National Missile Defense: Russia's Reaction

Order Code RL30967

Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction

Updated June 14, 2002

name redacted

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction

Summary

In the late 1990s, the United States began to focus on the possible deployment

of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The planned National Missile

Defense (NMD) system would have exceeded the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic

Missile Treaty. Recognizing this, the Clinton Administration sought to convince

Russia to modify the terms of the Treaty. But Russia was unwilling to accept any

changes to the Treaty. It also decried the U.S plan to deploy NMD, insisting that it

would upset strategic stability and start a new arms race.

Russia claimed that the ABM Treaty is the “cornerstone of strategic stability”

and that, without its limits on missile defense, the entire framework of offensive arms

control agreements could collapse. Furthermore, Russia argued that a U.S. NMD

system would undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent and upset stability by allowing

the United States to initiate an attack and protect itself from retaliatory strike. The

Clinton Administration claimed that the U.S. NMD system would be directed against

rogue nations and would be too limited to intercept a Russian attack. But Russian

officials questioned this argument. They doubted that rogue nations would have the

capability to attack U.S. territory for some time, and they believed that the United

States could expand its NMD system easily. Furthermore, they argued that, when

combined with the entirety of U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons, an NMD

system would place the United States in a position of strategic superiority.

During the Clinton Administration and first year of the Bush Administration,

Russian officials stated that, if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and

deployed an NMD, Russia would withdraw from a range of offensive arms control

agreements. Furthermore, Russia could deploy multiple warheads on its ICBMs to

overcome a U.S. NMD, or deploy new intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range

nuclear systems to enhance its military capabilities.

Russia has also outlined diplomatic and cooperative military initiatives as

alternatives to the deployment of a U.S. NMD. Russia has proposed that the

international community negotiate a Global Missile and Missile Technology NonProliferation regime as a means to discourage nations from acquiring ballistic

missiles. It has also suggested that it would cooperate with nations in Europe to

develop and deploy defenses against theater-range ballistic missiles. Many analysts

believe this proposal was designed to win support among U.S. allies for Russia’s

opposition to the U.S. NMD program. U.S. officials expressed an interest in the idea

but said it could not substitute for defenses against longer-range missiles.

The Clinton Administration sought to address Russia’s concerns by offering

continued support to the fundamental principles of the ABM Treaty and by seeking

to convince Russia that the U.S. NMD system would remain too limited to threaten

Russia’s nuclear deterrent. The Bush Administration, in contrast, has supported more

robust missile defenses, but it also has stated that they will not be directed against

Russia’s offensive forces. The President has indicated that the United States will

need to move beyond the limits in the ABM Treaty, but he suggested that Russia join

the United States in developing a new strategic framework.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The ABM Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

National Missile Defense Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Clinton Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Bush Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Russian Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Concerns about Strategic Stability and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Concerns about the Scope and Intent of NMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Differing Threat Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Skepticism about “Limited NMD” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Threat to Russia’s Deterrent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Possible Military Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Deploy Multiple Warheads on New ICBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Deploy new intermediate range missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Redeploy shorter-range nuclear delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Russian Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation Control System

(GCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Cooperation on Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe . . . . . . . . . . 14

The Russian Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

The U.S. and European Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Response to the Russian Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Clinton Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Bush Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Will Russia continue to cooperate on offensive arms reductions? . . . 19

Will Russia continue to cooperate in non-proliferation and threat reduction

activities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Will Russia convince other nations to support its objections to U.S. missile

defense policies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Russia’s Reaction to U.S. ABM Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction

Introduction

During the latter years of the Clinton presidency, the United States began to

focus on the possible deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles.

The Administration, and many missile defense supporters, claimed that the United

States needed to pursue National Missile Defenses (NMD) because “rogue” nations

such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq might soon acquire longer range missiles that

could strike U.S. territory, and the United States could not be certain that the threat

of offensive retaliation would deter these unpredictable actors. The Clinton

Administration realized that its plans for NMD would exceed the limits imposed by

the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union.

Consequently, the Administration opened discussions with Russia in an effort to

negotiate amendments to the Treaty that would permit the deployment of a limited

NMD system.

Russian officials consistently and repeatedly insisted that the 1972 ABM Treaty

is the cornerstone of strategic stability (this is defined on page 4). They argued that

any changes to the Treaty that permitted the deployment of defenses against longrange ballistic missiles would undermine international strategic stability, upset the

nuclear balance established by the Treaty, and interfere with Russia’s nuclear

deterrent capabilities. During talks with the Clinton Administration, Russia refused

to accept any modifications to the ABM Treaty that would permit national missile

defenses and campaigned against the U.S. policy at meetings with other nations and

international organizations. Russia also offered alternatives, suggesting that the

United States, Russia, and the international community address emerging missile

threats with diplomacy and arms control measures that would seek to stop the

proliferation of new threats and with cooperation on theater-range ballistic missile

defenses to address those threats that did emerge.

This report provides a detailed review of Russia’s reaction to U.S. policy on

missile defense and U.S. proposals for modifications to the ABM Treaty. It begins

with a brief background section that describes the central limits in the ABM Treaty

and U.S. policy on the deployment of missile defenses. It then describes, in more

detail, Russia’s objections to the U.S. proposals. The report also provides a summary

of possible military responses that Russia might take after the United States

withdraws from the ABM Treaty and begins deployment of missile defenses and

contains a discussion of Russia’s proposals for diplomatic and military alternatives

to the U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses. The report concludes with a brief

discussion of the U.S. response to Russia’s objections, a few issues for Congress, and

a summary of the Russian reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

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Background

The ABM Treaty

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) in May 1972. This Treaty prohibits the

deployment of ABM systems for the defense of the nations’ territory, or an individual

region, or defenses that can provide the base for such a defense. It permits each side

to deploy limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’s capital

and one at a location containing ICBM silo launchers. A 1974 Protocol further

limited each nation to one ABM site, located either at the nation’s capital or around

an ICBM deployment area. Each ABM site can contain no more than 100 ABM

launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles. The Treaty also specifies that, in the

future, any radars that provide early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack must

be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward.

The Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, airbased, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM system

components (these include interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors

that can substitute for radars). Each party can propose amendments, and, in the

Standing Consultative Commission established by the Treaty, they can consider

possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. Each party can

also withdraw from the Treaty, after giving 6 months notice, if “extraordinary events

related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”1

In September 1997, the Clinton Administration signed a Memorandum of

Understanding on Succession that named Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan

as the successors to the Soviet Union for the Treaty. This agreement never entered

into force because Congress insisted that the Clinton Administration submit it to the

Senate for advice and consent, as an amendment to the Treaty. The Clinton

Administration never did so, in part because it feared that the Senate might reject the

agreement in an effort to abolish the Treaty. Some Members of Congress argued that

the ABM Treaty was no longer in force because the Soviet Union has ceased to exist.

The Clinton Administration, however, determined that, in the absence of alternative

arrangements, Russia would serve as the successor to the Soviet Union for the Treaty.

The Bush Administration did not explicitly accept the argument that the ABM

Treaty was no longer in force and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz said the

United States would withdraw before violating the Treaty. During their nomination

hearings, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld referred to the Treaty as “ancient history”

and Secretary of State Powell stated that the Treaty is no longer relevant to our

strategic framework. The President Bush has also said that the ABM Treaty is

outdated, and that the United States must move beyond the limits in the Treaty to

deploy effective missile defenses. He announced the U.S. withdrawal from the

Treaty on December 13, 2001; this withdrawal took effect on June 13, 2002.

