smaller

UAVs are not currently, and are unlikely to be, weaponized. The Services do not

provide as detailed cost and budget documentation for these UAVs as they do for

major UAV programs. Individually, these UAVs appear very popular with ground

forces, yet do not necessarily demand as much congressional attention as larger UAV

programs like Predator or Global Hawk. As a whole, however, these small, manportable UAVs appear likely to increasingly compete with major UAV programs for

congressional attention and funding.

120

Gail Kaufman. “Evolving UAVs Force MTCR Reconsiderations.” Defense News.

December 10-16, 2001.

121

For more information on the MTCR see CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control

Regimes: Background and Status, by Sharon A. Squassoni, Steven R. Bowman, and (name r

edacted).

CRS-39

MQ-1 Predator

Through its high profile use in Iraq and Afghanistan and its multi-mission

capabilities, the MQ-1 Predator has become the Department of Defense’s most

recognizable UAV. Developed by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San

Diego, CA, the Predator has helped to define the modern role of UAVs with its

integrated surveillance payload and armament capabilities. Consequently, Predator

has enjoyed accelerated development schedules as well as increased procurement

funding. The wide employment of the MQ-1 has also facilitated the development of

several closely related UAVs (described below) designed for a variety of missions.

System Characteristics. Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance

UAV, roughly half the size of an Air Force F-16 Falcon. At 27 feet long, 7 feet high

and with a 48 foot wingspan, it has long, thin wings and a tail like an inverted “V”.

The Predator typically operates at 10,000 to 15,000 feet to get the best imagery from

its video cameras, although it has the ability to reach a maximum altitude of 25,000

feet. Each vehicle can remain on station, over 500 nautical miles away from its base,

for 24 hours before returning home. The Air Force’s Predator fleet is operated by the

11th Reconnaissance Squadron out of the Indian Spring Auxiliary Field, Nevada and

the 15th and 17th Reconnaissance Squadrons out of Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

Current reorganization efforts will make Indian Springs the home for all three

squadrons.122 The CIA reportedly possesses and operates several Predators as well.

Mission and Payload. The Predator’s primary function is reconnaissance and

target acquisition of potential ground targets. To accomplish this mission, the

Predator is outfitted with a 450-lb surveillance payload, which includes two electrooptical (E-O) cameras and one infrared (IR) camera for use at night. These cameras

are housed in a ball-shaped turret that can be easily seen underneath the vehicle’s

nose. The Predator is also equipped with a Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS)

sensor ball which adds a laser designator to the E-O/IR payload that allows the

Predator to track moving targets. Additionally, the Predator’s payload includes a

synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which enables the UAV to “see” through inclement

weather. The Predator’s satellite communications provide for beyond line-of-sight

operations. In 2001, as a secondary function, the Predator was outfitted with the

ability to carry two Hellfire missiles. Previously, the Predator identified a target and

relayed the coordinates to a manned aircraft, which then engaged the target. The

addition of this anti-tank ordinance enables the UAV to launch a precision attack on

a time sensitive target with a minimized “sensor-to-shoot” time cycle.

Consequently, the Air Force changed the Predator’s military designation from RQ-1B

(reconnaissance unmanned) to the MQ-1 (multi-mission unmanned).123 The air

vehicle launches and lands like a regular aircraft, but is controlled by a pilot on the

ground using a joystick.

Variants. MQ-9 Predator B. The MQ-9 Predator, or “Predator B”, is General

Atomic’s follow on to MQ-1, or “Predator A”. The goal of the Predator B project is

122

Elizabeth Rees. “Predator Squadron, Ops Center to Relocate to Indian Springs.” Inside

The Air Force, October 1, 2004.

123

Glenn W. Goodman, JR. “UAVs Come of Age.” The ISR Journal, July 2002, p.24.

CRS-40

to build upon the strengths of the parent UAV and to advance its mission capabilities.

The result is a medium-to-high altitude, long endurance Predator optimized for

surveillance, target acquisition and armed engagement. While the B-model borrows

from the overall design of the A-model, the newest incarnation is longer by 13 feet

in length and 16 feet in wingspan. It also features a 900hp Honeywell TPE 331-10

turbo propjet engine, which is significantly more powerful than the Predator A’s

115hp propjet engine. These upgrades allow the Predator B to reach a maximum

altitude of 50,000 feet, a maximum speed of 225 knots, a maximum endurance of 32

hours and a maximum range on 2000 nautical miles.124 General Atomics also

upgraded the 17-inch diameter MTS camera gimbal to a 22-inch MTS-B gimbal for

extended range surveillance. However, the feature that most differentiates Predator

B from its predecessor is its ordinance capacity. While the Predator A is outfitted to

carry two 100-pound Hellfire missiles, Predator B now can carry as many as 16

Hellfires, equivalent to the Army’s Apache helicopter, or a mix of 500-pound

weapons and Small Diameter Bombs approximately equal to the munitions payload

of an F-16. Additionally, Raytheon has experimented with a mini-UAV known as

“Silent Eyes” to be launched from the fuselage of the Predator B and to serve as a

target identifier in supplement to the laser designator.125

Predator B-ER, “Mariner”. The Predator B-Extended Range or “Mariner” is

less of a next generation Predator and more of hybrid of the Predator B and NASA’s

Altair UAV, also produced by General Atomics. The Mariner was created as a result

of General Atomic’s pursuit of the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance

(BAMS) program contract. As an extended range UAV, the Mariner retains the

original airframe of the Predator, but adds the 86 ft. wing from the Altair and an

increased fuel capacity. The subsequent combination has yielded a surveillance UAV

capable of altitudes of 50,000 feet and a flight endurance of 49 hours. General

Atomic has partnered with Lockheed Martin System and Sensors to integrate an

exterior-mounted maritime radar that will advance the surveillance capabilities of the

Mariner beyond the standard Predator B payload. The Mariner is expected to

compete with Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk for the BAMS contract, and the

vehicle’s proponents hope that Mariner could have a flyaway cost as little $19

million per vehicle.126

Predator C. In addition to the Mariner, General Atomics is currently

developing a third generation Predator that uses a turbo-jet engine to fly long

endurance, high altitude surveillance missions. The Predator C will reportedly use

the fuselage of the Predator B, but will be similar to Northrop Grumman’s Global

Hawk in payload capacity and flight performance. A spokesman for General

124

OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p. 10.

