Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations

Order Code RL30933

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War

Developments, and U.S. Relations

Updated December 31, 2003

-name redactedAnalyst in African Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments,

and U.S. Relations

Summary

This report covers Liberia’s first civil conflict (1989-1997), post-war

developments until roughly 2001, and the history of U.S.-Liberian relations and U.S.

policy toward Liberia. Subsequent, more recent events are covered in CRS Report

RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace.

The modern Liberian state was founded by “Americo-Liberians,” black freemen

and former slaves from the Americas who settled in Liberia beginning in 1821. State

structure and society in contemporary Liberia reflect a blending of indigenous and

Americo-Liberian cultural and political influences, but the latter historically

exercised extensive control over Liberia’s economy and central government.

Americo-Liberian rule persisted until December 1989, when after nearly a decade

under the corrupt rule of Samuel K. Doe, who seized power in a 1980 coup, Liberia

plunged into civil war. Factional conflict raged for 7 years, despite the signing of

multiple peace agreements, the presence of U.N. observers, and the deployment of

a regional intervention force dispatched by the Economic Community of West

African States. The conflict caused between 150,000 and 200,000 deaths, and

displaced much of the population. The warring factions committed numerous

atrocities and forcibly enlisted thousands of children as fighters. Throughout the

conflict, Congress and successive administrations provided humanitarian assistance

for the Liberian people. The United States had been Liberia’s leading pre-war trading

partner and a major aid donor. A peace process, initiated in mid-1996, resulted in the

July 19, 1997 election of former faction leader Charles Taylor as president of Liberia.

As the new government began the tasks of reconstruction and reconciliation,

Liberia appeared to have entered a period of normalcy. The killing and harassment

of prominent opposition leaders and the new administration’s closure of a newspaper

and radio stations, however, raised widespread doubts about its commitment to good

governance and support for basic human rights. Such incidents prompted strong

expressions of U.S. and international concern, but reports of human rights abuses,

corruption, and lack of democratic progress under the Taylor administration

persisted, as did criticism of it. International concern, particularly in 1999 and

subsequently, increasingly centered on the Taylor government’s on-going military

assistance to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels fighting neighboring

Sierra Leone’s government. This aid, which Taylor denied providing, notably

involved the exchange of military aid for diamonds from Sierra Leone and prolonged

its conflict. To counter these actions, the U.S. and other governments supported a

series of U.N. Security Council resolutions aimed at ending the trade in “conflict

diamonds” and sanctioning the Taylor government. The United States also pursued

unilateral sanctioning the Taylor government.

Eventually, poor political and human rights conditions and residual civil war

resentments and rivalries gave rise to series of limited armed incursions into Liberia

by anti-Taylor dissidents in 1999, who continued their efforts in the following year,

giving rise to a broad and sustained armed insurgency that eventually developed into

a second full-scale civil war (covered in CRS Report RL32243, as noted above).

Contents

General Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Americo-Liberian Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Doe Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Civil War, 1989-1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Growth of Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ECOMOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Conflict Resolution Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

1996: Conflict, Cease-fire, and Disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Role of ECOWAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Disarmament and the Transition to Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ECOWAS and Election Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The 1997 Elections and the Taylor Presidency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Relations with ECOMOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Post-War Transitional Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The Humanitarian Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Social Reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Liberia under Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Political Conditions under Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Security Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Press Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S.-Liberian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Background: Historical U.S.-Liberian Ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

American Colonization Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Firestone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

League of Nations Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Bilateral Ties under the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Civil War, 1989-1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

UNOMIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Post-War Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Recent U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Bilateral Relations, 2000-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

List of Tables

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Liberia: FY1990- FY2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Table 2. U.S. Support for ECOMOG in Liberia, 1991-1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Table 3. U.S. Support for UNOMIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War

Developments, and U.S. Relations

General Background

In 1821, groups of African

Americans established colonial

settlements in Liberia, a small

West African country, with the

assistance of the American

Colonization Society (ACS). In

1847, the legislature of the

settler colony declared the

territory an independent, free

republic — the first on the

African continent. The

legislature named the new

country Liberia and elected as

its first president Joseph Jenkins

Roberts.

Liberia in Brief

Size: 43,000 sq. mi. Slightly larger than Tennessee

Population: 3.22 million (2003 est.)

Population growth rate: 1.67% (2003)

Gross National Income (GNI): $.49 billion (2002)

GNI per Capita: $150 (2002)

External Debt: $2.8 billion (2003)

Major Exports: Timber, rubber, iron ore, diamonds,

cocoa, coffee

Languages: English 20% (official), 28 indigenous

languages/dialects

Key Ethnic Groups: Indigenous ethnic groups, 95%

(Bassa, Bella, Dei, Gbandi, Gio, Gola, Grebo, Kissi,

Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Loma, Mandingo, Mano, Mende,

Vai); Americo-Liberians 2.5% (descendants of U.S.

freed slaves and freemen); and Congo People 2.5%

(descendants of Caribbean ex-slaves).

Religions:

40% indigenous beliefs, 40%

Christian/Christian-indigenous beliefs, Muslim 20%.

Literacy: Male, 73.3%; Female, 41.6% (2003)

Under-5 Mortality rate: 235 deaths/1,000 live births

(2001).

Life Expectancy, years at birth: 48.15 (2003)

HIV-positive adults (percent of population): 9%

(2001).

Until 1980, Liberia, which

modeled its constitution after

that of the United States,

remained independent and

stable, but conflict over political

power and economic resources

Sources: CIA World Factbook 2001; USAID; World Bank

between descendants of settlers

Development Indicators; Ethnologue.com; United Nations.

and indigenous groups was

present from the birth of the

republic. Liberian state and

society reflect a blending of the

cultural and political influences

of both populations. The indigenous population is comprised of 16 main ethnic

groups who speak 27 languages or distinct dialects. Americo-Liberians, who include

the descendants of African-American settlers from the United States and “Congos,”

those descended from Caribbean freed slaves and captives rescued from illegal slave

ships interdicted at sea, make up about 5% of the population. Also resident in Liberia

are small numbers of foreign-born Liberians, primarily of Middle Eastern and

European descent, and non-Liberian African immigrants.

Americo-Liberian Rule. A small, Americo-Liberian-dominated elite

historically exercised strong control over Liberian politics and economic life, often

CRS-2

at the cost of the indigenous population. The former group traditionally predominated

in the urban, modern economy, while about 80% of the latter group engaged

primarily in subsistence agriculture and petty trade and generally experienced lower

standards of living. Such unequal social relations were an effect both of Liberia’s

American settlement history, and of Africa’s colonial era more generally. In the late

19th century, European colonial powers increased the political and territorial extent

of their rule across Africa, commonly moving gradually inland from coastal

commercial settlements or military bases. This pattern of occupation was increasingly

formalized after 1885, when European governments met and mutually agreed that

any colonizing state would have to “effectively occupy” and map out African regions

over which it claimed sovereignty.1 In accordance with this model of rule, and during

the same period, the Americo-Liberian elite began to impose a system of centralized

administrative rule, taxation, and codified law over the small, decentralized

indigenous confederations and independent clan or village-based societies of

Liberia’s interior, often employing military force (covered further below).

Doe Regime. Americo-Liberian rule came to an abrupt end in 1980, when a

groups of low-ranking military officers led by 28-year old Master Sergeant Samuel

K. Doe staged a violent military coup, toppling the government of William Tolbert.

Doe and his associates formed a ruling body called the People’s Redemption Council

(PRC). During the coup, President Tolbert was murdered, and the PRC later had

opponents executed. Americo-Liberian politicians and former Tolbert administration

officials were especially targeted for violent actions of reprisal, notable among which

was the public execution on a Monrovia beach of a group of Tolbert’s ministers at

the order of a PRC tribunal. Doe’s government was the first to be headed by a

Liberian of indigenous ethnic descent. The PRC initially received broad support for

advocating socio-economic advancement for all indigenous Liberians and a radical

political reform agenda. Doe and the PRC ruled by decree until 1984, when a new

constitution was passed by referendum, leading to elections in 1985. Doe won the

poll, which was widely believed to have been fraudulent. Increasingly, Doe’s security

forces coercively repressed political party rivals and journalists. Coup attempts in

1985 and 1988 by military leaders with bases of support in Nimba County, populated

mainly by the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, led to violent reprisals by the Doe

administration against these populations. By 1989, Doe’s government had become

infamous for its economic mismanagement and venality, brutality, and ethnic bias,

primarily in favor of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. His administration

bankrupted Liberia, eventually alienated the United States — which had long been

a strong supporter and close ally of Liberia, and supported Doe during the first half

of his tenure — and embittered Liberians from outside his ethnic support base,

causing widespread opposition to his rule.

1

On this period, see Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912, 1st U.S. ed.,

New York: Random House, 1991; and John M. MacKenzie, The Partition of Africa,

1880-1900 and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York: Methuen,

1983, inter alia.

CRS-3

Civil War, 1989-1997

On December 24, 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by

Charles Taylor, crossed into Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire, sparking a conflict that

mushroomed into a seven year civil war. Taylor, then 51 years old, had studied

economics in the United States, and had been active in the U.S. Liberian community

until his return to Liberia shortly after the 1980 military coup. Taylor fled to the

United States in 1983 to escape a criminal probe by Liberian authorities in relation

to his reported embezzlement of nearly $1 million while serving as a deputy minister

in the Doe government. In response to a Liberian government request for his

extradition, he was arrested in May 1984 in Massachusetts. In September 1985,

however, Taylor escaped from prison, along with four convicted felons, while his

deportation hearing proceedings were pending.

