Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary

Qatar, a small peninsular country in the Persian Gulf, emerged as a partner of the United States in

the mid-1990s and currently serves as host to major U.S. military facilities. Qatar holds the thirdlargest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is the largest exporter of liquefied natural

gas. Its small citizenry enjoys the world’s highest per capita income. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari

leaders have overseen a course of major economic growth, increased diplomatic engagement, and

limited political liberalization. The Qatari monarchy founded Al Jazeera, the first all-news Arabic

language satellite television network, in 1995. Over time, the network has proven to be as

influential and, at times, as controversial as the policies of its founders, including during recent

unrest in the Arab world.

In June 2013, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani abdicated in favor of his son Tamim bin Hamad,

marking the first voluntary and planned transition of power in Qatar since it became an

independent country in 1971. In a 2003 referendum, Qatari voters approved a new constitution

that officially granted women the right to vote and run for national office. The constitution

envisions elections for two-thirds of the seats in a national Advisory Council. However, elections

have not been scheduled, and the term of the current Advisory Council has been extended to

2016. Central Municipal Council elections were last held in May 2011.

Following joint military operations during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Qatar and the United

States concluded a defense cooperation agreement that has been subsequently expanded and was

renewed in 2013. In 2003, the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East moved

from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase southwest of Doha, the

Qatari capital. Al Udeid and other facilities in Qatar serve as logistics, command, and basing hubs

for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations. U.S. officials have described

Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation since 2001 as significant, but Administration officials and

some Members of Congress remain critical of Qatar’s efforts to combat reported support for Al

Qaeda and other violent extremist groups by some Qatari citizens.

According to the 2013 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights in Qatar,

principal U.S. human rights concerns included the “inability of citizens to change their

government peacefully, restriction of fundamental civil liberties, and pervasive denial of

noncitizen workers’ rights.” Political parties remain prohibited and civil liberties remain

restricted. According to the report, “The government made efforts to prevent and eliminate forced

labor, although the existence of the restrictive sponsorship system left some migrant workers

vulnerable to exploitation.” These concerns are drawing increased attention as Qatar implements

large scale infrastructure projects in preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

Qatari officials have positioned themselves as mediators and interlocutors in a number of regional

conflicts in recent years. Qatar’s deployment of military aircraft to support NATO-led operations

in Libya and U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State in Syria signaled a new assertiveness,

as has reported Qatari support for armed elements of the Syrian opposition. Some of Qatar’s

positions have drawn U.S. scrutiny and raised the ire of its Gulf Arab neighbors, including its

leaders’ willingness to engage Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Taliban

and allegations of Qatari support for extremists in Syria. It remains unclear whether Qatar’s

active and—for the United States—at times vexing policies may change under Emir Tamim. To

date, the Obama Administration has remained committed to military and counterterrorism

cooperation with the ambitious leaders of this wealthy, strategically located country.

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents

Country and Leadership Profile ....................................................................................................... 1

U.S.-Qatar Relations and Issues before Congress ........................................................................... 4

U.S. Military Cooperation and Foreign Assistance ................................................................... 5

Counterterrorism Cooperation and Concerns ............................................................................ 7

Qatar’s Foreign Policy ..................................................................................................................... 9

Afghan Taliban in Qatar .......................................................................................................... 10

Qatar and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ................................................................................ 11

Qatar’s Economy and U.S. Trade .................................................................................................. 13

Oil and Natural Gas ................................................................................................................. 14

U.S.-Qatar Trade...................................................................................................................... 16

Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 17

Figures

Figure 1. Qatar: Map and Country Data .......................................................................................... 2

Figure 2. Qatar’s Emir Hosts Palestinian Leaders ......................................................................... 13

Figure 3. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure ........................................... 15

Tables

Table 1. Chiefs of State and Select Qatari Leaders .......................................................................... 3

Table 2. Proposed U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2013 ..................................................................... 6

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 17

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

Country and Leadership Profile

Qatar, a small peninsular state bordering Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf (see Figure 1),

declared its independence on September 3, 1971.1 It is a constitutional monarchy governed by the

Al Thani family, and the constitution reflects the previously contested principle that successors to

the throne will follow the hereditary line of the emir’s male offspring. The Emir of Qatar, Tamim

bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, began his rule in June 2013 when his father, Shaykh Hamad bin

Khalifah, abdicated, marking the first voluntary and planned transition of power in Qatar since its

independence. Shaykh Hamad raised the global profile and influence of the small, energy-rich

country after replacing his own father in a palace coup in 1995. Emir Tamim’s mother, Shaykha

Mohza, is active in leading education, health, and women’s initiatives.

Of the country’s approximately 2.1 million people, roughly 15% are citizens; the rest are foreign

residents and temporary laborers.2 Qatar’s small native population is not publicly restive, and

members of the fluid expatriate population of more than 1.7 million have no political rights.

Public debate on some issues has been encouraged, although recent U.S. State Department human

rights reports have noted Qatar’s ban on political parties and restrictions on freedom of speech,

press, assembly, association, and religion for citizens and noncitizens alike.

In practice, the emir’s personal authority as Qatar’s constitutional monarch is tempered only by

the need to maintain basic consensus within the Al Thani family and among other influential

interest groups. Most experts regard the Al Thani family as having some significant, if

manageable, internal rivalries. Religious conservatives have considerable social influence, and

Qatar’s military and security forces answer to the emir. Elections for a Central Municipal Council

were held in May 2011, and planned national Advisory Council elections were again delayed in

mid-2013 in conjunction with the leadership transition (see below).

A broad shift in government leadership accompanied the 2013 transition and suggests that

changes were managed in order to accommodate the interests of others than the emir and his

immediate family. The emir appoints members of his extended family and other leading figures to

a governing Council of Ministers, which serves as the national cabinet (see Table 1 below).