1

For the full text of the Treaty and a description of the process leading to its negotiation see

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements. Texts and Histories of the Negotiations.

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, D.C. 1990.

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National Missile Defense Plans

Clinton Administration. The Clinton Administration’s plan for NMD, which

it outlined in 1999, called for the deployment of 100 interceptor missiles at a single

site in Alaska.2 This system would have been designed to defend against a relatively

limited threat of perhaps 20 missiles. Eventually the system might have expanded to

200-250 interceptors at one or more sites to defend against a larger and more

sophisticated threat. It might also have included space-based sensors and

components currently banned by the ABM Treaty. The Administration recognized

that this site, and some of the technologies under consideration, would not have been

consistent with the limits in the ABM Treaty. As a result, it participated in

discussions with Russia in an effort to modify the ABM Treaty to permit a limited

deployment. It would, however, have retained many of the central features of the

Treaty that limit the capabilities of ABM systems.

President Clinton announced on September 1, 2000 that he had decided not to

authorize deployment of an NMD system because he did not have “enough

confidence in the technology, and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD

system.” In two of three tests, the defensive missile had failed to intercept its target.

The Administration announced that it planned to continue with research and

development on its NMD technologies, and that it would continue discussions with

the Russians about the ABM Treaty. But the final decision on whether to begin

NMD deployment would be left to Clinton’s successor.

Bush Administration. President Bush has emphasized that he places a high

priority on defenses that could protect the United States, its forces, and its allies from

ballistic missile attack. He outlined his Administration’s approach in a speech on

May 1, 2001,3 when he indicated that “we can draw on already established

technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based capabilities to intercept

missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter the atmosphere.”4 During hearings

before Congress in July 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz provided

more details on the Administration’s missile defense program. He stated that the

Pentagon would pursue a robust research and development program into a wide range

of technologies that could be based on land, at sea, or in space. He stated that the

Administration had not yet identified a specific architecture for its system because

it would make use of the most promising technologies as soon as they were ready.

Ultimately, though, the Administration is seeking to develop and deploy an

integrated, layered system that can defend the United States, its forces, and allies

from missiles of all ranges at all phased of their flight trajectories.

2

For a detailed discussion of the U.S. NMD program and policy towards the ABM Treaty,

see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, National Missile Defense:

Issues for Congress, CRS Issue Brief IB10034. By (name redacted) and (name redacted).

3

The Bush Administration does uses the phrase “missile defense” rather than the Clinton-era

“national missile defense” to describe the systems currently under consideration. This is a

broader concept for missile defense that could combine defenses against both shorter,

medium, and longer-range missiles in an integrated defense architecture.

4

George W. Bush Delivers Remarks on Missile Defense. Transcript. Federal Document

Clearing House. May 1, 2001.

CRS-4

Administration officials acknowledged that many parts of its missile defense

program would not be consistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty. They argued

that the Treaty, and the nuclear strategy it embodied, should be replaced by a new

framework for deterrence that combines both offensive and defensive capabilities.

The Administration participated in consultations with Russia on a new strategic

framework, but, when it was unable to convince Russia to withdraw from the Treaty

with the United States, it announced that the United States would withdraw itself.

The Russian Response

Concerns about Strategic Stability and Arms Control

The dominant theme in Russia’s response to the U.S. approach to missile

defenses and the ABM Treaty is the idea that the ABM Treaty is the “cornerstone of

strategic stability” and that the U.S. deployment of missile defenses would undermine

stability and upset arms control.5 According to this view, the Treaty, with its ban on

widespread ballistic missile defenses, underscores the Cold War model of deterrence,

where neither the United States nor Soviet Union could threaten an attack on the

other without facing an overwhelming retaliatory strike. The assured destruction

promised by this retaliatory strike meant that the strategic balance was stable, that

neither side would risk an attack no matter how grave a crisis. Accordingly, the

deployment of ballistic missile defenses that could protect all U.S. territory (as

opposed to the limited defenses permitted by the Treaty) would undermine this

concept of stability. If a nation could intercept missiles launched in retaliation,

particularly if it had diminished their numbers in its initial strike, it might believe it

could launch a first strike without fearing retaliation. Knowing this, the nation

without the defensive system might conclude that it had to launch preemptively,

before losing any of its forces in an initial attack. Under these circumstances,

stability would be lost and a nation might have an incentive to launch first in a crisis.

Furthermore, Russian officials have argued that the ABM Treaty is the

cornerstone of the entire network of agreements that reduce offensive nuclear

weapons.6 The Treaty’s limits on ballistic missile defenses allowed the United States

5

Russia’s former defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, has said “the [1972] ABM Treaty, is the

cornerstone for strategic stability and the basis for the system of international agreements

in the sphere of the monitoring and control of weapons. Now it has been threatened due to

the fact that the USA has decided upon the deployment of a national ABM system, which

is prohibited by the [ABM] Treaty... If such a system is deployed in the USA, it [the treaty]

will become meaningless. See Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev on Military Reform,

Chechnya, ABM Defense. Vek. February 23, 20001. Translated in FBIS Document

CEP20010301000351.

6

Russia’s President Putin has said, “People must realize that the mutual reduction of

strategic attack weapons -- the most dangerous of all nuclear weapons -- is possible only

when the ABM Treaty continues to hold. Scrapping it would make a further reduction of

strategic attack weapons according to START-I impossible. START-II would not come

into force either, as it would be impossible to conclude START-III, aimed at talking about

the radical reduction of nuclear arsenals. This blow would also affect other agreements that

(continued...)

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and Soviet Union to accept limits and reductions in their offensive forces because

they knew they could maintain an effective deterrent at lower levels when the

offensive forces could not be blunted by defensive systems. Accordingly, if the

United States were to abrogate the ABM Treaty to deploy ballistic missile defenses,

Russia might feel compelled to abrogate agreements on offensive forces so that it

could retain an arsenal of sufficient size to ensure that it could penetrate the U.S.

ballistic missile defenses.

Finally, Russian critics note that the U.S. approach to missile defenses and the

ABM Treaty would upset not only strategic stability between the United States and

Russia, but also international strategic stability. They argue that other nations, such

as China, might believe that their offensive forces would be undermined by U.S.

defenses, and might feel compelled to expand their arsenals to ensure an effective

retaliatiory attack. But, if one nation, such as China, were to react this way, other

nations might feel threatened and might react, themselves, by increasing their

offensive military capabilities. Hence, the deployment of missile defenses and U.S.

abrogation of the ABM Treaty could set off a new, threatening international arms

race. Russian critics, and many critics of missile defense in the United States argue

that, in the long run, the United States could become less secure with nationwide

missile defenses than it is in its current more “vulnerable” condition.

The Clinton Administration sought to reassure Russia about its concerns for

strategic stability. On several occasions, when President Clinton met with President

Yeltsin or President Putin, he signed statements and declarations acknowledging that

the ABM Treaty remained the cornerstone of strategic stability. At their summit

meeting in June 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Joint Statement On

Principles of Strategic Stability. In this document, the Presidents declared that “They

agree on the essential contribution of the ABM Treaty to reductions in offensive

forces, and reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic

stability.”7 At the same time, the United States sought to convince Russia that the

Treaty could serve this purpose even if it were modified or amended to allow the

deployment of a limited NMD.8 In addition, the Clinton Administration argued that

6

(...continued)

are of fundamental, global importance: the NPT, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty... Russia

will be forced to look for an alternative to end its commitments not only regarding START,

but also the agreement on intermediate-range and short-range missiles, the conclusion of

which is linked to the legal and military framework of the START-II-ABM process.” See

Gafron, Georg and Kai Diekmann. Russia is Still a World Power. Interview with Russian

President Vladimir Putin Hamburg Welt am Sonntag. June 11, 2000. Translated in FBIS

Document EUP20000611000121.

