Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy

Order Code RL31429

Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy

May 22, 2002

Carol Migdalovitz

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy

Summary

Turkey has long been considered a strategic U.S. and NATO ally. That it

combines a predominantly Muslim identity with a secular democratic government has

added to Turkey’s significance to the United States since September 11, 2001.

Turkish domestic and foreign policy issues concern U.S. policymakers, who

would like a stable, competent, friendly government in Ankara. Since 1999, a

coalition of three parties of mismatched ideological preferences has presided over

unprecedented financial crises and the deepest recession in half a century. On the

other hand, the coalition has produced an impressive legislative record of economic

and political reforms. Some economic indicators, such as inflation and interest rates,

are showing improvement, but Turkey has yet to experience economic recovery. As

an election nears, cleavages in the government may become more severe as coalition

partners jockey for position. Other contenders are in opposition inside and outside

parliament. Islamists may emerge from an election with strong support. Two parties

have Islamist roots, but one of these is striving to be known as centrist rather than

Islamist, and it leads opinion polls.

A number of foreign policy issues join U.S. and Turkish interests. In the war

on terrorism, Turkey is playing a major role in Afghanistan, where it will assume

command of the international peacekeeping force. Yet, Turkey is reluctant to see the

war expand to Iraq. Turkey is a candidate for European Union membership, but has

not met the criteria for membership. U.S. policymakers had maintained that

membership would anchor Turkey in the West. Currently, the Administration wants

the EU, particularly Greece, and Turkey to resolve differences over a planned EU

rapid reaction force and its relationship to NATO. For its part, the EU wants Turkey

to help resolve the Cyprus issue. Talks are underway, but no progress has been

reported. Unless there is a resolution, Cyprus, as represented by the Greek-Cypriot

led government, is likely to be approved for EU membership and a crisis between the

EU and Turkey is possible, affecting Turkey’s EU prospects. Lack of a resolution

on Cyprus also will complicate Greek-Turkish relations, which have seen a

rapprochement since 1999. Cyprus and issues of Aegean sovereignty impede the full

normalization of relations between the two neighboring NATO allies. Turkey’s

relations with countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia are important because of

their energy resources and U.S. interests in pipelines to transport them independently

of Iran and Russia. The United States has encouraged the development of Turkey’s

ties to Israel since 1996. Turkey and Israel have concluded major arms and water

deals, and their relationship has withstood differences over Palestine.

The United States has been Turkey’s main arms source and, after a three-year

hiatus, the United States resumed providing assistance to Turkey after September 11.

The amount of aid is expected to increase sharply in view of U.S. support for

Turkey’s command of peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. For its part, Turkey

would like U.S.-Turkish trade to get more attention.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Domestic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Government Effectiveness and Political Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Role of Islamists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Economic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Foreign Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

War Against Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

European Union Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

European Security and Defense Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Cyprus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Caucasus and Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Executive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

List of Tables

Table 1. Parties, Leaders, Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Table 2. U.S. Aid to Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

List of Figures

Figure 1. Map of Turkey and Immediate Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy

Introduction

Turkey is a country of strategic and symbolic value to U.S. policy. It has been

a NATO ally since 1952 and, during the Cold War, it was the only NATO member

which bordered the Soviet Union. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey

remained strategically important because of crises in the nearby Balkans, Caucasus,

and Middle East. And, since the September 11, 2001 radical Islamist terrorist attacks

on the United States, Turkey’s significance has grown. U.S. policymakers use

Turkey’s example to refute predictions of an imminent “clash of civilizations”

between the Muslim and Western worlds because Turkey’s Muslim identity has been

compatible with its secular, democratic government, role in NATO, and European

Union (EU) membership ambitions.

Many issues concerning Turkey are related to U.S. policies. First, in order to

advance an array of U.S. interests, the United States seeks a stable, friendly

government in Ankara that maintains its democratic character. In part, this means

advocacy of political stability despite chronic chaotic, multiparty politics in Ankara.

And it also means caution regarding Islamist forces in Turkey -- both moderate ones,

which work within the political system, and radical ones, which perpetrate domestic

terrorist crimes. Finally, it means attention to Turkey’s chronic economic crises

which have the potential to undermine its political stability.

Many U.S. foreign policy interests concern Turkey. They are led by the war on

terrorism, particularly on two fronts -- Afghanistan and Iraq. Turkey, which has

participated with coalition forces in the war in Afghanistan, will assume command

of international peacekeeping forces there in June, and its support is viewed as

essential for any operation to unseat Saddam Hussein. The United States also has an

abiding interest in Turkey’s European Union (EU) prospects because membership

could ensure Turkey’s stability and democracy and anchor it in the West. Turkey’s

EU ambitions depend partly on its fulfillment of a rigorous reform agenda. They also

may depend on Turkey’s relations with Greece and Cyprus, which are of concern to

an active Greek-American constituency. An equally active Armenian-American

constituency is mindful of Turkey’s role in the Caucasus. The U.S. government is

interested in the region’s bountiful energy resources as well as in those in

neighboring Central Asia, and in pipelines that could transport that energy wealth

westward through Turkey. Central Asia, many of whose people are ethnic kin of the

Turks, also is on the front line of the war on terrorism.

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Domestic Issues

Government Effectiveness and Political Stability

In Turkey, the president is head of state and the prime minister is head of

government. The current president is Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a former chief judge with

a reputation for integrity and belief in the rule of law. Although very popular, Sezer’s

use of his position and constitutionally limited power has been controversial with the

political elite. His strict, legalistic interpretations and vetoes of legislation have

alienated political leaders, who appear intent on changing the Constitution to reduce

a president’s term in office from seven to five years.1

Since spring 1999, the Turkish government has been a three-party coalition of

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP), Deputy Prime Minister

Devlet Bahceli’s Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and Deputy Prime Minister Mesut

Yilmaz’s Motherland Party (ANAP). They control a comfortable majority in the

550-seat parliament, known as the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and form the

longest serving government after a decade of instability. The government’s agenda

has been unusually crowded and historic. Parliament has passed major

macroeconomic reforms in order for the government to obtain loans from

international financial institutions and thereby rescue the country from severe

economic crises. (See Economic Situation, below.) It also has passed many

constitutional amendments and several legislative packages of political reforms to

enable the country to enter negotiations for membership in the EU. (See European

Union, below.)

