U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure

Congressional research reportJan 23, 2008

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U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and

Force Structure

-name redactedSpecialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

January 23, 2008

Congressional Research Service

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www.crs.gov

RL31623

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure

Summary

The Bush Administration conducted a review of U.S. nuclear weapons force posture during its

first year in office. The review sought to adjust U.S. nuclear posture to address changes in the

international security environment at the start of the new century. Although it continued many

long-standing policies and programs, it also introduced new elements into both U.S. policy and

U.S. nuclear weapons programs. This report, which will be updated as needed, provides an

overview of the U.S. nuclear posture to highlight areas of change and areas of continuity.

During the Cold War, the United States sought to deter the Soviet Union and its allies from

attacking the United States and its allies by convincing the Soviet Union that any level of conflict

could escalate into a nuclear exchange and, in that exchange, the United States would plan to

destroy the full range of valued targets in the Soviet Union. Other nations were included in U.S.

nuclear war plans due to their alliances with the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the United

States maintained a substantial nuclear arsenal to deter potential threats from Russia. It would not

forswear the first use of nuclear weapons in conflicts with other nations, such as those armed with

chemical or biological weapons, and formed contingency plans for such conflicts. The Bush

Administration has emphasized that the United States and Russia are no longer enemies and that

the United States will no longer plan or size its nuclear force to deter a “Russian threat.” Instead,

the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal with the capabilities needed to counter

capabilities of any potential adversary, focusing on “how we will fight” rather than “who we will

fight.” Furthermore, U.S. nuclear weapons will combine with missile defenses, conventional

weapons, and a responsive infrastructure in seeking to assure U.S. allies, dissuade U.S.

adversaries, deter conflict, and defeat adversaries if conflict should occur.

During the Cold War the United States maintained a “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy

bombers in a strategic nuclear arsenal of more than 10,000 warheads. During the 1990s, the

United States reduced the size of this arsenal to around 7,000 warheads , but maintained all three

legs of the triad. The Bush Administration has announced that the United States will further

reduce its arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 “operationally deployed” warheads, but that it will

not eliminate many delivery vehicles while reducing its force and it will retain many nondeployed

warheads in storage as a “responsive force” that could be added to the deployed forces if

conditions warranted. The Bush Administration has also announced that it will resize and

modernize the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear weapons, so that the United States could

respond to unexpected changes in the status of its arsenal or the international security

environment.

Analysts and observers have identified several issues raised by the Administration’s Nuclear

Posture Review. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, how

to make the U.S. nuclear deterrent “credible,” the relationship between the U.S. nuclear posture

and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation, plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the

future of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

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Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

The International Security Environment ......................................................................................2

Threats During the Cold War.................................................................................................2

Evolving Threats During the 1990s .......................................................................................3

Threat Assessment under the Bush Administration ................................................................4

Strategy and Doctrine..................................................................................................................5

Deterrence During the Cold War ...........................................................................................5

Deterrence after the Demise of the Soviet Union ...................................................................6

Deterrence in the 21st Century ...............................................................................................7

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Deterrence ...................................................................7

Policy on the Possible First Use of Nuclear Weapons ......................................................9

Targeting and Employment Planning ......................................................................................... 11

Targeting During the Cold War............................................................................................ 11

Targeting after the Demise of the Soviet Union ................................................................... 12

Prompt Response and Alert Rates.................................................................................. 13

Bush Administration Approach............................................................................................ 13

Prompt Response and Alert Rates.................................................................................. 16

Force Structure.......................................................................................................................... 16

Nuclear Forces During the Cold War ................................................................................... 16

Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons..................................................................................... 17

Strategic Nuclear Forces ............................................................................................... 17

Ballistic Missile Defenses ............................................................................................. 18

Force Structure After the Cold War...................................................................................... 18

Non-strategic Nuclear Forces ........................................................................................ 19

Strategic Nuclear Weapons............................................................................................ 19

Ballistic Missile Defenses ............................................................................................. 20

Changes Adopted by the Bush Administration ..................................................................... 21

Non-strategic nuclear weapons...................................................................................... 21

Strategic Nuclear Weapons............................................................................................ 22

Ballistic Missile Defenses ............................................................................................. 29

Infrastructure ............................................................................................................................ 30

The Nuclear Weapons Complex During the Cold War ......................................................... 31

The Nuclear Complex in the 1990s...................................................................................... 32

Infrastructure in the Future.................................................................................................. 33

Issues Raised by the NPR.......................................................................................................... 36

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Defense Policy ......................................................... 36

Credible Deterrence ............................................................................................................ 38

U.S. Nuclear Posture and Nonproliferation Policy ............................................................... 39

Strategic Nuclear Weapons.................................................................................................. 41

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons .......................................................................................... 42

Tables

Table 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START I and START II....................................... 20

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Table 2. Illustrative U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under Bush Administration Plan .................. 23

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 43

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U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure

Introduction

During the Cold War, the United States maintained nuclear forces that were sized and structured

to deter any attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, and if deterrence failed, to

defeat the Soviet Union. In the years since the 1989 collapse of the Berlin wall and 1991 demise

of the Soviet Union, officials in the U.S. government and analysts outside government have

conducted numerous reviews and studies of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and force structure.

Although these studies have varied in scope, intent, and outcome, most have sought to describe a

new role for U.S. nuclear weapons and to identify the appropriate size and structure of the U.S.

nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War era. In offering their recommendations, these analyses

addressed not only the end of the hostile U.S.-Soviet global rivalry, but also the emergence of

new threats and regional challenges to U.S. security.

The U.S. Department of Defense conducted several far-reaching reviews, including the 1993

Bottom-up Review, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense

Review, that contributed to the Clinton Administration’s response to changes in the international

security environment. These formal reviews, when combined with less prominent internal studies,

resulted in numerous changes to the structure of U.S. nuclear forces and policy guiding their

potential use. However, many critics of the Clinton Administration argued that, at the end of the

1990s, the U.S. nuclear posture looked much as it had at the beginning of the decade. The number

of deployed nuclear weapons had declined as the United States implemented the first Strategic

Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and completed the withdrawal of most of its non-strategic

nuclear weapons. But, even though the Soviet Union no longer existed and the threat of global

nuclear war had sharply diminished, the United States continued to focus its nuclear planning and

size and structure its nuclear forces to deter the potential threat of a Russian attack.

In a speech at the National Press Club in May 2000, then-Governor George W. Bush both echoed

the criticism of the Clinton Administration’s nuclear policy and outlined an alternative approach

that he pledged to adopt if elected.1 He stated that the “Clinton-Gore Administration” remained

“locked in a Cold War mentality” and that the United States needed to “fend against the new

threats of the 21st century.” He argued that “America should rethink the requirements for nuclear

deterrence...” and stated that “the premises of Cold War nuclear targeting should no longer dictate

the size of our arsenal.” He stated that, if elected, he would ask the Secretary of Defense “to

conduct an assessment of our nuclear force posture.” After DOD completed that assessment, he

would reduce U.S. nuclear forces to the “lowest possible number consistent with our national

security.” In several speeches and statements during his first year in office, President Bush and his

advisers stated that “Russia is no longer our enemy” and they pledged to alter U.S. nuclear

weapons policy to reflect this view.

In its debate over the FY2001 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate passed a provision that

called on the next President to conduct a new nuclear posture review during his first year in

office. During the last few years of the Clinton Administration, Congress had prevented the

President from reducing U.S. strategic nuclear forces below the levels specified in START I until

the 1993 START II Treaty entered into force. The Clinton Administration had sought relief from

this language because the costs to the services of retaining weapons slated for elimination were

Federal Document Clearing House. Transcript. Governor George Bush Holds News Conference at National Press

Club. May 23, 2000.

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growing. But some Members questioned whether the Clinton Administration might reduce U.S.

forces too far if Congress lifted the prohibition. Hence, the Senate retained the prohibition in the

FY2001 Bill and stated that the next President could only reduce U.S. forces after conducting a

new nuclear posture review. Although the House had not included similar language in its bill, the

Conference Committee supported the call for a new nuclear posture review. 2

These two factors—the Congressional mandate and the Presidential commitment—established

the framework for the Bush Administration’s review of U.S. nuclear posture. The Administration

completed its review and sent a classified report to Congress at the end of December 2001; it

provided the public with a summary of its results in early January 2002. The results of the

Administration’s review generated a significant amount of debate in January, and then again in

March, when a copy of the classified report leaked to the press. Most analysts focused on areas

where the Bush Administration had proposed to change U.S. nuclear posture; some focused on

areas where U.S. nuclear policy would remain the same as it had been for years, or even decades.

This report provides a general overview of the past, present, and possible future of U.S. nuclear

policy. It begins with a review of the international security environment, highlighting the threats

that the United States has sought to deter or respond to with its nuclear forces. It then reviews the

strategy and doctrine guiding the U.S. nuclear force posture, targeting and employment policy, the

numbers and types of weapons in the nuclear force structure, and the infrastructure that has

supported design, development, and testing of U.S. nuclear weapons. In each of these areas, the

report summarizes U.S. nuclear policy during the Cold War, identifies changes implemented in

the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and details how the Bush Administration

proposes to bring continuity and change to U.S. nuclear weapons, policy, and infrastructure. The

report concludes with a discussion of several issues and questions that analysts have raised after

reviewing the Bush Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. These include the role of nuclear

weapons in U.S. national security policy, how to make the U.S. nuclear deterrent “credible,” the

relationship between U.S. nuclear posture and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation,

plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The International Security Environment

Threats During the Cold War

During the Cold War, the United States sought to maintain “nuclear and conventional capabilities

sufficient to convince any potential aggressor that the costs of aggression would exceed any

potential gains that he might achieve.”3 In spite of these general statements, however, one nation

stood at the top of the list of potential aggressors. The Soviet Union was the only nation with a

nuclear arsenal that could threaten the political existence of the United States and the only nation

that could pose a global challenge to U.S. allies and interests. Therefore, when detailing threats to

Section 1041 of that legislation (H.Rept. 106-945) called on the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive

review of U.S. nuclear posture to “clarify U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the near term.” The final bill

did not, however link the completion of this review to an elimination on the restrictions on nuclear reductions.

Congress removed this restriction in the Defense Authorization Bill for FY2002.

U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress. Fiscal Year 1985, by Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of

Defense. February 1, 1984. Washington, 1984. p. 27.

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U.S. national security, officials concluded that “the most significant threat to U.S. security

interests [remained] the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union.”4

Other nations, such as those in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, were included in the U.S.

nuclear war plans, but their presence reflected their relationship with the Soviet Union more than

any independent threat they might pose to the United States or allies. China could also threaten

U.S. interests, and the United States maintained the capability to respond to possible

contingencies in Asia. But, because the Soviet threat dominated U.S. defense planning, officials

believed that nuclear forces sized and structured to deter the Soviet threat would be sufficient to

deter or respond to these “lesser included cases.”

Evolving Threats During the 1990s

Most experts agree that the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 essentially eliminated

the threat of global nuclear war between the superpowers. The Clinton Administration argued that

“the dissolution of the Soviet empire had radically transformed the security environment facing

the United States and our allies. The primary security imperative of the past half century—

containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war—is gone.”5 But the Clinton

Administration argued that Russia could potentially pose a threat to the United States again in the

future. This potential existed “not because its intentions are hostile, but because it controls the

only nuclear arsenal that can physically threaten the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces.”6

Furthermore, officials in the Administration argued that “a stable transition in Russia is by no

means assured” so the United States “must hedge against the possibility that Russia, which

continues to maintain a formidable nuclear arsenal consisting of thousands of deliverable strategic

and tactical warheads, could reemerge at some time in the future as a threat to the West.”7

At the same time, the Clinton Administration recognized growing threats to the United States

from a number of emerging adversaries, particularly if they were armed with weapons of mass

destruction. In its National Security Strategy Report for 1998, the Administration noted that “a

number of states still have the capabilities and the desire to threaten our vital interests ...” and

that, “in many cases, these states are also actively improving their offensive capabilities,

including efforts to obtain or retain nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and, in some cases,

long-range delivery systems.” The Clinton Administration also declared that “weapons of mass

destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security. Proliferation of

advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists, and international

crime organizations the means to inflict terrible damage on the United States, its allies, and U.S.

citizens and troops abroad.”8

The Clinton Administration did not consider China to pose a direct threat to the United States.

Nevertheless, Administration officials did note that China maintained a formidable nuclear force,

The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. January 1988. Washington, 1988. p. 5.

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House, February 1995. Washington, DC.

p. 1.

U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and Congress. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense.

April 1997. Washington, DC. p. 11.

Statement of the Honorable Edward L. Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction,

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. April 14, 1999.

A National Security Strategy for a New Century. The White House. October, 1998. Washington, DC. p. 6.

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even though it was much smaller than Russia’s nuclear force. The Administration also stated that

“China continues to make steady efforts to modernize those forces, and that the United States

cannot be sure that it will not need nuclear weapons to deter China in the future.”9

Threat Assessment under the Bush Administration

The Bush Administration has stated that “nuclear forces continue to play a critical role in the

defense of the United States, its allies, and friends. They provide credible capabilities to deter a

wide range of threats, including weapons of mass destruction and large-scale conventional

military force.”10 However, in contrast with the Clinton Administration’s view about a potential

Russian threat, the Bush Administration has stated, on several occasions, that Russia and the

United States are no longer enemies. Even though Russia retains thousands of nuclear warheads,

which could reach targets in the United States, the Administration hoped that the growing

cooperation between the two nations would allow a “new strategic framework” to replace the

Cold War’s adversarial relationship and its reliance on “mutual assured destruction.”

Consequently, according to the Administration’s public comments on the Nuclear Posture

Review, the United States “will no longer plan, size or sustain its nuclear forces as though Russia

presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union.”11 The

Administration does acknowledge, however, that a “hostile peer competitor” could re-emerge in

the future, and this potential contingency did play a role in decisions on the future size and

structure of U.S. nuclear forces.12

At the same time, the Bush Administration has argued that, in the future, “the United States is

likely to be challenged by adversaries who possess a wide range of capabilities, including

asymmetric approaches to warfare, particularly weapons of mass destruction.”13 According to

some in the Administration, these adversaries might threaten U.S. allies and interests, U.S. forces

protecting U.S. interests, and U.S. territory in an effort to blackmail the United States to retreat

from its commitments around the world. These adversaries could include non-state actors and

terrorists as well as nations such as China,14 Iran, North Korea, and others. Therefore, when

planning its nuclear policy and force structure, the United States now faces threats from “multiple

potential opponents, sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges.”15

Statement of the Honorable Edward L. Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction,

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. April 14, 1999.

