Airborne Electronic Warfare: Issues for the 107th Congress

Order Code RL30841

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Airborne Electronic Warfare:

Issues for the 107th Congress

February 9, 2001

(name redacted)

Analyst in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, & Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Airborne Electronic Warfare: Issues for the 107th

Congress

Summary

Electronic warfare (EW) has been an important component of military air

operations since the earliest days of radar. Radar, EW, and stealth techniques have

evolved over time as engineers, scientists, and tacticians have struggled to create the

most survivable and effective air force possible.

Several recent events suggest that airborne EW merits congressional attention.

Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO operation in Yugoslavia, appears to have

marked an important watershed in the debate over current and future U.S. airborne

EW. It appears that every air strike on Serbian targets was protected by radar

jamming and/or suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft. Electronic

countermeasures self protection systems, such as towed radar decoys, were credited

with saving numerous U.S. aircraft that had been targeted by Serbian surface-to-air

missiles (SAMs).

The Department of Defense is engaged in numerous activities – such as research

and development (R&D) programs, procurement programs, training, experimentation

– that are designed to improve various electronic attack (EA), ECM, and SEAD

capabilities both in the near and long term. These activities often cut across

bureaucratic boundaries and defy easy categorization and oversight, which makes it

difficult to determine and assess DoD-wide EW priorities. Often, it appears that DoD

has no single, coherent plan coordinating all these efforts or setting priorities.

The Clinton Administration’s DoD budget request for FY2001 was the 106th

Congress’ first opportunity to exercise oversight of EW and SEAD programs in the

post-Kosovo era. Congressional appropriations and authorization conferees often

matched or exceeded DoD’s request for EW and SEAD programs to ensure the

survivability of numerous aircraft and to increase the military’s ability to suppress or

destroy enemy air defenses. Congress also disagreed with DoD plans, and reduced or

constrained some programs accordingly.

As part of its FY2002 budget oversight responsibilities, Congress can strongly

influence DoD’s EW force structure, aircraft survivability and air campaign

effectiveness. Some issues Congress may consider include: 1) the overall level of

DoD’s electronic warfare spending, and its spending priorities within EW; 2) how

DoD can wring the most warfighting capability out of its EA-6B force, which will be

DoD’s only radar jamming aircraft until 2010 or later; 3) why the Navy and Air Force

are pursuing distinctive paths in addressing tomorrow’s SEAD challenges, and

whether the country is best served by pursuing both approaches; 4) why DoD and

Congress appear to have distinct perspectives on the need to upgrade or replace key

electronic countermeasures such as aircraft radar warning receivers.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

EW Definition and Paper Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Brief Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Recent Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Kosovo: EW Successes and Shortfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Select FY2001 Congressional Action on ECM and SEAD Programs . . . . . 9

Overview of Recent DoD EW Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Electronic Attack-related Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Self Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

The Way Ahead: Likely EW Priorities in FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Electronic Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Self Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Considerations for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Appendix 1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix 2. FY2001 Appropriations for Select EW and SEAD Programs . . . 26

List of Figures

Figure 1. Illustrative EW Pyramid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Figure 2. Key SEAD Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

This analysis was originally prepared at the request of the Honorable Joseph R. Pitts

and is being reprinted by CRS for general congressional distribution with his

permission.

Airborne Electronic Warfare: Issues for the

107th Congress

Introduction

Issues for Congress

Defense analysts generally regard enhancing aircraft survivability as a

fundamental way to improve the overall effectiveness of the air campaign. Yet there

are numerous means and methods for improving aircraft survivability, all with various

strengths and weaknesses, risks and opportunities.1 Airborne electronic warfare

(EW), especially when coupled with stealth or low observable (LO) technology,

appears to be one of the most effective techniques for increasing aircraft and aircrew

survivability in hostile environments.

A number of recent events suggest that airborne EW merits congressional

attention. Military planners and others note that wise choices in the acquisition,

training and employment of EW systems will enable all facets of the air campaign,

including reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA), strike

operations, air superiority operations, close air support (CAS), and airlift. It is argued,

on the other hand, that poor EW decisions could unnecessarily endanger U.S. aircraft

and impede effective air operations.

A number of ongoing studies and processes within the Department of Defense

(DoD) – such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Electronic Attack

Analysis of Alternatives (EA AOA) – are directly or indirectly grappling with

decisions on DoD’s near and mid term EW force structure. As part of its FY2002

budget oversight responsibilities, Congress can strongly influence DoD’s EW force

structure, aircraft survivability, and air campaign effectiveness. Some issues Congress

may consider include:

1

!