Emir Tamim has inherited the duties of leading a nation that transformed under his father's tenure

from a weak satellite of Saudi Arabia into an ambitious, independent regional power with large

financial resources and considerable global influence relative to the country’s small population. In

his initial public statements and actions, the new emir suggested that elements of both continuity

and change would characterize Qatar's official policies under his leadership. Upon taking office,

he said:

...we are people who are committed to our principles and values. We do not live on the

sidelines of life and we do not go adrift without a destination. We are not subservient waiting

for guidance from anyone. This independent pattern of behavior has become factual in Qatar

and people who deal with us. We are people with visions.

Treaties signed in 1868 and 1916 between the Al Thani family and the United Kingdom recognized the Al Thani

family’s authority in Qatar but placed mutually agreed restrictions on Qatari sovereignty from 1868 through 1971.

The State Department 2014 Investment Climate Statement on Qatar estimated that there were approximately 250,000

Qatari citizens, “less than one-eighth of the total population.”

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...we respect all sincere and active political trends in the region but we are not supportive of a

trend against another. We are Muslims and Arab; we respect the diversity of religious

schools of thoughts and respect all religions in our country and abroad. As Arabs, we reject

dividing the Arab communities based on sectarianism or doctrine because this affects social

and economic immunity and prevents its modernization and development on the basis of

citizenship regardless of religious sects or thoughts.

At a December 2013 event in London, Qatari Foreign Minister Khaled al Attiyah said, “We have

the same policy but it may be that our approach has changed.”3

Figure 1. Qatar: Map and Country Data

Damien McElroy, “Assad should face war crimes trial… says Qatar,” Telegraph (UK), December 4, 2013.

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Table 1. Chiefs of State and Select Qatari Leaders

Emir and Defense Minister

Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani

Prime Minister and Interior Minister

Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al Thani

Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of State for the Council of Ministers

Ahmed bin Abdullah bin Ziad Al Mahmoud

Foreign Minister

Khalid Bin Mohammed Al Attiyah

Minister of Energy and Industry

Mohammed bin Saleh al Sada

Minister of State for Defense Affairs

MG Hamad bin Ali Al Attiyah

Chief of Staff, Qatari Armed Forces

MG Ghanim bin Shaheen al Ghanim

Ambassador to the United States (January 2014 - Present)

Amb. Mohammed Jaham al Kuwari

U.S. Ambassador to Qatar (September 2014 - Present)

Amb. Dana Shell Smith

Qatar’s 2003 Constitution, Political Reform, and Possible Elections

The 2003 constitution states that national legislative authority will reside in the hands of a 45-member Advisory

Council (Majlis Al Shura), two-thirds of which will be directly elected and one-third appointed by the emir from among

ministers or others.4 Until the 2003 constitution is fully implemented, the emir appoints all of the members of the

current Advisory Council; members serve four-year terms at the emir’s discretion. A special electoral law for new

Advisory Council elections was passed in May 2008 after concerns about voter franchise extension were resolved.5

The Advisory Council would have oversight authority over the Council of Ministers and would be able to propose

legislation and review budgets. The constitution also would empower the Advisory Council to issue motions of noconfidence against government ministers, subject to the approval of two-thirds of the Advisory Council. Council

members would serve four-year terms under the new arrangements.

Some observers doubt that the Qatari leadership intends to fully implement the changes anticipated in the 2003

constitution because democratic decision making could disrupt existing patronage relationships that ensure support

for the monarchy from rival social and royal family factions.6 Although Qatar has not experienced domestic political

unrest since 2011, regional unrest has likely affected Qatari citizens’ views of potential Advisory Council elections and

Qatari leaders’ calculations about instituting oversight changes outlined in the 2003 constitution. Citizens may fear the

consequences of unrest while sharing enthusiasm for increased oversight of government affairs. The preponderance of

non-citizen residents in Qatar and their transient status in the country suggests that regardless of the degree of

implementation of expected reforms, most inhabitants will not participate in democratic decision making about the

country’s development and orientation.

Prior to the establishment of a partially elected national assembly, Qatar had a fully appointed, 35-member advisory

council that could only make recommendations to the Council of Ministers. Qatar’s old Provisional Constitution

provided for a modified electoral procedure in choosing members of the Council and a three-year term; nevertheless,

the Council remained appointive in practice, and terms of the Council members were extended in three or four-year

increments since 1975.

Reportedly some members of the Al Thani family sought to restrict voting rights to so-called “native” Qataris whose

families have lived in Qatar since 1930 or before. The 2007 U.S. Department of State Human Rights report for Qatar

estimated that an electorate with that criterion could be “less than 50,000.” Under a compromise, post-1930 naturalized

citizens who have been citizens for ten years will have voting rights and will be eligible to run for office if their fathers

were born in Qatar. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Advisory Council approves new electoral law,” June 1, 2008.

Mehran Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar,” Middle East Journal, Volume 63, Issue

3, July 1, 2009.

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U.S.-Qatar Relations and Issues before Congress

The United States opened its embassy in Doha in 1973, but U.S. relations with Qatar did not

blossom until after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the late 1980s, the United States and Qatar

engaged in a prolonged diplomatic dispute regarding Qatar’s black market procurement of U.S.made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.7 The dispute froze planned economic and military

cooperation, and Congress approved a ban on arms sales to Qatar (§566(d), P.L. 100-461) until

the months leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, when Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from

Qatari territory and agreed to destroy the missiles in question.8 In January 1991, Qatari armored

forces helped coalition troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi Arabian town of Kafji, on the

coastal road leading south from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province.9 In June

1992, Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a period of

close coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present. The United States

promptly recognized the assumption of power by Shaykh Hamad in June 1995 and welcomed

Qatar’s defense cooperation, as well as Shaykh Hamad’s modest political, economic, and

educational reform efforts.

President Obama congratulated Emir Tamim upon his accession to the throne in June 2013, and

Qatari-U.S. relations remain close, amid some differences over regional security questions.

Qatari-U.S. defense relations have expanded to include cooperative defense exercises, equipment

pre-positioning, and base access agreements. U.S. concerns regarding alleged material support for

terrorist groups by some Qataris, including reported past support by a prominent member of the

royal family, have been balanced over time by Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts and its broader,

long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military forces active in Iraq, Afghanistan, and

the rest of the CENTCOM area of responsibility. In December 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense

Chuck Hagel visited Doha, met with Emir Tamim, and signed a new 10-year defense cooperation

agreement, followed in July 2014 by agreements for $11 billion in advanced arms sales.

