Long-Range Bombers: Background and Issues for Congress

Order Code RL31544

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Long-Range Bombers:

Background and Issues for Congress

Updated August 19, 2003

-name redactedResearch Associate

-name redactedSpecialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Long-Range Bombers:

Background and Issues for Congress

Summary

The Air Force’s long-range bombers were designed during the Cold War to

deliver nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union. Although they can be vulnerable to

enemy defenses if detected, they combine the ability to fly extended distances, much

farther than most other combat aircraft, with the ability to carry weapons payloads

many times larger than that of fighters. Over the past decade, the Air Force has taken

advantage of these characteristics by migrating its bomber fleet from a nuclear to a

conventional role. Today, the Air Force maintains three bombers: the B-1B, the B-2,

and the B-52, and each has been outfitted with a variety of precision and “dumb”

weapons for conventional strikes. In recent conflicts in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq

(2003), bombers have played prominent roles.

Questions remain, however, about where bombers fit into Air Force spending

priorities. Some argue that because bombers can be vulnerable against advanced air

defenses, scarce resources are best spent on other programs that can address the full

spectrum of potential future conflicts, such as the F/A-22 Raptor. Others counter that

the range and payload of the bombers — many times that of fighters like the F/A-22

— make them extremely valuable and believe that modernizing them, building

additional aircraft, and developing a next-generation bomber should be top budget

priorities.

Decisions in Congress and the Department of Defense regarding bombers may

have important long-term implications. Each of the three bombers is in need of

expensive upgrades, and decisions about the funding of these upgrades may affect the

continued utility of these aircraft. Second, a debate has arisen over whether to

expand or contract the bomber fleet. Third, military observers and policymakers

disagree about when to begin a next-generation bomber program; some push to begin

a new program immediately, while others advocate waiting a decade or more before

initiating development of a new bomber.

This report discusses the background, status, and current issues surrounding the

Air Force’s long-range bomber fleet. Before addressing each of the three bombers

individually, this report analyzes issues affecting the entire fleet.

Contents

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Congressional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Role of Bombers in Current and Future Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Next Generation Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Urgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Desired Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Fleet Diversity Versus Uniformity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

B-52 Stratofortress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B-52 Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Electronics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Engines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Targeting Pod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

SWING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Mission Capable Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Aging Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Recent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Desert Storm (Iraq, 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Operation Desert Fox (Iraq, 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

FY2004 Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

B-1B Lancer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Effects of Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Criticism of the Consolidation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Reinstatement of Retired B-1s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

New Basing for the B-1B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Alternative Air National Guard (ANG) Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

The Conventional Munition Upgrade Program (CMUP) . . . . . . . . . . 26

Block E (Wind Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD)

Integration and Computer Upgrade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Block F (Defensive System update Program, DSUP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

BONE (B-One Next Enhancement) Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Mishaps (Accidents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Mishap Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Recent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Operation Desert Storm (Iraq) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Operation Desert Fox (Iraq) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Operation Iraqi Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

FY2004 Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

B-2A Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Program Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

New Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Forward Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Radar Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Link 16 and Beyond the Line of Sight (BLOS) Communications

Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Alternate High Frequency Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Weapons Upgrades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Mission Capable Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Spare Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Cracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Recent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Operation Iraqi Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

FY2004 Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

List of Figures

Figure 1. Economic Service Life and Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Figure 2. B-52 Stratofortress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Figure 3. B-1B Lancer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Figure 4. B-2 Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

List of Tables

Table 1. Comparison of U.S. Long-Range Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Table 2. Projected Range and Air-to-Ground Strike Capabilities of

Bombers and Select Fighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Table 3. Inventory, Status, and Age of Air Force Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Table 4. B-52 Appropriations, by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Table 5. B-1B Appropriations, by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Table 6. B-2 Appropriations, by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Long-Range Bombers:

Background and Issues for Congress

Background

During the Cold War, the primary mission of long-range bombers was to deter

a nuclear attack on the United States by threatening the Soviet Union with retaliation.

Manned bombers, the airborne leg of the U.S. strategic triad, were designated as a

second-strike force that would hit back after a Soviet attack. In the Cold War-era,

policy makers envisioned a fleet of over four hundred bombers enabling the United

States to overwhelm perceived, on-going improvements in Soviet air defenses.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the breakup

of the Soviet Union led policymakers to reconsider the value of bombers. At the same

time, a U.S. economic recession led to military spending cuts. Because bombers are

among the most expensive systems in the Air Force inventory, they were ripe targets

for funding cuts. During this period, the planned procurement of B-2s was reduced,

many B-52s were retired, and an ongoing debate began about retiring a number of B1s.

In 1992, the bomber force was combined with other power-projecting assets of

the Air Force when Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Command merged to

form Air Combat Command (ACC). According to the Air Force, this restructuring

reflected an integrated way of thinking about air power. The role of long-range

bombers within the ACC is to combine mass (large payloads), reach (long range),

and immediacy (quick response) with the ability to conduct precision strikes with

non-nuclear weapons.

Today the United States Air Force maintains three long-range bombers: the

venerable B-52 Stratofortress, the supersonic B-1B Lancer, and the stealthy B-2

Spirit. Table 1 lists the characteristics of each. Since the end of the Cold War, their

primary mission has shifted from nuclear deterrence to conventional bombing, and

all three have been reconfigured to carry a variety of modern conventional bombs and

air-to-surface missiles. Since the debut of precision weapons in the late 1990s, the

bombers have seen their role increase, with bombers increasingly used for precision

strikes and close air support to U.S. and allied ground forces. Despite the shift to

conventional missions, some bombers retain nuclear capabilities: the B-2 is certified

to deliver nuclear weapons, and twelve B-52s “are held ready for nuclear missions.”1

1

Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. 2000.

Washington, DC.

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In 1999, the three bombers were used together for the first time in air strikes

against Yugoslavia under NATO’s Operation Allied Force. The B-2 bomber made

its operational debut, flying to Yugoslavia from Whiteman Air Force Base in

Missouri. All three bombers also played prominent roles in Operation Enduring

Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Table 1. Comparison of U.S. Long-Range Bombers

Feature

Un-refueled Range

(miles)

Weight, empty (lbs.)

Max. takeoff weight

(lbs.)

Payload (lbs.)

Crew

Speed

Altitude

Un-refueled range

(miles)

Stealth

B-1

B-2

B-52

7,455

6,000 +

8,800

192,000

160,000

185,000

477,000

336,500

488,000

55,000

40,000

4

2

1.2 mach

High subsonic

> 30,000 ft. ceiling

50,000 ft. ceiling

200 ft. minimum;

50,000

5

.84 mach

50,000 ft. ceiling

7,455

6,000 + miles

8,800

Some

Excellent

None

Sources: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft (various years), USAF Fact Sheets. Air Force Magazine, Air

Force Almanac. (Various years). U.S. Air Force Long-Range Strike Aircraft White Paper. November

2001.

Congressional Considerations

Introduction

Despite a prominent and widely praised role in the recent operations in

Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), there is little consensus among military leaders

and policymakers regarding the future of long-range bombers. While some advocate

increasing today’s bomber fleet and beginning development of a new bomber

immediately, others are pushing to cut the fleet and postpone a new bomber program.

Supporters point to bombers’ ability to carry massive weapons payloads, to loiter

over battlefields for long periods of time, and to strike targets around the globe from

bases in the continental United States. Detractors contend that large, lumbering

bombers are vulnerable to enemy air defenses, including surface-to-air missiles as

well as enemy fighters. In the high-threat environments for which the Air Force

plans, the role of most bombers would be reduced, and fighter/strike aircraft, which

are more “survivable” but have much shorter range and a fraction of the payload,

would have to take up the slack. Bomber advocates counter that the conflicts the

United States has faced in recent years, and those it is most likely to face in the

foreseeable future, would not involve high-threat environments, and that even if they

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did, bombers would likely play an important role once enemy air defenses have been

destroyed. Moreover, they say, bombers should be upgraded so they can penetrate

advanced air defenses.

At issue, then, is what priority to give bombers in the overall defense budget.

Advocates argue that the United States does not have enough bombers, that they are

not being modernized quickly enough, and that the Air Force needs to begin investing

in a next generation bomber immediately. There are currently no open production

lines for bombers, although some have advocated for re-opening production of B-2

stealth bombers. Bomber detractors believe that defense dollars are better spent

elsewhere, on programs that address the “full spectrum” of missions the Air Force

might confront, not just the low-threat environments faced in Afghanistan and Iraq.

These detractors say that even though the bombers performed well in Afghanistan

and Iraq, those conflicts were anomalies; the former was among the poorest states,

while the latter had had its air defenses destroyed by the first Gulf War and more than

10 years of sanctions and air strikes. Contingencies in other parts of the globe, they

argue, could involve more extensive air defenses, requiring more survivable aircraft,

such as the F/A-22, to “knock down the door” and clear the way for follow-on

aircraft. Others disagree and contend that the wars the United States is likely to fight

in the foreseeable future, like those it has fought over the past 30 years, have been

against poorly defended opponents in the developing world.

Long-range bomber issues that may confront Congress include the following:

What types of conflicts does the United States need to prepare for and how relevant

are bombers to those scenarios? How many bombers does the Air Force need to meet

the requirements of these conflicts? To what extent, if at all, do the bombers need

to be upgraded to meet these requirements? Is a next-generation bomber needed, and

if so, when? This report will address these big-picture issues, which relate to the

entire bomber fleet, before turning to each of the three bombers individually.

The Role of Bombers in Current and Future Conflicts

A key consideration in decisions about modernizing the bombers, expanding or

contracting the fleet, and developing a next-generation bomber is the type of conflict

the United States might face in the foreseeable future. The three bombers have

different roles in different types of conflicts. The large but vulnerable B-52 serves

as a bomber in “low-threat” environments, dropping a variety of precision and

“dumb” bombs, while in higher-threat environments it serves as a “stand-off” missile

launcher, firing air-to-ground cruise missiles from beyond the range of enemy

defenses. The B-1, in addition to serving as a bomber in low threat environments,

is capable of penetrating some air defenses because of its speed, anti-missile

defensive systems, and reduced radar signature (stealth). The B-2, which has

superior stealth, can undertake penetration missions against more sophisticated

defenses.

In recent conflicts, the United States has faced opponents with rudimentary or

battered air defenses, and all three bombers have been able to attack targets with

impunity. Against an opponent with sophisticated defenses, however, the B-52 and

possibly the B-1 could be reduced to a stand-off role. In the case of the B-1, the

plane’s existing defensive systems will soon become obsolete and the program to

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design a replacement was cancelled by the Department of Defense (DOD) in late

2002 (See B-1 DSUP, below). As a result, the B-1, like the B-52, could be relegated

to a stand-off role against even modest air defenses. Although the B-1 and B-52 are

being outfitted with more sophisticated stand-off weapons, the B-2, of which the Air

Force maintains only 16 combat-ready aircraft, would be the only long-range strike

aircraft capable of penetrating air defenses. Other than the 16 B-2s, the Air Force

would need to rely on fighter/attack aircraft such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike

Fighter (JSF) despite their shorter range and smaller weapons payload, to attack

ground targets in high-threat areas.

Table 2. Projected Range and Air-to-Ground Strike Capabilities

of Bombers and Select Fighters

Feature

Un-refueled Combat Radius

(nautical miles)

Payload (lbs.)

Max. takeoff weight (lbs.)

2,000 lb. JDAMs

500 lb. JDAMs

Small Diameter Bombs b

B-1

B-2

B-52

F-35 (JSF)

F/A-22

2,200

3,000

3,826

633

540

55,000

477,000

24

n/a

144

40,000

336,500

16

80

320+

50,000

488,000

18

30

144

14,600

50,000

2

2

8

4,500

60,000

2a

n/a

8

Sources: Air Combat Command Public Affairs Office, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft (various years),

USAF Fact Sheets, Air Force Almanac (various years).

Note: Stated numbers for the JSF and F/A-22 assume an air-to-ground strike configuration and that

fuel and weapons are carried internally. Although both are capable of carrying external fuel tanks and

weapons, doing so can compromise stealth. Data for the JSF is projected; flight testing has not been

completed.

a. The F/A-22 cannot carry the 2,000 lb. JDAM. It can carry two 1,000 lb. JDAMs internally for

strike missions.

b. Numbers for the SDB are estimates; SDB development has not been completed.

