Federal Research and Development: Budgeting and Priority-Setting, 1993-2000

Congressional research reportMar 14, 2001

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Federal Research and Development:

Budgeting and Priority-Setting, 1993-2000

March 14, 2001

Genevieve J. Knezo

Specialist in Science and Technology Policy

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Federal Research and Development:

Budgeting and Priority-Setting, 1993-2000

Summary

During his two Administrations, President Clinton linked research and

development (R&D) to economic growth and sought partnerships between government and business in research and innovation. In contrast to the two previous

Administrations which increased defense R&D relative to civilian R&D, the Clinton

Administration sought to reduce defense R&D funding and to increase funding for

civilian R&D, including at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National

Science Foundation (NSF), and for environmental research. The Republican majority

priorities during the 104th to 106th Congresses stressed, in large part, deficit reduction,

deregulation and tax incentives to foster market-driven innovation, and support for

civilian basic research and defense R&D as governmental functions.

Both President Clinton’s and Congress’s R&D priorities reflected moves to

balance the budget. As a result, in terms of constant dollars (that is, inflation-adjusted

dollars) of budget authority, federal R&D was funded below the previous high

funding level (FY1992) for each year from FY1993 to FY1999. During this period,

pressures mounted to raise funding for R&D programs. As budget surpluses started

to grow (beginning in 1997), Congress circumvented or raised caps imposed on the

discretionary portion of the federal budget, and as a result, major R&D funding

increases were made in the FY1998 to FY2001 budget cycles. In constant dollars,

FY2001 funding for nondefense R&D was 28% higher than for FY1993, while

FY2001 defense R&D was 6% less than for FY1993. Civilian R&D increases were

led by NIH whose R&D budget grew 72% in constant dollars between these two

years, followed by increases for R&D at NSF, at 40%; the Commerce Department,

22%; the Environmental Protection Agency, 20%; the Agriculture Department, 16%;

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2%. Between FY1993 and

FY2001, the Energy Department’s R&D budget was cut 7% in constant dollars.

FY2001 appropriations action funded defense and non-defense R&D at about the

same dollar amount for the first time since 1977.

Debates about priority-setting for R&D included increasing R&D in non-health

related fields to the same extent as in the health sciences fields; coordinating federal

agency R&D budgets to promote national needs as well as support of cutting-edge

science; and ensuring accountability for R&D spending. Special studies and caucuses

dealing with science policy were initiated in the House and Senate. In 1998, the

House passed a resolution endorsing the science policy study conducted by

Congressman Vernon Ehlers. The Senate passed a bill that would have increased

future R&D by specified minimum percentages, required the President to develop a

coordinated R&D budget, and enhanced R&D accountability.

Potential issues during the 107th Congress could include whether R&D funding

increases will be maintained in the face of potential tax cuts and economic slowdown,

funding levels for defense R&D and nondefense energy-related R&D, the funding

priority accorded areas of civilian R&D other than health research, and funding levels

for federal technology development programs.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Presidential Priority-setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

R&D Budgeting in the Context of Deficit Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Federal R&D Is a Decreasing Part of National R&D Spending . . . . . . . . . . 6

Detailed Summaries of R&D Budgeting From FY1996 to FY2001 . . . . . . . . . 10

Fiscal Year 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Fiscal Year 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Fiscal Year 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Fiscal Year 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Fiscal Year 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Fiscal Year 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Other Issues Relating to Priority-Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Congressional Earmarking of Specific R&D Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Coordination of R&D Priority-Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Funding for Large Research Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Priorities for Critical Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The “Ehlers” Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Potential Issues for the 107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

List of Figures

Figure 1. Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,

FY1949-FY2001, Line Grapha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Figure 2. Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,

FY1949-FY2001, Bar Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Figure 3. Trends in Nondefense R&D Funding by Budget Function,

FY1953-FY2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Figure 4. Trends in R&D Funding, By Agency, From FY1993 to FY2001,

Percentage Change in Constant Dollars of Budget Authoritya . . . . . . . . . . 5

Figure 5. R&D Funding as a Percentage of Discretionary Spending,

FY1962-FY2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Figure 6. R&D as a Percentage of Gross, Domestic Product (GDP) . . . . . . . . . 9

List of Tables

Table 1. Budget for R&D, FY1994 to FY2001, est. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Table 2. Historical Data on Federal R&D, FY1976-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Federal Research and Development:

Budgeting and Priority-Setting, 1993-2000

Introduction

This report describes executive and legislative activities relating to research and

development (R&D) budgets and priority-setting that occurred primarily during

FY1993 to FY2001, the period of the two Clinton Administrations. It includes

detailed summaries of presidential priorities and congressional appropriations

activities for R&D in the 104th to 106th Congresses. In addition, the report

summarizes other salient issues discussed during this period relating to congressional

earmarking of R&D projects, activities to coordinate R&D priority-setting, priorities

for critical technologies, implementation of the Government Performance and Results

Act of 1993 in R&D agencies, and priority-setting activities of the National Science

and Technology Council (NSTC). This report is based in part on CRS Issue Brief

94009, which chronicled R&D budgeting and priority-setting activities from 1994 to

2000.

Presidential Priority-setting

Since it started funding large amounts of R&D after World War II, the federal

government has always supported core fields of science, but the focus in R&D

budgets has changed in response to policy shifts, congressional concerns, and

presidential prerogatives. During the 1970s, interest focused on space R&D, growth

in energy and health research and reductions in defense R&D (R&D in the

Department of Defense (DOD) and defense R&D in the Department of Energy

(DOE)). In FY1978, non-federal sources, largely industry, started to eclipse the

federal government as a source of R&D funding. Support for defense R&D and for

basic research became prominent during the 1980s, with the Administrations of

Presidents Ronald Reagan and President George Bush.1 Energy research and space

research funding declined. In FY1989, near the end of the Reagan Administration,

about 65% of federal R&D funding went to defense R&D (R&D in DOD and defense

R&D in DOE), and near the end of the Bush Administration in FY1993, defense R&D

received about 57% of federal R&D funding. (For details, see Figures 1 and 2 and

Table 2.)

Following the precedent used by the National Archives and Records Administration, the Bush

Administration, 1989-1993, is cited as the Administration of George Bush. The Bush

Administration, beginning in 2001, is cited as the Administration of George W. Bush. These

forms are used in this report.

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Figure 1. Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,

FY1949-FY2001, Line Grapha

Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D

Outlays for the conduct of R&D, FY 1949-2001, billions of constant FY 2000 dollars

1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999

Defense R&D

Nondefense R&D

Source: OMB Historical Tables. FY 2001 is the President's request.

a Source: American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS, at

[http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/guihist.htm]. This source is used for all AAAS figures that

are in this CRS report.

Partly in response to the end of the Cold War, but also influenced by policy

inclinations, President Clinton sought to change these priorities — primarily to reduce

defense R&D in DOD and in DOE and to increase civilian research, technology

investment and development, basic research, computer networking, and

commercialization of R&D.2 This shift was intended to ensure federal support of

R&D to promote economic growth, a basic policy objective of the Clinton

Administration.3 See Figure 2.

For historical information, see: Genevieve J. Knezo, “Policies on Science and Technology

Topics Proposed By the Clinton Campaign: A List,” CRS Report 93-96 SPR, January 27,

1993, 6 p. See also Glenn McLoughlin and Wendy Schacht, “Technology Policy Initiatives

in the Clinton-Gore Administration,” CRS Report 93-357 SPR, Mar. 18, 1993. 48 p.

The 1995 Economic Report of the President and the Council of Economic Advisors’ (CEA)

October 1995 report, Supporting R&D to Promote Economic Growth: The Federal

Government’s Role, reported that the estimated social rate of return to R&D averages 50%,

which, the CEA said, is significantly higher than returns on other investments. This finding

(continued...)

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Figure 2. Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D,

FY1949-FY2001, Bar Graph

Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D

Outlays for the conduct of R&D, FY 1949-2001, billions of constant FY 2000 dollars

1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999

Defense R&D

Nondefense R&D

Source: OMB Historical Tables. FY 2001 is the President's request.

R&D Budgeting in the Context of Deficit Reduction

R&D budgeting during the period 1993-2001 occurred amid activities

undertaken to halt deficit spending and to balance the budget. The 103rd Congress

imposed, beginning in 1993, limits on discretionary spending—the part of the budget

from which most R&D is funded. Later, in 1997, the President and Congress agreed

on a balanced budget bill that capped discretionary spending through FY2002.

Because of the spending caps imposed by Congress, R&D programs increasingly

competed with funding for other discretionary programs as discretionary spending

was projected to decline from 37% of total outlays in FY1999 to about 30% in

FY2002. Thus R&D funding vied even more than it had in the past with programs

for public infrastructure, housing, discretionary social services programs, and

transportation, even as funding for these programs overall was projected to decline.

During the first Clinton Administration, 1993 to the beginning of 1997, funding

for many R&D programs was reduced in constant dollar (inflation-adjusted) terms,

(...continued)

is not without controversy. For instance, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, by

Terence Kealey, 1996, disputed a link between government support of S&T and economic

growth and endorsed a smaller governmental role in R&D.

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especially for space, energy, defense, and environment (in EPA and the Interior

Department). See Figure 3 and Tables 1 and 2. Appropriations in the 104th, 105th

and 106th Congresses were subject to caps, which continued to be applied, even as the

economy started to rebound and budgetary surpluses started to grow (beginning

Figure 3. Trends in Nondefense R&D Funding by Budget Function,

FY1953-FY2001

Trends in Nondefense R&D by Function, FY 1953-2001

outlays for the conduct of R&D, billions of constant FY 2000 dollars

1953

Health

1958

1963

1968

Gen. Science

1973

1978

Environ.

1983

Other

1988

1993

Energy

1998

Space

Source: AAAS, based on OMB Historical Tables in Budget of the United States

Government FY 2001. Constant dollar conversion based on GDP deflators. FY

2001 is the President's request.

Note: Some Energy programs shifted to General Science beginning in FY 1998.

in 1997). Because of wide congressional support for R&D, starting in 1996,

Congress, despite the pressure of caps, began to give R&D funding a higher priority.

In 1996, Congress appropriated 1.8% more for FY1997 R&D than the President had

requested. This pattern of congressional increases continued in succeeding years. In

addition, R&D funding started to increase over each previous year in terms of

constant dollars, beginning with FY1997. For FY1999 and FY2000, Congress used

emergency spending authority to circumvent budget caps in many areas, and, as one

result, federal R&D appropriations were increased.

For FY2001, Congress, utilizing CBO forecasts of additional surpluses, raised

the discretionary caps to about $100 billion above the existing cap and above what the

President had requested, paving the way for major increases in R&D appropriations.

For FY2001, Congress substantially increased R&D funding to $91 billion, 9.1%

more than in FY2000. R&D in every federal agency was funded at more than in

FY2000. R&D funding in all agencies, except the National Science Foundation

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(NSF), Commerce, Transportation, the Smithsonian, and the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), was appropriated at levels higher than requested. Defense

and non-defense R&D funding was equalized, for the first time since the late 1970s.