Qatari officials are quick to point out their commitment to the general goal of regional peace and

their support for U.S. military operations, even as they maintain ties to Hamas and others critical

of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. In June 2009, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBaron

explained Qatar’s policy in the following terms: “I think of it as Qatar occupying a space in the

middle of the ideological spectrum in the Islamic world, with the goal of having doors open to it

across that ideological spectrum. They have the resources to accomplish that vision, and that’s

rare.”10 By all accounts, Qatar’s balancing strategy toward its relationship with the United States

and regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia is likely to persist, which may continue to

Qatar defended its procurement of the missiles in protest of the sale of similar missiles by the United States to

Bahrain, with which Qatar had an unresolved border dispute until 2001. Elaine Sciolino, “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand

For Return of Illicit Stingers,” New York Times, June 28, 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Drawn Into Gulf Dispute—Stray

Stingers Tied To Qatar-Bahrain Tiff,” Washington Post, October 6, 1988.

The ban was formally repealed by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations

Act of 1991 (§568(b), P.L. 101-513). The conference report on H.R. 5114, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and

Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (H.Rept. 101-968) inserted Senate language (Amendment No. 144) that

repealed the ban based on information provided by the Secretary of Defense “that it is in the national interest to

reestablish United States-Qatari security relations because of their support for United States troops in the Middle East.”

Thomas Ferraro, “Allies Retake Saudi City,” United Press International, January 31, 1991; and Joseph Albright,

“Marines Take Credit for Khafji Victory,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, February 3, 1991.

Carrie Sheffield, “Tiny nation, global clout,” Washington Times, June 24, 2009.

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place Doha and Washington on opposing sides of some important issues even amid close

cooperation on others.

The United States has provided limited counterterrorism assistance to Qatar to support the

development of its domestic security forces, and the Export-Import Bank has provided over $2

billion in loan guarantees to support various natural gas development projects in Qatar since

1996. The Obama Administration has phased out U.S. foreign assistance and has not requested

military construction funds for facilities in Qatar since FY2012. Qatar donated $100 million to

victims of Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. Gulf states, and Qatari state entities and private

individuals continue to make large investments in the United States. Several prominent U.S.

universities have established satellite campuses in Doha at Qatar’s Education City, where Qatari,

American, and other students pursue undergraduate and graduate coursework across a broad

range of subjects.

In Congress, legislative action related to Qatar remains relatively limited with the exception of

appropriations and authorization legislation that affects U.S. defense programs and congressional

review of proposed foreign military sales to the Qatari military. Qatar’s foreign and domestic

policies are monitored by congressional foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence committees,

while Qatar’s resource wealth and associated economic clout fuels congressional interest in U.S.Qatari trade and investment ties.

In the 113th Congress, H.Res. 297 would congratulate Emir Tamim “on his ascension to the

throne”; express “thanks and appreciation” to Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani; and recognize

“the continued friendship between the United States and the people of the State of Qatar.” H.Res.

682 would call on the United States government and U.S. corporations to prioritize the rights of

migrant workers in dealing with Qatar, and would call on the government of Qatar to take added

steps to protect and improve laborers’ rights, particularly in light of preparations for the 2022

Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup.

A Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Economic Strategic Defense, Cultural and

Educational Partnership remains active.

U.S. Military Cooperation and Foreign Assistance

With its small territory and narrow population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on external

cooperation and support for its security. With 11,800 personnel, Qatar’s armed forces are the

second smallest in the Middle East,11 and in 2014, the government instituted mandatory shortterm military training and service and long-term reserve service requirements for Qatari males

aged 18 to 35.12

A series of major proposed U.S. arms sales to Qatar since 2012 has marked a shift in Qatar’s

defense planning toward the future use of advanced U.S. attack and transport helicopters and

other weapons systems, including items for air defense and missile defense (see Table 2 below).

Secretary Hagel visited Doha in July 2014 and announced the sale of more than $11 billion in

weapons and air defense systems previously notified to Congress. The sale of Patriot missile

Bahrain, with an estimated 11,000-member force, has the smallest.

Law 5 of 2014 on National Service, Official Gazette, State of Qatar, Issue 6, April 7, 2014.

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batteries, Apache attack helicopters, and Javelin anti-tank missiles marks the highest value sale of

U.S. weaponry to date in 2014. Qatar’s purchase of U.S. weapons systems, including U.S. air and

missile defense systems, corresponds to trends that have seen increased interest in such systems

from other governments in the region, ostensibly to defend against potential missile attacks from

Iran. France has provided approximately 80% of Qatar’s existing arms inventory, including its

fighter aircraft. Some reports suggest that in 2013, Qatar delayed a final decision about

purchasing new fighter aircraft in order to consider revised proposals from potential U.S.

suppliers.

Qatar invested over $1 billion to construct the large Al Udeid air base southwest of Doha during

the 1990s; it had only a small air force of its own at the time. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

also awarded over $100 million dollars in Military Construction Air Force (MCAF) contracts for

the construction of U.S. storage, housing, service, command, and communication facilities.

Qatar’s financing and construction of some of the state-of-the-art air force base at Al Udeid and

its granting of permission for the construction of U.S.-funded infrastructure facilitated gradually

deeper cooperation with U.S. military forces.