U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of

Defense. Washington, DC. 2002. p. 83.

U.S. Department of Defense. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review. News Transcript. January 9, 2002.

U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of

Defense. Washington, DC. 2002. p. 89.

U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. September 30, 2001. p. 3.

Rice, Condoleezza. Promoting the National Interest. Foreign Affairs. January/February 2000. v. 79. p. 56.

U.S. Department of Defense. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review. Press reports published after the leak

of the classified NPR report indicate that the Review listed these nations, along with Syria and Libya, as potential

recipients of a U.S. nuclear attack. However, Secretary of State Powell indicated that the Review did not offer guidance

on planning for nuclear attacks against any nation. Instead, he described the review as “prudent military planning”

where the planners had to consider “a range of options the President should have available to him to deal with these

kinds of threats.” See Savage, David G. Nuclear Plan Meant to Deter. Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2002. p. 1.

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Strategy and Doctrine

The United States has maintained its nuclear arsenal to deter attacks or threats of attack from its

adversaries. As was noted above, the Soviet Union and Russia have been the primary, but not

only, targets of this strategy. The United States has sought to deter attack by maintaining a nuclear

force structure and operational plans for those forces that would convince any attacking nation

that the costs of its aggression would far outweigh the benefits. The challenge for U.S. nuclear

policy has been to make this threat credible. Many analysts have argued that the overwhelming

destructive power of nuclear weapons could have undermined the threat to use them—because

the Soviet Union and Russia could have responded to a U.S. retaliatory attack with equally

destructive attacks against the United States, the United States might not have launched its

nuclear forces. Other nations might not be able to threaten the United States with massive

destruction, but they also might not believe that the United States would cross the nuclear

threshold unless its own survival were at risk. Hence, the United States has sought, on many

occasions in the past 50 years, to modify and adjust its forces and targeting strategy so that

potential adversaries would believe and heed the U.S. threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons,

adding more limited attack options and seeking greater flexibility in the timing and size of

potential nuclear attacks.

Deterrence During the Cold War

During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States sought to deter Soviet aggression by threatening

“massive retaliation” and “assured destruction.” These strategies envisioned a large-scale U.S.

nuclear strike against a wide variety of targets in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China if

the Soviet Union or its allies initiated a nuclear or large-scale conventional attack against the

United States or its allies. 16 In threatening such an overwhelming response, the United States

sought to convince Soviet leaders that the Soviet Union would cease to exist as a functioning

society if it initiated a conflict against the United States and its allies. In the 1970s, the United

States adopted a strategy of “flexible response” and, subsequently, a “countervailing strategy.”

These policies emphasized retaliatory strikes on Soviet military forces and war-making

capabilities, as opposed to attacks on civilian and industrial targets. They also allowed for the

possibility of limited, focused attacks on a smaller number of targets. These strategies sought to

provide the President with more flexibility, with respect to the timing, scale, and the targets of the

attack, than he would have had in earlier years.

The United States sought to deter not only a nuclear attack on U.S. territory, but also nuclear,

chemical or conventional attacks and coercion aimed at U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.17 This

“extended deterrent” sought to convince the Soviet Union that any level of aggression against

U.S. allies could escalate into a nuclear conflict that might involve attacks on the Soviet Union.

The United States and its allies did not insist that they would respond to any level of aggression

with nuclear weapons, but they sought to maintain the capability to do so. This posture reflected,

in part, the fact that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact maintained a clear numerical superiority

For a more detailed discussion of U.S. nuclear strategy and doctrine see Ball, Desmond. The Development of the

SIOP, 1960-1983, in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, Cornell University Press, 1986.

pp. 57-83; and Ball, Desmond and Robert C. Toth. Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes.

International Security, v. 14. Spring 1990.

The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. January 1988. Washington, 1988. p. 13.

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in conventional forces, and, without the possibility of resort to nuclear weapons, the United States

and NATO might face defeat. Consequently, the United States would not rule out the possible first

use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. However, in the late 1970s, the United States issued a

“negative security assurance,” in conjunction with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), in

which it stated that it would not threaten or attack with nuclear weapons any non-nuclear

weapons states that were parties to the NPT, unless these states were allied with a nuclear nation

in a conflict with the United States. This last exclusion meant that the statement did not alter U.S.

nuclear planning for potential conflicts with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. However, some

analysts believed that this commitment would encourage other nations to forswear their own

nuclear weapons because they knew they would not need such weapons to deter or respond to

nuclear attack from the United States.

Deterrence after the Demise of the Soviet Union

Throughout the 1990s, the Clinton Administration and others argued that nuclear weapons

remained important to deter the range of threats faced by the United States. Secretary of Defense

Perry outlined this view in his Annual Report for 1995, noting that “recent international

upheavals have not changed the calculation that nuclear weapons remain an essential part of

American military power. Concepts of deterrence ... continue to be central to the U.S. nuclear

posture. Thus, the United States will continue to threaten retaliation, including nuclear retaliation,

to deter aggression against the United States, U.S. forces, and allies.”18 In theory, this deterrent

strategy extended beyond Russia—“the United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of

strategic forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces and

to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile.” Furthermore, according to the

Clinton Administration, “nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a

guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would

contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons.”19

The Clinton Administration retained the existing U.S. policy on “first use”—specifically, it did

not forswear the first use of nuclear weapons. The Clinton Administration indicated that nations

other than Russia might face nuclear retaliation if they attacked the United States with nuclear,

chemical or biological weapons. Although it re-affirmed the U.S. negative security assurance in

1995, Administration officials indicated that the United States would reserve the right to use

nuclear weapons first “if a state is not a state in good standing under the Nuclear-Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT) or an equivalent international convention.”20 Furthermore, a nation might forfeit its

protections under the negative security assurance if it attacked the United States or U.S. forces

with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 21

The United States did not, however, directly threaten to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for

non-nuclear attacks. Its policy was one of “studied ambiguity.” For example, when discussing

how the United States might react if Libya were to develop and use chemical weapons, former

U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and Congress, by Secretary of Defense William Perry.

Washington, DC., February 1995. p. 84.

A National Security Strategy for a New Century. The White House, October 1998. Washington, DC. p. 12.

Cerniello, Craig. Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine. Arms Control Today.

November/December 1997.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms; Centering on Deterrence, Officials Drop

Terms for Long Atomic War. Washington Post, December 7, 1997. p. A1.

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Secretary of Defense William Perry stated “if some nation were to attack the United States with

chemical weapons, then they would have to fear the consequences of a response from any weapon

in our inventory... We could make a devastating response without the use of nuclear weapons, but

we would not forswear the possibility.”22 Secretary Perry also noted that, although the United

States would not specify how it would respond to WMD use, an aggressor could be certain that

the U.S. response would be “both overwhelming and devastating.” Assistant Secretary of Defense

Edward Warner testified that “the very existence of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces,

backed by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader

contemplating the use of WMD against the United States, its overseas deployed forces, or its

allies.”23

These statements generally referred to the potential U.S. response to an attack from another

nation. Most experts agreed that nuclear weapons could do little to deter an attack from a nonstate actor—it might be difficult to identify such an attacker and it could be difficult to identify

appropriate targets for a U.S. response. Nonetheless, many experts agreed that U.S. nuclear

weapons might play a role in deterring the state sponsors of non-state actors.

During the 1990s, the NATO alliance altered its nuclear strategy to reflect the demise of the

Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, but also did not adopt a “no-first use” policy. Although nuclear

weapons play a far smaller role in Alliance strategy than they did during the Cold War, the NATO

allies reaffirmed the importance of nuclear weapons for deterrence. The “New Strategic Concept”

signed in April 1999 stated that “to protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the

Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional

forces. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against

the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable.” Furthermore, nuclear weapons ensure “uncertainty in

the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression.”24

Deterrence in the 21st Century

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Deterrence

The Bush Administration has emphasized that nuclear weapons “continue to be essential to our

security, and that of our friends and allies.”25 Nuclear weapons remain the only weapons in the

U.S. arsenal that can hold at risk the full range of targets valued by an adversary. As a result, they

continue to play a key role in U.S. deterrent strategy.

During the Cold War, and in the past decade, U.S. policy often viewed nuclear weapons apart

from the rest of the U.S. military establishment, with nuclear weapons serving to deter a global

nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union or Russia. In contrast with this traditional perspective, the

This statement is quoted in Pincus, Walter. “Rogue” Nations Policy Builds on Clinton’s Lead. Washington Post,

March 2, 2002. P. 4.

Statement of the Honorable Edward L. Warner, III. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat

Reduction, Before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. April 14, 1999.

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of

the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC on 23rd and 24th April 1999.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense

For Policy. February 14, 2002.

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Bush Administration has described a more comprehensive and integrated role for nuclear

weapons. In its presentation outlining the results of the Nuclear Posture Review, the

Administration argued that nuclear weapons, along with missile defenses and other elements of

the U.S. military establishment, not only deter adversaries by promising an unacceptable amount

of damage in response to an adversary’s attack, they can also assure allies and friends of the U.S.

commitment to their security by providing an extended deterrent, dissuade potential adversaries

from challenging the United States with nuclear weapons or other “asymmetrical threats” by

convincing them that they can never negate the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and defeat enemies by

holding at risk those targets that could not be destroyed with other types of weapons. 26 According

to former Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, “linking nuclear forces to multiple defense

policy goals, and not simply to deterrence, recognizes that these forces ... perform key missions in

peacetime as well as in crisis or conflict.”27

In addition to expanding the role of nuclear weapons beyond deterrence, the Bush Administration

has altered the role of deterrence in U.S. national security strategy. It has stated, in several

speeches and documents, that the United States may not be able to contain or deter the types of

threats that are emerging today, such as those created by rogue nations or terrorists armed with

weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, the United States must also be prepared to preempt

these threats by launching strikes against adversaries before the adversary attacks the United

States, its allies or its interests. Some analysts have concluded that, with this change in

perspective, the Administration foresees the possible preemptive use of nuclear weapons against

nations or groups that are not necessarily armed with their own nuclear weapons.28 This would be

a striking change in U.S. national security policy, with the United States possibly contemplating

nuclear use early or at the start of a conflict, rather than in response to actions taken by the

adversary.29 On the other hand, some have argued that, with its overwhelming conventional

superiority, it would be difficult to imagine a scenario where the United States would have a

military need to launch a preemptive strike with nuclear weapons in the opening phases of a

conflict. Nevertheless, the United States has not ruled out this possibility.

The idea that nuclear weapons can play a role that goes beyond threatening nuclear retaliation is

not new to the Bush Administration. The Clinton Administration also stated that nuclear weapons

can serve as “a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who

would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons.”30 The key

difference between the past and the future may be rhetorical—during the Cold War, the United

States emphasized the role that nuclear weapons could play in deterring the Soviet Union before

mentioning other possible objectives for U.S. nuclear policy; in the future, with the greatly

reduced risk of global nuclear war, the other objectives may become more prominent in

discussions of U.S. national security strategy.

U.S. Department of Defense. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review. News Transcript. January 9, 2002.

These are the same four defense policy goals outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review for the whole of the U.S.

military. See U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. September 30, 2001, p. 11.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense

For Policy. February 14, 2002.

See, for example, Arkin, William. Not Just a Last Resort? A Global Strike Plan, With a Nuclear Option.

Washingtonpost.com May 15, 2005.

In a recent report, several retired U.S. and European generals have suggested that NATO maintain a preemptive

nuclear posture, as a part of its effort to deter the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction. See Ian Traynor,

Preemptive Nuclear Strike a Key Option, NATO Told, The Guardian, January 22, 2008.

A National Security Strategy for a New Century. The White House, October 1998. Washington, DC. p. 12.

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Furthermore, in its presentation on the Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush Administration asserted

that, in spite of contributing to four distinct policy objectives, nuclear weapons would play a

smaller role in U.S. national security strategy in the future than they had during the Cold War.

According to the Administration, U.S. deterrent policy has been highly dependent on the threat of

offensive nuclear retaliation, with the President having few other options for response if the

United States or its allies were attacked. Now, according to the Administration, the United States

will also seek to deter and defeat adversaries with precision conventional weapons, which may

soon be able to destroy some targets that were assigned to nuclear weapons in the past, and

ballistic missile defenses, which can deter attack by denying an adversary the ability to threaten

U.S. targets with ballistic missiles.31 According to Administration officials, this new combination

of weapons will provide the President with a greater number of options and greater flexibility

when responding to threats or aggression from U.S. adversaries. Some in the Administration have

referred to this change as “tailored deterrence,” with the United States developing more specific

responses that would rely on a broader range of military capabilities, to respond to the threats

posed by emerging adversaries.32

Some have argued that a national security concept that combines nuclear and conventional

capabilities will blur the distinction between the two types of weapons and, therefore, increase the

likelihood of a nuclear response. The Administration, however, has argued that the presence of

nuclear and conventional options would “reduce pressures to resort to nuclear weapons by giving

the President non-nuclear options to ensure U.S. security.”33 Furthermore, according to those who

support the Administration’s approach, where adversaries might doubt the U.S. willingness to

resort to nuclear weapons, these expanded options could enhance the credibility of the U.S.

deterrent. Others note, however, that, over the years, the threat of conventional response has not

succeeded in deterring potential adversaries, requiring the United States to respond with

conventional attack and war.

Further, in spite of the Administration’s presentation of a “new triad,” U.S. military planning has

always presented the President with a range of options. Nuclear options may have dominated

possible U.S. responses to Soviet aggression, but the President could always choose conventional

options when faced with a crisis or conflict. In fact, throughout the Cold War and the decade

since, the United States has always chosen conventional, rather than nuclear, options when

responding to aggression.