Growth of Factions

The hostilities initiated by the NPFL spawned other armed factions. Doe was

captured and murdered in September 1990 by the Independent NPFL, an NPFL

breakaway faction led by a battle commander called Prince Johnson. A video of

Doe’s brutal execution subsequently circulated widely in Liberia. An ethnicallymixed group of NPFL opponents, led by a group of predominantly Krahn former

officers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), called the Liberian United Defense

Force, emerged in 1991. It later formed an alliance with a small Mandingo-dominated

group, giving birth to the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO). In 1993

ULIMO split, giving birth to ULIMO-K, a Mandingo-dominated faction led by Alhaji

Kromah, a former Ministry of Information official, and ULIMO-J, a Krahndominated group led by Roosevelt Johnson, a former Ministry of Finance official.

The two factions engaged in periodically heavy fighting against one another. Other

key factions included politician George Boley’s Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and

the remnants of the AFL, led by General Hezekiah Bowen. Several smaller factions

— including the Bong Defense Front; the Lofa Defense Force, which itself split into

pro-and anti-NPFL elements; and the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL),

a breakaway faction of the NPFL — were also active in the conflict. The factions

tended to be unstable; combatants and their leaders were known to change sides

according to shifting local security conditions, changing tactical and political

alliances, financial inducements, and opportunities to loot or trade.

ECOMOG

In August 1990, the 16-member Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) agreed, though not unanimously, to deploy a joint military intervention

force, the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and place it under

Nigerian leadership. The mission later included troops from non-ECOWAS

countries, including Uganda and Tanzania. ECOMOG’s objectives were to impose

a cease-fire; help Liberians establish an interim government until elections could be

held; stop the killing of innocent civilians; and ensure the safe evacuation of foreign

nationals. ECOMOG also sought to prevent the conflict from spreading into

neighboring states, which share a complex history of state, economic, and ethnolinguistic social relations with Liberia.

CRS-4

Once in Liberia, the Nigeria-dominated ECOMOG force adopted a strategy of

attempting to defeat Taylor’s NPFL, seen by some observers as the most dangerous

and recalcitrant of the factions. ECOMOG was plagued by a host of problems,

including political differences between the member nations of ECOWAS; lack of

operational resources and related difficulties; allegations of corruption concerning

some ECOMOG forces, particularly certain Nigerian elements; and the formation of

unofficial and covert political and economic alliances with the armed Liberian

factions. ECOMOG was, however, able to stabilize Monrovia from 1990 through

1995, while Taylor’s forces, headquartered in the north-central town of Gbarnga

(baa-n-ga), and the LPC controlled much of the central and south-eastern

countryside.

Conflict Resolution Process

Beginning in November 1990, the factions signed numerous cease-fire and

demobilization agreements that focused on creating a transition to civilian rule, but

none was effective until 1995. The factions refused to disarm and vied for influence

in transitional coalitions, violent conflict erupted anew, and scheduled elections were

canceled because of continued fighting. 2

On September 22, 1993, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council established

the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). It later deployed 368 military

observers and associated civilian personnel in early 1994 to monitor implementation

of the abortive Cotonou Peace Agreement, prior to elections originally planned for

February/March 1994. Renewed armed hostilities, however, broke out in May 1994

and continued, becoming especially intense in July and August. ECOMOG, and later

UNOMIL, members were captured and held hostage by some factions. By mid-1994,

the humanitarian situation had become disastrous, with 1.8 million Liberians in need

of humanitarian assistance. Conditions continued to deteriorate, but humanitarian

agencies were unable to reach many in need due to hostilities and general insecurity.

Factional leaders agreed in September 1994 to the Akosombo Agreement, a

supplement to the Cotonou agreement, named after the Ghanaian town where it was

signed, but the security situation in Liberia remained poor. In October 1994, in the

face of ECOMOG funding shortfalls and a lack of will by the Liberian combatants

to honor agreements to end the war, the Security Council reduced to about 90 the

number of UNOMIL observers. It extended UNOMIL’s mandate, however, and

subsequently extended it several times until September 1997.

In December 1994, the factions and other parties signed the Accra Agreement,

a supplement to the Akosombo Agreement, but disagreements ensued and fighting

2

Key agreements included the Bamako Cease-fire Agreement (November 1990); the

Yamassoukro Accord (October 1991); the Cotonou Agreement (July 1993); the Akosombo

Agreement (September 1994); Accra Agreement (a.k.a. Akosombo II, December 1994); the

Abuja Accord (August 1995); and Abuja II (August 1996). Most of these agreements set

cease-fire conditions and provided for the establishment of transitional power structures. In

some cases, they spawned ancillary working agreements. Factions and political parties also

formed informal alliances and agreements.

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continued. Various conflict resolution efforts led to the ratification in August 1995

of a peace agreement known as the Abuja Accord, after the Nigerian capital where

it was signed by seven faction leaders and civilian representatives. The agreement

followed several months of concerted ECOWAS conflict negotiation efforts led by

Ghana and Nigeria. The main point of contention had been the composition of the

proposed transitional government, the Council of State. On August 31, however,

three civilian representatives and the three main rebel leaders — Taylor, Kromah, and

Boley — were sworn in. ULIMO-J leader Roosevelt Johnson was given the defense

portfolio. The Council, chaired by Wilton Sankawulo, a professor, was tasked with

implementing the cease-fire agreement, demobilizing all combatants, and holding

presidential elections in August/September 1996.

1996: Conflict, Cease-fire, and Disarmament. A great deal of optimism

followed the August 1995 Abuja Accord, and the humanitarian situation improved

moderately, but several skirmishes occurred in its wake, leading to heavy fighting in

late 1995. Sustained fighting broke out again in early April 1996, after the Council

of State attempted to arrest faction leader Roosevelt Johnson, who was also minister

of rural development, on murder charges. For seven weeks, fighting — mainly

between Taylor’s NPFL and Johnson’s ULIMO-J and allied factions — raged in

Monrovia. Fighters from both factions looted homes, businesses, government offices,

and international aid organizations. Tens of thousands of Liberians fled their homes

to escape the fighting, and as many as 20,000 sought refuge in the U.S. embassy’s

Greystone compound. U.S. military helicopters evacuated 2,400 Americans and other

foreign nationals to Freetown, Sierra Leone.

On April 29, after holding talks in Ghana, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary for

African Affairs George Moose traveled to Monrovia in an attempt to persuade the

militia leaders to attend a planned May 8 summit meeting of West African states in

Accra, Ghana to discuss salvaging the Abuja Accord, but his attempts to contact

Taylor and Kromah were unsuccessful. The following day, after shots were directed

at the U.S. embassy, U.S. Marine guards returned fire, killing three gunmen. One day

later, a U.S. amphibious battle group, consisting of four U.S. Navy warships carrying

2,200 marines, arrived in Monrovia harbor to discourage a possible attack on the

embassy.

Role of ECOWAS. On May 16, 1996, a member of Liberia’s Council of State,

George Boley, stated that the Council had not met to determine whether it should

arrest Krahn leader Roosevelt Johnson — the event which had touched off two

months of fighting and looting. Boley, a Johnson ally, argued that the move was a

“ploy” designed by Taylor and Kromah to eliminate Johnson as a political force.

ECOMOG began to re-assert control over parts of Monrovia in mid-May, and a

fragile peace was restored in Liberia when, on May 26, the factions agreed to a

cease-fire. Following the cease-fire accord, ECOMOG increased its deployment of

troops throughout Monrovia, and forces loyal to Taylor’s NPFL and Kromah’s

ULIMO-K withdrew from the city.

By early August 1996, most Liberian refugees had left the American embassy

compound. On August 17th, an ECOWAS committee met to discuss the situation in

Liberia, and agreed to extend the 1995 Abuja Accord to June 15, 1997. The group

also called for the disarmament of militia members by January 1997, to be followed

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by elections in late May 1997, and strongly urged its members and other countries not

to supply arms to Liberian fighters. Perhaps its most practical and effective action —

and a significant indication of regional resolve to end the chaos in neighboring

Liberia — was to warn faction leaders that if they interfered with the peace

implementation process they would face personal sanctions and possible trial as war

criminals.

At the August ECOWAS meeting, Liberia’s Council of State also made

significant progress. It not only achieved a reconciliation, but also determined to

restore Council member Roosevelt Johnson to a ministerial post (the Transportation

portfolio), and unanimously elected Ruth Sando Perry, a former senator, as Council

president. Ms. Perry was sworn in on September 3, thus becoming the African

continent’s first female head of state. In addition, humanitarian organizations were

able to renew delivery of limited assistance in various regions of the country.

UNOMIL’s mandate was extended twice, in March and June, 1997. On August

30, the U.N. Security Council agreed to extend by three months its observer mission

in Liberia, and accepted Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s proposal to raise the

number of observers by 24; there were just 10 in the country at the time.

Inter-factional violence, however, followed the peace agreement reached in August.

On October 31, gunmen tried but failed to assassinate Charles Taylor, but during the

attempt, three of Taylor’s chief aides were killed. Public insecurity remained

widespread; in several incidents, traders and other civilians were murdered while

traveling.