The government’s ambitious and arduous workload has revealed sharp

differences among the coalition members, who are ideologically mismatched. DSP

is traditionally, but perhaps no longer, statist and strongly nationalist. MHP is right

wing and zealously nationalist. ANAP is centrist, market-oriented, and worldly, with

a reputation for corruption. Bahceli and Yilmaz differ sharply over changes required

for EU accession. Yilmaz is pushing for rapid changes and compromises, while

Bahceli questions their compatibility with national sovereignty and argues for a

slower pace. Although Bahceli and other MHP officials publicly claim that they

favor EU membership, their supporters regularly lambaste Yilmaz and the EU and

reports of arguments at cabinet meetings are common.2

As time passes and another election nears, the strains are likely to worsen.

However, because most Turks blame them for the economic crises and the pain

inflicted by reforms, the coalition partners are likely to do poorly in a premature

election. Thus, they probably will hold together until the economic situation

1

The President’s powers, including his veto power, are limited. For example, if the

president vetoes legislation and the parliament passes it again unchanged, then the president

cannot veto it a second time. He can, however, appeal to the Constitutional Court to

overturn the law. Parliament has overridden several of Sezer’s vetoes.

2

See articles in Ortadogu, a newspaper that support the MHP, translations carried by Foreign

Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) on line.

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improves and the voting public feels the improvement. An election need not be held

until 2004, but Turkish governments generally do not serve out their full terms and

one is likely in 2003 if not before.

Table 1. Parties, Leaders, Positions

Party

Leader

Position

Democratic Left Party (DSP)*3

Bulent Ecevit

Center-Left

Nationalist Action Party (MHP)*

Devlet Bahceli

Right

Motherland Party (ANAP)*

Mesut Yilmaz

Center-Right

True Path Party (DYP)

Tansu Ciller

Center-Right

Felicity Party (SP)

Recai Kutan

Islamist

Justice and Development Party (AKP )

Tayyip Recep Erdogan

Islamist

Republican People’s Party (CHP)

Deniz Baykal

Center-Left

Democratic Turkey Party (DTP)

Mehmet Ali Bayar

Center-Right

People’s Democracy Party (HADEP)

Murat Bozlak

Kurdish

Waiting in the wings are several opposition parties. The True Path Party (DYP)

led by former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller favors EU membership and joined forces

with other parties, including DSP and ANAP, to pass some EU-conforming

legislation over MHP’s objections. On other issues, Ciller adopts populist positions

and opportunistically attacks the government. For example, she joined forces with

the MHP to oppose abolition of the death penalty.

There also are two Islamist parties in parliament. (See also Role of Islamists,

below.) The Saadet or Felicity Party (SP) is the current incarnation of several banned

Islamist parties of followers of former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Because

Erbakan is banned from politics, SP is led by his ally Recai Kutan. In August 2001,

members of a younger generation who disagree with Erbakan’s authoritarian

approach, led by former Mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdogan, split from SP to

form the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Most preliminary public opinion

polls gauging the prospects of parties for the next election show AKP and Erdogan

in the lead. In general, polls indicate that parties not in the government and not

viewed as responsible for the economic crises fare far better than the coalition

members; the latter may not reach the 10% of the vote threshold to enter parliament.

Two parties not now represented in parliament have political potential. The

Republican People’s Party (CHP) is the party of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of

the Turkish Republic, and champion of secularism. The 1999 national election

marked the first time that the CHP was unable to gain sufficient votes to enter

parliament. CHP is led by Deniz Baykal, a divisive figure, who has alienated many

3

Asterisk (*) denotes coalition member.

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prominent leftist personalities. The Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) was founded

by allies of former President Suleyman Demirel who were disenchanted with Ciller’s

leadership of DYP. Mehmet Ali Bayar, an energetic former counselor at the Turkish

Embassy in Washington, returned home recently to become DTP leader. Bayar’s

family is closely associated with the now 80-year-old Demirel, which may be both

an advantage and a handicap for Bayar. Demirel’s allies and family members have

been implicated in corruption scandals. It remains to be seen if Bayar will redefine

the party or bring in new people.

Finally, the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) is the current incarnation of

several banned parties based in the largely Kurdish populated southeast of Turkey.

In the last regional elections, HADEP won control of 36 municipalities, including the

regional capital of Diyarbakir. With only about 4.5% of votes in the 1999 national

election, however, it was unable to pass the threshold to enter parliament. HADEP’s

leaders have been targeted for prosecution repeatedly because of their statements,

which the authorities consider “separatist” and their alleged ties to the Kurdistan

Workers’ Party (PKK) or its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK is a

guerrilla/terrorist group that waged an insurgency, initially for Kurdish independence,

primarily in the southeast from 1984-1999.4 HADEP currently faces the threat of

banning, but remains popular.5

Role of Islamists

Turkey has had a series of Islamist parties, although their Islamism is not

claimed outright because the Constitution mandates the country’s secular character.

From June 1996 until June 1997, the Islamist Refah or Welfare Party (RP), under

Necmettin Erbakan, led a coalition government. Some of Prime Minister Erbakan’s

actions6 troubled the military and secular elite, and they mobilized a public campaign

that brought about Erbakan’s resignation without an explicit coup.7 Refah was

banned in February 1998 for exploiting religion for political purposes.8 Erbakan was

banned from politics for five years, although he has been the power behind two

4

On April 4, 2002, the PKK renamed itself the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress

(KADEK). PKK leader Ocalan was elected KADEK general chairman. A spokesman said

that the group would focus on resolving the Kurdish issue by means of democratic

transformation, without changing borders of the countries in the region. He declared, “the

armed struggle has ended.” A. Kocgiri, et.al., KADEK’s Goal is Democratic Liberation,

Ozgur Politika, April 17, 2002, translation entered into FBIS on line, April 17, 2002.

5

For more, see Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, editors, Political Parties in Turkey, London,

Frank Cass, 2002.

6

These actions included welcoming leaders of outlawed religious sects at his official

residence, allegedly staffing ministries and public agencies with Islamists, and attempting

to define Turkey more as part of the Islamic world than as part of the West. He was alleged

to be supported by Iran, and made a notorious visit to Libya, during which he sat mute while

Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi lauded the Kurdish cause.

