Defense Budget for FY2002: An Overview of Bush Administration Plans and Key Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportMay 22, 2001
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Defense Budget for FY2002: An Overview of
Bush Administration Plans and
Key Issues For Congress
May 22, 2001
Stephen Daggett
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Defense Budget for FY2002: An Overview of Bush
Administration Plans and Key Issues for Congress
Summary
Details of Bush Administration plans for the defense budget have been on hold
for several months as senior officials have undertaken a reassessment of defense
policy known as the “National Defense Review.” The initial Bush budget outline, A
Blueprint for New Beginnings, released on February 28, and the Administration’s
official FY2002 budget request, released on April 9, include $325 billion in new
budget authority for national defense in FY2002, but that total remains subject to
change as the defense review proceeds. Moreover, official Administration defense
budget projections beyond FY2002 simply reflect projected growth with inflation in
overall annual funding for national defense from FY2003 through FY2006 rather than
the results of any policy assessment.
Currently, the Administration plans to begin discussing the major conclusions of
its defense review late in May, and to provide additional budget details, at least on its
FY2002 defense plans, some time in June. Even then, however, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld has said that the reassessment process will constitute a “rolling review,” and
that further adjustments to the defense plan will be announced as they are decided.
It also remains unclear when plans for FY2003 and beyond will be determined and
what information about those plans will be provided publicly.
Though Congress has expressed some frustration with this process, it has also
accommodated the uncertainty by providing room for an unspecified increase in
defense spending in the FY2002 budget and in defense totals through FY2011. The
conference agreement on the FY2002 congressional budget resolution (H.Con.Res.
83), establishes a “strategic reserve” in the House that may include extra funds for
defense, and a specific defense “reserve fund” in the Senate. These reserve funds
permit the chairman of the budget committee in each chamber to increase allocations
of funds to the defense authorization and appropriations committees to accommodate
a higher defense request and to increased funding to the extent provided in annual
defense authorization and appropriations bills.
Meanwhile, virtually since the beginning of the year, there has been a debate in
Congress about the need for supplemental appropriations for defense for FY2001.
For its part, the White House initially set no timetable for submitting a FY2001
defense supplemental request and has provided little indication of the likely size of any
request. The conference agreement on the FY2002 congressional budget resolution
(H.Con.Res. 83) specifically sets aside $6.5 billion for FY2001 defense supplemental
appropriations, but additional funding may be provided as emergency appropriations.
Early congressional debate about the FY2002 defense budget – and future
budget trends – has focused heavily on two ongoing issues – the extent of “shortfalls”
in planned funding for major weapons programs and the meaning of a
“transformation” of U.S. defense capabilities.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Status of Bush Administration Defense Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bush Administration Defense Budget
Projections and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Defense Budget Proposals to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Key Bush Defense Policy Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Congressional Action on Defense in the Budget Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
House Action on Defense in the Budget Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Senate Action on Defense in the Budget Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Conference Agreement on Defense in the Budget Resolution . . . . . . . 9
Long-Term Defense Funding: The “Defense Shortfalls” Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FY2001 Supplemental Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Defense Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Budget Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
“Shortfalls” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CRS Publications on Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
List of Tables
Table 1: Bush Administration National Defense Budget Projections . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2: Clinton Administration Adjustments in Department of Defense
“Top-Line” Budget Authority (Discretionary Funding Only) . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 3: FY2002-FY2007 Clinton Administration Additions to
Department of Defense Top Line Budget Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 4: Congressional Budget Resolution – National Defense
Budget Function Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Defense Budget Issues for FY2002: An
Overview of Bush Administration Plans and
Key Issues for Congress
Introduction
The Status of Bush Administration Defense Plans
Details of Bush Administration plans for the defense budget – for FY2002 and
particularly beyond – have been on hold for several months as senior officials have
undertaken a reassessment of defense policy known as the “National Defense Review”
or, less formally, as the “Top to Bottom Review.” The initial Bush budget outline,
A Blueprint for New Beginnings, released on February 28, and the Administration’s
official FY2002 budget request, released on April 9, include an amount for defense
in FY2002 – the April 9 budget requests $325 billion in new budget authority for the
national defense budget function. But that total remains subject to change as the
defense review proceeds.
Moreover, official Bush Administration defense budget projections beyond
FY2002 simply reflect projected growth with inflation in overall annual funding for
national defense from FY2003 through FY2006 rather than the results of any policy
assessment. So what we have to date is essentially a “placeholder” defense budget
for FY2002, and somewhat less than that for later years , to be filled in as the
Administration makes decisions and conveys more detailed program requests to
Congress.
Currently, the Administration plans to begin discussing the major conclusions of
its defense review late in May, and to provide additional details, at least on its
FY2002 defense plans, some time in June. Even then, however, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld has said that the reassessment process will constitute a “rolling review,” and
that further adjustments to the defense plan will be announced as they are decided.
So one prospect appears to be for the June plan to be followed by an as yet unknown
number of adjustments, presented to Congress either informally or as formal budget
amendments. It also remains unclear when plans for FY2003 and beyond will be
determined and what information will be provided publicly.
Though Congress has expressed some frustration with this process, it has also
accommodated the uncertainty by providing room for an unspecified increase in
defense spending in the FY2002 budget and in defense totals through FY2011. The
conference agreement on the FY2002 congressional budget resolution (H.Con.Res.
83), establishes a “strategic reserve” in the House that may include extra funds for
defense, and a specific defense “reserve fund” in the Senate. These reserve funds
permit the chairman of the budget committee in each chamber to increase allocations
CRS-2
of funds to the defense authorization and appropriations committees to accommodate
a higher defense request and increased funding to the extent provided in annual
defense authorization and appropriations bills.
Meanwhile, virtually since the beginning of the year, there has been a debate in
Congress about the need for supplemental appropriations for defense for FY2001.
In the past few weeks, in particular, several leading defense advocates in Congress
have argued that a fairly substantial supplemental amount is needed urgently. For its
part, the White House initially set no timetable for submitting a FY2001 defense
supplemental request and has provided little indication of the likely size of any
request. The conference agreement on the FY2002 congressional budget resolution
(HconRes 83) specifically sets aside $6.5 billion for FY2001 defense supplemental
appropriations, but also may accommodate additional funding.
