U.S.-India Security Relations

Order Code RL31644

Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

U.S.-India Security Relations

November 22, 2002

Amit Gupta

Consultant on South Asian Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

U.S.-India Security Relations

Summary

Since the 2000 visit by former President Clinton to India and the advent of the

Bush Administration, the United States has begun to develop a security relationship

with India. This paper looks at why this move is being made, the opportunities and

likely constraints, and what role Congress may play to facilitate the future

development of this relationship. This report discusses why the relationship has

taken off, how the United States benefits from this new relationship, and potential

problems that may emerge, both from India’s domestic constraints as well as its

perceived foreign policy objectives. This report will not be updated.

In the past two years, the United States and India have moved away from the

misperceptions of the Cold War that prevented a strong relationship between the

world’s strongest democracy and its largest one. Instead, there has been an emphasis

on common security interests that are both short term as well as those encompassing

future concerns. These interests include joint operations and patrolling, transfers of

weapons technologies to ensure interoperability, sharing information on and

countering international terrorism, and India playing a role in multilateral

peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts. The Bush Administration also seems

to view India as being a strong partner in countering China’s growing military

presence in Asia.

Problems remain within the relationship, however. Religious tensions in India,

sparked by both Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism, tend to consume governmental

resources and attention to the point that the country is diverted from more forcefully

pursuing its role in the international community. Ethnic tensions and conflicts with

Pakistan over Kashmir have also forced the Indian government to divert resources

from international issues to the maintenance of internal security.

At the external level, doubts remain in India about the value of a full-fledged

security relationship with the United States because it would mean moving away

from the country’s traditional policy of non-alignment. From the United States’s

perspective, U.S. relations with India need to be balanced by relations with Pakistan,

the needs of the war on terror, and the behavior of China.

Contents

Evolving U.S.-India Security Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

U.S.-Indian Relations: Past Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

U.S. World View and Issues Shaping the Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

India’s Role and Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Military Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Domestic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Potential for Practical Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Prospects for Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Cooperation in Afghanistan and Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Interests and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Possible Counterweight to China? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

The Nuclear Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

The Pakistan Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

This report was prepared under the research supervision of Dick K. Nanto, Head,

Asia Section; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

U.S.-India Security Relations

Evolving U.S.-India Security Relations

Since the March 2000 visit by President Clinton to India and the advent of the

Bush Administration there has been an effort, in both the United States and India, to

strengthen ties and develop a security relationship. The emerging relationship centers

around arms sales, joint training, the possibility of joint operations, and the future

emergence of India as a militarily strong democracy in Asia. At the same time, there

are potential problems within the relationship that come both from a continuing

fundamental divergence of perceptions between the two countries regarding the

rationale for closer security relations and the resolution of the India-Pakistan conflict

in Kashmir. In some ways this difference in perspectives parallels a similar

difference in U.S. and Pakistani goals and assumptions that underlay the longstanding

U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Similarly, a continued India-Pakistan rivalry may place

severe constraints on how far the emerging security relationship with India can go.

Several aspects of the emerging security relationship with India are of interest

to Congress. These are summarized here and discussed in the report. An emerging

arms sales relationship will require the approval of Congress especially since some

sales may be viewed as having the potential to escalate tensions in the region. While

the economic sanctions on India have been lifted, a restrictive interpretation of the

legislation remains in place. It requires the State Department to individually review

each application made by India. Further, the issue of technology controls is likely

to gain prominence as more transfers to India occur.

Additional issues facing Congress include:

!

The level of training of Indian customs officials and other export

monitoring personnel for maintaining effective control over dual-use

technologies.

!

Preventing the export of sensitive technologies and materiel to states

of concern.

!

The compatibility of India’s database on exports of sensitive

technologies with American systems and software.

!

The nuclear status of South Asia. (As both India and Pakistan build

up their nuclear delivery capabilities, missiles, and related systems

that have implications for the Missile Technology Control Regime

are likely to be included).

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!

Creation of an appropriate border monitoring system along the Line

of Control in Kashmir between India and Pakistan, to help reduce

tensions between the two countries.

!

Linkage of aid to Pakistan and India to talks about the safety of their

nuclear weapons.

!

Furthering the 1999 Lahore process that provided for dialog between

India and Pakistan on issues that divide them.

U.S.-Indian Relations: Past Security Concerns

In the past, U.S.-Indian relations have been marked by divergent world views

that led both countries never to develop the type of relations that the United States

had with other major democracies, despite several instances of overlapping security

interests. Initial suspicions about post-independence India stemmed from its

unwillingness to commit to the western alliance in the emerging Cold War as well

as India’s adoption of a quasi-socialist economy. While the relationship briefly

blossomed during and immediately after the Korean war, with India as a member of

the United Nations armistice commission, it soon ran aground with the twin crises

of 1956–Hungary and Suez. India condemned the Israeli-French-British invasion of

Suez but was far more reluctant to condemn the Soviet Union’s brutal crushing of the

Hungarian revolt. Relations between the two countries again briefly flourished after

the Sino-Indian war of 1962 when the United States transferred conventional

weapons to India, discussed covering India under its nuclear umbrella, and for a

while was inclined to set up intelligence posts in the country to monitor China. At

the economic level, India became a major recipient of U.S. assistance. The United

States provided significant amounts of food aid to India in the 1960s to first tide over

the country during the Bihar famine and, later, to start an agricultural Green

Revolution in the country.

Subsequent attempts to get India and Pakistan to negotiate a settlement on the

disputed state of Kashmir, however, made the Indian government distance itself from

the United States. At the same time, growing Soviet problems with China led to a

strengthening of the India-Soviet Union relationship—particularly in the sphere of

military cooperation. By 1971 India and the Soviet Union signed a security treaty

that permitted India the freedom to militarily counter Pakistan. India-U.S relations

reached their lowest point in 1971 during the Bangladesh war. Indian officials

believe that the Nixon Administration sent an aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Enterprise,

into the Bay of Bengal to put pressure on India to halt the military campaign against

Pakistan.1

The relationship remained cool in the 1970s both due to American

disinterest–the Vietnam war and events in the Middle East had taken priority in U.S.

foreign policy–and because India, in 1974, decided to test a nuclear device. U.S.

1

Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States (Washington, D.C.:

National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 307.

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nonproliferation measures were automatically implemented against India, and the

1974 test led to a tightening of both U.S. nonproliferation policies (with the GlennSymington Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and the 1978 Nuclear

Nonproliferation Act) as well as those of other western suppliers–through the

creation of the London Club in 1975 and the decision by western nuclear suppliers

to ask for “fullscope” safeguards over any future technology transfers to other

countries. At the same time, the United States had decreasing interest in Pakistan

because it no longer had a relevant role as a frontline state in the Cold War.

A situation of disinterest changed after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The United States, seeking to contain Soviet expansion toward the Indian Ocean and

the Persian Gulf, decided to supply arms to Pakistan and to use Pakistani territory as

the conduit for supplying weapons to and training for the Afghan Mujahideen. This

was done even while it became apparent that Pakistan had decided to follow India

and initiate a nuclear weapons program. Although the personal relationship between

President Reagan and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was cordial, and her son

and successor Rajiv Gandhi was able to garner considerable goodwill in the United

States, the rationale of the Cold War kept the two countries apart. It was also during

the Rajiv Gandhi period (1984-1989) that the first discussions about transferring

defense related technology began. India expressed an interest in purchasing

American avionics and powerplants for its Light Combat Aircraft program.2

It was only after the end of the Cold War and the coming to power of the

Narasimha Rao government in India in 1991 that relations began to improve. The

new Indian government, recognizing that the economy was in a crisis, sought to carry

out a series of structural and market reforms that relaxed previous obstacles to

foreign investment in the country and allowed the economy to be rejuvenated. Indian

and American groups began to meet to discuss defense cooperation, especially the

transfer of technologies to assist in the development of India’s indigenous

conventional weapons production programs. At the same time, the first Bush

Administration declared in 1990 that Pakistan was not complying with

nonproliferation measures and cut off military and economic aid to Islamabad (the

President could not certify under the Pressler Amendment of 1985 that Pakistan did

not have a nuclear explosive device).

The Clinton Administration sought to improve relations further, but the May

1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan led to another series of sanctions being

imposed on both countries. While subsequent congressional amendments were to

pull back most of the economic sanctions, key ones remained, particularly in the area

of military technology transfers. India’s Light Combat Aircraft program was delayed

because of the inability to obtain General Electric F-404 powerplants to power the

prototypes. While sanctions led to a cooling down in the relationship, the United

States was proactive in keeping the peace between the two nuclear neighbors.

After the nuclear tests of 1998, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott

conducted nine rounds of meetings with India’s then foreign minister Jaswant Singh

2

See Raju G.C. Thomas, “U.S. Transfers of “Dual-Use” Technologies to India,” Asian

Survey, Vol XXX, No. 9, September 1990, pp. 840-843.

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to try and reduce the dangers emanating from both countries’ going overtly nuclear.

