The Military Draft and a Possible War with Iraq

Order Code RL31682

Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

The Military Draft and a Possible War with Iraq

December 31, 2002

nae redacted

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The Military Draft and a Possible War with Iraq

Summary

Since the possibility of a second major war with Iraq became apparent in mid2002, interest and concern about a return to the draft have manifested themselves for

the first time since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. As was the case in 1991, a review

of military manpower levels and potential war scenarios suggests that only a

prolonged war, with major military reverses for U.S. forces, or new international

developments creating the need for substantially larger armed forces, would result in

a military requirement to reinstitute the draft. Virtually all proposed scenarios for a

war with Iraq assume that it would not last long enough, result in high enough

American casualties, or require enough additional forces to necessitate a draft. The

military rationale for resuming the draft to meet the needs of the armed forces for

manpower during an Iraqi war, therefore, does not seem to be compelling.

However, there are possible scenarios that might tax the ability of the armed

forces to recruit a sufficient number of volunteers. One such scenario could combine

an Iraqi conflict with other confrontations (e.g., North Korea). Other scenarios

could involve the need for very large peacetime deployments of U.S. forces (e.g., the

possible occupation of a defeated Iraq) or major demands for domestic deployments

based on threatened or actual terrorist activity.

Some of the sociological arguments in favor of conscription involve different

interpretations of the same data; others are more philosophical and not related to

quantitative analysis or interpretation. While African Americans are present in the

enlisted ranks to a considerably greater extent than their proportion of the American

population, the Hispanic proportion is less, rather than more, than their presence in

the American population . If upper-middle class youth appear to be underrepresented

in the enlisted ranks, they are present in the officer corps. Throughout American

history there has been a debate about whether compulsory military service is (1) a

civic responsibility and display of patriotism, not subject to individual whim as to

whether it is performed or not; or (2) a violation of individual liberties that, if

implemented at all, should only be used in times of grave emergency.

Legal authority for the involuntary induction of men into the Armed Forces

expired on July 1, 1973. New legislation would be required to reinstate an active

draft. Currently the Selective Service System operates on standby status. Young men

are required to register with the system within 30 days before or after their 18th

birthday. If the draft were to be reactivated, young men age 18 through 26 would be

subject to induction (up to age 35 if deferred when initially called). Student

deferments were drastically restricted by law after they caused so much controversy

during the Vietnam War of 1964-1973. Graduate student deferments were in fact

abolished early in the Vietnam War, in 1966. Under current law, undergraduates who

were drafted would be allowed to finish an ongoing academic semester (or their

senior year, if about to graduate), and would then have to report for induction.

Married men would not be exempt from any actual draft. This report will be updated

as events warrant.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Possible Military Rationales for Resuming a Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Sources of Casualty Replacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Ongoing Recruiting of Volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Manpower in Non-Deployed Army and Marine Combat Units . . . . . . . 3

Army and Marine Corps Individual Ready Reserve Personnel . . . . . . . 5

“Stop-Loss” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Recall of Retired Military Personnel to Active Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Casualty Replacements: Will There Be Enough? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Regular Recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Active Army and Marine Corps Ground Combat Units Still in the

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Army National Guard and Marine Corps Reserve Ground

Combat Units in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Army and Marine Corps Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Personnel . . 9

Combat-Specialty Personnel Serving in Noncombat Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Increasing the Size of the Active Armed Forces under

Different Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

A War with Iraq and Possible Modest Increases in Force Size . . . . . . . 9

A Longer or Wider War and a Large Increase in Force Size . . . . . . . . 11

Social Rationales For and Against Resuming a Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Social Representation Arguments in Favor of a Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Social Representation Arguments in Opposition to a Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Current Status of the Draft and Action Required for Its Reinstatement . . . . . . . 15

The Military Draft and a

Possible War with Iraq

Introduction

Since the possibility of U.S.-led military action against Iraq began increasing in

late 2001, there has been interest and concern about whether such a conflict would

require the United States to resume conscription.1 This concern has been heightened

since roughly mid-2002, as President Bush has repeatedly stated that if Iraq did not

comply with various United Nations (U.N.) resolutions and inspection activities

dealing with its weapons of mass destruction and other activities deemed to be a

threat to international peace and security and U.S. national interests, military action

would be required to assure that compliance.2

There have been no indications that the Bush Administration has any intention

of deviating from the national policy of volunteer recruiting which has been in effect

since the end of 1972. Furthermore, although there have been occasional calls by

analysts, commentators, and Members of Congress for a resumption of conscription,

largely on grounds of perceived “social equity,”3 there does not appear to be broadbased public support for the enactment of legislation that would reinstitute draft

authority. Public opinion polls indicate that, in relation to the war against terrorism,

Americans would be very supportive of conscription, but that a draft for other

purposes, or other wars, would face more opposition. For instance, an Investor’s

Business Daily/Christian Science Monitor poll taken in mid-October 2002 asked “If

the United States finds itself at war and needing many more active-duty personnel for

the armed forces, would you prefer...the reestablishment of the draft or only voluntary

recruitment for the military?” Only 26% of respondents preferred a draft, while 69%

preferred to stick with volunteer recruiting. On the other hand, a May 2002 Fox

News survey asked “If more soldiers are needed in the war against terrorism, would

you approve or disapprove of re-instituting the draft?” The response here had 57%

supporting a draft and 34% opposed. A virtually identical question posed in

November 2001 saw 74% supporting a draft and only 18% keeping voluntary

1

See, for example, Rangel, Charles B. “Bring Back the Draft.” New York Times, December

31, 2002: A-21.

2

See CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.

Policy by (name redacted), updated regularly; and CRS Report RL31533, The Persian

Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2002.