Table 2. Proposed U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2013

Items

Estimated Cost

($, million)

Notification Date

UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters

$1,112

June 13, 2012

MH-60R and MH-60S SEAHAWK Helicopters

$2,500

June 26, 2012

AH-64D APACHE Block III Longbow Helicopters; Related Missiles

$3,000

July 12, 2012

HELLFIRE Missiles

$137

July 12, 2012

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units

$6,500

November 5, 2012

PATRIOT Configuration-3 Missile Fire Units and Missiles

$9,900

November 7, 2012

M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS); M57 Army

Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Rockets; M31A1

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Rockets

$406

December 24, 2012

Javelin Guided Missiles

$122

March 28, 2013

Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems

$110

May 15, 2013

C-17 Globemaster III Equipment and Support

$35

June 27, 2013

A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar

$1,100

July 29, 2013

Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

The Al Udeid airbase now serves as a logistics, command, and basing hub for the U.S. Central

Command (CENTCOM) area of operations.13 Nearby Camp As Sayliyah houses significant U.S.

military equipment pre-positioning and command facilities. Both Qatar and the United States

have invested in the construction and expansion of these facilities since the mid-1990s, and they

form the main hub of the CENTCOM air and ground logistical network in the region. Operations

in Iraq and Afghanistan put U.S. and partner-nation facilities in Qatar to greater use in recent

years. These facilities may require further investment to meet current and potential future needs,

Qatar also hosts USCENTCOM’s forward headquarters” U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, (P.L. 110-181), April 2010, p. 85.

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including needs associated with ongoing U.S. and coalition military operations against the Islamic

State and other extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. From FY2003 to FY2011, Congress

appropriated and authorized more than $457 million for U.S. military construction activities in

Qatar.14 The Administration’s FY2013 through FY2015 Military Construction requests have not

included funding for Qatar-based projects.

Counterterrorism Cooperation and Concerns

U.S.-Qatari counterterrorism cooperation has improved since the 1990s when, according to the

9/11 Commission Report and former U.S. government officials, Qatari royal family member and

later Interior Minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani provided support to Al Qaeda

figures, including the suspected mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Shaykh

Mohammed.15 The U.S. State Department has characterized Qatar’s counterterrorism support

since September 11, 2001, as “significant.”16 Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal continues to

operate from Doha after decamping there from Damascus in 2012. U.S officials are aware of the

presence of Hamas leaders, Taliban members, and designated Al Qaeda and Islamic State

financiers in Qatar.17

Qatari officials in public and in private meetings deny supporting extremist groups, and in general

terms the Qatari government continues to pursue a foreign policy based on strategic ambiguity

and openness to engagement with all actors (including violent armed extremist groups). Emir

Tamim said on September 17, “What is happening in Iraq and Syria is extremism and such

organizations are partly financed from abroad, but Qatar has never supported and will never

support terrorist organizations.”18 Qatar’s air force participated in coalition military operations

against Islamic State targets in Syria in September 2014.

The U.S. government has not publicly accused the Qatari state of providing material support to

terrorist organizations, but recent U.S. government statements allege that private Qatari citizens

and individuals based in Qatar provide such support. In March and October 2014, U.S. Treasury

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) authorized $81.7 million in FY2008

spending to build new Air Force and Special Operations facilities in Qatar. The National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417) authorizes $69.6 million in FY2009 spending to build new Air Force and Special

Operations facilities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorizes $117

million in FY2010 spending to build new Air Force recreational, dormitory, and other facilities at Al Udeid. P.L. 111383 authorized $64.3 million in FY2011 funds for Air Force facilities and a National Security Agency warehouse. The

FY2012 request included $37 million to continue the dormitory and recreation facility project, but P.L. 112-81 did not

authorize funds specifically for that use.

Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission

Report), pp. 73, 147-8, 488-9. The former emir named Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani to the post of Minister of

Interior in January 2001. Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid remained Qatar’s minister of interior from 2001 until being

replaced in mid-2013 by long-serving Minister of State for Interior Affairs Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifah al Thani.

See also, James Risen and David Johnston, “Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before September 11 Attack,” New York

Times, March 8, 2003; Josh Meyer and John Goetz, “Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda,”

Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003.

U.S. State Department—Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004, April

27, 2005.

The 2012 State Department report (released in May 2013) noted that the Qatari government “maintained public ties

to Hamas political leaders.” U.S. State Department—Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports

on Terrorism, 2012, May 30, 2013.

Deutsche Welle (Germany), “Emir Assures Merkel: Qatar has never supported 'IS' militants,” September 17, 2014.

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Under Secretary David Cohen for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence referred to Qatar as a

“permissive” terrorist financing jurisdiction in public remarks, but stated that Qatar “in other

respects has been a constructive partner in countering terrorism.”19

In June 2014, the new U.S. Ambassador to Qatar Dana Shell Smith said that the United States

government has “an active and productive dialogue with Qatar in the areas of counterterrorism,”

adding that “we are working with Qatar to improve the capacity of its counterterrorist financing

regime and disrupt illicit cash flows, including through the provision of training.” In her

confirmation hearing, Ambassador Shell Smith responded to a question about the status of U.S.

efforts to convince Qataris to refrain from supporting extremist groups in Syria by saying, “I

haven’t heard from anymore that we’re ready to just declare, you know, everything is wonderful

and perfect, but we do feel that we are making progress in our shared understanding of which

groups are constitute moderate opposition and who is worthy of our support.”

During 2012, the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)

completed a required review of Qatar after determining that “Qatar had improved its anti-money

laundering/combating the financing of terrorism regime and was either ‘Compliant or Largely

Compliant’ with all of the Task Force’s recommendations.”20 The Qatari central bank operates a

financial intelligence unit (FIU) that monitors activity in Qatar’s banking system and serves as a

liaison office to similar units in the United States and around the world.

U.S. government reporting identifies areas where U.S. officials believe that Qatari state controls

on financial activities could be improved in order to better combat terrorist financing. According

to the latest State Department counterterrorism reporting, in 2013:

Qatar’s monitoring of private individuals’ and charitable associations’ contributions to

foreign entities remained inconsistent. Qatari-based terrorist fundraisers, whether acting as

individuals or as representatives of other groups, were a significant terrorist financing risk

and may have supported terrorist groups in countries such as Syria. ...The Government of

Qatar routinely engages with international interlocutors on terrorist financing and has taken

some steps to improve oversight of foreign charities that receive contributions from Qatari

institutions and to work with the banking sector to identify suspicious transactions.