Most recently, the top-to-bottom review process itself has come under some
scrutiny in Congress. While Congress initially gave the Bush Administration
considerable leeway to undertake its review of defense strategy and programs, within
about the past month or so, key members of the congressional defense committees
have begun to raise some fairly far-reaching questions about the review process. Both
the House and the Senate Armed Services Committees have held hearings on issues
being considered in the review. And more and more critical questions have been
raised – including who is carrying out key aspects of the review; whether the military
services and Joint Staff are being adequately involved in the process; who will make
final decisions; what the timetable will be; what substantive proposals are emerging;
and, certainly not least, what Congress’s role will be in reviewing key decisions as
they are made.
Finally, as time for congressional action on annual defense funding bills
approaches, a number of particular issues are emerging with more urgency. Military
pay raises and personnel benefits have become matters of extensive discussion.
Decisions on some of these matters may have very large long-term budget
implications, so uncertainty about long-term defense budget trends has some
legislators concerned. More and more discussion is emerging, as well, about major
defense policy issues, including missile defense, defense space policy, shipbuilding, the
status of major acquisition programs in general, and policy toward China.
This report is organized into four sections.
! The first discusses what has been decided to date about Bush Administration
defense budget plans for FY2002 and beyond. For comparison, it includes
some discussion of the final Clinton Administration defense plan. It also
provides basic information on congressional action on defense spending to
date.
! The second discusses the ongoing debate about long-term defense budget
needs – which generally has been framed as a discussion of long-term defense
budget “shortfalls.” It briefly cites what the Joint Chiefs and other key defense
leaders have said over time about defense shortfalls. It also very briefly cites
key studies by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Congressional Budget Office.
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! The third discusses supplemental appropriations for FY2001.
! The final section briefly reviews the status of debate about defense
transformation, which appears to be the key theme shaping Bush
Administration defense policy. This section reviews what then-Governor Bush
said about transformation in key defense policy speeches during the
presidential campaign – particularly in a major speech at the Citadel in October
1999. The Citadel speech appears pretty close to the blueprint that the
Administration has followed in addressing defense policy issues now that it is
in office. How to define transformation, and how to implement it, remains
uncertain, however.
Bush Administration Defense Budget
Projections and Trends
Defense Budget Proposals to Date
The White House FY2002 budget request, released on April 9, includes $325.1
billion in new budget authority for the national defense budget function. The
Administration has also projected totals for the Department of Defense and for the
National Defense Budget Function through FY2006, but the figures beyond FY2002
simply reflect amounts if national defense budget authority were to grow at the rate
of inflation from FY2002 on. Table 1 shows the Administration figures broken down
in two ways – first by major titles in annual defense appropriations and authorization
bills, and, second, particularly for purposes of comparison with other data, with
“discretionary” and “mandatory” DOD accounts broken out.
A few key points may be of interest in assessing these budget projections.
! First, the FY2002 request shows an increase of about a $14 billion in new
budget authority compared to the projected FY2001 level (either for the
Department or Defense alone or for the overall national defense budget
function). By recent standards, this in itself constitutes a significant increase
in defense spending from one year to the next, although a substantial
supplemental appropriation for FY2001 would obviously raise the base and
reduce the apparent increase.
! That being said, almost all of the apparent increase in the FY2002 “top line”
defense budget was already decided upon by the outgoing Clinton
Administration. Indeed, outgoing Secretary of Defense William Cohen
released information on the Clinton Administration’s revised long-term defense
budget plans in mid-January, in a section of the Department of Defense Annual
Report to Congress. One table in the Annual Report provides an estimate of
the amounts the Defense Department calculated the Clinton Administration had
agreed to add to the defense budget in the period between the time the
FY1999 budget request was initially submitted to Congress and the end of the
new Pentagon planning period in FY2007. By Secretary Cohen’s calculation,
the Clinton Administration had agreed to add $227 billion in “top-line” changes
CRS-4
to ongoing defense budget plans – an increase of almost 9% – over a nine-year
period. Table 2, shows Secretary Cohen’s figures. Please note that the
amounts are for Department of Defense “discretionary” funding only – the
comparable Bush Administration figures are shown in an addendum in Table
1. Secretary Cohen’s argument was at least in part a response to the defense
policy debate in the presidential election campaign. Though the Bush
campaign alleged severe shortcomings in military readiness, it also promised
what appeared to be only fairly modest increases in defense spending. In
effect, Cohen was arguing that the Clinton Administration had long since been
doing more to increase defense capabilities than it was getting credit for. The
argument over that issue appears unlikely to abate in the future.
Table 1: Bush Administration National Defense Budget
Projections
(budget authority in billions of current year dollars)
Military Personnel
Operation & Maintenance
Procurement
RDT&E
Military Construction
Family Housing
Revolving & Management Funds
Total, Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Defense Activities
Other Defense-Related Activities
Total, National Defense
Addendum:
Dept. of Defense Discretionary
Dept. of Defense Mandatory
Est.
2000
73.8
108.8
55.0
38.7
5.1
3.5
5.6
290.5
12.4
1.2
304.1
Est.
2001
75.4
108.2
62.1
40.8
5.3
3.6
-0.4
295.1
14.1
1.5
310.6
Req.
2002
80.3
115.7
59.5
44.4
5.5
4.1
-0.1
309.4
14.2
1.5
325.1
Proj.
2003
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
318.0
14.4
1.5
333.9
Proj.
2004
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
326.9
14.4
1.5
342.8
Proj.
2005
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
336.0
14.7
1.5
352.2
Proj.
2006
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
345.5
14.9
1.5
361.9
287.3
3.2
296.3
-1.3
310.5
-1.1
319.0
-1.0
327.9
-1.1
337.1
-1.1
346.6
-1.1
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States
Government for Fiscal Year 2002, April 9, 2001; Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the
United States Government for Fiscal Year 2002, April 9, 2001.