3

See, for example, the column by Representative Rangel cited in footnote 1; Smith, Jeffrey

H. “Paying the Cost in Blood and Treasure.” Washington Post, September 24, 2002: 21; and

Wickham, DeWayne. “This Time, Fighting Should Not Be Left to Just a Few.” USA Today,

September 16, 2001: 11.

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enlistment only. Several other polls taken as soon as three days after 9/11 had very

similar results.4

This CRS report analyzes the possible scenarios under which the resumption of

a draft might be militarily necessary, describes some of the social rationales for and

against resuming the draft that have been cited (independent of military

requirements), and itemizes the current status of the draft and action required for its

reinstatement.

Possible Military Rationales for Resuming a Draft

Most scenarios for a war with Iraq assume that it would not last long enough,

result in high enough American casualties, or require appreciable additional forces

so as to require a draft. Despite these assessments, there has been some concern in

some quarters about the possible military need to resume conscription.

From a military manpower perspective, a draft could be required for one or both

of the following reasons: (1) an inability to secure sufficient voluntary enlistments

to replace casualties sustained in future military operations; and/or (2) a need to

increase the size of the armed forces beyond that which could be achieved through

voluntary recruiting. Most experts currently believe that it is unlikely that either of

these eventualities will come to pass as the direct result of any war with Iraq.

Sources of Casualty Replacements

Almost all casualties in a non-nuclear war involving all military services are

likely to occur in the ground combat components of the Army and Marine Corps.

Casualties can be replaced from several sources before a possible return to a draft.

These sources include the ongoing output of Army and Marine volunteer male

enlistees from recruit training centers (the ground combat arms of the Army and

Marine Corps remain all-male organizations), personnel from Army and Marine units

still in the United States (both active force units and reserve units called to active

duty), and members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Army and Marine

Corps. These sources would appear ample to meet the needs of any future war with

Iraq for replacements.

Ongoing Recruiting of Volunteers. Regular recruiting activities of the

services would, of course, continue to operate during the period immediately

preceding and during a war. The prospect of war or its actual existence would

dissuade some potential recruits from enlisting, and bring others forth in greater

numbers. Recent experience illustrates these conflicted views. During the period

September-November 1990, which were the first three complete months of Operation

Desert Shield–the military buildup in the Persian Gulf which preceded the actual

hostilities of early 1991–recruiting suffered considerably. Enlistments dropped

between 20% and 33% below previously-established goals. However, during the

4

Information taken from Public Opinion (Dialog File 468; Roper Center for Public Opinion

Research, December 13, 2002, by CRS Government and Finance Division.

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period October-December 1990, during which war became progressively more likely,

the actual number and quality of recruits (including those who had enlisted earlier

under the military’s “Delayed Entry Program,” but actually reported for service later),

was actually higher than anticipated.5 The nation’s most recent experiences with the

effects of war on recruiting therefore, is mixed at best, and arguably more positive

than negative.

Manpower in Non-Deployed Army and Marine Combat Units.

Casualty replacements can be transferred from combat units not deployed to the

theater of operations; the utility of this depends on how many combat units would

remain in the United States during a war. Such “stripping” of nondeployed units,

naturally, severely degrades their combat readiness until their ranks are filled with

new personnel and the unit trained once more to operate as a unit. It has generally

been done only in extreme situations.

The Army’s combat force structure is much smaller than it was during the

Persian Gulf War, although that of the Marine Corps has remained fairly stable. The

Army deployed seven divisions plus smaller units equal to two-thirds of a division,

and the Marine Corps two divisions, to the 1990–1991 war.6 Six Army divisions, and

one Marine division, remained in the Continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and

Okinawa. Two divisions were kept in Europe to cope with a possible Soviet threat

which, in 1990-1991, was rapidly declining but still extant; and one remained in

Korea, which was judged to face a more likely threat than Europe.7

It is not known, of course, how many divisions would be deployed to fight Iraq

in any future operation, or how long such a conflict could take. Many more specific

estimates were offered in advance of the 1991 Gulf War. However, some estimates

are possible. Virtually all agree that a smaller force than that of 1990-1991 would

5

Willis, Grant. “Army Tops Recruit Goal by 5 Percent.” Army Times, January 21, 1991: 4.

6

In the U.S. Army, a division, commanded by a major general, has between 10,000 and

15,000 soldiers, and is composed of three brigades plus additional, smaller units. A brigade,

commanded by a colonel (or, in the case of a brigade not part of a division, frequently a

brigadier general), has between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers, and is composed of two to five

(but usually three) battalions plus additional units. An armored cavalry reconnaissance unit

of brigade size is called a regiment. A battalion, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, has

300 to 1,000 soldiers, and is composed of four to six companies (but in most combat units

four) plus smaller units.(In the armored cavalry, a battalion-sized unit is called a squadron.)

A company, commanded by a captain, has anywhere from 62 to 190 soldiers and is

composed of three or four platoons. (A company-size unit in the artillery is called a battery,

and in armored cavalry units a troop.) A platoon, commanded by a first or second

lieutenant, will have between 16 and 44 soldiers, and will consist of three or four squads,

or four to five tanks or other armored vehicles. A squad or vehicle crew will be led by a

noncommissioned officer (sergeant) and have anywhere from four soldiers (the crew of one

tank, for example), to 9-11 soldiers in it. With minor exceptions, the terminology of U.S.

Marine Corps ground combat units, and modern foreign armies as well, is similar. This

description is adapted from material in Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Organization of the United States Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1.

Washington, June 14, 1994: J-1/J-8.

7

“Command and Staff,” Army, October 1991: 189, 194-95, 198-99.

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be needed. One reason cited is the unrepaired damage done to the Iraqi military by

the earlier war. The second reason commonly cited is the increase in the combat

capability of U.S. forces due to new, technologically advanced weapon systems;

improved command and control methods and doctrine; and over a decade of U.S.

deployments, exercises, and improvements in base structure in the Persian Gulf area.