The discussions led to a shift in U.S. policy on nuclear issues in the region. The

earlier position of the Clinton Administration was to “cap, reduce, and rollback” the

nuclear programs of both countries. This position changed, at least in the short term,

to one of urging India and Pakistan keep their nuclear forces non-deployed and at the

lowest possible levels.3

The Clinton Administration also made a significant differentiation between

India, which it treated as a nuclear democracy, and other proliferating states whom

it first labeled rogue states and later states of concern. By treating India and Pakistan

differently, it was able to continue developing relations with the two

countries–although far more warmly with India than Pakistan–while seeking to limit

the damage caused by regional proliferation. At the same time the Clinton

Administration successfully practiced international crisis diplomacy in the region.

In 1999, during the Kargil crisis (which followed a Pakistani advance into a

remote, high altitude part of Kashmir on the India side of the Line of Control), the

United States was instrumental in getting Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the

Kargil and Drass sectors of Indian Kashmir and in staving off a potential full-scale

nuclear conflict between the two countries. Former White House staffer Bruce

Riedel has revealed that President Clinton applied pressure on the Nawaz Sharif

government in Pakistan to back down and that the Pakistan military was thought to

be readying its nuclear warheads.4 The United States, however, did proceed to

develop bilateral linkages with India on issues of mutual interest–one such forum

being the Joint Commission of Counterterrorism.

The relationship took a turn for the better with the advent of the second Bush

Administration which saw India as playing an important role in future U.S. policy

towards Asia. As Secretary of State Colin Powell put it in his confirmation hearing,

We must deal more wisely with the world’s largest democracy. Soon to be the

most populous country in the world, India has the potential to help keep the

peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder

and more consistently to assist India in this endeavor, while not neglecting our

friends in Pakistan.5

It has been argued that this appraisal of India’s position came from the

Administration’s stance that China was no longer just a major trading partner but had

become a strategic competitor that needed to be contained in Asia. This proposed

3

For a discussion of U.S. policy see Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the bomb in South

Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, March 1999, p. 120.

4

The U.S. role in getting Pakistan’s troops to withdraw from Kargil is described in Bruce

Riedel, Center for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series 2002, “American

Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” available at

[http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm].

5

Washington File, January 17, 2001.

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strategy gained further credence after the April 2001collision and forced landing of

a Navy PC-3 surveillance aircraft by the Chinese Air Force.

By the mid-2001 it seemed that India and the United States were headed toward

building a new relationship that was based on military ties and an increasingly

similar world view. Thus the Indian government was one of the first to endorse the

Bush Administration’s National Missile Defense proposal, especially welcoming the

fact that missile defense would go hand in hand with deep cuts in U.S. nuclear

arsenals. There was also some degree of agreement between the two countries on the

limitations of the International Criminal Court, particularly on the issue of

peacekeepers. The two governments also decided not to criticize each other in

public—thus moving away from a policy that the Indians had followed in the Cold

War days. Indian concerns about the U.S. stand on the Kyoto treaty were conveyed

privately to the Bush Administration. The administration, similarly, was muted in

its criticism of India’s test of a 700 kilometer medium range Agni-1 missile in early

2002.6

The attacks of September 11, 2001, however, saw the United States, much to

India’s consternation, renew its security relationship with Pakistan.7 India offered

unconditional support to the United States including basing rights for carrying out an

air campaign over Afghanistan, but Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan made it

necessary for the United States to renew its alliance with Islamabad. Indian concerns

about terrorism were highlighted by the attack on the Indian parliament on December

13, 2001, which was viewed in New Delhi as an attack carried out reportedly by the

banned Lashkar-e-Taiba group at the behest of Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence

(ISI).8 India mobilized its armed forces and placed them on the border with Pakistan

but decided not to pursue a military action following a U.S. undertaking to put

pressure on President Musharraf to halt cross- border infiltration. New Delhi has not

been completely satisfied with these efforts because infiltration reportedly was not

totally halted. There has been some talk among analysts in India that the United

States’s ability to intervene successfully in South Asian crises is declining and that

India, in future crises, will have to rely on itself to address the problems posed by

Pakistan-supported infiltration.9

While in India some dissatisfaction exists about U.S. policy, particularly the

need in Washington D.C. to continue to develop the relationship with Pakistan, more

pragmatic goals have ensured that U.S.-Indian security cooperation has continued.

The three branches of the armed services of the two countries have set up executive

steering groups to facilitate greater cooperation, a joint forum on terrorism continues

to work, and Indian government officials attended a ballistic missile defense

6

Dennis Kux, “India’s Fine Balance,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, Vol. 81, No. 3, p.

97.

7

ibid.

8

Ranjit Bhushan, “Shock Therapy.” Outlook India, December 24, 2001.

9

K. Subrahmanyam, “Enduring Failures: US dancing to Pakistan’s tune,” The Times of

India, July 26, 2002.

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conference in Colorado Springs and showed interest in acquiring such a system for

India.10

The Bush Administration has, however, made it clear that India will play a

significant role in its security world view. The Administration’s new national

security strategy states:

Several potential great powers are now in the midst of internal transition–most

importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three cases, recent developments

have encouraged our hope that a truly global consensus about basic principles is

slowly taking shape.” [The report continues,] “The United States has undertaken

a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that

U.S. interests require a stronger relationship with India. We are the two largest

democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative

government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We

have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including the vital sea

lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and

in creating a strategically stable Asia.

[Further,] “Differences remain, including over the development of India’s

nuclear and missile programs, and the pace of Indian economic reforms. But

while in the past these concerns may have dominated our thinking about India,

today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we

have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership with India, we

can best address any differences and shape a dynamic future.”11

U.S. World View and Issues Shaping the Relationship

In the post-September 11, 2001 era, the United States now faces a challenge not

only from hostile states but also from nonstate actors who are capable of globalized

operations. The United States’ technological superiority gives it a global reach and

an overwhelming conventional superiority over its opponents, as was demonstrated

in the 1991 Gulf War, in Kosovo, and more recently during Operation Enduring

Freedom in Afghanistan. There are, however, several problems that have become

apparent in the exercise of U.S. military power.

First, the expanding global obligations of the United States have increased both

the number and type of missions that the country’s armed forces have to perform

against both state and nonstate actors. Second, waging war on two or more fronts

imposes a severe strain on the capabilities of the United States armed forces. The

concerns raised about undertaking a war in Iraq even while Afghanistan remains

unfinished business is a case in point, as it shows how much of a strain is put on U.S.

military infrastructure, personnel, and logistics. Third, in the new threat

environment, prevention including preemption, if necessary, has become of

10

Joint Statement Meeting of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group, Washington D.C., May

20-23, 2002.

11

The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, pp. 26-27.

Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov.nsc.nss.pdf].

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paramount importance. Gathering adequate information about various nonstate

actors requires cooperation from nations that until recently were not considered as

being in the forefront of the war against terrorism or even potential allies–Syria and

Pakistan being good examples.

Fourth, the United States has demonstrated conclusively that it has the ability

to wage war in any part of the world and to predominate there. What is more

difficult is the development of a successful exit strategy from a post-conflict nation

or region. This is particularly difficult given that some of the nations in which the

United States seeks to intervene are failed states that require a nation-building effort

in order to achieve future stability. Indeed, two of the most successful U.S. nation

building efforts–the reconstruction of post-war Germany and Japan–saw a heavy

infusion of capital and the continued stationing of troops in these countries.12 The

United States has committed troops to breakaway states of the former Yugoslavia,

deployed forces in Central Asia, and the debate continues about how long American

troops need to remain in Afghanistan.

Fifth, because the United States desires multilateral cooperation especially in

the post-conflict nation-building phase, there is a need for future allies who are

willing to engage in such global efforts. The apparent unwillingness of most of the

European allies to commit forces to an invasion of Iraq suggests that there may be a

need for a broader pool of nations from which to seek such future commitment.

Additionally, as U.S. operations increasingly take place in the nonwestern, and now

Muslim, world there is a need for nonwestern allies to show that such actions are not

cases of western imperialism, but instead, of genuine international concern that

require intervention by the entire global community.

Finally, the Administration perceives the need to seek new alliances in Asia.

Japan, the principal U.S. ally in the continent, has moved considerably in the

direction of providing non-lethal logistical support to U.S. forces. Tokyo maintains

its restrictive policies regarding the use of force and the deployment of its armed

forces for out-of-country operations. At the same time, there exists the potential

challenge posed by a China that is modernizing its military and continues to have

territorial disputes with several neighbors (most notably its claim to Taiwan). As one

analyst suggests, a strong India raises the price of China’s military buildup and

expansionist policies in Asia.13 The growing challenge posed by terrorist groups in

South and South East Asia may also require more troops for anti-terrorist operations,

peacekeeping, and peace enforcement missions. In these circumstances, an

additional ally that is democratic, militarily capable, and possibly willing to engage

in the regional and global military operations may be valuable. As China grows as

a military power, there may also be the need to have alternate centers of power in

Asia that can challenge Chinese dominance of the region.

12

The Administration has reportedly decided that it will have to pursue a reconstruction

strategy in a post-war Iraq in much the same way as past administrations did in Germany and

Japan. See, “A Postwar Plan,” The Washington Post, October 17, 2002.

13

Lloyd Richardson, “Now, Play the India Card,” Policy Review, No. 115, 2002.