Note: Totals for FY2003 and beyond are projected based on the assumption that budget authority for
national defense grows from the FY2002 level at the rate of inflation. Mandatory amounts in DOD
generally reflect small amounts of offsetting receipts for sales of material from DOD revolving funds
to the public. Mandatory funds may also include, as in FY2000, a use of contract authority, which,
under standing law, may be made available to support revolving funds.
! Most of the amounts the Clinton Administration decided to add to the FY2002
total – and to budget totals in later years – reflect “fact of life” changes in costs
or “must pay” items added by Congress in the FY2001 defense funding bills.
Table 3 is an accounting of these additions. Such changes in costs are quite
typical in defense budgets from one year to the next, and may often limit the
ability Administrations have to meet long-term budget targets. The Clinton
Administration had been trying for some time, for example, to increase
weapons procurement funding to $60 billion and more. Last year, the
Administration projected that procurement in FY2002 would grow to $63.0
billion. The Bush Administration FY2002 procurement request, however,
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totals $59.5 billion, an amount that would have drawn considerable criticism
from Congress had the Clinton Administration formally requested it.
Table 2: Clinton Administration Adjustments in Department of Defense
“Top-Line” Budget Authority (Discretionary Funding Only)
(billions of dollars)
FY
1999
FY
2000
FY
2001
FY
2002
FY
2003
FY
2004
FY
2005
FY
2006
FY
2007
Total
FY1999 Clinton Projection
258
264
272
276
285
292
299
307
314
2,568
Supplemental Requests
+9
+2
–
–
–
--
--
--
--
+11
Admin. Top Line Increases
–
+4
+20
+35
+25
+25
+25
+27
+28
+188
Congressional Additions
+7
+17
+4
–
–
–
--
--
--
+28
Total FY1999-2007 Increases
+16
+23
+24
+35
+25
+25
+25
+27
+28
+227
FY2002 Clinton Request
275
287
296
310
310
317
324
333
342
2,795
Source: William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Jan. 2001, p. 244.
Note: Amounts reflect Department of Defense discretionary funding only – these do not include small, negative “mandatory”
amounts and defense-related activities of other agencies, such as the Department of Energy.
Table 3: FY2002-FY2007 Clinton Administration Additions to
Department of Defense Top Line Budget Authority
(billions of dollars)
FY
2002
FY
2003
FY
2004
FY
2005
FY
2006
FY
2007
Total
02-07
Contingencies
2.1
–
–
–
–
–
2.1
Over 65 Health Care
3.9
0.9
0.9
1.0
1.0
1.1
8.8
Defense Health Program
0.6
–
–
–
–
–
0.6
Congressional Health Increases
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
1.6
Personnel Authorization Changes
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.9
4.6
Fuel
1.6
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
3.1
Inflation
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.7
1.9
2.1
9.4
Personnel
0.6
0.5
–
–
–
–
1.1
Intelligence & Classified
0.6
–
–
–
–
–
0.6
Science & Technology
0.1
–
–
–
–
–
0.1
Vaccines
–
–
0.4
–
–
–
0.4
Service Needs
3.1
4.0
3.6
3.1
3.3
3.1
20.2
14.5
7.9
7.7
7.1
7.6
7.8
52.7
Clinton Administration Adds
Source: Department of Defense.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
! The Bush Administration adopted the increased Clinton defense number for
FY2002, i.e., about $310 in DOD discretionary budget authority, but,
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significantly, did not initially decide to add even more to it. In response to
questions about the decision not to add more money, Secretary Rumsfeld has
said simply that the task is to “engage the brain” before “opening the taxpayer
wallet.” For its part, Congress has initially been supportive of delaying budget
decisions while the strategy review proceeds. But as the budget year has
progressed, and as questions about programs of particular congressional
interest continue to be unanswered, some Members of Congress are becoming
more anxious to know the results and to know how much defense money the
Administration may request.
Key Bush Defense Policy Initiatives
Although not initially adding significant amounts of new money to the outgoing
Clinton Administration FY2002 defense plan, Bush Administration officials have
emphasized some major defense policy initiatives.
! Military pay and benefits increases: In a speech to troops at Fort Stewart
Georgia on February 12, President Bush announced that “our proposed 2002
budget will include ... $1.4 billion for military pay raises. Pay raises on top of
the increases the Congress passed the last couple of budget cycles, $400
million to improve military housing, and $3.9 billion to improve military health
benefits.” The key element of this package appears to be $1.4 billion for pay
raises, of which, officials later explained, about $400 million would be for an
across-the-board raise of 4.6% beginning in January 2002, as opposed to a 3.7
percent raise planned in the Clinton budget. An additional $1 billion is
promised in FY2002 for unspecified bonuses and special pays, presumably
targeted to enhance retention of key personnel. The other elements of the pay
and benefits package, including $400 million for military housing and $3.9
billion for health benefits, are not new initiatives. Last year the Clinton
Administration proposed and Congress approved an ongoing program to
reduce differentials between amounts provided to military personnel for onbase and off-base housing – in FY2002, the initiative will cost about $400
million. The other $3.9 billion is currently estimated as the cost within the
Department of Defense budget of implementing guaranteed health care benefits
to over-65 military retirees that Congress provided last year. After FY2002,
the cost of those benefits will shift to a separate “mandatory” account financed
through a military retiree medical benefits trust fund – but in FY2002, the
Defense Department must absorb the costs within its regular the FY2002
“discretionary” accounts.
! Plans to reshape military forces inherited from the Cold War, ranging
from forces for strategic nuclear deterrence to forces for regional defense:
In several policy statements since taking office, particularly in A Blueprint for
New Beginnings that the White House issued on February 28, in remarks to
troops at Norfolk Naval Air Station on February 13, and, most recently, in a
speech at the National Defense University on missile defense policy and the
ABM Treaty, the President echoed statements made in several major speeches
during the presidential election campaign that appear to portend sweeping
changes in the fundamentals of U.S. strategy. In the Blueprint, for example,
the President said, “The Cold War is over, but to a too great extent the
CRS-7
structure and strategies appropriate to that era of bi-polar, super power standoff continue to govern our Armed Forces.... Indeed, the last revision to ....
military strategy occurred in the Gulf War period with the introduction of a
Regional Defense Strategy as a means to transition to the post-Cold War
imperatives. That interim strategy has remained transitional and largely
unaltered since is introduction a decade ago.”