…Despite a strong legal framework, judicial enforcement and effective implementation of

Qatar’s anti-money laundering/counterterrorist the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) law

are lacking. Qatar’s lack of outreach and enforcement activities to ensure terrorist financingrelated transactions are not occurring and the lack of referrals by the financial intelligence

unit of cases are significant gaps.

The State Department’s 2014 Narcotics Control Strategy Report annex entry on Qatar

recommends:

Qatar should continue its efforts to effectively implement AML/CFT regulations and

procedures, and should ensure sufficient resources and training are provided to develop the

necessary institutional capacity. Qatar should continue to work to increase the rate of

Cohen, Remarks at the Center for a New American Security, March 4, 2014; and, Remarks at the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, October 23, 2014.

The MENAFATF findings did not address the enforcement of Qatar’s AML-CFT laws. For details, see

MENAFATF, Mutual Evaluation Report - Fourth Follow‐Up Report for Qatar Anti‐Money Laundering and Combating

the Financing of Terrorism, April 28, 2012.

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investigations and prosecutions by building capacity within its law enforcement authorities.

Qatar also should pursue outreach and enforcement activities to ensure terrorist financingrelated STR [suspicious transaction] reporting occurs, and ensure the UNSCRs 1267 and

1373 freezing regime is effectively implemented. Qatar should mandate the declaration of

cross-border movements of bulk cash or negotiable instruments.

In September 2014, the U.S. government designated a senior Islamic State (IS/ISIL) organization

leader who helped raise funds for the group in the Gulf region, including a reported $2 million

payment from an unidentified “Qatar-based ISIL financial facilitator.”21 In December 2013, the

U.S. government designated Abdelrahman bin Umayr al Nuaymi, a Qatari national and human

rights activist, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) for allegedly acting as an Al

Qaeda financier.22 Nuaymi is the president of the leadership council of the Switzerland-based Al

Karama Foundation. U.S.-designated Al Qaeda financiers Salim Hasan Khalifa Rashid al Kuwari

and Abdallah Ghanim Mafuz Muslim al Khawar also were reported to be living in Qatar at the

time of their designation in July 2011.23

Qatar’s Foreign Policy

Qatar’s approach to regional affairs can be described as a multi-directional balancing act. To the

chagrin of Saudi Arabia and other regional powers, Qatar has sought in recent years to mediate

regional conflicts and political disputes by engaging a wide range of parties in Yemen, Lebanon,

Sudan, Libya, Egypt, and Gaza, some of whom are hostile to the United States. Qatari leaders

responded boldly to the regional unrest that emerged in 2011, and embraced political change that

brought Islamist parties to power in Tunisia and Egypt. In the period since, increasing criticism of

Qatar by some of the Sunni Arab members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and growing

Sunni-Shiite and Arab-Iranian tensions in the Gulf region have led Qatar to close ranks with its

neighbors to some degree. Among the key questions for the region is whether or not Qatar's

official embrace of some Sunni Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, will

change significantly under the leadership of Emir Tamim. Several Muslim Brotherhood figures

movement left Qatar in 2014 and claim that the government asked them to do so in response to

pressure from fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Qatar’s approach to the conflict in Syria has evolved over time. The former emir initially took a

measured approach and promoted dialogue, but he and the current emir adopted a more

confrontational approach as violence continued and worsened during 2012 and 2013. In

September 2014, Emir Tamim said before the United Nations General Assembly that:

the war of genocide being waged and the deliberate displacement carried out by the [Asad]

regime, remain the major crime. …We reiterate the call for the Security Council to promptly

shoulder its legal and humanitarian responsibility and support the Syrian people against both

dangers posed by terrorism of the regime and the crimes of genocide it is perpetrating, and

U.S. Treasury Department, “Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators,” September 24,

2014.

U.S. Treasury Department, “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 18, 2013.

U.S. Treasury Department, “Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical

Transit Point,” July 28, 2011.

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by the terrorist forces that took advantage of the misery and bitterness and the absence of the

state and the international community. The first danger has begotten the second.24

While some regional voices clearly resent Qatar’s assertive diplomacy, the Qatari government’s

agility in the face of uncertainty and the soft power of its government-supported Al Jazeera

satellite television network have made Qatar a key player in regional unrest since 2011. Some

critics assert that in spite of Qatar’s active foreign policy, its regional diplomacy has actually

yielded few tangible results, with the exception of the 2008 Doha agreement that temporarily

ended an 18-month long political crisis in Lebanon. Reported Qatari support for Sunni armed

groups in Syria has the potential to have a more lasting impact on the region, but has challenged

the traditional Qatari preference for remaining engaged with all sides in regional disputes. Qatar’s

ability and willingness to engage directly with armed groups, as evidenced by a series of reported

hostage release negotiations and prisoner exchange agreements in 2014, appears to remain unique

in the region and may complicate calculations about the relative costs and benefits of Qatar’s

policies.

Afghan Taliban in Qatar

Multilateral diplomacy aimed at ending the insurgency in Afghanistan facilitated the opening in

June 2013 of a political office by the Afghan Taliban in the Qatari capital, Doha, to engage with

third parties. The Obama Administration supported the office initiative “for the purposes of

negotiations between the Afghan High Peace Council and the authorized representatives of the

Taliban.”25 However, a dispute over the nature of the office led to its closure weeks later in July

2013: Afghan government authorities protested the Taliban’s use of the name “Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan” and the display of the former Taliban government flag at the facility. The Obama

Administration reiterated its view that, “The office must not be treated as or represent itself as an

embassy or other office representing the Afghan Taliban as an emirate government or

sovereign.”26 Qatari officials took steps to remove the disputed placards and flag. Afghan

President Hamid Karzai had long been critical of plans for the office and said in December 2013

that “Qatar is no longer an option for us.”27

Nevertheless, Qatar remains an interlocutor with the Afghan Taliban movement, and, in May

2014, Qatari officials announced they would host five Taliban prisoners from the U.S. prison at

Guantanamo Bay as part of a prisoner-exchange agreement that they had facilitated to secure the

release of U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. As of November 2014, press reports suggest that

the five individuals— Khairullah Khairkhwa, Mullah Norullah Noori, Abdul Haq Wasiq,

Mohammed Nabi Omari, and Mohammad Fazl—remain in Qatar and thus far have abided by

their commitment not to leave the country for 12 months. Qatari officials have committed to

Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 24, 2014.