In constant dollars, health R&D funding (which had received about 14% of total R&D

funding at the end of the George Bush Administration) received about 21% of total

FY2001 R&D appropriations, and about 43% of the civilian R&D budget.

Over the period FY1993 to FY2001, as shown in figure 4, funding was increased

almost 60% in constant dollar terms for R&D in the National Institutes of Health

(NIH); for the National Science Foundation (NSF), 35%; for R&D in the Department

of Commerce and EPA, over 20%; and for the Agriculture Department,

Figure 4. Trends in R&D Funding, By Agency, From FY1993 to FY2001, Percentage

Change in Constant Dollars of Budget Authoritya

Source: AAAS Reports, based on OMB and agency R&D budget data, and on AAAS

estimates of R&D in FY2001 appropriations. Includes conduct of R&D and R&D facilities.

Constant dollar conversions based on OMB’s GDP deflators. Based on millions of constant

FY2000 dollars. Original source was prepared by AAAS in 2000, as “Historical Table 2,”

from [http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/ca01main.htm].

about 15%). Large increases were made for research in computer and information

sciences, for nanotechnology, and for technology initiatives in the Department of

Commerce. R&D funding decreased in terms of constant dollars for NASA, and for

DOE and DOD R&D, by about 5% each. Basic research funding was increased by

about $5 billion in constant dollars from FY1993 to FY2001. The emphasis,

however, was on NIH basic research which increased about $3.5 billion in constant

dollars, while non-NIH basic research increased by a smaller amount, about $1.5

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billion constant dollars. Considerable pressure was applied by non-biomedical

scientists and their supporters during the FY1999 to FY2001 appropriation cycles to

balance funding among fields of science and among R&D agencies while increasing

funding. Specifically, they sought to increase funding for non-health civilian R&D to

keep pace with the steady and substantial increases that had been made in health

R&D.

The Clinton Administration’s success at reducing defense R&D and increasing

civilian technology-oriented funding altered federal R&D priorities. For instance,

defense R&D spending declined in constant dollars by 18.2% between FY1987, the

peak year of funding for defense R&D and FY2001. The percentage decline since the

FY1993 budget (the last Bush budget) and FY2001, the last Clinton budget, was

6.3%. Civilian R&D spending increased about 28% in constant dollars between the

FY1993 and FY2001, with the focus largely on biomedical research at NIH.

The last Democratic majority 103rd Congress had reoriented some R&D

programs to focus more on projects which would generate economic benefits or

contribute to “strategic” programs – to solve a problem or contribute to industrial

capability. This was reflected in large increases for technology transfer and

development at NIST and for clean car technology and high-performance computing

programs. The NSF and the NIH emphasized “strategic,” i.e., applications-oriented

research. Attempts were made by some leaders of the succeeding Republican-led

Congresses, beginning with the 104th Congress, to halt technology development and

applications-oriented research and to abolish some technology-oriented programs and

agencies, such as DOE and the Commerce Department. Funding for basic research

and especially for health research in NIH typically has received considerable

congressional priority.

Federal R&D Is a Decreasing Part of National R&D Spending

In FY2000, Federal R&D funding was estimated to be higher in constant dollars

of budget authority for the first time since the previous peak in FY1992, a peak which

was due largely to the Reagan and previous Bush Administrations’ defense R&D

buildups. In terms of outlays, the previous peak was in FY1990, which was estimated

to have been surpassed for the first time since then in FY2001. Despite these

increases, R&D funding decreased from about 12% of total federal outlays in 1965,

during the buildup for the space program, to about 4.4% today, and from about 16%

of budget authority in 1966 to about 12.9% in 2001.4 Federal R&D funding has also

Based on data in tables 5.4 and 9.7 in Office of Management and Budget, Historical

Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2001. The OMB data in these

tables report outlays for each fiscal year. Outlays, according to the Congressional

Quarterly’s American Congressional Dictionary, are “Amounts of government spending.

They consist of payments, usually by check or in cash, to liquidate obligations incurred in

prior fiscal years as well as in the current year, including the net lending of funds under budget

authority. In federal budget accounting, net outlays are calculated by subtracting the amounts

of refunds and various kinds of reimbursements to the government from actual spending.

(continued...)

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decreased as a percentage of discretionary outlays, from about 17% of total

discretionary outlays in FY1965 to about 12% today. See Figure 5.

(...continued)

Much of the data used in this report, which come from the data series and analyses of

the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), report R&D funding in

terms of budget authority, which “is the authority provided in law to enter into obligations

that will result in immediate or future outlays of Government funds. Government officials

may obligate the Government to make outlays only to the extent they have been granted

budget authority. The budget records budget authority as a dollar amount in the year when

it first becomes available.” (Office of Management and Budget, The Budget Systems and

Concepts, Fiscal Year 2001, p. 9.) AAAS budget authority data, which were used to develop

Tables 1 and 2 in this report, show that the previous constant dollar high for R&D spending

occurred in 1992 (not 1990 as OMB reports, using outlay data). This was during the George

Bush Administration. OMB data, like AAAS data show that in terms of constant dollars,

R&D funding fell below this 1992 level for every succeeding year until FY2000. The OMB

data show that the FY1990 OMB high year was not exceeded until FY2001, estimated.

While budget authority and outlays are not equal, they provide internally consistent trend

comparisons; historical trends of outlays and budget authority provide similar conclusions.

Note: according to the Congressional Quarterly’s American Congressional Dictionary,

obligations are defined as: “A binding agreement by a government agency to pay for goods,

products, services, studies, and the like, either immediately or in the future. When an agency

enters into such an agreement, it incurs an obligation. As the agency makes the required

payments, it liquidates the obligation. Appropriation laws usually make funds available for

obligation for one or more fiscal years but do not require agencies to spend their funds during

those specific years. The actual outlays can occur years after the appropriation is obligated;

for example, a contract for payment for a submarine when it is delivered in the future. Such

obligated funds are often said to be “in the pipeline.” Under these circumstances, an agency’s

outlays in a particular year can come from appropriations obligated in previous years as well

as from its current-year appropriation. Consequently, the money Congress appropriates for

a fiscal year rarely coincides with the total amount of appropriated money the government

will actually spend in that year.”

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Figure 5. R&D Funding as a Percentage of Discretionary Spending,

FY1962-FY2001

R&D as Percent of Discretionary Spending:

FY 1962-2001, in outlays

25%

20%

15%

10%

1962

1968

1974

1980

1986

1992

1998

Nondefense R&D / Nondefense discretionary

Total R&D / Total discretionary

Source: AAAS, based on Budget of the U.S. Government FY 2001

Historical Tables

In addition, Federal R&D funding, expressed in terms of outlays, also dropped

relative to total national economic performance, from an annual average of its peak

of 2.1 % of GDP in 1964 to 0. 8% estimated for FY2001.5 See Figure 6.

Overall federal R&D funding has increased over time even as it dropped as a

percentage of federal discretionary spending. But because private sector R&D has

increased even faster, federal R&D funding has continued to decrease as a percentage

of total national R&D funding. The federal share of support first fell below 50% of

the national R&D total in 1979 and it has been declining ever since.6 The National

Science Foundation (NSF) projected that total U.S. R&D would rise to about $264

billion in FY2000 (preliminary data), due largely to significant rises in industry-funded

R&D, resulting from growth in the economy. Industry-funded R&D was expected

to increase to $179 billion, or about 68% of total national funding for R&D, in

FY2000 (preliminary data). The government’s share has declined to 27% of the total.

Most industrial R&D support goes to applied research and to development. Based on

national expenditure data from NSF, preliminary data for FY2000 show that 31% of

These data are from OMB, Historical Tables, op. cit.

See Tables 1B and 2B, In National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2000 Data Update.

Available at: [http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf01309/start.htm].

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federal government R&D expenditures7 went to support basic research, compared

with 8% of industry-funded R&D. During that same year, the federal government

funded 49% of total national expenditures for basic research, while industry funded

31%.8

Figure 6. R&D as a Percentage of Gross, Domestic Product (GDP)

The federal government is the major national supporter of basic research, which

generates much of the knowledge that industry uses for innovative R&D. Most

industry-funded research typically is applied or development-oriented, geared to

product development. As a result, some observers in and outside of Congress have

expressed concern that federal support for research, especially for basic research,

should be sustained at high levels as a public good to enhance the U.S. ability to

advance scientifically and technologically and to broaden the knowledge base that

industry uses.

NSF surveys performers and supporters of research to collect data about R&D expenditures.

Apparently those who report information are given latitude in defining what an expenditure

is. See NSF, National Patterns, 1998, “General Notes,” pp. 2-3. Expenditures do not equal

outlays or budget authority.

Table 2 b, NSF, National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2000.Data Update.

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Detailed Summaries of R&D Budgeting From

FY1996 to FY2001

Presented next is summary discussion, for each of the fiscal years 1996 to 2000,

of presidential R&D budget priorities, congressional R&D appropriations activities,

and representative efforts made to modify R&D priorities. The objective of these

summaries is to give a snapshot of each year’s R&D budgeting highlights. The

summaries also give illustrations and examples of some of the priorities and trends

described above. Unless otherwise noted, the funding data in this section is expressed

in terms of budget authority. See Table l for specific details of agency budgets. See

Table 2 for funding levels expressed in terms of constant, inflation-adjusted dollars.

Fiscal Year 1996

For FY1996, the Clinton Administration proposed an R&D budget totaling

$72.6 billion. The Administration’s priorities were similar to FY1995, when cuts

were made in defense and energy research (the Superconducting Super Collider and

nuclear weapons), and funding was increased in applied technology programs in

NIST, in NSF (for basic research, facilities and instrumentation), and in NIH. During

1995, congressional scrutiny of R&D increased in response to budget pressures, and

efforts were made to de-emphasize the government’s role in civilian

applications-oriented R&D and to focus more attention on basic research. The

Republican-majority 104th Congress attempted to reduce programs of civilian

technology development, which many Republicans traditionally oppose on the

grounds that the private sector, not the government, should make market-related

choices and share the risks and rewards. P.L. 104-6 and P.L. 104-19, emergency

supplemental appropriations acts, rescinded an additional $2.43 billion in R&D for

FY1995 and FY1996.

Each year Congress passes a budget resolution, which sets spending levels, or

caps, for total spending and for each budget function that appropriations committees

use in setting discretionary spending allocations (called 302b allocations) for each

appropriations subcommittee. The resolution also gives out-year projections based

on current budget and economic assumptions and recommends priorities for spending.

The accompanying legislative report may include explanations of the amounts to be

allocated by the committees that have jurisdiction over the programs in each budget

function.9

The Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1996, (H.Rept.

104-159), reflected serious budget pressures that would affect R&D funding. The

American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) calculated, based on

information in the budget resolution, that civilian R&D would be cut, in constant

dollars, to about 66% of its 1995 level by FY2002.

For additional information, see OMB, Budget Systems and Concepts of the United States

Government, published annually.

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However, FY1996 congressional appropriations action reduced R&D less than

projected (4% below the constant dollar FY1995 level) and R&D was increased in

NIH, and in DOD and DOE, in the latter two agencies primarily for nuclear weapons

and ballistic missile defense. Congress reduced funding for civilian energy R&D,

transportation R&D, the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), and R&D in the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in the Department of

Commerce.