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India’s Role and Capabilities

India is a potential ally in the pursuit of American foreign policy and

international security goals. Despite sectarian and ethnic challenges to its political

structure and territorial integrity, India has remained a united and democratic country

for more than fifty years. In this period, its scientific capability has grown to the

point that the country is emerging as a software powerhouse and its space program

has made impressive progress. India hopes by 2008 to emerge as an “information

superpower” with sales of more than $50 billion.14 The space program is

commercially viable, produces some of the best unclassified images, and Indian

scientists now claim that in five years they hope to launch a lunar probe.15 One of the

areas in which President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee agreed the two countries

should cooperate was civilian space technology. The Indians have recently proposed

that India and the United States cooperate in the mapping of resources in

Afghanistan. This would facilitate developmental and reconstruction efforts in that

country.16

Coupled with these advantages is the existence of a large, professional Indian

military that has considerable experience in international peacekeeping operations.

India has also, in the past decade, displayed a limited ability to project power both

in the region and extraregionally. The Indian Navy has created an expanded role for

itself in the Indian Ocean region and is now conducting joint exercises with the U.S.

Navy and is escorting U.S. naval assets through the Straits of Malacca.17 During the

1990-1991 Gulf War, the Indian government was able to airlift a large number of

Indians who had been stranded in Iraq following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

For the United States, a bourgeoning security relationship could create a military

counterbalance to China in Asia. This could help reassure American allies who have

watched China’s military buildup, the development of its missile and space

capabilities, its claims to disputed maritime territories, and its bellicose language

over Taiwan with concern. A small Indian nuclear deterrent and its large

conventional capability could possibly add to China’s threat calculus and thus help

restrain its regional behavior. Joint naval patrols potentially free American ships to

carry out more important tasks particularly pursuing military action in other parts of

the world. The Indian military could also play a crucial part in the nationbuilding

efforts that the United States may pursue after future conflicts. These possibilities

for cooperation, however, would have to tempered by the military and political

constraints that prevail in India.

14

“Make India economic superpower: Minister,” The Hindu, September 20, 2002.

15

R.K. Rao and Gian Trotta, “India Sets Sights on Moon”, Space.Com available at

[http://www.space.com/SpaceReportersNetworkAstronomyDiscoveries/Rao_Indiamoon_

022502.html].

16

17

V. Sudarshan, “Nuclear Family?” Outlook India, October 7, 2002.

Chidnand Rajghatta, “India, U.S. to hold joint naval exercises,” The Times of India,

September 26, 2002.

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Military Constraints

India’s military is a mix between a modern military force and a traditional

military, where the army predominates and tactics are conservative. A series of

highly publicized arms purchases have given the Indian military a technological edge

in its region as well as the potential to project power extraregionally. India in recent

years has acquired advanced Su-30 and Mirage 2000 aircraft. It has also upgraded

its submarine fleet by purchasing a number of Russian Kilo class boats and is set to

acquire French submarines. Its armored regiments are to receive new Russian T-90

tanks. Its long range capability has been enhanced by the acquisition of long range

transport aircraft, landing ships, and the reported leasing of two nuclear submarines.

India remains in discussions with Russia for the purchase of the Admiral Gorshkov

aircraft carrier.18 In the past decade, India has also developed a strong military

relationship with Israel to the extent that Tel Aviv has become the second largest

supplier of weapons to New Delhi. These systems include the Phalcon airborne early

warning system, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the proposed sale of the Arrow antiballistic missile system.19

Coupled with such high-profile purchases are a set of indigenous arms

production efforts that have boosted the country’s military capability. These include

the nuclear, space, and missile programs. The missile program has provided India

with a ballistic missile capability that in the coming decade is expected to allow it to

target China’s eastern seaboard.20 The Indian draft nuclear doctrine of 1999 states

that the country will acquire a triad (of land, air, and sea based nuclear weapons) with

space based assets to direct it thus giving India a comprehensive nuclear capability.21

This arms buildup is complemented by the existence of a professional military that

has respected India’s strong tradition of civilian control over the armed forces.

At the same time, there are constraints on the development of this military force

into a truly modern one. Several of India’s conventional weapons programs have

been marked by delays and sub-standard products that have not been acceptable to

18

Col. Stanislav Lunev, “Russian Arms Sales Booming,” NewsMax.com, September 29,

2000, available at [http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=2000/9/29/132221].

19

Seema Mustafa, “Israel emerges as second biggest arms supplier to India, after

Russia,”Insas, available at, {http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/aug_01/is_emerge.htm]. For

information on Indian force levels, recent acquisitions, and arms production programs see

Bharat Rakshak:The Consortium of Indian Military Websites, available at

[http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/]

20

Ben Sheppard, “Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: The Ramifications for Regional

Stability,” Paper presented to the Brookings Institution, April 5, 2001, available at

[http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/fp/projects/south_asia/events/20010405.htm].

21

While official Indian sources stress that the draft nuclear doctrine is just that and that the

Indian government of the day would decide the country’s current nuclear posture, the force

buildup that India is carrying out suggests that India’s long term goal is to develop a triad

with a space based surveillance and targeting capability.

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its military.22 It, therefore, continues to remain dependent on external suppliers for

a range of systems required for warfighting. The development of the nuclear force

is progressing at a relatively slow pace, leading some analysts to describe India as

a “reluctant nuclearizer” or pursuing “creeping weaponization.”23 Indian analysts talk

of the country’s nuclear capability being developed over a period of several

decades–which may assume that both Pakistan’s and China’s responses will be fairly

static to such developments.

Additionally, India’s military doctrine remains one that is rooted in military

tactics that favor the large scale employment of land forces. Thus the role of air

power and the increasing use of precision guided munitions and unmanned air

vehicles are now being integrated into Indian military doctrine. This attitude was

best exemplified in the two military confrontations with Pakistan in the Kargil area

of the Line of Control–the de facto border that separates the two countries in

Kashmir. In the first Kargil crisis, in 1999, the Indian army insisted on trying to

retake the peaks captured by Pakistani troops and mujahideen and subsequently

suffered heavy casualties in the process.24 It was only when air power was employed

that the Pakistani occupying forces suffered severe casualties, and India began to turn

the tide in the conflict. Similarly, in the July-August 2002 skirmish between India

and Pakistan in the Kargil area, the Indian army reportedly tried once again to carry

out the mission on its own and only at a later date sought the help of the air force.

Also within intellectual and policy circles in India, the remnants of Cold War

suspicions of the United States still exist. These suspicions are manifest in warnings

of the dangers of a unipolar international system and the need for a balancing force

against the U.S. power. These analysts also argue that foregoing India’s traditional

policy of nonalignment and moving closer to the United States means becoming a

satellite state in the American camp and losing independence in foreign policy. As

K. Natwar Singh, the Indian National Congress’s spokesman on foreign affairs, put

it, “The broad foreign policy framework left behind by Nehru has stood us in good

stead. There is no other foreign policy India can follow without becoming a

satellite.”25 Indian analysts and government officials also remain concerned that the

United States has not put enough pressure on Pakistan to prevent cross border

infiltration in Indian Kashmir.26

22

This was the case with the Marut fighter and for objections raised about the Arjun Main

Battle Tank, see Sardar F.S. Lodi, “India’s Indigenous Tank Production–A Stalled Effort,”

Defense Journal, September 2001, available at

[http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/september/tank.htm].

23

Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and

Ready Arsenal, (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, 2001), p. 474.

24

See Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, (New Haven and London: Yale

University Press, 2002), pp. 86-104.

25

“Bad domestic policy can never produce good results,” Frontline, Volume 19, Issue 16,

August 3-16, 2002.

26

Chidanand Rajghatta, “Testy Indo-US ties mark Powell’s India, Pak visit,” The Times of

India, July 26, 2002.

CRS-11

Domestic Constraints

Two sets of domestic constraints are viewed as affecting the course of the U.S.India relationship. One is the state of the Indian economy and its potential for future

growth (which is discussed in the section on China). The other stems from concerns

about India’s ability to resolve ethno-religious tensions that could threaten the unity

of the country or, at the very least, bog its leadership down in efforts to maintain

domestic harmony. This could prevent India from securing a role of global

leadership. It could also limit any potential cooperation between the United States

and India, as U.S. concerns about human rights violations may restrict the pace of

growth in the relationship. An important part of the second concern is the role of the

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its espoused agenda of Hindutva (the Hindu way

of life).

The BJP’s espousal of Hindutva is viewed with concern by both minority groups

in India as well as other political parties in the Indian political system. Minority

groups see Hindutva as destroying the secular fabric of India, while mainstream

political parties suggest that it is undemocratic and goes against the constitutional

process nurtured in India since 1947.27

Internationally, the 2002 Gujarat riots raised concerns about Hindu radicalism

and subsequent statements by sections of the BJP’s support organizations–the Sangh

Parivar (BJP family)–have been seen as threatening to Muslims. The BJP’s ability

to achieve Hindutva, however, is severely circumscribed by India’s democratic

institutions as well as by coalitional politics in the country.