A widely-quoted figure is the possible deployment of 250,000 U.S. troops in the

theater of war. If this latter number refers only to Army and Marine Corps forces

actually on the ground in or close to Iraq, then it might indicate six Army and Marine

divisions.8 If, on the other hand, the 250,000 figure applies to personnel of all

services, including naval personnel afloat, then it implies about four Army and

Marine divisions.9 The U.S. active duty ground force structure currently consists of

ten active Army divisions (two in Europe, one in Korea, and seven in the United

States)10 and three active Marine divisions.11

Commitment of the largest force which has been openly discussed–five Army

and two Marine divisions–would thus leave two divisions remaining in the United

States and three in overseas deployments. It is possible that part or all of the two

divisions in Europe, given that they are no longer deployed there to meet a Soviet

military threat, could be deployed to the Persian Gulf as well. On the other hand,

existing U.S. commitments in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the desire to keep postWarsaw Pact Europe as stable as it has become, might prevent such a deployment.

Thus, in a worse-case scenario, two active Army divisions would remain in the

United States during a war with Iraq from which individual replacements could be

drawn. Such a drawdown would, however, drastically decrease readiness to meet any

other contingencies that might threaten U.S. interests around the world, such as a

more threatening North Korea..

8

A peak total of 306,000 Army and 94,000 Marine Corps personnel were deployed to

Operation Desert Storm. See CRS Report 94-529 F. U.S. Military Operations, 1965-1994

(Not Including Vietnam): Data on Casualties, Decorations, and Personnel Involved

Goldich, Robert L., and John C. Schaefer. June 27, 1994: 37. These included the

equivalent of eight Army and two Marine divisions as well as nondivisional support forces.

Simple arithmetic, dividing the 400,000 total by 10 divisions, leads to 40,000 troops per

division. Applying the 40,000 figure for what the Army has always called the “division

slice”–the total number of troops required to deploy and maintain a combat division in a

theater of war–implies about six divisions for a postulated “Gulf War II” force of 250,000

troops.

9

Maximum strength of all service–Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast

Guard–in the Gulf War area of operations was 541,000. Goldich and Schaefer, U.S. Military

Operations: ibid. Dividing this figure by the ten division-equivalents leads to a figure of

54,000 troops of all services for each ground combat division. Application of this figure to

the 250,000 servicemembers possibly needed for a future implies about four divisions.

Because Navy and Air Force requirements, however, may have little to do with Army and

Marine Corps needs, this latter figure is much more questionable than that involving just the

two services with ground forces.

10

11

“Command and Staff,” Army, October 2002: 233-35, 239-41.

One of these divisions, however (the 3rd, headquartered on Okinawa), contains only six

rather than a Marine division’s usual nine Marine infantry battalions. See Polmar, Norman.

The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet. Seventeenth Edition.

Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2001: 45.

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The Army could also call National Guard combat divisions or brigades to active

duty and use their personnel as individual replacements. There are currently eight

Guard divisions and 17 deployable Guard brigades (a division consists of three

brigades plus some supporting units).12 Such an action would meet bitter opposition

from the National Guard community, which remembers when virtually all Guard

divisions were stripped to provide some individual replacements at the beginning of

both World Wars and the Korean War. These actions severely eroded the state

affiliation and character of the Guard divisions. However, it could be argued that if,

in fact, there is “One Army,” where National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers are

considered as capable and usable as active Army soldiers, that Guard and reserve

soldiers should be as subject to individual reassignment as any others.13 One way in

which some of the problems created by stripping units remaining in the Continental

United States (CONUS)–whether active Army or Guard–might be mitigated, is to use

CONUS units–squads, platoons, companies, or battalions–as replacements for similar

units overseas which had sustained heavy casualties.14

Army and Marine Corps Individual Ready Reserve Personnel. The

Army and Marine Corps could also order members of their Individual Ready Reserve

(IRR) to active duty to provide casualty replacements. IRR personnel constitute a

pool of pretrained individuals with prior active military service for use upon

mobilization if necessary to bring units to war strength and replace casualties. In

most cases, IRR personnel are young people who have finished a tour of active duty

in the armed forces and have elected not to join an organized reserve component

unit–i.e., one which is paid and trains regularly–but who must legally be maintained

12

Ibid.: 241-43.

13

Related to these issues is the extent to which major reserve ground combat units–at this

time, Army Guard infantry and armored brigades and divisions–can be readied for combat

before mobilization, and how much post-mobilization training is required for them to be

combat ready. The active Army and Guard communities have had periods of extraordinarily

bitter disagreement over these matters for well over a century, since the beginning of the

modern organizations of the active Army and the National Guard. The most recent period

of such acrimony began in late 1990, in the period leading up to the Persian Gulf War of

early 1991; continued throughout the 1990s, and did not really begin to abate until around

1998. See CRS Report 97-719 F, The Army Reserve Components: Strength and Force

Structure Issues (out of print; available only from the author, (name redacted)); CRS

Report 91-763 F, The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War (out of print;

available only from the author, (name redact ed)); Towell, Pat. “Budget Crunch Has a

Service at War With Itself.” Congressional Quarterly, January 3, 1998: 5-11 (also at

[http://www.cq.com]); and Peters, Katherine McIntire. “On Guard.” Government Executive,

January 1998 see [http://www.govexec.com/features].

14

The Army is apparently attempting to institutionalize some aspects of unit replacement,

although virtually all such unit replacement efforts over the past 50 years have failed. See

Naylor, Sean D. “Manning Overhaul.” Army Times, December 30, 2002: 12-13; Naylor,

“Secretary pushes for large-scale personnel reform.” Army Times, September 16, 2002: 14;

Burgess, Lisa. “White Says Army Will Waste Billions if Individuals, Not Units, are

Rotated.” European Stars and Stripes, November 1, 2002; Cox, Matthew. “Battle buddies.”