Fiscal Year 1997

President Clinton proposed an R&D budget of $72.7 billion for FY1997, a

decrease of about 1.5% in constant dollars from FY1996. Using the President’s

Mid-Session Review of the FY1997 Budget, adjusted for the latest economic data,

AAAS estimated that non-defense R&D would be reduced 19% in constant dollar

terms by FY2002 if the budget were enacted as requested. The President sought

increases for NSF, NIH and for the Advanced Technology Program and the

Manufacturing Extension Program in the Commerce Department. Increases were also

requested for environmental R&D, energy efficiency and pollution prevention, the

new generation of vehicles partnership, and Mission to Planet Earth. H.Con.Res. 178,

the budget resolution for FY1997 that both the House and the Senate passed,

recommended reducing non-defense R&D 6% by 1997 and included projections of

a 23% constant dollar reduction for non-defense R&D by 2002. It proposed cutting

basic research less than in the Administration’s budget plan, but recommended cutting

R&D funding below requested levels for NASA, DOE, the Agriculture Department

(USDA), Commerce, Transportation, and EPA–primarily for reductions in applied

research and technology. The budget resolution recommended that space shuttle

operations be contracted out and that programs for energy supply R&D, fossil energy,

and conservation be reduced substantially. It recommended that NOAA refocus on

core missions; that R&D be cut in the Interior Department for the Geological Survey,

National Biological Services, and Bureau of Mines; that agricultural research and

extension be cut; and that in the Department of Commerce, the National Institute of

Standards and Technology’s (NIST) science and technological activities be increased,

and that ATP programs be eliminated.

Objections to R&D reductions were raised by the Administration and in

Democratic staff documents. The National Science Board, the governing policy body

of the National Science Foundation, released a statement, “On Federal Investments

in Science and Engineering,” NSF Press Release, January 25, 1996, calling for more

R&D funding. The views of the Democratic membership of the House Science

Committee were contained in comments on the “Omnibus Civilian Science

Authorization Act of 1996,” April 30, 1996. Eventually the FY1997 appropriations

enactments raised R&D funding 3.7% above the FY1996 level, with increases for

R&D in DOD and NIH and reductions for R&D in NASA, DOE, Agriculture,

Interior, Transportation, Commerce, and Education. The ATP program was not

eliminated. Basic research was funded at 8.2% above FY1999, a net gain of 1.9%

in constant dollars.

CRS-12

Fiscal Year 1998

The President’s FY1998 $74 billion R&D budget proposed to reduce overall

funding in constant dollars, by increasing non-defense R&D and basic research, while

reducing defense R&D. AAAS projected that this budget would reduce non-defense

R&D funding by 9.4% in constant dollars by FY2002 and defense R&D funding by

17.8%.

By 1997, when the FY1998 budget was under consideration, federal R&D

funding had been below the previous high funding level for six years in terms of

constant dollars of budget authority. See Table 2. As a result, pressures were

mounting from the research community and within Congress to raise federal R&D

spending to help sustain the Nation’s R&D infrastructure and to support R&D to

enhance innovation and knowledge growth. Congressional differences with the

President’s budget proposals were embodied in several pieces of legislation, none of

which was enacted. S. 124, the “National Research Investment Act of 1997,” would

have doubled funding authorization for non-defense R&D over the next 10 years,

specifically doubling NIH’s budget. The “National Research Investment Act of

1998,” S. 1305, would have doubled the federal S&T budget between 1999 and

2009.10

S. Res. 15 would have expressed the sense of the Senate to double NIH funding

over the next 5 years. Senator Arlen Specter, chairman of the Senate Appropriations

subcommittee that deals with NIH, announced a commitment to a 7.5% increase in

the NIH budget. In 1998, the Senate passed S. Amdt. 2272 to S.Con.Res. 86, the

Senate Budget resolution, that the Senate passed. The amendment expressed the sense

of the Senate that the NIH budget should be doubled within the next five years.

The House Science Committee, in “Views and Estimates for FY1998”

recommended an increase of 3% above FY1997 for the S&T programs within the

committee’s jurisdiction. This goal, it said, could be met within the framework of a

balanced budget. Representative George Brown, ranking Democrat on the Science

Committee, testified to the House Budget Committee that funding should be increased

for R&D, capital infrastructure, and education and training by $70 billion over the

next 5 years, using the $135 billion surplus estimated by CBO. Pressure to increase

funding came also from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Panel on Federal

S&T Analyses;11 the AAAS, in a March 24, 1997 analysis; and from the presidents of

four scientific societies, who, at a March 4 press conference, recommended a 7%

increase in funding. In contrast, a CATO Institute meeting in early February 1997

discussed The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, by Terence Kealey, which

disputed a link between government support of S&T and economic growth and

endorsed a smaller governmental role in R&D.

About $468 million worth of R&D rescissions were included in a supplemental

appropriations bill for FY1997, with reductions for DOD R&D and for a NASA wind

Introduction of the bill followed a conference on “A Decade of Investment,” attended by

more than 100 scientific and engineering societies.

At: http://www.nas.edu/fsrd/fsrd.html.

CRS-13

tunnel. As the year progressed, a healthy economy and increased tax receipts led to

forecasts of budget surpluses and elimination of deficits in 1998. For FY1998, final

congressional appropriations action raised federal R&D funding 4.2% above the

FY1997 level and 1.8% above the President’s request. All major R&D agencies

except the Department of Transportation (DOT) and USDA received increases ahead

of the expected 2.5% inflation rate, including: DOD, 2.8%; USDA, 0.6%; DOE,

3.1%; NSF, 6.1%; EPA, 14.2%; and NASA, 5.3%. The Research and

Experimentation Tax Credit for industry was extended retroactively and to June 30,

1998 in P.L. 105-34.

Fiscal Year 1999

The Administration sought $78 billion for R&D in FY1999, 2.6% more than for

FY1998, including an increase of 5.8% for non-defense R&D and a decrease of 0.3%

for defense R&D. The President’s budget gave priority to R&D in NIH, NSF, and

DOE (for greenhouse gas emissions reduction technology and for DOE defense

R&D). Reductions were proposed overall for R&D at DOD, but with increases in

basic and applied research; for NASA, NOAA, EPA, and DOT; and for most

agencies’ support for R&D facilities, except for DOE’s Spallation Neutron Source.

Basic research was to be increased by about 7.7% overall. AAAS said, “the programs

slated for increases show the priority the Administration is placing on fundamental

science, biomedical research, energy research in support of reducing U.S. greenhouse

gas emissions, industrial technology, and science in support of a Comprehensive Test

Ban treaty....”12 $27.1 billion of the non-defense R&D budget would have been

funded from discretionary funds. The rest (about $4 billion), “essentially representing

all of the requested increases for non-defense R&D in NIH, NSF, DOE and other key

agencies, would come from new offsetting revenues outside the cap,”13 would have

been funded from a special “Research Fund for America,” which excluded the Space

Station and other programs. About $3.6 billion of this approximately $4 billion

would have come from a proposed controversial tobacco settlement (S. 1415), that

Congress did not approve.

The Senate budget resolution for FY1999 (S.Con.Res. 86) called for cuts in nondefense research to 2003, but expressed non-binding language to support increases

for funding at NIH and for basic research. The House budget resolution (H.Con.Res.

284), which passed in the Senate in an amended form, endorsed increasing NIH

funding by about 10% for 5 years, but would have reduced other civilian R&D

budgets. Using assumptions in the budget resolution, AAAS made out-year

projections that defense R&D funding would decrease by 4.5% between FY1998 and

2003 and non-defense funding would increase by 21%.

Although it represented an increase over FY1998 in current dollars (not adjusted

for inflation), the FY1999 request was about 2% less than FY1998 in constant,

inflation-adjusted dollars. The House Science Committee in its Views and Estimates

for FY1999 proposed sustained increases at or above requested levels. The Science

AAAS, Preliminary Analysis of R&D in the FY1999 Budget, March 5, 1998, p. 5

AAAS, Preliminary Analysis of R&D in the FY1999 Budget, p. 2.

CRS-14

Committee’s criteria stressed funding long-term, high-risk, well-managed R&D;

agency-relevant research; exclusion of “marketing and commercialization” projects;

full leveraging of international, industry, and state science partnerships; and

prioritizing of infrastructure necessary for program requirements.14 Both President

Clinton and House Speaker Gingrich spoke publicly about the importance of R&D to

the economy and pledged to seek additional R&D funding.15 OMB Director Franklin

Raines called for scientists to give more attention to priority-setting, measuring

performance, and avoiding special pleading for pet projects in order to increase

federal support of R&D.16

Congress approved $80.2 billion for R&D, about 3.1% above the presidential

request and 5.3% more than for FY1998. All major R&D agencies except NASA

received increases above the expected 2.0% rate of inflation. Congress increased

funding by using some of the $70 billion federal surplus and by allocating $21 billion

in emergency “off-budget” spending, freeing up funding for some programs which

would have been restricted by budget caps. In relation to FY1998, basic research

funding was increased 11.3%. The largest R&D appropriations increase went to NIH,

at 15% over FY1998. DOE’s R&D appropriation was 11.4% higher than FY1998,

with increases in R&D in solar and other renewables, fossil energy and energy

conservation, and basic energy. Total defense R&D was increased 3.5%; NASA’s

R&D budget was cut by 1.6%, reducing funds for the International Space Station, but

increasing funding for space sciences and for life and microgravity sciences and

applications. NSF’s R&D was increased 8.4%; increases were made for NIST

laboratories, the Advanced Technology programs and NOAA; USDA’s budget was

increased 6.6%; funding for the U.S. Geological Survey’s biological research was

increased; in EPA, R&D appropriations were 3% higher than in FY1998, with an

increase in funding for particulate matter research.

Authorizing legislation which had been introduced first in 1997 generated

considerable attention, although it was not enacted: S. 1305, the “National Research

Investment Act of 1998,” (introduced in 1997) would have doubled R&D funding

within 10 years. It was not supported by some members of the academic community

or by some appropriations committee members. Its out-year projections would have

funded R&D about $12 billion more than the budget resolution in 2003. House

Science Committee analysis concluded the bill would reduce non-defense R&D by

more than $3.5 billion from current levels between 1999 and 2003 and that it

disproportionately favored NIH.17 The succeeding bill introduced in 1998, S. 2217,

the “Federal Research Investment Act,” (H.R. 3121 in the House), whose principal

sponsor was Senator Bill Frist, one of the leaders of the Senate Caucus on Science

and Technology that had been created in 1996, passed in the Senate. The bill

mandated federal funding levels for fundamental, scientific, and pre-competitive

engineering research to be increased to equal approximately 2.6% of the total federal

Science Committee Calls for Increase in Research Funding, press release, March 20, 1998.

“The Reappropriator,” Washington Post, June 18, 1998, A23; and American Institute of

Physics, 1998, FYI #91 and #96.

Science, June 12, 1998, p. 1671.

Washington Fax, April 22, 1998

CRS-15

budget. It also required a presidential report on R&D, and study and actions dealing

with improving measures of research performance by agencies, and termination of

research programs that were not performing successfully. It passed the Senate in

October 1998. No action was taken in the House.