Democratic institutions like the judiciary and the election commission have

successfully resisted efforts to push through measures on the Hindutva agenda such

as building a temple at a disputed site in Ayodhya (where the Babri Masjid Mosque

used to be). The election commission conducted, what was internationally accepted,

as a, by and large, fair and free election in Indian Kashmir in 2002. The National

Conference, a coalition partner of the BJP, lost the elections. The BJP did not seek

to rig the elections and has abided by the electoral verdict. This would not have been

possible had the BJP been committed to ensuring that the election results were in its

favor and had used the state machinery to win. Similarly, the election commission

has refused to bow to pressure from the Gujarat state chief minister, Narendra Modi,

who has been calling for early assembly elections in the state.28

Indian coalitional politics also put a brake on the ability of the more radical

elements in the BJP to fulfill the Hindutva agenda. In 1998, when the BJP first set

up a coalition government, it was unable to push through any of the more provocative

promises on its manifesto. These included building a temple at Ayodhya and setting

up a uniform civil code in the country (India, at present, has different civil codes in

some areas to take into account the religious needs of different minority groups). In

27

28

C.P. Bhambri, “Hindutva and Multi-Culturalism,” The Hindu, December 6, 1998.

“Nothing wrong with Election commission order on Gujarat polls: SC,” Rediff.Com,

available at [http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/sep/02guj.htm.]

CRS-12

fact, the only position on the manifesto that was acceptable to India’s mainstream

political parties, was the decision to resume nuclear testing.29

The Gujarat riots of February 2002 left some 2,000 people dead, and the inept

handling of the riots by the state government, which many analysts believe was

prompted by sectarian considerations, led to India being severely criticized by the

international community.30 This also raised fears that India’s secular form of

government was being torn apart. While a serious problem for the country, the

important issues are how the Indian and Gujarat state government will deal with the

perpetrators of the riots and whether, as some analysts believe, the riots work to

cement the position of the BJP in the forthcoming state elections.

Since the 1980s, the Indian legal system has done a fairly effective job of

bringing to justice criminals who initiate sectarian violence. Several of the main

culprits in the anti-Sikh riots of 1984 (that followed the assassination of Prime

Minister Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards), including a cabinet minister,

were jailed for their role in those killings. In the case of Gujarat, both Muslims and

Hindus who committed murder and acts of violence are yet to be brought to justice.

The BJP has lost the last three state elections in India including the 2002 state

assembly elections in Kashmir where its ally, the National Conference, lost its

monopoly over state power. It has been argued that the BJP’s popularity came not

from its pursuit of Hindutva but from its appearance as a relatively uncorrupt political

party and from the stature of its Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee. Mr.

Vajpayee is not only perceived as a moderate in the BJP but also seems to be widely

regarded as a true statesman in Indian politics. Moreover, Hindutva has little impact

in the southern states of India where regional parties have held sway.

A balanced assessment of India’s political system would suggest that the

country’s democratic institutions remain strong even though some sections within the

political process are pushing to change the Nehruvian-style democracy that has held

the country together for over fifty years. Further, in a situation of coalition politics,

that is likely to continue; no party can stray too far from a centrist agenda without

courting electoral disaster.

India’s democratic system will likely continue to face challenges from religious

and ethnic groups. But the strength of democratic institutions, that are vital for any

party to successfully govern the country, as well as the tremendous diversity within

the nation, make it difficult for extremist ideologies to successfully entrench

themselves as statist policies. This is not to say that ethnic and religious rivalries will

be successfully resolved in the future. But their ability to seriously destabilize the

Indian state may be questioned, and they do not seem likely to affect U.S.-Indian

security cooperation in the near term.

29

Amit Gupta, “South Asian Nuclear Choices,” Armed Forces Journal International,

September 1998, p. 24.

30

“We Have No Orders To Save You”State Participation and Complicity in Communal

Violence in Gujarat,” Human Rights Watch, Vol. 14, No. 3, April 2002, p.4.

CRS-13

Potential for Practical Cooperation

At the last meeting of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group in Washington D.C.

(May 20-23rd, 2002), the two countries stated that they had achieved the following

results in defense cooperation:

!

combined naval patrols in the Straits of Malacca,

!

resumption of defense trade, beginning with the Firefinder radar

sale,

!

combined special forces airborne exercises in Agra,

!

U.S.-India Ballistic Missile Defense workshop in Colorado Springs,

and

!

signing of a General Security of Military Information Agreement to

facilitate cooperation in defense technology.31

Based on these results, what are the likely areas in which security cooperation

between the two countries may occur? At present, three areas have been identified:

joint cooperation on counterterrorism, cooperation between the armed forces of both

countries in regard to localized threats (except Pakistan), and transfers of military

technology to India. The easiest of these fields in which to implement cooperation

should be the transfer of military technology, particularly that of electronics and

subcomponents. But it is constrained by legislative restrictions and pressure from

within the executive branch to pursue nonproliferation objectives.

One of the key concerns during the Cold War period was that systems

transferred to India would fall in the hands of the then Soviet Union. Now, through

recent negotiations, U.S. officials have obtained a pledge from their Indian

counterparts that U.S. technologies would not be transferred to other countries–the

General Security of Military Information Agreement.

Indian requirements in this area appear principally to be in the form of

subsystems to bring their existing weapons platforms to a higher technological level.

This would include avionics for aircraft, components to enhance the space program,

and to create a modern communications system that would permit the Indian armed

forces to effectively communicate amongst themselves and with future coalition

partners. While there are ongoing discussions about achieving interoperability

between the armed forces of the United States and India, this will not be possible

until Indian armed forces have the advanced communications capability that enables

them to communicate fully and exchange real time data with American forces.

The United States government has also taken a positive attitude on the sale of

third party systems to India. It allowed Israel to sell the Phalcon airborne early

31

Joint Statement Meeting of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group, Washington D.C., May

20-23, 2002.

CRS-14

warning system to India after not allowing Israel to sell the system to China. A key

index of the new security relationship is whether the Bush Administration will permit

the sale of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system to India. At the last meeting of the

Defense Policy Group the two sides decided to hold a future missile defense

workshop in New Delhi and “agreed on the value of pursuing a missile defense

requirements analysis for India.”32

From the Indian perspective, the sale of the missile defense system will

strengthen India’s “no first use” nuclear doctrine, since it would enhance its

capability to survive a first use of nuclear weapons against it. The system

presumably not only would be useful against Pakistan, but also against China which

currently enjoys missile superiority over India.

Opponents of the Arrow deal with Israel argue that it will destabilize the region,

because it would enhance India’s nuclear capability and encourage it to engage in a

first use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan.33 Even if the United States vetoed the

deal it would not stop the Indians from procuring a ballistic missile defense capability

from other sources–albeit less capable ones. India is reportedly looking into the

purchase of the Soviet S-300 anti-missile system–a system meant to provide theater

missile defense.34 U.S. approval of the Arrow deal also has symbolic overtones.

India was one of the first nations to support President Bush’s call for a missile

defense and, subsequently, has sent officials to the United States to be briefed on the

ongoing progress in the area. India has indicated that it would like to be included in

the development of a U.S. missile defense capability and hopes to have such a

capability tailored to its requirements.35 As the Bush Administration attempts to sell

the idea to skeptical allies and other friendly countries, the willingness to share the

technology may help create a more favorable international environment on the issue.

32

Joint Statement Meeting of the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group, Washington D.C., May

20-23, 2002.

33

One needs to differentiate between a first strike and a first use of nuclear weapons. A first

strike would suggest that significant damage could be inflicted on an opponent’s nuclear and

military capability. First use, on the other hand, is the propensity to initiate the use of such

weapons in a conventional conflict. At present, both India and Pakistan seem to lack the

number of weapons, the accuracy, and the command and control systems to carry out a first

strike. Even with the availability of the Arrow system it is difficult to make the argument

that India will have a first-strike capability. The type of space and air surveillance capability

required to gather information on the Pakistani nuclear force will take several more years

to acquire. For details see Dinshaw Mistry, “The geostrategic implications of India’s space

program,”Asian Survey, Nov-Dec 2001 Vol. 41, No. 6, pp. 1023-1044.

34

“Agreement on S-300 ABM System Likely,” Strategic Affairs, September 1, 2001,

available at [http://www.stratmag.com/issue2Sep-1/page02.htm].

35

Indian observers point out that not only is missile defense in its infancy, but India will

have to take several additional measures to collaborate effectively with the United States

Missile Defense Agency. These would include establishing linkages between its national

surveillance grid and America’s worldwide surveillance system. See, “Talks on with U.S.

to acquire missile shield,” The Hindu, June 29, 2002.

CRS-15

Another problem with both third party and direct U.S. arms sales to India comes

from their impact on peace and security in South Asia. Pakistani President Pervez

Musharraf has called upon the United States to not sell high technology weapons to

India, since it would encourage New Delhi to carry out aggression against Pakistan.

Arms sales to India also lead to the demand from Pakistan for the sale of

commensurate systems, so that it can maintain some form of military balance with

India.36

The Indian government, however, views major U.S. arms sales to Pakistan as

destabilizing to the region.37 Indian officials argue that each time Pakistan has

acquired weapons from the United States, it has turned them on India–as was the case

in both the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars.38 Replenishing the Pakistani arsenal,

therefore, would lead Islamabad, Indian analysts believe, to pursue an aggressive

policy towards India, particularly on the Kashmir issue.