The Air Force points out that against the most sophisticated air defenses, the

F/A-22 will be the most “survivable” and effective aircraft because of its stealth,

speed, and agility, even though its range is shorted and its payload smaller in

comparison to the B-2. The Air Force and other observers contend that the F/A-22

will be the only aircraft that can reliably penetrate advanced defenses and “break

down the door” for follow-on aircraft; resources are therefore best spent on such

aircraft rather than on upgrading or building more bombers. B-1s and B-52s will

continue to play a role as stand-off platforms and as follow-on strike platforms, and

B-2s will continue to serve as penetrators, but to ensure access in high-threat

environments, these observers say, the bulk of Air Force investment should go to

fighters.

Bomber advocates, on the other hand, argue that building more B-2s and

upgrading the B-1’s defensive systems are cheaper, more effective ways to address

the high-threat environment than developing advanced fighters. Modernizing

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existing bombers and expanding the fleet will not only address the high-threat

environment, they say, but also will improve capabilities in lower-threat

environments. They point to several advantages of bombers:

Long-range bombers are designed to operate from far-away bases

and can strike targets around the globe from the United States if

necessary. Allies sometimes restrict the Air Force’s use of bases

close to conflicts. In the recent war in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Turkey

prohibited the use of their air bases for combat missions, and other

countries denied rights to fly through their air space. Even with

aerial refueling, short-range aircraft require bases close to the

conflict zone to operate effectively, and their value in future

conflicts could be severely diminished if nearby countries deny

access.

! Even if neighboring countries provide access to bases near a future

conflict, opponents could use surface-to-surface missiles to disable

those bases, again limiting the capabilities of short-range aircraft.

! New targeting technologies have dramatically increased the

capabilities of bombers. Because of GPS- and laser-guided

munitions and new targeting pods, high-flying bombers now conduct

precision strikes previously conducted only by low-flying, shortrange aircraft. In Afghanistan and Iraq, bombers performed close air

support missions, previously the exclusive domain of low-flyers like

the A-10 Warthog.

! Bombers’ long range and massive payload enable them to loiter for

hours above conflict zones so they can respond rapidly to newly

designated, time-sensitive targets.

!

Bomber advocates point out that these new capabilities have substantially

increased demand for bombers in recent conflicts. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, for

example, B-1s were in such demand that CENTCOM air component commander Lt.

Gen. Michael Moseley personally managed their scheduling.2 Since 12 of the 36

combat ready B-1s were deployed to Guam in case of an emergency in Korea and

another 12 were undergoing maintenance or modernization, only 12 were available

for the war. The demand for bombers is also apparent in statistics for recent

conflicts: in Afghanistan, bombers accounted for 20% of combat missions and

dropped 76% of the bomb tonnage in the first three weeks of the air campaign.3 In

Iraq, the B-1 flew fewer than 2% of the total number of combat sorties, yet dropped

roughly half of the JDAMs.4

Bomber advocates also contend that few potential opponents are likely to obtain

advanced air defenses because they are expensive and difficult to operate. In recent

2

David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Baghdad Confidential,” Aviation Week, April 28,

2003.

3

Bruce Rolfson. “Bombers Shine in Air War But Remain Budget Targets.” Air Force Times.

November 26, 2001.

4

David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Baghdad Confidential,” April 28, 2003.

CRS-6

wars and in the most likely scenarios for future conflict, air defenses are modest at

best. Bomber advocates therefore say that a bomber fleet with upgraded defensive

systems will remain valuable in the vast majority of future conflicts.

Inventory

How many bombers does the Air Force need? How many will it need in the

future? The Air Force currently maintains 183 long-range bombers, of which 96 are

combat ready. It plans to reduce the number of B-1s to 60, although some members

of Congress oppose this consolidation (see B-1 consolidation, below). Likewise,

DOD has sought to cut 18 B-52s from the fleet, but has met with resistance from

Congress (see B-52 consolidation, below).

Table 3. Inventory, Status, and Age of Air Force Bombers

Active Inventory

Reserve Inventory

Combat Ready

Average Age

B-1

B-2

B-52

Total

78

0

36

15.2

21

0

16

8.1

84

9

44

40.8

183

9

96

—

Source: Air Force Almanac, 2003 (September, 2002).

When evaluating the inventory requirements for tomorrow’s long-range bomber

force, a number of factors must be weighed, including the anticipated politicomilitary environment, the numbers and capabilities of other military platforms that

can deliver long-range weapons (e.g., Navy ships), and improvements in targeting

and weapons technologies. What impact will the conversion of ballistic-missile

submarines (SSBN) into cruise-missile carriers (SSGN; each converted Trident

submarine would carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles) have on the required number

of B-52s? Can bomber variants of the F/A-22 or Joint Strike Fighter be developed

that could contribute to the long-range bombing mission? Can unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAVs) be armed so they can take on a bombing role? If so, would this

reduce the needed number of B-1s or B-2s?5

Bomber advocates, including some members of Congress, contend that more

bombers are needed given the expanded roles of these aircraft in recent conflicts and

the possibility that the United States will be denied access to overseas bases in the

future. In particular, some in Congress have argued for re-opening production of the

B-2 to augment the bomber fleet and improve long-range penetration capabilities (see

B-2, below).

5

See CRS Report RL31673 for more information on a potential bomber variant of the F/A22.

CRS-7

The Air Force and DOD, however, remain opposed to expanding the bomber

fleet and continue to press for cuts in the numbers of B-1s and B-52s. The Air Force

contends that the current number of combat-ready bombers is adequate for current

and projected needs and that other needs are more pressing than expanding the

bomber force. Air Force Chief of Staff John Jumper, when asked if today’s bomber

fleet is sufficient for future challenges, replied: “There’s nothing I’ve seen that

informs me we don’t have enough bombers.”6

The Air Force contends that the current bomber force is sufficient because

bombers today are vastly more capable than in the past. Where previously several

bombers and scores of bombs were required to eliminate a single target, today a

single bomber can reliably destroy a dozen or more targets using precision weapons.

Thus the Air Force and others turn around the argument that increased capabilities

have increased demand for bombers to reason that increased capabilities mean fewer

bombers are needed. Moreover, the Air Force is developing smaller and more

precise weapons that will enable bombers and other aircraft to attack more targets

with great accuracy. A 500 lb. version of the JDAM and the 250 lb. Small Diameter

Bomb (SDB) will greatly increase the capabilities of existing bombers in coming

years, and even smaller weapons are planned. Improved accuracy, it is hoped, will

give these smaller munitions the same destructive power as today’s larger, less

accurate weapons.

Today the B-2 carries sixteen 2,000 lb. JDAMs, but soon it will carry an

estimated eighty 500 lb. JDAMs, which are scheduled to debut in 2004. General

Jumper believes these new weapons will reduce the number of bombers needed: “Ten

B-2 bombers with 90 weapons each will take care of the target decks that we have

prepared for conflicts in most parts of the world.”7 Each B-2 is anticipated to carry

over 300 SDBs, which are expected in 2007.8 Thus, 21 B-2s could theoretically

attack over 6,000 separate targets in a single operation. Today, such an attack would

require nearly 400 B-2s, assuming 16 weapons each.

Bomber supporters counter that the math doesn’t always translate to the

battlefield. If the United States were to face two simultaneous conflicts, for example,

the 16 combat-coded B-2s would be stretched thin regardless of how many bombs

each carries. Moreover, enhanced capability has increased, not decreased, demand

for bombers in recent conflicts. Lastly, bomber advocates note that neither the 500

lb. JDAM nor the SDB has been successfully fielded yet, and it may be imprudent

to make decisions about the future size of the bomber inventory based on weapons

that have not yet been deployed.

6

John Roos. “Holding the Heading: Air Force Chief Shares His View of Transformational

Activities.” Armed Forces Journal International. May 2002.

7

Ibid

8

John Tirpak. “Bomber Questions.” Air Force Magazine. September 2001.

CRS-8

Next Generation Bomber

A key consideration regarding a next-generation long-range bomber is when to

begin a development program. Other questions that may confront Congress include

the desired characteristic of a future bomber and how it will fit into a future fleet

structure.

Urgency. How urgent is the need for a next generation bomber program?

Current Air Force plans call for a new long-range bomber to come on line in 2037,

about the time when it predicts that corrosion, fatigue, or other problems will render

substantial numbers of existing bombers inoperable. The Air Force’s 1999 bomber

roadmap states that 190 bombers are needed to fulfill its long-range strike mission

requirements and estimates that the numbers of existing bombers will drop below

that level in 2037.9

Figure 1. Economic Service Life and Attrition

U.S. Air Force White Paper on Long

Range Bombers. March 1, 1999

The bomber roadmap laid out the following schedule for research and

development of a next generation bomber that would enter service in 2037:

Event

9

Date

Mission Area Assessment

2013

Mission Needs Statement

2014

Concept Exploration

2016

New Acquisition Program

2019

Production

2034

Initial Operational Capability

2037

U.S. Air Force White Paper on Long Range Bombers. March 1, 1999.

CRS-9

The House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, contending that

a new bomber will be needed before 2037, recently added $100 million to the Bush

Administration’s FY2004 budget request to accelerate research and development of

a next generation bomber.10 The Armed Services Committee expressed concern that

the Air Force’s schedule will not ensure a sufficient bomber force for future

requirements and states that it expects the Air Force to update its Future Years

Defense Program to include funding to develop and procure a new bomber “well

prior” to its previous plan.11

The arguments put forward by advocates of a new bomber include the

following:

The need for more and better long-range, high-payload strike aircraft

that can penetrate advanced air defenses.

! The old age and vulnerability of the B-52. The youngest B-52 is

now over 40 years old. While its remarkable durability and

flexibility has sustained the B-52’s relevance, at some point fatigue

will catch up to it. Additionally, because the B-52 lacks

sophisticated defenses and is easily detected by radar, its capabilities

are limited unless enemy defenses have been suppressed.

! The possibility that the United States will be denied access to

overseas bases for future conflicts.

! The heavy reliance on bombers in recent conflicts.

!

Bomber advocates’ contend that the Air Force tends to be biased toward fighter

aircraft and has chronically underfunded bomber programs. One noted aviation

historian argues:

They (USAF leaders) recoil at the idea of sending Air Force fighter pilots into

air-to-air combat during the first decade of the 21st century in F-15C, which were

first built in the 1970s, but upgraded and produced into the 1990s. Yet, they

apparently have no qualms about condemning bomber pilots to fly the ancient B52Hs, which were last produced in 1962, into combat during the first three

decades of the 21st century.12

These observers argue that the Air Force gives priority to fighters because the

generals who run the service tend to be tactical fighter pilots. Their bias, some say,

is indicated by the increasingly lopsided ratio of dollars invested in tactical fighters

versus bombers, which increased from slightly less than 5:1 in 1999 to more than

30:1 in 2003.13 This funding imbalance is reflected in a growing imbalance between

10

House Committee on Armed Services, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004,”

H.Rept. 108-106 (H.R. 1588), p. 221. House Committee on Appropriations, “Department

of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2004,” H.Rept. 108-187 (H.R. 2658), p. 269.

11

House Armed Services Committee, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004,”

H.Rept. 108-106 (H.R. 1588), p. 221.

12

Williamson Murray. “U.S. Needs New Bomber, Not more Fighters.” Aviation Week &

Space Technology. March 27, 2002. p.66.

13

Ibid.

CRS-10

tactical fighters and bombers in the Air Force inventory: in 1950, the ratio of fighters

to bombers was two to one, but by the late 1990s, the ratio had grown to 16 to one,

meaning that less than 5% of the service’s 4,000 aircraft were bombers.14

The Air Force has opposed accelerating development of a follow-on bomber

because it believes other priorities are more urgent. Major General Dan Leaf,

Director of Air Force Operational Requirements, has said that “we can’t realistically

afford to modernize everything at once.” Fielding the future strike platform “is not

as pressing a problem...as continued modernization of the fighters.”15 Leaf also

argues that the Air Force plan favors fighter modernization not only because fighter

capabilities need to be upgraded, but also because there have not been major

technological leaps that apply to bombers. “The next generation bomber study...led

the service to postpone development of a future strike platform because ‘there wasn’t

significant technological advance anticipated in the near term to merit going forward

right now,’” Leaf explained.16 Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper also

states that existing bombers, including the venerable B-52, meet foreseeable needs:

“...there’s nothing that would prompt me to begin retiring the B-52s that continue to

work very well and carry large loads.”17

Desired Capabilities. What characteristics should a next-generation bomber

have? Among the factors to be considered are range, payload, speed, unit cost,

stealth, and whether the aircraft will be manned or unmanned. Reportedly, Air

Combat Command (ACC) is examining four options:

The B-3: An upgraded version of the B-2 that has greater payload

and range along with better stealth and communications.

! Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle (HCV): An aircraft that would operate

in the upper atmosphere at “hypersonic” speeds (Mach 12). It would

be virtually invulnerable to enemy defenses because of its speed and

altitude and could reach east Asia from the continental United States

in less than two hours.18

! A high-altitude, low-cost unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV)

with a range of 17,000 nautical miles and a payload of 4,000 lbs.

19

! A lower-flying, stealthy UCAV.

!

14

Laura Colarusso. “Analysts: USAF Bomber Force Dangerously Close to Serious

Disconnect.” Inside the Air Force. October 19, 2001.

15

Laura Colarusso. “Future Strike Platform Takes Back Seat to Fighter Modernization.

Inside the Air Force. March 1, 2002. Undersecretary of Defense Aldridge makes similar

arguments in “Interim Bomber?” Aerospace Daily. August 12, 2002.

16

Ibid.

17

John Roos. “Holding the Heading: Air Force Chief Shares His View of Transformational

Activities.” Armed Forces Journal International. May 2002.

18

19

“Hypersoar,” [http://www.globalsecurity.com]. Accessed on 7/22/2003.

Laura Colarusso. “Future Strike Platform Takes Back Seat to Fighter Modernization.”

Inside the Air Force. March 1, 2002.

CRS-11

There are two general approaches to developing a next generation bomber: “leap

ahead” and “incremental.” The former favors the development of expensive,

revolutionary technologies, while the latter prefers to build upon existing

technologies. The Air Force appears to favor a leap ahead approach. Former Chief

of Staff General Mike Ryan states the Air Force “wants to make a big leap in

capability with its next strategic system...we need to go to the next level of strike

capability, beyond the B-2.”20

Supporters of the leap ahead approach argue that competitors may arise to

challenge U.S. air power in the future. The proliferation of advanced Russian surfaceto-air missiles, for example, is just a hint of the kind of weapons that may emerge

tomorrow. Potential adversaries are also developing anti-access systems and

techniques like GPS jamming, “anti-stealth” radars, and terminal defenses that will

require serious technological advances to defeat, they argue.

Incrementalists, on the other hand, point out that the United States has

dominated the air in every conflict since Vietnam, and especially since the Persian

Gulf War in 1991. They argue that while we should improve on today’s capabilities,

we can strive toward cost effective solutions. Developing leap ahead capabilities will

be difficult and expensive — Air Force officials say that research into hypersonics

has advanced little beyond the X-30 National Aerospace Plane, which was cancelled

in 1995.21 Yet it is unclear that we need such exotic capabilities in tomorrow’s longrange bombers. Retired Air Force General Richard Hawley argues, for example, that

It is not even clear that supersonic flight is a desirable, much less required

attribute for a future long-range strike platform. From the standpoint of military

utility, loiter capability appears more valuable than speed, given the strategic

premium now being placed on dealing with mobile and other time-critical

targets.22

Incrementalists believe tomorrow’s bomber could leverage existing platforms

and technologies. Adapting technologies developed for the F/A-22, for example, or

outfitting the Global Hawk UAV with more powerful engines and state-of-the-art

weapons such as the Small Diameter Bomb, might be cost-effective ways to expand

strike capabilities. Some even argue that commercial aircraft such as the 767 could

serve as the foundation of a new bomber. Savings would be achieved by using parts

and structures built in large numbers for airlines.23 Because the United States can

achieve air supremacy quickly and because bombs have become so accurate, some

incrementalists argue that bombers have essentially become “trucks” for hauling

large quantities of ordnance over great distances. They argue that only a few

bombers with expensive capabilities such as stealth and supersonic speed are needed.

20

John Tirpak. “Bomber Questions.” Air Force Magazine. September 2001.

21

Nick Cook. “USAF Hones Future Bomber Requirement.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. January

2, 2002.

22

General Richard Hawley and John Backshies. “Closing the Global Strike Gap.” Armed

Forces Journal International. September 2001.

23

Robert Wall. “USAF Bomber Plans Spark Renewed Debate.” Aviation Week & Space

Technology. April 2000. p.30.

CRS-12

There is an important role, they say, for cheap, commercially-derived aircraft that

simply carry lots of weapons and fuel.

Fleet Diversity Versus Uniformity. DOD currently operates three different

bombers. This diversity offers advantages in terms of planning flexibility in different

types of conflicts. At the same time, diversity challenges enemy air defenses because

a system that may be effective against one plane might be ineffective against another.

Further, diversity avoids “single point failure.” If one bomber were to experience a

serious problem such as airframe fatigue, a software bug, or vulnerability to a new

air defense technology, other types of bombers may not be affected.

While fleet diversity has advantages, it also has drawbacks, primarily in terms

of cost. Describing the current bomber force, General Richard Hawley remarked:

The fact is that we’ve got three small fleets of airplanes...every time you own a

fleet of airplanes, you incur a lot of overhead cost....You have to fund that

overhead for each system so we’re carrying three software maintenance facilities.

We’re funding three small armies of engineers to support each of these three

bombers and what we ought to do is neck down to one bomber.24

As a point of reference, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program was designed in

part to reduce the costs of fleet diversity. The JSF attempts to reduce operations,

maintenance and training costs by increasing the commonality between the Air Force,

Navy, and Marine Corps variants of the aircraft, while maintaining enough diversity

so that one basic platform will satisfy the unique requirements of three different

users.25 Policy makers will have to weigh the costs and benefits of fleet diversity

when contemplating a next generation bomber.

24

Laura Colarusso. “Analysts: USAF Bomber Force Dangerously Close to Serious

Disconnect.” Inside the Air Force. October 19, 2001.

25

For more information on the JSF, see CRS Report RL30563.

CRS-13

B-52 Stratofortress

Overview

The 40-year-old B-52 has remained relevant to a changing battlefield. Although

nuclear strikes were its primary mission during the Cold War, the B-52 has carried

out important non-nuclear missions in conflicts going back to the Vietnam War. Air

Force Secretary James Roche stated recently that the B-52 has transformed three

times in its history, from a high-level bomber to a low-level intruder to a stand-off

cruise missile carrier to a close air-support aircraft.26 The B-52 is the only platform

that can operate with more than 20 types of bombs and cruise missiles in the U. S.

inventory. In high-threat areas where enemy defenses are robust, B-52s employ airlaunched cruise missiles (20 per aircraft) to attack ground targets from a distance.

In low-threat environments such as Afghanistan or Iraq, B-52s can use JDAM

precision bombs or various gravity bombs.

Figure 2. B-52 Stratofortress

Source: USAF.

Eighty five B-52s are on active duty and nine are in the reserve. Of these, 44 are

combat ready. In accordance with plans stated in the 1992 Bomber Road Map, all

G models have been retired, and their role has been assumed by H models, which

have more powerful engines, longer range, and lower operating cost. According to

current Air Force plans, B-52s will remain in service through 2037 when a next

generation bomber should come on line.

26

Lance M. Bacon, “Think Bombers Are Bad Now? Just See What They Get Next,” Air

Force Times, June 16, 2003.

CRS-14

Program Status

B-52 Consolidation. For several years, the Air Force has tried to retire 18

B-52s. Much like the B-1 consolidation plan, the rationale is to save money that

could be spent to improve the readiness and effectiveness of the remaining aircraft.

Air Force officials argue that these 18 “attrition reserve” aircraft are unneeded.

According to a March 1999 USAF White Paper on Long Range Bombers (p.2, 21),

the Air Force needs only 76 B-52s to support its full range of mission taskings.27 In

July 2001, Air Force Secretary James Roche reiterated the Air Force’s desire to retire

18 B-52s.28 Congress has consistently resisted this retirement, citing the lack of an

active bomber production line and the importance of the long range bomber force.

In June 2001, the House Appropriations Committee refused to sanction a move that

would have prevented upgrade of 18 B-52s.29 In several recent years, Congress has

increased funding for B-52 operations and maintenance and has directed the Air

Force to keep all 93 in the inventory.

Electronic Warfare. With the EA-6B Prowler approaching the end of its

service life, the Air Force has explored adding radar jamming equipment to B-52s as

part of the Air Force’s diversified approach to jamming. B-52s, which are

vulnerable in high-threat environments to enemy air defenses, would serve primarily

in a standoff jamming role while other aircraft would conduct close-in jamming. The

Air Force stresses that B-52s equipped with jamming equipment would retain their

full capabilities as bombers and would not become dedicated electronic warfare

aircraft.30 Some have suggested that converting the 18 attrition reserve B-52s into

electronic jamming platforms could have the additional benefit of satisfying

Congress’ desire to keep these aircraft active as a hedge against potential future

needs.31 The Air Force has not made final decisions about future radar jamming

plans and, at present, lacks funding for a B-52 electronic warfare program.

Modernization

Electronics. The 1999 Air Force White Paper on Long Range Bombers (p.7)

stated that improving situational awareness is the “highest priority modification

needed for the B-52.” The Situational Awareness Defensive Improvement program

will attempt to improve B-52 situational awareness by significantly upgrading the

AN/ALR-46 radar warning receiver. Valued at $48 million in 2000, the program will

run through 2003. Work was also started in 2000 on the Avionics Mid Life

27

Adam Herbert. “With Law On Its Side, Air Force Ignores Congressional B-52 Language.”

Inside The Air Force. August 11, 2000, p. 1.

28

“Air Force Secretary Says He Intends To Cut B-52 Fleet.” InsideDefense.com. July 16,

2001.

29

Aerospace Daily. “House panel rejects $30 million cut for B-52 modifications.”June 13,

2001.

30

Robert Wall, “Jammer Bomber: B-52’s electronic attack role faces funding, technical

roadblocks,” Aviation Week, June 2, 2003.

31

Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum. “Air Force Embraces Jammer, But Plots Independent

Course.” Aviation Week and Space Technology. May, 27, 2002, vol. 156.

CRS-15

Improvement (AMI). AMI is a five year contract, valued at $108 million, and will

replace three key offensive avionics component subsystems: the avionics computers,

the inertial navigation, and the data transfer system. The AMI underwent successful

testing in May 2003 and the entire fleet is scheduled to receive the upgrade by 2007.32

Engines. Since 1996, the Air Force has explored replacing the B-52’s engines

to improve performance and lower costs. After a lull, interest has been renewed by

a March 2003 report form the Defense Science Board (DSB) unanimously

recommending that the Air Force re-engine the B-52 “without delay.”33 According

to the DSB, replacing the aircraft’s 1950s-era engines with four modern engines

would increase range by 46% while reducing aerial refueling needs and maintenance

costs. The benefits of reengining, particularly less demand on refueling tankers,

would far outweigh the costs, according to the DSB. They state that new engines

would cost $3 to $3.5 billion, but savings would total between $6 and $9 billion

between 2011, when the new engines are completed, and 2037, when the B-52 is

retired. In July 2003, the Air Force asked Boeing to investigate the feasibility of

replacing the B-52’s eight engines with eight modern engines, rather than four as had

been suggested earlier. An eight-engine upgrade could boost the B-52’s performance

and expand is mission possibilities as well as increase efficiency, according to the Air

Force.34

The Air Force states that although it is interested in re-engining, it does not

currently have adequate funds.35 It is exploring alternative funding, such as the

federal Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC) program, which uses private

sector financing to improve energy efficiency and then pays back investors with the

savings. In early 2003, however, Congress moved to block use of the ESPC for the

B-52 by capping the program at $100 million. Some in Congress apparently objected

to the use of non-appropriated funds, such as the ESPC or a lease arrangement.36

Targeting Pod. Operation Iraqi Freedom marks the first time that a bomber

has been able to laser designate targets for itself. B-52s equipped with the Northrop

Grumman Litening II targeting pod were able to locate and designate targets,

something previously only done by fighters or ground forces.37 Integration of the pod

on the B-52 was originally scheduled for June 2003, but was rushed so that it could

be employed in Iraq, where it was used successfully to destroy targets with laserguided bombs. In addition to enabling B-52 crews to locate and designate targets, the

32

Wes Auldridge, “B-52 Undergoes Worldwide Testing,” Air Force Flight Test Center

Public Affairs, May 20, 2003.