Disarmament and the Transition to Peace

Despite continued violent incidents, on November 22, 1996 the factions began

turning over their weapons to UNOMIL and ECOMOG peacekeepers. Food,

clothing, and scholarships were offered as incentives to fighters to disarm. It was

widely suspected that the various factions had buried weapons caches for later use,

but the disarmament eventually brought in a significant number of weapons. During

the official disarmament period of November 22, 1996 to February 9, 1997, over

41,000 fighters, including over 4,000 child combatants, reportedly disarmed; over

9,500 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were also surrendered.

As the disarmament process proceeded, the ECOMOG force, previously

dominated by Nigeria, was reinforced and broadened, when in early 1997 other

countries committed additional troops. In February, the United States undertook

Operation Assured Lift; the U.S. military mission transported 1,160 ECOMOG

troops and equipment to Liberia. U.S. transport aircraft, based in Germany, ferried

Malian, Ivorian, and Ghanaian peacekeepers from their home countries to Monrovia.

This logistical assistance was intended as a signal of U.S. support for the peace

process. European donor members of the U.S.-led International Contact Group on

Liberia provided transport defrayment costs and equipment for the effort. The

ECOMOG force was again increased in April, with the arrival of troops from Niger,

Burkina Faso, and Benin.

ECOWAS and Election Planning. ECOWAS foreign ministers met in

February 1997 to assess the status of disarmament, and determined that the effort had

CRS-7

largely succeeded and that the elections should take place, as planned, on May 30.

Large weapons caches were discovered in March and April, however, and some

human rights groups expressed skepticism about the relative success of the

demobilization process. They urged that elections not be held until ECOMOG and

other actors could guarantee a free and fair vote, through such actions as continuing

the disarmament effort, encouraging refugees to return, and ensuring safe polling

places. On April 14, Liberia’s Roman Catholic bishops also called for a

postponement, arguing that more time was needed for voter repatriation, registration,

and education.

A special ECOWAS summit, held in Abuja in mid-May 1997, decided to

postpone Liberia’s elections until July 19, with the new government to be installed

on August 2. In early July, 12 out of Liberia’s 13 political parties — Charles Taylor’s

party was the sole holdout — urged that the vote be delayed further. ECOWAS did

not agree. Because ECOMOG had pledged to remain in Liberia for six months after

the elections, Nigeria and other countries were anxious for elections to be held as

early as possible.3 The United States and other western donor states also wanted the

Liberian elections to proceed as scheduled. Liberia’s independent election

commission denied the plea for a postponement.

The 1997 Elections and the Taylor Presidency. Charles Taylor was

among the first declared candidates for the presidency. In early May, Taylor publicly

launched the campaign of his National Patriotic Party (NPP), formed following the

dissolution of the NPFL in January 1997, in defiance of an independent election

commission ban on electioneering and before any of the other candidates had begun

to campaign. He argued that the country needed a “strong leader.” He drew much

rural support, but the urban Monrovia electorate divided its support among the eleven

other candidates. Multiple candidates, including three former warlords and several

former cabinet ministers under the toppled Doe government, contested the election.

The main challenger to Taylor, however, was Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a

Harvard-educated former U.N. executive and businesswoman.

Charles Taylor was proclaimed the winner of the July 19 poll, with 75.3% of the

vote. By most accounts, the election — the country’s first in 12 years — was

peaceful, and voter registration and turnout rates were high. Between 700,000 and

750,000 Liberians registered to vote — a substantial figure, given that many people

had fled the country or were displaced internally. Election day turnout was estimated

at nearly 90%. Roughly 500 international electoral observers were on hand, including

330 from the U.N., groups from the European Union (EU) and the Organization of

African Unity (OAU), and a team led by former President Jimmy Carter. Initially,

candidate Johnson-Sirleaf complained of fraud and other irregularities, but

international election monitors did not concur with her claims. Mr. Carter and

spokesmen for EU, U.N., and OAU observers all characterized the vote as generally

3

This position was underlined by ECOMOG’s need to dispatch some of its 13,000-strong

force in Liberia to Sierra Leone, in order to contend with a May 25 putsch that toppled the

elected government in neighboring Sierra Leone. ECOMOG strongly opposed the coup, both

politically and militarily, particularly in light of the existence of political-military relations

between the Liberian factions, notably Taylor’s NPFL, and armed actors in Sierra Leone.

CRS-8

free, fair, and peaceful. Johnson- Sirleaf, who had termed the results “statistically

impossible,” later said she would present “a strong and constructive opposition.”

Taylor won his substantial electoral victory despite his well-known role in

launching the civil war and fomenting bloodshed in Liberia over the preceding 7

years. Several possible reasons have been offered for this ostensibly counter-intuitive

outcome. Taylor, described as a charismatic figure, had the biggest campaign war

chest; controlled extensive media resources, including the country’s only radio

station; and was the best organized contender. Taylor’s campaign workers also

reportedly enticed Liberian refugees resident in neighboring Ivory Coast to cross into

Liberia to cast their votes for him in exchange for food and money, and transportation

to polling stations was reportedly provided by vehicles owned by Taylor. Many

Liberians reportedly believed that a vote for Taylor was a vote for peace and stability;

many feared that Taylor, as head of the largest armed faction, might continue to fight

for power if he was not elected. Liberians reportedly explained their choice with the

slogan that referred to Taylor: “You kill my pa, you kill my ma, I will vote for you.”

Many also agreed with Taylor’s claim that Liberia needed a “strong leader,”

particularly given events in neighboring Sierra Leone, which had also faced civil war

throughout the 1990s, after its elected president was deposed in May 1997 by a group

of disaffected junior officers.

In light of his past conduct, the prospect of a Taylor presidency was disturbing

to many Liberians and foreign observers; some argued that Taylor’s leadership might

undermine external assistance and investment. The possibility of renewed violence

also concerned some observers. Taylor had made many enemies during the conflict,

and although many fighters had been demobilized, the ECOWAS peacekeeping

force, known as ECOMOG, continued to discover large arms caches well after the

disarmament deadline.

Relations with ECOMOG. The Taylor government’s post-war relationship

with ECOMOG, the ECOWAS intervention force, was uneasy and sometimes tense.

The Taylor government initially claimed that it wanted ECOMOG to remain in

Liberia to ensure security, but serious disputes occurred over ECOMOG’s

post-conflict role. ECOMOG’s effort to counter the 1997 coup in Sierra Leone was

a major source of friction between ECOWAS and Taylor. When Sierra Leonean junta

leader Johnny Paul Koroma attempted to flee Sierra Leone in February 1998,

ECOMOG aircraft forced his helicopter to land in Liberia. Taylor objected to the

action, labeling it a violation of Liberian sovereignty. Shortly thereafter, an

ECOMOG jet fighter made several low passes over Monrovia, and Liberia recalled

its ambassador to Nigeria in protest, but Taylor later reportedly consulted with other

Liberian leaders and decided not to pursue the issue. In mid-March 1998, however,

several Nigerian journalists and a defense official, en route home from Sierra Leone,

were arrested in Monrovia on drug charges and released only after ECOMOG

intervened. In early May 1998, ECOMOG announced it had captured dozens of

Liberians fighting for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a group of rebels then

fighting the government of Sierra Leone.4 Taylor, however, disavowed any Liberian

4

See CRS Report RL31062, Sierra Leone: Transition to Peace.

CRS-9

government ties to the RUF and called for all Liberian combatants in Sierra Leone

to return home.

In October 1998, Liberia closed its western border with conflict-beset Sierra

Leone after dispatching 1,000 troops to the area. The deployment was sharply

criticized by ECOMOG’s commander, General Malu. Taylor was dismissive of such

concerns, asserting that Liberia’s constitution granted his government authority to

deploy military force to protect the country’s borders. As the Sierra Leone conflict

heated up, ECOMOG began to move its troops into Sierra Leone. Relations between

ECOMOG and the Taylor government remained rocky; ECOMOG leaders accused

Taylor of supporting the RUF militarily. Most ECOMOG troops had been withdrawn

from Liberia by late 1998, but a small force remained in Liberia in 1999. In July

1999, remaining ECOMOG troops supervised the destruction of weapons turned in

during the disarmament process, which ended in late 1999. In October 1999,

ECOMOG began a rapid withdrawal of its remaining 1,000 troops, marking the end

of ECOMOG’s presence in Liberia.

Post-War Transitional Period

President Taylor’s first cabinet included family members and a former rival

warlord. To get the nation’s finances on track, his government announced that it

would reintroduce the U.S. dollar as the country’s currency; submitted a stop-gap

budget; and met with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and

the African Development Bank to develop a sound economic program, to which the

EU also pledged support. The new government also sought support from diverse

foreign governments.

Notwithstanding concerns about stability after the election, there were many

signs of progress and normalcy in Liberia. In August 1997, ECOMOG lifted a

shipping embargo imposed in 1993, restoring an important source of revenue to the

country. Seaports and airports reopened, providing communication and goods

transportation links with the outside world. At the end of the month, UNOMIL

personnel began to depart, but the U.N. maintained a presence in Liberia. In

December 1997, it established the U.N. Peace-building Support Office in Liberia

(UNOL) to assist in the consolidation of peace, national recovery and reconstruction,

and the creation of democratic structures.