One option the United States is pursuing is to sell both countries the technology

of peace–i.e., monitoring devices, sensors, and surveillance equipment that would

be useful for monitoring their borders and for reducing potential tensions in the

region. Indian claims of cross-border infiltration from Pakistan and Pakistan’s denial

of such infiltration has been the source of current tensions between the two countries.

International efforts at reducing tensions have included proposals such as

placing a United Nations force in the area, something that Pakistan might favor since

it would internationalize its dispute with India over Kashmir.

India’s

counterproposal was for joint patrolling of the border, although both countries admit

that given the poisoned atmosphere between the two countries such patrolling would

not be feasible in the near future.

India has agreed to purchase monitoring and surveillance equipment from the

Sandia National Laboratories to track and prevent infiltration. For both India and

Pakistan, such equipment would serve both political and genuine security concerns.

Surveillance equipment would help in monitoring Pakistan’s sensitive western border

with Afghanistan. This remains a medium term concern for the United States as the

presence of al Qaeda in the region has not been eradicated. Monitoring systems

along the India-Pakistan border–particularly the Line of Control in Kashmir–would

give credence to Pakistan’s claims that it has stopped supporting cross-border

infiltration. India could benefit from preventing what has become a damaging set of

terrorist attacks on its home soil.39

36

Recent reports indicate that Pakistan is seeking to acquire a tactical anti-ballistic missile

system from the United States to counter Indian developments in the area, Aroosa Alam,

“Pakistan to acquire anti-ballistic missile system,” The Pakistan Observer, November 5,

2002.

37

Chidnand Rajghatta, “Testy Indo-US ties mark Powell’s India, Pak visit,” The Times of

India, July 26, 2002.

38

Kux, Estranged Democracies, pp. 86-87, 108-109, 264,-265, and p. 294.

39

For a discussion of the prospects for monitoring the India-Pakistan border and the

(continued...)

CRS-16

Prospects for Joint Operations

Given U.S. needs for coalition partners, India could possibly emerge as a nation

willing to participate in multilateral operations, particularly after actual hostilities

have ended. India has a long history of participation in United Nations peacekeeping

efforts. The Indian Army’s first U.N. assignment came during the Korean War when

it sent a field ambulance group to participate in the conflict. After the Korean War,

India contributed an infantry brigade in the Congo (in 1961) to carry out a peace

enforcement mission. Subsequent U.N. missions have included the Gaza, Cambodia,

Somalia, Namibia, Lebanon, and recently sending troops to monitor the border

between Ethiopia and Eritrea. India has participated in more than 30 U.N. missions

over a fifty-year span and contributed over 50,000 Indian soldiers to the international

organization’s peacekeeping efforts.40

India has been an important provider of troops for peacekeeping and peace

enforcement efforts because its military has the experience of operating over varied

terrain–from mountains and glaciers in the Himalaya, to deserts in Rajasthan, and

to jungles in the North East of India. The Indian military also has, as Major General

Arjun Ray points out, “continuing operational experience in the entire spectrum of

conflict, from operations other than war (OOTW), to low intensity conflict,

conventional warfighting, and nuclear warfare”41 The Indian military can support

fairly large formations for protracted periods in less developed areas. It was able to

extricate a brigade group from Somalia, and its air force and navy provide the ability

to air lift and sea lift logistics overseas.

India’s reputation as a center for software development and its growing space

capability also have implications for its role in peacekeeping and enforcement

measures. Indian troops and personnel could be used for manning high technology

equipment, while Indian space resources could be used for mapping areas of conflict

(in the latter area there is a growing interest in bringing about civilian space

cooperation between the United States and India). Finally, India has set up a

peacekeeping training center in New Delhi to help train potential peacekeepers.

Cooperation in Afghanistan and Central Asia

In practical terms, there already is an emergence of U.S.-Indian security

cooperation in naval patrols and in the attempt to stabilize Afghanistan and parts of

39

(...continued)

available technologies to do so see, Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Enhancing

Security through a Cooperative Border Monitoring Experiment: A Proposal for India and

Pakistan,” Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional

Paper/21, July 2001 (Albuquerque, New Mexico).

40

Major General Arjun Ray, India’s Experience in Peacekeeping, Capacity Building, and

Training of UN Peacekeepers, paper presented at UN International Seminar on

Peacekeeping, New Delhi, March 17-19, 1999, available at

[http://www.indembassy.org/policy/Peace_Keeping/UN_Seminar_ray.htm.]

41

Ray, ibid.

CRS-17

Central Asia. The Indian Navy has escorted U.S. naval vessels from the Straits of

Malacca to the Arabian Sea, thus freeing up U.S. naval assets for other operations.

The Indian role in Afghanistan and Central Asia, while driven by the country’s

own strategic interests, also complements U.S. objectives in the region. In order to

counter the Taliban, which was pro-Pakistani and was reportedly helping train

Kashmiri insurgents, India provided military aid to Tajikistan and the Northern

Alliance.42 It set up a 25-bed hospital at Farkhor, Tajikistan in 2001. The Northern

Alliance military commander, Ahmad Shah Masood, who was assassinated in

September 2001, died in the Indian-run hospital. Indian sources add that,

Through Tajikistan, India also reportedly supplied the Northern Alliance high

altitude warfare equipment worth around $8 million. A handful of Indian defence

“advisers” who reportedly included an officer in the rank of Brigadier, were

based in Tajikistan to advise the Northern Alliance in operations against the

Taliban. Helicopter technicians from the clandestine Aviation Research Centre

(ARC) operated by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), repaired the

Northern Alliance’s Soviet-made Mi-17 and Mi-35 attack helicopters.43

In April 2002, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes visited Dushanbe and

signed an agreement to place a military base at Farkhor, near the Afghan border.

Under the agreement, the Indian military will “train Tajik defence personnel, service

and retrofit their Soviet and Russian military equipment and teach its army and air

force personnel English.”44 India and Tajikistan are expected to collaborate in

combating drug trafficking. This could be important since Afghanistan’s heroin

harvest is likely to be smuggled out of long-used routes through Tajikistan into the

West.

India is also helping the Karzai government in Kabul to enhance its security

structure and has committed itself to providing $100 million in economic

assistance.45 As mentioned earlier, India would like to cooperate with the United

States to use space-based assets to map the resources of Afghanistan.46 India’s

military presence in Central Asia, and Afghanistan, while modest, may help protect

U.S. interests.

42

India reportedly gave $10 million worth of high altitude warfare equipment to the

Northern alliance and used Tajikistan as a conduit to supply the Alliance, see Shaikh Azizur

Rahman, “India Strikes for Oil and Gas,” The Washington Times, September 2, 2002.

43

Rahul Bedi, “India and Central Asia,” Frontline, Vol. 19, No. 19, September 14-27, 2002.

44

Bedi, ibid.

45

The aid package provides food, clothing, medicines, and information technology to Kabul.

India also plans to train about 250 Afghan police officers. Ministry of External Affairs,

New Delhi, Press Statement, “India’s Assistance to Afghanistan,” August 7, 2002, available

at [http://meadev.nic.in/speeches/eam-afghan-7aug.htm]

46

See S.M. Hali, “Indian Machinations in Afghanistan,” Pakistan Observer, October 15,

2002.

CRS-18

U.S. Interests and Considerations

The United States’ major interests in South Asia are to avoid another IndiaPakistan conflict, reduce the nuclear threat in the region, retain support for its

campaign against international terrorism–particularly among those groups located in

the region, use India as a possible counterweight to China, and obtain the assistance

of both India and Pakistan for peacekeeping and nation-building efforts. Some of

these interests are immediate; others, especially India becoming a counterweight to

China in Asia, are long term and would depend on a variety of factors. These would

include some of the problems that remain in both countries about the perceived utility

of such a relationship.

Such problems include:

!

Reluctance of the United States to be involved in any forceful

resolution by India of its problems with Pakistan.

!

Divergence of world views of the Untied States and India,

particularly regarding Iraq.

!

The effect on U.S.-Indian relations of tensions between India and

Paksitan regarding Kashmir.

!

American disfavor of India’s use of repressive measures to counter

the autonomy movement in Kashmir.

Despite the importance of these fundamental differences between U.S. and

Indian objectives, there are a number of areas in which mutally beneficial cooperation

may take place. As mentioned above, U.S. military capability now permits entry into

any part of the world, and American conventional military capability means that its

forces usually will prevail in a battle with enemy forces. The problem remains of how

to create a successful exit strategy–one that allows U.S. interests to be preserved over

the long term. In practical terms this has meant ensuring domestic law and order and

the restoration of a civil society. It has also required the development of the economy

of the nation of interest to ensure both stability and growth. In the post-Cold War era,

this has been the situation in the Balkans and more recently in Afghanistan. If

military action is conducted against Iraq, a long range strategy to maintain peace and

stability likely would be required.

For the United States, the dilemma is how to continue maintaining a presence

in critical regions when it means committing forces for an extended period of time.

This is not only financially difficult but places tremendous strain on military

personnel and the planning of concurrent operations. Already analysts suggest that

the Administration likely will find it difficult to wage war in Iraq while key elements

of its special forces remain in Afghanistan. One area of discussions with India might

center on the availability of Indian forces for future long term peacekeeping and

peace enforcement missions.