125

Michale Sirak. “Predator B Faces Fielding Slowdown.” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 28,

2003.

126

Ron Laurenzo. “Global Hawk, New Predator to Compete For Navy Contract.” Defense

Week, December 22, 2003.

CRS-41

Atomics stressed that the Predator C will not be a direct competitor with the Global

Hawk.127

I-Gnat-ER. Currently, the Army uses the I-Gnat as a temporary gap-filler for the

RQ-5 Hunter when that UAV is removed from deployment to be overhauled or

modified. Servicemen in the field have characterized the I-Gnat as a downsized

version of the Predator UAV.128 This medium altitude, long-endurance surveillance

and reconnaissance platform is also manufactured by General Atomic Aeronautical

Systems and evolved as an upgraded derivation of the Gnat-750. The I-Gnat-ER

features nearly the same system, payload and performance characteristics as the MQ1 Predator A with a few exceptions. The I-Gnat-ER can remain aloft for 30 hour,

six hours longer than its Air Force sibling, yet it lacks the SAR and Beyond-Line-OfSight (BLOS) capabilities and is engineered for a significantly shorter flight radius.

The Army currently owns three I-Gnat vehicles as the result of an FY2004

Congressional budget increase for ER/MP CONOPS development.129 Two additional

vehicles outfitted with Satellite Communications (SATCOM) data links, MTS

sensor/target designators and Hellfire missiles are expected to be delivered to the

Army by the end of 2005. 130 According to DoD congressional testimony, the I-Gnat

will continue to augment Hunter operations in Iraq.131

Program Status. Predator UAVs are operated as part of a system, which

consists of four air vehicles, a ground control station, and a Predator Primary Satellite

Link. The actual current year cost in FY2005 for one Predator A system was

approximately $18.0 million, while the current year cost (CY05) for a Predator B

system was $46.8 million.132 The Air Force currently possesses 57 deployable MQ-1

Predators and fields 12 systems. The current inventory of MQ-9 Predator Bs stands

at six vehicles and initial Pentagon plans anticipate the number to grow to 46 by the

end of FY2011. Recent developments have led many to believe that both Predators

will continue to be some of the Air Force’s most valued assets. During a Senate

Armed Service hearing, Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper said, “We’re

going to tell General Atomics to build every Predator they can possibly build.”133

However, in order to avoid the logistical complications experienced with the

127

Elizabeth Rees. “General Atomics to Roll Out High-Altitude ‘Predator C’ by Year’s

End.” Inside The Air Force, May 13, 2005.

128

Emily Hsu. “Army Deploys ‘Improved Gnat’ UAV to Support Troops in Combat.” Inside

the Army, March 29, 2004.

129

Sgt. 1st Class Marcia Triggs, U.S. Army. “Aviation Unveils Life Without Comanche.”

Army News Service, April 5, 2005.

130

Greg Grant. “US Army Steps Up UAV Efforts.” Defense News, June 27, 2005.

131

Dr. Glenn Martin’s Testimony Before the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee

of the House Armed Services Committee. “Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) and

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).” March 17, 2004.

132

Major Thomas Macias, U.S. Air Force. “Point Paper on Predator Program Acquisition

and Flyaway Cost.” Air Force Legislative Liaison Office, August 18, 2005.

133

U.S. Congress, 109th Congress, 1st Session, Senate, Committee on Armed Services.

“Fiscal 2006 Defense Authorization.” February 10, 2005.

CRS-42

accelerated development of the Predator A in the mid 1990s, the Air Force

announced that the initial operation capability (IOC) of the Predator B has been

pushed back from FY2006 to FY2009. The extra time will be used to ensure that

trained operators, adequate support infrastructures and appropriate operation

strategies are in place.134 In FY2005 and FY2006, Congressional appropriators

increased both Predator R&D and Procurement funding from the President’s Budget

Request. In FY2006, Senate Authorizers supported research into integrating “Viper

Strike” munitions on the Predator. For complete budget activity, see Table 7 below:

Table 5. Predator A & B Combined Funding

($ in Millions)

Procurement

RDT&E

FY05

Request

Authorization

Conference

Appropriations

Conference

FY05 Supplemental

Appropriations

Conference

FY06

Request

Authorization, House

Authorization, Senate

Appropriations, House

Appropriations, Senate

9 air vehicles

Mods

9 air vehicles

146.6

31.8

176.6

Mods

31.8

12 air vehicles

176.6

Mods

31.8

Spares

9 air vehicles

Mods

15 air vehicles

Mods

9 air vehicles

Mods

13 air vehicles

Mods

9 air vehicles

Mods

125.5

30.2

210 .5

30.2

125.5

30.2

177.5

30.2

125.5

30.2

81.3

83.2

63.5

Source for all funding tables in this section:

FY2005 Auth: H.R. 4200, P.L. 108-375, H.Rept. 108-767

FY2005 Appro: H.R. 4613, P.L. 108-287, H.Rept. 108-622

FY2005 Emergency Supplemental: H.R. 1268

FY2006 Auth: H.R. 1815, H.Rept. 109-89, S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69

FY2006 Appro: H.R. 2863, H.Rept. 109-119, H.R. 2863, S.Rept. 109-141

134

Michale Sirak. “Predator B Faces Fielding Slowdown.” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 28,

2003.