7

For more detail, see CRS Report 97-462, Turkey’s Unfolding Political Crisis, April 11,

1997.

8

The European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban in July 2001.

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subsequent Islamist parties, the Fazilet or Virtue Party (FP), banned in June 2001,

and the current Saadet or Felicity Party (SP). Erbakan’s dominating style, however,

produced a split in Islamist ranks.

Saadet is challenged by the breakaway Justice and Development Party (AKP)

led by the charismatic, former Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan

claims that he and the AKP are centrist, but he is a graduate of religious schools, his

wife wears a head scarf (a symbol of religious piety that, in Turkey, can also be a

political statement), and he has spoken against contraception and alcohol. AKP

rhetoric supports Western ideals of democracy and human rights and backs Turkey’s

EU candidacy. A January 2002 Constitutional Court decision ruled that Erdogan

could not found a party or run for parliament because of his 1999 conviction for

inciting hatred based on religion. He had recited a poem deemed seditious in public,

and served four months in jail for this conviction. While Erdogan maintains that the

court decision does not affect his party leadership, it clearly prevents him from

becoming Prime Minister and clouds his political prospects. Erdogan has been

ordered to stand trial anew on charges of insulting the military and inciting hatred

based on religion in a 1992 speech.9 He also is being investigated for embezzlement

and corruption during his tenure as mayor. Deputy AKP leader Abdullah Gul now

heads the party’s parliamentary group.

Turkey has been plagued by radical Islamist terrorism. Turkey’s Hizbullah,

unrelated to the identically named Lebanese group, is believed to be a Kurdish Sunni

organization that targets other Kurds whom it deems to be religiously lax. Turkish

authorities believe that Hizbullah has received some training from Iran and they have

taken strong measures to suppress the movement.10

Human Rights

In recent decades, Turkey has had a poor human rights record. Abuses related

to the war against Kurdish insurgents have declined sharply since 1999, when PKK

leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured. Only a low level of violence has persisted for

the past three years and, with the decline in violence, the human rights situation has

improved. Nonetheless, the U.S. State Department’s most recent human rights report

describes several remaining problem areas.11 For example, four provinces, where

many abuses occur, remain under state of emergency decrees which give

authoritarian powers to governors. (At the height of the insurgency, 11 provinces

were governed in that way.) The State Department report describes extrajudicial

killings, such as deaths due to excessive use of force and torture, widespread use of

torture, and beatings and other abuses by security forces, especially during

incommunicado detention and interrogation. Yet the situation apparently is

9

In the speech, he congratulated Afghanistan for forming an Islamic republic.

10

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of

Global Terrorism 2000, April 30, 2001.

11

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country

Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001, Turkey, March 4, 2002.

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improving. In April 2002, a Council of Europe delegation reported that torture

appeared “to be far less frequent than in the past.”12

Prison conditions overall are poor. There are limitations on freedoms of

expression and association, and some restrictions on religious minorities. Violence

against women persists as does abuse of children.

Many of the constitutional amendments passed in October 2001 and two

packages of “harmonization” laws passed in February and March 2002 to make

Turkey more compatible with the European Union are intended to improve human

rights. A new civil code will greatly improve the rights of women. Other laws limit

the practice of banning political parties, reduce some restrictions on the press, and

require measures be taken against torture. More legislation is needed, and it is not yet

clear how the array of new laws will be implemented.

Economic Situation13

The decline in the economy in 2001 was the worst in over half a century.

Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 7.4%, while inflation rose to 68.5%,

and the Turkish currency, the lira, lost 60% of its value. GDP per capita dropped

from about $2,900 to $2,100.14 The government forecasts 3% real growth in GNP

and an annual inflation rate of 35% for 2002.

The government is unpopular mainly because it has sparked economic crises and

presided over harsh remedies.15 In December 1999, the government launched an

ambitious economic program to conquer chronically high inflation with the help of

a $4 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby credit. The government’s

implementation of reforms, however, was uneven and slow. When combined with

banking scandals, this produced a lack of investor and public confidence and a severe

liquidity crisis in November 2000. The IMF stepped in with another $7.5 billion in

loans, but the government retained a pegged exchange rate regime too long and, in

spite of the adverse financial situation, still delayed critical economic decisions. In

February 2001, a publicized tiff between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer

provoked another drop in investor confidence, a massive capital flight, and another,

worse financial crisis.

12

Claudia Parsons, Council of Europe says Torture declining in Turkey, Reuters, April 24,

2002.

13

See also, CRS Report RS20842, Turkey: Financial Crises in Context, March 13, 2001.

14

Turkish State Statistics Institute.

15

It has been credibly posited, however, that long-term, neglected structural problems, and

not the government’s actions, were the true cause of the economic crises in 2000 and 2001.

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To restore confidence and thereby secure additional international financing,

Ecevit recruited former World Bank Vice President Kemal Dervis, a Turkish

national, to be Minister of

State in charge of the economy

to handle reforms. Dervis

Basic Facts

shepherded many major

initiatives through parliament,

Population

67 million

including the restructuring of

Ethnic Groups

Turkish 80%

Kurdish 20%

state banks; formation of an

independent central bank and

Gross Domestic Product

bank supervisory board;

Real Growth Rate -7.4% (2001)

creation of independent

Inflation

68.1% (2001)

regulators for energy,

Unemployment

8.4% (2001)

telecommunications, and

External Debt

$106 billion (2000)

agriculture; and contract

transparency.

The central

Exports

apparel, foodstuffs,

bank is tasked with combating

textiles, metal manufactures

inflation above all else.

Imports

machinery, chemicals, semiReassured, the IMF and World

finished products, fuels

Bank together agreed in May

Major Trading Partners

2001 to provide another $15.7

Exports

Germany, United States,

billion in support.