Army Times, November 13, 2000: 8; and unpublished material from the Army Center of

Military History in possession of the author.

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in a reserve status until their combined active and reserve service totals eight years.15

They do not currently train regularly, although they can legally be required to do so.

During the Persian Gulf War, the Army called over 17,000 IRR personnel to active

duty, of which over 10,000 were infantry, armor, field artillery, or combat engineer

personnel.16

“Stop-Loss”. Although not directly related to a possible draft, it should also

be noted that all services instituted so-called “stop-loss” programs shortly after

September 11, 2001 and the beginning of military operations in and around

Afghanistan a month later. According to 10 USC 12305, during most periods when

reservists have been called to active duty, the President “may suspend any provision

of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of

the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security of

the United States.” For practical purposes, stop-loss enables the services to keep any

servicemember, active duty or reserve, on active duty and/or in an active reserve

status, when that member would otherwise be separating from active duty or active

reserve status through retirement or end of the member’s enlistment or obligated

periods of service. Stop-loss thus increases the amount of military manpower “in the

bank” to replace casualties.

Recall of Retired Military Personnel to Active Duty. According to 10

USC 688, almost all retired regular or reserve military personnel may be involuntarily

ordered to active duty for more than 12 months during the 24 months that follow the

date on which the retiree first goes on active duty. During the Persian Gulf War,

1,379 Army retirees were recalled to active duty.17

Casualty Replacements: Will There Be Enough?

DOD and the military services never make public casualty estimates before a

military operation (although they are essential in planning military operations, to

determine what medical resources will be required and how many replacements for

casualties will be needed). The numerous casualty predictions made before

Operation Desert Storm were, with only one exception, far above the minuscule 628

U.S. casualties (147 killed, 458 wounded, 23 prisoners of war (POW) returned at the

15

10 USC 651 states that “each person who becomes a member of an armed force...shall

serve in the armed forces for a period of not less than six years nor more than eight

years...Any part of such service that is not active duty or that is active duty for training shall

be performed in a reserve component.” DOD enforces this eight-year maximum allowed by

law.

16

Currie, Col. James T., U.S. Army Reserve, and Col. Richard B. Crossland, U.S. Army

Reserve. Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1995,

Department of the Army Pamphlet 140-14. Washington, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve,

1997: 493-519.

17

Brinkerhoff, John R. United States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm: Individual

Manpower Mobilization: The Army Reserve Personnel Center. Washington, Office of the

Chief, Army Reserve, 1992: 30-33.

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end of hostilities) sustained.18 The key factors pertaining to the Iraqi armed forces

which led to the one-sided victory of the U.S.-led coalition in 1991, and to the

casualty rate that was so much lower than what virtually all observers and

participants expected, still appear operative, according to a recent in-depth analysis

of Arab countries’ military effectiveness over the past half-century. Most of these

reported Iraqi deficiencies include poor performance by junior officers leading small

units; inattention to maintenance and repair of weapons and equipment; lack of

honesty and accuracy in conveying information between different echelons of

command; poor battlefield intelligence; and difficulties in employing technically

sophisticated weapons.19

On the other hand, it has been postulated that Iraqis fighting in their homeland,

as opposed to a recently-conquered country, might be much more effective. This

could be particularly true in the case of elite military organizations, such as the

“Republican Guard,” divisions of which offered the most resistance to U.S. and

coalition forces in the 1991 war. These have enjoyed much higher standards of living

and governmental favoritism than the majority of Iraqis, a status they would not want

to lose. Their role in domestic repression could also leave them more inclined to

fight to the death, if they knew they would be facing a combination of post-war

international and Iraqi justice, as well as the private settling of scores by their

previous victims.

The most pessimistic estimates of U.S. casualties made before the 1991 war

were those of the Center for Defense Information (CDI), which projected a possible

10,000 dead and 35,000 wounded.20 By the time the Coalition ground offensive

began (the ground combat operations of the Gulf War, as in all other wars, being

those in which the most casualties were sustained21) informal discussions among

analysts in and out of uniform in the Washington area were speculating that while the

CDI figures had become far too pessimistic, U.S. losses would include at least

several hundred killed and a few thousand wounded. This was predicated on

assumptions that while many Iraqi forces would surrender or simply flee the

18

For U.S. casualties, see Goldich and Schaefer, U.S. Military Operations: 36. The 23

POWs returned in early March 1991 at the end of hostilities does not reflect the case of

Navy Captain Michael Scott Speicher, whose initial classification as killed in action has

been changed to missing in action, and whose status and possible survival have been the

subject of intense controversy. See CRS Issue Brief IB92101, POWs and MIAs: Status and

Accounting Issues, by (name redacted), updated periodically.

19

This is adapted and summarized from Pollack, Kenneth M. Arabs at War: Military

Effectiveness, 1948-1991. Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 2002: 264-66, 55283, and passim.

20

“U.S. Invasion of Iraq: Appraising the Option.” The Defense Monitor [published by the

Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC], Vol. XIX, #8, 1990; originally cited in

Goldich, The Persian Gulf War and the Draft: 4.

21

The Army and Marine Corps sustained 91% of total Gulf War casualties. Goldich and

Schaefer, U.S. Military Operations: 36. While the Marine Corps figures include casualties

among Marine aviators flying fixed-wing aircraft, and both Army and Marine figures

include helicopter crew casualties, almost all losses of both ground-oriented services were,

in fact, sustained among ground troops.

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battlefield without offering much effective resistance, some would stand and

fight–and do so effectively. As it transpired, while a fair number of Iraqi units did

stand and fight in 1991, in accordance with what were actually well-thought-out and

tactically-sound orders, their resistance was almost totally ineffective.