The overall level of DoD’s electronic warfare spending, and its

spending priorities within EW.

!

How DoD can wring the most warfighting capability out of its EA6B force, which will be DoD’s only radar jamming aircraft until 2010

or later.

Aircraft and aircrew survivability can be increased, for instance, by changing the aircraft’s

characteristics (e.g. more armor, greater speed, better radar, incorporating stealth technology,

or longer-range weapons). Training and exercises can also increase survivability. Operational

and organizational innovation (e.g. using aircraft as “hunter killer teams” or passing

information from long-range sensors to a fighter aircraft) can also increase survivability.

CRS-2

!

Why the Navy and Air Force are pursuing distinctive paths to solving

tomorrow’s SEAD challenges, and whether the country is best

served by pursuing both approaches.

!

Why DoD and the Congress appear to have distinct perspectives on

the need to upgrade or replace key electronic countermeasures such

as aircraft radar warning receivers.

There are also other near term and longer term issues Congress may wish to consider.

They are described in the conclusion of this report.

EW Definition and Paper Focus

The Department of Defense defines electronic warfare as “Any military action

involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the

electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy....The three major subdivisions

within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic

warfare support.”2 Electronic warfare support can be considered the foundation of

EW. This activity includes “listening” to an enemy’s radars and communications to

determine what frequencies and wavelengths he is using, so that others can better

attack or protect against them. Electronic attack activities include jamming or

deceiving an enemy’s radar or radio communications, oftentimes by exploiting

information collected by electronic warfare support assets. Electronic protection (or

electronic countermeasures, (ECM)) also jams or deceives an adversary’s use of the

electromagnetic spectrum. ECM are usually used in the “end game,” when an enemy

missile, for example, has locked onto an aircraft and is homing in for a kill.

While not a subset of EW per se, the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)

is an important mission area that exploits EW techniques, technologies and platforms.

DoD defines SEAD as “That activity which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily

degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means.”3

In addition to exploiting EW techniques, SEAD platforms also use bombs and missiles

to attack enemy air defenses.

The three EW sub-elements and SEAD are mutually supporting and are

intimately linked. For example, DoD’s only active radar jamming aircraft – the EA6B Prowler – employs EW self protection systems. The Prowler also contributes to

SEAD by jamming radar signals and by firing the High Speed Anti-Radiation

(HARM) missile. Finally, the EA-6B depends on electronic warfare support

information to effectively do its job. The F-16CJ (also known as the Block 50),

DoD’s primary SEAD aircraft, also shoots the HARM missile. The F-16CJ uses

advanced ECM assets to protect itself from attack. Like the EA-6B, the F-16CJ

exploits information about enemy electronic activity collected by its own sensors, or

electronic warfare support platforms.

2

JCS Pub. 1-02: DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. U.S. Department of

Defense. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/]

3

Ibid

CRS-3

This report will focus on electronic attack, SEAD and electronic

countermeasures (ECM)/self-protection. Electronic warfare support issues, may be

addressed in subsequent CRS studies. References will be made to electronic warfare

support throughout this report as needed.

End Product:

Aircraft

Survivability

Electronic

Protection

Defeating

enemy’s

attack

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Su

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E ss

(an xplo ion

d a its of

lso and En

inc co em

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n

l

es tribu Air

ph tes De

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ica to E fen

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tta

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s)

Figure 1. Illustrative EW Pyramid

Electronic Attack

EW Support

Blinding

the enemy

Collecting

Information

Brief Background

Electronic warfare has been an important component of military air operations

since the earliest days of radar. Radar, EW, and stealth techniques have evolved over

time as engineers, scientists, and tacticians have struggled to create the most

survivable and effective air forces possible.

During World War II, for instance, ground-based early warning radars were used

early in the conflict to detect attacking aircraft at long ranges, to direct fighters to

intercept them, and to warn anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) batteries of imminent attack.

These ground-based radars significantly increased the success of air defenses. The

attrition of attacking aircraft rose accordingly. To negate or degrade ground-based

radars, the Allies and Germany quickly developed a number of countermeasures that

are still employed today. Chaff (strips of metal that reflect radar emissions) was

developed and used by both the Allies and Germany to confuse or obscure early

warning radars. The Allies also developed radar jamming. Germany used unmanned

systems (cruise and ballistic missiles) to penetrate England’s air defenses. And the

Allies modified their aerial tactics to reduce the amount of time that aircraft spent in

enemy radar coverage.