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RQ-2 Pioneer

The Pioneer UAV has gained distinction for its nearly twenty years of service

to the Navy, Army and Marine Corps. Originally developed by Israeli Aircraft

Industries (IAI), RQ-2 Pioneer was acquired by the U.S. Navy in 1986.

Subsequently, Aircraft Armaments Incorporated out of Hunt Valley, MD and IAI

jointly manufactured the Pioneer for the Navy, U.S. Marine Corp and the U.S. Army.

The UAV was often employed in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm for

reconnaissance and Naval gun spotting missions. At the end of FY2002 the Navy

ended its use of the air vehicle and passed its assets to the Marine Corps, which

intends to field the RQ-2 until either 2010 or until a Vertical Take off and Landing

UAV (VTUAV) is ready for operation.135 Many believe that Pioneer has remained

useful during its service life by being durable-the Marine Corp unofficially refers to

the vehicle as “Old Reliable”-and by undergoing several progressive performance

upgrades.136

System Characteristics. At 14 feet long, the Pioneer is roughly half the size

of the Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator A UAV. It can reach a maximum altitude of 15,000

feet, but flies an optimal altitude of 5,000 feet above its target. The vehicle can

achieve flight by rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO), a catapult launcher, or traditional

runway takeoff from land or from ships. Pioneer is maintains a flight range of 100

nautical miles. The propeller driven SF-350 piston engine keeps the UAV aloft for

up to five hours. The Pioneer can land on a runway or can be recovered using a

retrieval net when a runway is unavailable. Since 1986, Pioneer has flown over

36,500 hours in direct support of Navy and Marine Corps operational commanders,

including more than 7,500 flight hours during Operation Iraq Freedom.

Mission and Payload. The mission of the Pioneer is to provide real-time

intelligence and a reconnaissance capability to field commanders. Pioneer can be

used for over-the-horizon targeting, surveillance, Naval gunfire spotting, and battle

damage assessment. Its 75 lb payload consists of a combined E-O/IR camera. Other

payloads that have been demonstrated include a meteorological sensor, a mine

detection sensor and a chemical detection sensor.

Program Status. The Navy had planned to retire the Pioneer in 2004 and

replace it with the VTUAV. However, when it quit that program, the Navy gave all

of its Pioneer systems to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps hopes keep them

flying another 10 years through a product improvement program.137 Current

procurement funds are geared towards post-production support. In FY2005 and

FY2006, DoD’s Pioneer procurement requests contained funding for upgrade kits

only and no actual system or vehicle procurement appropriations. According to the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, in the final year of production, the Pioneer

135

Peter La Franchi. “Directory: Unmanned Air Vehicles.” Flight International, June 21st,

2005, p. 75.

136

B.C. Kessner and Lorenzo Cortes., “Reliable, But Unglamorous Pioneer Epitomizes

Legacy UAV Predicament.” Defense Daily, April 27, 2004.

137

Glenn W. Goodman Jr. “UAVs Come Of Age.” The ISR Journal, July 2002. p.28.

CRS-44

system, which includes five vehicles, a ground control station with supporting

equipment and launch/recovery devices, cost $17.2 million in FY2004 dollars. The

Marine Corps currently possesses 35 Pioneer UAVs operated out of MCAS Twenty

Nine Palms, CA, MCAS Cherry Point, NC and with the Marine Aviation Detachment

in Paxtuxent River, MD.

Table 6. Pioneer Funding

($ in Millions)

Procurement

RDT&E

FY05

Request

8.7

Authorization Conference

8.7

Appropriations Conference

8.7

Request

1.9

Authorization, House

1.9

Authorization, Senate

1.9

Appropriations, House

1.9

Appropriations, Senate

1.9

FY06

RQ-4 Global Hawk

Recently, Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk has gained distinction as

the largest and most expensive UAV currently in operation for the Department of

Defense. This large UAV incorporates a diverse surveillance payload with

performance capabilities that rival or exceed most manned spy planes. The Global

Hawk’s surveillance achievements in demonstrations and over the battlefield have

led many to believe that the RQ-4A and its successor, the RQ-4B, play an important

role in the future of ISR. However, the complex task of adding specific intelligence

systems to the payload configuration has helped to keep this high altitude, long

endurance UAV from advancing beyond developmental stage despite extensive

operational deployment. Many Pentagon officials and Congressional members have

become increasingly concerned with the program’s burgeoning cost and have

subsequently slowed development progress until adequate program controls are

implemented.138

138

For the most recent Congressional concerns, see House Report 109-89. House Armed

Service Committee “National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2006.” May 20,

2005, p. 91.

CRS-45

System Characteristics. At 44 feet long and weighing 26, 750 lbs, Global

Hawk is about as large as a medium sized corporate jet. Global Hawk flies at nearly

twice the altitude of commercial airliners and can stay aloft at 65,000 feet for as long

as 35 hours. It can fly to a target area 5,400 nautical miles away, loiter at 60,000 feet

while monitoring an area the size of that state of Illinois for 24 hours, and then return.

Global Hawk was originally designed to be an autonomous drone capable of taking

off, flying, and landing on pre-programmed inputs to the UAV’s flight computer. Air

Force operators have found, however, that the UAV requires frequent intervention

by remote operators.139 The RQ-4B resembles the RQ-4A, yet features a significantly

larger airframe. In designing the B-model, Northrop Grumman increased the Global

Hawk’s length from 44 feet to 48 feet and its wingspan from 116 feet to 132 feet.