Policy on the Possible First Use of Nuclear Weapons

The United States has never ruled out the possible first use of nuclear weapons. Although it has

pledged that it would not attack non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear weapons under most

circumstances, it has maintained a policy of “studied ambiguity” about the circumstances under

which it would consider nuclear retaliation and the type of response it might use if a nation

attacked the United States with WMD.

U.S. Department of Defense. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review. News Transcript. January 9, 2002.

For a more detailed review of the concept of tailored deterrence, see CRS Report RL34226, Nuclear Weapons in U.S.

National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects, by (name redacted).

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense

For Policy. February 14, 2002.

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In its nuclear posture review (NPR), the Bush Administration did not alter the U.S. policy on the

first use of nuclear weapons. However, with its emphasis on the emerging threats posed by

nations armed with weapons of mass destruction, the Administration did appear to shift towards a

somewhat more explicit approach when acknowledging that the United States might use nuclear

weapons in response to attacks by nations armed with chemical, biological, and conventional

weapons. The Bush Administration has stated that the United States would develop and deploy

those nuclear capabilities that it would need to defeat the capabilities of any potential adversary

whether or not it possessed nuclear weapons. Specifically, in its briefing on the Nuclear Posture

Review, the Administration stated that the capabilities needed in the U.S. nuclear force structure

“are not country-specific” and that the United States “must maintain capabilities for unexpected

and potential risks.” The focus will be “on how we will fight, not who we will fight.”34 This does

not, by itself, indicate that the United States would plan to use nuclear weapons first in conflicts

with non-nuclear nations. However, General Richard B. Myers, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff stated in an interview that the scope of the destruction, not the weapon used in an attack,

would affect a U.S. decision on whether to respond with nuclear weapons. He included high

explosives (i.e., conventional weapons) in the list of “weapons of mass destruction” that might

bring a nuclear response from the United States.35 Furthermore, press articles that reported on the

nuclear posture review stated that the Administration had considered using nuclear weapons in

contingencies with nations such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.36 These nations do not, at this

time, possess nuclear weapons.

When responding to these press reports, the Bush Administration stated that the NPR had not

produced war plans for attacks on non-nuclear nations. Instead, the U.S. nuclear force posture

was designed to deter these nations from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction.

According to the President’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, it was supposed “to

send a very strong signal to anyone who might try to use weapons of mass destruction against the

United States.”37 President Bush also appeared to endorse a policy of more explicit nuclear threats

during a news conference on March 14, 2002. He stated that “we want to make it very clear to

nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us

or our allies... I view our nuclear arsenal as a deterrent, as a way to say to people that would harm

America that ... there is a consequence. And the President must have all the options available to

make that deterrent have meaning.”38

Documents and press reports published in the years since the release of the NPR have reinforced

the perception that the United States is planning for the possible, or even likely, first use of

nuclear weapons in conflicts with nations that do not possess their own nuclear weapons. In 2004

and 2005, the Joint Staff prepared a new draft of its Joint Doctrine for Nuclear Operations, a

document that had last been updated in 1995. The last available draft of this document, dated

March 15, 2005, includes a list of several circumstances under which the United States might

consider the first use of nuclear weapons. These would not only allow for the use of nuclear

weapons in response to the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by other nations, but

also in anticipation of that use, both to destroy installations that may house those weapons and to

U.S. Department of Defense. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review. News Transcript. January 9, 2002.

General Myers made these comments in an interview on the Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer on CNN. They are

quoted in Savage, David G. Nuclear Plan Meant to Deter. Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2002. p. 1.

Gordon, Michael. U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Targets and New Weapons. New York Times. March 10, 2002. p. 1.

Savage, David G. Nuclear Plan Meant to Deter. Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2002. p. 1.

Miller, Greg. Bush Puts Nuclear Use in “Options Available.” Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2002.

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“demonstrate the U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of

WMD (weapons of mass destruction.)”39

Some analysts have argued that these statements and possible plans for using nuclear weapons

against non-nuclear weapons states are inconsistent with the U.S. negative security assurance

offered to the non-nuclear nations under the NPT. Neither the President nor Secretary of State

Powell have addressed this issue or announced a withdrawal of the negative security assurance.

However, in February, 2002, John Bolton, then the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and

International Security, stated that he did not think the rhetorical approach used in the negative

security assurance “is necessarily the most productive” and “doesn’t seem to me to be terribly

helpful in analyzing what our security needs may be in the real world.”40 He argued that the

assurances had been offered in “a very different geostrategic context” and stated that the Bush

Administration would be reviewing U.S. security assurances to non-nuclear nations “in the

context of our preparation for the 2005 review conference” of the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty.41

Targeting and Employment Planning

Targeting During the Cold War

During the Cold War, the United States sought to deter the Soviet Union, and defeat it if

deterrence failed, by threatening to destroy a wide range of military and industrial targets. The

U.S. plan for how to achieve this objective was contained in a document known as the SIOP—the

Single Integrated Operational Plan—which is highly classified. According to scholarly reports

and articles, the SIOP evolved over the years, in response to changes in the number and

capabilities of U.S. nuclear forces and changes in theories of how to deter the Soviet Union.

Throughout this time, though, the SIOP reportedly contained a number of attack options for the

President to choose from. These options varied in terms of the numbers and types of targets to be

attacked and varied according to the number and types of U.S. warheads available when the

conflict began.42

In 1990, General John Chain, Commander in Chief of the Strategic Command, outlined U.S.

targeting strategy in testimony before Congress. He stated that “the task is to be able to deter any

U.S. Department of Defense. Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. Joint Publication 3-12. Final Coordination (2).

March 15, 2005. p. III-2.

A New Strategic Framework? Detailing the Bush Approach to Nuclear Security. Interview with Undersecretary of

State John R. Bolton. Arms Control Today. March 2002. Secretary Bolton also said that the negative security

assurances reflected “an unrealistic view of the international situation” and that, in case of an attack, “we would have to

do what is appropriate under the circumstances, and the classic formulation of that is, we are not ruling anything in and

we are not ruling anything out.” See Nicholas Kralev. “U.S. Drops Pledge on Nukes.” Washington Times. February 22,

2002. p. 1.

When asked about the U.S. policy on negative security assurances, Richard Boucher, the spokesman for the State

Department, reaffirmed the existing U.S. policy. He did however, note that the United States did not rule out a possible

nuclear response to the use of WMD, even if the attacking nation did not possess nuclear weapons. See U.S.

Department of State. Daily Press Briefing. February 22, 2002.

See, for example, Ball, Desmond and Jeffrey Richelson, eds. Strategic Nuclear Targeting. Cornell University Press.

1986. See also McKinzie, Matthew G. et al. The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change. Natural Resources

Defense Council. 2001. pp. 5-14.

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possessor of nuclear weapons from attacking the United States by having a postured retaliatory

force significant enough to destroy what the attacker holds most dear... Against this macro

mission, target categories are designated. Within these target categories, a finite list of targets are

designated; and against those targets, weapons are allocated.” These target categories reportedly

included Soviet strategic nuclear forces, other military forces, military and political leadership,

and industrial facilities.43 These represented mostly “counterforce” and industrial targets. The

United States did not seek to destroy Soviet cities, although many likely would have faced attack

due to their proximity to military or industrial targets. The United States sought the capability to

destroy thousands of sites in these target categories, even if the Soviet Union destroyed many

U.S. weapons in a first strike. The need for weapons that could survive a Soviet strike and

retaliate against a wide range of Soviet targets created the requirement for large numbers of U.S.

strategic nuclear weapons.

Targeting after the Demise of the Soviet Union

After the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and collapse of the Soviet Union, the Department of

Defense conducted several studies to review U.S. nuclear targeting strategy and weapons

employment policy. According to published reports, these reviews revised and greatly reduced the

length of the target list, but left the basic tenets of the strategy untouched. According to a 1995

article in the Washington Post, “the United States primary nuclear war plan still targets Russia

and provides the President an option for counterattack within 30 minutes of confirmed enemy

launch.”44

In 1997, the Clinton Administration altered the U.S. strategy from seeking to win a protracted

nuclear war, a strategy identified during the Reagan Administration, to seeking to deter nuclear

war. In practice, this probably meant the United States would not seek to cause as much damage

against as wide a range of targets as it had planned on attacking in previous war plans.

Consequently, the United States would not need to maintain as large an arsenal of nuclear

weapons as it had needed during the Cold War.45 But, these changes did not alter the core

objectives of U.S. nuclear policy. The United States would continue “to emphasize the

survivability of the nuclear systems and infrastructure necessary to endure a preemptive attack

and still respond at overwhelming levels.”46 Furthermore, the United States reportedly continued

to prepare a range of attack options, from limited attacks involving small numbers of weapons to

Statement by John T. Chain, Jr. Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command and Director, Strategic Target

Planning, before the House Armed Services Committee. March 6, 1990. Prepared Text, p. 5.

“Secretary Cheney and General Powell and their aides threw thousands of targets out of the SIOP (single integrated

operational plan), helping to reduce it from its Cold War peak of more than 40,000 to about 10,000 by 1991.” In

addition “General Butler reviewed each target one-by-one tossing many out ... one day he eliminated 1,000 targets in

newly liberated Eastern Europe...” By 1994, General Butler had helped to pare the SIOP to 2,500 targets. See Ottaway,

David B. and Steve Coll. Trying to Unplug the War Machine. Washington Post, April 12, 1995. p. A28.

The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which the United States and Russia signed in 1991, reduced U.S. and

Russian forces to 6,000 accountable warheads on strategic offensive delivery vehicles. Prior to START I, each side had

deployed more than 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons. START II, signed by Russia and the United States in 1993,

lowered the limit to 3,500 strategic offensive weapons on each side. The targeting reviews completed in the early 1990s

had confirmed that the United States could reduce its forces to START I and, after the demise of the Soviet Union,

START II levels without undermining its ability to pursue the existing employment policies. The new U.S.

employment strategy, and plans to further reduce nuclear weapons to around 2,500 strategic warheads, emerged from

additional targeting and force structure reviews in the mid-1990s.

Ibid. p. 12.

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major attacks involving thousands of warheads, and to plan attacks against military targets,

nuclear forces, and civilian leadership sites in Russia.47 The Clinton Administration argued that

the flexibility offered by this range of options would enhance deterrence by providing the United

States with more credible responses to a range of crises and attack scenarios.

Prompt Response and Alert Rates

The Clinton Administration retained the U.S. policy of maintaining the capability to launch

nuclear weapons after receiving indications that an attack on the United States was underway, but

before incoming warheads could detonate.48 Analysts have criticized this policy, arguing that it

leads Russia to maintain its forces at a high state of alert, which could lead to an inadvertent

launch of Russia’s nuclear weapons if Russia received false or ambiguous warnings of nuclear

attack. Nevertheless, Clinton Administration officials stated that the United States would not rely

solely on the ability to launch promptly; it could wait until detonations had occurred, then launch

its retaliatory strike at a later time. 49 Consequently, some of the options available in U.S. war

plans included weapons that would be available if the United States launched its forces before

any were destroyed, and some included only those weapons that would survive if the United

States absorbed a first strike before initiating its response. The decision on whether to launch U.S.

weapons promptly or to wait for detonations on U.S. soil would be left to the national command

authority at the time of the crisis.

Bush Administration Approach

During testimony before Congress, Douglas Feith, then the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,

stated that the “mutual assured destruction” relationship between the United States and Soviet

Union was no longer an appropriate basis for calculating our nuclear requirements. Therefore,

when determining the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, DOD “excluded from our

calculation ... the previous, long-standing requirements centered on the Soviet Union, and, more

recently, Russia.”50

The Bush Administration has referred to this new targeting strategy as a “capabilities-based”

strategy, rather than a “threat-based” strategy. During the Cold War, U.S. targeting strategy

focused on deterring and, if necessary, defeating the Soviet threat. According to the

Administration, this gave rise to war plans that allowed for few contingencies and required only a

minimum of flexibility and adaptability. 51 In the future, when planning for the possible use of

Smith, R. Jeffrey. Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms; Centering on Deterrence, Officials Drop

Terms for Long Atomic War. Washington Post, December 7, 1997. p. A1.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms; Centering on Deterrence, Officials Drop

Terms for Long Atomic War. Washington Post, December 7, 1997. p. A1.

According to Robert Bell, “we direct our military forces to continue to posture themselves in such a way as to not

rely on launch on warning—to be able to absorb a nuclear strike and still have enough force surviving to constitute

credible deterrence. Our policy is to confirm that we are under nuclear attack with actual detonations before

retaliating.” Cerniello, Craig. Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine. Arms Control Today.

November/December 1997.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense

For Policy. February 14, 2002.

U.S. Department of Defense. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review. News Transcript. January 9, 2002. As

was noted above, however, U.S. nuclear war plans during the later part of the Cold War did include options and some

level of flexibility.

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nuclear weapons, the United States would “look more at a broad range of capabilities and

contingencies that the United States may confront” and tailor U.S. military capabilities to address

this wide spectrum of possible contingencies.52 Specifically, the United States would identify

potential future conflicts, review the capabilities of its possible adversaries, identify those

capabilities that the United States might need to attack or threaten with nuclear weapons, and

develop a force posture and nuclear weapons employment strategy that would allow it to attack

those capabilities.

The most specific and visible change to emerge from this new targeting strategy has been the

replacement of the Cold War SIOP (single integrated operational plan) with a new war plan

known as OPLAN (operations plan) 8044. This document now contains the major strike options

and major contingency plans that had been included in the SIOP. Some press reports indicate that

the Administration also developed, then a companion contingency plan, CONPLAN 8022-22,

which planned for the prompt U.S. response to a number of contingencies with nations other than

Russia. Reports indicate that while most of the options in this new plan called for the use of

conventional weapons, some also allow for the use of nuclear weapons early or at the start of a

conflict.53 The Pentagon reportedly eliminated this plan after a few years, absorbing its targeting

and attack options into OPLAN 8044.

The Bush Administration has not discussed, publicly, how it will identify specific targets or

allocate weapons in its “capabilities-based” targeting strategy. It has, however, identified three

types of contingencies that it believes the United States must prepare to address with its nuclear

employment plans. 54

•

Immediate contingencies include “well-recognized, current dangers.” The Soviet

threat was an immediate contingency in the past, current examples include a

WMD attack on U.S. forces or allies in the Middle East or Asia.