United Kingdom, Italy,

France

Germany, Italy, US. Russia,

France, UK

Improvement in the

Imports

economy was slowed by the

detrimental effects of post

September 11, 2001

Sources: World Factbook 2001, Organization for

developments on tourism and

Economic Cooperation and Development, November

2001 and April 2002, Turkish State Statistics Institute

exports -- sectors that the

regular reporting.

government had counted on to

spur growth. Turkey needed

more money to repay loans

due in 2002 and concluded another three-year standby agreement with the IMF for

2002-2004 for $16.2 billion (including $12 billion in new funds plus $4.2 billion in

carry-over loans) contingent on more reforms. Turkey thus became the IMF’s largest

debtor. A new Letter of Intent to the IMF has presented a program that includes

increasing the primary budget surplus to 6.5% of Gross National Product (GNP),

exercising greater control over budgets and hiring at State Economic Enterprises

(SEEs), ensuring the independence of the Central Bank, moving to inflation

targeting, reducing the number of state banks and their staffs, developing a

recapitalization scheme for state banks, and other reforms.16 As of April 2002,

interest rates and inflation were decreasing. Dervis continues to predict

optimistically that a resumption of growth is imminent.17

16

Turkish Treasury Web Site Posts Turkey’s New Letter of Intent, entered on FBIS online,

April 16, 2002.

17

Talk at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 22,2002.

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Many other economic reforms are still needed, experts believe, and some of

those passed still await implementation. Perhaps most important, Turkey needs to

increase foreign direct investment (FDI) to obtain capital to spur growth. To do this,

its bureaucratic investment process has to be streamlined and the fight against

corruption has to continue, analysts argue.18 The government also must convince

investors of its consistency and commitment to the economic reform program.

Investors want assurance that the government will be able to hold the line especially

as an election nears. They doubt the government’s commitment, despite a year of

substantial reforms, and many maintain that 17 prior IMF programs failed primarily

due to politicians’ populist propensities. Skeptics point out that some officials seem

to question the reforms or speak as if they do not understand them or the economy,

and worry that reforms lack a constituency even among those who had approved

them, let alone among the wider population.19 Finally, although this government has

been relatively long-lasting, its stability continues to be of concern to investors

weighing political risks. At times, the physical health of the frail prime minister acts

as a barometer for the markets.20 The IMF is attempting to help generate confidence

by frequent reviews of government performance and monitoring of reforms before

releasing funds in increments. Restoration of confidence is the sine qua non for

economic growth.

Foreign Policy Issues

War Against Terrorism

Afghanistan.21 After September 11, 2001, Turkey voted in NATO to invoke

Article 5 of the defense treaty and joined the coalition to fight Al-Qaeda and the

Taliban regime. Within 24 hours, Turkey provided U.S. forces access to its air space.

It also provided intelligence based on its long relationship with the Uzbek-TajikHazera Afghan Northern Alliance. Turkey sent a general to U.S. Central Command

(CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa, Florida, another liaison team to the European

Command (EUCOM) in Germany, and 90 special forces troops to Afghanistan to

train Northern Alliance forces. Turkish ships in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas

shadowed, interdicted, and boarded suspect vessels. All U.S. humanitarian flights

destined for Afghanistan to drop the meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) flew from air bases

in Turkey.

After the ouster of the Taliban, Turkey sent 267 troops to join the 5,000-man

International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping operation under

British command. Turkey also blocked funding for Al-Qaeda by freezing the assets

18

Foreign direct investment in Turkey is the lowest in Europe and lower than in some

developing countries.

19

Turkey has never defaulted on its debts, even as it failed to fulfill the requirements of

economic reform programs.

20

21

The 77-year-old Ecevit was hospitalized twice in May 2002.

For background see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Concerns, updated March 26, 2002.

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of people and companies linked to Osama bin Laden and associated groups in Egypt,

Libya, Uzbekistan, and Somalia. Turkish border authorities arrested Al-Qaeda

operatives allegedly en route from Iran to perpetrate terrorist attacks in Israel.22 They

also arrested Turkish Al-Qaeda suspects attempting to return from Afghanistan.

Turkey allowed U.S. flights transporting Al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees to the U.S.

naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to transit its territory. Turkey has undertaken

to train a 600-man National Guard battalion of Afghans and provide them with

uniforms and equipment and has trained 20 new Afghan diplomats. It hopes to play

a major part in the reconstruction of the country.

The United States and Britain, seeking to have a Muslim country take on a

prominent role in the war against terrorism and disabuse Muslims of the notion that

the war is against them, have urged Turkey to assume the ISAF command. Turkey

posed several conditions. It wanted ISAF’s mission to continue to be limited to

Kabul and not to expand to all of Afghanistan. It wanted ISAF to continue to be

made up primarily of familiar NATO forces, and not forces from varied Muslim

countries unused to working together. It wanted assurances of continued intelligence,

logistical, and communications support. And most critically, Turkey needed

adequate funding because it could not afford to undertake the mission out of its own

limited resources. Turkey’s conditions reportedly were met, and it will assume

command for six months in June 2002. With command, Turkey will increase the size

of its contingent up to an estimated 1,500 men.

Some critics question the appropriateness of Turkey’s assumption of the ISAF

command, noting its close ties to ethnic kin in Afghanistan, especially Uzbeks led by

warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum, whose family still lives in Turkey. They

wonder if other ethnic groups will accept Turks as impartial arbiters or if Turks will

be able to act impartially in an ethnically charged setting. Other critics argue that

Turkish armed forces have not respected human rights at home and would be

inappropriate examples for the Afghans. As noted above, however, the human rights

situation in Turkey may be improving and, of the Turkish security forces, the military

has attempted to address its deficiencies in this area more than others, such as the

police. Still others believe that Turks lack experience in leading a peacekeeping

operation. However, as will be noted below, the Turkish armed forces have served

in many international peacekeeping operations and assumed command of

peacekeepers in Somalia from U.S. forces without incident.

Iraq. Turkey opposes expansion of the war against terrorism to Iraq. This

opposition is motivated by concern for Iraq’s territorial integrity, not for Saddam

Hussein. Turkey believes that the post Gulf War power vacuum in northern Iraq

created an environment that enabled the PKK to find safe havens and escalate its war

in Turkey. Turkey fears that a new war could lead to a power vacuum, the partition

of Iraq and the birth of a Kurdish state in the north that could serve as a model for

Turkish Kurdish separatists seeking their own state in southeast Turkey.