U.S. State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki, Daily Press Briefing, June 19, 2013.

Ibid.

“Doha was not our choice in the first place, Doha, Qatar was an American choice and an American plan, we

negotiated for almost two years, we told from the very beginning the Americans that is not our place, we want the

peace process to be in Afghanistan and if not in Afghanistan, then Saudi Arabia or Turkey but the Americans insisted

on Qatar and then we put conditions, the Americans agreed to those conditions and again, the US President gave me a

letter of assurances but when the Office in Qatar opened, it was exactly the opposite to those assurances therefore Qatar

is no longer an option for us.” OSC Report SAR2013121244787755, “Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with

French Daily Le Monde News,” Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, December 12, 2013.

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

monitoring the individuals in question and to ensuring they do not reengage in military or

terrorism activity during their stay in Qatar.28 In October 2014, the Afghan Taliban movement

reported that two leaders of the Haqqani Network (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist

Organization) were arrested and transferred to Afghan custody after reportedly visiting the

released Taliban members in Qatar.29 The Taliban claim the arrests violated the prisoner release

agreement because the individuals were related to or invited by relatives of the detainees. Some

U.S. critics of the prisoner exchange have argued that the incident suggests that the terms of

release for the Taliban detainees were not sufficiently rigid.

Qatar and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Although Qatar and Israel do not have formal diplomatic ties, Qatar has supported the Arab

League position backing internationally supported negotiations between the Palestinian Authority

and Israel.30 In his first speech upon taking power, Emir Tamim said:

Qatar is committed to the solidarity with brotherly Palestinian people and struggles to

achieve the legitimate rights and considers the realization of these rights a condition for just

peace, which include the Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967

including East Jerusalem, establishment of independence of the Palestinian State, the right

for return for refugees as [there can be] no settlement without a just peace.31

Qatar, like other Arab states, continues to support the Palestinian bid for recognition and full

membership at the United Nations. Qatari leaders regularly criticize Israeli decisions on

settlements and Jerusalem that they claim undermine prospects for a two-state solution. In recent

years, some observers have viewed Qatar’s diplomatic approach as supportive of Hamas,

particularly since Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal relocated from Syria to Doha at the

Qatari government’s invitation in 2012.

Outspoken Qatari criticism of Israeli government military operations and negotiating positions

continued during the summer 2014 Gaza conflict. In July 2014, Qatar and Turkey jointly

sponsored a ceasefire proposal that garnered some positive consideration from U.S. officials but

was ultimately rejected. Qatar’s Foreign Minister is reported to have subsequently described

Israel as “the aggressor” in the conflict and said:

I expect the legitimate demands of our kinsfolk in Gaza to be met. I also expect a halt to the

aggression and complete lifting of the land, air, and sea blockade. In addition, I expect them

(in Gaza) to enjoy a commercial port albeit under international supervision. …The people in

According to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, On May 12th, we signed a memorandum of understanding with

Qatar detailing the specific security measures that would be undertaken and enforced -- and enforced by them if any

Taliban detainees were transferred to their custody… Included in this MOU were specific risk mitigation measures and

commitments from the government of Qatar, like travel restrictions, monitoring, information sharing and limitations on

activities, as well as other significant measures… we have the kind of assurances we think are meaningful and

enforceable. And we believe the Qatari government will enforce them.” Secretary Hagel, Testimony before the House

Armed Services Committee, June 11, 2014.

See Thomas Joscelyn, “Taliban claims captured Haqqani leaders visited ex-Gitmo detainees in Qatar,” Long War

Journal (Blog), October 19, 2014; and, Margherita Stancati and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Haqqani Leaders Detained in

Persian Gulf, Not Inside Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2014.

Agence France Presse (AFP), “Arabs support Palestinian call for peace conference,” February 12, 2012.

OSC Document IMN2013062669656496, “Qatar's New Emir Gives 1st Speech; Pledges To Continue Father's

Policy,” Al Jazirah Satellite Television (Doha), June 26, 2013.

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Gaza have suffered enough. They have been living in a large prison since 1967. They are

deprived of the most basic things in life. The residents of Gaza and the West Bank say that

they are killed in any case. They say they are either killed by Israeli gunfire or slowly die of

hunger. They resist and defend their land, and we move for their sake.32

At the September 2014 U.N. General Assembly, Emir Tamim described Israel’s summer 2014

military strikes in Gaza as “a crime against humanity.”33 He also said, “I salute the steadfastness

of the resistance of the Palestinian people in Gaza in the face of occupation and in insisting on

regaining its legitimate rights,” vowing that “the State of Qatar will spare no effort to provide

assistance for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.”

Since 2013, Qatar reportedly has provided several million dollars for construction projects in the

Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and financed the Palestinian Authority’s purchase of a fuel shipment

for the Gaza electricity generation plant that Israel approved in December 2013.34 Though Qatar

has claimed to maintain control over its Gaza construction projects, some allege that these

projects and Qatari-aided shipments of fuel into Gaza aid Hamas’s military or logistical efforts,

while others deny this.35 A Qatari official has reportedly indicated that any money it would

contribute to Gaza going forward for humanitarian purposes would not go directly to Hamas.36

Some Members of Congress, including then-Senator and now Secretary of State John Kerry, have

criticized Qatar for providing financial and political support to Hamas.37 Qatari officials deny that

their government supports Hamas financially and argue that their policy is to support the

Palestinian people. Qatari officials have long argued that their relationship with Hamas reflects a

consistent policy of engagement with all sides in the interests of peace.