! Invest more in R&D and focus on “leap ahead” weaponry: The Blueprint
also prescribes a large investment in defense R&D – $2.6 billion more for
R&D in FY2002 and $20 billion more between FY2002 and FY2006 – and a
focus on programs that will “propel America’s Armed Forces generations
ahead in military technology.” “In both R&D and acquisitions, [the President]
will emphasize programs that offer our Armed Forces information superiority,
safety through stealth, and victory achieved less through massed power than
superior striking speed, agility and mobility.” Reportedly, up to $1 billion of
the $2.6 billion for FY2002, is for missile defense programs. And there may
be some debate about the size of the R&D increases – it appears that the
baseline for measuring the increases is somewhat below the level approved by
Congress for FY2001 or the Clinton Administration plan.
! Improve defense efficiency: The Blueprint promises continued efforts to
gain efficiencies through competitive sourcing and privatization; greater
reliance on commercial products, and additional base realignment and closure.
Some commentators have seen the Administration’s decision to select business
leaders as secretaries of each of the armed services as evidence that defense
efficiency measures will receive particular emphasis in coming years.
Congressional Action on Defense in the Budget Resolution
Congress completed action on the annual congressional budget resolution
(HconRes 83) in early May – the House approved a conference agreement on the
resolution on May 9, and the Senate approved its version on May 10 – without having
full information about Administration defense spending plans. As a result, defense
was a matter of considerable debate. The key issue was how to cope with the lack
of a specific budget request – for FY2002 and beyond – but still accommodate an
increase in defense spending given a widespread willingness in Congress to support
additions. See Table 4 for a complete list of alternative proposals for national
defense in budget resolution proposals made on the floor in each House.
House Action on Defense in the Budget Resolution. In its version of
the budget resolution, approved on March 28, the House incorporated the
Administration’s “placeholder” funding levels for FY2002 though FY2006 and
projected them ahead with continued growth for inflation through FY2011. It also
approved an increase of $5.6 billion in its allocation of funds for FY2001 – i.e., the
current fiscal year, not the budget year – to the appropriations committee to
accommodate supplemental defense appropriations (technically this was implemented
by revising allocations under Section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act). In
addition, the House version allowed the Chairman of the Budget Committee to further
increase FY2001 allocations to provide additional emergency supplemental
CRS-8
appropriations for defense, agriculture and other purposes, subject to a limitation that
the on-budget Federal surplus for FY2001 must not be reduced below $29 billion.
Finally, for FY2002 through FY2011, the House resolution established a number of
“reserve funds” to accommodate increases in spending in for particular programs,
including Medicare and agriculture. One of the reserve funds, referred to as a
“Strategic Reserve,” allows the Chairman of the Budget Committee to increase the
allocation of funds for defense programs, following an amended Administration
budget request and reflecting legislation reported before July 11, 2001 – i.e., defense
authorization and appropriations measures must be prepared before that date. The
House-passed measure also included some defense policy statements concerning
personnel issues – see below for a further discussion.
Table 4: Congressional Budget Resolution – National Defense Budget Function
Alternatives
(billions of current year dollars)
FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011
House Progressive Caucus
Budget Authority
–
Outlays
–
House "Blue Dog"
Budget Authority
317.5
Outlays
301.9
House Republican Study Com.
Budget Authority
310.3
Outlays
300.6
House Democratic Alternative
Budget Authority
–
Outlays
–
Senate Domenici Original
Budget Authority
310.3
Outlays
300.6
House-Passed
Budget Authority
310.3
Outlays
300.6
Senate-Passed
Budget Authority
310.3
Outlays
300.6
Conference Agreement
Budget Authority
316.9
Outlays
302.4
Total
02-06
Total
02-11
258.5
272.6
266.0
267.4
273.4
275.3
280.7
279.5
288.2
282.9
296.1
287.9
304.2
299.1
312.6
307.6
321.1
316.1
330.1 1,366.8 2,930.8
325.0 1,377.8 2,913.4
329.1
323.5
334.2
329.6
345.7
338.5
357.2
335.4
367.9
359.3
---
---
---
---
349.6
344.0
362.8
354.4
369.8
360.6
379.4
374.0
390.1
381.9
401.0
389.9
412.3
404.7
423.9
416.4
435.8
428.4
435.8 1,851.7 3,960.5
428.4 1,814.9 3,882.7
327.2
320.5
334.3
325.1
345.1
334.6
356.9
349.2
368.7
358.1
379.6
366.4
390.4
380.4
400.0
391.4
409.8
402.0
420.1 1,732.2 3,732.1
412.5 1,687.5 3,640.2
324.7
319.3
333.4
325.7
342.7
334.2
352.3
347.3
362.2
354.6
372.3
362.0
382.8
375.7
393.6
386.5
404.5
397.6
416.3 1,715.3 3,684.7
409.3 1,681.2 3,612.2
324.6
319.3
333.3
325.5
342.6
334.0
352.2
347.2
362.1
354.6
372.2
361.9
382.7
375.6
393.5
386.5
404.5
397.6
416.3 1,714.7 3,684.0
409.2 1,680.6 3,611.5
334.5
326.8
333.4
325.7
342.7
334.2
352.3
347.3
362.2
354.6
372.3
362.0
382.8
375.7
393.6
386.5
404.5
397.6
416.3 1,725.1 3,694.6
409.3 1,688.6 3,619.7
324.8
319.1
333.6
326.6
342.3
335.2
350.9
347.1
359.8
353.5
369.0
359.8
378.5
372.4
388.3
382.2
398.3
392.2
408.8 1,711.5 3,654.5
402.6 1,681.5 3,590.8
-- 1,734.1
-- 1,686.3
NA
NA
Sources: House alternatives from H.Rept. 107-30; Domenici original from Congressional Record, April 2, 2001, pp. S3281-3286; Housepassed, Senate-passed, and conference agreement from H.Rept. 107-60.