22

Douglas Frantz and James Risen, A Secret Iran-Arafat Connection is seen Fueling the

Mideast Fire, The New York Times, March 24, 2002.

CRS-10

Turkey’s opposition is also motivated by economic concerns. Before the Gulf

War, Turkey closed its border with Iraq, then one of its major trading partners, and

abided by international sanctions on Baghdad. Turkish officials estimate the cost of

the closure at $30 to $60 billion, depending on their audience, and argue that the

international community never compensated Turkey for its losses. As a result of the

U.N.’s humanitarian “oil-for-food” program begun in December 1996 and of a semiillicit trade in Iraqi diesel and crude oil, bilateral Iraqi-Turkish trade now totals about

$1 billion annually. (The United States waives sanctions on Turkey for the illicit

energy traffic.) The two neighbors hope to reach pre-Gulf War trade levels of about

$2.5 billion annually, and Turkey does not want to see this positive trend reversed.

It has not addressed the idea that economic relations with a post-Saddam Iraq might

be even better. Turkey has had an ambassador in Baghdad since 1997.

Since the Gulf War, Turkey has allowed U.S. and British planes to enforce a nofly zone over northern Iraq (Operation Northern Watch) to protect Iraq’s Kurds from

Saddam Hussein and monitor the movement of his armed forces. Turkey has

developed a modus vivendi with the two major Iraqi Kurdish groups -- the Kurdistan

Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) -- but it does

not trust their assurances that they do not want independence. Some Turkish

observers, however, acknowledge that the Iraqi Kurds already have established a de

facto state in northern Iraq, with institutions and infrastructure.

Finally, Turkey does not find U.S. scenarios for Saddam Hussein’s replacement

credible and is particularly skeptical about the prospects of the U.S.-backed

opposition Iraqi National Congress.23 Attempting to pre-empt U.S. action, Prime

Minister Ecevit urged Saddam to allow the return of U.N. inspectors, but Saddam

reportedly responded rudely.24

Despite all of these doubts, some believe that Turkey, because it is a faithful

U.S. ally, and also because it is indebted to the United States for its help at the IMF,

will, in the end, support U.S. efforts to overthrow Saddam. Some maintain that if the

Administration fulfills promises of consultation with Turkish leaders ahead of any

action and chooses a time that mitigates effects on the Turkish economy, such as

avoiding tourism season, support would be more likely than not to materialize.

European Union Membership

At its December 1999 summit in Helsinki, the EU formally recognized Turkey’s

candidacy for membership, but put Turkey in a category separate from 12 other

candidate countries. The EU began accession negotiations with the others, but not

with Turkey, which has not met the so-called Copenhagen criteria for membership.

The criteria require that a candidate achieve:

! stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights,

and respect for and protection of minorities;

23

24

See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, March 22, 2002.

Amberin Zaman, Turkey Fails to Influence Saddam, The Daily Telegraph, February 9,

2002.

CRS-11

! the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope

with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;

! the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to

the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.

If Turkey manages to complete the wide range of economic reforms it has

undertaken since 2000 to fulfill agreements with the International Monetary Fund,

it will be on the way to meeting the economic criteria for membership.25

However, the EU also demands many political reforms of Turkey -- from

ensuring the independence of the judiciary, to ending torture, reforming the prison

system, and allowing greater freedom of expression, the press, association, and

assembly.26 European officials seem to emphasize three reforms: abolition of the

death penalty, cultural rights for Kurds, and limitation of the role of the military in

politics. According to its March 2001, National Program, or policy agenda for

achieving membership, Turkey promised to abolish the death penalty in the medium

term or within three years. It knows that it cannot be admitted to the EU while

retaining the death penalty. Parliament has amended the Constitution to abolish the

death penalty, except for terrorism and crimes against the state. Additional

legislation to implement this change is needed, but that still will not fulfill the EU

requirement.

Debate on the issue continues, but it is not a debate about the death penalty per

se, which has not been carried out since 1984. It is a debate about the fate of PKK

leader Abdullah Ocalan, the most notorious Turk on death row. Turks blame Ocalan

for waging a war from 1984-1999 and causing more than 30,000 deaths. He was

captured in February 1999, tried for treason, and sentenced to death in June 1999.

However, with the EU looking over its shoulder, the government delayed requesting

parliament to approve his execution pending his appeal to the European Court of

Human Rights, which still has not ruled. A member of the governing coalition, the

Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the opposition True Path Party (DYP) seem to

be insisting that Ocalan be executed before the death penalty is abolished. They

sometimes voice their demand in terms of “terrorists,” not Ocalan, but Turks know

to whom they are referring.

In the cultural field, the EU requires that citizens be afforded access to education

and media in their mother tongues. Many Turks view this demand, which has been

voiced by the PKK and its sympathizers, as encouraging Kurdish separatism. A

compromise on media broadcasts may authorize government networks to broadcast

in Kurdish in regions with large Kurdish populations. State institutions might also

play a role in Kurdish education, although this compromise has not advanced as far

as that on broadcasts and there is a Constitutional impediment to overcome. There

25

Conclusions of the European Council, Copenhagen, June 1993, cited in CRS Report

RS20879, European Union Enlargement, by Karen Donfried, Updated July 25, 2001.

26

Commission of the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress

Towards Accession, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1756.

CRS-12

is no national consensus on the issues. Ecevit agrees with state broadcasting, but

opposes Kurdish education. Some ANAP leaders propose allowing private schools

to offer Kurdish courses. MHP opposes Kurdish broadcasts and education.

Even more difficult is limiting the role of the military, whose influence has been

great since the founding of the republic. Chief of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu has

lowered his profile by declining to meet visiting civilian officials and making fewer

public comments.27 One of the new constitutional amendments changed the

composition of the National Security Council so that civilians outnumber military

members five to four. The NSC immediately implemented the change. But numbers

are not the same as influence, and the NSC decides by consensus not by vote. The

commanders view fundamentalism (called reactionism in Turkey) and separatism,

broadly defined, as the two main threats to the state. They make pronouncements on

these dangers and criticize politicians for their laxity in combating them. They

routinely voice opinions on matters that, in EU countries, would be beyond their

purview. History and tradition still lead civilian officials to defer to military

commanders. It remains to be seen if both civilians and the military wish to or can

change their conduct.