P.L. 105-277 extended the research and experimentation tax credit for industry

for one year retroactively to July 1998, allowed full funding of $335 million without

incorporation into a block grant for the Eisenhower Professional Development

Program to improve training for teachers in math and science, and, in a move which

generated controversy, extended the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act

to extramural grants (the Shelby amendment). This was later narrowed by OMB

interpretation to selected research data used or cited in federal actions having the

force and effect of law.18

The FY1999 omnibus appropriations bill (P.L. 105-277) required OMB to establish

procedures for the public to obtain access to data from federally funded research, through

provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. This was a major change from traditional

practice. While permitted, federal agencies typically have not required grantees to submit

research data, and pursuant to a 1980 Supreme Court decision, agencies, under FOIA, did not

have to give the public access to research data not part of agency records.

There was considerable debate about this legislation. Opponents said that FOIA is an

inappropriate vehicle to allow wider public access. They said that using it would harm the

traditional process of scientific research--human subjects would refuse to participate in

scientific research, believing that the federal government might obtain access to confidential

information; researchers would have to spend additional time and money preparing data for

submission to the government, thereby interfering with ongoing research; and government/

university/industry partnerships would be jeopardized because data funded jointly would be

made available under FOIA. Proponents of the amendment said that “accountability” and

“transparency” were paramount: the public should have a right to review scientific data

underlying research funded by government taxpayers and used in making policy or setting

regulations. OMB released final revisions to Circular A-110, as directed by law, on

September 30, 1999. After considerable public comment, OMB limited access under FOIA

to selected research data that the federal government cites or uses in actions having the force

and effect of law. Legislation was introduced in the 106th Congress (H.R. 88) to repeal the

law and hearings were held, but the bill did not pass.

Court challenges may be raised to the circular. (See: Public Access to Data from

Federally Funded Research: OMB Circular A-110 and Issues for Congress. By Eric A.

Fischer and Genevieve J. Knezo, CRS Report RL30376, Nov. 18, 1999. 37 p. ) Reportedly,

William L. Kovacs, vice president of environmental and regulatory affairs for the U.S.

Chamber of Commerce and a major supporter of the legislation, predicted that the OMB

regulations, which some see as being too narrow in allowing access to research data, could

be revisited by the new Bush Administration. Court challenges to the amendment, he was

reported to have said, probably would wait until the government sought to issue controversial

new regulations “based on unavailable research data.” (Victoria Slind-Flor, “Law Applies

Act to Information if U.S. Funds Are Involved,” The National Law Journal, October 30,

2000.) The National Academies held a conference on this topic, entitled, “Seeking Access to

Research Data in the 21st Century: An Ongoing Dialogue Among Interested Parties,” part

of the Science, Technology, and Law Program, in Washington, D.C., on March 12, 2001.

CRS-16

Fiscal Year 2000

The President’s budget request for R&D included an increase of 2.9%, which

was above the inflationary level of 2% for non-defense R&D, making it 51% of the

R&D budget request. Defense R&D was slated to decline 5.3% from FY1999 due

to cuts in weapons development and applied research. Within the defense R&D

category, only DOD basic research was proposed to be increased, by about $6 million

more than in FY1999. The Administration sought a $336 million initiative in

“Information Technology for the 21st Century,” with increases in long-term

fundamental research funding in NSF, DOE and DOD, representing a 28% increase

in the then current level of funding for information technology. The President

requested 8.6% more than in FY1999 for DOE’s R&D in renewable energy

technology and energy conservation; transportation R&D was proposed to be

increased 11.6%. Basic research would increase 4.2% over FY1999, continuing the

pattern of recent increases. NSF’s R&D budget would be increased by 7.8%; DOE’s

non-defense R&D budget would increase 6.4%. NIH’s budget was proposed to

increase by 2.0%. The President sought to increase NASA’s R&D to $9.8 billion,

primarily for the International Space station, up 7.7%. Commerce’s R&D budget

included an 18% increase for the NIST Advanced Technology program and would

have provided $283 million to NOAA for research related to climate change and

associated subjects. The Administration proposed a “21st Century Research Fund,”

to highlight important R&D programs. For the long-term, the President’s budget

showed all agencies’ R&D budgets’ declining in constant dollar terms between

FY2000 and FY2004, with the largest declines in NIH.

Final congressional action funded FY2000 R&D at about $83 billion, about 5%

over FY1999 and 7% over the President’s request. The largest increases were in NIH

and DOD, followed by NSF, DOE, and USDA. Excluding NIH, R&D funding for

nondefense R&D increased 2.4%. Because of the large projected budget surplus

($123 billion), there was pressure to circumvent caps in the appropriations process,

as was done in 1998 for the FY1999 budget. While sticking to mandatory budget

caps, Congress allowed appropriations for discretionary programs to exceed capped

levels by designating up to $14 billion above the caps as emergency spending,

mandating a 0.38% across the board cut, delaying some spending to FY2001, and

using offsets. The increases for R&D exceeded those proposed by the President for

NIH, NASA, DOD S&T, defense R&D, and basic research. Congressional action

resulted in R&D funding at levels less than the President proposed for NSF, DOE,

and USDA, and for information technology programs.

H.R. 2086, a Science Committee bill on networking and information technology

that passed the House in 2000, would have increased funding over the following five

years for information technology. The House Science Committee’s calls for

increasing R&D budgets appeared in its “Analysis and Review” of the FY2000 R&D

budget.19 Its bipartisan FY2000 Views and Estimates Report endorsed a 3% increase

for R&D programs under its jurisdiction. Non-biomedical scientists and others

Appearing at: [http://www.house.gov/science/welcome.htm].

CRS-17

continued to criticize the emphasis given to biomedical research and sought to

rebalance the federal R&D funding portfolio to support lagging fields of science.20

H.R. 1180, enacted as P.L. 106-170, the “Work Incentives Improvement Act,”

contained a 5-year extension of the research and experimentation tax credit for

industry. (See CRS Issue Brief IB92039.) S. 296, the “Federal Research Investment

Act,” (H.R. 3121 in the House), the successor to S. 2217, 105th Congress, passed the

Senate on July 26, 1999. The bill would have doubled R&D funding within 11 years,

at a 2.5% annual increase above the rate of inflation for all fields of science in major

agencies. It also mandated a separate detailed budget presentation on R&D;

addressed better accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in federal R&D funding;

required an NAS study and OMB guidance on performance measures for research;

and established a process to terminate unsuccessful research programs. No action

was taken in the House on the bill in 1999.

Fiscal Year 2001

With the FY2001 budget submission, President Clinton proposed to raise budget

caps, permitting a 5.2% increase in total discretionary spending. He also sought to

ensure greater funding balance among R&D agencies and fields, given the recent large

increases for health R&D. However, funding for most other fields had decreased,

remained stable, or increased less. The President also sought to raise the federal R&D

budget 3% over FY2000 to $85.3 billion, with the largest increases for non-defense

R&D, at 6.2%; and to reduce defense R&D by about 0.2%. The FY2001 budget

proposed larger increases for R&D in non-life sciences disciplines than for life

sciences research. R&D increases, in descending order, were proposed for DOT,

25%; NSF, 19%; DOE, 8%, the Commerce Department, 7%; NIH, 6%; and EPA,

5%. NSF’s increase would go to support the agency as the lead for interagency

initiatives in nanotechnoloy, information technology, and biocomplexity research.

Projections for the budget showed that between FY2000 to FY2005, non-defense

R&D would increase by 14.2% (3% in constant dollars); defense R&D would

decrease by 4.7% (a 14.6% decrease in constant dollars).

The FY2001 congressional budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 290, approved April

13, did not include detailed recommendations for federal support of R&D, but it

developed targets for budget functions and appropriations that support R&D. AAAS

projected that the resolution would permit increases in non-defense R&D in FY2001,

but, nonetheless, would reduce R&D spending 7.8% in inflation-adjusted dollars by

2005. R&D would be reduced in constant dollars in all agencies, except for NSF and

DOT. Because the plan proposed tax cuts and would not allow use of the Social

Security surplus, funding levels would be lower than those projected in the President’s

budget. Defense R&D was projected to decline 13.7% in inflation-adjusted dollars

by 2005.

For FY2001, Congress, utilizing CBO forecasts of additional surpluses, raised

the caps on discretionary spending to about $100 billion above the existing cap and

“Balancing the Federal Research Portfolio: Who’s Deciding and Why?” Science, August

11, 1999.

CRS-18

above what the President had requested, paving the way for major increases in R&D

appropriations. During the FY2001 appropriations process, Congress substantially

increased R&D funding to $91 billion, 9.1% more than FY2000. R&D in every

agency was increased over FY2000 and R&D in most agencies, except NSF, DOT,

EPA, the Commerce Department, and the Smithsonian, was funded higher than

requested. The largest increases were for NIH and the Defense Department. Funding

levels for defense and non-defense R&D were about equal, for the first time since the

late 1970s. There was an 8.9% increase in funding for non-defense research,

excluding NIH. This was smaller than the NIH increase of 15%, but reversed recent

trends of declining or stable funding for non-health sciences. The increase in DOD

research support resulted in increases for physical sciences and engineering research.

Nanotechnology research was increased 55% over FY2000 (but NSF’s lead role was

scaled down); NSF’s support for information technology R&D was more than

doubled; basic research support was increased by about 11.8% overall. Substantial

increases in NIH’s R&D budget were made during the 1990s, so that its funding totals

about the same as all other non-defense agencies’ R&D funding combined. The

FY2001 increases for civilian R&D agencies, excluding NIH, raised their funding

levels to about what they were in the early 1990s in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars.

See Table 2.

Considerable effort was made during congressional deliberations to increase

funding for federal R&D. The House Science Committee in its Views and

Estimates...for Fiscal Year 2001, noted that “...out-year budgets are either flat or

actually decline. The President’s budget fails to meet the stable and sustainable

funding criteria needed for science and technology programs in the out-years” (p. 2).

Rep. Vernon Ehlers sought support from colleagues “... to sign a letter to the

chairman and senior Democratic member of the House Appropriations Committee,”

urging that high priority be given to basic scientific research in the FY2001

appropriations process ((302b) allocations).21 In part in an effort to explain the

importance of R&D to the public, the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science

and Technology released a report, Wellspring of Prosperity, Science and Technology

in the U.S. Economy, How Investments in Discovery Are Making Our Lives Better,

Spring 2000. An Office of Science and Technology (OSTP) report sought to

demonstrate the economic benefits of federal R&D: Discovery and Innovation:

Federal Research and Development activities in the Fifty States...., 2000, 650 pp.

S. 296, the “Federal Research Investment Act” that was passed the Senate first

in 1999 as S. 2217, passed again in the Senate in 2000 as Title I of the “Next

Generation Internet Act,” S. 2046, amended. It authorized increases for civilian R&D

funding at set amounts, with the goal of investing 10% of the discretionary budget in

civilian R&D by 2011. It also included provisions to measure research performance

and accountability. House Science Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner

opposed it because, he said, it would weaken the authorizations process.22 The House

did not pass the bill.