The expanded size enables the RQ-4B to carry an extra 1000 lbs. of surveillance

payload.

Mission and Payload. The Global Hawk UAV has been called “the theater

commander’s around-the-clock, low-hanging (surveillance) satellite.”140 The UAV

provides a long-dwell presence over the battlespace, giving military commanders a

persistent source of high quality imagery that has proven valuable in surveillance and

interdiction operations. The RQ-4A’s current imagery payload consists of a 2,000-lb

integrated suite of sensors much larger than those found on the Predator. These

sensors include an all-weather SAR with Moving Target Indicator (MTI) capability,

an E-O digital camera and an IR sensor. As the result of a January 2002 Air Force

requirements summit, Northrop Grumman expanded its payload to make it a multiintelligence air vehicle. The subsequent incarnation, the RQ-4B, is outfitted with an

open-system architecture that enables the vehicle to carry multiple payloads, such as

signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) sensors.

Furthermore, the classified Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program

(MP-RTIP) payload will be added in order to increase radar capabilities. These new

sensor packages will enable operators to eavesdrop on radio transmissions or to

identify enemy radar from extremely high altitudes. Future plans include adding

hyper-spectral sensors for increased imagery precision and incorporating laser

communications to expand information transfer capabilities.141 The end goal is to

field a UAV that will work with space-based sensors to create a “staring net” that will

prevent enemies from establishing a tactical surprise.142 In August of 2003, the

Federal Aviation Administration granted the Global Hawk authorization to fly in

U.S. civilian airspace, which further expanded the vehicles’ mission potential.143 This

distinction, in combination with the diverse surveillance capabilities, has led many

officials outside the Pentagon to consider the Global Hawk an attractive candidate

139

Jeff Morrison. “USAF No Longer Viewing Global Hawk As An Autonomous System,

Official Says.” Aerospace Daily, December 3rd, 2005.

140

Glenn W. Goodman, Jr. “UAVs Come Of Age.” The ISR Journal, July 2002.

141

David A. Fulghum. “Global Hawk Shows Off Updated Package of Sensor Aviation Week & Space

Technology.” Aviation Week Intelligence Network. September 08, 2003.

142

143

Ibid.

Sue Baker. “FAA Authorizes Global Hawk Flights.” Aeronautical Systems Center Public Affairs,

August 21, 2003.

CRS-46

for anti-drug smuggling and Coast Guard operations.144 Documentation from the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicates that the RQ-4A is expected to

reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2006.145

Program Status. Developed by Northrop Grumman Corporation of Palmdale,

CA, Global Hawk entered low-rate-initial-production in February 2002. The Air

Force has stated that it intends to acquire 51 Global Hawks, at an expected cost of

$6.6 billion for development and procurement costs. Currently, the Air Force

possesses 12 RQ-4A vehicles. According to the most recent Select Acquisition

Report, the current program-unit cost for the Global Hawk has reached $128.7

million.146 In April 2005, the Air Force reported to Congress that the program had

overrun by 18% as a result of an “increasing aircraft capacity to accommodate

requirements for a more sophisticated, integrated imagery and signals intelligence

senor suite”.147 A Government Accountability Office Report in December 2004

noted that the program had increased by nearly $900 million since 2001 and

recommended delaying the purchase of future Global Hawks until an appropriate

development strategy could be implemented.148 The rising costs of the UAV and

accusations of Air Force mismanagement have caused concern among many in

Congress and in the Pentagon as well as facilitating an overall debate on the Air

Force’s development strategy.149 The Conferees of the FY2005 Defense

Authorization Bill [House Report 108-767] admonished the Air Force’s management

strategy for not using previously authorized funds for a counter-drug surveillance

evaluation program. They noted that “the committee suspects the Air Force used the

$18.0 million set aside in 2001 for the counter-drug demonstration to meet other

requirements of the Global Hawk development program”.150 As a result, the

Conferees recommended a cut of $18 million to the President’s R&D request for the

Global Hawk. The final appropriation bill [Public Law 108-335] cut the R&D

request by six million dollars. In June of 2004, the House Appropriations Committee

expressed serious concern over Air Force’s accelerated development strategy and

consequently cut the president’s budget request for advanced procurement by $21.3

million and current year procurement by $89.86 million.151 The current year

procurement cut transferred one RQ-4A to the Navy for FY2005. Neither of the cuts

144

Ron Laurenzo. “Global Hawk Scouts Ahead for Other UAVs.” DEFENSE WEEK, September 2,

2003.

145

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030. August 2005, p. 6.

146

OSD. Selected Acquisition Report. December 31, 2004, p. 11.

147

James R. Asker. “Global Hawk 18% Over Budget.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April

25, 2005.

148

United States Government Accountability Office. GAO-05-6 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Changes

in Global Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. November 2004, p.

3-4.

149

See House Report 109-89. House Armed Service Committee “National Defense Authorization Act

for the Fiscal Year 2006.” May 20, 2005, p. 91.

150

U.S. Congress, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee of Conference, Ronald W. Reagan

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, House Report 108-767, p.209-210.

151

See House Report 108-553, accompanying H.R. 4613, 108th Congress, June 18th 2004, p. 193-194.

CRS-47

survived conference and the Air Force’s procurement budget request was fully

funded for FY2005. In December 2004, Michael Wynne, acting Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisitions, emphasized that DoD would not purchase UAVs that cost

as much as manned aircraft of equivalent capabilities. Of the Global Hawk, Wynne

noted that the vehicle had gone from being “relatively inexpensive to [where it] now

approaches what we have paid for some bombers in the past”.152 As a result of

increasing cost criticism, the Air Force devised a plan in early 2005 intended to

restructure the Global Hawk program in an effort to facilitate IOC by the end of

2005. The House Appropriations Committee cut the President’s FY2006 current year

procurement request by $110 million, advance procurement request by $10 million

and increased Global Hawk R&D by $21 million. Final appropriations and

authorizations await the Senate Defense Appropriations and Senate Defense

Authorization (S. 1042, Senate Armed Services Committee Report 109-69) bills. See

Table 9 for a complete overview of FY2005 and FY2006 funding.