The Humanitarian Situation. The civil war claimed a high toll on

non-combatants. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated

that during the war at least 740,000 of Liberia’s pre-war 2.5 million inhabitants

became refugees, that 1.2 million became internally displaced persons (IDPs), and

that between 150,000 and 200,000 persons — and possibly as many as 300,000 —

were killed or maimed as a direct result of the civil war. The war drastically reduced

rural food production and cut off international trade, causing hunger and widespread

malnutrition. It was not until ECOMOG occupied Monrovia in mid-1990 that foreign

humanitarian assistance was able to reach the population. In 1994, the food situation

in rural areas again deteriorated. Fighting forced farmers to leave fields unharvested,

and humanitarian relief agencies abandoned many areas, following the looting of

CRS-10

their supplies and other disruptions. In 1996, fighting in Monrovia again resulted in

the theft and destruction of non-governmental organizations’ (NGO) supplies and

equipment. During the war, countless human rights abuses and atrocities were

committed against civilians, often along ethnic lines, and many children were used

as fighters by most of the factions. Although large-scale combat ended in early 1997,

widespread suffering continued; for months, relief organizations discovered pockets

of starving people. Thousands of non-combatants, including many severely

malnourished children, emerged from the forests, where they fled to avoid being

caught up in the factional violence. Hundreds of people are believed to have perished

for lack of food and medicine.

The suffering did not go unnoticed. In an April 1998 meeting in Paris,

international donors agreed to resume aid to Liberia, and NGOs raised awareness of,

and funds for, Liberia. In September, Liberia was listed among countries that might

qualify for debt relief under the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative,5 and Liberia received tens of

millions of dollars of foreign assistance after its electoral transition to peace. In

March 1999, the U.N. Development Program provided Liberia $3.4 million for

housing construction and a credit program for small business owners. Liberia

remained highly indebted, however. In its Budget Justification for fiscal year 2001,

USAID estimated Liberia’s foreign debt at $2.5 billion and domestic debt at $124

million, and the country remained in arrears to the OAU (later superseded by the

African Union, or AU) and to the U.N. by about $10 million. In March 2000, Reuters

reported that Liberia was one of eight OAU member debtor states sanctioned by the

OAU; the governments of such countries may neither vote nor attend meetings until

membership dues in arrears are paid. For the same reason, Liberia lost its voting

rights in the U.N. General Assembly; its voting rights remained suspended as of late

2003.

Social Reintegration. The reintegration into society of former combatants,

displaced people, and refugees proved to be a daunting task. By year 2000, at least

280,000 refugees had re-entered the country, and some 75,000 internally displaced

persons had returned to their homes. Many Liberians, however, remained reluctant

to return home, fearing ethnically based political violence. For some, conditions in

foreign refugee camps remain preferable to those in Liberia, and many never returned

home; at least 244,000 remained refugees in the West African sub-region in 2001,

four years after the war.

The process of reintegrating ex-combatants into society following disarmament

and demobilization also faced difficulties. On at least three separate occasions in May

1998, former soldiers staged violent demonstrations, demanding back pay and

pension benefits, an issue that had been complicated by the issuance of falsified

5

On debt reduction, HIPC, and development, see CRS Report RL30449, Debt and

Developing in Poor Countries: Rethinking Policy Responses; CRS Report RL30214, Debt

Reduction: Initiatives for the Most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries; IMF, Debt Relief

Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, Factsheet, September 2003,

[http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm]; and World Bank, HIPC,

[http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/].

CRS-11

demobilization certificates. Ex-combatants also briefly took hostage several dozen

government officials, all members of Taylor’s National Patriotic Party, to highlight

their assertion that the government had disbursed only a fraction of a $3 million

Taiwanese grant for demobilized troops. Taylor responded by stating that his

government was working on a program that would benefit all ex-combatants,

regardless of their former affiliation, that would include vocational training and

rehabilitation for the disabled. Veterans, however, again demonstrated in August,

1999. Internally displaced persons (IDP) in Liberia called for assistance help; in April

1999, IDPs demonstrated for government resettlement support.

Liberia under Taylor

Economy. There were some early signs of incipient positive economic

progress and growth in Liberia. Production and trade gradually increased, though

moderately, and the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) reported an

overall improvement in the food situation as the country entered a post-conflict

transition period.

Despite some improvements, much of the economy remained troubled, and early

progress did not yield long-term or robust economic growth. Rebuilding of

demolished infrastructure was extremely limited, and public utilities (plumbing,

sewage, and electricity) remained severely lacking, as did improvements in the

provision of basic education and health care services. Civil servant salaries were

often months in arrears. Key development challenges for Liberian development

identified by USAID in its Budget Justification for fiscal year 2001 included high

formal sector unemployment and illiteracy rates, with both rates in the range of 80%6;

low revenue and productivity bases; substantial destruction of public and private

institutions and facilities; negligible public utility services; massive corruption; low

rates of access to primary health care; a 4.5% national HIV/AIDS infection rate,

which was rising; and an annual population growth rate of 3.3% — a rate high

enough to outweigh improvements in living standards.

Many publicly announced government plans to undertake economic and

governance reforms did not materialize, and international policy experts and other

observers grew increasingly concerned over a general lack of public sector

transparency. Reports of sizable discrepancies between government budgets,

revenues, and actual expenditures became increasingly common. Many government

agencies received funding irregularly, and agency staffs often went unpaid for months

at a time. In some instances, state agencies were able to operate only because of

periodic patronage “donations” by members of the Taylor administration, or by

foreign donations. Few state revenues were directed toward investment in public

goods and services. Most public infrastructure remained severely degraded, and the

provision of social services became sporadic, if such services were available at all.

Under Taylor, much of Liberia’s formal sector economy came to be dominated

by commercial enterprises controlled by a relatively small group of politically

powerful elites, often in association with international, grey-market business

6

Other sources report significantly lower illiteracy rates.

CRS-12

operators. Liberia’s domestic manufacturing and industrial production capacity

remained marginal and unable to supply local demand, which necessitated the

importation of most manufactured consumer products. Many imported goods,

however, were sold at a high premium over their import costs. Fuel imports, for

instance, were brokered by a single firm on behalf of the of Liberian government;

fuel was then sold to the public by a cartel of domestic distributers and retailers.

Other commodities that were subject to total or partial monopolistic marketing

practices and controlled pricing structures included rice and car imports, cement and

beer sales and production, printing, and cocoa and coffee exports. Politically

powerful elites also dominated the banking, fisheries, textile and construction, and

communications industries.

Taylor reportedly held direct, personal shares in a number of private firms, but

he was also said to have received off-the-books payments from private firms in

exchange for business licenses and concession rights, as well as earnings cuts.7 In

particular, numerous reports suggest that members of the Taylor administration

controlled and diverted for their own uses significant amounts of revenue from the

export of timber, which many observers alleged was routinely harvested in an

environmentally destructive and unsustainable manner. State revenues earned from

the “flags of convenience” merchant marine fleet fees and other operations of the

U.S.-based Liberian International Ship & Corporate Registry comprised a second key

source of revenues subject to alleged diversion by the Taylor administration. In a

number of cases, revenue streams from the timber exports and the ship registry

reportedly funded arms purchases, and were increasingly used by the Taylor

government to fund its military activities.8

Governance. Liberia is constitutionally a republic, and its government

structure and constitution are modeled on that of the United States and on

Anglo-American common law, although local indigenous customary law is widely

used in rural areas. Despite the existence of constitutional checks and balances

between the branches of government, control of political and administrative power

has historically been dominated by a strong, centralized presidency. Under Taylor,

concentrated executive power grew. State institutions that constitutionally or legally

7

When Taylor entered exile in 2003, numerous press reports described how he had

controlled Liberia’s economy — a goal that he continued to attempt to pursue. See, for

instance, Edward Harris, “Ousted Liberian Leader Controlled a Financial Empire - and Isn’t

Giving it Up, Diplomats Say,” Associated Press, September 7, 2003; Tim Weiner “Liberian

Ex-Leader Stole $3 Million as He Left, U.N. Aide Says,” New York Times, September 6,

2003; Terence Sesay, “UN’s Liberia Envoy Says Taylor Stole 3 Million Dollars Meant for

Soldiers,” Agence France Presse, September 5, 2003; and Emily Wax, “In Exile, Taylor

Exerts Control,” Washington Post, September 17, 2003.

8

See, inter alia, Report of the Panel of Experts, cited above, in United Nations Security

Council document S/2003/498, April 24, 2003, and a series of earlier U.N. Liberia sanctions

monitoring reports; and multiple Global Witness reports, particularly Taylor-Made, The

Pivotal Role of Liberia’s Forests in Regional Conflict, September 2001; ——, The Usual

Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone; Why it’s

Still Possible, How it Works and How to Break the Trend, March 2003; and ——, Logging

Off: How the Liberian Timber Industry Fuels Liberia’s Humanitarian Disaster and

Threatens Sierra Leone, September 2002.

CRS-13

were meant to provide accountability and independent checks on the executive

branch — including the judiciary, legislature, the National Human Rights

Commission, and the National Reconciliation and Reunification Commission —

wielded little effective authority. Courts were reportedly liable to executive branch

influence, corrupt practices, and operational inefficiencies related to a lack of

resources.