•

Potential contingencies are “plausible, but not immediate dangers.” This might

include the emergence of new, adversarial, military coalitions, or the reemergence of a “hostile peer competitor.” According to the Administration, the

United States would probably have sufficient warning of the emergence of these

threats to modify or adjust its nuclear posture.

•

Unexpected contingencies are “sudden and unpredicted security challenges.”

This might include a “sudden regime change” when an existing nuclear arsenal

transferred to the control of a hostile leadership or an adversary’s sudden

acquisition of WMD.

These three types of contingencies would place different demands on U.S. nuclear war planners.

Because the United States can understand and anticipate immediate contingencies, it can size,

structure, and plan in advance for the use of its nuclear arsenal to address these contingencies, just

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense

For Policy. February 14, 2002.

Arkin, Not Just a Last Resport. See also Kristensen, Hans M. Preparing for the Failure of Deterrence. SITREP, A

Publication of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. November/December 2005. pp. 10-12.

The following summarizes the discussion in the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report. See U.S. Department of

Defense. Annual Report to the President and Congress. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense. Washington, 2002.

p. 88.

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as it did when addressing the Soviet threat during the Cold War.55 The United States can also plan

in advance for the possible use of nuclear weapons in potential contingencies, even if it does not

maintain the needed force structure on a day-to-day basis. Hence, the war-planning and targeting

process for these contingencies are likely to be similar to the process used during the Cold War,

albeit with a wider range of possible plans to address targets among a greater number of

countries. And, although the Administration has not addressed this issue, the United States will

likely prepare a number of alternative employment plans so that the President will have options to

choose from if a conflict occurs. These are likely to include many of the same types of targets as

the United States planned to attack during the Cold War because the ability to destroy these types

of facilities is likely to remain important to the U.S. ability to defeat an enemy and limit damage

to itself during a conflict. These targets could include deployed and non-deployed stocks of

weapons of mass destruction (during the Cold War, Soviet nuclear weapons made up the majority

of the targets in this category), other military facilities, leadership facilities, and, possibly other

economic targets.

The United States cannot, however, prepare pre-planned options for attacks for unexpected

contingencies because it does not know when or where these threats may emerge. The focus on

the “unexpected” has underlined the Administration’s insistence that the United States develop

and expand its capabilities for “adaptive planning.”56 The United States Strategic Command

(STRATCOM), which develops the operational plans for U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, already

has the ability to do some adaptive planning. It began this effort in 1992, when it sought to

develop “a flexible, globally focused, war planning process” along with living SIOP, a nuclear

war plan “able to respond almost instantaneously to new requirements.”57 Now, “STRATCOM is

in the process of developing a more flexible and adaptive planning system ... that employs

modern computing techniques and streamlined processes to significantly improve our planning

capability for rapid, flexible crisis response.”58 A responsive adaptive planning process must also

rely on timely and accurate intelligence, so that the planners will be able to identify targets and

attack them at their vulnerable points. Therefore, the Administration has called for improvements

in U.S. “sensors and technologies so that they can provide more detailed information about an

adversary’s plans, force developments, and vulnerabilities.” It has requested additional funding

“for the development of advanced sensors and imagery, for improved intelligence and assessment,

and for modernization of communications and targeting capabilities in support of evolving strike

concepts.”59

The Bush Administration has emphasized the increasing importance of adaptive planning, and

waning relevance of pre-planned attack options, to highlight the fact that its nuclear doctrine and

targeting strategy focus on emerging threats, rather than on a smaller version of the Cold War

The Administration has indicated, however, that it will not size the force of “operationally deployed nuclear

warheads” to address the potential Russian threat U.S. Department of Defense. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture

Review. News Transcript. January 9, 2002.

According to Undersecretary Feith, the United States must have “the flexibility to tailor military capabilities to a

wide spectrum of contingencies, to address the unexpected, and to prepare for the uncertainties of deterrence.” See U.S.

Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense For

Policy. February 14, 2002.

Schwartz. Stephen I. Nukes You Can Use. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. May/June 2002. p. 19.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander in Chief of Strategic

Command. February 14, 2002.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense

For Policy. February 14, 2002.

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threat from the Soviet Union. Yet the Administration’s plans probably do not represent a complete

break from past practices. First, because the Administration has identified the “re-emergence of a

peer competitor” as one of the potential contingencies the United States might need to address,

the United States is likely to retain some form of predetermined war plan with options for

possible attacks against Russian targets. Second, although the Administration has indicated that it

will reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (this is discussed in

the next section), it will retain enough warheads to threaten many, if not most, of the targets

included in options in the current OPLAN. It may eliminate some of the existing options, and

possibly add options for attacks against other possible adversaries, but it probably will not

completely replace pre-planned options with adaptive planning. Instead, U.S. nuclear weapons

employment policy is likely to include options for attacks against Russia, contingency plans for

attacks against other countries, and adaptive planning capabilities to address unexpected,

emerging threats. This would be similar to the employment policy that had emerged by the end of

the Clinton Administration. Although the Clinton Administration continued to prepare a SIOP that

focused on Russia, press reports indicate it also maintained current intelligence on WMD

facilities in countries, such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, and that it passed this information to

target planners at STRATCOM so that they could prepare contingency plans for attacks with U.S.

nuclear weapons. According to one report, STRATCOM could produce target packages for these

plans “within hours.”60

Prompt Response and Alert Rates

During the 2000 presidential campaign, Governor George W. Bush indicated that, as a part of his

nuclear posture review, he would consider reducing the alert rates of U.S. nuclear weapons.

However, when the Administration completed its review, it did not propose any changes to U.S.

alert rates. To the contrary, DOD concluded that, even as the Air Force prepared to retire the

Peacekeeper ICBMs, it would keep the force on alert to maintain the morale and operational

readiness of the units. Further, the 2005 draft of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations

specifically states that “increased readiness levels may be necessary to deter aggression” and that

the “alert posturing of nuclear weapons” can “send a forceful message that demonstrates the

national will to use nuclear weapons if necessary.”61 In addition, with the growing emphasis on

the possible use of nuclear weapons in anticipation of, as well as in response to, an adversary’s

use of chemical or biological weapons, the Bush Administration seems unlikely to ever consider

the U.S. adoption of a “no first use” policy.

Force Structure

Nuclear Forces During the Cold War

During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for

nuclear weapons, including short-range missiles and artillery for use on the battlefield, mediumrange missiles and aircraft that could strike targets beyond the theater of battle, short- and

medium-range systems based on surface ships, long-range missiles based on U.S. territory and

Pincus, Walter. “Rogue” Nations Policy Builds on Clinton’s Lead. Washington Post, March 2, 2002. p. 4.

U.S. Department of Defense. Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. Joint Publication 3-12. Final Coordination (2).

15 March 2005. p. I-4.

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submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United

States. The long-range missiles and heavy bombers are known as strategic nuclear weapons; the

short- and medium-range systems are considered non-strategic nuclear weapons and have been

referred to as battlefield, tactical, and theater nuclear weapons.

Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons62

Throughout the Cold War, the United States deployed thousands of shorter-range nuclear

weapons on land in Europe, Japan, and South Korea and on ships around the world. These

weapons were deemed essential to the U.S. strategy of extending nuclear deterrence to its allies.

The United States began to reduce these forces in the late 1970s, in part because NATO officials

believed they could maintain deterrence with fewer, but more modern, weapons.63 These

modernization programs continued through the 1980s, particularly through the deployment of

ground-launched cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe. However, by

the end of that decade, as the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the United States had canceled or scaled

back all planned modernization programs. In 1987, it also signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear

Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched shorter and

intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

Since the early 1960s the United States has maintained a “triad” of strategic nuclear delivery

vehicles. These include land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long-range heavy bombers. The United States developed

these three different types of nuclear delivery vehicles, in large part, because each of the military

services wanted to play a role in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. However, during the 1960s and 1970s,

analysts developed a more reasoned rationale for the nuclear “triad.” They argued that these

different basing modes would enhance deterrence and discourage a Soviet first strike because

they complicated Soviet attack planning and ensured the survivability of a significant portion of

the U.S. force in the event of a Soviet first strike.64 The different characteristics of each weapon

system might also strengthen the credibility of U.S. targeting strategy. For example, ICBMs

eventually had the accuracy and prompt responsiveness needed to attack hardened targets such as

Soviet command posts and ICBM silos, SLBMs had the survivability needed to complicate

Soviet efforts to launch a disarming first strike and to retaliate if such an attack were attempted,65

and heavy bombers could be dispersed quickly and launched to enhance their survivability, and

they could be recalled to their bases if a crisis did not escalate into conflict.

For a more in-depth review of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons see CRS Report RL32572, Nonstrategic Nuclear

Weapons, by (name redacted).

The numbers of operational U.S. non-strategic nuclear warheads declined from more than 7,000 in the mid-1970s to

below 6,000 in the 1980s, to fewer than 1,000 by the middle of the 1990s. See Toward a Nuclear Peace: The Future of

Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy. Report of the CSIS Nuclear Strategy Study Group, Washington,

DC. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993. p. 27.

U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1989, by Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense.

February 18, 1988. Washington, 1988. p. 54.

In the early 1990s, SLBMs also acquired the accuracy needed to attack many hardened sites in the former Soviet

Union.

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Modernization programs continued to enhance the capabilities of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons

throughout the Cold War era. These programs culminated with the deployment of Peacekeeper

(MX) ICBMs and Trident submarines and Trident II (D-5) SLBMs in the mid-1980s and 1990s

and with the deployment of the B-2 (Stealth) bomber in the 1990s. The United States also

continued to add to the numbers of its deployed strategic nuclear weapons through the end of the

1980s. However, by the mid-1990s, the numbers of warheads deployed on U.S. strategic nuclear

forces began to decline as the United States and Russia implemented the first Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty (START).

Ballistic Missile Defenses

The United States has pursued research and development on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems

since the early 1950s. In the mid-1960s it developed the Sentinel system, which would have used

ground-based, nuclear-armed interceptor missiles to protect a number of major U.S. urban centers

against Soviet attack. In 1969, the Nixon Administration renamed the system “Safeguard,” and

changed its focus to deployment around ICBM fields to ensure that these missiles could survive a

first strike and retaliate against the Soviet Union. Congress almost stopped the program in 1969,

when the Senate voted 50-50 to approve an amendment halting construction. Safeguard

continued, however, when Vice President Spiro Agnew broke the tie with a vote for the program.

In 1972, the United States and Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,

which limited each nation to the deployment of two ABM sites, one around its capital and one

around an ICBM field.66 The United States completed its ABM site around ICBM fields near

Grand Forks, North Dakota. It operated for a short time in 1974 and 1975, then was shut down by

Congress, largely because the costs of operating the system, even in peacetime, were thought to

be high relative to the limited protection it offered. U.S. research and development into ABM

systems, especially for ICBM protection, continued, albeit at lower budget levels through the late

1970s, before rising again during the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration further

increased this funding after President Reagan announced an expansive effort, known as the

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), to develop non-nuclear ballistic missile defenses, based on

land, at sea, and in space, that would protect the United States against a full-scale attack from the

Soviet Union. As cost estimates and technical challenges increased, the Reagan Administration

stated that it would begin with a more limited deployment of land-based and space-based sensors

and interceptors that would seek to disrupt and deter an incoming attack, instead of providing

complete protection. The first Bush Administration further scaled back the goals for SDI, stating

that the United States would seek to deploy a defensive system that could protect against smallscale missile attacks from the Soviet Union or other U.S. adversaries.

Force Structure After the Cold War

During the 1990s, the United States reduced both the numbers and types of weapons in its nuclear

arsenal. Some of these changes reflect the imposition of negotiated arms control limits; others,

such as the changes in U.S. non-strategic forces, reflect adjustments in U.S. objectives and

nuclear force posture.

A Protocol signed in 1974 reduced this to one permitted site per side, around either the nation’s capital or an ICBM

silo field.

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Non-strategic Nuclear Forces

In September 1991, President George Bush announced that the United States would withdraw all

land-based tactical nuclear weapons (those that could travel no more than 300 miles) from

overseas bases and all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships, submarines,

and naval aircraft.67 These initiatives affected more than 2,500 nuclear warheads that had been

deployed on shorter range delivery systems. 68 Furthermore, in late 1991, NATO decided to reduce

by about half the number of weapons for nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe, which led to

the withdrawal of an additional 700 U.S. air-delivered nuclear weapons. At the end of the 1990s,

the United States maintained an estimated 1,000 warheads for its active stockpile of nonstrategic

nuclear weapons.69 This number included around 500 air-delivered weapons that may still be

stored at bases in Europe. 70 The remainder are air-delivered weapons and around 350 nucleararmed sea-launched cruise missiles that are stored at facilities in the United States.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Throughout the 1990s, the United States continued to maintain a triad of strategic nuclear forces,

with warheads deployed on land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

According to the Department of Defense, this mix of forces offered the United States a range of

capabilities and flexibility in nuclear planning, complicated an adversary’s attack planning, and

hedged against unexpected problems in any single delivery system. During the past 10 years,

while implementing the START Treaty, the number of warheads deployed on these strategic

nuclear forces declined from a Cold War high of around 12,000 warheads to fewer than 7,500

warheads. The remaining warheads are deployed on 18 Trident submarines with 24 missiles on

each submarine and either 6 or 8 warheads on each missile; 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, some

with one and others with 3 warheads on each missile; 50 Peacekeeper (MX) missiles, with 10

warheads on each missile; 76 B-52H bombers, with up to 20 cruise missiles on each bomber; and

21 B-2 bombers with up to 16 bombs on each aircraft. This force structure is displayed on Table

1, below.

In early 1993, the United States and Russia signed a second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Under this Treaty, the United States and Russia would have each reduced their strategic offensive

nuclear weapons to between 3,000 and 3,500 accountable warheads. In 1994, the Department of

Defense decided that, to meet this limit, it would deploy a force of 500 Minuteman III ICBMs

with one warhead on each missile, 14 Trident submarines with 24 missiles on each submarine and

5 warheads on each missile, 76 B-52 bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers. The Air Force would

eliminate 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs and reorient the B-1 bombers to non-nuclear missions.