In August 2014, Emir Tamim hosted meetings between PA President Abbas and Hamas leader

Khaled Meshaal in Doha aimed at unifying Palestinian negotiating positions with regard to a

potential long-term ceasefire arrangement with Israel (Figure 2). In a concurrent interview,

Meshaal said:

The relationship between Qatar and HAMAS is not new. It is public. HAMAS has a broad

network of Arab, Islamic, and international relations. No one is ashamed of this. We have

great appreciation for the popular and official Qatari position and the courage of the Qatari

leadership and what it offers to the Palestinian cause. The Qatari support is not for HAMAS

as a movement in particular, but for the Palestinian people. Its former emir, Hamad BinKhalifah Al Thani, and current emir, Tamim Bin-Hamad Bin-Khalifah, have adopted

positions toward Gaza, made direct visits, played a role in construction, adopted political

positions that support Palestinian rights, and hosted many meetings in Doha between the

Palestinian forces and between us and President Abbas, as well as the first Gaza summit in

the 2008 and 2009 war. All of this is honorable history of Qatar, which is to be thanked and

U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) Report LIN2014072829885496, “Qatari Foreign Minister Criticizes

Israel’s Stand in Talks To Reach Ceasefire in Gaza,” Al-Hayah Online in Arabic, July 28, 2014.

Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 24, 2014.

“Palestinian Official: Rebuilding Gaza Will Cost $6 Billion,” Reuters, August 4, 2014. Overall these projects have

been expected to cost more than $400 million to complete.

Channa Rifkin, “Qatar invests in the West, and funds Hamas,” Ynetnews, July 29, 2014.

“Palestinian Official: Rebuilding Gaza Will Cost $6 Billion,” op. cit.

For example, then-Senator John Kerry voiced specific concerns about alleged Qatari government and private support

to Hamas, arguing in April 2009 that “Qatar ... can’t continue to be an American ally on Monday that sends money to

Hamas on Tuesday.” US Fed News, “Sen. Kerry Speaks on Middle East to Brookings Institute,” April 2, 2009.

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

not blamed. For the enemy to attack it, this is a source of pride for Qatar and is evidence of

the correctness of the Qatari position.38

Figure 2. Qatar’s Emir Hosts Palestinian Leaders

August 2014

Source: Qatar News Agency, August 21, 2014. PA President Abbas on left, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal on

right.

During past periods of progress in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Qatar was in the forefront of

talks aimed at expanding Arab economic ties with Israel. Qatar’s position regarding the Arab

boycott of Israel is governed by the September 1994 decision by the GCC to terminate

enforcement of the indirect boycotts, while maintaining the primary boycott.39 An Israeli trade

office in Doha was shuttered by the Qatari government in response to the January 2009 Gaza War

and has not been reopened.

Qatar’s Economy and U.S. Trade

Qatar has backed up its active diplomacy with growing financial resources and economic

influence over the last decade—a period of “unparalleled prosperity.”40 Between 2000 and 2012,

Qatar’s nominal GDP skyrocketed from $35 billion to an estimated $185 billion. According to a

May 2014 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, GDP growth averaged 14% over the last

decade and the country’s per capita GDP is the highest in the world.41 Hydrocarbon exports have

OSC Report LIN2014082138116374 “Mish’al Interviewed on Cease-Fire, Alleged Coup in West Bank, Relations

With Egypt, Other Issues,” Filastin al-Yawm in Arabic, August 21, 2014.

U.S. Treasury Department, List of Countries Requiring Cooperation with an International Boycott, August 20, 2014.

In February 2010, the Middle East Economic Digest judged that “Qatar is enjoying a period of unparalleled

prosperity.” Middle East Economic Digest, “Qatar’s peaking energy market,” February 12, 2010.

IMF, Qatar - 2014 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 14/108, May 6, 2014.

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

led the way, but non-oil and gas sector growth reached 9% in 2012. Oil and natural gas export

proceeds provide roughly half of the government’s revenue, but the IMF expects the contribution

of the non-hydrocarbon sector to grow steadily over the next five years.

Qatar continues to base its annual state budgets on an assumed oil price of $65 per barrel, making

Qatar better positioned than other producers to deal with declining oil market prices. In recent

years, government spending has exceeded budget projections, but conservative energy export

price estimates have ensured large surpluses. The IMF has estimated that Qatar’s fiscal surpluses

will continue through at least 2015, but are likely to decrease in size. The government continues

to invest surplus revenue abroad for future generations and has increased public spending in

support of domestic infrastructure, housing, and health sector improvements. Qatari press outlets

feature limited criticism of domestic budget transparency, spending priorities, foreign contractors,

and government efficiency.

Some observers have raised questions about the long-term ability of Qatar to attract private sector

investment and produce employment opportunities once the current phase of large state-supported

infrastructure investment is complete. By all accounts, Qatari officials remain confident in their

economic prospects and appear to have used the post-2008 downturn as an opportunity to assess

lessons learned during the country’s boom, to reconsider planned projects, and, where possible, to

take advantage of lower input costs by delaying project start dates or renegotiating contracts.

Managing the infrastructure and service needs created by the influx of laborers to the county

remains an immediate challenge. The country’s population, including expatriates, more than

tripled between 2000 and 2010, growing to over 2 million in 2013.42 As such, Qatar’s economic

successes have been accompanied by new challenges in the areas of social cohesion; education;

labor; national infrastructure; and energy, water, and food supplies. To respond to these

challenges, Qatari authorities have embarked on a series of parallel national development

strategies based on a comprehensive national vision document that seeks balanced, sustainable

growth by the year 2030.43 Emir Tamim bin Hamad chaired the implementation oversight body

for the Vision 2030 project in his prior role as heir apparent. The national development strategy

for 2011 through 2016 sets ambitious infrastructure investment targets with over $65 billion in

planned spending on housing, roads, water, airports, and shipping facilities.44

Oil and Natural Gas45

With proven oil reserves of 25.4 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian Gulf

producers, such as Kuwait (96.5 billion barrels), Iraq (112 billion barrels), and Saudi Arabia (252

billion barrels). However, Qatar has the third-largest gas reserves in the world, an estimated 25.2

trillion cubic meters (tcm).46 Qatar Petroleum (QP), the state-owned oil and natural gas company,

Based on figures available from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United

Nations Secretariat, “World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,” accessed May 2012.