The legislature under Taylor was dominated by his National Patriotic Party,

which held 49 of the 64 seats in the House of Representatives, and 21 of the 26

Senate seats. The legislature exercised little practical independence from the

executive, although legislators were generally free to voice their sometimes strongly

expressed views. In part, some opposition leaders and other critics allege, the

legislature’s weaknesses were a result of Mr. Taylor and his political allies’ effective

control of the majority of state revenue collections and expenditures, and its influence

over or significant ownership interest in many major commercial operations. In this

view, both NPP and opposition legislators, many local government leaders and their

networks of supporters, including civil servants, joined or were coopted by the Taylor

administration in exchange for civil service jobs, salaries, the use of vehicles and

other state resources, and the expenditure of state resources in their constituencies.

Similarly, businessmen relied on connections to key government figures to ensure

their freedom to run commercial operations, and obtain natural resource extraction

concessions, tax breaks and related advantages.

The Taylor administration exercised political authority through its control of

public policy formation and implementation. While legal processes were nominally

practiced, they were often subject to irregularities. Legislative and budget proposals

were regularly promulgated, for instance, but often remained unratified or subject to

other legal ambiguities and ad hoc presidential actions. The Strategic Commodities

Act of 2001, for instance, was reportedly passed in 2001 and later ratified, but

Liberian officials stated in late 2001 that it had not been signed into law. Despite

uncertainties over the legal status of the Act — which granted the Executive sole

power and negotiation rights over all commercial contracts or agreements related to

the extraction of Liberia’s natural resources — observers say that Taylor’s backing

of the Act had the de facto effect of putting it into practice.

Political Conditions under Taylor. Taylor was widely reported to have

harbored deep suspicions and fears of diverse plots against him by foreign

governments, and Liberian political opponents and rivals. He periodically voiced

public statements warning of and against such alleged machinations, which in some

cases gave birth to sometimes extended political contretemps. Taylor also exhibited

autocratic, sometimes seemingly arbitrary, behavior that some observers saw as

verging on megalomaniacal, particularly given Taylor’s penchant for speaking of

himself in the third person.9 Many observers, however, also described Taylor as wellread, articulate and persuasive, and possessed of a charismatic personality.

9

In May 1999, for instance, he reportedly summarily fired a large number of his cabinet

ministers who failed to participate in 3 days of prayer and fasting, although most were

reinstated the next day.

CRS-14

Some plots alleged by Taylor or his representatives seemed credible, particularly

in light of several armed clashes between his supporters and members of former

factions, and a series of raids in Lofa county in 1999 that in 2000 gave birth to the

rebellion that ultimately toppled him in 2003 (see CRS report RS21525, Liberia:

Transition to Peace). Others seemed far fetched, nevertheless led to the arrest of

perceived opponents of Taylor, and several alleged political murders.10 Because of

such incidents, many opposition politicians and clan chiefs fled Liberia to live in

exile, despite Taylor’s public extension of invitations to them to return to Liberia,

accompanied by verbal assurances of their personal safety.

Security Affairs. Despite moderate post-war social and political progress, the

security situation remained troubled, both with respect to institutional developments

and with respect to public security and human rights.

Post-war national reconciliation was hampered by the new government’s failure,

according to its critics, to create an ethnically broad, politically inclusive, and smaller

Liberian military, as required under the Abuja Accords. This failure was a source of

considerable friction between the Taylor government and ECOMOG, which had been

mandated with helping Liberia to undertake such post-conflict military reforms.

While Taylor engaged ECOMOG on this issue, he apparently viewed ECOMOG

primarily as a source of training expertise, rather than of organizational and policy

reform advice, and did not see the objectives associated with Liberia’s peace process

as paramount. Taylor, citing sovereign self-defense concerns and lack of funds,

delayed such restructuring. Instead, Taylor replaced personnel who left the army

through attrition and mandated retirements with former NPFL fighters and other

loyalists. Following persistent criticism, in late 2000 a commission with a mandate

to downsize and restructure the army was reportedly created and allocated about

$100,000, but no further reforms resulted. Taylor also ensured that the national

military did not pose a threat to his leadership, while simultaneously attempting to

ensure that it remained loyal. Army troops exercised less authority than several other

state security services (see below), and were ill paid and given fewer resources.

Taylor maintained a substantial personal and state security apparatus, which

increasingly faced accusations of human rights abuses and corrupt, often violent

behavior.11 Formal military and security forces under Taylor included the Armed

Forces of Liberia (AFL); the Liberia National Police (LNP), which focused on

internal security; the Special Operations Division (SOD), a nominal LNP

paramilitary unit closely controlled by Taylor; the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU),

formerly called the Antiterrorist Brigade (ATB), an elite unit composed of former

NPFL fighters and foreign mercenaries; the Special Security Service (SSS), an

executive protective force; the Executive Mansion Special Security Unit (SSU); the

10

In August 2000, a pro-Taylor newspaper reported that the Liberian government had

become aware of an American plot to destabilize Liberia and assassinate Charles Taylor, an

accusation refuted by then-U.S. Ambassador Bismarck Myrick as “false and baseless.” On

several occasions, human rights activists and journalists were jailed for various plots or

other alleged offenses against Taylor.

11

See annual U.S. State Department human rights reports on Liberia and various reports by

the International Crisis Group and by Global Witness, inter alia.

CRS-15

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and the National Security Agency (NSA).

These forces were bolstered by diverse special units and irregular militias, such as the

Navy Rangers; Delta Force; Navy; Wild Geese; Man Moving Man Dropping;

remnants of the Lofa Defense Force, a civil war faction; Demus Force; Jungle Lions;

the Small Boys Unit; and Special Operation Strike Force. In addition, various

government entities, and state-owned and firms, notably those controlling large

timber concessions, also maintained armed security services. Both regular and

irregular security units, which often included former members of Taylor’s defunct

NPFL, frequently operated autonomously and engaged in looting and extortion; many

had serious human rights abuse records, notably in rural areas. Such units

collaborated closely, sometimes effectively merging, particularly as armed opposition

to Taylor grew in 2000 and subsequently.

Human Rights. President Taylor signed the country’s first human rights bill

and named former foe Alhaji Kromah head of a national reconciliation commission,

but some critics contended that the government made few moves to identify and

punish war crime perpetrators. Several events also raised questions about Taylor’s

commitment to human rights.12

In late 1997, authorities discovered in Gbarnga the remains of prominent

opposition leader Samuel Dokie, a former Taylor ally, who left the NPFL in 1994 and

later became associated with Johnson-Sirleaf’s Unity Party. Dokie had been tortured

and murdered, along with family members and a bodyguard. Three members of the

SSS were arrested in the case, but were acquitted for lack of evidence in a February

1998 trial. Four other suspects reportedly fled the country. The United States and the

EU publicly condemned the Dokie murders and the manner in which a subsequent

murder trial was conducted.

In February 1998, the former faction leader, ethnic Krahn, and then-cabinet

minister Roosevelt Johnson criticized Taylor, asserting that he had been building an

army comprised entirely of heavily armed former NPFL fighters. One month later,

three of Johnson’s bodyguards were allegedly detained and flogged by members of

Taylor’s Special Security Service in what Johnson characterized as an attempted

assassination attempt against himself. Johnson made similar claims in August. In

September 1998, in a replay of an April 1996 confrontation that had touched off

weeks of violence in Monrovia, Liberian government forces sought to arrest Johnson

in his guarded compound. A gunfight resulted, causing hundreds of Monrovians to

flee their homes. Johnson fled to the American embassy, outside of which gun

fighting again erupted. He and his two sons then slipped unbidden through the open

embassy gate, while Liberian security forces continued to fire at him, killing four

Johnson supporters and wounding two U.S. embassy staff. Due to the high level of

violence exhibited by the militiamen, U.S. diplomats refused to release Johnson into

Liberian government custody, and a six-day standoff ensued. The Reverend Jesse

Jackson accepted a request to attempt to negotiating a settlement. Nearly a week

later, a Liberian government spokesman, though still demanding that Johnson be

turned over to stand trial for crimes including murder, rape, treason, and kidnaping,

12

Agence France-Presse, “Diplomats Concerned over Human Rights Violations in Liberia,”

January 5, 1998.

CRS-16

stated that Monrovia would not prevent the United States from flying Johnson out of

Liberia. Many aid workers left during the fighting, and thousands of ethnic Krahn

fled to Côte d’Ivoire, reversing the prior flow of refugees returning to Liberia.

The United States closed its embassy after the incident and demanded an

investigation of the shooting, an apology, and a guarantee of the mission’s security

from the Taylor government. After an initial refusal, the Liberian government offered

an official apology on November 14, and the embassy reopened. Johnson later

claimed that hundreds of people were massacred during the gun battle at his home.

The Taylor government countered that “no more than 50 or 60” had died. During the

raid on the Johnson compound, Liberian forces took into custody dozens of ethnic

Krahn. In April, after the lengthy trial for treason of 32 individuals, 13 people were

sentenced to 10 years in prison. Washington and other foreign governments closely

monitored the trial. In December, Johnson was added to the list of those guilty of

treason, and he and several other faction leaders were tried in absentia. During a

November 1998 visit to Monrovia, then-U.S. Deputy Assistant of State for African

Affairs Vicki Huddleston, stated that a “transition to democracy requires human

rights, rule of law, and this is lacking in Liberia...”13 Huddleston’s comment reflected

many similar observations by diverse international and Liberian observers.

Press Restrictions. Taylor and his supporters periodically voiced concern

over media coverage of the Taylor administration, particularly regarding coverage of

alleged human rights abuses by state agents, and journalists were subjected to

intimidation by state security agents.14 In January 1998, the government announced,

without an immediate explanation, that it was closing the independent newspaper

Heritage, which had published articles critical of Liberia’s relations with ECOMOG.