However, this Treaty never entered into force and, as is noted above, Congress prevented the

Clinton Administration from reducing U.S. forces unilaterally. Table 1 outlines the forces that the

These steps were not contingent on reciprocal actions by the Soviet Union, but, on October 5, 1991, Soviet President

Gorbachev announced a similar set of initiatives.

The United States maintained the capability to return sea-based nuclear weapons to aircraft carriers and submarines.

In 1994, the Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the United States no longer maintain

that capability on aircraft carriers, although it still could return nuclear-armed cruise missiles to attack submarines.

NRDC Nuclear Notebook. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, July 1998. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 54,

July/August 1998. p. 70.

Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1954-2004. Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists. November/December 2004. p. 76.

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United States had deployed after completing the reductions mandated by START I, and compares

them with the forces the Clinton Administration had planned to deploy under START II.

Table 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START I and START II

Deployed under START I

System

Launchers

Accountable

Warheadsa

Planned for START II

Launchers

Accountable

Warheads

Minuteman III ICBMs

500

1,200

500

Peacekeeper ICBMs

500

Trident I Missiles

168

1,008

Trident II Missiles

264

2,112

336

1,680

B-52 H Bombers (ALCM)

970

940

B-52 H Bombers (nonALCM)

B-1 Bombersb

B-2 Bombers

336

Total

1,236

5,947

933

3,456

Source: U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet; CRS Estimates.

Under START I, bombers that are not equipped to carry ALCMs count as one warhead, even if they can

carry up 16 nuclear bombs; bombers that are equipped to carry ALCMs count as 10 warheads, even if they

can carry up to 20 ALCMs. With these weapons included in the total, U.S. strategic nuclear forces can carry

around 7,100 warheads. Under START II, bombers would have counted as the number of weapons they

were equipped to carry.

Although they still count under START I, B-1 bombers are no longer equipped for nuclear missions.

Furthermore, the Air Force plans to reduce the B-1 fleet to 60 aircraft.

Ballistic Missile Defenses

In the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Congress and the Clinton Administration restructured

the BMD programs to emphasize theater missile defense development and deployment efforts,

and to focus national missile defense (NMD) efforts on technology development. In 1996, the

Administration adopted a new policy that called for the continued development of NMD

technologies during the first three years (1997-2000), followed by a deployment decision (in

2000) if the system were technologically feasible and warranted by prospective threats. Using this

approach, the United States would seek to develop an NMD system to defend the United States

against attacks from small numbers of long-range ballistic missiles launched by hostile nations,

or, perhaps, from an accidental or unauthorized launch of Russian or Chinese missiles.

Development and deployment would be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty.

In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added funding to the future-years defense budget for

NMD so that it would be able to pursue the deployment option in the event a deployment decision

was made. The Administration emphasized, however, that an NMD deployment decision still

would not be made until June 2000. In addition, the Administration announced that it had

restructured the NMD program for a possible deployment date of 2005, rather than 2003. This

change was made, according to the Pentagon, to reduce the amount of risk in the program and to

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maximize its success. The Administration also acknowledged that it would have to approach the

Russians with proposals for amendments to the ABM Treaty that would permit the deployment of

an effective, although limited, NMD system. However, after a test failure in July 2000, President

Clinton announced, on September 1, 2000, that he would not authorize the deployment of an

NMD system and would, instead, leave the decision to his successor.

Changes Adopted by the Bush Administration

The Bush Administration has described a “new triad” of weapons systems and capabilities that

will contribute to nuclear deterrence and U.S. national security in the coming years.71 In this “new

triad,” nuclear weapons and precision-guided conventional weapons combine as “offensive

strike” forces. According to the Administration, this combined strike force will reduce the U.S.

reliance on nuclear weapons and provide the President with a greater number of options when

responding to an attack. Missile defenses make up the second leg of the triad. The Bush

Administration has stated that defenses will contribute to deterrence by complicating attack

planning and undermining confidence for an adversary planning an attack with ballistic missiles

and by giving the United States an option, besides “shooting back” if attacked with ballistic

missiles. The third leg of the new triad is a “responsive infrastructure” that would allow the

United States to maintain and, if necessary, expand its nuclear arsenal in response to emerging

threats. This capability would allow the United States to reduce its forces, knowing it could

restore them at a later date if new threats emerged. These three legs are joined together by

“command and control, intelligence, and planning capabilities.” The Administration has stated

that these will provide the United States the ability to identify targets and plan nuclear or

conventional attacks on short notice, in response to unexpected threats. The Administration

argues that “the new triad will provide ... the flexibility in planning necessary to address the new

range of contingencies, including the unexpected and undeterrable.”72

The following sections summarize the Bush Administration’s plans for non-strategic and strategic

nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and infrastructure. The report does not address the plans for

precision-guided conventional weapons, as these are beyond the scope of the paper.73 It also does

not provide any details on the Administration’s plans for intelligence and command and control

systems, as this information remains classified.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

When announcing the results of the nuclear posture review, the Bush Administration did not

outline any changes to the current deployments of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Administration

officials indicated that further adjustments in NATO’s nuclear posture were an issue to be

addressed by the alliance. However, press reports indicate that the Bush Administration does plan

to retain the capability to launch non-strategic air-delivered nuclear weapons on U.S. fighter

aircraft.74 It also plans to retain the nuclear-armed Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles and

U.S. Department of Defense. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review. News Transcript. January 9, 2002.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense

For Policy. February 14, 2002.

One element of this concept, plans to put conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles, is covered in CRS

Report RL33067, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress.

According to press reports, the United States could extend the service life of F-15 and F-16 fighters, which can carry

(continued...)

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the capability to deploy those missiles on attack submarines. Reports indicate that the Navy had

sought to retire that capability, but was overruled by the Pentagon’s civilian leadership. 75 Reports

also indicate, however, that the Administration has relocated and consolidated some of the

nonstrategic weapons deployed in Europe, reducing the number of bases equipped to house those

weapons from 10 bases in seven countries in 2000 to 8 bases in six countries by the end of its first

term.76

Although the reports on the NPR did not discuss many details for U.S. non-strategic nuclear

weapons, the Bush Administration could support the continued deployment of these systems. The

Administration’s strategy outlines the need to react quickly to new intelligence and promptly

target and deliver nuclear weapons to emerging targets. Non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed

at bases overseas may be closer to the battlefield than strategic weapons based in the continental

United States, and, therefore, may be able to respond more quickly. They also may carry fewer

and smaller warheads than U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, which would make them better suited

to discrete, precise attacks.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

At the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush Administration announced that the

United States would reduce its strategic nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 “operationally deployed

warheads” over the next decade. 77 It codified these reductions in the Strategic Offensive

Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty), which the United States and Russia signed in

May 2002.78 According to the Administration, operationally deployed warheads are those

deployed on missiles and stored near bombers on a day-to-day basis. They are the warheads that

would be available immediately, or in a matter of days, to meet “immediate and unexpected

contingencies.”79 The Administration claims that the size of this force is not determined by a need

to counter a “Russian threat.” However, the Administration did consider Russia’s remaining

nuclear capabilities when developing the U.S. nuclear force posture; a conflict with Russia is

considered to be a “potential contingency” that could arise if the U.S. relationship with Russia

were to deteriorate significantly. The forces needed to address potential contingencies are

included in the “responsive force” not in the “operationally deployed force” of 2,200 warheads.

(...continued)

nuclear or conventional weapons. And, although the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is not planned to be and not likely

to become nuclear-capable when it enters the force in 2012, the Air Force could add nuclear capability in later

upgrades. If it adds this capability, the Air Force could then retire the F-16 aircraft. See Hebert, Adam. Pentagon

Already at Work on Nuclear Systems Needed After 2020. Inside the Pentagon. March 21, 2002. pp. 6-9.

Navy to Retain Cold War-Era, Nuclear-Tipped Tomahawk Missiles. Inside the Navy. December 8, 2003. p. 1.

Stan Norris and Hans Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1954-2004,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

November/December 2004.

President Bush announced the U.S. intention to reduce its forces on November 13, 2001, during a summit with

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The United States and Russia codified these reductions in a Treaty signed in late

May 2002. See CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, by (name r

edacted).

For details on the Moscow Treaty see CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive

Reductions Treaty, by (name redacted).

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense

For Policy. February 14, 2002.

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The Bush Administration indicated that the United States would retain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs,

and heavy bombers for the foreseeable future. It did not offer a rationale for the retention of this

traditional “triad,” although the points raised in the past about the differing and complementary

capabilities of the systems probably still pertain. Moreover, the Administration also, initially at

least, plans to retain most of the delivery vehicles in the current strategic force structure as it

reduces from the current level of around 7,000 warheads80 to a force of around 2,200

operationally deployed warheads. It has eliminated 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, which carried 500

warheads, and is in the process of converting four Trident submarines, which count as carrying

576 warheads, to non-nuclear missions. The Pentagon also recommended, in the 2006

Quadrennial Defense Review Report that the United States eliminate 50 of its 500 Minuteman III

ICBMs81 and that the Air Force reduce the size of the B-52 fleet to 56 aircraft. Further, the

Administration has indicated that it plans to retire the entire fleet of 460 Advanced Cruise

Missiles (ACM) and reduce the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) from over 1,100 missiles

to 528 missiles.82 Table 2, below outlines a force structure that is consistent with the plans

announced by the Administration.

Table 2. Illustrative U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under Bush Administration Plan

System

Launchers

Accountable Warheads

Minuteman III ICBMs

450

500

Trident II Missilesa

336

864

B-52H Bombersb

500

B-2 Bombers

336

Totalc

863

2,200

Source: CRS Estimates.

The launcher total for Trident submarines counts all 14 vessels. The warhead total, however, excludes

warheads that would be carried on two submarines in overhaul and assumes that each deployed missile

would carry only 3 warheads. If all 14 submarines counted, as they would have under START II, and each

carried only 3 warheads per missile, the total would be 1,008 warheads.

If B-52 bombers counted as the number of weapons they were equipped to carry, this force might total

almost 1,000 warheads. The Administration has said, however, that it will only count weapons stored at

bomber bases against its limit of 2,200 warheads. This table assumes that number will be around 500

weapons.

If START rules were applied to this force, it would total between 2,700 and 3,000 warheads.

The United States will also exclude from its accounting those warheads that could be deployed on

weapons systems in overhaul—this would generally apply to two Trident submarines at any given

time. These two submarines could have counted as up to 384 warheads under the START

Treaties, but will not count against the new total of 2,200 warheads. Further, to reach the level of

2,200, the Administration will have to remove more warheads from deployed missiles and count

At the end of 2001, according to the data released after the United States and Russia completed the implementation

of the START I Treaty, the United States had more than 7,000 warheads on its ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

START II, which never entered into force, would have reduced this number to 3,500 warheads, and a prospective

START III Treaty, outlined by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997, would have limited each side to 2,500 warheads.

Sherman, Jason. 2005 QDR the First to Adjust Strategic Forces. InsideDefense.com January 24, 2006.

Kristensen, Hans. U.S. Air Force Decides to Retire Advanced Cruise Missile. Federation of American Scientists.

Strategic Security Blog. March 7, 2007. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/03/us_air_force_decides_to_retire.php

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only those bomber weapons deployed at bomber bases, not the total number of weapons that

could be carried on all U.S. bombers.

The Administration has indicated that approximately 3,800 warheads would be deactivated in the

near-term, and many of these warheads would be placed in an active reserve. According to the

Administration, these stored warheads constitute a “responsive force” because the warheads could

be restored to deployment in weeks or months, in response to potential contingencies, which are

“more severe dangers that could emerge over a longer period of time.” Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld has also noted that the United States must retain many retired warheads because it

currently has no warhead production capacity; if problems came up that disabled a type of

warhead, the United States could only maintain its forces by deploying the stored warheads.83 On

the other hand, in June 2004 Ambassador Linton Brooks, Director of the National Nuclear

Security Administration (NNSA), announced that the Bush Administration had decided to reduce

sharply the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Although he did not offer any precise numbers, he

stated that the number of warheads would decline by over half in the next eight years.84 Groups

outside the government have estimated that this decision could lead to the retirement and

disassembly of around 4,300 warheads in the coming years, leaving around 6,000 warheads in the

U.S. stockpile by 2012.85 Further, in mid-December 2007, the White House announced that

President Bush had approved a significant reduction in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.86 The

release did not provide any concrete numbers, but officials indicated the reduction could be

between 10% and 15%.

Critics argue that this reconstitution force makes a mockery of the U.S. plans to reduce its

offensive nuclear forces. The Administration, however, has claimed that the ability to reconstitute

forces, if necessary, allows for deep reductions in operationally deployed forces. The

Administration has also stated that the responsive force represents the force that the United States

will need to meet the “four goals of dissuading potential adversaries, assuring allies, deterring

aggression, and defeating enemies.”87

The following provides a more detailed summary of the Bush Administration’s plans for each leg

of triad of strategic offensive forces.88

ICBMs

At the start of the Bush Administration in 2001, the U.S. ICBM force contained 500 Peacekeeper

missiles, each deployed with 10 warheads, and 500 Minuteman III missiles. Each Minuteman III

missile could carry 3 warheads, but, as it reduced to the START force levels, the United States

“downloaded” 150 Minuteman III missiles so that each now carries only one warhead. The other

Rumsfeld: Fate of Deactivated Nuclear Warheads Still Undetermined. InsideDefense.com. May 21, 2002.

Wald, Matthew. U.S. to Make Deep Cuts in Stockpile of A-Arms. New York Times. June 4, 2004.

NRDC Nuclear Notebook. U.S. Nuclear Reduction. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. September/October 2004. pp.

70-71.

The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. President Bush Approves Significant Reduction in Nuclear

Weapons Stockpile. December 18, 2007.

Ibid.

A more comprehensive review of each of these force structure elements can be found in CRS Report RL33640, U.S.

Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues.

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350 missiles still carry 3 warheads each. This ICBM force carried a total of 1,700 warheads

before the Peacekeeper deactivation program began..