Senate Action on Defense in the Budget Resolution. On April 6, the
Senate approved its version of the annual budget resolution, after several days of
debate. On April 3, the Senate debated two amendments to add to the national
defense budget function – one by Senators Landrieu and Carnahan to add a total of
$100 billion over the FY2002-2011 period for national defense, to be offset by an
equivalent reduction in tax cuts, and a substitute by Senator Warner to add $8.5
billion to the FY2002 total for specified defense purposes, including defense health
shortfalls, Department of Energy defense programs, and defense readiness. The
underlying issue concerned how to balance defense increases with tax cuts, deficit
CRS-9
reduction, and goals for spending on other programs over the long term. Democrats
generally objected to the budget resolution’s lack of specific targets for spending,
saying that unrealistic constraints – on defense and other programs – inevitably will
be imposed by tax cuts and other measures. In the end, the Senate rejected the
Landrieu/Carnahan amendment by a vote of 47-53, and approved the Warner
substitute by a vote of 84-16. Later, on April 5, the Senate approved an amendment
by Senator Domenici to add $1 billion to the FY2002 defense function for
Department of Energy defense-related environmental programs. The Senate
resolution also established two reserve funds for defense personnel related programs
– one, offered as an amendment by Senator Reid, to permit concurrent payment of
disability benefits and retired pay to disabled military retirees (i.e, to allow recipients
of disability pay also to receive retired pay), adding $2.9 billion in mandatory spending
in FY2002 and $40 billion through FY2011, and a second, offered by Senator Collins,
to increase GI bill monthly benefits, costing $743 billion in FY2002 and $9.9 billion
through FY2011 in mandatory spending.
Conference Agreement on Defense in the Budget Resolution. For
FY2001 (i.e., this year’s budget, not the FY2002 budget on which Congress is mainly
acting), the conference agreement provides a $6.5 billion increase in the national
defense budget function, which presumably would be available to increase the 302(a)
allocation to the appropriations committees for supplemental appropriations. This
would not rule out additional defense funds provided as emergency appropriations,
as well, so total defense supplemental funding for FY2001 could well be substantially
higher.
For FY2002, the agreement provides $324.8 billion in new budget authority for
national defense – the requested level as reestimated by the Congressional Budget
Office, and not including the Senate additions. To allow for further increases in
defense, the resolution uses the mechanism of reserve funds, separately administered
in the House and the Senate, to accommodate increased spending in FY2002 and over
the whole FY2002-2011 period. Section 217 of the conference agreement establishes
a reserve fund in the Senate, which allows the Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee to increase 302(a) allocations to the appropriations committee and to the
Armed Services Committee provided, (1) the President submits a budget amendment
requesting additional funding for FY2002 in response to the “National Defense
Review” and (2) the appropriations committee reports a measure which provides
funding for such an amendment. The only limitation directly imposed on the amount
of any defense increase is that a point of order will apply against a measure if its cost,
taken together with all previously enacted legislation, would reduce the surplus below
the surplus in the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. This became boilerplate
language in provisions regarding each of the reserve funds, though all of the other
reserve funds also include specified limits on the amount of additional funding that
may be provided.
Section 218 of the conference agreement establishes a more general “Strategic
Reserve Fund” in the House, specifying that additional funds may be provided (1) for
defense “following the President’s National Defense Review,” (2) for a prescription
drug benefit, or (3) “for other appropriate legislation.” The Chairman of the Budget
Committee may adjust committee allocations to accommodate specific legislation that
exceeds allocations otherwise provided to the committees. In effect, this is an
CRS-10
agreement to increase defense by an unspecified amount when the Rumsfeld review
is completed.
Notably, the budget resolution does not include the Senate reserve funds on
concurrent receipt of disability and retired pay or increased GI bill benefits (discussed
above under Senate action), though it does include a House-approved measure that
would require the Secretary of Defense to report within 180 days on the concurrent
payments issue and for GAO and CBO to review the costs.
Long-Term Defense Funding: The “Defense
Shortfalls” Debate
In recent years, much of the debate about the defense budget has been over the
extent of presumed “shortfalls” in long-term funding, particularly for procurement of
major weapons. To put the issue in context, in 1990 following the end of the Cold
War, the first Bush Administration agreed to long-term reductions in the size of the
force, from about 2.1 million active duty troops to about 1.6 million over five years,
selective reductions in major weapons purchases, and an attendant reduction of about
25 percent, after adjusting for inflation, in defense spending over the next five years.
The budget cuts were reflected in projections for defense spending that were agreed
to in the 1990 budget agreement, which covered the years FY1991 through FY1995.
When the Clinton Administration came into office, it adopted a revised defense
strategy, articulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, that called for further cuts in the
force, to about 1.4 million active duty personnel, some additional weapons cuts (the
largest in missile defense), and a reduction in defense spending that initially was
projected to total about $120 billion over the four years from FY1994-97 compared
to Bush Administration plans. In fact, over time, virtually all of these initial budget
cuts were restored – the Administration first added money back for military pay and
benefits increases, then, as inflation projections declined, permitted the Defense
Department to preserve the added purchasing power, and repeatedly added more
funds for military readiness.1 Later, the 104th Congress added some money for
defense early in its term, and, after surpluses began to appear in the later years of the
decade, both the Administration and the Congress agreed to quite substantial
increases in defense, despite caps on discretionary spending agreed to in the revised
1997 budget agreement.
Even so, debate about defense shortfalls grew more and more intense over time.
The following is a very brief survey of key statements about defense shortfalls in
recent years:
! As early as February 1995, in congressional testimony on the FY1996 budget,
then Secretary of Defense William Perry justified projected defense funding
1
Though, notably, during the Clinton years, substantially more was allocated to operation and
maintenance and related readiness accounts and less to weapons procurement than the
outgoing Bush Administration had projected.