7

Joint Statement By the Presidents of the United States of America and The Russian

Federation on Principles of Strategic Stability. The White House. Office of the Press

Secretary. June 4, 2000.

8

Secretary of Defense Cohen noted that, although the Presidents agreed that the Treaty

remained a cornerstone of strategic stability, it was not a static document. He pointed out

that “the treaty allows amendments to fit new strategic realities, such as the emerging new

threats we face.” DOD New Briefing, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Presenter.

(continued...)

CRS-6

the changes it sought in the ABM Treaty would permit only a limited NMD system

that would address the emerging threat from “rogue” nations and that the system

would not be capable enough to intercept the larger numbers of missiles that Russia

would possess, even as its forces declined in the coming decade.

Concerns about the Scope and Intent of NMD

Differing Threat Assessments. Russian officials have agreed with the U.S.

view that ballistic missile proliferation could pose a problem and introduce new

missile threats to both nations. The Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic

Stability, signed after the June 2000 summit, stated that the Presidents agreed “that

the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and

missile technologies...” Furthermore, the Presidents agreed that “this new threat

represents a potentially significant change in the strategic situation and international

security environment.”9 In an interview held shortly before the summit, President

Putin proposed that the United States and Russia cooperate on the development of

a “boost-phase” theater missile defense system that could be based near “rogue”

nations to address this emerging threat.10

However, Russian officials disagree with the U.S. view that missile proliferation

and the potential missile capabilities of “rogue”nations pose a significant or

immediate threat to the United States. In an interview with the Russian press,

President Putin acknowledged that “such threats, theoretically, in principle, [could]

emerge one day.” But he went on to state that “we do not believe that there are such

threats now nor that they are coming from any specific states.”11 Consequently,

President Putin did not agree with the U.S. view that these emerging threats justified

the U.S. proposals for changes to the ABM Treaty and the deployment of an NMD

system.12 Moreover, Russian officials claim that, even if “rogue” nations could

threaten the United States with long-range missiles, the overwhelming power of U.S.

offensive forces would deter such an attack. Russia’s former Defense Minister, Igor

Sergeyev, outlined this view when he stated:

8

(...continued)

June 9, 2000.

9

Joint Statement By the Presidents. Op cit.

10

Grier, Peter. Putin’s “Star Wars” Lite: Could it Fly? Christian Science Monitor. June 8,

2000. p. 2.

11

Shchedrov, Oleg. Putin sees U.S. missile concerns, but no threat now. Reuters. July 12,

2000.

12

“The situation indeed has changed, but not enough to break down the system of strategic

stability that has formed by emasculating the ABM Treaty. It is possible to take steps to

counter the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies without going beyond the

framework of the ABM Treaty and by acting above all by means of political and diplomatic

methods.” See Putin’s Nuclear Weapons Reduction Proposals. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda,

November 14, 2000.

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“the development of ICBMs entailed a colossal strain on the economy even

for giants like the USSR and the United States. So assertions that ICBMs

will appear in the near future in the possession of Third World states that

do not possess a sound economy or the relevant technologies appear very

lightweight and unfounded. Indeed, even if we imagine the purely

theoretical situation where such missiles will become part of the armory,

the nuclear deterrence factor that demonstrated its effectiveness back in the

Cold War years will still apply to those countries.”13

Thus, Minister Sergeyev, and others in Russia have concluded that, if the

emerging missile threats in “rogue” nations do not really threaten U.S. territory, then

a U.S. NMD system cannot really be directed against those threats. Instead, the

United States must be seeking to develop a missile defense system that can contribute

to its global drive for domination and undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

“The results of our military-technical analysis indicate that the threat of the

carrying out of a strike against the USA by intercontinental ballistic

missiles launched by so-called "problem" states, which the USA sets forth

as the primary reason for the development of its national ABM system, is,

in realty, not being considered [i.e., it is not the real reason for the

development of the national ABM system]. We do not see any [real]

motives for the deployment of this national ABM system other than the

striving of the USA to acquire strategic domination in the world. We are

deeply convinced that such a deployment would be primarily directed

against Russia.”14

Skepticism about “Limited NMD”. Many Russian officials and analysts

did not believe that the United States planned to limit its missile defense system,

even under the Clinton Administration. Some argued that the United States would

not spend more than $100 billion dollars to develop and deploy a missile defense

system, then limit it to a capability to intercept only 10-20 missiles.15 The Clinton

Administration contributed to this disbelief when it stated that it would seek

modifications to the ABM Treaty in two phases; the first would simply allow the

deployment of a single NMD site in Alaska and the upgrades to some early warning

radars. In the second phase, the Clinton Administration planned to request an

increase in the permitted number of interceptor missiles and the addition of spacebased sensors. Some Russians suspected that additional phases, with additional

“minor modifications” would have followed, and that, eventually, the U.S. approach

would have loosened the Treaty enough to permit the deployment of more extensive

defenses. The Bush Administration also insists that its missile program would be

limited to address only the threat from rogue nations. But the Administration has

13

Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with

Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June

22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242

14

Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev on Military Reform, Chechnya, ABM Defense. Vek.

February 23, 20001. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20010301000351.

15

Russian military chief says NMD will destroy strategic stability. Itar-Tass. February 16,

2001. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20010216000210.

CRS-8

outlined plans to develop and deploy a robust, layered system, as opposed to the

limited land-based system considered by the Clinton Administration, which could

provide a more capable defense against Russian missiles.

Russian analysts calculated that, even with the Clinton Administration’s limited

defensive system, the United States could expand its missile defense capabilities by

upgrading its early warning and command and control structures, then quickly adding

to the number of deployed interceptors. Former Defense Minister Sergeyev outlined

this concern in an interview with the Russian press. He noted that “It is not the

quantity of interceptor missiles that determines the combat potential of any

antimissile defense system.

First and foremost, it depends on the system's

information components which ensure the acquisition and tracking of targets, the

ability to distinguish real warheads from dummy targets.”16 A Russian analyst,

Alexander Pikayev, also noted that the United States could easily expand its NMD

capabilities once it had developed the space-based sensors that would improve

targeting and tracking capabilities. He stated that, once it had developed and

deployed these capabilities, “it would be easy for the U.S. to produce and deploy

large numbers of interceptors.”17

In April 2000, Pentagon officials presented Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor

Ivanov with a detailed briefing about the capabilities of the radars planned for the

U.S. NMD system in an effort to convince him that the system would not pose a

threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent forces.18 But Russian officials were not

convinced.19 The Bush Administration also provided Russian officials with detailed

briefings on the new U.S. missile defense program in early August 2001.

Consequently, with their doubts about the U.S. assessments of emerging

ballistic missile threats and their doubts about the limited nature of a prospective U.S.