The Bush Administration deactivated and retired all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs. DOD first

announced this decision, and the Air Force began to budget for the process, in 1994. The 1993

START II Treaty would have banned multiple warhead ICBMs, so the United States would have

had to eliminate these missiles while implementing the Treaty. However, beginning in FY1998,

Congress prohibited the Clinton Administration from spending any money on the deactivation or

retirement of these missiles until START II entered into force, an event that never occurred. The

Bush Administration requested $14 million in FY2002 to begin the missiles’ retirement; Congress

lifted the restriction and authorized the funding. The Bush Administration began deactivating the

Peacekeeper missiles in October 2002 and completed the retirement on September 19, 2005.89

Under START II, the United States would have had to destroy the silos that house the

Peacekeeper missiles to ensure that the missiles could not be deployed again in the future. Now,

however, the Air Force plans to retain the empty silos, and save the expense of excavating or

exploding them. It also plans to retain the missile stages for possible use as space launch vehicles

or target vehicles for missile defense tests. Finally, it plans to retain the warheads removed from

the missiles and deploy some of them on Minuteman III missiles. 90

The Bush Administration is also in the process of reducing the Minuteman III force from 500 to

450 missiles, although the 109th Congress prohibited the Administration from proceeding with

this plan until it submitted a report justifying the plan and analyzing its implications. It still plans

to download most of them to carry only 1 warhead, but some could remain deployed with 2 or 3

warheads, for a total force of 500-600 warheads. The Air Force plans to modernize these missiles,

to improve their accuracy and reliability and to extend their service lives beyond 2020. This

modernization program is expected to cost around $5.5 billion.91 Of this amount, $55 million will

be used to upgrade the command consoles in missile alert facilities to allow for more rapid

retargeting—a capability identified in the NPR as essential to the future nuclear force. The Air

Force is also conducting an ongoing $1.9 billion program to replace the guidance system on the

Minuteman missile to increase its accuracy and extend its service life. The Air Force had hoped

that the new guidance system would make the Minuteman missile as accurate as the Peacekeeper

missiles, but press reports indicate that the system has shown some problems during its testing

program. 92 The Air Force has also been repouring the fuel in the first and second stages of the

Minuteman missiles remanufacturing the third stage. The Air Force will also eventually extend

the life of the missiles’ fourth stage, the one that carries the reentry vehicle. Finally, under the

Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle program, the Air Force will replace the existing warheads on

some of the Minuteman missiles with the W87 warheads removed from Peacekeeper missiles.93

The Air Force has also begun to study its options for extending or replacing the Minuteman III

missiles. It reportedly produced a “mission needs statement” and conducted an Analysis of

Alternatives (AOA) during FY2004 and FY2005, with a plan to bring the new missile into service

U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002. NRDC Nuclear Notebook. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. May/June 2002. p. 70.

Ibid.

Donnelly, John M. Air Force Defends Spending Half A Billion on Iffy ICBMs. Defense Week. September 10, 2001.

p. 1.

U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002. NRDC Nuclear Notebook. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. May/June 2002. p. 70-71.

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by 2018. In June 2006, General Frank Klotz, of Air Force Space Command, noted that his

organization would recommend to the Pentagon that the Air Force take an evolutionary approach

with the Minuteman and continue to modernize and upgrade existing missiles, rather than start

from scratch designing and producing a new missile. Under this plan, the existing fleet of

Minuteman III missiles could remain in the force through 2025 or 2030. Some in the Air Force

and defense community have also begun to consider the possibility of deploying ICBMs with

conventional, rather than nuclear warheads.94 They argue that this type weapon system would

“improve the U.S. ability to swiftly react to targets around the globe,” contributing to the mission

of “prompt global strike.”95 Critics, however, contend that such a deployment and use of ICBMs

could prove very destabilizing. They note that, if the United States ever launched these missiles,

both Russia and China could mis-interpret the launch and react as if the United States had

launched a nuclear attack against them.

SLBMs

At the start of the Bush Administration, the U.S. SLBM force consisted of 18 Trident submarines.

Eight of these submarines, which were based at Bangor, Washington, carried the older Trident I

(C-4) missile; four of these are being converted to carry conventional weapons. The other four are

being converted to carry the Trident II (D-5) missile. The remaining 10 submarines, which were

based at Kings Bay, Georgia, all carried the Trident II missile. Each of these missiles can be

equipped to carry up to 8 warheads. However, when reducing its forces to comply with the

START I Treaty, the Navy removed warheads from the missiles on the 8 Tridents in the Pacific

fleet, and each now carries no more than 6 warheads. It may have also begun to “download” the

warheads on the remaining submarines, so that all the missiles will eventually carry no more than

6 warheads.

The Bush Administration plans to retain 14 Trident submarines, all equipped with D-5 missiles, in

the U.S. strategic nuclear force. This is the same plan that the Clinton Administration announced

in 1994 for the U.S. force under START II. However, the Clinton Administration had planned to

retire the four oldest Trident submarines so that the missiles that could be deployed on them

would not count under the limits in the START II Treaty. The Navy has, instead, begun to convert

these vessels to carry conventional cruise missiles or other non-nuclear weapons, or to perform

special missions. All four have now been removed from the strategic force. Reports estimate that

it will take two years, and up to $1 billion, to convert each submarine.96 Because these

submarines will still have launch tubes for ballistic missiles, they will still count under the

START Treaty, but they will not count under the Administration’s calculation of “operationally

deployed warheads.”

The retirement of four Trident submarines will eliminate 576 operationally deployed warheads (4

submarines, with 24 missiles and 6 warheads on each missile.) To further reduce the number of

“operationally deployed” warheads, the Navy may remove additional warheads from Trident

For more information on proposals to deploy ballistic missiles with conventional warheads see CRS Report

RL33067, Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name r

edacted).

Schmitt, Eric. U.S. Considers Conventional Warhead on Nuclear Missiles. New York Times. February 24, 2003. See

also Butler, Amy. DTRA Director Pushes Conventionally-armed ICBMS. Defense Daily, January 26, 2004. p. 5.

Connolly, Allison. For Four Subs, Its Goodbye Ballistic Missiles, Hello SEALs. Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. December

18, 2004.

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missiles. Each missile probably would have carried 5 warheads under START II; they are likely

to carry as few as 3 warheads in the future. In addition, the Navy will have two Trident

submarines in overhaul at any given time. The warheads that could be carried on missiles on

these submarines will count under START and would have counted under START II. However,

the Bush Administration will not count these warheads in its total of 2,200 “operationally

deployed warheads.”

Furthermore, as the Navy retired four submarines based at Bangor, Washington, it moved 5

submarines from Kings Bay, Georgia to Bangor, for a total of 9 submarines at Bangor and 5

submarines at Kings Bay. This move occurred between FY2003 and FY2006. Initially, the Navy

had planned to move 3 submarines to Bangor, leaving 7 at each base, to “balance the force” and

to maintain an equivalent workload at each base. However, some reports indicate that the Navy

decided to move an additional two submarines to Bangor so that the United States could increase

its ability to cover potential targets in China and East Asia.97 The Navy also plans to continue

producing D-5 missiles, with the force expected to grow to a total of 561 missiles, with 58 of the

missiles designated for the British Trident program. 98

The Navy has indicated that the Trident submarines can remain in service for 44 years, which

means that the first retirements will begin in 2029. The Navy has initiated studies into options for

a replacement for the Trident—one would be a new, dedicated ballistic missile submarine and

another would be a variant of the Virginia class attack submarine. It would have to begin work on

a new submarine by 2016 so that it could begin to enter the fleet as the Tridents begin to retire.99

The Trident II missiles will reach the end of their service lives sooner than the submarines, and

they will begin to retire in 2019. The Navy plans to conduct a modification program to extend the

missiles’ life; funding will begin in FY2005 and missile production is scheduled to begin in

FY2015. The Navy plans to purchase 300 missiles, enough to equip 10 Trident submarines. The

Navy is also planning to refurbish the W76 warheads on the Trident missiles, starting in 2007, so

they can remain in service until 2040.100

The Navy has also devloped a plan to deploy some Trident missiles with conventional warheads,

as a part of the prompt global strike mission. This responds to a recommendation in the NPR that

DOD study the feasibility of modifying a ballistic missile system to carry a non-nuclear

payload. 101 To perform this type of mission, the missile’s accuracy would have to be improved.

Consequently, DOD requested $30 million to begin a “three year effective enhancement” effort to

“demonstrate the near-term capability to steer a sea-launched ballistic missile warhead to GPSlike accuracy.”102 Congress rejected this request in FY2003 and FY2004. However, the Navy

requested $127 million in funding again in FY2007, and a reprogramming of $100 million in

FY2006, so that it could pursue the deployment of conventional warheads on Trident submarines

Norris, Robert S. And Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

January/February 2006.

Norris, Robert S. And Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

January/February 2006.

Hebert, Adam. Pentagon Already at Work on Nuclear Systems Needed after 2020. Inside the Pentagon. March 21,

2002. pp. 6-9.

100

U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002. NRDC Nuclear Notebook. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. May/June 2002. p. 72-73.

101

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of

Defense For Policy. February 14, 2002.

102

Grossman, Elaine M. Pentagon Eyes Bunker-Busting Conventional Ballistic Missile for Submarines. Inside the

Pentagon, June 27, 2002. p. 1.

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in the near term. The President also requested $175 million for this effort in FY2008. This effort

is designed to provide STRATCOM with the ability to use conventionally-armed ballistic missiles

in support of the new Global Strike mission.103 The 109th Congress rejected the request for

funding to alter the missiles and submarines, although it did permit some funding for continued

research on the reentry vehicle. Members expressed particular concern about the possibility that

adversaries might mistake the launch of a conventionally-armed Trident missile for a nucleararmed missile, and react accordingly. In its first session, the 110th Congress also rejected the

Administration’s request for funding for this program, creating, instead, a new $100 million fund

that could conduct research into a wider range of options for the prompt global strike mission.

Bombers

At the present time, the U.S. Air Force has 94 B-52 bombers and 21 B-2 bombers that are

equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force also has 92 B-1 bombers that were deployed as

nuclear-armed aircraft in the 1980s and 1990s. The United States reoriented the B-1 bombers to

conventional missions, and removed them from the nuclear war plans in the late 1990s. Under the

START II Treaty, the United States could have restored them to a nuclear role, even though it had

no plans to do so. The Bush Administration has indicated that it will no longer maintain the

capability to exercise this option.104 The Bush Administration has also indicated that it would like

to reduce the size of the B-1 force. It initially planned to retire 33 bombers assigned to the Air

National Guard and provide upgrades to the conventional weapons systems on the remaining 60

aircraft.105 However, in the FY2004 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills, Congress

had mandated that the Air Force restore 23 of these aircraft to service. The Air Force has argued

that this mandate would be too costly and complex to implement. It indicated, however, in early

February 2004, that it might request that seven or eight of these aircraft return to active service. 106

The Bush Administration did not outline any changes to the size of the B-52 or B-2 fleets when it

announced the results of the NPR.107 The FY2007 budget, however, it requested the elimination

of 38 B-52 bombers, leaving a fleet of 56 aircraft. The 109th Congress rejected this request,

allowing the Air Force to retire only 18 B-52 bombers, and mandating that it maintain at least 44

“combat-coded” aircraft. Congress also required that the Administration submit a report on the

future requirements for the U.S. bomber fleet. In the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R.

1585, Sec. 137), Congress mandated that the Air Force maintain a fleet of 74 B-52 bombers, with

no less than 63 in the Primary Aircraft inventory and 11 backup aircraft. Two additional aircraft

would be designated as “attrition reserve.” The Conference Committee indicated that the

Members agreed that a fleet of fewer than 76 aircraft would be insufficient to meet long-range

strike requirements.

103

Grossman, Elaine M. Pentagon Wants Early Start on Conventional Missiles for Subs. InsideDefense.com. January

20, 2006.

104

U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002. NRDC Nuclear Notebook. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. May/June 2002. p. 73.

105

For B-1 Bomber Fleet, Air Force Determines Less is More. InsideDefense.com, June 27, 2001. See also CRS Report

RL31544, Long-Range Bombers: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

106

USAF Wants Seven or Eight More B-1s, Not 23; Will Deal With Congress. Inside The Air Force. February 20,

2004. p. 1.

107

The Clinton Administration had planned to reduce the B-52 fleet to 76 aircraft, but Congress has blocked any

planned retirements.

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The B-52 bomber, which first entered service in 1961, is equipped to carry nuclear or

conventional air-launched cruise missiles and nuclear-armed advanced cruise missiles. The B-52

bombers can also deliver a wide-range of conventional arms. With upgrades, the Administration

expects the older version of these cruise missiles, the ALCMs, to the fleet until 2030 and the

aircraft to remain in service until around 2044. The B-2 “Stealth” bomber first entered service in

late 1993. It is equipped to carry nuclear gravity bombs, such as the B-61 and the B-83, and

conventional bombs. The Bush Administration believes this aircraft will remain in the force until

2040.

Under the START II Treaty, the United States would have had to count the total number of

nuclear weapons these aircraft were equipped to carry under its allocation of permitted warheads.

These warheads would have counted even if the bombers were equipped to perform conventional

missions, unless the bombers were altered so that they could no longer carry nuclear weapons.

The Bush Administration has stated, however, that it will not count the weapons that could be

carried on bombers under its total of 2,200 “operationally deployed” warheads. It will only count

as “operationally deployed” those nuclear weapons stored at bomber bases, excluding a small

number of spare warheads. It does not intend to alter any bombers so that they cannot carry

nuclear weapons. It plans to maintain nuclear capability, without distinction, on all B-52 and B-2

bombers. But it does plan, however, to eliminate the nuclear mission from the B-52 bombers

housed at Barksdale Air Force Base. Consequently, the number of bomber weapons could

decrease in the future, even without changes to the numbers of deployed bombers.

Ballistic Missile Defenses

In several speeches given during the campaign and his early months in office, President Bush

indicated that he would pursue a more robust missile defense program than the one he inherited

from the Clinton Administration. The President stated that the world had changed, that the United

States faced new threats, and that it could no longer rely on the Cold War-era doctrine of nuclear

deterrence to safeguard its national security. He stated that he would pursue the development of

missile defense technologies that could be deployed on land, at sea, and in space, and that would

protect the United States, its allies, and its forces overseas from ballistic missile attacks from

rogue nations. The President recognized that his planned missile defense system would not be

consistent with the limits in the ABM Treaty. He sought to convince Russia to withdraw from the

Treaty together with the United States. When that approach failed he announced, on December

13, 2001, that the United States had given its six months’ notice; the United States withdrew from

the Treaty on June 13, 2002.