The office of the newspaper’s printing contractor was also raided, and the publisher

was accused of supporting coup plotters. Also in January 1998, the government

closed Star Radio, a USAID-supported station also supported by several European

governments and, on January 14, briefly shut down Radio Monrovia, which carried

the Voice of America. The government attributed the Star Radio shutdown to a

dispute with the station over a fine levied for the unauthorized transferral of

frequencies. Many saw these events as undermining Liberia’s progress toward

democracy; in January, a coalition of diplomats in Monrovia issued a statement

expressing concern over human rights violations.

In mid-March 2000, the Liberian government shut down Radio Veritas, operated

by the Catholic church, and Star Radio, citing, a “security threat created by agents

provocateurs using the news media to abuse the unprecedented freedom of speech

and press now prevailing in the country,” according to the U.S. Department of State.

13

Reuters, “Liberia’s Sirleaf Says She Named in Treason Charge,” November 4, 1998;

Panafrican News Agency, “Washington Unimpressed with Rule of Law in Liberia,”

November 4, 1998.

14

See, for instance, Agence France-Presse, “Journalists Might Have to Die, Warns Liberian

Security Force: Claim,”December 12, 1997; Reuters, “Detained Liberia Reporter Says

Police Tortured Him,” December 25, 1997; Reuters, “Liberia Drops Treason Charge Against

Journalist,” December 29, 1997; and Tim Sullivan, “Liberian Warlord Becomes President

and Keeps Some Old Habits,” Associated Press, February 15, 1998

CRS-17

The stations had aired listener comments critical of the Taylor government. The

closure was protested by the U.S. government, Amnesty International, and Liberian

journalists. Radio Veritas was later allowed to resume broadcasting, provided it limit

itself to religious programs, a restriction rejected by Archbishop Michael Kpakala

Francis (recipient of the 1999 Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award). On July 20,

2000, the government ordered Star Radio, which had been off the air since the March

closure, to dismantle its equipment.

U.S.-Liberian Relations

Background: Historical U.S.-Liberian Ties

American Colonization Society. The United States has a lengthy historical

relationship with Liberia dating from 1821, when groups of African Americans

established settlements in Liberia with the assistance of the American Colonization

Society (ACS). The ACS was formed in 1816 by a diverse group of white

abolitionists; supporters of slavery; opponents of racial integration and the growth of

a population of free blacks in the United States; and clergy who wanted to spread

Christianity to Africa. The ACS sought to settle in Africa persons of African descent

from the New World, both freeborn and freed slaves, as an alternative to their

emancipation and assimilation in the United States. Some historians have suggested

that the ACS was essentially a racist organization.

African American settlers became known as Americo-Liberians, while persons

from the Caribbean and slaves liberated from slave ships and resettled in Liberia

became known as Congos. In 1842, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, a settler from the U.S.

state of Virginia who had served as sheriff and lieutenant governor of the colony,

became its first non-white governor. In 1847, following a settler referendum, the

colony’s legislature declared the territory an independent, free republic, the first on

the African continent. Naming the new country Liberia, it elected Roberts as its first

president. Liberia modeled its constitution after that of the United States, named the

capital of Liberia, Monrovia, after the fifth U.S. President, and chose a flag similar

to that of the United States.

After the creation of the republic, a two-party political system developed in

which the sole participants were Americo-Liberians, who held a near monopoly on

political and economic power in Liberia until 1980. In the latter half of the 1800s

and early 1900s, the republic’s government gradually extended its authority over the

indigenous ethnic groups, confederations, and small clan or village-based societies

of Liberia’s interior. Such efforts sought to expand the areas under the government’s

control and impose over such territory a system of centralized administrative rule,

taxation, and codified law. These efforts were pursued by the establishment of a

system of “indirect rule” as well as the imposition of direct central governance, often

underpinned by the use of military force. Under indirect rule, the central government

sought to co-opt indigenous political structures by entering into alliances with

confederations of indigenous groups. It created a system of decentralized authority

presided over by nominally “traditional” local chiefs who were, however, elected or

appointed by the government. Such actions sought to impose central government

CRS-18

rule, suppress indigenous uprisings and external interference in Liberia, and collect

taxes, but generated indigenous grievances, causing several small wars between the

government and indigenous polities. To deal with such rebellions, the Liberian

Frontier Force (LFF) was formed in 1908. The force was irregularly paid, ill-trained

and often unpaid, and it engaged in looting and violent predations against the

indigenous population. The LFF was at first commanded by British officers, who

recruited many Sierra Leoneans into its ranks and later, beginning in 1912, by U.S.

soldiers. This action continued a pattern of U.S. support for the Liberian government,

which included periodic interventions on its behalf in response to political

disagreements and armed conflicts between it and the indigenous population. Such

undertakings both bolstered Americo-Liberian rule and discouraged external,

particularly French, colonial designs on the small country, contributing to Liberia’s

continuing independence during a period when all other African countries, except for

Ethiopia, became subject to European colonialism.

Firestone. In 1926, the U.S. Firestone company, in the face of high rubber

prices spurred by the growing demands of the auto industry and the predominance of

British interests in global rubber production, signed contracts with the Liberian

government — with the assistance of the U.S. State Department — that gave the firm

a 99-year lease concession to create a one million-acre rubber plantation. The deal,

which involved the take-over of a small 99-acre British-operated rubber plantation

and the extension of credit by Firestone to the Liberian government, led to the

creation of the world’s largest rubber plantation.

League of Nations Inquiry. Liberian-U.S. relations underwent strains in the

late 1920s and early 1930s. A League of Nations inquiry found that the Liberian

government, in many cases through the use of coercion carried out by the LFF, was

forcing indigenous Liberians to engage indentured and forced labor in support of

public works projects, and on plantations in what later became Equatorial Guinea.

The United States criticized the Liberian government, and called for a commission

of inquiry and the implementation of reforms to end such labor abuses.

World War II. U.S.-Liberian relations deepened as a result of World War II and

the continuing commercial linkages represented by the Firestone rubber plantation.

Pan Am Airlines began service in 1941 to Liberia to and from Lake Piso, with flights

of “Clippers” — planes that took off and landed on water.15 During World War II.,

Pan Am’s presence in Liberia centered on the provision of services in support of U.S.

military operations.

Following the signing of the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Agreement

between the United States and Liberia in 1938, Robertsfield International Airport

(RIA) was constructed in 1942. RIA, which long had one of Africa’s longest

runways, served as a U.S. military cargo relay point and refueling station, as well as

a transportation hub for the rubber plantation. It was used to support U.S. military

campaigns in North Africa and the Far East. A force of about 5000 predominantly

African-American medical personnel, engineering and combat troops, and air crews

15

Pan Am serviced Liberia from 1942 to 1987, when air service was canceled because of

low profitability.

CRS-19

were based in Liberia to support these operations, as well as to carry out U.S. Army

Air Corps anti-submarine sea plane patrols along the Liberian coast. During the war,

Liberia adopted the US dollar as its official currency. After the United States entered

World War II, it signed a bilateral accord with Liberia, called the Defense Areas

Agreement, that permitted U.S. construction, operation, and control of bases in

Liberia, and defense of these and other U.S. interests there. Between 1942 and 1947,

the Freeport of Monrovia, designed as a major shipping transfer, storage, and dutyfree processing zone, was constructed under U.S. Lend-Lease Administration

agreements.

Cold War. Liberia was among the African countries with the closest ties to the

United States in the 1950s through the mid-1970s, in part because of Liberian support

for U.S. objectives related to the Cold War during that period. Several defense

cooperation pacts were signed in the 1950s, and the U.S. Peace Corps was present

in Liberia from 1962 to 1990; during that period, 4,281 volunteers served in Liberia.

The Voice of America began construction of facilities in Liberia in 1961, and began

broadcasting from Liberia in December 1962 to all of Africa, southern Europe, and

elsewhere. It maintained transmitter and repeater installations there until 1990, when

the main site was over-run by combatants in the fighting, and was subsequently

looted and stripped of its assets.

1970s. In April, 1973, the United States and Liberia signed an agreement

allowing the construction in Liberia of one of several Omega Navigational Stations

that made up a global network of beacons that emitted signals for ship and aircraft

guidance. The facility also served as a back-up system for guidance of U.S. nuclear

submarines. The system was installed in the mid-1970s.

A brief period of U.S.-Liberian tensions characterized the mid to late-1970s,

during the administration of William R. Tolbert, who came to power in 1971, after

the death of his autocratic predecessor, William Tubman. Tolbert promoted Africacentric cultural values and Pan-Africanist political views, and sought to increase

popular participation in government, end indigenous-Americo-Liberian divisions, and

ameliorate poverty. His administration negotiated better terms for Liberia with multinational firms, including Firestone; sought closer relations with the Soviet bloc and

non-aligned movement; and refused U.S. access to Robertsfield International Airport

for a U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, a small, mobile contingency force. These and

other policies, such as his cutting of ties with Israel, alienated the United States.

Tolbert also promoted populist economic policies, such as the lowering of the

price of rice and ending a monopoly on rice imports. As the 1970s progressed, a

global recession in the wake of the petroleum crisis grew deeper, commodity prices

for Liberia’s primary exports dropped, and his policies faced increasing difficulties.