The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Science Policy News, no. 33, March 23,

2000. A copy of the letter is included in the article.

“The Bombs Bursting in Air,” What’s New, Sept. 29, 2000, <Whatsnew@aps.org>.

CRS-19

Other Issues Relating to Priority-Setting

Several other issues relating to priority-setting were prominent between 1993

and 2000, including criticism of so-called earmarking, coordination of R&D prioritysetting, priorities for critical technologies, the “Ehlers” report, implications for R&D

of the Government Performance and Results Act, and the role of the National Science

and Technology Council.

Congressional Earmarking of Specific R&D Projects

There has been considerable controversy about congressional earmarking for

R&D. Earmarking may be defined as the practice of Congress, in report language or

law, directing that appropriated funds go to a specific performer to conduct a project

or designating awards for certain types of performers or in certain geographic

locations.23 Typically an agency has not included these awards in its budget request

This definition accords with common standard definitions. See, for instance, (1) from the

Congressional Quarterly American Congressional Dictionary: “Earmark - To set aside

funds for a specific purpose, use, or recipient. Generally speaking, virtually every

appropriation is earmarked, and so are certain revenue sources credited to trust funds. In

common usage, however, the term is often applied as an epithet for funds set aside for such

purposes as research projects, demonstration projects, parks, laboratories, academic grants,

and contracts in particular congressional districts or states or for certain specified universities

or other organizations.” [Http://www.crs.gov/products/guides/newformat/

Glossary/e.html]; (2) OMB Circular A-11, (Revised 2000), defines the following as

“Research Performed at Congressional Direction: Intramural and extramural research

programs where funded activities are awarded to a single performer or collection of

performers with limited or no competitive selection or with competitive selection but outside

of the agency’s primary mission, based on direction from the Congress in law, in report

language, or by other direction. Funded activities may be merit-reviewed prior to award,”

p.282; and (3) The CRS report, Fact Sheet on House Budget Process, 98-518 GOV, by

Sandy Streeter, Updated Feb. 11, 1999, defines “Earmarks and Limitation in Appropriations

Bills,” as “An annual appropriations act is generally made up of separate paragraphs, each

of which provides funding for specific agencies and programs. Generally, each paragraph

corresponds to a unique account and provides appropriations for multiple projects and

purposes as a single lump sum. Earmarks and limitations are two devices regularly used in

annual appropriations acts to restrict, or more precisely direct, the availability of funds for

specific projects or purposes of an account. Sometimes an earmark or a limitation may

generate more interest or controversy than the total appropriation. ...An earmark refers to

funds set aside within an account for a specified purpose. Sometimes earmark refers to any

congressional set-aside for a specified program, project, activity, institution, or location. At

other times, the term more narrowly refers to set-asides for individual projects, locations, or

institutions. For example, an appropriations bill including $100 million for a construction

account may set aside $10 million of the construction funds for a particular project. In

addition to setting aside funds, the earmark might also provide spending floors by stating that

not less than $10 million must be used for the specified project. Some earmarks are included

in the text of appropriations measures, floor amendments, and conference reports to such

measures. If enacted, these earmarks are legally binding. Most earmarks, however, are

included in the Senate and House Appropriations Committees’ reports explaining a measure

as reported. Earmarks are also frequently included in the managers’ joint explanatory

(continued...)

CRS-20

and often such awards may be made without prior competitive peer review.

Opponents believe that the practice forces agencies to fund projects that they normally

would not have funded. Critics believe that earmarking undermines the authorization

process and distorts agency R&D priorities. In addition, many earmarks establish new

centers or institutions, which might require federal support in the future. Supporters

of earmarking believe the practice helps to develop R&D capability in a wider variety

of institutions, that it compensates for reduced federal programs for instrumentation

and facilities renewal, and that it generates economic benefits in targeted regions

because R&D capacity generates industrial growth. The enactment of legislation to

give the President a line-item veto was expected to reduce earmarking if the earmarks

were specified as line-items in relevant enactments (P.L. 104-130). Subsequently, the

Supreme Court struck down the line-item veto.

There is scant federally collected data about earmarking and these data differ

from that collected by others. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)

reported that for FY1993, Congress had earmarked about $1,712 million for R&D

and research facilities (71% more than for FY1992), including $442 million for

universities (22% more than for FY1992).24 The Chronicle of Higher Education

reported that congressional earmarks for academia, which consist largely of R&D

projects, totaled $763 million for FY1993.25 OSTP has not released any similar data

since then. President Clinton’s chief of staff, John Podesta, said in a speech on

September 1, 1999 at the National Press Club, that Congress earmarked about $1

billion for R&D for FY2000.26 The Chronicle of Higher Education (July 28, 2000),

which has been collecting data on congressional earmarks to colleges and universities

for several years, reported that such language, largely for R&D, totaled $1.044 billion

for FY2000, an increase of 31% over FY1999, continuing an upward trend begun for

FY1997, after 3 years of decline following the previous peak of $763 million in

FY1993.

There have been attempts to limit earmarking for R&D. In 1993, the late

George E. Brown, chairman of the House Science Committee, sought to limit the

ability of appropriations committees to earmark R&D funding for specific projects,

(...continued)

statement (or managers’ statement) that accompanies the conference report. Committee reports

and managers’ statements do not have statutory force; departments and agencies are not

legally bound by their declarations. These documents do, however, explain congressional

intent and frequently have effect because departments and agencies must justify their budget

requests annually to the Appropriations Committees.”

“Congressional Earmarks in the FY1993 Appropriations,” Memorandum for J. Thomas

Ratchford From Willis H. Shapley, December 8, 1992, attached to Letter from D. Allan

Bromley, The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology to Honorable George

Brown, U.S. House of Representatives, December 10, 1992.

Colleen Cordes and Katherine McCarron, “Academe Gets $763 million in Year From

Congressional Pork Barrel,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 16, 1993, pp. A21A26.

Speech before National Press Club, discussed in American Institute of Physics Bulletin of

Science Policy News, no. 79, July 5, 2000.

CRS-21

because he said it undermined the authorizations process.27 Proposals have also been

made to limit the dollar amount that could be spent on earmarked capital projects and

to subject all grants to competitive review. The Clinton-Gore technology policy

document, Technology for America’s Economic Growth, February 1993, stated that

the Administration would “work closely with Congress to prevent ‘earmarking’ of

funds for science and technology.” The Final Report of the House Members of the

Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, December 1993, recommended

that committee reports list all earmarked funds below the appropriations account

level.28 Aspects of earmarking and indirect costs were scrutinized in a GAO report,

Department of Transportation: University Research Activities Need Greater

Oversight.29 Sec. 7203 of P.L. 103-355, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of

1994, was expected to encourage merit-based selection procedures and to discourage

earmarks. However, the law does not appear to be applicable to report language,

where many earmarks appear.30 In 1997, several FY1998 authorization bills passed

by the House (for NSF, NASA, NIST, and other agencies) would have limited agency

funding for R&D beginning in FY1998 only to persons who received funds from any

federal agency after FY1997 by means of a competitive, merit-based process. The

ban would have lasted for 5 years. This provision was not enacted into law.

OMB categorizes federal agency R&D awards into five categories, whose

spectrum ranges from earmarks (called “research performed at congressional

direction”) to rigorously merit-reviewed, competitively selected research.31 The

categories are

! Research performed at congressional direction,

! Inherently unique research,

! Merit-reviewed research with limited competitive selection,

! Merit-reviewed research with competitive selection and internal (program)

evaluation,

! Merit-reviewed research with competitive selection and external (peer)

evaluation.

Although in some cases congressionally-directed funds may be merit-reviewed

prior to award, they are not competitively selected as is much merit-reviewed R&D,

and as such are considered a distinct category from merit-reviewed research. The

Clinton Administration announced in 1995 that increasing the amount of merit- (peer)

“Brown Sees Gains in His Battle Against Academic Earmarks,” Congressional Quarterly,

December 4, 1993, 3307-3310.

H. Rept. 103-413, vol 1, p. 11.

RCED-94-175, May 1994.

For technical information on earmarking as part of the legislative process, see The

Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, by Sandy Streeter, CRS Report

97-684 GOV, Updated Sept. 29, 2000, 33 p.

OMB Circular A-11, revised 2000, pp. 282-283.

CRS-22

reviewed R&D programs would constitute one of its performance goals.32 Meritreviewed R&D programs constituted “almost 40%” of the proposed R&D budget for

FY1996.33 In the FY2001 proposed budget, merit-reviewed programs were reported

to constitute about 37% of the proposed R&D budget.34

Other efforts were made by the Clinton Administration to increase meritreviewed research, and, it seems, to decrease earmarking. President Clinton’s

FY2001 budget proposal noted that as result of a recommendation made in a NSTC

report on the Government-University Partnership, “..agencies have reported the

amount of funding that was awarded through...Congressional direction. The

Administration is in the process of developing consistent measures across Federal

agencies for [this type of award] in order to publish the data in the 2002 budget.”35

The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)36 report, Renewing the

Federal Government-University Research Partnership for the 21st Century, April

1999, issued by the NSTC in response to Presidential Review Directive - 4, endorsed

the need for merit-review in funding federal research projects (Chaps. 4 and 5). It

said the NSTC “supports OMB’s effort to refine the definition of merit-review in its

annual revision of the terms in OMB Circular-11, Preparation and Submission of

Budget Estimates (part 1).” It also said the NSTC would seek ways to decrease

practices of awarding research funds that bypass merit-review processes (chap. 5).

Coordination of R&D Priority-Setting

Some observers recommend more centralized priority-setting for R&D in

Congress and in the Executive branch. They cite the disadvantages of not having a

single mechanism in the executive branch to determine a unified and explicit R&D

budget or to evaluate the total government R&D portfolio in terms of progress

toward meeting national objectives. They also argue that congressional jurisdiction

for R&D is split among a number of committees and subcommittees preventing

examination of the R&D budget as a whole. This, they say, means that R&D funding

can serve particular local or program interests, but may not be appropriate for a

national R&D agenda. Opponents see value in a decentralized system in which

budgets are developed, authorized, and appropriated separately by those most familiar

with the needs of specific fields of R&D—the department or agency head and the

specific authorizing and appropriations subcommittees with jurisdiction for the

agency.

Several recommendations were made during the period FY1993 to FY2000 to

improve coordination of R&D priority-setting and budget-making. For instance, in the

Chapter 7 of President’s FY1996 Budget entitled “Investing in Science and Technology”

Ibid.

Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2001, p. 99.

Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2001, p. 183.

Created by President Clinton by Executive Order 12881 on November 23, 1993 with

cabinet-level status.

CRS-23

biomedical area, in October 1997, House Speaker Gingrich announced he would

appoint a group, including Members of Congress, to assess how NIH sets research

priorities.37 The Institute of Medicine produced Scientific Opportunities and Public

Needs: Improving Priority Setting and Public Input at the National Institutes of

Health, 1998. NIH held public meetings on priority-setting, in response to the report.