CRS-11
levels as sufficient to preserve adequate levels of military readiness, but he
warned that short-term readiness was being protected at the expense of a
decline in long-term investments in new weapons. For the present, he said, this
was acceptable, (1) because new weapons ordered in the 1980s were still
entering the force in large numbers, and (2) because as the size of the force
declined, older weapons were retired earlier, so the average age of equipment
in the field was declining even without new acquisition. But Perry described
the situation as a “procurement holiday” which would have to end soon,
though he put no numbers or time frame on the needed level of funding for
new weapons.
! Later, in the autumn of 1995, as part of a formal review of long-term DOD
budget plans, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs John Shalikashvili also emphasized
the need to increase procurement funding. Shalikashvili did provide a number,
saying that funding should grow from about $45 billion for procurement at the
time to $60 billion per year for procurement by about FY1998.
! Following the 1997 budget agreement, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
assumed that overall defense funding would be frozen for the foreseeable
future. The QDR nonetheless argued that more money should be allocated to
procurement, largely by reallocating savings from force reductions and from
improvements in efficiency. The QDR reaffirmed the $60 billion procurement
target, saying it should be reached in the FY2000 budget.
! In September 1998, after some months of growing debate about military
readiness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively identified substantial shortfalls
in funding in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The
Chiefs expressed particular concern about declines in recruitment and retention
of skilled personnel, and all endorsed higher pay raises and the repeal of
military retirement rules in effect for personnel who joined the force after 1986.
Each of the services also estimated long-term funding shortfalls, mainly for
weapons procurement, ranging from about $1 billion per year over the next
several years in the Marine Corps to $4-6 billion per year in each of the other
services.
! In February 1999, the Pentagon released a revised FY2000-2005 defense plan
that included, officials said, an increase of $112 billion over six years in total
defense purchasing power (including an $84 billion increase in the defense toline, and the remainder in retained inflation savings). The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs affirmed that this met the most critical unfunded priorities that the
services had identified in the preceding months, which were estimated at about
$150 billion. Later, the military services submitted “unfunded priorities lists”
to the congressional defense committees that totaled about $43 billion over six
years. In action on the FY2000 defense bills, Congress agreed to a substantial
package of increased pay and personnel benefits.
! Most recently, just before leaving office, the Clinton Administration announced
that it had again agreed to a long-term increase in defense spending compared
to earlier plans. Officials said that increases amounted to about $53 billion
between FY2002 and FY2007 – Table 3, above, provides details.
CRS-12
Although Congress has focused very intensely on military pay and benefits in
recent years – and has provided some substantial increases – most of the debate
about defense shortfalls concerns the pace of weapons procurement. Among defense
advocates the debate has focused, not on whether $60 billion a year for procurement
is adequate, but on how much more than $60 billion a year is needed, and in what
years, to “recapitalize” and “modernize” the force. At one extreme is a study released
in December 1999 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
entitled Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the Next Millennium,2 which calculated
that procurement budgets would have to average from $111 to $164 billion per year
(in FY2000 prices) over the next decade to replace the weapons in the current
inventory with more advanced versions as systems reach the ends of their planned
service lives.
At the other end of the debate, Clinton Administration officials acknowledged
that procurement budgets should grow further over time, but, they said, not to nearly
the level CSIS postulated. Secretary Cohen and other senior DOD officials argued
that their long-term budget plans would raise procurement spending gradually – $75
billion was planned by FY2005 – and that continued modest increases would suffice
in the future. In their view, the key issue was how to deal with a “bow wave” of
procurement costs in the later years of the decade – i.e, a significant surge in total
procurement costs as a number of weapons now in R&D begin to enter production
along with systems already being produced. This “bow wave” will come once new
weapons programs, such as the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, the Comanche
helicopter, and the DD-21 destroyer, come into full rate production at the same time.
Cohen’s judgment was that this could be accommodated by reallocating funds to
procurement without large increases in overall defense spending.
Later last year, the Congressional Budget Office released a study that reflects
something of a middle ground.3 Much like the CSIS study, CBO’s analysis is based
on what it calls a “steady-state” analysis of the defense budget – i.e., the amount
needed over the long term to maintain a force of the current size and composition.
For procurement, a “steady state” level of funding would be roughly sufficient to
replace the existing stock of weapons as they reach the ends of their normal service
lives. CBO estimated that a “steady state” budget over the next 15 years would have
to average about $340 billion a year, in FY2000 prices (i.e., about $50 billion above
the FY2000 level then anticipated), of which, about $90 billion a year would be for
procurement. This is considerably less than CSIS estimates.
The large gap between CSIS and CBO point out how dramatically minor
differences in assumptions can lead to vastly different estimates when projected over
a long term. Both studies are based on a similar analysis of procurement requirements
2
Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New
Millennium (Washington: CSIS, 1999). The CSIS study was the subject of a hearing before
the House Armed Services Committee on February 8, 2000, and prepared remarks are
available at the Committee website: [http://www.house.gov/hasc/schedules/2000.html].
3
Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today’s Forces,
September 2000. Available electronically at
[http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2398&sequence=0&from=7].
CRS-13
– each assumes that current generation weapons will be replaced on a one-for-one
basis as they reach a certain age. This, in turn, implies an average annual rate of
production of new weapons to maintain the given size of the force. For Navy ships,
for example, if one assumes an average service life of 35 years, to maintain a fleet of
300 ships would require 8.7 new ships a year. CBO did not assume that nuclear
weapons and some other systems would all be replaced, however, was somewhat
more sanguine about weapons cost growth than CSIS, and relaxed its assumptions
somewhat to acknowledge that weapons are now commonly being kept in service
longer than initially planned. For its part, CSIS acknowledged that $111 billion per
year for procurement would suffice, according to its calculations, rather than $164
billion per year, if strategic nuclear weapons programs were taken out of the equation.
Now the Bush Administration has inherited this unresolved debate. For their
part, many Members of Congress who serve on the defense committees hope to see
enough of an increase in defense spending to accommodate production of weapons
programs pretty much as the services have planned.4 This would imply substantial and
sustained increases in the defense budget over the next several years. For its part,
however, the Bush Administration continues to study the issue, with several Pentagon
panels reviewing major weapons issues, but with no significant public discussion of
conclusions.