Assuming a scenario for a war with Iraq in 2003, in which U.S. forces sustained

casualties of several hundred dead and several thousand wounded–it would appear

that existing personnel resources from the sources noted above would be ample to

replace casualties in a war with Iraq without resort to a draft. As noted above, these

sources would include the following.

Regular Recruiting. Recruits would continue to enlist as the war was being

fought. For instance, during FY1991-2001, an average of over 6,000 recruits per

month entered the Army and about 2,700 a month entered the Marine Corps,22

although most of these would not have enlisted for combat arms duty, based on the

normal distribution of occupational skills required by the peacetime services.

Active Army and Marine Corps Ground Combat Units Still in the

United States. Assuming that five U.S. divisions–four Army and one

Marine–were committed to an Iraq war (a mid-range estimate), this would leave three

Army divisions still in the United States. If necessary, the almost 9,000 soldiers in

their infantry and tank units of company size–where almost all casualties are

sustained–could be sent to replace casualties.23 The 3rd Marine Division, with twothirds the infantry strength of a full Marine division, would probably have about

3,000 Marine infantrymen in its rifle companies that could replace Marine casualties.

Army National Guard and Marine Corps Reserve Ground Combat

Units in the United States. In extremis, the infantrymen and tankers of the

Army and Marine Corps reserve components could be activated, removed from their

reserve units, and used as replacements for active force units–or other reserve

units–fighting in the theater of war. The eight Army National Guard armored,

mechanized infantry, and infantry divisions; and the 15 “enhanced readiness” Army

Guard infantry, light infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored combat brigades

together have almost 37,000 men in their infantry and tank companies at full

strength.24 The Marine reservists in the rifle companies of the 4th Marine Division,

and the tankers in the two Marine reserve tank battalions, totalling about 5,000-6,000

Marines, would be similarly available.

22

Calculated from DOD data in CRS Report RL31297, Recruiting and Retention in the

Active Component Military: Are There Problems?, by (name redacted), February 25, 2002:

4-5.

23

Calculations based on numbers of infantry and tank battalions, and hence their organic

companies, in these divisions. Data obtained from numerous DOD websites; The Infantry

Rifle Company. Field Manual 7-10. Washington, Headquarters, Department of the Army,

14 December 1990 and changes; and Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. Field

Manual 71-1. Washington, Headquarters, Department of the Army; and “Command and

Staff.” Army, October 2002: 233-43.

24

Ibid.

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Army and Marine Corps Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Personnel.

Finally, as of September 30, 2001, 152,000 soldiers were in the Army IRR and

60,000 Marines in that of the Marine Corps.25 Although most of these personnel

have not served in combat occupational specialties, tens of thousands of them have,

and could be used as combat replacements with comparatively little refresher

training. The experience with mobilized IRR members during the Persian Gulf War

was quite favorable.26

Combat-Specialty Personnel Serving in Noncombat Jobs. None of

these estimates take into account soldiers and Marines, both officers and enlisted

members, who were trained as infantrymen or tankers, have served in combat units

and sometimes in actual combat, but who at the actual time war breaks out would be

serving in the support organizations of their services.

Finally, it should be noted that all of the categories of personnel listed above

would all be immediately, or almost immediately, available for combat duty in the

Persian Gulf. Draftees, by law (10 USC 671), must receive at least 12 weeks of

training before being sent overseas to serve on land.

All of this would suggest, therefore, that only catastrophic military reverses, on

a scale involving the destruction of a substantial proportion of the U.S. forces

deployed against Iraq, and/or a prolonged conflict measured in terms of years, rather

than several months, would generate a military requirement to reinstitute the draft to

obtain casualty replacements. Both these scenarios seem unlikely.27

Increasing the Size of the Active Armed Forces

under Different Scenarios

A War with Iraq and Possible Modest Increases in Force Size. A

requirement to quickly increase the size of the active armed forces, like the need to

provide casualty replacements, could be initially met much more quickly with other

methods than reinstituting a draft. Even if up to 265,000 reservists are activated for

25

Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics. FY2001 Summary. Office

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

26

Brinkerhoff, United States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm: Individual

Manpower Mobilization: 30-33.

27

Some have suggested that Iraqi employment of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical

weapons could result in massive U.S. and coalition casualties. However, there appears to

be a consensus that despite Iraq’s intensive activities to acquire nuclear weapons one way

or another, they have not done so. Regarding chemical or biological weapons, informed

analysts suggest that the practical difficulties involved in “weaponizing” such agents for

practical battlefield use; their susceptibility to rapid atmospheric dispersal; and the wide

range of U.S. protective equipment and tactics, would all combine to prevent their use by

Iraq from resulting in massive American casualties, although they certainly would be able

to inflict some harm to U.S. troops in the theater of war. For a summary of these issues, see

Harris, Elisa D. “Baghdad’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: What does Saddam have? Will

it be used? To what effect?” Homeland Security Monitor, Intellibridge Corp., October 23,

2002, at [http://www.intellibridge.com]

CRS-10

a war with Iraq (the total number called up for the 1991 war),28 the overwhelming

majority of the combat forces of the Army Reserve Components, and perhaps some

of the Marine Corps Reserve, would probably not be initially ordered to active duty.

A requirement for major increases in active duty strength could be met much more

quickly by activating more reserves than by instituting a draft. A draft would not

provide the trained officers and noncommissioned officers to man units effectively;

it would only turn out freshly-trained junior enlisted recruits. Furthermore, even the

latter would not become available until they had finished their recruit and initial

occupational skill training, a process which could take roughly three to five months

for junior enlisted ground combat soldiers and Marines.29 It seems unlikely that

actual hostilities in a war with Iraq would last that long, given the 42-day long 1991

war and the four-day ground war at its very end. If, therefore, the draft were resumed

during hostilities, or even a good many weeks before hostilities began, it is unlikely

that drafted recruits would reach the theater of war before the war ended.