NMD system, many Russian officials and analysts concluded that “the so-called

limited nature of the U.S. NMD sytem is based on the desire to obscure the very

essence of the system. The NMD is only a stage in the development and deployment

of a full-scale ABM system.”20 Former Defense Minister Sergeyev stated that the

Clinton Administration’s limited NMD would be the “first step toward the future

16

Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with

Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June

22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242

17

Pikayav, Alexander. ABM Treaty Revision: A Challenge to Russian Security.

Disarmament Diplomacy. Issue No. 44.

18

Myers, Steven Lee. Russians Get Briefing on U.S. Defense Plan. New York Times. April

29, 2000.

19

“The argument that the US NMD system will be "limited" in nature and therefore

represents no danger to the Russian strategic deterrent forces does not convince us” See,

Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with

Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June

22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242.

20

Russian military chief says NMD will destroy strategic stability. Itar-Tass. February 16,

2001. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20010216000210.

CRS-9

emergence of a multifunctional global system for combating all types of ballistic,

aerodynamic, and space targets and subsequently also surface and land targets. This

comprehensive defense system will be directed first and foremost against the

deterrent potential of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.”21

The Threat to Russia’s Deterrent. Russian analysts have argued that the

United States could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent, and possibly

acquire a disarming first strike capability, with even a relatively limited missile

defense capability. First, they note that Russia’s arsenal of strategic offensive nuclear

weapons is likely to decline sharply over the next decade, to perhaps fewer than

1,500 warheads, as older weapons are retired and financial constraints preclude the

acquisition of newer weapons. But the United States could maintain a much larger

offensive nuclear force of several thousand nuclear weapons, even under prospective

arms control scenarios. In addition, NATO enlargement, the U.S. advantage in antisubmarine warfare, and the U.S. advantage in precision-guided conventional

weapons, such as the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, provide the United

States and its allies with the ability to conduct conventional attacks on strategic

targets in Russia in a comprehensive first strike. If the United States launched an

attack against Russia with its conventional and nuclear forces, and destroyed a large

percentage of Russia’s diminished nuclear forces, a few hundred missile defense

interceptors could be sufficient to intercept Russia’s retaliatory strike. Hence,

according to this argument, even a limited missile defense system could “undermine

strategic stability” and contribute to U.S. efforts to “achieve radical changes in the

military balance.”22

Russian analysts also note that China is likely to react to the deployment of a

U.S. NMD system by expanding its military capabilities and its offensive missile

forces. One Russian analyst, Alexander Pikayev, has stated that China has already

adopted a $10 billion package for a new nuclear buildup in reaction to U.S. plans to

deploy an NMD system together with a TMD system in the Western Pacific, and that

China would have to significantly increase the size of its missile force to maintain the

credibility of its deterrent in the face of a U.S. NMD. But, according to Pikayev and

other Russian analyts, these weapons could pose as much of a threat to Russia as they

could to the United States: “Currently, the predominance of Chinese conventional

weapons vis-a-vis the vast but sparsely populated Russian Far East is balanced by

Moscow’s superiority in nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear build-up might

considerably erode this superiority, further weakening Russia’s position in the Far

21

Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with

Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June

22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242

22

Rogov, Sergey Mikhaylovich. Reliance on the Nuclear Shield: Not Unilateral Reduction,

but a Search for Compromise Solutions With the United States Will Ensure Russia's

National Security. August 4, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000810000216.

See also, Pikayav, Alexander. ABM Treaty Revision: A Challenge to Russian Security.

Disarmament Diplomacy. Issue No. 44.

CRS-10

East.”23 According to Pikayev, this imbalance with Chinese forces might compel

Russia to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Forces Treaty.

Possible Military Responses

Hence, in spite of U.S. claims to the contrary, many Russian officials and

analysts appear to believe that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and

deployment of a nationwide missile defense system would undermine the existing

framework of arms control agreements, upset international strategic stability, incite

new arms races, and threaten the credibility of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent.

Several Russian officials have declared that, if the United States were to follow this

path, Russia would feel compelled to withdraw from a range of arms control

agreements so that it could deploy the military forces that it would need to offset the

U.S. threat to its nuclear deterrent. These military responses could include changes

in the deployment of several different types of nuclear weapons.

Deploy Multiple Warheads on New ICBMs. The 1993 START II Treaty,

which has not yet entered into force, would have banned the deployment of landbased strategic ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVed ICBMs). Under

this agreement, Russia would have had to eliminate its 10-warhead SS-18 ICBMs

and 10-warhead SS-24 ICBMs. It also would have to reduce, from 6 to one, the

number of warheads deployed on its SS-19 ICBMs. This would leave Russia with an

ICBM force that consisted of single warhead SS-25 and SS-27 missiles and around

100 aging SS-19 missiles..

Even without Treaty implementation, Russia is likely to eliminate many of the

older multiple warhead missiles. The SS-18s, which have long been considered the

backbone of Russia’s strategic nuclear force, are likely to reach the end of their

service-lives by the end of the decade. Russia would find it hard to maintain these

forces because the missiles were produced at a plant in Ukraine, which is no longer

making ICBMs for Russia, and Russia lacks the economic resources needed to build

a new plant to support these missiles in Russia. However, if it were not bound by the

START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs, Russia could deploy its older single-warhead SS25 ICBM and new single-warhead SS-27 ICBM with 3 warheads.24 Alternatively,

Russia could develop new types of decoys and penetration aids for these missiles, to

complicate U.S. efforts to intercept them with its missile defense system.

Russia currently has 360 SS-25 missiles and 30 operational SS-27 missiles. The

SS-27 missiles were expected to replace the SS-25 missiles in Russia’s force. Russia

is currently producing fewer than 10 of these missiles per year, but had hoped to

produce up to 30 missiles per year later this decade. Many experts believed Russia

would eventually produce 300 SS-27 missiles, but with the low production rates

currently in place, this number is likely to be lower. Even if each of these missiles

23

Pikayav, Alexander. ABM Treaty Revision: A Challenge to Russian Security.

Disarmament Diplomacy. Issue No. 44.

24

Dolinin, Aleksandr. Russia's Security Is Reliably Guaranteed. Interview with Strategic

Missile Troops Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Vladimir Yakovlev. Krasnaya

Zvezda, July 5, 2000. Translated in FBIS CEP20000705000396.

CRS-11

were to carry 3 warheads, Russia’s ICBM force would likely include fewer than 1000

warheads by the end of the decade. This contrasts with more than 3,500 warheads

on Russia’s ICBM force now. So, even if Russia were to abrogate START I and set

aside START II, it would probably institute sharp reductions in the size of its ICBM

force.

Deploy new intermediate range missiles. Several Russian officials have

also suggested that Russia might abrogate the 1987 INF Treaty and deploy new

shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles.25 As was noted above, Russia could

pursue this option in an effort to offset any advantages that China might acquire if it

expanded its nuclear forces in response to a U.S. NMD. But the threat to deploy new

missiles in this range can also be seen as a part of Russia’s attempt to convince U.S.

allies in Europe to join it in opposing U.S. NMD plans.26 In discussing this option,

Vladimir Yakovlev, the former Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces

noted that “in the event of the repudiation of the INF Treaty, Europe once again falls

hostage to a clash between the nuclear superpowers. The United States is planning

to [maintain] a 100,000-strong grouping on the continent of Europe with command

and control posts and the relevant infrastructure and all this is an extremely worthy

target for Russian missiles.27

Russia could reportedly produce new intermediate range missiles in a relatively

short amount of time. According to one official, the Moscow Institute of Heat and

Engineering, Russia’s leading design bureau for ballistic missiles, has already

prepared blueprints and technical documents for the system and could transfer them

to the Votkinsk missile assembly facility as a soon as a decision was made to begin

producing missiles.28 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that it could produce large numbers

of these missiles in a short period of time. The Votkinsk Missile Assembly facility

is the same location where Russia produced the SS-25 missiles and is currently

producing the SS-27 missile, at a rate of fewer than 10 per year. Economic

constraints would make it very difficult for Russia to expand production at this

facility. Hence, any increase in the production of intermediate-range missiles could

come at the expense of the already-low production rate for SS-27 missiles.