CRS-19

Two problems exist in attempting such joint operations, one technical and the

other political. Technically, Indian military communications equipment is not

compatible with American hardware, and steps would have to be taken to better

integrate the two. India also currently does not possess an aerial refueling capability

and that limits the extent to which it can carry out joint operations or even exercises

with the United States. Taking combat aircraft out of the South Asian region for joint

training would require dismantling, crating, and shipping them unless U.S. or other

refuelers could be used. India is in the process of acquiring air refueling tankers.

That is why current joint training by the two countries has centered around naval and

land exercises. In September 2002, the two navies began the Malabar IV series of

exercises off the Indian west coast. The two navies worked on the cross-decking of

helicopters, formation steaming, coordinated gun shoots and anti-submarine warfare

training.47

In October 2002, about 100 Indian armed forces personnel, along with the

Indian Air Force’s transport workhorse IL-76, practiced inter-operability with their

American counterparts in the rugged terrain near Elmendorf Air Force Base at Fort

Richardson in Anchorage. The Alaska exercise, code named “Jeronimo Thrust,” was

followed by another round of joint exercises at Agra in October 2002.48 Following

this, Indian troops will practice in Guam. All these exercises are aimed at jointly

countering terrorism.

The more difficult problem comes from doubts about the Indian government’s

willingness to participate in a peace enforcement or intervention mission. India’s

reluctance to participate in such efforts may come from several domestic and

international concerns. There remains within India some disquiet about security

cooperation with the United States, since it is viewed as supporting the military

ambitions of the remaining superpower. There has also been some sense that India

should maintain a degree of diplomatic distance from the United States given the

inability of the Bush Administration to completely halt cross border infiltration from

Pakistan into India, the U.S. reliance on Pakistan in the anti-terror campaign, and its

unwillingness to label Pakistan a terrorist state.49

The reluctance by India to participate in such peacekeeping efforts also comes

from the more pragmatic concerns about their impact on Indian foreign policy,

security, and economic interests. Indian foreign policy efforts have sought to retain

ties with a range of countries and groups that are sometimes opponents. India is one

of the few countries in the world that has good relations with both Israel and the

Palestine Authority. It has strong ties with Iran and continues to maintain an embassy

in Baghdad. It has, through diplomatic efforts dating back to the late 1940s and

1950s, constructed diplomatic and international trade relations with countries on each

continent. It also has a large diaspora community of twenty-five million people that

is spread over the world. Nearly four million of these migrants live in the Persian

Gulf region.

47

Indo-U.S. Naval Exercises Begin, The Hindu, September 27, 2002.

48

“IAF, USAF to hold exercise at Agra,” The Hindustan Times, October 17, 2002.

49

Sultan Shahin, “India considers radical review of US ties,” Asia Times, June 14, 2002.

CRS-20

There is also the problem of reprisals. India, despite its support for the

Palestinian cause, its support to the Nasser regime in Egypt during the 1956 Suez

crisis, and its diplomatic support to wars of national liberation in Muslim countries

like Algeria and Indonesia, has not received full-fledged assistance from these

countries in its efforts to deter Pakistan. It was this lack of reciprocity that in part

saw the Indian diplomatic push in the 1990s to first normalize relations with Israel

and then to build a strong military and security relationship with that country.50 For

India, participating in a coalition effort in the Middle East would be dangerous since

it could reap the anger of the Arab world and face unrest and public demonstrations

domestically from disgruntled Muslim fundamentalist forces.

India, however, could carry out U.N. peace enforcement and economic relief

missions in a post-Saddam Iraq. India’s traditional ties with Iraq might give it

goodwill with the Iraqi population and Indian officers have worked with the Iraqi

military. In addition, there are large numbers of Indians who have experience with

working in Iraq.

Possible Counterweight to China?

Upon assuming office, one of the Bush Administration’s first actions was to

describe China as a strategic competitor to the United States. With this in mind,

India was touted as a potential partner in Asia. India’s relations with China became

hostile in the late 1950s when China publicly laid claim to areas along the northwestern and north-eastern parts of India. India’s refusal to negotiate a settlement that

ceded the land to China led to the 1962 border conflict in which Indian forces were

defeated. China’s subsequent 1964 test of a nuclear bomb left India feeling

vulnerable and reportedly requesting to be part of the United States’s nuclear

umbrella.

Further complicating the India-China relationship was China’s strong friendship

with Pakistan that resulted first in the transfers of conventional weapons and later,

in the 1980s and 1990s, the reported transfer of nuclear and missile technologies.

The India-China border dispute, China’s support for Pakistan’s WMD programs, the

Chinese Navy’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean, and the belief by Indian

policy analysts that China will remain a long term competitor, all combine to create

problems in the India-China relationship.51 Relations reached a nadir in 1998 when

India initially argued that its nuclear tests were conducted as a result of the challenge

posed by China.

On the other hand, there have been significant improvements in India’s

relationship with China since the late 1980s. In 1993 and 1996, the two countries

signed confidence building agreements that led to a reduction of force levels along

50

51

Ramtanu Maitra, “Why India dumped the Palestinians,” Asia Times, September 20, 2002.

See M.V. Rappai, “India-China relations and the Nuclear Realpolitik,” Strategic Analysis,

Vol. 23, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 15-26.

CRS-21

the Himalaya mountains.52 Trade between the two countries continues to expand,

and, according to Indian analysts there is three times as large a volume of illegal trade

between the two countries. The fact that India is an economy of one billion people

is also not lost to China.

China has in recent times claimed that it views both Pakistan and India as

friendly neighbors and that it is against the internationalization of the Kashmir

issue.53 There also may be a recognition in Beijing that India is one of the countries

that can help move the international system away from one that is marked by

American supremacy to one that China hopes would be multipolar, despite Chinese

suspicions of, and low regard for, India.54

Despite these positive movements in India-China relations, India’s long term

military programs are aimed partly at countering China and preventing Beijing from

exercising nuclear blackmail against New Delhi. India’s missile program is geared

towards developing a missile capability to target China’s eastern seaboard. Without

such a capability India would lack a true deterrent against Beijing. The Indian

attempt to indigenously produce a nuclear submarine and the proposed leasing of two

Russian nuclear submarines is indicative of the desire to have a second strike

capability against China.55 India’s continuing concerns about China stem from the

unresolved border and China’s reported continued supply of nuclear and missile

technologies to Pakistan. There is also the belief that China will not tolerate India

as a competitor, or even an equal, for great power status in Asia.56

The likelihood of India becoming a military counter to China or its

attractiveness as an alternative market, however, is questionable and certainly not

immediate. India’s nuclear weapons program and its missile program have

developed far more slowly than expected, and most Indian analysts believe that it will

be a long time before India’s stockpile of nuclear warheads crosses the three digit

mark.57 Similarly, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force that would be required

to effectively deter China and the space capability that would help make it effective,

apparently are not going to be operational in the near future.

52

W.P.S. Sidhu and Jing-Dong Yuan, “Cooperative Monitoring for Confidence Building:

A Case Study of the Sino-Indian Border Areas,” Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional

Paper/13,Sandia National Laboratories, August 1999, available at

[http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/Links/about/papers/SAND98-0505-13/index.html].

53

Cheng Ruisheng, “Sino-Indian Relations After India’s Nuclear Tests,” available at,

[http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/NSA/cheng.pdf].

54

Zhang Guihong, “Remembering a War: A win-win Situation?” Rediff.com, available at

[http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/31chin.htm].

55

Rahul Bedi, “Russian nuclear subs high on India’s shopping list,” Asia Times, April 12,

2002.

56

57

Mohan Malik, “China’s Southern Discomfort,” Asia Times, July 11, 2002.

K. Subrahmanyam, “A Credible Deterrent: The Logic of the Nuclear Deterrent,” The

Times of India, October 4, 1999.

CRS-22

More fundamentally, India has far to go to match the pace of China’s economic

development. India’s market reforms have also not been carried out at the pace that

would make it a viable alternative trading partner to China.58 Continued resistance

from both within the government and the unions has limited Indian privatization

efforts to slow incremental steps as opposed to bold moves towards liberalization.59

The size of the Indian middle class and its purchasing power are also limited. In the

early 1990s, eager market analysts suggested that the Indian middle class was about

the size of the United States. That figure has been now pegged back to the more

realistic assessment that the Indian middle class–it may be less that 100 million

people.

Equally important is the possibility that China’s future policies and indeed those

of future U.S. administrations may not conform to current assumptions. China’s own

strategy, especially as it sees radical Islam encroaching on its own borders, may be

to work towards a long term foreign policy stance that is more acceptable to the

United States. Similarly, the recent revelation of North Korea’s nuclear capability has

led to some effort by the United States and China to coordinate their policies about

getting the North Korean government to dismantle its nuclear program.

Internal changes, particularly of the Chinese regime, would also have an impact

on U.S. policy. Future American administrations may similarly assume that China is

becoming the type of status quo state that it is willing to accept as a strategic partner.

Whatever the future course of events, helping India emerge as a strong democratic

Asian power may work to secure U.S. strategic interests in the region.