Table 7. Global Hawk Funding

($ in Millions)

Procurement

FY05

Request

Authorization Conference

Appropriations Conference

RDT&E

4 air vehicles

287.7

AP CY

71.8

4 air vehicles

AP CY

4 air vehicles

AP CY

287.7

71.8

287.7

71.8

336.1

FY05 Supplemental

18.3

FY06

Request

Authorization, House

Authorization, Senate

Appropriations, House

Appropriations, Senate

152

5 air vehicles

AP CY

4 air vehicles

AP CY

5 air vehicles

AP CY

3 air vehicles

AP CY

5 air vehicles

AP CY

39.7

327.6

69.9

297.7

69.9

327.6

69.9

199.4

59.9

327.6

69.9

308.5

329.7

317.5

Dave Ahearn. “Northrop Grumman Defends $30 Million Global Hawk Cost.” Defense Today.

December 17, 2004.

CRS-48

RQ-5A Hunter / MQ-5B Hunter II

Originally co-developed by Israel Aircraft Industries and TRW (now owned by

Northrop Grumman) for a joint U.S. Army/Navy/Marine Corps short range UAV, the

Hunter system has found a home as one of the Army’s principle unmanned platforms.

The service has deployed the RQ-5A for tactical ISR in support of numerous ground

operations around the world. At one time, the Army planned to acquire 52 Hunter

integrated systems of eight air vehicles a piece, but the Hunter program has

experienced some turbulence. The Army canceled full-rate-production of the RQ-5A

in 1996, but continued to use the seven systems already produced. It acquired 18

MQ-5B Hunter IIs through low-rate-initial-production in FY2004 and FY2005. The

MQ-5B’s design includes longer endurance and the capability to be outfitted with

anti-tank munitions. Both variants are currently operated by the 224th Military

Intelligence Battalion out of Fort Steward, GA; by the 15th Military Intelligence

Battalion out of Ft. Hood, TX; and by 1st Military Intelligence Battalion out of

Hoenfel, Germany.

System Characteristics. The RQ-5A can fly at altitudes up to 15,000 feet,

reach speeds of 106 knots, and spend up to 12 hours in the air. Weighing 1,600 lbs,

it has an operating radius of 144 nautical miles. The MQ-5B includes an elongated

wingspan of 34.3 feet up from 29.2 feet of the RQ-5A and a more powerful Mercedes

High-Fuel Engine, which allows the Hunter II to stay airborne for three extra hours

and to reach altitudes of 18,000 feet.153

Mission and Payload.. During its years of service, the Army has used the

Hunter system mostly for short and medium range surveillance and reconnaissance.

More recently, however, the Army has explored the expansion of the Hunter’s

missions, including weaponization for tactical reconnaissance/strike operations and

border surveillance for the Department of Homeland Security. The Hunter primarily

uses a gimbaled E-O/IR sensor payload for its ISR functions, yet a 2003 Northrop

Grumman demonstration showcased a new ground operated SAR/MTI (moving

target indicator) sensor on the Hunter as part of a potential Tactical Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle Radar (TUAVR) package.154 The Hunter II is also set to receive an advanced

software architecture in order to ease the integration of future payloads and to extend

the vehicle’s service-life. During the later half of 2004, Northrop Grumman tested

a variety of munitions as part of the Hunter payload. The Viper Strike precision

guided munitions, which can designate targets either from the munition’s laser, from

another aerial platform or from a ground system, appears to be weapon of choice for

the Hunter system. This weapon allows the Hunter to provide accurate strikes at

targets that elude the Hellfire missile, and makes the Hunter the Army’s first armed

UAV.

Program Status. The Army has halted production on the RQ-5 Hunter and

now fills service gaps in the Hunter force with the I-Gnat-ER. As of February 2005,

all 32 Hunter UAVs are still in operation and periodically receive upgrades and

153

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030. August 2005, p. 7

154

“Army Test NG-Built SAR/MTI Sensors on Hunter UAV” Aerospace Daily, June 23, 2003.

CRS-49

modifications. The Hunter system consists of eight aircraft, ground control systems

and support devices, and launch/recovery equipment. In FY2004, the final year of

Hunter procurement, a Hunter system cost $26.5 million. The FY2005 and FY2006

Defense budgets contained no funds for the procurement or R&D of any RQ-5

system. An August 2005 announcement revealed that the Army awarded General

Atomic’s Warrior UAV the contract for the Extended Range-Multi Purpose (ER-MP)

UAV program over the Hunter II.155 Despite the loss, Northrop Grumman expects to

continue to market the Hunter II to the rest of the services over the next few years.156

RQ-7 Shadow

The RQ-7 Shadow found a home when the Army, after a two decade search

for a suitable system, selected AAI’s close range surveillance platform for its tactical

unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) program. Originally, the Army, in conjunction

with the Navy explored several different UAVs for the TUAV program, including the

now-cancelled RQ-6 Outrider system. However, in 1997 after the Navy pursued

other alternatives, the Army opted for the low cost, simple design of the RQ-7

Shadow 200. Having reached full production capacity and an IOC in 2002, the

Shadow has become the primary airborne ISR tool of numerous Army units around

the world and is expected to remain in service through the decade.