Finally, although not a Copenhagen criterion, the issue of Cyprus has

complicated Turkeys’ prospects for EU membership. (See below.)

Turkey is seeking to have the EU set a date for starting accession negotiations

by the end of 2002, arguing that it would encourage and accelerate reforms. EU

officials unanimously insist that the Copenhagen criteria be met first.

Many Turks are skeptical about the changes required by the EU, believing that

they threaten the country’s character and territorial integrity. The EU, in turn, has

spoken and unspoken doubts about granting membership to Turkey. If admitted,

Turkey would soon be the largest country in the EU, with a young and growing

population. It would have a right to proportionate representation on the EU

Commission and in the EU Parliament. And, although a decline in emigration from

new members accompanied previous EU enlargements, European countries are

fearful of being inundated by Turkish migrants or workers who would have free

movement as citizens of an EU country. In addition, Turkey has a large agricultural

sector, which might threaten some in Europe with comparable strengths. And,

Turkey is 98% Muslim, while EU countries are predominantly Christian in

background. This has led some Europeans to be uneasy about what Turkey’s

accession would mean to their sense of identity and to EU cohesion.28 Finally, if

Turkey were admitted, then the EU would border Iraq, Iran, and Syria, causing some

unease in European circles.

27

Vice President Cheney’s reported insistence on meeting Kivrikoglu, despite the latter’s

reluctance, generated much commentary in the Turkish press in March 2002.

28

For example, see remarks by German opposition leader Edmund Stoiber in Quentin Peel

and Anton Notz, Stoiber warns against continual EU Enlargement, Financial Times, May

16, 2002.

CRS-13

Despite these concerns, many observers believe that the EU is committed

politically to Turkish membership, but view it as at least a decade away. However,

Turkey obtained candidacy when the major EU member states were governed by

social democrats. If the political pendulum in Europe swings rightward, as seems to

be occurring, opposition to Turkey’s membership might become stronger and more

outspoken.29

European Security and Defense Policy. The EU plans to create a 60,000man rapid reaction force for use in humanitarian missions and peacekeeping, and

seeks access to NATO planning, intelligence, and other assets. Turkey, a member

of NATO, but not of the EU,30 threatened to veto the EU’s use of NATO resources

unless it was allowed to participate in the EU’s defense decision-making. The EU

would not permit a non-EU member to take part in its decisions. The stalemate

continued until the United States and Britain mediated a compromise in November

2001. The resulting as yet unpublished “Ankara agreement” reportedly provides that

the European force would not be used in a conflict between EU and NATO members.

This assuaged Turkey’s concern that the EU might intervene in possible GreekTurkish disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean. In addition, representation of non-EU

NATO members to EU defense decision-making bodies would be upgraded and

consultation would be “flexible,” meaning that Turkey could request talks concerning

and participation in EU missions that could affect its security interests. In return, the

EU will have assured access to NATO planning capabilities and presumed access to

NATO (mostly U.S.) assets, such as strategic lift and satellite intelligence.31

Greece refuses to accept the “Ankara agreement,” charging that Britain was not

authorized to negotiate with Turkey and the United States, two non-EU members, on

behalf of the EU, and that the agreement contravenes previous EU arrangements.

Athens insists that the Ankara document be modified to provide for autonomous EU

decision-making. It rejects procedural bypasses. In the near term, the Greek

government is unlikely to relent because it and the domestic opposition are using the

issue politically and the opposition is ascendant in the polls. Underlying this is the

long-term belief of many Greeks that EU autonomy in its implementation of ESDP

would mean that Europe would side with Greece in a confrontation with Turkey.

Turkey maintains the issue is now one for NATO and the EU to resolve with Greece,

and will not accept changes to the Ankara accord. The lack of a resolution may

prevent the EU’s assumption of its first peacekeeping operation in the neighboring

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), scheduled for September 2002.

Currently NATO commands the FYROM force.

29

Ibid.

30

Other NATO, non-EU members are Norway, Iceland, Poland, the Czech Republic, and

Hungary.

31

The “Ankara agreement” has not been published, but there have been many reports

detailing its alleged provisions. See, Positive Aspects of European Defense Deal Outweigh

Negative, Anatolia News Agency, in English, BBC Monitoring Europe, December 3, 2001,

Lale Sariibrahimoglu, Turkish Military Compromise comes when NATO is at Stake, Turkish

Daily News, December 4, 2001, and Ilter Turkmen, An Auspicious Week, Hurriyet,

December 8, 2001, translation entered in FBIS on line, December 8, 2001.

CRS-14

Cyprus.32 Although not a Copenhagen criterion, the EU wants a settlement on

the island of Cyprus. Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided between Greek Cypriots

who reside in the southern two-thirds of the island and constitute the internationally

recognized government and Turkish Cypriots who control the northern part of the

island and have their own government, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

(TRNC), recognized only by Turkey. The EU has said that while it would prefer to

admit a united Cyprus, it will admit Cyprus regardless of a settlement. The Cyprus

that accedes to the EU in that eventuality would be the Greek-Cypriot government,

without Turkish-Cypriot participation. If that happens, Turkey has threatened to

annex the north and warned of a crisis; but what Ankara would, in fact, do is

uncertain because a crisis could scuttle Turkey’s own EU prospects. The EU is

expected to approve Cyprus’s accession in December 2002.

The United States, European Union, United Nations, and Turkey seek to avert

a crisis on this issue. All have pressured the parties to return to the negotiating table

after over a three-year pause. Direct talks between Cypriot President Glafcos

Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash began in January 2002. The

parties and outside observers believe that they will soon know if a breakthrough is

possible.