33

Michael Sirak and Christopher Stagg, “Fresh Interest Brews to Re-Engine B-52s,” Jane’s

Defense Weekly, April 30, 2003.

34

Stephen Trimble, “Air Force Widens Review of B-52 Re-Engineing Options,” Aerospace

Daily, July 7, 2003.

35

Sirak and Stagg, op. cit.

36

Trimble, op. cit.

37

Lorenzo Cortes, “B-52 Crew Credits Arsenal, Loiter Capability During Operation Iraqi

Freedom,” Defense Daily, May 9, 2003.

CRS-16

pod enables them to personally verify ground-designated targets to prevent errors

such as the accidental designation of friendly troops or civilians. Finally, the pod

enables the crew or others to assess battle damage by recording video of bomb hits.38

SWING. The Air Force plans to continue upgrading the B-52’s capabilities

under the Smart Weapons Integration Next Generation (SWING) program. Under

current plans SWING will arm the aircraft with an extended range version of the

Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD-ER) and the yet-to-be completed 250

lb. precision Small Diameter Bomb, Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD), and

extended range Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM-ER).39 Currently the

B-52 can carry twelve 2,000 lb. JDAMS, while new bay wiring will increase that

number to 20 and permit the aircraft to carry 30 of the 500 lb. JDAM. According to

the Air Force, the B-52 will be able to carry 144 independently targeted SDBs once

SWING is completed. The B-52 would carry 12 JASSMs, each capable of hitting a

moving target with a 1,000 lb. warhead from a range of 200 miles.40

Readiness

Mission Capable Rate. The B-52 fleet continues to maintain a relatively

high degree of readiness. The B-52 has the highest MCR of all bombers in the force,

and is second to the F-117 for both fighters and bombers.41 Over the past decade

(FY1992 to FY2002), the B-52’s MCR has hovered around 80%, standing at 81% in

FY2002, according to GAO.42

Aging Issues. The Air Force plans to maintain and upgrade the B-52 through

2037. Generally speaking, the B-52’s aging issues include wear and tear of the wings

and fuselage, and metal corrosion. Regarding wear and tear, Air Force Chief of Staff

General John Jumper has expressed his confidence in the B-52’s robustness:

“First, the B-52 is over-engineered by a (very substantial factor). These planes

were built before the age of computer-aided design; the plane’s designers built

it by multiplying by two or three what they felt was needed (structurally). So the

airplane is built well.”43

In 1999, wing upper surface was believed to be the weak link in terms of B-52

wear and tear. The estimated life span of this component is 28,300 flight hours, as

38

Tony Wickman, “B-52 Dons New Upgrade,” Air Force Flight Test Center Public Affairs,

April 9, 2003.

39

“B-52H SWING Plan Includes MALD, SDB, JASSM-ER, and WCMD-ER,” Defense

Daily, May 21, 2003.

40

Lance M. Bacon, “Think Bombers Are Bad Now? Just See What They Get Next,” Air

Force Times, June 16, 2003.

41

Bruce Rolfsen. “The B-52’s Big 5-0.” Air Force Times. April 15, 2002, p. 14.

42

“Military Readiness: DOD Needs a Clear and Defined Process for Setting Aircraft

Availability Goals in the New Security Environment,” GAO, April 2003.

43

John Roos. “Holding the Heading Air Force chief Shares His View of Transformational

Activities.” Armed Forces Journal International. May 2002.

CRS-17

opposed to 42,000 hours for the fuselage, 44,800 hours for the horizontal stabilizer,

and 73,500 hours for the wing lower surface. As of May 2003, the average B-52 has

completed 15,858 flight miles, while the oldest has completed 20,709.44

Corrosion has become a concern for the KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft, and

some fear that corrosion will force that aircraft into early retirement. Because the

KC-135 and B-52 are approximately the same age, it has been suggested that

corrosion may become a problem for the Stratofortress. Thus far, however, fatigue,

caused by wear and tear, appears to be a greater concern than corrosion for the B-52.

Recent Operations

Before Desert Storm, the B-52 was used in Vietnam both for close air support

and area bombing. Its success, manifest during Linebacker II (the Hanoi bombing

in 1972) was mitigated in part by heavy losses: 15 aircraft were lost to enemy fire in

the two weeks of that operation

Desert Storm (Iraq, 1991). On the second day of combat, 80 B-52s flying

from the continental U.S. and four overseas locations fired Conventional AirLaunched Cruise Missiles (CALCMs) with 2,000 lb. warheads. On January 17,

1991, seven B-52s flew from Louisiana on a 35 hour-mission, at the time the longest

sortie ever. B-52s flew 414 missions against targets in Iraq. No aircraft were lost to

enemy fire, but one crashed in the Indian Ocean returning to Diego Garcia. Three

crew members lost their lives. The aircraft dropped 27,500 tons of ordnance in 1,624

sorties — 31% of all U.S. bombs and 41% of all Air Force bombs employed during

the conflict.”45

Operation Desert Fox (Iraq, 1998). Two B-52s operated from Diego

Garcia, and launched approximately 90 Block 1 3,000 lb. CALCMs equipped with

an improved guidance system.46 The Block 1 CALCMs were considered twice as

accurate as those used in Desert Storm.

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo). B-52s operating from Fairford, England

launched CALCMs and 11,000 bombs in 270 missions during the 1999 Operation

Allied Force attacks on Yugoslavia. B-52s also employed the AGM-142 Have Nap,

a jointly developed U.S.-Israeli missile.

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Many observers have

lauded the B-52’s performance in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.

Operating from Diego Garcia, B-52s were able to loiter for extended periods, and

dropped weapons on targets designated by ground forces, including mobile targets.

Using precision bombs, B-52s were able to provide close air support from altitudes

44

Lance M. Bacon, “Think Bombers Are Bad Now? Just See What They Get Next,” Air

Force Times, June 16, 2003.

45

46

Airpower in Operation Desert Storm, USAF Fact Sheet 91-03 Special Edition. May 1991.

Robert Wall. “New Weapons Debut In Attacks on Iraq.” Aviation Week and Space

Technology. December 28, 1998, vol. 149, No. 25, p. 14.

CRS-18

above 30,000 feet while also hitting traditional targets. This mission flexibility was

made possible by training conducted a year before the campaign began.47

Support to Northern Alliance fighters from B-52s was crucial to the fall of

Mazar-e-Sharif, a key battle in the war. Prior to the B-52’s employment, ground

forces were stalemated.48 From mid-January to the end of March 2002, B-52s flew

255 sorties, including 80 in Operation Anaconda, a key attack on Taliban and AlQaeda positions. Illustrating its payload diversity, the B-52s employed JDAMs,

Mk82 bombs, Wind-corrected Munition cluster bombs, and 115 M-129 leafletdispensing bombs.49

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). B-52s also played an important role in

the recent war in Iraq, where 28 of the aircraft conducted 280 combat sorties.50 B-52

crews credited the plane’s ability to carry a wide variety of weapons and its ability

to loiter over battlefields as the key to its success. They also lauded the Litening II

targeting pod, which enabled them to designate targets themselves for the first time.51

The B-52 was also praised for being the among the few platforms able to continue

operating during a sandstorm: when the storm grounded helicopters and forced

fighter strike packages to turn around, B-52s armed with 500 lb. bombs flew over the

storm and devastated Iraqi mechanized forces that were trying to maneuver under

cover of the storm.52

Costs

The acquisition costs for the 744 bombers are indicated in Table 4, a total of

$4,916 million, with the unit cost varying between $30 million and $74 million.53

47

Frank Wolfe. “Bombers Able To Use Flexible Targeting For Afghan Campaign.” Defense

Daily. October 26, 2001

48

“Power of B-52s Proves Telling As In Gulf War, Heavy Bombers Pave Way For Military

Successes in Afghanistan.” Dayton Daily News. November 28, 2001.

49

Bruce Rolfsen. “The B-52’s Big 5-0.” Air Force Times. April 15, 2002. p.14.

50

Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, “Operation Iraqi Freedom — By The Numbers,” U.S. Air

Force, April 30, 2003.

51

Lorenzo Cortes, “B-52 Crew Credits Arsenal, Loiter Capability During Operation Iraqi

Freedom,” Defense Daily, May 9, 2003.

52

Lance M. Bacon, “Think Bombers Are Bad Now? Just See What They Get Next,” Air

Force Times, June 16, 2003.

53

Heather Kirkwood. “Mechanics’ Creativity Keeps 50-year-old B-52s In The Air.” South

China Morning Post. 29 April 2002.

CRS-19

Table 4. B-52 Appropriations, by Year

($ Millions Then-Year)

Year

RDT&E

Procurement

Quantity

Milcon

Total

FY1981

16.3

460.1

FY1982

96

438.4

FY1983

90

532.2

FY1984

78.8

461

The last B-52 (H

model) was

produced in 1961

and procured with

FY1962 funds

FY1985

22

466

488

FY1986

16

451.2

467.2

FY1987

10

397.2

407.2

FY1988

13

238.7

251.7

FY1989

216

216

FY1990

181.7

181.7

FY1991

58.6

58.6

476.4

534.4

622.2

539.8

FY1992

3.9

31.1

35

FY1993

22

76.7

98.7

FY1994

6.3

37.4

43.7

32.8

32.8

FY1995

FY1996

21

4.9

25.9

FY1997

11.6

20.2

30.8

FY1998

1.8

39.3

41

FY1999

6.4

38.3

42.1

FY2000

40.1

24.8

64.9

FY2001

50.7

42.5

93

FY2002

66.8

14.3

85

FY2003

55.7

24.7

80.4

Total

628.4

4,288.0

4,916.4

CRS-20

FY2004 Developments.

Administration Request. The Administration requested $61.1 million in

procurement funds and $28.6 million in RDT&E for avionics upgrades.

Authorization. The House Armed Services Committee (HR1588) authorized

$80.1 million, $19 million more than the Administration’s procurement request. The

increase funds Litening II targeting pod integration. The House Committee matched

the Administration’s R&D request of $28.6 million. The Senate Armed Services

Committee (S1050) matched the Administration’s requests for both procurement and

R&D.

Appropriation. The House Appropriations Committee (HR2658) reduced

procurement for the Offensive Avionics System by $9.2 million, bringing total B-52

procurement down to $51.9 million. The Committee did not add any funds for the

Litening II pod as the Armed Services Committee did. The House Appropriations

Committee left the RDT&E request unchanged at $28.6 million. The Senate

Appropriations Committee (S1382) added $17 million to the Administration’s

procurement request, for a total of $78 million. They matched the Administration’s

request for RDT&E.

CRS-21

B-1B Lancer

Overview

Like all the long-range bombers currently serving in the Air Force, the B-1B was

designed to carry nuclear weapons deep into Soviet territory during the Cold War.

The plane’s supersonic speed, reduced radar signature, and large payload gave it

important advantages over the B-52, even though its range was shorter. Since the

end of the Cold War, the Air Force has adapted the B-1B to carry conventional

weapons, although its value in conventional warfare has only been tested in the recent

conflicts in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The B-1B has the largest payload

capacity of the three bombers and can carry a broad array of precision and nonprecision weapons. Ongoing upgrades will increase the variety of weapons it can

carry and will enable it to deliver three different munitions to separate targets in a

single sortie, a first among U.S. warplanes.

Figure 3. B-1B Lancer

Source: USAF Photo by MSgt. Rose Reynolds

The B-1 entered service in 1986 and the total order of 100 aircraft was

completed in 1988. However, the plane has been controversial throughout its history.

In 1977, President Carter cancelled the program in development, believing that

existing air- and sea-launched missiles provided adequate nuclear strike capability.

President Reagan revived the B-1 program in 1981, and following modifications to

the original design, the plane was designated the B-1B. After it sat out or played

marginal roles in the conflicts of the 1990s, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

CRS-22

suggested in 2001 that the B-1 be retired. In response, the Air Force decided to

reduce the B-1 fleet by roughly one third, or 33 aircraft. Although the retirement

process is underway, supporters of the B-1 in Congress and elsewhere are fighting

to reinstate all or some of the decommissioned planes. They argue that the B-1’s

performance in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate its value on the modern battlefield.