System Characteristics. Built by AAI Corporation of Hunt Valley, MD, the

Shadow is 11 feet long with a wingspan of 13 feet. It has a range of 68 nautical

miles, a distance picked to match typical Army brigade operations, and an average

flight duration of five hours. Although the Shadow can reach a maximum altitude

of 14,000 feet, its optimum level is 8,000 feet. The Shadow is catapulted from a raillauncher, and recovered with the aid of arresting gear. The UAV also possesses

automatic takeoff and landing capabilities. The upgraded version, the RQ-7B

Shadow, features a greater wingspan by 16 inches and larger fuel capacity that allows

for an extra two hours of flight endurance.

Mission and Payload. The Shadow provides real-time reconnaissance,

surveillance and target acquisition information to the Army at the brigade level. A

potential mission for the Shadow is the perilous job of medical resupply. The Army

is considering expanding the UAV’s traditional missions to include a medical role,

where several crucial items such as blood, vaccines and fluid infusion systems could

be delivered to troops via parachute.157 Unlike the RQ-5 Hunter, the Shadow will not

be outfitted with weapons capabilities.158 For surveillance purposes, the Shadow’s

60-pound payload consists of an E-O/IR sensor turret which produces day or night

video, and can relay data to a ground station in real-time via a line-of-sight data link.

As part of the Army’s Future Combat System plans, the Shadow will be outfitted

155

Jefferson Morris. “Army More Than Doubles Expected Order for ERMP with General Atomics

Win.” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report. August 10th, 2005.

156

Ibid.

157

Erin Q. Winograd. “Army Eyes Shadow UAVs Potential For Medical Resupply Missions.”

InsideDefense.com, [http://www.InsideDefense.com]. December 20, 2002, p.14.

158

Kevin Mauer. “Pilotless Plane guides 82nd.” Fayetteville Observer, August 13, 2004.

CRS-50

with the Tactical Common Data Link currently in development to network the UAV

with battalion commanders, ground units and other air vehicles.159

Program Status. The Army currently maintains an inventory of 100 Shadow

UAVs at Ft. Bragg, Ft. Hood, Ft. Lewis, Ft. Stewart, Ft. Wainwright, at military

bases in Germany and Korea, and with National Guard units in Baltimore, MD and

Indian Town Gap, PA.160 The program cost for a Shadow UAV system — which

includes four vehicles, ground control equipment, launch and recovery devices,

remote video terminals, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles for

transportation-reached $16.4 million in current year dollars for FY2005.161 The

Army intends to use the Shadow as the interim Class III TUAV for the future combat

systems project, which the Army expects to reach IOC in 2014.162 In FY2005 the

Army procured eight TUAV systems, but only requested $26 million in FY2006 for

retrofitting the existing Shadow fleet with previously developed upgrades and

modifications. Total RDT&E requests equalled $53.6 million in FY2005 and $139.6

million in FY2006. In FY2005, the Appropriations Conferees increased the request

amount by nearly a third, while in FY2006 the House Appropriators matched the

request levels.

Table 8. RQ-7 Shadow Funding

($ Millions)

Procurement

RDT&E

FY05

Request

100.5

45.6

Authorization Conference

118.2

45.6

Appropriations Conference

118.2

54.4

Request

139.6

Authorization, House

139.6

Authorization, Senate

139.6

Appropriations, House

142.6**

Appropriations, Senate

156.6

FY06

**Markup includes funding for RDT&E of an I-Gnat ER system

159

“Upgraded Shadow UAV Rolls Off Production Line.” Defense Today, August 5, 2004.

160

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030. August 2005, p. 8.

161

OSD. Army Procurement BA 02: Communications and Electronics FY2006, February 2005,

TUAV (B00301), Item No. 62, p. 1 of 16.

162

Peter La Franchi. “Directory: Unmanned Air Vehicles.” Flight International, June 21, 2005.

CRS-51

Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS)

In the mid 1990s, the Pentagon began developing a UAV designed primarily for

combat missions. The result was two separate Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles

(UCAV) programs, the Air Force’s UCAV and the Navy’s UCAV-N demonstrator

program. The Air Force favored Boeing’s X-45 for its program, while Northrop

Grumman’s X-47 Pegasus and Boeing’s X-46 competed for the Navy’s project.

However, in June 2003, the Pentagon merged the two separated programs in order

to establish the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) project under the

management of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The

objective of the J-UCAS merger was to create a flexible offensive network in which

the air and ground elements are adapted to meet specific combat mission.163 As part

of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753 in December 2004, DARPA was ordered to

transfer administration of the J-UCAS resources to Air Force, which will form a joint

program planning committee with the Navy.164 While questions surround the

direction in which the Air Force will move the program forward, statements from the

Pentagon have indicated that the program will maintain a competitive environment

between Boeing and Northrop Grumman’s vehicles.165

System Characteristics. Currently, J-UCAS consists of two variants from

the Navy and Air Force’s previous programs. Featuring a length of 39 feet and a

wingspan of 49 feet, the X-45C evolved as an enhanced cross-breed of the two

evaluation X-45A vehicles DARPA inherited from the Air Force and the Boeing’s

experimental X-46A submission for the Navy program. Powered by General

Electric’s GE F404-102D turbojet engine, the X-45C is expected to achieve speeds

of 450 knots and altitudes of 40,000 feet. Furthermore, the X-45 can stay aloft for

up to seven hours and operate at a range of 1,200 nautical miles. When engineering

the X-45C, Boeing experimented with airframe designs that maximized the stealth

capabilities of the UAV system. They landed on the larger arrowhead design, which

resembles fellow stealth aircraft like the B-2 Spirit Bomber and F117A-Nighthawk.