Redeploy shorter-range nuclear delivery systems. During the early

1990s, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment many of

their shorter-range nuclear delivery systems. They did this unilaterally, without any

negotiated agreements and without any formal monitoring or verification provisions.

For Russia, these weapons came out of deployment areas in the other former Soviet

25

Dolinin, Aleksandr. Russia's Security Is Reliably Guaranteed. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 5,

2000. Translated in FBIS CEP20000705000396.

26

Saradzhyan, Simon. U.S. NMD Effort Fueling Russia’s New Missile Plan. Defense News.

July 10, 2000. p. 1.

27

Odnokolenko, Oleg. Wait For a Response. Asymmetrical Response. Russia Could Be

Embroiled in Ruinous Arms Race. Segodnya, June 22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document

CEP20000622000085

28

Saradzhyan, Simon. U.S. NMD Effort Fueling Russia’s New Missile Plan. Defense News.

July 10, 2000. p. 1.

CRS-12

republics and near Russia’s borders. Many were consolidated at storage areas within

Russia. Some analysts in the United States have expressed concerns that Russia

might return some of these weapons to deployment or to storage areas closer to

Russia’s western borders. The Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket forces

indicated that this was a possibility when he stated that Russia could also institute

“changes to the principles of employment and deployment of operational-tactical

nuclear weapons” as a part of its response to U.S. deployment of NMD.29

This type of response would not give Russia any new capabilities to threaten the

United States or to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. However, it would be consistent

with Russia’s new national security strategy, which allows for the possible use of

non-strategic nuclear weapons in response to conventional military attacks on Russia.

Most experts believe that this change in Russia’s strategy is a response to the

degradation in Russia’s conventional military capabilities, and its growing concern

about the military implications of NATO enlargement. In addition, the threat of new

nuclear deployments near Europe could be a part of Russia’s efforts to draw support

from the United States’ allies in Europe for Russia’s opposition to missile defense.

According to this school of thought, the more threatened the Europeans feel by

Russia’s potential responses, the more likely they are to pressure the United States

to alter its policy on missile defense.

Most experts agree that Russia will not win the support of U.S. allies in Europe,

even if it threatens to redeploy shorter-range or intermediate-range nuclear forces

near its western borders. However, if Russia intends to make these changes anyway,

in response to its diminished conventional capabilities, then the collapse of arms

control in response to U.S. missile defense policy could provide a convenient excuse.

Russian Alternatives

Russian officials have stated that, instead of relying on missile defenses that

could upset stability and undermine arms control, the two sides should rely on “an

umbrella based on diplomacy”30 and has offered proposals for measures that the

international community might adopt to address the threat posed by missile

proliferation. The Clinton Administration did not dismiss the Russian approach, but

also did not accept it as an alternative to the U.S. approach. Then-Secretary of

Defense Cohen noted, after the June 2000 summit between Presidents Clinton and

Putin, that the response to missile proliferation should include both diplomatic efforts

to stop proliferation and defensive systems to protect the nations from possible

attack.31

29

Dolinin, Aleksandr. Russia's Security Is Reliably Guaranteed. Interview with Strategic

Missile Troops Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Vladimir Yakovlev. Krasnaya

Zvezda, July 5, 2000. Translated in FBIS CEP20000705000396.

30

Williams, Daniel. Russia Wants Political Shield; Moscow Says Diplomacy, Not

Technology, Key to Missile Defense. Washington Post. June 14, 2000. p. A34

31

DOD News Briefing, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Presenter. June 9, 2000.

CRS-13

The Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation

Control System (GCS)

In June 1999, Russia proposed that the international community establish a

Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-proliferation Control System (GCS).

Russia advocated this regime as “component part of the global regime of the

non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies.”32 It would, in part,

complement the Missile Technology Control Regime – which regulates the supply

side of missile technologies – by regulating the behavior of nations that might seek

to acquire ballistic missile technologies; and, would operate under U.N. auspices.

It would also provide incentives to nations so that they would forgo their own missile

arsenals. Russian officials said the goal was to present an alternative to NMD that

maximizes “peaceful” diplomatic and political efforts to address concerns about

missile proliferation.33

Specifically, Russia proposed that the international community create a prelaunch and post-launch notification launch-monitoring regime to build transparency

into ballistic missile developments. Nations that participated in this regime would

gain an understanding of missile developments in neighboring countries and might

feel less threatened, and therefore, less compelled to develop their own missiles. The

regime would also include a global monitoring system to provide a “mechanism for

detection of missile launches for any purpose.” This monitoring system, which could

build on the system under development by the United States and Russia, might also

ease tensions and uncertainties about ballistic missile developments. For nations

who agreed to forgo the development of their own ballistic missiles, the Russian

proposal offered security guarantees, with the international community coming to a

nation’s assistance if it were attacked by ballistic missiles. Finally, the proposal

contained incentives for countries to forgo the development of ballistic missiles.34

The Clinton Administration responded cautiously to the Russian proposal. It

reportedly saw some positive elements, but also had concerns that the discussions

might be used as a forum to criticize U.S. NMD plans and undermine U.S. efforts to

win support for missile defenses.35 Furthermore, although the United States

supported the principle of a multilateral launch notification regime, it preferred to

focus its attention on the bilateral U.S.-Russian effort. It believed it would be easier

to make the Joint Data Exchange Center available to other countries once it was

operational than to conduct multilateral negotiations to establish the center.

32

Ivanov Comments on START-3 Negotiations, Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

Russian Federation, September 2, 2000.

Translated in FBIS Document

CEP20000905000219.

33

U.S. Adopting “Wait and See” Approach to Russian Missile Initiative. Inside the

Pentagon, April 16, 2000. p. 1.

34

U.S. Adopting “Wait and See” Approach to Russian Missile Initiative. Inside the

Pentagon, April 16, 2000. p. 1.

35

U.S. Adopting “Wait and See” Approach to Russian Missile Initiative. Inside the

Pentagon, April 16, 2000. p. 1.