Debate over the future of the plane continues. Under current plans, the Air Force will

maintain and upgrade the B-1B for service through 2040, by which time a new longrange bomber should enter the fleet.54

Program Status

Consolidation. In early 2001, advisors to Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld suggested that the Air Force retire the entire B-1B fleet.55 A study

commissioned by Rumsfeld highlighted the B-1 as one of four programs least

compatible with the Pentagon’s future plans. The study recommended that DOD

place higher priority on B-2 and B-52 modernization and consider purchasing more

B-2s to replace the B-1 in the fleet.56 At the time, the Air Force was $2 billion short

in modernization funds for the B-1B. To address this shortfall without eliminating

the plane, the Air Force opted to retire a third of the fleet, reducing the number of B1s to 60 from 93 and consolidating basing to two active duty locations from three

active duty and two Air National Guard locations.

When the Air Force publicly justified its consolidation plan, it cited not only

budgetary constraints,57 but also the need to improve B-1 maintenance and supply.58

The B-1 has historically suffered from severe parts shortages that forced technicians

to “cannibalize” parts from one plane to keep others flying: by 2001 the plane had

the highest cannibalization rates in the Air Force by a wide margin. Parts shortages

also contributed to some of the lowest mission capable rates in the Air Force in the

late 1990s and 2000s.59 Further, the B-1 is among the most expensive planes to fly,

costing $14,343 per flying hour, or more than double the cost for either the B-2 or the

B-52.60

54

U.S. Air Force Long-Range Strike Aircraft White Paper. November 2001, p. 27.

55

Jefferson Morris, “GAO Criticizes Air Force on Handling of B-1B Consolidation,”

Aerospace Daily, September 9, 2002.

56

Lance M. Bacon, “Back in the Big Game,” Air Force Times, June 16, 2003. See also Jim

Garamone. “Conventional Forces Group Makes Report to Rumsfeld.” American Forces

Press Service. June 26, 2001.

57

Robert Wall. “B-1B Backers, Air Force Clash Over Bomber Ax.” Aviation Week and

Space Technology. July 16, 2001, and General John Jumper’s confirmation hearing excerpts.

Air Force Magazine. October 2001, p. 39.

58

Darren Heusel. Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center Public Affairs, “Maintainers

overcome challenges to keep B-1Bs flying.” Air Force News Archive. March 29, 2002 and

Drew Brown. “Pentagon Officials Stand By B-1 Move.” Macon Telegraph. June 30, 2001.

59

60

See “Readiness” below.

“Military Readiness: DOD Needs a Clear and Defined Process for Setting Aircraft

Availability Goals in the New Security Environment,” GAO, April 2003.

CRS-23

Another argument behind consolidation is that with more and more effective

precision weapons, a single bomber is vastly more capable than in the past. In

Operation Desert Storm in Iraq (1991), for example, numerous bombs and possibly

multiple sorties were needed to destroy individual targets; in Operation Iraqi

Freedom (2003), however, a single bomber could reliably destroy as many as two

dozen separate targets.

Effects of Consolidation. The Air Force reports that consolidation has

brought substantial savings and improved performance to the remaining B-1 fleet for

two reasons. First, consolidation has expedited modernization of the remaining fleet

because, according to an Air Force spokesman, “the USAF is aggressively

reinvesting dollars saved from the B-1 consolidation to significantly increase the

capabilities of the remaining aircraft.”61 In the first year since consolidation, savings

amounted to $130 million according to the Air Force.62 Initial estimates pegged total

consolidation savings over five years at $1.4 billion, but subsequent estimates

lowered that figure to roughly $800 million.63 Second, consolidation has boosted B-1

performance both by reducing the demand for spare parts and by enabling the Air

Force to take needed parts from retired planes. By early 2003, the cannibalization

rate had dropped dramatically, while the mission capable rates during Operation Iraqi

Freedom have been the highest yet reported for the aircraft — 79%.

Criticism of the Consolidation Plan. A September 2002 GAO study

criticized the plan for failing to analyze how the reduction would affect national

security needs or detailing how the Air Force would replace the capabilities of the

lost B-1’s using other aircraft. The study also found that the Air Force was

inconsistent in its methodology for implementing consolidation and incomplete in

estimating savings.64 The GAO report further criticized the decision to move planes

from the Air National Guard to active duty, finding that Guard units had lower flying

hour costs, higher mission capable rates, and more experienced crews.65 A 1998

GAO report argued that moving B-1s from active duty to the National Guard could

save millions of dollars while maintaining bombing capabilities.66

Others have criticized the B-1 consolidation for failing to live up to its promise.

The primary justification for reducing the number of aircraft was to free up funds to

modernize the remaining aircraft. Yet, the Air Force subsequently cancelled the B1’s defensive systems upgrade program (See DSUP below), a decision that could

61

Hampton Stephens, “Air Force Neglects B-1 Defensive System Upgrades in FY-04 POM,”

December 13, 2002.

62

Lance M. Bacon, “Back in the Big Game,” Air Force Times, June 16, 2003.

63

Robert Wall. “B-1B Fights Demotion In Combat Role.” Aviation Week and Space

Technology. June 24, 2002. David Castellon. “B-1B Blunder? GAO Finds Air Force’s B-1B

Cuts Might Not Be So Cost-Effective After All.” Air Force Times. July 15, 2002.

64

Jefferson Morris, “GAO Criticizes Air Force on Handling of B-1B Consolidation,”

Aerospace Daily, September 9, 2002.

65

66

Jefferson Morris, op. cit.

“Air Force Bombers: Moving More B-1s to the Reserves Could Save Millions Without

Reducing Mission Capabilities.” GAO/NSIAD-98-64. February 1998. Washington, DC.

CRS-24

have important implications for the future utility of the B-1. Without an upgrade to

its defenses, the B-1 may lose its ability to penetrate even meager enemy anti-aircraft

systems. The B-1 would then essentially become a standoff platform like the B-52,

and the only remaining long-range, high-payload aircraft capable of penetrating air

defenses would be the 16 combat-ready B-2s. Critics of consolidation question

whether the Air Force needs additional standoff aircraft and whether 16 long-range

bombers capable of penetration missions is enough. These critics also ask why the

B-1’s capabilities should be downgraded substantially when the purpose of the

consolidation was to free up funds for upgrades.

Reinstatement of Retired B-1s. Some members of Congress have fought

the consolidation plan since it was first proposed. The decision concerned some in

Congress because DOD did not consult with them beforehand. Shortly after the plan

was announced in 2001, Senator Larry Craig introduced an amendment to the

FY2001 Defense Supplemental Appropriations Bill to prevent DOD from using

money authorized or appropriated in that year to implement the consolidation plan.

This amendment was withdrawn.67 On August 1, 2001 the House Armed Services

Committee amended the FY2002 Defense Authorization bill to prevent B-1

consolidation at the request of Representative Saxby Chambliss.68 In conference,

however, Congress modified its position and required the Air Force to conduct a

study of the bomber force structure before proceeding with consolidation (Sec. 1032.

H.Rept. 107-333, S. 1438).

In 2003, the House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees added

$20.3 million, plus additional funds for construction, personnel, and base operations,

to the Administration’s FY2004 request to begin the reconstitution of 23 B-1s that

had been slated for retirement. The Armed Services Committee stated that the

aircraft’s “contributions were crucial to the success of both operations [Enduring

Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom].”69 Some members of Congress

expressed concern that the reduced B-1 fleet could leave too few bombers to meet

demand.70 Air Combat Command presently keeps 36 B-1Bs at combat-ready status,

with the remaining planes undergoing maintenance or upgrades, being used in

training, or being retired. During the recent war in Iraq, roughly 12 of these were

deployed to support the war and another 12 were deployed to Guam in case of an

emergency on the Korean Peninsula, leaving 12 combat-ready planes as backup for

the Iraq war or for contingencies elsewhere.71

67

Ibid.

68

Kerry Gildea. “HASC Move Stalls Air Force Plan To Move Bombers.” Defense Daily.

August 2, 2001.

69

House Armed Services Committee, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004,”

H.Rept. 108-106 (H.R. 1588), p. 95.

70

Lori Lessner. “B1 Battle Takes Off: Kansans In Congress Battle Those Who Say The

Plane Is Not Worth Its Cost.” Wichita Eagle. July 2, 2001.

71

David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Baghdad Confidential,” Aviation Week, April 28,

2003.

CRS-25

Within the Air Force, there is some concern that reinstating the 23 bombers will

lead to a return to the spare-parts shortages of past years. According to an Air Force

spokesman, the FY2004 funding authorized by the House Armed Services

Committee would not go far in reinstating and modernizing the planes, let alone

ensuring adequate future parts supplies.72 The Air Force has estimated that it will

need an additional $1 billion in operations and maintenance funding through FY2009

to operate the 23 planes, and the House Armed Services Committee, in its FY2004

authorization bill, “strongly urges” DOD to budget an additional $1.1 billion for the

B-1B reconstitution in future year requests.73 Despite its concerns about funding,

some within the Air Force do believe more B-1s are needed, pointing out that two

thirds of the combat-ready fleet was deployed during Iraqi Freedom’ leaving an

inadequate buffer against other potential conflicts.74 Separately, B-1 supporters

within the Air Force, together with advocates at Boeing, are pushing for the

reinstatement of 12 retired aircraft.75

New Basing for the B-1B. Under the consolidation plan, B-1Bs formerly

associated with the Georgia and Kansas Air National Guard have been removed from

Robins and McConnell Air Force Bases (AFBs), respectively (9 aircraft each). The

seven aircraft stationed at Mountain AFB in Idaho were also removed. The 60

remaining aircraft are now based only at Dyess AFB near Abilene, Texas (which lost

8 aircraft and now houses 32) and Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota (which retains 26

B-1Bs). The remaining two aircraft are used for testing at Edwards AFB near Los

Angeles.

Alternative Air National Guard (ANG) Missions.

Under the

consolidation plan, the 184th Bomb Wing, located at McConnell AFB, was re-tasked

in September 2002 with 10 KC-135, becoming the 184th Air Refueling Wing. The

116th Bomb Wing, located at Robins AFB, has become the 116th Air Control Wing

operating E-8 JSTARS surveillance aircraft.

72

Tara Copp, “Congress Could Reinstate 23 B-1 Bombers,” Scripps Howard News Source,

May 15, 2003.

73

House Armed Services Committee, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004,”

H.Rept. 108-106 (H.R. 1588), p. 95.

74

Stephen Trimble, “USAF Estimates $1B Cost for Changing B-1B Retirement,” Aerospace

Daily, June 2, 2003.

75

Stephen Trimble, “B-1B’s War Achievements Spur New Upgrade Proposals,” Aerospace

Daily, May 7, 2003.

CRS-26

Modernization

The Conventional Munition Upgrade Program (CMUP). The CMUP,

which began in FY1992, is a 15 year program comprised of several blocks. Its

original purpose was to convert the B-1B from a nuclear to a conventional bomber,

while current and planned upgrades aim to improve the mission capable rate, increase

weapon flexibility, and incorporate new communications and defensive systems.

Block E (Wind Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD) Integration

and Computer Upgrade). Block E is a computer systems upgrade intended to

increase the roster of precision weapons the B-1B can carry and enable it to attack

three different targets with three different types of munitions in a single sortie. The

upgrade will add the Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW), the Joint Air-to Surface

Stand-off Weapon (JASSM), and the Wind-Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD)

to the B-1B’s arsenal, while also improving the plane’s avionics. In 2000, the

upgrade faced a five month delay, half of it due to a strike by contractor engineers.

A May 7, 2002 test demonstrated the B-1’s ability to deliver three different kinds of

weapons in one pass.76 The Air Force has three Block E B-1Bs as of June 2003 and

expects to complete the upgrade by late 2004.77

Block F (Defensive System update Program, DSUP). The goal of the

Block F upgrades is to improve the B-1B’s ability to operate in well-defended enemy

territory by providing it with countermeasures to defend against guided missiles. The

upgrade will equip B-1Bs with a defensive system developed by the Navy, the

Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasure (IDECM). The IDECM uses the

ALR-56M radar warning receiver and radio frequency countermeasures and the ALE55 towed fiber-optic decoy, a replacement of the Block D ALE 50 towed decoy

system. Block F will not be completed until 2009, assuming the original schedule

is kept.78

Block F has suffered from technical problems with the ALE-55 fiber optic

towed decoy from BAE Systems. Initial flight tests revealed problems with the

decoy’s in-flight deployment. Boeing, lead integrator for the DSUP, states that

subsequent tests have demonstrated that the problems have been resolved. Still,

Boeing has been exploring alternative decoys at the behest of the Air Force, in

particular the FO-50 from Raytheon.79 Because of delays and cost overruns related

76

Lt. Col. Mark Spillman. “B-1B achieves triple munitions drop, target kill.” Air Force

News Archive. May 9, 2002.