Greece. Turkey and Greece have had troubled relations almost since Greece

gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. In more recent times, the

two NATO allies have differed over Cyprus and over the sovereignty of Aegean Sea

territorial seas, continental shelf, airspace, and islands. In 1987 and 1996, they came

to the brink of war over Aegean issues.33 Only U.S. diplomatic intervention avoided

war in 1996.34

Changes in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations are underway. In spring 1999,

Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou and Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail

Cem reached out to each other and began a rapprochement. Their initiatives were

assisted by an outpouring of popular goodwill and sympathy after devastating

earthquakes hit both countries in August and September 1999. Greece’s decision to

allow the EU to affirm Turkey’s membership candidacy that December confirmed

a change in relations. Since then, positive developments have continued. The two

governments have signed numerous agreements for cooperation on so-called “lesser”

issues: maritime trade, economy, science and technology, customs and culture,

organized crime and terrorism, environmental protection, education, illegal

immigration, and agriculture. They have agreed to jointly conduct seismic research

in the Aegean, combat Mediterranean anemia, and become parties to the Ottawa

Convention to prohibit antipersonnel land mines, and to eliminate land mines in their

border regions in Thrace. Greece and Turkey submitted a joint bid to co-host the

2008 European soccer championship. The two foreign ministries have established

32

See also CRS Issue Brief IB89140, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations, updated regularly.

33

See CRS Report 97-799, Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues – Background and Recent

Developments, August 21, 1997.

34

See CRS Report 96-140, Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis, updated March 7,

1996.

CRS-15

a telephone “hot line.” In talks with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, the

two allies agreed to a confidence-building measure to notify each other of their

schedules for military exercises. Bilateral trade topped $700 million in 2001. Rail

service will be opened from Izmir and Istanbul in Turkey to Thessaloniki and Athens

in Greece. Finally, Turkey and Greece have agreed to construct a natural gas pipeline

from Bursa in Turkey to Komotini in Greece that will be used to ship gas from Iran

to Europe.

The above accords may help to create a foundation for a more lasting resolution

of major issues. On March 12, 2002, the two neighbors began exploratory talks, i.e.,

talks to decide on the parameters of talks, on Aegean issues. Turkey’s “roadmap” to

EU membership requires it to resolve border disputes with its neighbors or take them

to the International Court of Justice by 2004. This requirement undoubtedly is the

catalyst for the talks.

Although three years old, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement remains a fragile

infant. Skeptics abound and, at times, the new relationship appears to be one of two

foreign ministers and not of two peoples. Polls indicate that Greeks and Turks

continue to view each other as their foremost threat. Members of the foreign

ministers’ own parties and governments have criticized their efforts. Especially in

Greece, the opposition party and the media seem not to believe that progress has been

made or in Turkey’s good will. Some Turkish nationalists also do not believe in the

rapprochement, or they share the view of Greece’s encouragement of Turkey’s EU

path as a Greek/European conspiracy to weaken Turkey.

Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey has good relations with Georgia and

with the ethnically related Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan,

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Turkey has trade and

military ties with Georgia and welcomes the recent U.S. initiative to train and equip

the Georgian armed forces to fight terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge. Turkey’s

determination to become an energy and transit bridge from Central Asia and the

Caucasus to Europe is its main policy motivation in the region.35 Turkey and

Azerbaijan have joined with international partners to construct the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) oil pipeline from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean

coast beginning in summer 2002 and a natural gas pipeline from the Azerbaijani field

at Shah Deniz via Georgia to Turkey beginning about the same time. Turkey and the

United States hope that Kazakhstan will eventually choose to use the BTC instead

of an Iranian route to ship its oil westward.

Turkey’s relations with Armenia are troubled. Turkey recognized Armenia’s

independence in 1991, but never established diplomatic ties because Yerevan failed

to meet its conditions. Ankara insists that Armenia drop an international campaign

for recognition of what Armenians refer to as their national genocide at the hands of

the Turks from 1915 to 1923 and repudiate claims to Turkish territory. Further,

Ankara demands that Armenians withdraw from the 20% of Azerbaijani territory that

they conquered in a war to gain independence for the predominantly Armenian-

35

For background on regional energy resources and pipeline plans, see CRS Report

RS21190, Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects, April 9, 2002.

CRS-16

inhabited Azeri region of Nagorno-Karabakh.36 For its part, Yerevan wants Turkey

to end a blockade of Armenia and Karabakh that it imposed out of sympathy with

Azerbaijan, and to drop all conditions for diplomatic relations. Although the

genocide issue is the major problem dividing the neighbors, Ankara would probably

not break ranks with Azerbaijan for the sake of Armenia because of ethnic ties and

the valuable energy connection.

Israel.37 Agreements reached in the Arab-Israeli peace process from 1993 to

1995 made relations between Israel and Muslim Turkey more acceptable in Turkey

and the region. Those relations have blossomed since a February 1996 military

cooperation agreement. Since then, high ranking civilian and military officials have

exchanged visits; regular, semiannual strategic talks have been held; and Turkey

chose Israel firms to upgrade its F-4 and F-5 fighter planes and M-60A1 tanks and

well as for other arms purchases. With U.S. permission, the two countries are

discussing joint production of Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missiles. They also are

discussing co-production of Popeye-2 air to surface missiles. The United States,

Turkey, and Israel hold periodic trilateral air and naval exercises. On the civilian

side, bilateral trade totaled $1.3 billion in 2001, and tourism and cultural and

academic exchanges have increased. Most recently, Israel agreed to purchase water

from Turkey.

Turkish public opinion sympathizes with the Palestinians, and Turks protested

Israel’s actions against the Palestinians in its “war on the terrorism infrastructure,”

launched on March 29, 2002. Turkish-Israeli relations were rocked on April 4, 2002,

when Prime Minister Ecevit referred to Israel’s actions as a ‘genocide’ and harshly

criticized Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The next day, Ecevit claimed that his

use of the word had led to interpretations he did not intend and said, “We attach great

importance to our relations with Israel.”38 He later regretted the “misunderstanding.”

Foreign Minister Cem declared that Turkey’s relations with Israel were separate from

the Middle East problem. Some members of the Turkish military defended Israel’s

actions. Nonetheless, Israel protested, as did American-Jewish organizations, who

had joined with Turkey in 2000 in opposition to a Congressional resolution to

commemorate the Armenian genocide.39 The U.S.-based groups sent Ecevit letters

of complaint.40 Turkey’s ambassador to Washington convened a meeting with

representatives of American-Jewish groups, which they characterized as positive.

Nonetheless, there has been some residual resentment in America. Israel and Turkey

36

See CRS Issue Brief IB92019, Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict, updated regularly.