There are scenarios in which even a short war with Iraq could lead to a long

term requirement for larger armed forces. Such increases in the active armed forces

might, for instance, be required for the range of postwar occupational tasks the

United States might undertake after a [presumably] victorious conflict with Iraq. (In

regard to war-related contingencies, as noted above, it would appear that only major

military reverses, or a major contingency elsewhere in the world simultaneous with

an ongoing war in the Persian Gulf, could generate such a requirement.) There is

every indication that such larger forces could, up to a considerably larger manpower

total than at present, be maintained by voluntary recruiting alone.

The active Armed Forces have, since FY1999, maintained a strength of slightly

under 1.4 million personnel. However, throughout the mid and late 1980s, a force

of almost 2.2 million volunteers was maintained, and recruit quality (measured by

high school graduate status and scores on a standardized aptitude test) sustained at

unprecedented highs. Were quality standards to be relaxed slightly, and/or recruiting

and compensation budgets increased as needed, it appears possible that a force of 2.3

or 2.4 million could be maintained as well. Although some prospective recruits

would be disinclined to volunteer during hostilities due to reluctance to be involved

in combat, others might be more inclined to do so due to the greater degree of

excitement, patriotism, and popular prestige resulting from involvement in a

presumably successful war.

28

This figure has frequently been quoted as a maximum, and CRS is not aware of any

predictions which have suggested that more than the 1990-1991 total might be called to

active duty. See, for example, the typical statement in Schmitt, Eric. “Buildup Leaves U.S.

Nearly Set to Start Attack.” New York Times, December 8, 2002: 1, which states that “The

Pentagon has plans to mobilize as many as 265,000 members of the National Guard and

Reserves, roughly as many as for the Persian Gulf war in 1991.” There is, of course, no

military rationale for making a possible 2003 mobilization the same size as that which took

place in 1991.

29

Estimates derived from data in Defense Manpower Data Center. Military Manpower

Training Report for FY2002. March 2002: 17-21, 33-37.

CRS-11

A Longer or Wider War and a Large Increase in Force Size. It would

thus appear that both military rationales for resuming the draft–to provide casualty

replacements and more manpower with which to expand the active duty force–would

probably be absent in regard to a war with Iraq alone, without other actual or

potential conflict elsewhere. However, if an Iraq war were followed by the need to

deploy a substantial occupation force in that country, and such a requirement were

combined with the need to deploy substantial additional forces elsewhere, the

services might have trouble recruiting sufficient volunteers to establish and maintain

the required higher force levels. Also, at some point the costs of recruiting sufficient

volunteers might become prohibitive, and would counterbalance the increased

training and personnel management costs that a return to the draft could produce.30

Official pronouncements are firm in stating that the United States could cope

with simultaneous wars with Iraq and North Korea–Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

stated on December 23, 2002 that he “had no reason to believe that North Korea feels

emboldened because of the world’s interest in Iraq. If they do, it would be a mistake.

We are perfectly capable of doing that which is necessary.”31 Nonetheless, some

analysts believe that U.S. forces are currently either too small to win two such

conflicts without a prolonged period of initial stalemate, or possibly the threat of

defeat, which could lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.32

It should be noted that, historically, many wars have tended to last much longer

than predicted, either by national political leadership or the military leaders whose

job it is to plan for and conduct the war. Few Americans believed, when U.S. ground

combat forces landed in [then] South Vietnam in February1965, that the war would

not end for the United States until March 1973. Many predicted in the decade or so

preceding the outbreak of World War I in August 1914 that recent technological and

organizational advances in warfare would make the conflict short, sharp, and

decisive, rather than the four and one-half year grinding struggle that it became.

More recently, it is doubtful that Saddam Hussein or his generals–let alone the

population of Iraq–thought that when the Iraqis invaded Iran in September 1980 that

fighting would continue until late 1988. Almost 65 years ago, Winston Churchill

wrote a cautionary note about excessive faith in “short, sharp, decisive” conflicts.

It is arguably all the more significant due to the slight archaism of his language; his

unquestioned willingness throughout a military and political career in British public

30

Most, if not almost all, defense manpower analysts agree that a return to conscription for

the purposes of maintaining a peacetime force of roughly the size maintained since the draft

ended in 1972 would cost more, rather than less, money than a volunteer force of the same

size. See, for example, The Differential Budget Costs of Conscription-Based Alternatives

to the All-Volunteer Force. Study Prepared for the Manpower and Personnel Directorate

(J-1) of the Joint Staff, Contract No. F49642-84-D0038. Springfield, VA, Syllogistics, Inc.,

July 23, 1986. 215 p.; U.S. General Accounting Office. Military Draft: Potential Impacts

and Other Issues. Report nos. NSIAD-88-102 and B-229465. Washington, March 10, 1988.

61 p.

31

Scarborough, Rowan. “Rumsfeld Says U.S. Can Win War in Two Theaters.” Washington

Times, December 24, 2002: 1.

32

Scarborough, Rowan. “U.S. Ability to Fight Two Wars Doubted.” Washington Times,

December 25, 2002: 1.