77

Lance M. Bacon, “Think Bombers Are Bad Now? Just See What They Get Next,” Air

Force Times, June 16, 2003.

78

“B-1 Bomber Upgrade Program Falters Again With New Delays, Expenses,” Inside the

Air Force, May 5, 2000.

79

Stephen Trimble, “B-1B’s War Achievements Spur New Upgrade Proposals,” Aerospace

Daily, May 7, 2002, and Hampton Stephens. “Service Pursues Alternative After Trouble

With BAE’s Towed Decoy.” Inside the Air Force. July 5, 2002, vol. 13, n. 27.

CRS-27

to the decoy problems, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees each voted

to cut FY2003 funding for the DSUP, but they restored funding in conference.80

In late 2003, after a series of restructurings and cost overruns,81 the Air Force

chose not to continue funding the DSUP in its FY2004 budget request, leading many

to believe the program has been cancelled. Recognizing that without a defensive

upgrade, the B-1 may lose the ability to penetration enemy ani-aircraft systems, the

Senate Armed Services Committee added FY2004 funding to accelerate development

of an extended range version of the Joint Air to Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM).

The JASSM-ER will enable the B-1 to attack enemy surface targets located in welldefended areas from a distance.82

BONE (B-One Next Enhancement) Contract. BONE will improve the

targeting capabilities of the B-1 by integrating the Link-16 jam-resistant

communication system and beyond line-of-sight satellite communications. Currently,

B-1 crews receive target coordinates from ground forces or other aircraft by voice;

the B-1 crew must then manually program the coordinates into the chosen weapon.83

The Link-16 system would automate this process, reducing both the time required for

re-targeting and the possibility of human error. The Link-16 program went

underfunded in 2002, but funding was restored in FY2003. Funding for FY2004

meets plans, and the House Armed Services Committee “strongly urged” DOD to

continue the Link-16 program.84

Readiness

Readiness has long been a challenge for the B-1B, but in the past year it appears

that readiness has improved substantially. In 1998, its mission capable rate (MCR)

fell from the mid-60s to 51% and remained in the low 50s through 2000.85 A number

of studies conducted since the mid-1990s attributed the low MCR to severe spare

parts shortages.86 Some contractors have gone out of business, while others no longer

80

Hampton Stephens, “Appropriators Reverse Course, Fund B-1 Defensive System

Upgrade,” Inside the Air Force, October 11, 2002.

81

Lorenzo Cortes, “Multiple Rebaselinings, Nunn-McCurdy Breaches Doomed B-1 DSUP,

Air Force Says,” Defense Daily, January 30, 2003.

82

Senate Armed Services Committee, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004,”

S.Rept. 108-46 (S. 1050), p. 210.

83

David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Baghdad Confidential,” April 28, 2003.

84

House Armed Services Committee, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004,”

H.Rept. 108-106 (H.R. 1588), p. 219-220.

85

“Military Readiness: DOD Needs a Clear and Defined Process for Setting Aircraft

Availability Goals in the New Security Environment,” GAO, April 2003.

86

Institute for Defense Analyses Bomber Study. Alexandria, VA. May 1995, and “Military

Readiness: DOD Needs a Clear and Defined Process for Setting Aircraft Availability Goals

in the New Security Environment,” GAO, April 2003.

CRS-28

manufacture B-1B parts.87 Consequently, the B-1B force suffered from

cannibalization rates as high as 85% in 2001, compared to an Air Force average of

11%.88 In the years leading up to consolidation, which reduced the B-1 fleet from 92

to 60, the Air Force operated the B-1 fleet with roughly 20 “attrition reserve” aircraft

used for spare parts.89

Since the Air Force began to institute the consolidation plan, the B-1’s MCR has

improved dramatically, reaching a reported 79% during Operation Iraqi Freedom,

while the cannibalization rated dropped below 50%. Air Force leaders attribute the

improvement to the consolidation because fewer planes now compete for scarce parts

and because remaining aircraft can poach freely from those that have been retired.90

Mishaps (Accidents). The B-1B has historically had the highest mishap rates

of the three bombers and among the highest in the Air Force fleet. Seven out of a

total order of 100 B-1s have been lost to accidents. Through FY2002, the lifetime

Class A mishap rate for the B-1B is 3.30, while the Class B mishap is 9.65.91 The

corresponding lifetime rates for the B-2A were 0.00 and 5.42 while for the B-52 they

were 1.28 and 2.33. B-1 mishaps have been caused by a variety of factors, including

engine fires, electronics systems malfunctions, electronic warfare systems, onboard

electric generators, and landing gear/hydraulics systems.92 In December 2001, a B-1

supporting Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq crashed into the Indian Ocean. The

four-member crew ejected and was rescued, but the plane was destroyed. The Air

Force has not determined the cause of the crash.93

Mishap Costs. Based upon the Air Force definition of class A and class B

mishaps, it is estimated that over the past 18 years, B-1B mishaps have cost between

$18,300,000 and $41,200,000 (13 class A, 26 class B). The former is a conservative

87

Darren Heusel. “Maintainers Overcome Challenges To Keep B-1Bs Flying.” Air Force

News Archive. March 29, 2002.

88

Lance M. Bacon, “Back in the Big Game,” Air Force Times, June 16, 2003.

89

Bruce Rolfsen. “The B-52’s 5-0: The Stratofortress Cuts A Wide Swath - And May See

Another 40 Years Of Service.” Air Force Times. April 15, 2002, p. 14.

90

Lance M. Bacon, “Back in the Big Game,” Air Force Times, June 16, 2003.

91

Data from “B-1 Flight Mishap History,” available on the Air Force Safety Center website

at http://afsafety.af.mil/AFSC/RDBMS/Flight/stats/aircraft_stats.html. The mishap rate is

the number of accidents per 100,000 flight hours. A mishap is Class A if 1) the aircraft is

destroyed or missing, 2) a fatality or an injury resulting in a permanent disability occurs, or

3) total damage exceeds $1 million. A mishap is Class B if 1) an injury results in partial

disability, 2) five or more personnel are hospitalized, or 3) if total damage is between

$200,000 and $1 million.

92

Associated Press. “Engine Flames Out On B-1 Bomber After Takeoff, Sparks Grass Fires”

Fort Worth Star Telegram. March 9, 2000. Lori Lessner. “B1 Battle Takes Off: Kansans In

Congress Battle Those Who Say The Plane Is Not Worth Its Cost.” Wichita Eagle. July 2,

2001. David Atkinson. “B-1s Provided Needed Long-Range Muscle In Air War.” Defense

Daily. June 25, 1999, vol. 202, n. 61. “B-1B Has The Highest Mishap Rate Of Bomber

Fleet, According To Air Force Documents.” Aerospace Daily. December 13, 2001.

93

“B-1B Crash Cause Remains Unknown,” Today’s Air Force News, September 24, 2002.

CRS-29

estimate that does not reflect the fact that class A mishaps can cost much more than

$1 million.94

Recent Operations

Operation Desert Storm (Iraq). B-1Bs did not participate in Operation

Desert Storm because these aircraft were still not certified to employ conventional

weapons.95 Consequently, funding for the B-1 conversion to conventional munitions

began in FY1992.

Operation Desert Fox (Iraq). The B-1B flew its first combat mission during

Operation Desert Fox in 1998. Operating out of bases in Bahrain, three B-1Bs flew

four sorties and attacked three targets.96 They flew with fighter escorts because they

were operating without the ALE-50 towed decoy.

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo). The B-1 saw more action in the air war

over Serbia in 1999. Six block D B-1Bs flew 25 sorties each — 300 total — during

the campaign. The B-1Bs were based in Fairford, England, and needed seven hours

for each trip to Kosovo and back. Ground crews rearmed and refueled the B-1s in

four hours, enabling numerous sorties.97 The planes used 500 lb. Mk-82 gravity

munitions and cluster bombs. The six B-1Bs had the ability to deliver precision

munitions, but because of small inventory of those weapons, they employed only

“dumb bombs.” B-1s in this conflict experienced problems with retained stores:

bombs stuck in the weapons bay.98

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). The B-1 appears to have

been a major contributor to the air campaign in Afghanistan. Some have called the

B-1 the “workhorse” of the conflict because it flew just 5% of the sorties, but

dropped 40% of the ordnance and 70% of the JDAM guided bombs.99 Eight B-1Bs

were based at Diego Garcia, and flew up to four sorties per day. Operation Enduring

94

Air Force Program Acquisition Cost Summary. Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)

Summary Table. December 31, 1992. See also CRS Report RL31571, “Military Aviation

Safety,” by (name redacted).

95

General Richard E. Hawley, USAF-Ret. “Swinging The Air Power Pendulum: The Case

For Returning To A Bomber-Centric Attack Force.” Strategic Review, p. 41. Spring 2001.

96

“Beginning with the second night of bombings, the team provided the 28th Air

Expeditionary Group with satellite imagery for B-1B pre-strike mission planning, and poststrike bomb damage assessment analysis. Prior to take-off, B-1B flight crews familiarized

themselves with targeting updates, near real-time intelligence to enhance situational

awareness, and threat avoidance information, courtesy of the Space Support Teams.” Air

Force Space Command News Service. January 5, 1999.

97

David Atkinson. “B-1s Provided Needed Long-Range Muscle In Air War.” Defense Daily.

June 25, 1999, vol. 202, n. 61.

98

Frank Wolfe. “AF Trying To Fix Retained Weapons Problem On B-1.” Defense Daily.

March 1, 2000, vol. 205, No. 39.

99

Thomas Hargrove, “Oft-Debated Bomber Gets Shot At Saddam,” Scripps Howard News

Source, April 8, 2003.

CRS-30

Freedom marks the first time the B-1 employed the JDAM (24 2,000 lb. JDAMs per

aircraft).

In Enduring Freedom, the B-1B first demonstrated several of the qualities that

supporters say validates the plane. In addition to delivering a large proportion of the

total ordinance dropped, B-1Bs took advantage of their long range by loitering over

battlefields waiting for target information from special forces operatives on the

ground. In another first for the B-1, the plane provided close air support to ground

forces; precision bombs enabled the high-flying bomber to hit targets close to allied

troops, something previously done only by lower-flying attack and fighter aircraft.

B-1 advocates have cited Pentagon data suggesting that the B-1Bs was the most costefficient platform per target killed, but the Pentagon has not publicly compared the

cost per kill statistic of various aircraft.100

Operation Iraqi Freedom. The B-1 took on an even larger role in Iraq.

Eleven B-1s stationed in Oman conducted 225 sorties (six to seven daily) or roughly

one percent of all combat sorties flown, yet they dropped 24% of the overall weapon

tonnage and nearly half of the total number of precision guided JDAMs dropped by

allied aircraft.101 Again commanders took advantage of the B-1B’s large payload and

ability to loiter over battlefields for more than 10 and a half hours and attack targets

immediately as they were identified. On April 7, 2003, a B-1 flying near Baghdad

diverted from its planned mission to drop four JDAMs on a building where

intelligence said Saddam Hussein might be hiding. The plane dropped the bombs 12

minutes after receiving target coordinates, and afterwards completed its original

mission, destroying 17 additional targets.102 According to one report, the B-1 was in

such demand that CENTCOM air component commander Lt. Gen. Michael Moseley

personally managed its scheduling.103

Costs

Because considerable controversy surrounded the B-1, Congress required, and

the President delivered , a formal certification that the entire program would not cost

more than $20.5 billion ( FY1981 dollars). Some attributed the numerous problems

later associated with the B-1 program at least partly to the cap. The total program

acquisition cost (current DOD estimate) is $30.88 billion (FY1981 dollars) for a unit

100

Peter Pae. “Maligned B-1 Bomber Now Proving Its Worth: Military: Plane’s Successes

In War Have Quieted Critics In Pentagon — For Now.” Los Angeles Times. December 12,

2001.