As the X-45C’s competitor, Northrop Grumman’s X-47B, an advanced version of the

UCAV-N’s X-47A, is nearly as long as the X-45C, yet possess a significantly greater

wingspan of 62 feet. The increased wingspan in combination with the more powerful

Pratt & Whitney F100-220U turbojet engine will allow X-47B an endurance of nine

hours and range of 1,600 nautical miles. The speed and altitude of the Pegasus is

expected to match that of the X45-C. The X-47B retains a smooth and sleek design

optimized for stealth but features folding wing-tips that cut down on size, making it

more suitable for storage aboard an aircraft carrier.166 Designs are in place for the X47B’s common operating system, which is expected to accommodate both Air Force

and Naval technology.167 Both aircraft possesses automated flight capabilities.

163

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030. August 2005, p. 11.

164

OSD. Program Budget Decision 753. December 23, 2004, p. 9.

165

Sharon Weinberger. “J-UCAS May Lead to Multiple Air Vehicles”. Defense Daily, March 15th,

2004.

166

“UCAVs and Future Military Aeronautics.” Military Technology, June 2005, p. 100.

167

Ibid.

CRS-52

Potential Mission and Payload. Initially, the separate Navy and Air Force

programs envisioned UCAV combat missions specific to the needs of the individual

services. The Air Force intended the X-45's primary mission to be the suppression

of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and secondary mission of electronic attack warfare.168

The Navy planned to use its UCAV for armed intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance.169 The payloads of each vehicle are expected to be tailored to the

respective mission. Both Boeing and Northrop Grumman’s systems will possess

internal weapons bays and will be capable of carrying guided weapons similar to

those of conventional strike aircraft. The current weapon choice for the X-45C and

the X-47B is the GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). Both vehicles will

feature SARs, Electronic Support Measure sensor suites (ESM), and Ground Moving

Target Indicators (GMTI). Additionally, the X-47B’s payload will include an EO/IR camera combination in order to augment its surveillance and reconnaissance

missions.

Program Status. Since its inception, the UCAV programs have experienced

a constant change in administration and organization, which many believe will affect

the pace of development. In 2003, the Air Force and Navy’s respective UCAV

projects were combined under the DARPA controlled J-UCAS program in order to

facilitate interoperability and development synergy. In September of 2004, DARPA

hired the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory as a not-for-profit

integrator/broker in charge of promoting cooperation for common vehicle

architectures.170 In a move viewed by several observers as an abrupt reversal, the

Office of the Secretary of Defense instructed the Air Force to take control over the

project. The subsequent fluctuation of J-UCAS management appears to complicate

forecasting of the program’s future. Development of the combat UAV has been

advanced via the spiral development process.171 Currently, the J-UCAS aircraft

inventory includes two X-45A air vehicles and one X-47A air vehicle. OSD plans

indicate that three X-45Cs three and the X-47Bs will be delivered by the end of 2006.

Operational flight assessments of both vehicles are expected to begin in 2007.172 The

total money spent on the J-UCAS/UCAV program, which prior to FY2006 reached

more than $1.45 billion in RDT&E funding, made it one of the most expensive UAV

ventures undertaken by DoD. For recent funding developments, see Table 11.

168

Steven J. Zaloga. “World Missile Briefing.” The Teal Group Corporation. February

2004, UCAV section, p.4.

169

Amy Butler. “OSD Eyes E-10A As Possible Billpayer For Attack Drone Program.”

Defense Daily, December 5th, 2003.

170

Ibid.

171

For more information on spiral development, see CRS Report RS21195, Evolutionary

Acquisition and Spiral Development in DOD Programs: Policy Issues for Congress, by

(name redacted) and (name redacted).

172

Amy Butler. “Contractors Seek Program Stability with USAF J-UCAS Oversight.”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 20th, 2005, p. 44.

CRS-53

Table 9. J-UCAS Funding

($ in Millions)

RDT&E

Demonstration &

Validation

Advanced Tech.

Development

FY05

Request

422.9

284.6

Authorization Conference

222.9

284.6

Appropriations

Conference

222.9

363.6

Request

272.3

77.8

Authorization, House

272.3

77.8

Authorization, Senate

272.3

77.8

Appropriations, House

272.3

77.8

Appropriations, Senate

72.3

77.8

FY06

RQ-8B Fire Scout

Currently in the engineering and manufacturing development phase of

production, the Fire Scout was initially designed as the Navy’s choice for an

unmanned helicopter capable of reconnaissance, situational awareness and precise

targeting.173 While the Navy canceled production of the Fire Scout in 2001,

Northrop Grumman’s vertical take-off UAV was rejuvenated by the Army in 2003,

when the Army designated the Fire Scout as the interim Class IV UAV for the future

combat system. The Army’s interest spurred renewed Navy funding for the RQ-8,

making the Fire Scout DoD’s first joint UAV helicopter. Recent experimentation

and evaluation efforts have explored the possibility of arming the Fire Scout and

adding multiple and non-traditional mission capabilities to the platform.

System Characteristics and Mission. Northrop Grumman based the

design of the Fire Scout on a commercial Schweitzer Co. helicopter. As an upgrade

from the original RQ-8A, the RQ-8B Fire Scout features an advanced four-blade

173

“RQ-8A Fire Scout, Vertical Take Off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(VTUAV)” GlobalSecurity.org, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/vtuav.htm],

April 26th, 2004.