CRS-14

Russia has held two organizational meetings on its proposal for a GCS. At the

first conference, in March 2000, Russia outlined its plan for the regime. At the

second, in February 2001, the participants talked about an international code of

conduct on missile technology transfers that had been proposed at the MTCR

meetings in 2000. This code would affect the demand side, placing limits on nations

seeking to advance their missile capabilities. The United States has not participated

actively in the GCS forum. The U.S. embassy sent an observer to the first meeting

but no U.S. official attended the second. The Clinton Administration agreed to try

to integrate the GCS proposal into the existing MTCR framework, but it did not

support the creation of a separate regime outside of the MTCR framework.36

Cooperation on Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe

The Russian Proposal. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin first proposed

that Russia cooperate with nations in Europe in developing defenses against theater

ballistic missiles in June 2000, shortly after his summit meeting with President

Clinton. He referred to this concept as “a regionally-based missile defense system”

that would not require any changes in the ABM Treaty.”37 Putin’s initial, general

proposal was followed by meetings between NATO officials and Russia’s Minister

of Defense, Igor Sergeyev, later in June. At that time, General Sergeyev reportedly

outlined the framework for cooperation that Russia had in mind. He said that

possible areas of cooperation could include:

-- joint assessment of the nature and scale of missile proliferation and possible

missile threats;

-- joint development of a concept for a pan-European nonstrategic missile defense

system and of a procedure for its creation and deployment;

-- joint creation of a pan-European multilateral missile launch warning center;

-- the holding of joint command and staff exercises;

-- the conducting of joint research and experiments;

-- joint development of nonstrategic missile defense systems;

-- creation of nonstrategic missile defense formations for joint or coordinated

actions to protect peacekeeping forces or the civilian population.38

Russia’s second proposal was included in a nine-page paper entitled “Phases of

European Missile Defense” that was presented to NATO’s Secretary General Lord

36

Russia holds Second GCS Conference. Arms Control Today. March 2001. p. 34.

37

Europe Urged by Putin to reject U.S. Missile Plan. London Times, June 12, 2000.

38

Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with

Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June

22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242

CRS-15

George Robertson in Moscow in February 2001. This paper reportedly added details

to the general outline that Russia had first presented in June 2000. One key

difference was that, instead of hinting at the use of boost-phase defenses, as Russia

had done in June 2000, the new paper indicated that the defensive system would rely

on more conventional terminal defenses in transportable units that could be moved

to counter specific threats during a crisis.39 But the rest of the proposal remained

essentially the same. Russia and the European nations would first cooperate in a

forum that would review and assess emerging ballistic missile threats. They could

then establish a joint early warning center to process data and share information on

missile launches. These nations could also jointly develop, build and deploy a nonstrategic anti-ballistic missile system that could be ready for rapid deployment to any

area in Europe where the threat of missile attack might arise.40 According to some

reports, the plan was “long on generalities and short on specifics.” It provided “little

technical evaluation and no cost estimates, development timetables, or organizational

structures.” It simply represented a “theoretical basis for how a mobile Europeanbased system might be developed using Russian technology.”41

Russian officials emphasized that Russia had the technology, industrial base,

and testing facilities needed to develop and produce a mobile non-strategic ballistic

missile defense system. They also noted that Russia had the early warning network

needed to monitor and respond to ballistic missile threats that might emerge from

nations to the south of Europe.42 The paper presented to Lord Robertson did not

identify the technologies that could be used in the system, but it did contain a

diagram, and analysts who reviewed the material concluded that Russia intended to

use its S-300 and S-400 air-defense systems.43 The S-300 reportedly includes a

sophisticated set of tracking devices and rockets that can reportedly intercept up to

six missiles or aircraft at one time.44 These systems are reportedly based on the SA10 air-defense system that the Soviet Union first deployed in the late 1960s. The

system accomplished some successful intercepts of theater-range ballistic missiles

in the mid-1990s. Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems attributes this system with

capabilities similar to the U.S. Patriot system, which can intercept shorter-range

ballistic missiles.45 But Russian sources claim the S-400 version will be able to

39

Baker, Peter and Susan B. Glasser. Russia Details Anti-Missile Alternative. Washington

Post. February 21, 2001. p 16.

40

Russia Sees Rapid Anti-Missile Force. New York Times on the Web. April 10, 2001.

41

Baker, Peter. Russia’s Skeletal Missile Plan. Outline of European Shield Brings Little

Response from the West. Washington Post. April 3, 2001.

42

Sorokina, Svetlana. Interview with Vladimir Yakovlev, Commander in Chief of the

Russian Strategic Missile Troops. From the "Hero of the Day" program, June 22, 2000.

Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000323.

43

Baker, Peter. Russia’s Skeletal Missile Plan. Outline of European Shield Brings Little

Response from the West. Washington Post. April 3, 2001.

44

45

Hoagland, Jim. Putin’s Rocket Challenge. Washington Post. March 18, 2001. p. B7

Lennox, Duncan, editor. Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems. Issue 33. August 2000. pp.

302-305.

CRS-16

intercept missiles with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. This version reportedly

entered production in mid-2000 and may become operational in 2001.46

The U.S. and European Reactions. When Russia first offered its proposal

for a European missile defense system, the Clinton Administration said the idea

could not serve as a substitute for a U.S. NMD. Specifically, Secretary of Defense

Cohen stated that it would leave the United States and Europe vulnerable to attacks

from long-range rockets being developed by countries such as Iran and North Korea.

Therefore, it could not protect the United States or its allies from the full range of

emerging threats.47 To be acceptable to the United States, a missile defense sytem

would have to “protect all of the United States territory.” Therefore, the Russian

suggestion for a cooperative system with Europe “could supplement, but not

substitute for the system that the U.S. is developing.”48

The European reaction to Russia’s initial proposal was also “guarded”

According to a European diplomat, “There is a lot of skepticism because this would

seem to be another attempt by Moscow to drive a wedge between Europe and the

United States.”49 Many analysts also considered the proposal to a be a “clumsy”

attempt by Moscow to draw the European nations away from the United States and

to increase pressure on the Clinton Administration to defer missile defense

deployment and remain within the ABM Treaty.

The reaction to Russia’s February 2001 paper that added details to the June 2000

proposal was not as critical. Officials from the both Bush Administration and NATO

noted that Russia’s focus on theater missile defenses for Europe indicated that Russia

appeared to agree with the United States that missile proliferation posed a threat and

agreed that missile defense systems, as well as diplomacy and arms control, could

play a role in addressing the threat.50 Some analysts suggested that a change in tone

that accompanied Russia’s second proposal, and the fact that it came less than a

month into the Bush Administration, signaled that Russia realized that the new

President was more committed to the deployment of missile defenses and that

Russia’s opposition could be futile. Instead, by offering more details on the Russian

alternative, Russia could be seeking to maintain a dialogue with the United States on

missile defenses.51

46

Missile Troops Begin Testing of S-400 Defensive Missile System. Moscow TV. June 21,

2000.

47

Drozdiak, William. U.S. Rejects Russian Plan for Joint Missile Defense. Cohen Says

Proposal Fails to Shield Against Long-Range Strikes. Washington Post. June 10, 2000, p.

17

48

DOD News Briefing. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Presenter. June 9, 2000.

49

Drozdiak, William. U.S. Rejects Russian Plan for Joint Missile Defense. Cohen Says

Proposal Fails to Shield Against Long-Range Strikes. Washington Post. June 10, 2000, p.

17

50

Gordon, Michael R. Moscow Signaling A Change in Tone on Missile Defense. New York

Times, February 22, 2001. P. 1.

51

Gordon, Michael R. Moscow Signaling A Change in Tone on Missile Defense. New York

(continued...)

CRS-17

U.S. Response to the Russian Reaction

Clinton Administration

The Clinton Administration sought to address Russian concerns about the U.S.

plans for missile defense by convincing Russia that the ABM Treaty would remain

largely in place, that missile defenses would remain relatively limited, and that they

would be directed against possible small-scale attacks from “rogue” nations. As was

noted above, the Clinton Administration agreed with the Russian view that the ABM

Treaty was the cornerstone of strategic stability. It proposed only modest changes to

the Treaty, so that it could deploy a limited ground based site in Alaska, rather than

North Dakota, and so that it could upgrade radar capabilities. It acknowledged that

the United States might seek further modifications in the future, but it never

suggested that it would deploy a robust, layered defense that included sea-based or

space-based interceptors.