The Nuclear Issue

In recent times the U.S.-India relationship has faced some of its most significant

stumbling blocks from the nonproliferation issue. After the 1998 tests, the Clinton

Administration initially attempted to pursue its policy of “cap, reduce, and rollback”

of both India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs. This included non-deployment,

keeping weapons at the lowest possible numbers, and the signing of the

comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). Under the Glenn-Symington amendments

(1976-1977) a series of economic and technological sanctions were automatically

imposed on India and Pakistan, but with mixed results. Pakistan’s economy was

somewhat hurt by the sanctions, but the Indian economy, after an initial setback,

rebounded to achieve 6% growth rates. Subsequently, with the Brownback

amendments (1998-1999), Congress repealed most of the sanctions. Those still in

place were rolled back after September 11, 2001 when the Bush Administration

responded favorably to the Pakistani and Indian offers of assistance in fighting the

war on terror.

58

See for example, Indrajit Basu, “No offense, GE tells India, but China’s better,” Asia

Times, October 18, 2002.

59

Arindam Mukherjee, “Disinvestment: Dawn to Dusk,” Outlook India, September 23,

2002.

CRS-23

Nine rounds of meetings between then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott

and then Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh also changed the Administration’s

perspective on nuclearization of South Asia. As Strobe Talbott wrote,

The Clinton administration does not expect either country to alter or constrain

its defense programs simply because we have asked it to. The essence of the case

the administration is making to both is that they can meet their security

requirements as we have heard them define them without further testing nuclear

weapons, without producing more fissile material, and without deploying

nuclear-capable missiles–and that, conversely, they will undermine their security

unless they move quickly and boldly to bring under control the action-reaction

cycle between them.60

Indian concerns were better understood in Washington D.C. and more recently,

in 2001, the Indian government became one of the first countries to endorse President

Bush’s plan for a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) shield. Indian thinking on the

subject reflected its traditional stand on nuclear weaponry as well as an understanding

of what the implications of the new technology would be for global politics and for

future international regimes.

Traditionally, India has sought global nuclear disarmament and viewed it not

just as an idealistic goal but as way to make the world and the South Asian region

more secure. In the general security context, BMD fits into the Indian objective of

having a credible minimum nuclear deterrent since a missile shield would reduce the

need for a large inventory of nuclear weapons. Such an inventory is perceived as

being both expensive and destabilizing.61 Instead, the Indians would like to have what

has been termed a minimum nuclear strategy and a maximal missile defense

capability.

Pursuing a BMD program also complements India’s diplomatic strategy of being

in the decision making process in international regimes. India has thus carried out

the necessary scientific experiments to get pioneer status under the Law of the Seas

Treaty and to become a member of the Antarctic Club. In contrast, as a late

nuclearizer, India has faced considerable problems in maintaining its civilian nuclear

industry, obtaining dual-use technology, and in attempting to legitimize its nuclear

weapons arsenal. Joining the BMD process at the outset is, therefore, seen as

allowing India to help shape the course BMD takes and to be an integral part of any

international regime that should emerge.62

The Bush Administration, while not accepting the legality of the Indian and

Pakistani nuclear programs, has sought to limit the dangers of proliferation in the

60

Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” p. 120.

61

For the best analysis on what a proposed Indian force structure would resemble, see

Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready

Arsenal, (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, 2001).

62

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “Arrows and Exports: The new Indo-U.S. nuclear agenda,” The

Hindustan Times, October 1, 2002.

CRS-24

region.63 One key issue has been the security of the nuclear weapons in both Pakistan

and India. The United States remains concerned about unauthorized use, illegal

transfers, or theft.64 These concerns exist more in the case of Pakistan than India,

because the latter has a robust civil-military relationship and there is a clear cut chain

of authority on the use of nuclear weaponry. Doubts remain though about the

security of the actual facilities where these weapons are stored. Several studies have

emerged that discuss how to make these facilities more secure while not

compromising the United States’ commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty.65

U.S. concerns have also arisen in the area of technology transfers. Since 9/11,

one of the Administration’s primary concerns has been to prevent terrorists and rogue

states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In the Indian case, the

administration is not concerned about state to state transfers of weapons technology,

but of commercial exports of dual use technology and precursor chemicals. India has

displayed restraint in this area and has restrictive arms sales policies. In the past,

India turned down offers from Iraq and Libya to invest in Indian defense programs,

because India did not want to be involved in an arms production relationship with

either country. India also reportedly refused to sell fighters to Zimbabwe in the

1980s because the latter was a frontline state in the fight against apartheid.66 At the

official level, these restrictive policies remain in place. India’s joint weapons

production efforts are taking place with two mainstream states–Israel and Russia.

The main concern for the United States comes from the size of India’s scientific

and technological establishment as well as the cumbersome nature of its bureaucratic

structure. India has one of the largest reservoirs of scientific manpower in the world.

The concern, as in the case of scientists from former Soviet countries, is that some

of these personnel, enticed by lucrative contracts, may move to other countries to

help develop weapons programs in areas such as nuclear weaponry, ballistic missiles,

chemicals, bio-technology, and space research.67 A similar problem exists with

Indian software engineers whose work would be even more difficult to track given

the decentralized ability to upload software.

Another problem comes from inadequate export control safeguards in India. A

recent British release of documents shows an Indian firm sold missile related

63

V. Sudarshan, “Nuclear Family,” Outlook India, October 7, 2002.

64

Recent revelations that Pakistan had, in the past, reportedly transferred nuclear technology

to North Korea added to these concerns, David E. Sanger and James Dao, “U.S. Says

Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea,” The New York Times, October 18, 2002.

65

Rose Gottemuller with Rebecca Longworth, “Enhancing Nuclear Security in the CounterTerrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation,” Carnegie

Endowment Working Papers, Number 29, August 2002.

66

67

K.R. Singh, “India and the Arms Bazaar,” The Hindustan Times, March 22, 1989.

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “ Arrows and Exports: The New Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agenda,” The

Hindustan Times, September 30, 2002.

CRS-25

technology to Iraq.68 While Indian laws are fairly stringent about exports and the

Indian government does not support the sale of dual-use technologies to states of

concern or to unstable regions, its implementation has been uneven. As one U.S.

official is quoted as saying, “ The best laws and most comprehensive control lists

have little meaning if governments lack the basic capability to control their borders

or other key transhipment points.”69 India has begun to tighten up its monitoring of

exports but Indian officials admit that the country’s export control system leaks like

a sieve.70

Indian customs officials lack education on successful technology monitoring

procedures as well as providing the kind of technological equipment and computer

software that would facilitate such monitoring. As one expert has written,

the most promising avenues of future US-India export control cooperation

include more rigorous training of customs officials, establishment of exporter

database, popularizing the need for internal compliance programs, and

establishment of online procedures for processing export licenses. Regarding the

last item, GOI [Government of India] has developed an Electronic Data

Interchange, but its data bank and functioning need improvement71

The two countries are negotiating in this regard. Recently, the United States and

India agreed to set up a High Technology Cooperation Group, comprising senior

representatives of relevant departments of both countries. The group, “ . . would

expeditiously work towards developing a new statement of principles governing

bilateral cooperation in high-technology trade that broadly advances our relationship

in this area, including addressing ways to increase trade in ‘dual use’ goods and

technologies. The delegations reaffirmed their countries’ shared commitment to and

common interest in preventing proliferation of strategic goods and technology. They

decided to further enhance their export control cooperation.”72

The Pakistan Factor

The India-Pakistan relationship colors the U.S.-India relationship and, in the

past, was one of the principal reasons for discord between the two countries. U.S.

relations with Pakistan have been a key determinant of U.S. relations with India. In

the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan soured the relationship with

India, despite the U.S. supply of grain to India in the 1960s, because Pakistan was to

use these weapons, in 1965, to try and militarily resolve the Kashmir crisis. In the

1980s, Pakistan’s acquisition of F-16 fighters again created disquiet in India because

of the fear that this would enhance Pakistan’s offensive capability even though by

68

Shishir Gupta, “The Indian Connection,” India Today, October 14, 2002, pp. 52-55.

69

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, op.cit.

70

Ibid.

71

Anupam Srivastava, “Positive-sum Game Accruals in US-India Relations, Bharat Rakshak

Monitor, Vol. 5 (1), July-September 2002.

72

Washington File, November 14, 2002.

CRS-26

then India had achieved conventional force superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan.73 Such

concerns continue in India, and consequently any U.S. arms sales to Pakistan are

likely to be met with criticism from India–particularly the sale of later generation F16s which India sees as upgrading Pakistan’s nuclear delivery capability.

But the more difficult issue arises from the continued India-Pakistan tensions

and what they do for U.S. long term policy in the region. The events of 2002, where

American shuttle diplomacy has lessened but not removed tensions between the two

countries, put a strain on U.S. diplomatic efforts and complicate any effort to further

strengthen relations with India. If India remains locked in a conflict with Pakistan,

its ability to exercise influence in other parts of the world or to successfully

participate in joint operations is necessarily circumscribed. Another problem is that

the United States may find itself in a situation of declining influence in the South

Asian conflict. In May-June 2002, U.S. officials were able to persuade the Indian

government not to go to war mainly because they prevailed on President Musharraf

to halt state-sponsored infiltration into Indian Kashmir and to close down militant

training camps in Pakistani Kashmir. If infiltration continues, however, India is

likely to disregard future U.S. attempts at crisis diplomacy, viewing such efforts as

having little influence in Pakistan.