CRS-12

life of almost 60 years to maintain strong armed forces and commit them to combat;

and his own personal combat experience (“active service” in British idiom):

Let us learn our lessons. Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and

easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measures the tides

and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must

realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the

slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices,

weak, incompetent, or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile

neutrals, malignant fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations–all take their

seats at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always

remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be

a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance.33

Social Rationales For and Against Resuming a Draft

A variety of social and philosophical rationales have been advanced in favor of,

or opposed to, resuming the draft. Many of these apply in peacetime as well as war,

and many, because they involve value judgments, are not subject to “proof’ or

“refutation.” Two basic social arguments in favor of resuming a draft for the current

war are generally advanced: (1) a draft would insure “equitable” (a term itself subject

to a broad range of interpretations) socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic representation

in the Armed Forces; and (2) it would reinforce the concept of citizenship as entailing

responsibilities as well as rights.

Social Representation Arguments in Favor of a Draft

In time of war, some proponents of returning to conscription argue, it is

important that the discriminated-against members of American society do not bear

more than their fair share of fighting and casualties, and that those who have

benefitted the most do not bear less than their fair share. Furthermore, they

frequently suggest that the mixing of various socioeconomic classes, races, ethnic

groups, and nationalities that would occur with a broadly-based draft would

contribute to the social cohesion of the nation.

Those concerned with social representation have tended to concentrate on two

specific factors. The first is the greater proportional representation of AfricanAmericans in the military compared to their proportion in the overall American

population. As of FY2000, blacks comprised 20% of non-prior service enlistees and

22% of the active duty enlisted force, as compared to 12-14% of the civilians of

comparable ages.34 The second is a perceived lesser representation of children of

affluent, upper-middle-class and upper class households in the enlisted ranks of the

33

Churchill, Winston S. My Early Life: A Roving Commission. New York, Charles

Scribner’s Sons, 1938 [reprinted 1958]: 232.

34

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy). Population

Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 2000. February 2002: B-4, B-36.

Hereafter cited as Population Representation FY2000.

CRS-13

Armed Forces. DOD statistics also appear to bear out this assertion, although the

difference is, arguably, not dramatic. In FY1999, about 24% of the employed fathers

of new enlisted recruits were likely to be in “executive, managerial, administrative,

or professional” occupations, but almost 34% of all civilian youth ages 14-21 had

fathers in those occupations. The figures for mothers of new recruits were almost

29% in the four high-status occupational categories, compared to 33% of the mothers

of the 14-21 civilian youth cohort–a much smaller difference than for fathers.35 A

more elaborate and technical index of socioeconomic status indicates that “enlisted

accessions come from all socioeconomic levels. However, there is a tendency for

accessions to come from families in the lower three-quarters of the status

distribution. These differences are expressed in the occupations of parents of

accessions, as well as discrepancies in education and home ownership.”36

Social Representation Arguments in Opposition to a Draft

Those who oppose returning to a draft simply cite other arguments, and

statistics. They note, for instance, that those demographic groups most often cited in

analyses of social representation are not uniformly overrepresented in the armed

forces as compared to their presence in the overall population–and thus are not

threatened with disproportionately high casualties in time of war. For instance,

Hispanics are represented in the military to a lesser extent than their proportion in the

total population, constituting only 9% of enlisted personnel in FY2000, compared to

13% of the total American population in the comparable age group (18-44).37

Women are much less represented, constituting 50% of the population and about

15% of enlisted personnel.38 Hispanics and women, therefore, by being

underrepresented in the armed forces rather than overrepresented, would therefore

arguably “benefit” by their differing proportions, as presumably they would suffer

casualties below their percentage in the overall population.39

Another example of how today’s volunteer force may be more broadly

representative of the American population than some volunteer force opponents

suggest involves the inclusion of officers in an analysis of the issue. Members of the

middle and upper socioeconomic classes whose military functions are more

35

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy). Population

Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 1999. November 2000: 7-9. Hereafter

referred to as Population Representation 1999. Socioeconomic status questions were not

included in the FY2000 survey.

36

Ibid.: viii.

37

Population Representation FY2000: B-36. In FY1989, these percentages were 4 and 8

respectively, indicating that the presence of Hispanics in the armed forces had become more

representative, when compared with the total population, over the ensuing 11 years. See

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy). Population

Representation in the Military Services,FY1989: July 1990:66.

38

39

Population Representation FY2000: v.

Women, of course, would also suffer far fewer casualties because they are not allowed to

serve in ground combat units and certain special operations units, but these restrictions are

a separate issue.

CRS-14

analogous to civilian leadership positions are present in the officer corps,40 thus, it

is argued, mitigating against their proportional absence from the enlisted force.

Finally, some point out that a truly “socially representative” force should have fewer

blacks, and more whites, and many more less-qualified individuals than the Armed

Forces currently accept. Others have suggested that a logical outcome of this latter

belief could be the imposition of racial quotas (penalizing capable minority youth

who may enlist due to lack of perceived civilian opportunities), or forcing the

military to turn away high-quality recruits to make room for less capable ones.

Another statistic cited to rebut the charge of minority overrepresentation deals

with the proportion of minorities in combat units. Contrary to many impressions held

by the general population, the proportion of African-Americans in enlisted combat

occupational specialties is less than that of whites (in FY2000, 18% of white service

members served in “infantry, gun crews, and seamanship specialties,” but only 12%

of African-Americans served in these specialties).41 Within the officer corps, in

FY2000 39% of white officers served in “tactical operations”–i.e., command and

staff in combat branches and units–while 25% of black officers served in tactical

operations.42 All of these discussions clearly raise the issue about what, if any, kinds

of “representativeness” are more significant than others, and why.

Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities

There has also been, since colonial times, a debate about whether, on the one

hand, military service is a responsibility of citizenship, not subject to individual

whim as to whether it is performed or not; or, on the other, if compelling people to

perform military service if they do not wish to is in fact is a violation of individual

liberties which strikes at the heart of American democratic principles. There are, of

course, various middle grounds between these two extremes. One, which arguably

represents the national consensus today, as it has evolved since the founding of the

Republic, is that compulsory service may be acceptable in time of a major war, if

sufficient military manpower cannot be obtained through voluntary recruiting, but it

is not acceptable in peacetime. American history contains only 12 years in which a

true “peacetime” draft operated–between 1953, when the Korean War ended, and

1965, when the Vietnam War escalated into a major conflict involving large numbers

of American ground troops. However, the five sustained major wars, lasting several

years, that the Nation has fought since 1861, have seen conscription authorized by

public law and implemented.43

40

The DOD Population Representation series does not contain socioeconomic status data

on officers comparable to that it has for enlisted personnel, making direct comparisons very

difficult.

41

Population Representation FY2000: 3-14.

42

Ibid.: 4-17.

43

The Civil War, 1861-1865 (in which both the Federal and Confederate forces were

sustained by conscription); World War I, 1917-1918; World War II, 1941-1945; Korean

War, 1950-1953, and the Vietnam War, 1965-1973 (the period of major American

engagement; much smaller numbers of Americans, not including any ground combat troops,

(continued...)

CRS-15

These are only a sampling of some of the main sociological arguments made for

and against a return to conscription in anticipation of, or during, a possible war

against Iraq. There are a host of other arguments, such as who should serve if there

were a draft, that would follow if the fundamental decision for conscription was

made. The debate involves fundamental values and assumptions, and what aspects

of human existence one considers important and morally significant. As such, they

are virtually impossible to bridge, if held strongly. It remains only to note that if the

draft were resumed shortly before or after an outbreak of actual hostilities, it seems

unlikely that any draftees would actually be committed to battle before a war against

Iraq ended.

Current Status of the Draft and Action Required for

Its Reinstatement

Legal authority for the involuntary induction of men into the Armed Forces

expired on July 1, 1973, having been in continuous existence since 1948 (the World

War ll-era draft lasted from 1940-1946; there was no draft from late 1946 through

mid-1948). The last draftee actually entered the Armed Forces on December 27,

1972, with the exception of a few men who had been drafted before then but received

educational deferments and reported for induction later. A public law would be

required to reinstate an active draft.

Currently the Selective Service System operates on standby status. Young men

have been required to register with the system within 30 days before or after their

18th birthday since President Carter reinstated standby registration in 1980.44 At

present, 88% of eligible young men ages 18-25, and 92% of those 20-25, have in fact

registered as required by law. The penalty for not registering is a maximum of five

years imprisonment and/or a $250,000 fine. Nonregistrants are also ineligible for a

wide range of federal grants and loans, including most educational benefits. Women

are exempt from registration and induction.45 Statutory authority for the standby

Selective Service System (and for an active draft, should such ever be reimposed} is

contained in the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. Appendix 451 et seq.

43

(...continued)

were engaged from 1961 on).

44

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of male-only registration (and by inference

conscription) in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). However, central to the Court’s

decision was the assumption that the primary purpose of a draft would be to produce

“combat troops,” and because “women are excluded from combat by statute or military

policy, men and women are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or

registration for a draft.” However, since the Court’s decision, statutes barring women from

service in combat naval vessels or aircraft have been repealed, and women are currently

barred–and by administrative regulation, not statute–only from certain ground combat and

special operations forces units and occupational specialties, and from submarines. It might

be, then, that all-male registration and drafting would be viewed as some as more vulnerable

to a constitutional challenge.

45

50 USC App. 453 requires only men to register with the System, and 50 USC App. 454 (a)

makes certain registrants, after appropriate classification, liable for military service.

CRS-16

A standby network of trained volunteers and administrators is ready to assist in

rapidly reconstituting an active draft mechanism, should legal authority for a draft be

reinstated by the Congress. The Selective Service System is currently required to

begin delivering inductees to the armed forces within 193 days–over six months–after

a draft begins operating.46 This is a major change from the System’s stated capability

as it existed during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. At that time the System could

fully mobilize and begin inducting men in three days, deliver the first draftees to

DOD within 13 days, and deliver 100,000 draftees within 30 days after receiving the

authority to do so.47 As most of the structure that existed in 1991 is still extant, it is

possible that the System could deliver inductees much more quickly than the 193day requirement indicates, if a draft were activated. Indeed, the speed with which the

World War I and World War II draft mechanisms were created suggests that even

without a standby Selective Service System, an actual draft could be operating long

before 193 days had passed.48 (On the other hand, it may be that the current system

could in fact deliver inductees well before the 193rd day, but that DOD has stated it

simply has no military requirements for an earlier delivery.)

If the existing standby mechanism were to be reactivated, young men age 18

through 26 would be subject to induction (up to age 35 if deferred when initially

called). Current plans call for those men turning 20 in the current year to be called

first, followed as necessary by men ages 21 through 25, with those called to be

determined by a birthday-based lottery, subject to existing statutory and regulatory

exemptions and deferments. Existing plans do not envision calling 18 and 19-year

olds. Student deferments have been drastically restricted from the way in which they

operated throughout most of the draft’s post-World War II history, including most

of the Vietnam War. A 1971 law provides that undergraduate students would be

deferred only until the completion of their current semester or quarter, or, if seniors,

until graduation.49 Married men would not be exempt. For further information on the

standby Selective Service System and standby draft registration, see the System’s

website, [http://www.sss.gov].

46

See the Selective Service System website, [http://www.sss.gov].

47

Information provided by the Selective Service System in January 1991 in connection with

the preparation of CRS Report 91-103 F, The Persian Gulf War and the Draft (out of print;

available only from the author, Robert Goldich).

48

For World War I, see Chambers, John Whiteclay II. To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes

to Modern America. New York, Free Press, 1987; for World War II, see Flynn, George.

The Draft, 1940-1973. Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas: 9-52.

49

P.L. 92-129, Sept. 28, 1971; the Military Selective Service Act Amendments of 1971.

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