Tolbert’s promises of reform had produced rising economic expectations, but these

were not met, and popular disillusion with his administration grew. Unemployment

rose, and Tolbert’s administration was increasingly beset by nepotism and corruption.

His policies also faced political opposition; they were viewed as too radical by the

powerful elite establishment, and too cautious by radical student-led reformers. In

1979, popular opposition to Tolbert crystalized when the government proposed

marketing and production reforms that would have caused an increase in the price of

rice. The proposed policy — and the perception that businesses associated with the

CRS-20

governing elite would benefit from a rise rice prices — engendered protests, and riots

and looting of food ensued. The government responded by arresting radical student

leaders and suppressing opposition to its policies.

Bilateral Ties under the Reagan Administration. In April 1980, Tolbert

was toppled and killed in a violent military coup led by Master Sergeant Samuel K.

Doe (see above). Despite this undemocratic beginning, U.S.-Liberian ties warmed

during the first half of the 1980s, in large part due to Liberia’s support of U.S. foreign

policy goals, but also because of long standing U.S.-Liberian historical ties and the

various strategic communications and other facilities that the United States had

constructed in Liberia. In August, 1982 President Reagan met with Doe at the White

House and paid tribute to 120 years of U.S.-Liberian diplomatic relations, praising

the two countries’ “special friendship,” “firm bond,” and “long history of

cooperation,” which he said would be “further strengthened.”16 In the years that

followed, Liberia initiated relations with Israel, causing the Libyan government to

freeze ties with Liberia, and Liberia to expel Libyan representatives. Doe also

expelled the Soviet ambassador to Liberia. In 1983, Liberia and the United States

signed the bilateral Defense Facilities Agreement, which permitted U.S. access rights

to RIA on very short notice. These developments were accompanied by a rapid

increase in U.S. assistance and cooperation. From 1980 to 1985, according to the

New York Times, Liberia was the largest sub-Saharan Africa per-capita recipient of

U.S. aid.17 A U.S. diplomatic communications facility that processed U.S.

communications and radio traffic between U.S. diplomatic and intelligence posts in

Africa and the United States operated in Liberia. 18 In 1985, Doe won a rigged

election, but his victory was not viewed critically by the U.S. administration.19

The trend toward greater U.S. cooperation with Liberia subsequently waned.

The end of the Cold War and U.S. disillusionment with increasing corruption and

dictatorial tendencies under Doe during the latter half of his regime, in the mid to

late-1980s, led to a gradual decline in U.S. assistance, and a trend toward decreasing

U.S. engagement with Liberia. In 1985, following U.S. remarks critical of the Doe

government’s human rights record, Doe began to open lines of communication with

Libya, where he traveled in 1988. In 1985, U.S. assistance to Liberia reached its

highest annual level, $69.1 million. In 1986 and 1987, the United States suspended

16

Public Papers of the Presidents, “Meeting With Samuel K. Doe, Head of State of

Liberia,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, August 17, 1982.

17

James Brooke, “Mission to Liberia Evidently Fails,” New York Times, December 5,

1988.

18

Nancee Oku Bright, Liberia: America’s Stepchild, transcript of PBS documentary,

October 10, 2002.

19

Herman Cohen, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1989 — 1993, has

stated that “[Doe] should have lost, but he rigged the election. But at that time all West

African elections were rigged. It was a very normal thing to do, for the government to win

the election even though they had less than the majority of the vote. So it did not trouble us

at all.” See Oku Bright, Liberia: America’s Stepchild. See also David B. Ottaway, “Shultz

Sees Liberian Doe, Cites `Genuine Progress’,” Washington Post, January 15, 1987, inter

alia.

CRS-21

bilateral aid to Liberia following Liberia’s failure to make credit payments due to the

International Monetary Fund, which also halted assistance to Liberia.20

Civil War, 1989-1997. As Liberia’s civil war burgeoned after its inception in

December 1989, many Liberians, hoping for a U.S. intervention, were dismayed that

the United States did not intercede. Americans were soon evacuated from Liberia and

hopes for a U.S. peacekeeping force were dashed. Former Assistant Secretary of State

for Africa Herman Cohen has written that he and other State Department and other

agency Africa specialists supported significant U.S. engagement in Liberia to protect

U.S. facilities and pursue a resolution of the conflict, in addition to evacuating U.S.

citizens from the country. Higher-level decision makers, however, did not share these

goals and saw little need for a U.S. role in Liberia, according to Cohen.21

Following the deterioration of socio-economic and political conditions under

Doe and the subsequent civil conflict, which resulted in a waning of the U.S. official

presence in Liberia, some policy makers began to view Liberia as simply one more

country in a continent that they saw as generally peripheral to U.S. interests. From

this perspective, Liberia was worthy of no special U.S. attention or engagement, and

a basic position of non-interference in Liberian internal affairs was an appropriate

guiding principle for U.S. policy. Others believed that the historically close

relationship between the United States and Liberia obligated the former to take

special responsibility in answering Liberia’s humanitarian and developmental needs,

helping to promote a democratic system, and working to stop human rights abuses.

Some criticized the U.S. response to the Liberian conflict as inadequate, believing

that it would have been appropriate for the United States to have sent in troops at

various stages of the conflict to help restore order and protect civilians. They pointed

to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo as recent examples of successful humanitarian

interventions, and asked why similar levels of assistance were not appropriate for an

African country with historic U.S. ties.

As the conflict continued, U.S. involvement in Liberia centered on ensuring the

delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance to the Liberian people, providing

technical and logistical support to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and

supporting ECOWAS and U.N. mediational efforts to end the war. From FY1991 to

FY2003, no military aid was provided to Liberia; U.S. assistance consisted

predominantly of food aid and relatively small U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) loans and grants.22

20

See Ottaway, “Shultz Sees Liberian...”

21

Herman Cohen, “Liberia: A Bold Plan Hijacked,” Intervening in Africa: Superpower

Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent, 2000; and Oku Bright, “Liberia...”

22

Historical data on U.S. assistance to Liberia is available online from the USAID

publication Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations July 1, 1945

- September 30, 2001. An online version of this resource, U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants

Online [Greenbook], is available. See [http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html].

CRS-22

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Liberia: FY1990- FY2001

($ millions)

Year

DA

ESF

FFP

IMET

Peace

Corps

Other

Economic

Assistance

Annual

Total

1990

0

0

14.5

0.4

1.9

0.2

17

1991

0

0

43.5

0

0

0

43.5

1992

0

1.3

35.4

0

0

0

36.7

1993

0

0

50.6

0

0

0

50.6

1994

3.7

0

56.4

0

0

0

60.1

1995

0

0

51.6

0

0

0

51.6

1996

2.3

0

55.7

0

0

0

57.9

1997

12.5

1.7

23.1

0

0

0

37.3

1998

10.8

1.4

30.3

0

0

0

42.5

1999

7.1

0.5

16.8

0

0

0

24.5

2000

8.9

0

4.2

0

0

0

13.1

2001

5.7

0

4

0

0

0

9.7

Totals by

Function

51

4.9

386.1

0.4

1.9

0.2

444.5

Abbreviations: DA: Development Assistance (USAID grants); ESF: Economic Support Fund; FFP:

Food for Peace — P.L.480 Title II - Food Aid and Section 416 Program; IMET=International Military

Education and Training.

Data Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Online

[a.k.a. Greenbook], [http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html]. Data as of December 19, 2003.

Note: For background on U.S. assistance to Africa, see CRS Issue Brief IB95052, Africa: U.S.

Foreign Assistance Issues. USAID’s Greenbook is among the most comprehensive sources of

historical data on U.S. foreign assistance. It provides data on assistance by functional category, as

obligated during a given year. Calculations of annual assistance figures from other sources, such as

data on annual appropriations or recent actual expenditures in agencies’ annual budget requests, may

differ from the figures listed above.

In strife-torn Monrovia in 1996, USAID delivered water to Liberian refugees

sheltering in the U.S. embassy’s Greystone compound and sought to bring food into

the city by helicopter. USAID coordinated its relief efforts with multi-lateral

government agencies and NGOs. As peace gradually took hold in 1997, U.S. policymaking attention shifted toward the need for its further consolidation, particularly

through support for transitional security maintenance and electoral assistance. In June

1997 the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa held a hearing

entitled The Liberian Election: A New Hope?, during which U.S. Special Envoy to

Liberia Howard Jeter reviewed recent developments in Liberia. He emphasized the

centrality in U.S. policy toward Liberia of U.S. political, financial, and technical

support for ECOMOG, beginning in mid-1996. He also expressed strong U.S.

support for ECOWAS’ effort to ensure “free, fair and credible elections in Liberia,”

and reviewed an agenda for then-forthcoming U.S. electoral assistance for Liberia.

CRS-23

Table 2. U.S. Support for ECOMOG in Liberia, 1991-1998

($ millions, fiscal years)

Account

1991

1993

1994

1995

1996

PKO (a)

3.8

6.83

6.69

5.7

12

ESF (b)

—

13

1

0

8.6

1.5

Drawdown (c)

10

—

—

—

15

—

—

13.8

19.83

7.69

5.7

35.6

1.5

2.844

Totals

1997

1998

2.844

Source: State Department, “Multi-Year Assistance for ECOMOG Peacekeeping Operations,”

information sheet.

a. PKO: Peacekeeping Operations Account

b. ESF: Economic Support Fund

c. Drawdown: Provision of equipment from U.S. Defense Department stockpiles, sometimes using

existing government service contracts or agencies.