FY2001 Supplemental Appropriations
In recent years, supplemental appropriations for defense programs have
commonly been used not only to meet unplanned requirements, such as the costs of
military operations in Yugoslavia in FY1999 and 2000, but also as a means of adding
money to the defense budget, particularly for military readiness, without technically
violating caps on spending established by the 1997 budget agreement. The FY1999
supplemental appropriations bill for Kosovo, for example, (P.L. 106-31, H.R. 1141),
provided over $5.8 billion of unrequested funds (out of $12 billion for defense in all),
including $1.8 billion for military pay and benefits increases beginning in FY2000.
Early this year, some defense supporters in Congress clearly expected that the
incoming Bush Administration would propose supplemental appropriations for
FY2001 as an immediate means of bolstering defense. Expectations rose further
when each of the military services began to report significant shortfalls in the FY2001
budget, ranging from growing unfunded medical costs in all the services, to spare
parts shortages in the Army and Air Force, to unexpected growth in shipbuilding
costs in the Navy. In January, the services provided briefings and extensive backup
material to Congress supporting supplemental appropriations of almost $8 billion, not
including military personnel and health care costs. Bush Administration officials,
however, pointedly decided not to request an early supplemental appropriations bill,
saying that funding requirements for FY2001, along with later budgets needs, would
be addressed following the planned review of military strategy.
4
This view was reflected, for example, in a hearing on “Defense Transformation” held by the
Subcommittee on Military Procurement of the House Armed Services Committee on March
28, 2001.
CRS-14
The Administration’s reluctance to support an early supplemental prompted
considerable debate in Congress. In February, Senate Armed Services Committee
Chairman Warner, wrote a letter to the White House supporting the decision to
pursue a strategy review before asking for a large increase in defense spending, but
he also urged an immediate supplemental request, amounting to about $3.9 billion, for
specific, short-term needs. Subsequently, several leading pro-defense Democrats,
including Rep. Dicks and Rep. Skelton, strongly urged immediate action on a larger
supplemental and submitted a measure providing $6.7 billion, including funds for a
pay raise in FY2001. Finally, during debate on the congressional budget resolution,
Sen. Warner and others again urged action on a defense supplemental. The
conference agreement on the budget resolution specifically sets aside about $6.5
billion in available FY2001 funds for defense supplemental appropriations, though
more may be provided if it is approved as emergency appropriations.
Within Congress, this year’s debate about whether and when to bring up a
defense supplemental appropriations bill is, to a degree at least, embroiled in a much
broader debate about controls over spending. In this case, the White House appears
to be taking the side of Members of Congress who want to enforce strict limits on
spending, including limits of some kind on emergency appropriations bills even for
defense. On the other side are legislators, particularly many appropriators, and more
particularly many pro-defense appropriators, who do not think restrictions on
emergency appropriations in general, and on defense emergency appropriations in
particular, are advisable. This is not a new issue. On the contrary, the use of
emergency supplemental appropriations was repeatedly an issue in the 104th and 105th
Congresses. Many legislators argued that emergency appropriations should be limited
because they added to the deficit or, more recently, “spent” part of the surplus
generated by Social Security. Annual debates about supplemental appropriations bills
raise a number of Issues – whether to find sufficient rescissions to offset supplemental
funding for all supplemental funding or only for some, whether non-defense
rescissions should be used to offset supplemental defense funding, and whether
defense should be exempt from offsets while other emergency spending should not.5
In the end, as Federal budget surpluses grew, pressures to limit supplemental funding
eased. Now, with a Republican Congress and a Republican President, these questions
appear to be back on the agenda.
Defense Transformation
Defense policy was a major issue in last year’s presidential election, and, in
retrospect, the Bush campaign laid out how a Bush Administration would approach
defense issues in some detail very early in the campaign. It was, nonetheless,
something of a surprise to many observers when the Administration announced plans
for a sweeping review of military strategy before making any significant decisions on
the defense budget. Moreover, as the scope of the review became apparent, analysts
5
For a full review of the debate over supplemental appropriations for defense from FY1995
through FY1999, see Stephen Daggett, “Emergency Appropriations for the Department of
Defense: Congressional General Distribution Memo”, August 18 1998, 28 p. Available to
congressional offices by request from the author.
CRS-15
began to look much more closely at precisely what Governor Bush had said about
defense policy during the campaign. As it turns out, Bush Administration procedures
and policy proposals have so far followed very closely the outlines of a major speech
on defense policy made at the Citadel on September 23, 1999 – and it remains a
matter of intense interest to see how closely future policy decisions made in the
review will adhere to some fairly dramatic statements in that and other campaign
speeches.
Some excerpts from the Citadel speech illustrate why the defense review has
roiled the waters. Key passages from the speech include –
Recently, after years of neglect, a significant pay raise was finally passed. My first
budget will go further – adding a billion dollars in salary increases. We also will
provide targeted bonuses for those with special skills. Two-thirds of military
family housing units are now substandard, and they must be renovated. And we
must improve the quality of training at our bases and national training centers.
At the earliest possible date, my administration will deploy anti-ballistic missile
systems, both theater and national, to guard against attack and blackmail. To make
this possible, we will offer Russia the necessary amendments to the anti-ballistic
missile treaty – an artifact of Cold War confrontation.... If Russia refuses the
changes we propose, we will give prompt notice, under the provisions of the treaty,
that we can no longer be a party to it.
As president, I will begin an immediate, comprehensive review of our military...
We will modernize some existing weapons and equipment, necessary for current
tasks. But our relative peace allows us to do this selectively. The real goal is to
move beyond marginal improvements – to replace existing programs with new
technologies and strategies. To use this window of opportunity to skip a generation
of technology. This will require spending more – and spending more wisely.
When our comprehensive review is complete, I will expect the military's budget
priorities to match our strategic vision – not the particular visions of the services,
but a joint vision for change. I will earmark at least 20 percent of the procurement
budget for acquisition programs that propel America generations ahead in military
technology. And I will direct the Secretary of Defense to allocate these funds to the
services that prove most effective in developing new programs that do so. I intend
to force new thinking and hard choices.