Outside of Congress, a 1996 report by the Council on Competitiveness, “Endless

Frontier, Limited Resources,” recommended new partnerships between governmental

and non-governmental sectors to keep U.S. R&D vital. Considerable attention was

given to emphasizing the need for federal support of basic research (not technology

development) as a priority.38 In December 1997, the National Science Board, part of

the governing body of the National Science Foundation, released a report,

“Government Funding of Scientific Research,” calling for mandatory priority-setting

and coordination of federal R&D. This followed its August 1997 announcement that

it would try to play a bigger role in setting national S&T priorities and policy. A

series of 1997 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) reports, Preparing for the 21st

Century, identified priorities for support to maintain U.S. research strength, social and

environmental quality, and economic growth. The 1999 NAS Committee on Science,

Engineering and Public Policy (COSEPUP) report, Evaluating Federal Research

Programs, recommended better coordination of federal research priorities and

designation of lead agencies in instances when similar R&D was conducted by

different federal agencies.

In 1991, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), an agency of Congress

(since disbanded), reported that R&D priorities should be explicit, in order to evaluate

R&D projects against such national goals as national prestige, political needs,

scientific merit, education, building regional capacity, geographic distribution, and

training.39 In 1995, as NAS report, Allocating Federal Funds for Science and

Technology, 1995, recommended that the President present to Congress, and that the

Congress consider, the R&D budget as a unified whole before the separate parts of

the budget were considered by individual congressional committees. It also

recommended that it be reconstituted from an R&D budget to a science and

technology (S&T) budget, excluding development activities, to connote the function

of creating new knowledge. Objections to this concept were raised by the American

Physical Society at hearings held by the House Science Committee in February 1996.40

S. Amdt. 2235 (Bingaman and Lieberman) to the Senate Budget Resolution

(S.Con.Res. 86) for FY1999 endorsed the views of the 1995 Academy Report, and

expressed the sense of the Senate that for fiscal years 2000 to 2004, all federal civilian

S&T program spending should be classified under budget function 250, which now

COSSA Washington Update, June 29, 1998, 6.

Committee for Economic Development, America’s Basic Research: Prosperity Through

Discovery, 1998.

Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, 1991.

“House Science Committee Holds Hearing on the “Press Report.” What’s New, American

Physical Society, March 1, 1996.

CRS-24

encompasses science and technology, 41 and that the President should classify these

programs, which cross all federal civilian departments and agencies, in function 250.

The resolution passed the Senate on April 2, 1998.

As for Administration activity, a presidential report, Science in the National

Interest, 1994, outlined the Administration’s goals to support both long-range

research and research aimed at meeting shorter term “strategic goals,” to increase

support for civilian research to establish interagency initiatives on topics the

Administration considered priority issues, and applied research and proposed actions

to meet five broad goals for U.S. global leadership in S&T. National R&D

investment, it said, should be increased to 3% of GDP. The President’s priorities

appeared in Science and Technology Shaping the 21st Century, Report to Congress,

1997, and in a 1995 white paper, “Technology and Economic Growth: Producing

Real Results for the American People,” which stressed applied R&D. In 1997, the

White House and the National Governors Association established a mechanism to

promote coordinated federal and state technology efforts.

Pressure to coordinate priority-setting for R&D could continue in the new

George W. Bush Administration, especially if physical, natural sciences, and social

sciences researchers continue to press for more funding in the face of continuous

increases for health sciences research. In addition, Congress could enforce tight

discretionary caps depending upon FY2002 budget projections and outyear

assumptions. This could increase pressure to set priorities for federal R&D more

systematically and to ensure that it receives what supporters consider an appropriate

share of federal discretionary spending.

Funding for Large Research Projects

Megaprojects, or “big” science projects, like the space station, require long-term,

large capital investments or long-term funding commitments for individual researchers

working toward a research goal, such as the Human Genome Project. They may

necessitate building new large facilities or instruments, which require commitment of

large amounts of annual operating funds that can limit long-term flexibility of federal

R&D funding. Critics say that as funding for big science increases and large amounts

of financial support are committed to one R&D topic, less money is likely to be

available for smaller research projects which might be riskier, and, as a result,

opportunities for “frontier” creative science could diminish.

Funding for U.S. megaprojects decreased and the composition of megaprojects

priorities has changed considerably since FY1992, with decreases for defense, and

some slight increases for civilian megaprojects, despite the cancellation of the

According to OMB Circular A-11, Exhibit 79 b, p. 178, Circular A-11, revised (2000),

function 250, GENERAL SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY includes the

subfunctions of 251, General science and basic research, and 252, Space flight, research and

supporting activities. NSF reports, however, that “Not all federally sponsored basic research

is categorized in function 251, ... some basic research is included in the remaining 19

functional categories,(Federal R&D Funding by Budget Function, Fiscal Years 1998-2000,

p. 2).

CRS-25

Superconducting Super Collider and the scaling back of the space station. Cutbacks

occurred because of perceived waste resulting from failures, budgetary pressures,

lack of foreign contributions, and pressures from other fields of science.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) science

ministers, in September 1992, adopted a U.S.-initiated proposal to establish a formal

body to promote cooperation and priority selection for megaprojects, called the

Megascience Forum. Its mandate was renewed for three years in 1995 and, in April

1999, the forum was given a new mandate for five years and renamed the OECD

Global Science Forum, with the goals of promoting collaboration, removing barriers

to effective international scientific cooperation and preserving funding resources.42

Recent activities focus on international cooperation in structural genomics,

high-tensity proton beam facilities, biological informatics, nuclear physics, radio

astronomy, neutron sources, and neutron scattering facilities in the OECD countries

and in Russia.

Priorities for Critical Technologies

The 1989 enactment of P.L. 101-189, a national defense authorization act for

FY1990 and FY1991, authorized the director of OSTP to prepare biennial reports for

the President and Congress to identify no more than 30 national critical dual-use

technologies “essential for the United States to develop to further the long-term

national security and economic prosperity of the United States.” The list is meant to

help guide priority setting for R&D. OSTP produced four reports under this

mandate. The third, National Critical Technologies Report, 1995, covered 27

technologies and compared the current U.S. competitive position relative to Japan

and Europe. The fourth and most recent report produced under these mandates, New

Forces at Work: Industry Views Critical Technologies, 1998, identified the most

often cited essential technologies as: software, microelectronics and

telecommunications technologies, new materials, and sensor and imaging

technologies, and emphasized the importance of finding enough skilled people to

work in these areas.

In one of its final actions, the Clinton Administration’s National Science and

Technology Council, in January 2001, released the executive summary of a

forthcoming report, New Foundations for Growth: The U.S. Innovation System Today

and Tomorrow. 43 The report provides a blueprint for establishing priorities and

enhancing the effectiveness of federal policies that facilitate technological innovation

in the private and public sectors. It was prepared by the RAND Corporation’s

Science and Technology Policy Institute (a successor to the Critical Technologies

Institute created by OSTP in part to fulfill the mandate of the law), a federally funded

research and development center (FFRDC) serving as the policy research arm of the

Office of Science and Technology Policy. The report made recommendations for

both private and public sector initiatives. Among the many recommendations were:

improve the portfolio of public research by assessing priorities and providing balance

Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/s_t/ms/index.htm.

Available at: http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1338.0/.

CRS-26

across fields; make the Research and Experimentation tax credit permanent; clarify

intellectual property rights policy; examine federal investment priorities in

“infratechnologies”—data, measurement and testing methods, and standard practices

and techniques; evaluate policy guidelines for R&D partnerships; raise the awareness

of federal agencies to issues affecting the national innovation system; and work on

ways to improve methods to measure performance of research investments.

P.L. 100-456, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1989 required the

DOD to report annually to the congressional defense committees a plan for

developing the 20 technologies considered by the Secretary of Defense and the

Secretary of Energy to be the technologies most essential to develop in order to

ensure the long-term qualitative superiority of U.S. weapon systems. The law required

both product and process technologies to be considered in selecting the technologies

to be included in such a plan. The DOD’s first report responsive to this requirement

was Critical Technologies Plan, 1989. During 1992, the DOD released its Defense

Science and Technology Strategy report, the first in the department’s series of science

and technology reports responsive to the law. The names and types of reports DOD

prepares in response to the law have evolved over time. Currently the department’s

objectives, plans and priorities for science and technology appear in the reports

entitled Defense Science and Technology Strategy, 2000, 2000 Defense Technology

Objectives, 1999 Defense Technology Area Plan, and in 2000 Joint Warfighting

Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP). In addition, the Defense Threat Reduction

Agency, part of DOD, maintains and continuously updates a publication entitled

Militarily Critical Technologies, of which “Part III: Developing Critical Technologies

(DCT),” describes critical technology in 20 areas, ranging from aeronautics, through

information technologies, to weapons effects technologies. The document lists U.S.

and worldwide technologies that would produce increasingly superior performance

of military systems or maintain a superior capability more affordably. DOD develops

the list in cooperation with other U.S. government agencies, U.S. industry, and

academia, through the militarily critical technologies list process in response to the

Export Administration Act of 1979. The documents are available from the Defense

Technical Information Center (DTIC).

The “Ehlers” Report

In 1997, Representative Vernon Ehlers was tasked by the House leadership to

head a special study on science policy. Following a series of hearings, a report

entitled Unlocking Our Future was released on September 24, 1998. On October 8,

1998, the House passed H.Res. 578, declaring “it is the sense of the

House...that...[the report] should serve as a framework for future deliberations on

congressional science policy and funding.” The academic community generally

praised the report, although some criticized it as not supporting the social sciences,

not addressing all major issues critical to future applications of science, and not

proposing major changes in funding patterns or mechanisms. On the whole, it

generated considerable discussion about future policies for U.S. science support.44

“Congress Ratifies Ehlers Science Policy Report,” Washington Fax, October 15, 1998;

“Seeing the Ehlers Report as a Republican R&D Manifesto, Rather Than a National Science

(continued...)

CRS-27

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

The Government Performance and Results Act, P.L. 103-62, is related to the

issue of priority-setting since the law requires agencies to define long-term goals, set

specific annual performance targets, and report annually on performance. The law is

intended to ensure accountability for federal investments and to develop processes

which ensure that an agency’s programs and priorities meet its goals. The law allows

the use of qualitative measurement alternatives if quantitative methods can not be

used. This is especially salient to agencies that fund R&D since, they say, it is

difficult to define goals and priorities for many basic research programs and to

measure the results quantitatively , since research outcomes often can not be defined

well in advance and accomplishments take a long time to demonstrate and document.

The NSTC Committee on Fundamental Science in Assessing Fundamental Science,

July 1996, and the Federal Research Roundtable, an informal interagency group now

terminated, developed guidance for R&D performance measures. Also, GAO

produced Measuring Performance: Strengths and Limitations of Research

Indicators, RCED-97-91. The National Research Council in a February 1999 report,

Evaluating Federal Research Programs: Research and the Government Performance

and Results Act, recommended that federal agencies use performance measures for

research and issued “benchmarking” reports comparing the status of U.S. science to

other countries for mathematics, materials science and engineering, and immunology.