Administration officials also met frequently with Russian officials to discuss

U.S. NMD plans and to seek Russian agreement on changes to the ABM Treaty.

Although these discussions proved futile, and Russia offered little more than a simple

“no” in response to U.S. initiatives, this effort appeared to indicate that the United

States placed a high priority on reaching agreement with Russia before it proceeded

with its missile defense plans. Administration officials indicated that the United

States would consider withdrawing from the ABM Treaty if Russia failed to accept

modifications but Russia apparently never believed that the Clinton Administration

would take this step. This view may have contributed to Russia’s reluctance to

accept or even discuss the U.S. proposals.

Bush Administration

The Bush Administration has altered sharply the U.S. approach towards

addressing Russia’s concerns. First, the Administration does not support the view

that the ABM Treaty remains the cornerstone of strategic stability. To the contrary,

Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell stated that the Treaty is “ancient history” and “not

relevant in the current strategic framework.” In his speech on May 1, 2001, President

Bush said the United States must “leave behind the constraints of the ABM Treaty”

and, instead, “replace this treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean

break from the past...”

Second, the Bush Administration has not accepted the limited approach to

missile defenses that had been pursued by the Clinton Administration. Although the

Administration insists that its defensive systems will also be directed against “rogue”

nation threats and accidental launches, it has not pledged to keep that system limited

to a few hundred interceptors based at one or a few sites on land. Instead, the

Administration has pledged to develop a “layered” defense that will include

components based on land, at sea, and in space. Unlike the Clinton Administration,

51

(...continued)

Times, February 22, 2001. P. 1.

CRS-18

and possibly because it has not yet settled on an architecture, the Bush

Administration has not yet sought to convince Russia that the technologies included

in U.S. missile defense plans could not intercept a deliberate Russian attack and

would not undermine Russia’s deterrent. Instead, the Administration has offered

verbal assurances that it does not view Russia as an adversary, and, therefore, would

not direct U.S. missile defense efforts against Russian forces.

In late July 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that the two nations would

hold discussions on their offensive nuclear weapons and missile defenses, and seek

to reach agreement on a new strategic framework. These discussions began in early

August, when Russian officials received a detailed briefing on U.S. technologies and

the Bush Administration plans for missile defenses. But the Bush Administration did

not view these discussions as the opening round in a formal negotiating process that

might produce a new treaty limiting offensive nuclear weapons or missile defenses.

Instead, the United States wanted Russia to agree to set aside the ABM Treaty, or to

have both parties withdraw from it together, so that the United States could proceed

with missile defense.

Russia, on the other hand, preferred to keep some form of Treaty regime in

place. It acknowledged that the world has changed and that the relationship with the

United States has changed, but it continued to place a value on the predictability and

formality offered by arms control agreements. Reports indicate that it may have been

willing to permit more extensive testing of missile defense systems, and to relax the

definitions in the Agreed Statements on Demarcation so that the United States can

test TMD systems against a wider range of targets. It also sought details about how

the U.S. missile defense program would be constrained by the ABM Treaty, so that

the two sides could devise amendments to relax the relevant constraints. In essence,

Russia approached the Bush Administration with a response that would have been

acceptable, and possibly even effective, during the Clinton Administration, when the

United States was willing to modify the ABM Treaty. But the Bush Administration

did not offer any proposals for amendments because it did not want any constraints

to remain on U.S. missile defense plans.

Issues for Congress

Members of Congress have expressed a range of opinions about the Bush

Administration’s approach to missile defense and arms control.52 Congress did not

vote directly on binding legislation that would address the question of whether the

United States should withdraw from the ABM Treaty. It does, however, have annual

opportunities to review the Administration’s plans for missile defenses when it

reviews the Administration’s budget requests during the annual authorization and

appropriations process. These debates may be dominated by questions about the

costs and technical feasibility of U.S. missile defense plans. But the Members may

52

See, for example, Biden, Joseph R., Jr. Missile Defense Will Make Us Less Secure, Wall

Street Journal, May 3, 2001; John Kyl. ABM Treaty Must Go. USA Today May 2, 2001.

p. 12; and (name redacted), Senate Democrats Square off with Bush Over Missile Plan. New

York Times May 3, 2001. p. 1.

CRS-19

also address some questions about the implications of these plans for the U.S.

relationship with Russia and the future of the arms control process.

Will Russia continue to cooperate on offensive arms reductions?

Many critics of U.S. missile defense policy consider Russia’s threat to withdraw from

a range of offensive arms control agreements as a key threat to U.S. security. They

note that these agreements not only reduce the size of the only arsenal that can

threaten U.S. survival, but they also include monitoring and verification provisions

that bring predictability, transparency, and cooperation to the U.S.-Russian nuclear

relationship. Others, however, argue that the benefits of arms control are not worth

the cost of remaining vulnerable to missile attack. They note that Russian nuclear

forces are likely to decline sharply during the next decade under economic

constraints, with or without arms control. They also note that the United States and

Russia have signed a new Treaty that would reduce their offensive nuclear forces, so

that Russia’s withdrawal from older Treaties would not undermine U.S. security.53

Finally, they contend that the United States and Russia have established a mature,

cooperative relationship on nuclear weapons issues and that the transparency and

predictability from this relationship could continue even if the countries were not

monitoring compliance with arms control treaties.

Will Russia continue to cooperate in non-proliferation and threat

reduction activities? Some critics of U.S. missile defense policy argue that

Russia might cease its cooperation in a range of other policy areas if the United

States were to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. They point to Russia’ expanding

nuclear cooperation with Iran as evidence that Russia could do serious harm to U.S.

national security if it chose to pursue a less restrained nonproliferation policy. Some

also contend that Russia might withdraw from participation in the Nunn-Lugar

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, where the United States provides financial

and technical assistance in securing and eliminating Russian nuclear weapons and

materials. Without U.S. participation, these weapons and materials might be lost,

stolen, or sold to nations seeking their own nuclear weapons. Some believe these

possibilities could pose a greater threat to U.S. security than the emerging missile

threats that would be the target of U.S. missile defenses.

Others, however, doubt that Russian policies in these areas would be linked to

U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. They note that Russia has been cooperating

with Iran in nuclear developments and military sales for many years, and that these

activities are driven more by Russia’s interest in earning hard currency than by

Russia’s interest in undermining U.S. non-proliferation objectives. Some also argue

that Russia would not be likely to cut off cooperation under the Nunn-Lugar

programs because it recognizes the threats posed by the potential loss of nuclear

weapons and materials and it would be unable to safeguard and eliminate aging

nuclear weapons without U.S. assistance.

Will Russia convince other nations to support its objections to U.S.

missile defense policies? Russia conducted a world-wide public relations

53

See CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions

Treaty, by (name redacted).

CRS-20

campaign in an effort to win the support of other countries in its opposition to U.S.

missile defense policies. It joined with China on numerous occasions to criticize

U.S. missile defenses as a threat to international stability and it has sought to win

support from U.S. allies in Europe by promising to cooperate on the development of

theater missile defenses for Europe. It has also issued declarations with many other

nations in support of the ABM Treaty and opposition to U.S. missile defense plans.