Resolving the India-Pakistan dispute remains a difficult process which partly

stems from attempts by Pakistan to portray it strictly as a dispute over Kashmir. The

argument made is that once the Kashmir dispute is resolved to Pakistan’s satisfaction,

it can enter into an honorable peace with India. In fact, since the July 2001 Agra

summit, Pakistan has attempted to portray the dispute as the core issue in IndiaPakistan relations. This tends to simplify the issue and disregards the power,

territorial, and demographic differentials between the two countries and related issues

of conflicting national interest.

Kashmir is considered the root cause for the India-Pakistan conflict, because it

is vital to the identities of both states. Pakistan views Kashmir as an integral part of

the country’s national identity that rests on the two-nation theory (a theory that argues

that in South Asia Hindus and Muslims have to be two separate nations).74 At a

military-strategic level, fomenting a rebellion in Kashmir ties down a large number

of Indian troops and thus helps alleviate the asymmetry in conventional forces

between the two countries. India views Kashmir remaining within the Indian union

as a reflection of the country’s secular national identity. Less often articulated is the

Indian fear that if Kashmir is allowed to secede from the union, other ethnic groups

in the country might make similar demands–and India might go the way of the former

Soviet Union or erstwhile Yugoslavia. In the past, the Indians have used a range of

political and economic measures to prevent various ethnic groups from breaking

away from the Indian Union. Indian officials, therefore, argue that if Pakistan-

73

74

Kux, Estranged Democracies, op. cit., pp. 383-384.

For what is still the best discussion of the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, and the

role of competing national identities, see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan

Relations, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966, Reprinted by the Indian Council of

World Affairs, New Delhi 1996).

CRS-27

supported infiltration is stopped India can work with disaffected groups in Kashmir

to hammer out a lasting political solution.75

But even if Kashmir is successfully resolved to Pakistan’s satisfaction, which

apparently would mean that the entire state with its Hindu, Buddhist, and nonKashmiri Muslim minorities become part of Pakistan, it would most likely not bring

about peace between the two countries. India would remain a large, militarily

powerful state neighboring Pakistan, and Pakistan’s concerns about being dominated

by India would likely continue. Pakistan, with its population of 145 million, is

dwarfed by its neighbors China and India, both of whom have populations in excess

of one billion. In light of these size, economic, and demographic differentials, the

fear in Pakistan is that India, increasingly confident about its economic performance

and military capability, seeks to turn that country into a weak satellite state.76

Pakistan’s security dilemma is further compounded by the inability to

successfully establish democratic institutions in that state. The October 2002 polls,

the April 30, 2002 referendum that preceded the polls, and the Pakistani parliament’s

election as Prime Minister of Zafarullah Khan Jamali–a moderate who has the

support of the army77–have left the military in a position of controlling the Pakistani

polity in the long term. As one Pakistani analyst put it,

Professor Hassan Askari Rizvi has argued that so deeply entrenched are the

army’s commercial, administrative and other interests in the civilian structure

today that it simply cannot afford to go home. That being so, he has said, there

can be no real transfer of power in Pakistan. At best, the army is prepared to

share power, no more. It could even be induced to go into the background as long

as there were cast-iron guarantees that none of its privileges will be touched, its

financial and administrative structure interfered with or its conduct questioned

in parliament or in public. The kind of political arrangement that General

Musharraf and his commanders wish to put in place after October is based on the

same concept. More and more, as time passes, one is reminded of a remark

attributed (though mistakenly) to Jawaharlal Nehru: “Every country has an army;

in Pakistan, the army has a country.78

Thus the international community may be emphasizing the wrong issue in attempting

to manage the conflict situation in South Asia. Resolving the Kashmir conflict will

not necessarily reduce tensions between the two countries, especially given President

Musharraf’s moves to secure his and the military’s political position in the country.

If the military remains central to Pakistani politics, some analysts feel the

conflict situation in South Asia is likely to be perpetuated. Pakistan military has

little incentive to lessen tensions with India, since that would weaken its attempts to

75

Zafar Meraj, “The Burden of Expectations,” Outlook India, November 11, 2002.

76

Shahid Javed Burki, “What India Really Wants,” Dawn, July 2, 2002.

77

“Pakistan Parliament Chooses Leader,” The New York Times, November 21, 2002.

78

Khalid Hasan, “Pakistan Doing Okay: Generally Speaking,” The Friday Times, October

4, 2002.

CRS-28

retain a national security state and to enjoy a disproportionate share of the Pakistani

budget. A recent report by the International Crisis Group states,

The military’s support for the Jihadis [in Kashmir] is motivated by a desire to

undermine the security of India, which it perceives as both threat and regional

rival. As a result, military leaders have consistently derailed attempts by civilian

governments to normalise relations during Pakistan’s short democratic interludes.

Bhutto’s bid to normalise relations was disrupted in 1989. In 1999 Musharraf

personally oversaw the military operation in Kargil that torpedoed Prime

Minister Sharif’s overtures to Vajpayee.”79 [The report warns], “Given the deep

hostility to India, if Pakistan’s military remains in the driver’s seat they would

be tempted to resume adventurism in Kashmir once international attention

shifted.

Moreover, should Musharraf keep power after the October polls,

civilian leaders will have no choice but to accept military dictates in all spheres

of policy, including Kashmir. As a result South Asia will remain precariously

poised between a cold peace and a hot war.80

For the United States, therefore, this remains a problem in the long term

relationship with both countries, especially if it is to be called repeatedly to

diplomatically intervene between the two countries. The situation in late 2002 is

instructive. India and Pakistan have terminated almost all official links, and the

United States has become the emissary between the two countries. The United States

is apparently willing to tolerate this state of affairs because of the war against al

Qaeda and the Taliban. But as the war on terror’s focus moves away from

Afghanistan to other parts of the globe, the question emerges about the willingness

and ability of the United States to pursue the kind of diplomatic crisis intervention

it has in 2002.

Economic incentives may move the Indians and the Pakistanis away from a

conflictual situation to one where some degree of cooperation between the two

becomes necessary. Future U.S. assistance, particularly military assistance to both

countries, could be tied to working on conflict management proposals in South Asia.

Dialogue regarding nuclear weapons has been slow to unfold. As part of the

1999 Lahore agreement between India and Pakistan the two countries were to take,

“immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear

weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for

confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of

conflict.”81 The 1999 Kargil conflict put these negotiations on hold, but there were

promising aspects to it that were not neglected and hold promise for future

agreements between the two countries. One such agreement was, “The two sides

undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic

79

“Pakistan: Transition to Democracy,” International Crisis Group Asia Report, No. 40,

October 3, 2002, p. 19.

80

81

Ibid., p. 19.

The 1999 Lahore Declaration, signed by Pakistan’s then Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif

and by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, is available at

[http://www.usip.org/library/pa/ip/ip_lahore19990221.html].

CRS-29

missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.”82 Despite

the tensions between the two countries, they have scrupulously followed this

agreement and informed each other of missile tests.83

Given the near war over Kashmir in 2002, it remains in both countries’ interests,

as well as that of the United States because of its operations against the Taliban and

al Qaeda, that the two countries seek to build confidence in the realm of nuclear

weaponry. Direct negotiations between India and Pakistan, should they come about,

may require U.S. facilitation, that is linked to U.S. aid to the two nations.

Economic cooperation between the two countries may also work to mitigate

conflict. Two potential areas of cooperation are the sharing of river waters between

the two countries and Pakistan’s proposal for an extension of the proposed

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline to India. Another proposal was for Iran

to supply gas to India via a pipeline that ran through Pakistan. India has been

reluctant to sign onto either project because it believed that Pakistan’s asking price

was too high. There was also the concern in India that this would lead to the country

becoming energy dependent on Pakistan.84 A counter argument could be made that

there would be a mutual vulnerability because if Pakistan shut off the flow of gas,

India would retaliate by shutting off the flow of water into Pakistan.

An alternative approach is voiced by some Pakistanis who argue that the key to

resisting Indian domination lies not in a military conflict, which they feel Pakistan

is not capable of winning, but in becoming an economically viable and strong state

that can resist external pressure. To do this one writer argues the country needs to

cool the obsession with changing the status quo with India, stabilize the nuclear

deterrent in South Asia, and pursue a policy of economic growth. To do so the

Pakistan government would have to focus more of its resources on education,

infrastructures and business and create an environment favorable to domestic and

foreign investment.85

From the U.S. perspective, such a policy has appeal. An economically

flourishing Pakistan with a lower level of tensions with India is more likely to be

democratic and less likely to be prone to Islamic extremism. Tying future U.S. aid

to achieving such results could be in American long term interests as well as that of

the Pakistani people–especially since the October 2002 Pakistani elections have

shown renewed support for the Islamic fundamentalist parties in that country.

82

Ibid.

83

“India and Pakistan in tit-for-tat missile test,” The Guardian, October 4, 2002.

84

C. Raja Mohan, “Gazprom proposes shallow-water pipeline,” The Hindu, August 12, 2002

and Nadeem Malik, “Pakistan offers free trade to Afghanistan,” The News International,

August 28, 2002.

85

Khaled Ahmed, “What does India want from Pakistan?” The Friday Times, July 26, 2002.