Federal agencies submitted GPRA-related strategic plans to Congress in

September 1997 and delivered their first annual performance plans with FY1999

budget justifications. A House Majority Leader report rated the FY1999 plans. The

House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the Senate Committee

on Governmental Affairs held hearings on implementation. The House Science

Committee held hearings in 1996 and 1997 on implementation in the science agencies

and, in 1997, announced that research performance measurement would be an

oversight target. Several congressional committees asked agencies to link FY1999

and FY2000 budget requests to goals expressed in their strategic and performance

plans. The agencies’ first performance reports, for FY1999, were delivered to the

Congress during 2000.45 During 2001 agencies will submit FY2000 performance

reports and FY2002 performance plans.

S. 296, the Federal Research Investment Act, an amendment to S. 2046 that

passed the Senate in 2000,46 would have required the OSTP director to enter into an

agreement with the NAS to conduct a comprehensive study to develop methods for

(...continued)

Policy, Is Not a Bad Thing...,” Washington Fax, October 21, 1998; and Richard E. Scolve,

“For U.S. Science Policy, It’s Time for a Reality Check, Chronicle of Higher Education,

October 23, 1998, pp. B4-B5. The NAS endorsed specific follow-up in its Science and

Technology for the Nation: Issues and Priorities for the 106th Congress: Views...on

“Unlocking Our Future...,”December 16, 1998.

For additional details on this issue, see: Genevieve J. Knezo, Government Performance and

Results Act: Brief History and Implementation Activities, CRS Report RS20257, 6 p.

Passed in the Senate on September 21, 2000.

CRS-28

evaluating federally-funded R&D programs and would have required the OMB

director, based on study results, to promulgate one or more alternative forms for

federal R&D performance. It also would have set in motion a process to terminate

“unsuccessful” federal research programs. Versions of these provisions appeared in

the 105th Congress in S. 2217. Also in the 105th Congress, the Senate report on the

FY1999 VA/HUD appropriations bill that was enacted as P.L. 105-276, called on

NSF to identify quantifiable goals for research and gave OSTP and OMB authority

to seek the NAS study, as listed in S. 2217, 105th Congress, (predecessor to S. 2046,

106th Congress). However, no funds were appropriated for the NAS study.

During 2000, the National Academies’ Committee on Science, Engineering and

Public Policy, (COSEPUP), with endorsement by the OSTP, the leadership of the

House Science Committee, and the major sponsors of the Senate legislation,

conducted a study to examine the processes R&D agencies use to prepare their

GPRA documents in an effort to ensure agency responsiveness to the GPRA

mandates. The final report is expected in Summer 2001.

In a 1993 report, Science, Technology, and the Federal Government: National

Goals for a New Era, the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy

(COSEPUP) of the National Academies47 recommended that in order to determine

priorities for funding basic research, two main goals be used: (1) “the United States

should be among the world leaders in all major areas of science;” and (2) “the United

States should maintain clear leadership in some major areas of science.” Subsequently

the group examined the status of U.S. R&D in relation to other nations, using a

technique called international benchmarking. U.S. R&D status was examined in three

fields—mathematics, immunology, and materials science and engineering.

In March, 2000, a report that assessed U.S. status vis a vis other nations, using

benchmarking methodology was released, entitled Experiments in International

Benchmarking of US Research Fields. The Subcommittee on Basic Research of the

House Science Committee held a hearing on this topic on October 4, 2000, entitled

“Benchmarking U.S. Science: What Can It Tell Us?” The purpose of the hearing was

to examine the NAS report and benchmarking as a method to evaluate research

performance from an international comparative perspective.48

Requirements for agencies to give precise goals for research and statements of

performance outcomes could become more salient because of congressional actions

taken in 2000 and 2001. P.L. 106-531, the “Reports Consolidation Act of 2000,”

permits agencies to combine annual GPRA performance reports with financial reports

required under the Chief Financial Officers Act, to be called a “Performance and

Accountability Report.” The agency head is required to assess the completeness and

reliability of the performance data that agencies use and to include a summary of the

performance report in the accountability report if the two reports are not combined.

In addition, with the passage of H.Res. 5, the House Rules Committee adopted a rule

64 pages; available online at [http://books.nap.edu/catalog/9481.html].

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Basic Research,

Benchmarking U.S. Science: What Can It Tell Us?, Hearing, 106th Congress, 2nd Session,

October 4, 2000, 56 pp.

CRS-29

requiring that all “committee reports include a statement of general performance goals

and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives for which the measure

authorizes funding.” These requirements are intended to make performance measures

more precise.

National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)

Executive Order 12881, issued by President Clinton on November 23, 1993,

established NSTC with cabinet-level status. It was a successor to the previous

Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET).

Among NSTC’s functions were recommending federal agency R&D budgets that

would help accomplish national objectives, advising OMB on federal agency R&D

budgets, and helping to coordinate presidential interagency R&D initiatives. In a

1997 report, Science and Technology and the President: A Report to the Next

Administration, the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government

criticized the breadth of these activities. It recommended “fine-tuning” NSTC to

concentrate on its role as a policy council and to allocate “its resources on a small

number of priority policy issues of concern to the President and reduce...its emphasis

on detailed R&D program development and coordination.”49 There is no evidence

that the NSTC reoriented its work in response to this recommendation.

Beginning in 1995, with the FY1996 budget request, NSTC started to identify

major Administration R&D priorities and submitted budget requests that identified

these as cross-cutting budget initiatives whose R&D activities were coordinated by

NSTC interagency committees. The FY2001 initiatives, which represented major

Administration priorities, whose funding was highlighted in the President’s budget

under the heading of the “21st Century Research Fund, included: the “National

Nanotechnology Initiative; Change Technology; U.S. Global Change Research;

Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles; Integrated Science for Ecosystem

Challenges; Fundamental Health Research; Weapons of Mass Destruction;

Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D; and Education Technology

and the Interagency Education Research Initiative.” NSTC said had it established

performance measures for these areas. These were not published with the budget.

Available at [http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/science_tech/nextadm.htm].

CRS-30

Potential Issues for the 107th Congress

President Bush released a preliminary budget outline in February 200l, that gives

summary information about funding.50 But discussion of detailed R&D budget issues

that will confront the 107th Congress must await the release of the President’s full

budget. Candidate George W. Bush’s views on science were inventoried before the

election in Science magazine,51 among other places. Among issues that could be

raised in the 107th Congress are such questions as

! whether R&D funding increases should continue, given predictions of a

possible slowdown in the economy, tax cuts, and increases in social services

spending, which may increase pressure to maintain congressional discretionary

spending caps in the outyears;

! whether the George W. Bush Administration will maintain the technology

policy initiatives favored by the Clinton Administration; and

! whether the George W. Bush Administration will restore the emphasis given

to defense R&D by previous Republican Administrations and implied by

President George W. Bush’s support for enhanced missile defense systems.

Debates are likely to continue on topics that were prominent during the last few

years, including earmarking, the appropriate balance between health research and

other fields of science, research priority-setting and accountability under the

Government Performance and Results Act, the emphasis to be given to energy R&D,

and coordination of priority-setting in the executive and legislative branches.

A Blueprint for New Beginnings -- A Responsible Budget for America’s Priorities,

February 2001.

“Gore and Bush Offer Their Views on Science,” Science, Oct. 13, 2000, pp. 262-269..

CRS-31

Table 1. Budget for R&D, FY1994 to FY2001, est.

(Millions of dollars budget authority)

Based on information prepared by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (R&D Budget and Policy Project), which appears electronically at

[http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd]. Data are from AAAS, as described in the footnote. These AAAS data include conduct of R&D and R&D facilities. R&D is a line-item

in only some agency budgets. Thus reported R&D funding data for specific programs vary depending upon the judgment of researchers, agency sources, assumptions

made, definitions of R&D, and a determination of whether science education is included and so forth. Alternative CRS data for R&D agencies, FY1996-FY2001 that

vary slightly from the historical AAAS data appear in Research and Development Funding: Fiscal Year 2001, CRS Issue Brief IB10051.

Agency/Program

R&D,

R&D

R&D FY2001,

together with

FY1994 A

FY1995

FY1996, B FY1997, C FY1998

FY1999

FY2000

FY2001,

est.

Budget Function

AAAS, est. request, est.

[represented by numbers in

by AAAS

brackets in this column]

NIH1* [550]

10,459

$10,762

$11,443

$12,217

$13,097

$14,971

$17,102

$18,094

$19,597

Health Care Res/Quality (before

141

135

FY2000, called Health Care

100

168

209

229

Res/Policy)3

CDC1

203

318

323

346

358

438

477

518

585

FDA1

195

170

173

159

104

135

146

140

HCFA3

139

HRSA2

Other HHS R&D2

124

131

141

Total HHS R&D

11,169

11,476

12,077

12,912

13,809

15,750

18,082

19168

20,879

Res & Related Acts.

2,089

2,064

2,137

2,254

2,366

2,516

2,649

3,183

3,343

Academic Research Infra

100

118

Major Res. Equipment

126

109

139

121

R&D in Edu.& Hum.Res.1

100

108

121

110

118

Total NSF R&D [250]

2,240

2,396

2,401

2,424

2,568

2,714

2,863

3,431

3,240

CRS-32

Agency/Program

together with

Budget Function

[represented by numbers in

brackets in this column]

NASA Hum Space Flt.4

NASA SAT

[Space Science4] [250]

[Life/Microgravity

Science4]

[NASA Earth Science4]

NASA Mission Supt.R&D1

[250]

Other NASA R&D

Total NASA R&D

General Science1* [250]

Science

Energy Supply R&D1

[270] Interior Bill

Fossil Energy R&D1 [270]

Interior Bill

Energy Conserv.R&D1

[270] Interior Bill

Clean Coal Technology6

[270] Interior Bill

Uranium Enrichment [270]

Other nondef.R&D 2

Totl DOE nondef R&D

R&D,

FY1994 A

R&D

FY1995

R&D

FY1996, B

1,971

5,803

1,902

5,917

1,876

5,929

[489]

1,688

1,640

9,462

966

R&D

FY1997, C

R&D

FY1998

R&D

FY1999

R&D

FY2000

AAAS, est.

2,180

5,453

2,500

5,680

[2,020]

[219]

2,272

4,885

1,612

1,714

in SAT

[1,422]

1,704

9,459

959

9,416

972

9,352

986

1,491

9,884

2089

2,245

1,811

1,746

2,228

550

341

327

333

274

276

342

357

309

324

356

225

3.4

3.0

-2

-101

3,966

3,932

3,455

R&D

FY2001,

request, est.

by AAAS

1,790

769

2,333

5,585

2,193

275

1,443

1,862

1,125

2,135

5,929

2,399

302

1,406

1,976

1,193

2,130

6,177

2,483

314

1,483

1,991

1,241

9,715

545

9,777

629

10,040

657

10,298

2,651

2,638

2,969

3,001

373

364

468

444

295

328

293

339

400

431

465

458

-40

3,328

3,309

R&D FY2001,

est.

3,740

3,816

4,234

4,297

CRS-33

Agency/Program

together with

Budget Function

[represented by numbers in

brackets in this column]

U.S. Geological Survey1 +

Nat’l Biological Service1*

Bureau of Mines

Minerals Mangmnt Ser.