The Administration began to outline its plans for missile defense in July 2001.108 Initially, the

Administration planned to continue all the ongoing theater missile defense (those that would

attempt to shoot down shorter-range missiles) and national missile defense (those that would

attempt to shoot down longer-range missiles) programs pursued by the Clinton Administration.

However, it did propose sharp increases in funding, adding $3.1 billion to the Clinton

Administration’s planned budget of $5.2 billion for missile defense in FY2002. The Bush

Administration also eliminated the distinction between theater and national missile defense,

dividing the programs, instead, into boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal phase. 109 The Bush

108

For details see CRS Report RL31111, Missile Defense: The Current Debate, by (name redacted) et al.

These refer to the portion of a ballistic missile’s flight trajectory, during which an interceptor missile would attempt

to shoot it down.

109

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Administration has not identified an eventual architecture for its ballistic missile system. It has

stated that it does not know what types of technologies or how many sensors and interceptors it

will eventually deploy, or when these systems will be available. Instead, it has pursued a “robust

research and development program” to identify promising technologies and systems. It has

indicated that it may begin deploying technologies in the next few years, as they begin to show

promise, then upgrade them over time as the technologies mature. This process, often referred to

as spiral development, differs significantly from most other military acquisition programs because

military officials have not established performance criteria or milestones that the systems must

achieve before they can proceed to production and deployment. In addition, because the

Administration has not identified the eventual size or structure of its completed program, it

cannot identify either the annual or total costs for the program.

The Administration and others who support this acquisition approach argue that it will allow the

United States to field missile defense technologies quickly, even if they are not perfect and

require later modifications. They argue that this is necessary because the United States faces a

growing threat from nations armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, as was noted above, missile defenses form one of the legs in the Administration’s

new “triad” of capabilities identified in the nuclear posture review. The Administration argues

that missile defenses can enhance deterrence by complicating an adversary’s attack planning,

dissuade an adversary from acquiring ballistic missiles by undermining the value of those

weapons, assure allies of the U.S. ability to contribute to their defense, and limit damage to the

United States, its friends, and forces if deterrence fails. 110

During 2004, DOD began to deploy interceptor missiles for its missile defense system in silos in

Alaska; six of these were in place by the end of 2004, two more were deployed in 2005 and three

more in 2006, for a total of 11.111 The Administration also deployed two of these interceptor

missiles at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The Administration had hoped to declare

these interceptors, and therefore its missile defense system “operational” before the election in

2004. However, delays in the program, continuing problems with scheduled tests, and continuing

questions about the system’s effectiveness have delayed this announcement. Reports indicate

however, that the system was placed on alert in July 2006, when North Korea conducted a test

launch of its longer-range missile. The Missile Defense Agency has also begun to plan for the

eventual deployment of a missile defense site in Eastern Europe by reviewing possible

deployment areas in Poland and the Czech Republic. The 110th Congress may address the plans

and funding for this site in its review of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill.

Infrastructure

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear weapons complex provides warheads required

by the Department of Defense for its strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The complex is

an integrated network of facilities that conduct research and development; produce nuclear and

other materials; produce, maintain and test nuclear weapons; and dismantle retired warheads.

During the Cold War, the facilities in the complex expanded their capacity and capability to meet

110

U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of

Defense For Policy. February 14, 2002.

111

Yardley, William. A Missile Defense System is Taking Shape in Alaska. New York Times. December 10, 2006. p.

36.

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the needs of a large nuclear arsenal of increasing technical sophistication. In the last decade, as is

described in more detail below, the number of facilities in the complex declined and the focus of

its efforts shifted. The Bush Administration plans to adjust the complex further, restoring some of

the capabilities lost in the last decade and enhancing the U.S. capability to produce and maintain

nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Weapons Complex During the Cold War

By the middle of the 1980s, the U.S. nuclear weapons complex consisted of 14 major facilities,

and a number of smaller facilities, located in 12 states.112 Three laboratories—Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, CA; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los

Alamos, NM; and the Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, NM—conducted research

and development and designed new nuclear weapons. The complex also included four facilities

that could produce nuclear or other materials used in nuclear weapons and naval nuclear reactors.

These facilities, which were operated by a number of industrial contractors, included the Hanford

site near Richland, WA; the Savannah River Site, near Aiken, SC; the Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory, near Idaho Falls, ID; and the Feed Material Production Center at Fernald, OH.

The nuclear weapons complex also included six major nuclear weapons production facilities.

These included the Rocky Flats Plant, outside Denver, CO; the Kansas City Plant, near Kansas

City, MO; the Mound Plant, near Dayton OH; the Pinellas Plant, in Clearwater, FL; and the

Pantex Plant near Amarillo, TX. These facilities were also operated by industrial contractors.

Finally, the complex included the Nevada Test Site, about 65 miles from Las Vegas, which

conducted explosive tests of U.S. and British nuclear warheads. These tests were used to confirm

the reliability of existing weapons, test the effects of nuclear weapons, and help in the

development of new nuclear warheads.

Many of the facilities in the nuclear weapons complex were constructed in the 1940s and 1950s,

so they were deteriorating significantly during the 1980s. In 1988, DOE closed the nuclear

reactors at Hanford and Savannah River, in response to safety concerns. The Rocky Flats Plant,

which produced the nuclear triggers, or “pits,” for nuclear weapons closed in 1989, in response to

safety and environmental concerns. At the time, DOE expected to reopen at least some of these

facilities. In the late 1980s, it also developed a plan to modernize and replace many of its

facilities, on the assumption that the United States would need to continue to design, produce,

test, maintain, and dismantle large numbers of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.113

However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led many to question and

reconsider assumptions about the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

112

For a detailed description of these facilities see the National Research Council. Committee to Provide Interim

Oversight of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources.

The Nuclear Weapons Complex: Management for Health, Safety, and the Environment. Appendix B: The DOE Nuclear

Weapons Complex: A Descriptive Overview. National Academy Press. Washington, 1989. pp. 102-112.

113

See U.S. Department of Energy. Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study. DOE/DP-0083. Washington,

DC. January 1991.

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The Nuclear Complex in the 1990s

During the 1990s, the focus of efforts in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex changed. Instead of

concentrating on developing, testing, and producing new nuclear weapons, the United States

turned its efforts to maintaining the existing stockpile and ensuring its safety and reliability in the

absence of underground nuclear testing. DOE also reduced the size of the existing infrastructure,

from 14 to 8 facilities, and began to modernize the remaining facilities.114 The facilities at

Hanford, Pinellas, Mound, and Rocky Flats all ceased work on nuclear weapons. The remaining

facilities included the 3 nuclear weapons laboratories—Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia; four

production facilities—the Kansas City Plant, the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee, the Savannah River

Site, and the Pantex Plant; and the Nevada Test Site. The number of people employed by the

nuclear weapons complex, which had reached a peak of nearly 58,000 people in 1990, had fallen

below 24,000 people by the end of the decade.

Operations at all eight of the remaining facilities changed in response to changing demands for

nuclear weapons work and changes in the U.S. nuclear force posture. For example, the Savannah

River site, which had produced plutonium and tritium in its now-closed reactors, focused, instead,

on efforts to purify existing tritium. 115 In addition, the Pantex Plant, which had focused mostly on

the final assembly of nuclear weapons, began to shift its workload towards the dismantlement of

retired weapons. DOE is also establishing a facility at Los Alamos Laboratory that can make pits

for nuclear weapons, which had been produced at the Rocky Flats Plant during the Cold War. The

Los Alamos facility will not have nearly the capacity of Rocky Flats, but its supporters argue that

it will help fill a gap in the U.S. ability to maintain its nuclear weapons and certify the reliability

of its pits.

Perhaps the most significant change in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex was the cessation of

nuclear testing. The United States adopted a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992 and signed the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.116 Although the Senate refused to consent to the

ratification of the Treaty in October 1999, the United States has continued to observe a

moratorium. In the absence of nuclear testing, DOE developed the Stockpile Stewardship

Program to maintain U.S. nuclear weapons. This program, which will use existing computing and

analysis capabilities along with several new, large experimental facilities at the nuclear weapons

laboratories, includes surveillance efforts that are designed to predict and detect problems in

nuclear warheads; assessment and certification efforts that analyze and evaluate the effects of

changes on warheads safety and performance; and design and manufacturing efforts which are

intended to refurbish stockpile warheads and certify new parts, materials, and processes.117

114

For details, see CRS Report 97-945, Nuclear Weapons Production Capability Issues: Summary of Findings, and

Choices, by Jonathan Medalia.

115

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is needed to boost the yield of nuclear weapons. The United States has

not produced any tritium since the reactors at Savannah River shut down in 1988. Tritium decays at a rate of 5.5% per

year. To maintain a significant stock, DOE must purify existing tritium and, eventually, produce new tritium.

116

Congress passed the moratorium over the objections of the Bush Administration. See P.L. 102-377, sec 507,

FY1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. See also CRS Report RL33548, Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments, by Jonathan Medalia.

117

U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Defense Programs. Stockpile Stewardship Program: Overview and Progress.

October 1997. p. 4.

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Congress first authorized this program in 1993 and elements of it have been underway since that

time. 118

Infrastructure in the Future

The Bush Administration has called the nuclear weapons infrastructure one of the three legs of its

“new triad.” According to Administration officials, the U.S. ability to maintain its existing nuclear

weapons “lends credibility to the arsenal and assurance to allies.” An infrastructure “focused on

sustainment and sized to meet the needs of a smaller nuclear deterrent” would provide the United

States with the capabilities to “respond to future strategic challenges.” In addition, the “ability to

innovate and produce small builds of special purpose weapons would convince an adversary that

it could not expect to negate U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities.” Hence, according to the

Administration, an infrastructure that allows the United States to sustain its forces and adapt them

to meet emerging needs would “provide the United States with the means to respond to new,

unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner.”119 Further, by maintaining the infrastructure

needed to adapt old warheads and produce new ones, the United States can reduce its stockpile of

nondeployed warheads. This characterization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure, and its

integration into the new model of deterrence, does not alter its central functions, but it does raise

the profile of the facilities and underline the Administration’s commitment to modernize and

expand the complex.120

When announcing the results of the Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush Administration indicated

that the United States would continue to observe a moratorium on nuclear testing, in spite of the

President’s opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Administration has stated that

the United States will continue to pursue the stockpile stewardship programs to assure the safety,

reliability and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile. According to Administration

officials, DOE will strengthen the weapons assessment process and seek improvements in

understanding the of physics of nuclear explosions through new and expanded simulation

capabilities.121 The ongoing program will include aggressive surveillance and the planned

refurbishment of existing warheads, to “anticipate stockpile problems and fix them before they

arise.”

The Bush Administration confirmed that the Stockpile Stewardship Program has permitted DOE

to certify the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal up till now, but it contends the

United States may not be able to continue to do so in the future, as the nuclear stockpile ages.

Furthermore, DOE has only a limited capacity to fabricate and certify pits and other components

for nuclear weapons. Many existing facilities, and the workforce, are aging. Therefore, the

Administration has outlined a more comprehensive program to rebuild the nuclear weapons

complex and its workforce to ensure that the United States can respond to emerging problems in

the nuclear weapons arsenal or emerging threats in the international environment.

118

See P.L. 103-160, FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Sec. 3138.

119

U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. Statement of John A. Gordon, Undersecretary of Energy for Nuclear

Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. February 14, 2002.

120

Funding to rebuild the nuclear weapons production complex increased from $9 million in FY2001 to $197 million in

FY2002. The Bush Administration requested $243 million for FY2003. See Weisman, Jonathan. Nuclear Arms

Scientists May Lack “Sense of Mission”. USA Today. March 18, 2002. p. 6.

121

U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. Statement of John A. Gordon, Undersecretary of Energy for Nuclear

Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. February 14, 2002.

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The Administration has argued that a “responsive” nuclear weapons infrastructure must

incorporate several capabilities that include and go beyond the 1990s focus on stockpile

surveillance and management. For example, the infrastructure must be able to respond to

surprises in the status of the stockpile, such as age-related defects that appear suddenly, or

changes in international security environments. The Administration has also argued that the

United States should be able to anticipate innovations in weapons design and countermeasures

pursued by an adversary and counter them before they arise. The infrastructure must also have a

sufficient reserve or surge capacity for research, development, and production; a sufficient stock

of assets, such as tritium, to support the deployed and responsive force of nuclear warheads; and

the capacity to maintain the readiness of sufficient numbers and types of weapons. Specifically,

the NPR recommends that the infrastructure have the capacity to identify and repair emerging

problems in existing warheads in three to four years and to allow for the design, development,

and production of new types of warheads within five years of a decision to enter full scale

development.122

The Administration has identified a number of specific tasks that the infrastructure must

accomplish over the next decade. At the top of the list is the refurbishment of several existing

warheads so that it can retain them for the foreseeable future. This refurbishment effort will take

place at the Pantex Plant, and will use most of the existing capacity at that facility. In addition, the

NPR has indicated that the United States should be able to produce new warheads if the

international security environment dictates. Therefore, the NPR reportedly indicates that Pantex

will need to expand its capacity, from the current level of around 350 warheads per year to 600

warheads per year,123 so that it could assemble sufficient quantities of new warheads without

interfering with the planned refurbishment program. In the past decade Pantex has concentrated

on dismantling warheads removed from service; in the future, DOE will schedule warhead

dismantlement at Pantex when there is time between refurbishment and other production efforts.

DOE also plans to expand the capacity at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, so that it can

meet the expected workload for replacing uranium components in the existing U.S. nuclear

arsenal.124

The Administration also sought funding, in the years after the completion of the NPR, for a study

on one specific modified nuclear warhead—the “robust earth penetrator.” This type of warhead

would be designed to penetrate below the ground before exploding, so that it could increase the

probability of destroying hardened and deeply buried targets. These types of targets might include

command and control facilities, storage depots for weapons of mass destruction, or other military

assets. The United States currently has one type of nuclear weapon—the B-61 mod 11 bomb—

that is designed to penetrate before detonating. But this weapon can only penetrate about 10

meters and may not survive penetration in many types of terrain.125 Consequently, DOE initiated a

research project on a new earth penetrating weapon. According to Ambassador Linton Brooks, the

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, this research would focus on

modifications to the B-61 and B-83 bombs. 126 This study could have cost $10 million in FY2003

122

U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. Statement of John A. Gordon, Undersecretary of Energy for Nuclear

Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. February 14, 2002.