101

Lance M. Bacon, “Back in the Big Game,” Air Force Times, June 16, 2003; David A.

Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Baghdad Confidential,” Aviation Week, April 28, 2003; Tara

Copp, “House Oks Reviving 23 B-1s,” Abilene Reporter-News, July 11, 2003.

102

Hunter Keeter, “B-1 Drops 2,000 Pound JDAMs In ‘Iraqi Leadership’ Strike,” Defense

Daily, April 9, 2003.

103

David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Baghdad Confidential,” Aviation Week, April 28,

2003.

CRS-31

cost of $225 million (FY1981 dollars). Appropriations for the B-1A program,

between FY1965 and FY1981 were $4.2 billion.104

Table 5. B-1B Appropriations, by Year

($ Million Then-year)

Year

RDT&E

Procurement

Quantity

Milcon

Total

FY1981

260

FY1982

292

1,801

1

2,093

FY1983

754

3,868

7

4,622

FY1984

750

5,572

10

6

6,328

FY1985

465

7,071

34

96

7,632

FY1986

265

4,914

48

211

5,390

FY1987

119

50

169

FY1988

376

1

377

FY1989

222

7

253

260

24

FY1990

51

51

FY1991

91

91

FY1992

2

160

162

FY1993

86

213

299

FY1994

49

192

241

FY1995

74

180

254

FY1996

202

125

327

FY1997

218

150

368

FY1998

221

125

346

FY1999

195

92

287

FY2000

179

127

306

FY2001

158

49

207

FY2002

152

38

190

FY2003

161

106

267

Total

5,200

25,049

104

100

371

30,620

The B-1A program was the original design that was cancelled in 1977 by President

Carter. When President Reagan revived the B-1 in 1981, the original design was modified

and designated the B-1B.

CRS-32

FY2004 Developments.

Administration’s Request. The Administration requested a total of $181

million to continue B-1B modernization. It requested $92 million for procurement

and $89 million for RDT&E.

Authorization. The House Armed Services Committee (HR1588) added $20.3

million to the Administration’s procurement request to begin the regeneration of 23

of the 33 aircraft retired under the consolidation plan. Total procurement funding

totaled $111.9 million, while RDT&E authorization matched the Administration’s

request at $89 million. The Senate Armed Services committee (S1050) authorized

$92 million for procurement and $89 million for RDT&E, matching the

Administration’s request.

Appropriation. The House Appropriations Committee (HR2658) added $20.3

million to the Administration’s request to revive 23 B-1s that had been slated for

retirement. The Committee also reduced procurement for the Wind Corrected

Munitions Dispenser system by half, or $15 million, citing technical problems that

must be fixed before procurement of the system continues. Procurement

appropriations totaled $96.9 million, a net increase of $5.3 million. The House

Committee did not alter the RDT&E request. The Senate Appropriations Committee

(S1382) did not add funding to reinstate retired aircraft. Instead, the committee

reduced procurement by $15 million from the Administration’s request, for a total

of $77 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee did not change the

Administrations request for RDT&E.

CRS-33

B-2A Spirit

Overview

The B-2 was designed to strike well-protected targets deep in Soviet territory

with nuclear weapons. Because of its stealth technology, the B-2 can avoid detection

by enemy radar and attack targets without escort or U.S. air superiority. During the

1990s, the Air Force adapted the plane for non-nuclear bombing missions, taking

advantage of its long range, large payload, and stealth. Today it can carry 16

independently targeted 2,000 lb. JDAM precision guided bombs, eight massive

4,700 lb. “Bunker Busters,” or a variety of other weapons.

The B-2 is slower and has a smaller payload than the other bombers, but its role

is different because of its stealth. It is the only bomber capable of operating in welldefended airspace and is intended for early strikes in a conflict. The B-2, along with

the F/A-22, is the centerpiece of the Air Force’s “Global Strike Task Force” concept,

which is designed to attack “anti-access” targets in future conflicts, opening the way

for follow-on platforms like the Joint Strike Fighter and the other bombers.105

Figure 4. B-2 Spirit

Source: USAF Photo by MSgt. Rose Reynolds

105

Representative Norm Dicks in Marty Kauchak. “Focus on OEF’s Air Campaign:

Funding, New Doctrine Needed To Continue Air Campaign’s Legacy.” Armed Forces

Journal International. March 2002, p. 20, and John A. Tirpak. “Air Force Leaders Report

On The State Of The Force.” Air Force Magazine. April 2001, p. 28.

CRS-34

Funding in FY1993 enabled the purchase of 20 aircraft. Subsequent funding has

upgraded the B-2’s capabilities as a conventional bomber. In 1996, the Air Force

enlarged the fleet to 21 by adding an existing test aircraft to its force. Sixteen B-2s

are combat coded, and the entire fleet is based at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, with the

509th Bomb Wing.

Program Status

New Production. Advocates want the Air Force to order more B-2s to

enlarge the fleet. Initially, the Air Force ordered 165 aircraft, but the end of the Cold

War and enormous cost increases led the Air Force to reduce the number to just 21.

Proponents in Congress and at Northrop Grumman, the lead contractor, contend that

a new version of the B-2 would be far less expensive than the original. Northrop

Grumman has twice provided the Air Force (1995 and 2001) with unsolicited

proposals to reopen the production line. The most recent projected a unit price of

$500 million for 40 new aircraft, compared to more than $2 billion each for the

original planes. Northrop Grumman officials say they can substantially reduce costs

for a modified version of the B-2, dubbed the B-2C, by eliminating the expensive

electronic hardening which protects against nuclear blast and by using “off-the-shelf”

electronics rather than custom designed systems. Maintenance, parts, training, and

support for the B-2C could raise the price to nearly $735 million each for a total bill

of $29.4 billion for the 40 aircraft.106

Senior Air Force and DOD officials have publicly expressed opposition to

restarting the B-2 line.107 Some suggest that DOD’s lack of interest in the B-2 may

be caused by concern that it would conflict with funding other procurement

programs, such as the F/A-22 Raptor.

Other Air Force officials have called for a larger B-2 force and suggest replacing

B-1Bs and B-52s with an additional 60 to 80 Stealth Bombers.108 They contend that

B-1Bs and B-52s are low-threat environment aircraft, unable to address the full

spectrum of bombing missions. The B-52’s cruise missile launching capabilities,

they say, could be taken on by Navy ships and submarines.109

Some members of Congress have voiced support for building more B-2s:

Representative Ike Skelton and Senator Jeff Sessions have said that the B-2 is the

106

Air Force and Pentagon estimate, Defense Daily, June 4, 2001.The current 21 B-2s have

cost the Air Force a total of $44.4 billion for development and procurement.

107

Jim Skeen. “Defense Exec Advises Against B-2 Restart.” Los Angeles Daily News.

January 31, 2002.

108

“Battle Over New, Stealthy B-2s Brews Between Roche And Capitol Hill.” Inside the Air

Force. October 26, 2001.” Air Force General Hopes QDR Will ‘Pay Attention’ To

Arguments For More B-2s.” Aerospace Daily. June 28, 2001.

109

Adam J. Hebert. “Former ACC Chief Says USAF Should Move To Larger, All-B-2

Bomber Fleet.” Inside Defense. October 17, 2001.

CRS-35

most advanced bomber aircraft in the force and stressed the need for more.110 In

October 2001, Representative Norman Dicks advocated building 10 or 20 more to

enable more strikes early on in future conflicts.111 More recently, Representatives

Duncan Hunter and Howard McKeon stated that the B-2 is the kind of technology the

United States need to support and advocated production of the cheaper version.112

Supporters argue that building more B-2s would send a clear message to potential

enemies that the United States was serious about maintaining a long range strike

capability.113 However, history may not be on the B-2’s side in regard to restarting

production. The Air Force has re-opened only two assembly lines: the U-2

surveillance aircraft and the C-5 heavy air lifter.

Forward Deployment. The B-2’s radar-absorbing skin must be serviced

under controlled environmental conditions in special hangars. The Air Force does

not have any permanent hangars for the B-2 overseas. New deployable shelters,

however, enable the Air Force to station B-2s much closer to conflicts, reducing

flight times and increasing the number of sorties each plane can fly. Previously, all

B-2 combat missions began and ended at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri,

requiring extremely long sorties to reach far-away conflicts. During the conflict in

Afghanistan, for example, B-2s had to fly sorties in excess of 40 hours to reach their

targets and return home.

With the new deployable shelters, the Air Force can set up a temporary B-2 base

in about one month. However, it appears that the Air Force intends to use the

shelters to set up semi-permanent bases at Fairford Royal Air Force Base in England

and on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.114 Some have speculated that the

Air Force may also station B-2s on Guam in the Pacific. B-2s conducting missions

against Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom were the first to use the shelters for

combat missions, flying from Diego Garcia. The hangars cost $2.5 million each and

the Air Force currently has five, each capable of housing one B-2 at a time.115

Modernization

Radar Upgrade. An upgrade to the Raytheon APQ-181 radar is intended to

improve the B-2’s bombing accuracy and prevent possible interference when the

spectrum used by the plane’s current radar becomes available to commercial users.

110

Andy Pasztor and Anne Marie Squeo. “Northrop’s B-2 Stealth Bomber Re-Emerges As

Focus Of Pentagon’s Battles Over Budget.” Wall Street Journal. October 24, 2001.

111

Jonathan M. Block. “Battle Over New, Stealthy B-2s Brews Between Roche And Capitol

Hill.” Inside the Air Force. October 26, 2001

112

Jim Skeen, “Politician Pushes B2s,” Los Angeles Daily News, June 2, 2003.

113

Nick Johnson. “Additional B-2 Bomber Acquisition Unlikely To Fly, Analysts Say.”

Aerospace Daily. June 15, 2001.

114

Michael Sirak. “USA Establishing Forward Deployment Capability For B-2”, Jane’s

Defence Weekly. September 19, 2001.

115

Bill Kaczor, “Portable Shelters Bolster B-2’s Mobility,” Air Force Times, February 24,

2003.

CRS-36

Unless resolved, conflict with commercial users could begin in 2007, according to

a recent Defense Information Systems Agency’s Spectrum Center study.116

After considering several options to resolve frequency spectrum conflicts, the

Air Force chose to add new components to the existing radar rather than simply

modify the existing radar or develop an entirely new system. This hybrid option

incorporates Raytheon’s Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) antenna to the

front end of the existing radar.117 According to Air Force officials, it will provide the

“greatest bang for the buck,”118 increasing performance by 40% in addition to

resolving the spectrum conflict, an official at Northrop Grumman said.119 The Air

Force plans to complete installation of the hybrid on all 21 B-2s within eight years.

Six aircraft would be upgraded initially to ensure at least part of the fleet will be

ready before the 2007 deadline. The upgrade is projected to cost roughly $1

billion.120

Link 16 and Beyond the Line of Sight (BLOS) Communications

Programs. The Air Force is planning to upgrade the B-2 with the Link 16 jam

resistant data link to improve communications and enable B-2 crews to change

targets in-flight more effectively. Further, the Air Force intends to add satellite

receivers to the B-2 to enable the plane to communicate when out of range of its

current systems. The Link 16 upgrade should be completed in FY2006. DOD

requested $59 million for the program for FY2004. Congress has supported

improving the B-2’s retargeting capabilities in general, and implementing Link 16

specifically. In June 2001, Senator James Inhofe pushed for the Link 16 upgrade after

DOD did not request funding.121 The House authorized $104.1 million for continuing

upgrades, adding $32 million to the Administration’s request through an amendment

by Representative Howard McKeon.122 For FY2004, the House Armed Services

Committee added $30 million to the Administration’s request to accelerate the

satellite receivers.

Alternate High Frequency Material. Alternate High Frequency Material is

hoped to enhance the stealth of the B-2, while reducing maintenance. This new

material will be applied to each aircraft as it undergoes annual depot maintenance in

the next six years. The first aircraft with this new coating should be ready in 2003.

116

Frank Wolfe and John Robinson. “Air Force Negotiating With Industry On Possible

Contract To Modify B-2 Radar.” Defense Daily. June 5, 2002, vol. 214, Issue 47.

117

Sharon Weinberger. “Air Force to Spend $1 Billion on B-2 Upgrade.” Aerospace Daily.

August 12, 2002.