For more information, see the General Secretariat for Development Planning website at http://www.gsdp.gov.qa/

portal/page/portal/GSDP_Vision_Root/GSDP_EN/What%20We%20Do/QNV_2030

See Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016, Chapter 3, Figure 3.2, p. 72, at http://www2.gsdp.gov.qa/

www1_docs/NDS_EN.pdf.

For more information and analysis, see U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar Country Analysis Brief,

January 2014.

Qatar’s supply of natural gas doubled in 2002, when surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar’s North Field.

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

increased its crude oil output from 593,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1999 to approximately

824,000 b/d in December 2008.47 However, production has been lowered closer to 700,000 b/d as

investments are made in technology to extend the life and productivity of the country’s oil fields.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Japan and South Korea are the top

importers of Qatari oil.

Figure 3. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar Country Analysis Brief, January 2014.

As part of a long-term development strategy, Qatar has tapped international financial markets and

invited foreign investment in order to finance the expansion of its gas extraction and liquefied

natural gas (LNG) production and export facilities.48 U.S. companies, particularly ExxonMobil,

are partners in most of Qatar’s LNG export projects. The Export-Import Bank of the United States

has provided over $1 billion in loan guarantees to support the development of Qatar’s gas

production facilities in cooperation with a range of U.S., European, and Asian companies, banks,

Economist Intelligence Unit, “Qatar has cut oil production in line with OPEC’s decision,” December 8, 2008.

Qatar’s government has a 60%-70% stake in two joint partnerships with foreign firms, including ExxonMobil (USA),

TotalFinaElf (France), KoGas (South Korea), and Matsui (Japan). In February 2005, Qatar Petroleum signed a $7

billion agreement with Shell and a $12 billion agreement with ExxonMobil to export natural gas to the United States

and Europe.

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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations

and export credit agencies.49 Qatar expanded its yearly natural gas production from 31.4 billion

cubic meters annually in 2002 to 158.5 billion cubic meters in 2013, and is now the world’s

largest exporter of LNG.50 More than 60% of Qatari LNG exports go to Asian markets, and most

export sales are conducted under the auspices of multi-year supply-purchase arrangements. The

large natural gas production and shipping facilities at the coastal city of Ras Laffan in northern

Qatar serve as the main site for the country’s gas development projects, including the world’s

largest gas-to-liquids facility. Qatar owns numerous LNG import terminals in other countries,

including the United States. Qatar participates in and hosts the headquarters of the Gas Exporting

Countries Forum, an assembly of major gas exporting countries that some have described as a

potential natural gas OPEC.

Qatar has paused its rapid expansion of export-oriented natural gas projects through 2015 in

expectation of clearer market signals about long-term investment needs. However, limited offshore exploration activities are now underway. Global economic uncertainty and natural gas

market changes have complicated global demand projections for Qatari energy exports. However,

steady growth in regional energy consumption and the recent effects of regional unrest have

created new opportunities for growth. For example, Jordan is constructing a new LNG import

terminal at Aqaba to relieve pressure placed on Jordanian supplies by unrest in Egypt.

U.S.-Qatar Trade

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the value of U.S. exports to Qatar reached $4.95 billion in

2013, consisting mainly of transport equipment, manufactured goods, and machinery—up from

$3.57 billion over the same period in 2012. The value of U.S. imports from Qatar, mainly oil,

totaled $1.3 billion in 2013 up from $1.01 billion in 2012. U.S. crude oil imports from Qatar have

declined to zero, but U.S. imports of Qatari petroleum products have grown. Reflecting the

impact of the increase in U.S. domestic natural gas production, U.S. LNG imports from Qatar

declined from a peak of 90.9 million cubic feet in 2011 to zero beginning in April 2013.51

According to the 2014 U.S. Investment Climate Statement for Qatar, “Qatar has not entered into a

bilateral investment, trade, or taxation treaty with the United States. However, Qatar and the

United States did sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in April 2004.”52

Qatar has made a series of large investments in the United States in recent years, including a real

estate investment in the City Center project in Washington, DC. In November 2013, Qatar

Airways signed a letter of intent to purchase 50 additional Boeing 777 airplanes in a deal that

may be worth more than $19 billion. As noted above (See “U.S. Military Cooperation and

For example, since 1996, the Export Import Bank has provided loan guarantees to support the export of U.S.

equipment and services for the construction of facilities at Ras Laffan, including most recently the construction of

natural gas liquefaction plants and facilities associated with the QatarGas II and III projects. See Export Import Bank of

the United States, “Ex-Im Bank $930 Million Guarantee Supports U.S. Exports to Build LNG Plant in Qatar,”

November 18, 2004; and Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank Finances QatarGas 3 Liquid Natural

Gas Complex, December 15, 2005.

BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2014.

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. Imports by Country of Origin and U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas

Imports from Qatar (Million Cubic Feet), October 31, 2014.

U.S. State Department Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Qatar 2014 Investment Climate Statement, June

2014.

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Foreign Assistance”), Qatar’s purchase of U.S. arms and defense equipment also should

contribute to an expansion in the value of U.S. exports in coming years.

Outlook

The leadership transition in Qatar signaled the opening of a new chapter in U.S.-Qatari relations

that already had grown increasingly close in recent years, in spite of some abiding policy

differences. Emir Tamim and his government appear to be taking an equally active, if quieter

approach to diplomacy than that of the emir’s father and his counterparts. Nevertheless,

increasing scrutiny is being applied by some observers to Qatar’s relationships with Islamists and

certain armed groups. Most observers expect Qatari policy makers to favor policies that will

consolidate the political and economic gains that Qatar has made in recent years and set the

country on a sustainable path. Expanding U.S.-Qatari defense relations also may signal a stronger

commitment on the part of the new Emir to invest in relations with the United States. Decision

makers in the United States appear likely to continue to debate how best to maintain improved

defense and counterterrorism relations with Qatar while seeking to address more challenging

issues related to regional security, human rights, political reform, and labor conditions.

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

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