Nat’l Park Service1

Bur. of Reclamation

Bur. of Land Mangmnt

BCM and BIA

Other Interior R&D2

Total Interior R&D [300]

Agr.Research Serv. R&D

Facilities 1*

CSRS

CSREES 3

Facilities

Economic Research Serv.3

Natl Agric. Stats Service

Foreign Agr.Serv.

Forest Service3

Other R&D

Total USDA R&D [350]

R&D,

FY1994 A

R&D

FY1995

R&D

FY1996, B

R&D

FY1997, C

R&D

FY1998

R&D

FY1999

367

167

367

152

Total =

516

391

138

402

106

673

707

429

106

668

722

622

724

591

732

418

198

1,487

406

181

1,489

405

183

1,556

198

1,513

R&D

FY2000

AAAS, est.

R&D

FY2001,

request, est.

by AAAS

267

162

365

137

388

151

543

499

811

573

8536

590

9176

597

920

462

211

1,638

538

523

559

211

1,763

237

1,824

237

1,953

472

760

413

191

1,553

R&D FY2001,

est.

CRS-34

Agency/Program

R&D,

R&D

R&D FY2001,

together with

FY1994 A

FY1995

FY1996, B FY1997, C FY1998

FY1999

FY2000

FY2001,

est.

Budget Function

AAAS, est. request, est.

[represented by numbers in

by AAAS

brackets in this column]

FHWA (Highway Adm).2

243

240

256

289

504

258

257

314

272

Federal Transit Admin.2

Maritime Admin.

—

Federal Railroad Admin.1*

Federal Aviation Admin.1*

298

299

233

253

242

226

284

292

Research and Special Progs.

Coast Guard1*

Nat’l Hgwy Trfc Safty Ad. .

Office of Secretary

Other Transp R&D2

Total DOT R&D [400]

636

666

602

650

859

603

606

778

701

NOAA R&D Facils

561= NOAA

558=

536=

580 =

37 638-all NOAA

NOAA Opers, Res. &

Facils

total NOAA total NOAA total

535

NOAA

565

556

557

R&D1

total

Other NOAA R&D2

436= NIST

198

208

257

NIST S&T Res.1

Total

318

208

225

227

233

236

269

128

NIST ATP1 and IIIP1

0.5

[31]

203

170

178

115

192

NIST Construction3

0.5

-16

107

Econ. Develop. Admin.

1,007

Other Commerce R&D1

1,118

932

1,111

Totl Comm.R&D [370]

964

1,081

1,075

1,073

1,148

Total EPA R&D1* [250]

536

619

528

595

636

669

647

673

686

Total Educ.R&D [500]

175

165

185

209

224

233

271

263

Total AID R&D [150]

314

223

169

150

164

142

114

124

Total VA R&D * [700]

297

263

588

608

674

655

684

Total NRC R&D [270]

Total Smithsn R&D1

135

138

142

146

138

113

122

119

Total TVA R&D2

CRS-35

Agency/Program

together with

Budget Function

[represented by numbers in

brackets in this column]

TolCrpsEngrs R&D1

Total Labor R&D2

Total HUD R&D3

Total Treasury R&D2

Total Justice R&D2

Total Other R&D2

TOTAL NONDEF. R&D

DOD R&D1,4 [050]

DOE Def. R&D,2,3 [050]

TOTAL DEFENSE

R&D,

FY1994 A

32,500

35,603

2,813

38,400

R&D

FY1995

R&D

FY1996, B

R&D

FY1997, C

N.A.

13.

33,115

35,349

2,484

37,833

32,667

35,842

2,602

38,444

33,886

37,430

2,979

39,801

R&D

FY1998

R&D

FY1999

35,697

37,568

2,979

40,409

122

38,073

37,975

3,234

41,208

R&D

FY2000

AAAS, est.

40,751

39,344

3,301

42,583

R&D

FY2001,

request, est.

by AAAS

43,446

38,576

3,405

41,981

R&D FY2001,

est.

45,348

41,846

3,697

45,543

Source for data consists of tables and analyses that may be found at the AAAS websites [http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/fy01.htm] and

[http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/guide.htm]. AAAS analysis for FY2000-FY2005 “AAAS Analysis. Outyear Projections for Nondefense R&D in the FY2001 Budget

and Outyear Projections for Defense R&D in the FY2001 Budget,” March 10, 2000, Available via [http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/prev01p.htm]. “Data from Budget

of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2001” Public Budget Database table “Budget Authority and Offsetting receipts, 1976-2005,” and Analytical

Perspectives Table 25. Percentage changes in right column adjusted for inflation according to GDP deflators.”

Footnotes to Table:

A=Adjusted to reflect rescissions and supplementals in P.L. 103-211.

B= Includes rescisions and supplementals enacted in FY1997 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 104-208)

C= Includes funds in P.L. 105-18

CRS-36

KEY OF ASSUMPTIONS (applies only to FY2001 budget request and projections columns):

For nondefense R&D:

“*=Source: estimates of R&D in the forthcoming AAAS Report XXV: Research and Development FY2001.

1=Based on specific outyear projections for account in Public Budget Database, assuming R&D as percent of account remains constant at the proposed FY2001 ratio.

1*=See above. R&D accounts for over 90 percent of spending in this account.

2=Not specifically mentioned in outyear projections; assumes freeze at FY2001 requested level.

3=R&D accounts for 100 percent of spending in this account; specific outyear projection for this account in the Public Budget Database.

4=Based on detailed NASA projections in NASA budget justification.

5=Based on projections for the two accounts containing most of Education’s R&D.”

6=includes spending from trust funds.

For defense R&D:”Data from Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Budget Database table “Budget Authority and offsetting receipts,

1976-2005” and Analytical Perspectives

Table 25. Percentage changes in right column adjusted for inflation according to GDP deflators.”

“*=Source: estimates of R&D in forthcoming AAAS Report XXV: Research and Development FY2001.

1 = Based on outyear projections for RDT&E, which accounts for 98 percent of total DOD R&D.

2 =Based on specific outyear projections for account in DOE budget justification, assuming R&D as percent of account remains constant at the FY2001 ratio.

3 = Not specifically mentioned in outyear projections; assumes freeze at FY2000 level.

4 = Based on account-level projections for RAT&E, courtesy of DOD.”

Key to Budget Functions: 150 International Affairs; 270 Energy; 350 Agriculture 400 Transportation; 550 Health; 250 General Science, Space, and Technology

— Note: Some NASA work reported as 250, includes non-R&D activities; 300 Natural Resources and Environment; 370 Commerce and Housing Credit; 500

Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services; 550 Health.

CRS-37

Table 2. Historical Data on Federal R&D, FY1976-2001

(Budget authority in billions of CONSTANT FY2000 dollars)

Based on AAAS Table, “Historical Table 2. Total R&D by Agency, FY 1976-2001 DEC. ‘00, Revised.” Source: AAAS at [http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/rd/guihist.htm].

Fiscal

Year

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

DoD

25.51

26.98

26.29

26.46

26.36

29.78

33.47

36.37

41.37

45.87

49.04

50.69

50.42

49.12

46.45

44.01

43.68

43.80

39.14

38.16

37.89

38.78

38.63

39.47

39.28

41.02

NASA

8.94

8.92

8.89

9.31

9.86

9.47

7.37

4.20

4.43

5.11

5.22

5.91

6.20

7.54

8.72

9.61

9.88

9.94

10.37

10.21

9.99

9.74

10.03

9.86

9.78

10.10

DOE

7.78

9.76

11.12

11.11

10.85

10.56

8.69

7.94

8.35

8.58

7.76

7.40

7.76

7.96

8.57

8.68

9.40

8.39

7.46

6.92

6.64

6.47

6.53

7.07

7.12

7.84

NIH*

5.74

5.84

6.25

6.58

6.48

6.12

5.93

6.23

6.85

7.55

7.58

8.74

9.15

9.61

9.94

10.62

11.13

11.15

11.54

11.62

12.10

12.72

13.48

15.22

17.10

19.21

NSF

1.69

1.70

1.74

1.71

1.72

1.64

1.56

1.63

1.85

2.03

1.96

2.08

2.10

2.24

2.12

2.24

2.28

2.27

2.47

2.59

2.53

2.57

2.71

2.86

3.18

Agri.

Dept.

1.31

1.28

1.39

1.46

1.34

1.40

1.33

1.36

1.45

1.44

1.34

1.49

1.48

1.45

1.50

1.64

1.76

1.65

1.69

1.61

1.57

1.62

1.61

1.67

1.76

1.92

DOI

.82

.77

.79

.84

.77

.71

.62

.59

.54

.56

.54

.56

.61

.65

.73

.74

.73

.78

.72

.61

.62

.55

.51

.57

.59

DOT

.82

.78

.82

.72

.75

.69

.50

.57

.72

.63

.53

.42

.43

.49

.72

.70

.71

.72

.64

.61

.62

.61

.69

EPA

.69

.83

.78

.64

.46

.36

.37

.44

.45

.47

.49

.51

.52

.54

.57

.56

.65

.59

.51

.62

.66

.68

.65

.67

DOC

.59

.62

.68

.67

.59

.49

.54

.56

.55

.57

.54

.56

.64

.67

.89

1.13

1.21

1.02

1.00

1.12

1.10

1.07

1.09

Other *

1.99

2.09

2.36

2.53

2.69

2.41

1.77

1.67

1.44

1.54

1.71

1.66

1.85

2.03

2.11

2.35

2.13

2.41

2.24

1.90

2.25

2.31

2.47

2.53

2.81

Total

R&D

55.89

59.41

61.12

62.18

62.13

64.03

62.19

61.53

68.14

74.22

76.53

80.05

80.71

81.84

81.50

81.32

83.17

82.23

78.34

76.58

75.41

76.99

78.08

81.37

83.33

89.11

R&D

Defense

28.04

29.33

29.18

29.20

29.01

32.63

36.76

39.41

45.17

49.80

52.75

54.37

54.18

52.94

50.26

47.76

47.67

47.48

42.21

40.84

40.73

41.70

41.71

42.72

42.58

44.65

R&D

Nondefense

27.85

30.07

31.93

32.98

33.12

31.39

25.43

22.12

22.97

24.42

23.79

25.68

26.53

28.91

31.24

33.56

35.50

34.75

36.13

35.74

34.67

35.29

36.37

38.65

40.75

44.46

Basic^

6.26

6.79

8.76

9.17

9.61

8.76

8.73

9.59

10.46

11.18

11.44

12.30

12.57

13.52

13.83

14.68

14.96

15.16

15.09

14.87

15.29

15.58

15.96

17.69

18.97

20.79

Note: The data in this table may differ from data in Table 1 due to rounding off.

Based on data in: AAAS Reports I through XXV, based on OMB and agency R&D budget data. Includes conduct of R&D and R&D facilities. Figures in bold represent peak funding levels in constant-dollar terms. Constant dollar conversions based

on OMB’s GDP deflators from the FY 2001 budget.

* Between FY 1991 and 1992, R&D from ADAMHA (HHS) transferred to NIH. ADAMHA R&D included in NIH totals for all years.

** - Latest estimate for FY 2000.

*** - AAAS estimates of R&D in final FY 2001 appropriations bills.

^ - Basic Research Source: AAAS -December 19, 2000 - Revised

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.