118

Laura M. Colarusso and Amy Butler, “Air Force Seeks Acquisition Authority for B-2

Upgrade Effort,” Inside the Air Force, October 4, 2002.

119

Michael Sirak, “USAF In B-2A Radar Upgrade Dilemma,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

August 14, 2002.

120

Ibid.

121

Lee Ewing and Marc Selinger. “Representative McKeon calls for restarting B-2 line,

buying 40 more.” Aerospace Daily. July 2, 2001.

122

Ibid.

CRS-37

The Air Force expects that three aircraft will be modified each year (during their

scheduled maintenance), with a completion for all by FY09.

Weapons Upgrades. Several modifications are being pursued or considered

to increase the B-2’s payload capabilities. The Smart Bomb Release Assembly

(SBRA) will enable the B-2 to carry 80 500 lb. JDAMs instead of the 16 2,000 lb

JDAMs currently employed. The SBRA upgrade began in May 2003 and should be

completed in mid-2004. Estimated costs are $31.7 million.123

Plans have also been drawn to equip the B-2 with the Small Diameter Bomb

(SDB). Although the precision 250-pound SDB is still in development, the Air Force

hopes to equip all B-2s with the weapon by FY04. The Air Force estimates that the

B-2 could carry between 320 to 360 independently targeted SDBs.124 In addition, two

unused bays on the B-2 (called the LIB-28 bays) are being evaluated to carry either

additional weapons or jamming devices. Additional weapons could improve weapons

flexibility, while jamming equipment may increase the B-2’s survivability or enable

new missions.

Readiness

Mission Capable Rate. The mission capable rate for the B-2 fleet is low

compared to many other aircraft in the Air Force inventory. The B-2’s MCR was

42.2% in 1999 and only 37% in 2000. As noted by DOD’s Office of Operational

Testing and Evaluation, these rates are far below the service requirement of 60%.

The B-2’s MCR dropped even lower in 2001, to 31%, which is about half the MCR

of the B-1B.125 More recently, in June of 2002, the B-2’s MCR rose to 42%.126 The

Air Force reported a B-2 MCR of 85% during Operation Iraqi Freedom, however,

MCRs are typically much higher during wartime.127

The B-2’s low MCR may be tied to maintaining the aircraft’s stealthy features.

Due to treatment needed to keep the aircraft stealthy, the maintenance time spent

between B-2 flights is longer than that of other aircraft. Air Force officials contend

the MCR would be as high as 80% without the low-observability requirements.128

Maintenance. The radar-absorbing materials (RAM) used to coat the wings

and fuselage have to be applied after each mission. The time needed to “cure” these

123

“Northrop Grumman to Produce Smart Rack for B-2,” Defense Week, May 12, 2003.

124

Testimony of Secretary of the Air Force James Roche before the House Armed Services

Committee. “U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) Holds Hearing on FY2004

Defense Authorization: Day 2 ,” FDCH Political Transcripts, February 27, 2003.

125

Director for Operational Testing and Evaluation. 2002 Report to Congress.

126

Elaine Grossman. “Northrop Pitches Concept To Ready 16 B-2s For Stunning Attack On

Iraq.” Inside the Pentagon. July 25, 2002.

127

Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, “Operation Iraqi Freedom — By the Numbers,”

Assessment and Analysis Division, April 30, 2003, p. 10.

128

Grossman, op. cit.

CRS-38

materials keeps B-2s in depot and off the flight line. A March 2001 report from

DOD’s Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation indicated that each hour of

flight typically requires 52 to 70 hours of maintenance, of which 20.8 hours are for

low-observability coating and treatment.129 Some hope that this time will be

significantly reduced with a spray-on RAM, the Alternative High Frequency Material

(AHFM) that Northrop Grumman finished testing in October 2000. Not all aircraft

surfaces can be treated with this spray, but it is expected that the B-2’s maintenance

time will decrease sharply, from 20.8 to 9.2 hour per flying hour. The upgrade will

improve the MCR by 8%, according to the B-2 program office deputy director at

Tinker AFB.130

Spare Parts. Another issue that presents risks of lowering B-2 readiness is an

expected engine parts shortage that could begin as early as 2005. The B-2 uses

analog engine controllers, which are projected to be scarce in four years at the rate

they are currently being replaced. Advances in digital technology will likely make

it harder to find suppliers for analog engine hardware. DOD suggests replacing the

B-2’s analog engine controller with a digital model. In addition to alleviating a spare

parts shortage, switching to a digital engine controller may also provide better

airspeed control.131

Cracks. Cracks appeared in the aft deck of several B-2s in 1990 but were fixed,

at a cost of $200 million, after a change in the design of the aircraft. A second series

of cracks, located on titanium plates behind the jet engine’s exhaust, appeared in

2000 on 16 of the 21 B-2s.132 The cause of these cracks is being reviewed. Both the

Air Force Combat Command and Northrop Grumman are working on a fix, and at

this stage it is difficult to predict how much these cracks will cost to repair. In its

FY2004 appropriations bill, the House Armed Services Committee added $27 million

to DOD’s budget request for repairing the cracks.133 According to Northrop

Grumman, the money in the appropriations bill would go toward a permanent

solution to the problem.134

The cracks range from one inch to as long as nine inches, but according to Air

Force officials, they do not represent a threat to stealth capabilities, mission

129

James Dao. “Stealth Bomber, Once Scorned, Gains Fresh Backing.” New York Times.

June 26, 2001, and Tony Carpaccio. “Northrop’s B-2 Needs Excessive’ Maintenance To

Keep Flying.” Bloomberg.com. March 4, 2001.

130

The B-2 system program office is currently developing a robotics system to apply the new

radar absorbing material faster and cheaper than by human labor. The first application on

a combat coded aircraft will be made this Fall at Palmdale AFB, California.

131

Marc Selinger. “Engine Parts Shortages Could Begin to Ground B-2s in 2005, Report

Says.” Aerospace Daily. July 24, 2001.

132

James Dao. “16 Of 21 B-2’s Have Cracks Near Exhaust, Officials Say.” New York Times.

March 20, 2002.

133

House Armed Services Committee, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004,”

H.Rept. 108-106 (H.R. 1588), p. 95-96.

134

Hampton Stephens, “Feinstein Pushes for Funds to Fix Cracks in B-2’s Stealthy Skin,”

Inside the Air Force, July 11, 2003.

CRS-39

readiness, or flight safety. Still, the Air Force is keeping a close watch on these

cracks: aircraft with cracks are examined at the end of every flight day, and those

aircraft without cracks every 200 flight hours. The Air Force is concerned that the

cracks may expand to the point of affecting the B-2’s stealth if not fixed. It appears

that fuselage cracking may not be unique to the B-2. Other aircraft have experienced

similar cracks, including the F-22, the F-117, and the C-130.135

Recent Operations

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo). The B-2 made its operational debut in

Kosovo. Beginning March 24, 1999, six B-2s flew combat sorties during the NATOled air strikes. All B-2 sorties were flown 31-hours round trip, non-stop from

Whiteman AFB, Missouri, to Yugoslavia. The 50 B-2 strike sorties accounted for

approximately 1% of total sorties flown during the Operation, while releasing 11%

of total U.S. Air Force precision weapons, which destroyed 90% of the targets they

attacked.136 The bomber employed GPS guided munitions including 651 2,000 lb.

JDAMs and GBU-37. The B-2s reportedly flew without support aircraft for some

sorties.

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Six B-2s took part in the

conflict, flying from Missouri for missions over Afghanistan beginning October 5,

2001. They were the first bombers deployed in the conflict. B-1Bs and B-52s were

employed once enemy air defenses were destroyed and low observability was less

important. As in Operation Allied Force, the B-2s were able to deliver 16 JDAMs per

mission and demonstrated great accuracy.137 Crew fatigue was an important

consideration for such long missions. After attacking targets in Afghanistan, B-2s

stopped at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. With the engines still running, they

changed crews, refueled, and flew back to Missouri. The whole trip took six aerial

refuelings.

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Four B-2s stationed on Diego Garcia flew 49

sorties during OIF. It was the first time that B-2s have been stationed overseas, using

the new deployable shelters. The Air Force has not released detailed information

about the activities of the B-2 during the conflict, but did praise the aircraft’s ability

to carry the 4,700 lb. “bunker buster” guided bomb.

Costs

Unlike the B-1, the B-2 program was not limited by a price cap. Costs for the

stealth bomber grew even as planned production shrank. In 1978, planners called for

165 B-2s at a total cost of $36 billion ($218 million each, FY1980 dollars). In early

1986, the Air Force reduced its order to 132 B-2s for a total cost of $58.2 billion

135

Ibid.

136

Vernon Loeb. “From U.S., Bat-Winged B-2 Strikes At Taliban Bomber Aloft for Days

In Long-Distance Run.” Washington Post. October 20, 2001.

137

Martin Fletcher. “All in a day’s work for long distance stealth warriors.” London Times.

October 12, 2001.

CRS-40

($440 million each). By 1991, production was cut to 75 at a total cost of $64.8

billion ($863 million each), and in 1993, the final purchase of 20 B-2s was totaled

$44.5 billion ($2.2 billion per plane).

Some argue that this aircraft is not only expensive to purchase, but also to

maintain, requiring a workforce of 1,000 mechanics for its 16 combat ready aircraft.

Others argue that the B-2 actually costs less than conventional aircraft because,

thanks to its stealthy features, it can deliver an enormous payload without escort or

air superiority. If one compares the cost of a conventional, multi-plane strike package

to a B-2 strike package, the “value of stealth” becomes apparent, advocates argue.138

However, opponents point out that the B-2 is usually escorted by stand-off jamming

aircraft.

The B-2’s program Acquisition Cost (current Air Force estimate) was $44.5

billion for 21 B-2s (then-year $), with a unit cost of $2.12 billion (then-year $).139

Table 6. B-2 Appropriations, by Year

($ Millions, Then-year)

Military

Construction

Year

RDT&E

Procurement

Quantity

FY1988

and prior

13,220

3,810

5

102

17,132

FY1989

2,176

3,037

3

80

5,293

FY1990

1,881

2,087

2

111

4,079

FY1991

1,751

2,349

3

104

4,204

FY1992

1,563

2,800

2

FY1993

1,261

2,687

3,948

FY1994

790

572

1,362

a

389

405

794

FY1996

FY1997

790

624

1,414

624

97

721

FY1998

356

345

701

FY1999

131

240

371

FY2000

302

115

417

FY2001

130

25

155

FY2002

219

23

242

FY2003

265

104

FY1995

Total

25,807

19,290

Total

4,363

369

15

b

397

45,565

138

For a graphical depiction of what B-2 advocates call the value of stealth, see CRS Report

RL30639, Electronic Warfare: EA-6B Modernization and Related Issues for Congress.

139

Richard Aboulafia. “World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing.” Teal Group Briefing

Book Series. January 2001.

CRS-41

a. Congress also appropriated $125 million for the “Bomber Industrial Base,” to keep open the

possibility of acquiring additional B-2s for one year.

b.

Six flight-test aircraft funded through R&D appropriations have been retrofitted, using

appropriated R&D funds, to join the operational B-2 fleet — yielding a total of 21 operational

aircraft.

FY2004 Developments

Administration’s Request. The Administration requested $76 million for

procurement and $152 million for research and development.

Authorization. The House Armed Services Committee (HR1588)

recommended $128 million for procurement and $186 million for research and

development. The Committee moved $25 million from R&D to procurement per an

Air Force request, and added $27 million to repair cracks in the aft deck. The

committee added $4 million to R&D for research into the aft-deck cracks, and $30

million to accelerate research into the B-2 satellite communications link. The Senate

Armed Services committee (S1050) also moved the $25 million from R&D to

procurement for a total of $101 million. Research and Development was reduced to

$127 million. The Senate committee made no other changes to the Administration’s

request.

Appropriation. The House Appropriations Committee (HR2658) added $27.1

million to the procurement request to repair aft-deck cracks and moved $25 million

from RDT&E to procurement. Overall, procurement funding for the B-2 was

increased by $51.8 million over the request. In terms of RDT&E, the Committee

added $30 million for the B-2’s satellite communications link and $4 million for

research related to the cracks. RDT&E appropriations totaled $160.9 million, $8.8

million more than requested. The Senate Appropriations Committee (S1383)

reduced the procurement request by $5 million, for a total of $71 million. They did

not change the Administration’s request for RDT&E.

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