37

For more background, see CRS Report 98-633, Israeli-Turkish Relations, July 17, 1998.

38

Turkish Premier Downplays “Genocide” Accusation Vs Israel, Associated Press, April 5,

2002.

39

In October 2000, the House leadership withdrew H.Res. 596 from floor consideration in

response to a letter that President Clinton wrote to Speaker Hastert, explaining the potential

harm that passage might do to U.S.-Turkish relations and, thereby, to wider U.S. interests.

40

The American Jewish Committee spearheaded one letter, saying “We want you to

understand the disappointment we have felt because of your remarks.” Another signed by

eight American Jewish organizations compared Israel’s counterterrorist operations with

Turkey’s own. Hurriyet, excerpted by Turkish-American Association, April 9, 2002.

CRS-17

want the incident to pass rapidly because Israeli-Turkish relations have become so

important that neither wants them to be detrimentally affected. Thus, Israel has

welcomed the idea of holding a Middle East peace conference in Turkey and Turkish

officials have said that they would be happy to host it.

Other Issues. Turkey has supported many recent U.S. policies through

deployments of its armed forces. It has a 705-man battalion serving in SFOR, the

peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a 1,065-man battalion in KFOR in

Kosovo, and a military police squad and an infantry unit, totaling 79 men, in the

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Turkey has sent military

observers to Kuwait and East Timor. Turkey participates in the Temporary

International Peacekeeping Force in the West Bank city of Hebron (TIPH) and

suffered a casualty there in March 2002. Turkey participates in the U.S-initiated

Southeastern Europe Multinational Peacekeeping Brigade (SEEBRIG) along with six

other Balkan countries, which have conducted joint military training. A Turkish

brigadier general served as the first commander of SEEBRIG, which was created in

September 1998. Turkey supports the candidacies of Romania and Bulgaria to join

NATO.

U.S. Policy

Executive. Administrations generally have followed policies that appreciate

Turkey’s strategic importance; encourage its democratic, secular character; seek

improvements in human rights practices; and support its economic reforms.

Given Turkey’s strategic importance and its role in peacekeeping operations of

significance to U.S. policy, security relations are a high priority. There are regular

Defense Department consultations with Turkey, and the United States is Turkey’s

main arms supplier. Between 1993 and 2000, the United States signed agreements

to sell Turkey $5.17 billion in arms, making Turkey the first- or second-ranking

European purchaser in each year of that period.41 Although the economic crises have

led to a lengthening of the Turkish armed forces’ procurement schedule, purchases

are proceeding. In May 2002, Turkey agreed to buy six Airborne Warning and

Control System (AWACs) planes from Boeing. A contract with Bell-Textron for the

first installment of attack helicopters, inordinately long in negotiations, is expected

to be concluded soon and may be submitted for congressional approval in late 2002.42

Economic ties are of increasing importance. The United States contributes

about 32% of IMF finances and has used its influence to support IMF loans for

Turkey since 1999 as well as tighter monitoring of Turkey’s performance. Turkey

would like more attention paid to bilateral trade. A U.S.-Turkey Economic

Partnership Commission was created to address this desire. During Prime Minister

Ecevit’s January 2002 visit to Washington, the Administration offered to include

Turkey in the Israel-Jordan qualified industrial zones (QIZ’s) agreement and work

on this is progressing. Goods produced in QIZ’s enter the United States duty free.

41

CRS Report RL31113, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients,

1993-2000, September 5, 2001.

42

See CRS Report RS20660, Turkey: U.S. Sale of Helicopters, Updated November 28, 2001.

CRS-18

The Administration exempted Turkey from increased tariffs imposed on imported

steel in March 2002. The Administration is unlikely, however, to lower textile

quotas as Turkey wants (textiles are Turkey’s number one export) because of concern

about political opposition from textile-producing states.

Congress. Congress has long been interested in Turkey. Much interest has

been critical, with resolutions often addressing concerns of Greek-Americans about

Cyprus or Aegean Sea sovereignty issues or Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish

population. Because of concerns for regional stability and possible use of U.S. arms

in abusing human rights, Congress sometimes has scrutinized or impeded U.S. arms

sales to Turkey. More recently, some Members have introduced resolutions to

express appreciation of Turkey’s role in the war on terrorism or its relations with

Israel.

Assistance. Turkey was a long-term, major recipient of U.S. foreign aid

through FY1998. The Clinton Administration did not request Foreign Military

Financing (FMF) or

Economic Support Funds

(ESF) for FY1999,

Table 2. U.S. Aid to Turkey

however, arguing that

Economic

Counter

Military

TOTAL

Turkey had graduated

Narcotics

from an assistance

relationship to be more

1990

$60.0

$0.4

$503.4

$563.8

like other NATO

1991

$14.3

$0.4

$501.2

$515.9

members. U.S. officials

1992

$250.0

$0.4

$553.7

$804.1

noted the size and growth

of Turkey’s economy and

1993

$200.0

$0.4

$453.1

$653.5

its ability to do without

1994

$0.0

$0.4

$406.0

$406.4

assistance. International

1995

$165.7

$0.4

$329.2

$495.3

Military Education and

Training (IMET) funds

1996

$33.5

$0.4

$321.1

$355.0

continued.

1997

$22.3

$0.5

$176.5

$199.3

1998

$8.1

$0.5

$0.0

$8.6

After the September

11, 2001 attacks, how1999

$3.3

$0.5

$1.5

$5.3

ever, Turkey received

2000

$0.0

$0.0

$1.6

$1.6

$20 million in FMF from

2001

$0.0

$0.0

$1.7

$1.7

the Emergency Response

Fund. For FY2003, the

2002

$0.0

$0.0

$2.7

$2.7

Administration requested

2002

$200.0

$0.0

$28.0

$228.0

$17.5 million in FMF

and $2.8 million in

2003

$0.0

$0.0

$20.3

$20.3

IMET. Also, on March

* Compiled by Larry Nowels, Specialist in Foreign Affairs,

19, 2002, Vice President

April 18, 2002.

Cheney said that the Administration would provide Turkey with $200

million in ESF and $28 million in FMF to help defray the costs to Turkey of

assuming leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan. These funds are part of the

Administration’s request for FY2002 supplemental appropriations.