CRS-54

rotor design to reduce the aircraft’s acoustic signature.174 With a basic 127 lbs

payload, the Fire Scout can stay aloft for up to 9.5 hours. With the full capacity

sensor payload the helicopter UAV endurance diminishes to roughly six hours. The

vehicle also possesses autonomous flight capabilities. The surveillance payload

consists of a laser designator and range finder, an IR camera and a multi-color EO

camera, which when adjusted with specific filters could provide mine-detection

capabilities.175 The Fire Scout currently possesses line-of-sight communication data

links. Northrop Grumman officials hope to expand the communications capabilities

to include a wideband data relay from another airborne platform and possible satellite

communications.176 Accompanying the renewed interest in the Fire Scout is an

expanded vision of mission capabilities, which most notably includes the armament

of the helicopter UAV for strike missions. Recent weaponization plans have

included the integration of Hydra folding-fin rockets, 2.75 inch Mark 66 unguided

rockets, or the Hellfire II anti-tank missiles. Discussions of future missions have also

covered border patrol, search and rescue operations, medical resupply and submarine

spotting operations.177

Program Status. Currently, five RQ-8A air vehicles accompanied by four

ground stations have reached the developmental testing phase of the acquisition

process. These evaluation Fire Scouts were produced as low-rate-initial-production

vehicles. The Pentagon’s 2005 UAS Roadmap estimates a future inventory of 192

vehicles between both the Army and Navy.178 The Army anticipates full-rateproduction in 2008 and IOC by 2010.179 Furthermore, the Army intends to use the

Fire Scout as the interim brigade-level UAV for its Future Combat System

program180, while the Navy selected the RQ-8B to support the Littoral Combat Ship

class of surface vessels.181 Fire Scout funding is spread out through a variety of Navy

and Army programs.

174

David A. Fulghum. “Army Adopts Northrop Grumman’s Helicopter UAV.” Aviation Week &

Space Technology, October 20th, 2003.

175

Northrop Grumman Corp Press Release. “Northrop Grumman’s Next-Generation Fire Scout UAV

on Track.” June 23rd, 2005.

176

David A. Fulghum. “Army Adopts Northrop Grumman’s Helicopter UAV.” Aviation Week &

Space Technology. October 20th, 2003.

177

Ibid.

178

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030. August 2005, p. 9.

179

Peter La Franchi. “Directory: Unmanned Air Vehicles.” Flight International, June 21st, 2005, p.

74.

180

The Army intends to field four different classes of UAVs as part of its Future Conbat

System (FCS): Class I for platoons, Class II for companies, Class III for battalions, and

Class IV for brigades. See CRS Report RL32888: The Army’s Future Combat System

(FCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), for more information.

181

Northrop Grumman Corp Press Release. “Northrop Grumman’s Next-Generation Fire Scout UAV

on Track.” June 23rd, 2005.

CRS-55

Eagle Eye182

In February 2003, the Coast Guard selected the Bell Helicopter Textron’s

TR911D Eagle Eye tilitrotor UAV for its Deepwater Modernization program. A

partnership of manufacturers, led by Bell and including Lockheed Martin and AAI,

manages the development of the Eagle Eye.183 The $3 million Eagle Eye takes off

vertically like a helicopter, but then tilts down its rotors to fly like a plane. The Coast

Guard, anticipates the eventual acquisition of 69 vehicles, which will extend the

surveillance capability of their cutters.184 Able to patrol the U.S. coastline for drug

smugglers, refugees and ships in distress, the Eagle Eye will also be able to transmit

video and infrared images to the cutter and command centers ashore. Furthermore,

the vehicle can fly up to 220 knots and has an operational radius of roughly 300

miles, which surpasses the performance capabilities of comparable VUAVs.185

Subsequently, Marine Corps officials have expressed interest in the Eagle Eye as a

short to medium range replacement for the RQ-2 Pioneer. 186

“Small UAVs”

Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System (FPASS). Serving as part of the Air

Force’s airbase defense system, Lockheed Martin’s FPASS currently monitors the

perimeter of several airbases in Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to prevent enemy

incursions or terrorists attacks. Known to airmen as the Desert Hawk, this battery

operated, propeller driven UAV was developed in 1999 at the request of U.S. Central

Command (CENTCOM) to improve situational awareness through area surveillance,

patrols of base-perimeters and runway/departure paths, and aerial spotting for ground

convoys. The Desert Hawk’s small size, light weight and Styrofoam body have led

many servicemen to draw comparison to remote-controlled model planes. The simple

design, however, appears conducive to on-the-job repairs, which operators perform

routinely with tape or glue.187 Launched by a shoulder mounted slingshot device, the

aircraft flies preprogrammed paths for up to one hour and lands through a controlled

crash. The Desert Hawk carries either a small digital or infrared camera and can

operate as far away as six nautical miles. The total inventory of Desert Hawks for

182

The Eagle Eye is not currently a DoD UAV program. However, it merits attention in this

report because if fielded, it could likely be used in Homeland Defense scenarios. Also,

Marine Corps and Navy officials have expressed interest in VTUAVs such as Eagle Eye.

183

Christopher J. Castelli. “Bell Signs Industry Agreement for Eagle Eye Tiltrotor UAV.” Inside the

Navy, August 2nd, 2004.

184

OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030. August 2005, p. 19.

185

Jefferson Morris. “No Plans To Use Fire Scout UAV, Deepwater Team Leader Says.” Aerospace

Daily, August 12th, 2002, p.4.

186

Lorenzo Cortes. “Marine Corps Looks to Eagle Eye for VUAV Requirements.” Defense Daily,

April 22nd, 2004, p.3.

187

Staff Sgt. C. Todd Lopez. “Desert Hawk Gives Security Forces an Eye in Sky.” 379th Air

Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, U.S. Air Force, July 21st, 2004.

CRS-56

the Air Force stands at 126 vehicles.188 Each system, including ground control

stations, six vehicles and spare parts, costs approximately $300,000.189

Dragon Eye. AeroVironment’s Dragon Eye provides Marines at the company

level and below with reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition capabilities.

This backpack carried, battery operated UAV features a 3.8 ft. rectangular wing,

twin propellers and

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