Some critics of U.S. missile defense plans argue that the United States might

find itself isolated in the international community if it continues to pursue missile

defenses and withdraws from the ABM Treaty. They note that most countries are at

least uncomfortable, if not outright opposed, to this policy. Some fear that these

nations might interfere with or complicate other areas of U.S. policy if they feel that

the United States has upset the international order with its pursuit of missile defenses.

The Bush Administration pledged to consult with U.S. allies before it proceeded

with missile defense, in part to ease their concerns and reduce their resistence.

Supporters of missile defense deployments generally support consultation with U.S.

allies, although some have expressed concern that the Administration’s emphasis on

these consultations could leave U.S. policy vulnerable to the objections of other

nations. And many do not think these objections will affect the U.S. international

position. They argue that U.S. missile defenses will enhance, not degrade,

international security, and that other nations will realize that they will benefit in the

long run if the United States pursues this course. Some also note that international

criticism will not, in the long run, affect U.S. policy objectives. Finally, as is noted

below, the international reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was

relatively quiet, in large part because Russia’s reaction was so mild.

Russia’s Reaction to U.S. ABM Withdrawal

During the first months of the Bush Administration, analysts and observers

debated how Russia would react if and when the United States withdrew from the

ABM Treaty. They questioned whether Russia would continue to press its objections

to U.S. policies on missile defense and the ABM Treaty, or whether it would try to

reach an accommodation with the Bush Administration on a new framework for

strategic stability. Many members of the Bush Administration believed that the

United States would gain Russia’s cooperation when Russia realized that the U.S.

was committed to withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. They noted that Russia

remained extremely interested in reductions in offensive nuclear forces and that the

Bush Administration’s plans to reduce U.S. forces would ease Russia’s concerns

about U.S. intentions.

Others, however, argued that Russia had outlined well-reasoned and complex

objections to U.S. policies on missile defense and the ABM Treaty, and that it was

not likely to change its views in the near term. Instead, they believed that Russia

could follow through on its threats to withdraw from a range of arms control

agreements and its plans to augment its nuclear forces. They argued that the United

States might eventually become less secure, even if it deployed missile defenses,

because it would be faced with a more adversarial, less cooperative Russia. And

CRS-21

Russia would retain enough nuclear weapons to saturate the U.S. defenses and

threaten the survival of the United States.

This debate grew silent in September 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the

World Trade Center and Pentagon. Russia’s President Putin was the first

international leader to call President Bush after the attacks and he quickly offered his

support to the U.S. war on terrorism. He allowed U.S. forces to use bases in former

Soviet republics and he cooperated by sharing intelligence and Russian knowledge

about Afghanistan. The U.S.-Russian relationship that emerged in the latter months

of 2001 seemed to prove the Bush Administration’s view that the two nations were

no longer enemies and that they could build a new, more cooperative relationship.

Thus, when President Bush announced, on December 13, 2001, that the United

States had given Russia the six-month notice of its intent to withdraw from the ABM

Treaty, Russia’s reaction differed sharply from the conventional wisdom. Reports

indicated that the White House called President Putin in the days before the

announcement, and that the two sides worked together to craft statements that would

indicate that the withdrawal would not upset their relationship. In his statement,

President Putin said that he considered the U.S. decision to be “mistaken” and he

emphasized that Russia had done everything it could to preserve the Treaty. But he

indicated that the U.S. withdrawal would not undermine U.S.-Russian relations, and

that the two sides should work out a “new framework of mutual strategic relations.”54

The White House welcomed Putin’s statement and said that it agreed that the U.S.

withdrawal presented “no threat to the security of the Russian Federation.” The

White House also pledged to work with Russia to formalize reductions in offensive

forces, a process that Russia viewed as a high priority.55

Other officials and analysts in Russia responded with a similar, mild tone.

Andrey Kokoshin, who had served as Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister and was a

member of the Duma, also referred to the U.S. decision as a mistake, but said that it

would not undermine Russia’s security because Russia had weapons systems that

were capable of overcoming U.S. defenses. Kokoshin said that Russia would not

have to “step up the capabilities” of its strategic nuclear forces.56 Marshall Igor

Sergeyev, the former Defense Minister and an adviser to Putin, echoed these views.

He said that the U.S. withdrawal would not create any problems for Russia’s military

security for 10-15 years. He also supported the negotiation of a new strategic

framework, arguing that it “would be extremely undesirable to remain in a legal

vacuum on strategic stability matters for a long time.”57 Some in Russia, however,

54

President Putin Responds to U.S. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. December 13, 2001.

Translated in FBIS CEP20011213000300.

55

The White House. Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal.

Office of the Press Secretary. December 13, 2001.

56

Kokoshin says Russia has Systems Capable of Overcoming ABM Systems. Moscow NTV.

December 13, 2001. Translated in FBIS CEP20011213000361.

57

Kremlin Says U.S. Exit From ABM Treaty Poses No Threat to Russian Security.

Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, December 14, 2001.

Translated in FBIS

(continued...)

CRS-22

offered a more negative response. The Duma approved a resolution that called the

U.S. withdrawal “mistaken and destabilizing.”58

By the time the U.S. withdrawal took effect, on June 13, 2002, the United States

and Russia had negotiated a new Treaty limiting strategic offensive weapons and the

Presidents had signed a Joint Declaration outlining a new framework for cooperation

between the two nations. Although some tensions remained in this relationship,

particularly with respect to Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran, cooperation

between the two nations continued to grow. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM

Treaty no longer seemed like a potentially divisive issue. Foreign Minister Ivanov

noted the event, but stated the “the primary aim now is to minimize the negative

consequences of the U.S. withdrawal.”59 He, and others, noted that Russia had

convinced the United States to continue negotiations on reductions in strategic

offensive forces, which represented a significant achievement for Russian diplomacy.

Furthermore, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov noted that the U.S. missile defense

system did not yet exist and, therefore, there was no reason for Russia to retaliate.60

The Russian Duma, on the other hand, criticized the U.S. withdrawal, calling

it a “gross political mistake” and proposed that, in response, Russia “declare itself

free from its commitments under the START II Treaty.”61 The Russian government

took this step on June 13, 2002, when the Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying

that Russia no longer felt bound by the Treaty.62 This step, however, was largely

symbolic. Officials in both the U.S. and Russian governments have indicated that the

Treaty has been set aside; they acknowledged its absence when they referred to the

START I Treaty as “START” in the text of the new Strategic Offensive Reductions

Treaty.

Hence, although Russian officials criticized U.S. missile defense plans and

promised to take military and diplomatic steps in response to the U.S. withdrawal

from the ABM Treaty, the Russian reaction when the event occurred was far less

aggressive. The changes in the international security environment, and the

continuing improvements in the U.S-Russian relationship, had essentially buried the

debate over the ABM Treaty.

57

(...continued)

CEP20021214000130

58

Russian Parliament Hits U.S. Pullout from Treaty. Washington Times. January 17, 2002.

p. 17.

59

FM Ivanov Says Russia Regrets U.S. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Interfax. June

13, 2002. Translated in FBIS CEP20020613000005.

60

Moscow Plays Down Threat of U.S. Missile Defense. Reuters. June 13, 2002/

61

Rogozin Says Duma Should Declare Russia’s Freedom from START II Commitments.

Interfax. June 13, 2002. Translated in FBIS CEP20020613000084.

62

Moscow Plays Down Threat of U.S. Missile Defense. Reuters. June 13, 2002.

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