123

Pincus, Walter. “Nuclear Plans Go Beyond Cuts.” Washington Post. February 19, 2002.

124

Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Administration’s Secret Plan for Strengthening U.S. Nuclear Forces. Natural

Resources Defense Council. February 13, 2002.

125

Tyson, Anne Scott. New Push for Bunker-Buster Nuke. Christian Science Monitor. May 9, 2002. P. 1.

126

The Bush Administration Views on the Future of Nuclear Weapons. An Interview with NNSA Administrator Linton

Brooks. Arms Control Today. January/February 2004. p. 3.

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and $40-$50 million over three years.127 Congress authorized the Administration’s request for $15

million for the second year of this study in FY2004, but it only appropriated 7.5 million. The

Administration requested $27.5 million in its FY2005 budget to begin “developmental ground

tests” on the “candidate weapons designs. It also planned to request sharply higher levels of

funding in the next few years, including $95 million in FY2006, $145.3 million in FY2007, and

$128.4 million in FY2008.128

Congress denied the Administration’s request for funding for this program in the Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447). It also denied the Administration’s request for funding

in FY2006, and DOE has since abandoned its efforts, with DOD taking on some aspects of the

study to determine whether the casing for a new weapon, either nuclear or conventional, could

penetrate hardened and buried targets before exploding.

In the FY2005 budget, Congress provided DOE with funding for a new program, the Reliable

Replacement Warhead (RRW). Many in Congress and at DOE expected this program to provide

the United States with a new way to maintain and modify its warheads. Ambassador Brooks

indicated that this program could be a part of the “transformation” of the U.S. weapons complex,

allowing the United States to maintain and modify its warheads without explosive nuclear testing,

and allowing the United States to reduce the size of its stored stockpile of warheads.129 DOE has

pursued this program by establishing design teams at both U.S. nuclear weapons labs. By

February 2006, both teams had developed designs that they believed would meet military

requirements, would not require nuclear testing to certify, and would meet other criteria

established for the program.130 In early March 2007, the National Nuclear Security

Administration (NNSA) announced that the Nuclear Weapons Council had selected the design

from Lawrence Livermore Lab in California.131

In recent years, questions have come up about the need for this new warhead design, particularly

in light of the fact that many have begun to question the role and requirements for nuclear

weapons in the future. In the FY2008 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, Congress eliminated all

funding for this program.

The NPR also recommended that the United States reduce the amount of time that it would take

to resume nuclear explosive testing at the Nevada Test Site. The Administration claims that this

“enhanced test readiness” is “prudent as a hedge for the possibility that a future safety or

reliability problem could not be fixed without testing.”132 If a problem came up in these

127

Weisman, Jonathan. Nuclear Arsenal Upgrade Planned. USA Today. March 18, 2002. p. 1. See also Pincus, Walter,

Nuclear Warhead Study Aims at Buried Targets. Washington Post, March 15, 2002, p. 16. According to Spencer

Abraham, Secretary of Energy, the study will focus on whether an existing warhead can be modified for use as an earth

penetrating weapon. Because it will not seek to develop a new warhead, the study will not violate a 1994 congressional

ban on the design and development of new nuclear weapons.

128

Department of Energy FY2005 Congressional Budget Request. National Nuclear Security Administration.

DOE/ME-0032, Volume 1. January 2004. pp. 63 and 76.

129

For details see CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current

Developments, by Jonathan Medalia.

130

For a detailed review of the RRW program, see CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead

Program: Background and Current Developments, by Jonathan Medalia.

131

U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. “Design Selected for Reliable Replacement

Warhead.” Press release, March 2, 2007.

132

U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. Statement of John A. Gordon, Undersecretary of Energy for Nuclear

Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. February 14, 2002.

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processes, it would take 24-36 months for DOE to prepare for and conduct an underground

nuclear test. Furthermore, the Administration has noted that this time might lengthen in the future,

as remaining personnel with nuclear testing skills and expertise retire. Consequently, the

Administration included $15 million in the FY2003 DOE budget and $25 billion in the FY2004

DOE budget to begin to reduce the time needed to prepare for nuclear testing. These funds would

be used to augment key personnel and increase their proficiency, begin training the next

generation of personnel, conduct additional subcritical tests, replace key components, modernize

certain test diagnostic capabilities, and decrease time to show regulatory compliance. 133

The Administration also hoped to construct on a new facility that would be able to produce the

“pits” for nuclear weapons. DOE will continue to use the interim pit facility at Los Alamos

National Laboratory, but this facility would only be able to produce 20-50 pits per year and would

not be able to manufacture all the types of pits currently in the U.S. stockpile. According to the

Administration, this facility may not be sufficient if the United States must replace large numbers

of aging pits in the future. Therefore, it plans to bring a new facility on line by 2020.134 It will size

this facility with the capacity to support the planned workload for maintaining and replacing

existing pits and to address “surprise” requirements and the need for potential new warhead

production.135 Congress has raised questions about this program. In the Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2005 Congress provided $7 million for the modern pit facility, but specified

that these funds could not be used to select a construction site for the facility.

In 2006, DOE announced a plan to consolidate and reduce the size of its nuclear weapons

complex. This plan, which is still in the early stages, would eliminate some of the DOE facilities

and combine others at a smaller number of locations. This plan is, at this time, known as

“Complex 2030.”136 The National Nuclear Security Administration formally announced plans to

transform the nuclear weapons complex in mid-December 2007. This plan would reduce the size

and the cost of the complex, with a reduction of about 30% in square footage and a decline of

about 20%-30% of the workforce over a decade. 137

Issues Raised by the NPR

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Defense Policy

As was noted above, the Clinton Administration retained much of the existing U.S. nuclear

weapons policy and force posture in the decade after the demise of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, in official documents, the Administration stated that nuclear weapons were playing

a smaller role in U.S. defense strategy than they had during the Cold War, and it stated that these

weapons existed primarily to serve as a deterrent for adversaries who were armed with their own

133

Ibid.

134

Costa, Keith, NNSA To Begin Work on New Plutonium Pit Production Plant. Inside the Pentagon. June 6, 2002. p .

14.

135

U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. Statement of John A. Gordon, Undersecretary of Energy for Nuclear

Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. February 14, 2002.

136

Lobsenz, George. DOE Moves on Consolidation of Weapons Complex. Defense Daily, October 24, 2006.

137

U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. Office of Public Affairs. NNSA Releases

Draft Plan to Transform Nuclear Weapons Complex. December 18, 2007.

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nuclear weapons. The Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration before it, also

eliminated many specific targets from the U.S. war plan, and began to reduce the size of the U.S.

nuclear arsenal, in response to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. But the central

tenets of the U.S. deterrence strategy and nuclear employment plans remained essentially

unchanged. Furthermore, during the 1990s, the Clinton Administration began to develop targeting

options for the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attack from nations

other than Russia, and, in its declaratory policy, the Administration would not rule out the

possible first use of nuclear weapons in these circumstances.

At the same time, many participants in the public debate over nuclear weapons policy argued that

the United States should alter sharply its nuclear weapons strategy and force posture. They

claimed that, in the absence of the global threat from the Soviet Union, the United States could

maintain its deterrent posture with a far smaller number of nuclear weapons; many proposed

reductions to levels of around 1,000 warheads. Some also argued that, with its overwhelming

superiority in conventional weapons, the United States could defeat almost any potential

adversary without threatening to resort to nuclear weapons. Several studies concluded that a

policy of “nuclear abolition” could be a practical, albeit long term, goal for the United States and

other nations with nuclear weapons. In the meantime, they argued that the United States should

use its nuclear weapons only to deter the potential use of nuclear weapons by other nations. In

this framework, the United States could consider its nuclear weapons to be “weapons of last

resort.”138

The Bush Administration’s description of the role of nuclear weapons differs sharply from the

views advocated by many analysts over the last decade, but it is more consistent with official

policies and posture adopted by the Clinton Administration. The Bush Administration assumes

that nuclear weapons will be a part of U.S. security strategy for at least the next 50 years. Given

this time frame, the NPR recommends that the United States begin now to develop weapons

systems that will enter the force in the years between 2020 and 2040. Therefore the

Administration clearly does not assume that the current systems in the U.S. nuclear arsenal will

be the last. The Administration also has a role for nuclear weapons that goes well beyond a

“weapon of last resort” designed to deter only nuclear attack. The Administration not only argues

that nuclear weapons can deter chemical, biological, and conventional attack, it believes they can

do more than just deter attack. It has argued that they can also be used to assure allies of U.S.

commitments, dissuade adversaries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or threatening

the United States, and defeat adversaries by destroying critical targets if deterrence fails. This last

objective has contributed to the Administration’s interest in developing new types of nuclear

weapons that can threaten hardened and deeply buried targets.

The Administration has argued, however, that this expanded role for nuclear weapons does not

mean that the United States is increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. It has noted that the

addition of missile defenses and precision-guided conventional weapons to U.S. deterrent forces

will give the President a greater number of options in a crisis and actually reduce the likelihood of

nuclear use. Critics, however, question this logic, arguing that the Administration’s approach will

blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and increase the likelihood of

nuclear use. According to one analyst, the Administration has outlined a role for nuclear weapons

138

“... as the Cold War waned, so did the notion that nuclear weapons could be used to fight a war. While Washington

did not give up its option to make the first use of nuclear weapons against a Warsaw Pact attack, it cast the use of such

weapons as a last resort. With the end of the Cold War, the need for nuclear weapons seemed to fade further.” Gordon,

Michael R. Nuclear Arms For Deterrence or Fighting? New York Times, March 11, 2002. p. 1.

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that emphasizes war-fighting over deterrence. He has argued that “if military planners are now to

consider the nuclear option any time they confront a surprising military development, the

distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear options fades away.”139 Others have also concluded

that the Administration’s plan will increase U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Former Senator

Sam Nunn, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and retired General Eugene Habiger

wrote that the Administration’s policy is “expanding options for nuclear attacks, widening the

number of targeted nations and developing new nuclear weapons variants.” They note that “each

of these ideas may have a plausible military rationale,” but “their collective effect is to suggest

that the nation with the world’s most powerful conventional forces is actually increasing its

reliance on nuclear forces.”140

Some critics of the Administration’s policy continue to argue for a far more limited role for

nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and security policy. They question whether threats to use nuclear

weapons in response to anything other than a nuclear attack would be either necessary or credible.

Therefore, according to one analyst, “the U.S. would be far better served by adopting a genuinely

new nuclear posture, one that maintains nuclear weapons only to deter nuclear attack. Given the

awesome power of U.S. conventional forces, we do not need nuclear weapons for any other

purpose, even to deter a chemical or biological attack.”141 Furthermore, given the long-standing

“taboo” against the use of nuclear weapons, some argue that the United States would enhance its

standing in the international community if it sought to reduce, rather than expand, the role of

nuclear weapons in international affairs.

Credible Deterrence

In many ways, the debate over the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy follows from a

more fundamental debate over how to make deterrence credible. This debate surfaced frequently

during the Cold War, when the United States sought to develop a mixture of strategy, doctrine,

and force posture that would deter not only a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States but also a

conventional attack by the Soviet Union or its allies against U.S. allies. For example, some

analysts questioned whether the Soviet Union would believe U.S. threats to launch a massive

retaliatory strike in response to an attack in Europe, when the Soviet Union could respond by

devastating U.S. cities. Concerns about the credibility of the U.S. deterrent underlined many of

the U.S. efforts to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons and war plans that contained

options allowing attacks against a range of targets. Analysts hypothesized that, if the Soviet

Union knew that the United States could launch an attack more tailored to the provocation, and

more directed against Soviet nuclear forces, then U.S. threats might seem more credible to the

Soviet leadership. In other words, the more prepared the United States appeared to fight and win a

nuclear war, the more likely it would be for the Soviet Union to refrain from aggression and for

deterrence to succeed. Others argued, however, that such large force structures and elaborate

plans were simply overkill, that the threat of nuclear destruction with as few as 100 warheads,

known as a minimum deterrent, could be enough to deter any rational leader from challenging the

United States.

139

Comments attributed to Ivo Daalder, of the Brookings Institution. See Dao, James. Pentagon Study Urges Arms

Shift, For Nuclear to High Tech. New York Times. January 9, 2002.

140

Nunn, Sam, William Perry, and Eugene Habiger. “Still Missing: A Nuclear Strategy.” Washington Post. May 21,

2002. p. 17.

141

Scoblic, J. Peter. “Think Anew About U.S. Nukes.” Christian Science Monitor. March 19, 2002.

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In the years after the end of the Cold War, debates over the credibility of nuclear deterrence often

focused on whether nations armed with chemical or biological weapons might believe U.S.

threats to retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked with chemicals or biological agents. Some

argued that the potential loss of life from a biological attack would be so severe that nuclear

deterrent threats would be both appropriate and credible. Others argued that nations simply would

not believe that the United States would cross the nuclear threshold in response to anything less

than a nuclear attack, so nuclear threats would not be a credible deterrent for chemical or

biological weapons. Furthermore, some argued that if a nation did use chemical or biological

weapons, and the United States did not retaliate with nuclear weapons, the United States would be

caught in a bluff and the credibility of its nuclear deterrent would be further damaged. These

views contributed to the theory that the United States should threaten to use nuclear weapons only

as a “last resort.”

The Bush Administration has outlined plans to develop a more focused nuclear war-fighting

capability for the United States. The emphasis on the development of penetrating nuclear

weapons that can destroy hardened and deeply buried targets, along with the “capabilities” based

approach that states the United States will seek the ability to destroy threatening capabilities

possessed by any potential adversary, are a part of this new strategy. As was noted above, critics

have argued that these changes in the U.S. nuclear posture make it more likely that the United

States will use nuclear weapons in a future crisis. The Bush Administration has argued, however

that U.S. plans and capabilities to use nuclear weapons against smaller countries would make

nuclear use less likely because it would make the U.S. deterrent more credible and robust.142

Analysts who support the Bush

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