The transformation of our military will require a new and greater emphasis on
research and development. So I will also commit an additional $20 billion to
defense R&D between the time I take office and 2006.
To date, the Administration has (1) undertaken the strategic review promised in
the Citadel speech, (2) formally announced a larger pay raise as mentioned in the
speech, (3) announced its decision to proceed with a national missile defense system
and to restructure or renounce the ABM Treaty, and (4) emphasized in its budget
presentations that additional funding is, as promised, being allocated to R&D.
Some obvious questions follow:
CRS-16
! How selective will the Defense Department be in choosing which weapons to
modernize?
! Which, if any, weapons programs now being planned represent only “marginal
improvements” in existing systems and which represent “programs that propel
America generations ahead”?
! What does it mean to “skip a generation of technology”?
! How are current visions of any of the military services at odds with a joint
vision for change?
! When will 20 percent of the procurement budget be allocated to leap ahead
technology?
! Will the budget shares of the military services change substantially in years
ahead, and if so, who will gain and who will lose?
Whether the defense review will answer all these difficult questions definitively
remains to be seen – but even posing the questions has understandably left many
interested parties in Congress and in defense industry nervous about the outcome.
In practice, it may be some time before major weapons issues – which have been
the focus of the most intense speculation – are decided. In the meantime, the
Administration is now beginning the process of reporting on the results of the defense
review. On May 25, President Bush is scheduled to deliver the commencement
address at the U.S. Naval Academy. This address is billed as a major statement of
Administration policy, in which the President will describe, in at least broad terms, the
outcome of the review of defense strategy that Secretary Rumsfeld has been
overseeing since January.
What, exactly, the President will say about defense strategy has been a matter of
extensive speculation. Over the past few weeks, it has been widely reported
! that the review will call for a shift in the focus of U.S. strategy toward the
Pacific;
! that the review is looking closely at “forward presence” requirements,
particularly for the Navy, and might reduce estimates of the number of aircraft
carriers and perhaps other ships needed for presence missions;
! that large deck aircraft carriers in particular are likely to be reduced because
of concerns about their vulnerability in the future;
! that the Navy’s argument about the survivability and value of large deck
aircraft carriers now appears to have carried the day, and the number of
carriers will not be reduced;
! most recently, that the defense review will formally abandon the two major
theater war (2MTW) requirement that has been a key factor in determining the
size and composition of the force since the early 1990s; and
! that the shift toward Asia and the demise of the 2MTW requirement may lead
to reductions in the size of the Army.
The Administration has held very tight reins over the strategy review, however, and
no senior officials have openly hinted at the decisions being made on these and other
far-reaching issues.
CRS-17
For Additional Reading
Budget Documents
The White House, Executive Office of the President, “A Blueprint for New
Beginnings: A Responsible Budget for America’s Priorities, Feb. 28, 2001.
Available electronically at:
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/budtoc.html]
Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States
Government for Fiscal Year 2002, April 9, 2001. Available electronically at:
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/budget.html]
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government for
Fiscal Year 2002, April 9, 2001. Available electronically at:
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/hist.pdf]
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years
2002-2010, Jan. 2001. Available electronically at:
[http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2727&sequence=0&from=7]
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the President’s Budget Proposals for
FY2002, May. 2000. Available electronically at:
[http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2819&sequence=0&from=7]
“Shortfalls”
Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New
Millennium (Washington: CSIS, 1999). The CSIS study was the subject of a
hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on February 8, 2000, and
prepared remarks are available at the Committee website:
[http://www.house.gov/hasc/schedules/2000.html]
Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today’s Forces,
by Lane Pierrot, September 2000. Available electronically at:
[http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2398&sequence=0&from=7]
Steven M. Kosiak, “Cost of Defense Plan Could Exceed Available Funding by $26
Billion A Year Over Long Run,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
April 2, 1998. Available electronically at:
[http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/U.19980402.Cost_Of_Def
ense__P/U.19980402.Cost_Of_Defense__P.htm]
Transformation
Bush, Governor George W. “A Period Of Consequences,” speech presented at The
Citadel, South Carolina, Thursday, September 23, 1999. Available electronically
at:
[http://www.georgewbush.com/News/speeches/092399_consequences.html]
CRS-18
Bush/Cheney Campaign, Background information on defense policy, following
Citadel Speech, September 23, 1999.
Available electronically at:
[http://www.georgewbush.com/Media/PDFs/defense.pdf], and at
[http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1999/09/990923-bush-dod.htm]
“Defense Transformation” a hearing before by the Subcommittee on Military
Procurement of the House Armed Services Committee, March 28, 2001.
Prepared statements available electronically at:
[http://www.house.gov/hasc/schedules/2001.html]
Donnally, Thomas, et al., Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding
America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century,”
September 2000. Available electronically at:
[http://www.geocities.com/newamericancentury/defensereport.html]
Flournoy, Michele A., Project Director, Report of the National Defense University
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group, Washington: National Defense
University, November 2000. Available electronically at:
[http://www.ndu.edu/inss/spa/QDRRprt.pdf]
Kosiak, Stephen; Andrew Krepinevich; and Michael Vickers, A Strategy for a Long
Peace, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Jan. 30, 2001. An
Executive Summary is available electronically at:
[http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20010130.A_Strategy_f
or_a_L/R.20010130.A_Strategy_for_a_L.htm#ch1]
O’Hanlon, Michael, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 2000), 208 p. A fax quality version is available
electronically at:
[http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815764391/html/1.html#pagetop]
U.S. Commission on National Security, 21st Century, “Phase III Report: Roadmap
for National Security: Imperative for Change,” Feb. 15, 2001, 139 p. Available
electronically at:
[http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf]
CRS Publications on Transformation
CRS Report RS20771, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process,
and Issues, by Jeffrey D. Brake, January 8, 2001, 6 p.
CRS Report RS20859, Air Force Transformation: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Christopher Bolkcom, March 27, 2001, 6 p.
CRS Report RS20787, Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and
Issues for Congress, by Edward F Bruner, April 4, 2001, 6 p.
CRS Report RS20851, Naval Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O’Rourke, March 21, 2001, 6 p.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.