UNOMIL. Another important facet of U.S. policy toward Liberia during the war

was its support for the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL, which

existed from September 1993 to September 1997). UNOMIL was charged with

monitoring compliance with cease-fire agreements and a ban on arms shipments to

Liberia, and the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants;

observing and verifying the election process; training ECOMOG engineers in land

mine clearance; and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian aid.

Table 3. U.S. Support for UNOMIL

($ Millions)

1994

1995

1996

1997

12.25

4

6

6

Source: Budget of the United States, various years.

Post-War Period. Following Taylor’s election in 1997, the U.S. government

sought to establish a dialogue with Liberia on key bilateral issues, particularly the

observation of human rights and the strengthening of democracy and economic

development in Liberia.

In 1998, the Carter Center began implementation of a USAID-funded

democracy and governance program that sought to strengthen civil society, enhance

the capacities of non-governmental organizations and the independent media, and

institutionalize respect for human rights and government accountability.23 Beginning

23

The Carter Center, a private, nonpartisan organization, run by former President Jimmy

(continued...)

CRS-24

in 1991, the Carter Center participated in mediation efforts that sought to end the

war. In 1992, it established an office in Monrovia, which initiated human rights

protection programs, assisted diverse Liberia non-governmental organizations, and

worked to create a democratic electoral process. The Center’s office, which closed

in April 1996 due to fighting, had re-opened in April 1997, as the war drew to a

close, and as preparations for elections commenced.

Initial optimism for political and economic rebuilding and reconciliation gave

way to pessimism about Liberia’s prospects. Monrovia’s war-devastated public

infrastructure remained largely unrepaired, and the Taylor government showed few

signs of investing in public goods. Its poor human rights record and reported support

of the RUF, which the United States repeatedly condemned, undercut prospects for

improved bilateral relations between the Taylor Administration and the United

States. As political and economic conditions in Liberia under Taylor gradually

degenerated, U.S. policy makers’ views of the Taylor Administration became

increasingly negative and critical. U.S. assistance levels reflected such concerns; in

1997, as prospects for post-conflict rebuilding improved, U.S. assistance increased

substantially, though at a moderate level by global comparison, but then steadily

decreased. See Table 1, U.S. Assistance to Liberia: FY1990 - FY2001.

In late June 1999, the United States temporarily closed six embassies in Africa

— including the U.S. mission in Monrovia, which reopened several days later — due

to possible threats from Islamic militants. Britain did likewise for four of its

embassies in Africa during the same period. Shortly thereafter, the then-newly reestablished Liberian Anti-terrorist Unit (ATU) was deployed near the U.S. embassy

in Monrovia, despite U.S. assertions that the embassy situation was secure and that

the situation did “not warrant” the ATU deployment.24

Recent U.S. Policy

Bilateral Relations, 2000-2003. As bilateral relations deteriorated in

response to developments in Liberia that conflicted with stated U.S. policy goals

toward Liberia, a strategic dilemma facing U.S. policy makers was whether to engage

Liberia diplomatically and provide it with assistance in order to encourage socioeconomic and political improvements or to pursue a more hard-line policy of regime

isolation and containment, and to withhold development assistance.25 The first option

held the potential to engender governance and economic reforms and decrease human

suffering, but held the potential to reward the Taylor government with increased

legitimacy, and offset the impact of punitive or proscriptive sanctions against it. The

23

(...continued)

Carter and his wife, Rosslyn, engages in conflict prevention and resolution,

democracy-building, and health-related initiatives world-wide.

24

U.S. State Department, Noon Briefing, June 25, 1999; Attes Johnson, “Liberia Deploys

Anti-terror Unit near Us Embassy,” Reuters, July 1, 1999; PANA, “Liberia Deploys Troops

at Us Embassy,” June 30, 1999; and Radio Liberia International, Monrovia, “’Anti-Terrorist

Unit’ Deployed to Improve Security,” via BBC Monitoring Africa - Political, June 30, 1999.

25

Basic U.S. policy goals toward Liberia are articulated in the annual budget requests of the

State Department and USAID.

CRS-25

second option held the potential to curtail the Taylor government’s regionally

destabilizing activities, but also to prompt it to take a defensive posture, lash out at

perceived domestic opponents and reformers, and reduce U.S. leverage with the

regime. Beginning under the Clinton Administration, and later under the Bush

Administration, U.S. policy toward Liberia appeared to join aspects of both options,

but increasingly emphasized the latter.

The Clinton Administration threatened to take punitive actions against the

Taylor government in response to Liberian intervention in Sierra Leone’s civil war,

which also resulted in congressional calls for tough, activist U.S. policy measures to

counter such alleged actions. In a May 12, 2000 opinion editorial in the Washington

Post, for instance, Senator Judd Gregg stated that “Taylor and his criminal gang must

go; every feasible effort ought to be made to undermine his rule.”26 On October 10,

2000, then-President Clinton issued a proclamation denying entry into the United

States of persons assisting or profiting from the armed activities of the RUF rebels

then fighting the government of Sierra Leone. In a related statement, he declared that

the restrictions were to apply immediately to President Taylor, senior members of the

Liberian government, and their supporters and families. He stated that the action

represented an explicit sanction against the Liberian government for its failure to end

its trafficking in arms and illicit diamonds with the RUF, thus fueling the Sierra

Leonean conflict.27 As a precaution against possible “anti-American sentiment in

Liberia” as a result of the travel ban, the U.S. State Department ordered

non-emergency embassy staff in Monrovia to depart Liberia, and issued a general

travel advisory for Liberia.28 The Liberian government responded with a reciprocal

visa ban prohibiting U.S. officials and family members from traveling to Liberia.

Relations continued to deteriorate. In mid-October 2000, Taylor reportedly

accused the U.S. government of conducting covert intelligence activities to

undermine his rule by funding development projects through the Ambassador’s

Special Self-Help Fund. He also accused the United States of undermining Liberia’s

economic development by failing to fund infrastructure projects, an assertion that he

had voiced in the past.29 On November 2, 2000, the State Department issued a travel

advisory against travel in Liberia, particularly in the northwest border region, due to

rebel activity in the area. It also terminated an earlier ordered departure of

non-emergency U.S. embassy staff from Liberia, but prohibited family members from

accompanying U.S. government employees in Liberia. In early November 2000, the

Carter Center announced the closure of its Monrovia field office, stating in a letter

to the Liberian government that “prevailing conditions and the actions of your

26

Judd Gregg, “A Graveyard Peace,” Op-Ed, Washington Post, May 9, 2000.

27

U.S. State Department, “Clinton Proclamation Regarding Sierra Leone,” October 11,

2000, Washington; White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President,”

October 11, 2000.

28

29

U.S. State Department, Noon Briefing, October 11, 2000.

The News (Monrovia), “Taylor Accuses US of Sabotage,” via All Africa, October 16,

2000; The News (Monrovia), “American Ambassador Speaks Out On Aid Issue,” via

AllAfrica, October 23, 2000; and Tom Kamara, “Living with Paranoia,” The Perspective,

October 25, 2000.

CRS-26

government have made it increasingly difficult for the Center and others to be

effective in supporting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”30

U.S. policy makers in the Bush Administration, and some members of Congress,

continued to view the Taylor regime critically. During a March 14, 2001 hearing of

the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa, subcommittee

members and witnesses criticized the Taylor government harshly, calling his

government a regional menace and source of destabilization, an abuser of human

rights, and anti-democratic.31

Under the Bush Administration, the United States continued to back U.N.

sanctions against the Taylor government, support the maintenance of congruent U.S.

bilateral sanctions, and provide humanitarian and civil society capacity-building

assistance to Liberia. Several inter-Liberian conflict resolution and political party

consultative forums received U.S. assistance or were addressed by U.S. officials. In

FY2001, the Guinean military received U.S. training intended, in part, to counter

Liberian-sponsored regional destabilization by improving Guinea’s territorial defense

and humanitarian relief/refugee protection capabilities. The United States was a key

founding member of the International Contact Group on Liberia, a coalition of donor

and West African regional governments formed in September 2002 by key donor and

regional states to coordinate a comprehensive, regionally-focused resolution to the

recently concluded, second civil war that burgeoned beginning in 2000.32

30

Carter Center, “Carter Center Shuts Down Liberia Operation,”November 7, 2000.

31

House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, Confronting Liberia [hearing], Subcommittee

on Africa, Committee on International Relations, 107th Congress, 1st Session, March 14,

2001.

32

More recent events in Liberia and U.S-Liberian relations are covered in CRS Report

RS21525, Liberia: Transition to Peace.

CRS-27

Guinea

Sierra

Leone

Voinjama

Lofa

Cote d'

Ivoire

Sanniquellie

Grand

Cape

Mount

Bong

Nimba

Gbarnga

Tubmanburg

Bomi

Margibi

Robertsport

Kakata

Montserrado

Monrovia

Grand

Bassa

Zwedru

Grand

Jide

S

Buchanan

Liberia

Rivercess

River Cess

Sino

National Capital

County Seat

Secondary City

Airport

Greenville

Grand

Kru

International Border

County Border

Road

Railroad

Maryland

Grand Cess

River

Harper

0

0

25

50

25

75 km

50mi

Adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix.

Atlantic Ocean

Cape

Palmas

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