Just as countermeasures were developed to combat radar, countermeasures were

developed to counter the countermeasures. For example, Germany began using radar

frequencies that were unaffected by Allied chaff. They also developed new techniques

such as intercepting aircraft radar navigation transmissions, and identifying aircraft by

the unique radar return generated by the aircraft’s propeller. Toward the end of the

CRS-4

war, ECM had reduced some of the advantages that radar conferred upon air

defenses. U.S. bombers employing onboard ECM during raids on Germany suffered

attrition rates 25 percent less than bombers without onboard ECM.4

In the post World War II period, much research focused on using radar to guide

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and AAA. Rather than just warn the missile or artillery

battery of the attacking aircraft’s approach, radar now provided precise information

to guide the missile or artillery shell to its target. In response to radar-guided SAMs,

the United States tried to increase aircraft survivability in a number of ways. Some

aircraft, such as the U-2, flew very high. Others (such as the SR-71) flew very high

and very fast. Still others (such as the F-111) flew very fast and at low altitudes.

Many, if not most aircraft also carried electronic countermeasures.

The effectiveness of radar controlled air defenses grew, as they became more

redundant and better integrated. Therefore, the United States developed many

techniques to enhance aircraft survivability against systems such as North Vietnam’s

quadruple-layered, integrated air defenses. This era spawned, for example, the

development of the F-105 suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft, antiradiation missiles, and airborne jamming platforms such as the EA-6B Prowler and

EF-111 Raven. Also, the United States began flying aircraft in large “strike

packages,” where only 20-40 percent of the aircraft were “bomb droppers.” Sixty to

80 percent of the escorting aircraft were employed to ensure the bombers’

survivability, either through jamming, decoys, SEAD or other means.5

The growing reach of SAMs (e.g. the Russian built SA-5 has a range of 186

miles and a maximum altitude of 23 miles)6 and improvements to ground based radars

spawned new approaches to improving aircraft survivability. By using new materials,

and designs to reduce heat emanations and to deflect or absorb radar signals, aircraft

such as the F-117 Night Hawk significantly reduced the probability of detection and

tracking by adversaries. As in the past however, potential adversaries have noted this

advancement and are pursuing counters to “stealth” technologies. The downing of an

F-117 Night Hawk in the 1999 conflict in Yugoslavia (Operation Allied Force) by a

Serbian SAM illustrates that the struggle for control of the electromagnetic spectrum

is an ongoing endeavor for US air forces.

Recent Activities

Kosovo: EW Successes and Shortfalls. Operation Allied Force may be

an important watershed in the debate over current and future U.S. airborne EW. It

appears that every air strike on Serbian targets was protected by radar jamming and/or

SEAD aircraft.7 ECM self protection systems such as towed radar decoys were

4

Momyer. William. Airpower in Three Wars. U.S. Department of the Air Force. Washington,

DC, 1978. p.126.

5

Grant, Rebecca. The Radar Game. IRIS Independent Research. Arlington, VA. 1998. p. 19.

6

Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, 1997. Jane’s Publishing Group. London.

7

For a more complete discussion of EW in Kosovo, see CRS Report RL30639, Electronic

(continued...)

CRS-5

credited with saving numerous U.S. aircraft that had been targeted by Serbian SAMs.

General Wesley Clark, the operation’s military leader described how critical a role

EW played in the allies’ success. He testified that “We couldn’t have fought this war

successfully without the EA-6B contribution. We really need the electronic warfare

capacity that we have there.”8 The value of the F-16CJ SEAD aircraft was also widely

touted.9 The table below suggests the impact of EW and SEAD on NATO aircraft

survivability during the Kosovo campaign.

Duration of Conflict (Days)

78

NATO Aircraft

900

Sorties Flown

38,000

SAMs fired at NATO Aircraft

700

NATO Aircraft Shot Down

2

By using this metric, one can assert that DoD’s EW and SEAD efforts effectively

protected U.S. aircraft from Serbia’s integrated air defenses. Yet, despite the low

number of NATO aircraft destroyed during Operation Allied Force, concerns have

been raised over a number of EW and SEAD issues.

In the area of electronic attack, the main concern raised by the Kosovo conflict

is that DoD currently has too few jamming aircraft in its inventory to support more

than one conflict simultaneously. Although Operation Allied Force was considered by

many to be a small scale contingency, “U.S. systems such as RC-135 Rivet Joint

electronic intelligence aircraft and EA-6B tactical airborne electronic warfare aircraft

were employed in numbers roughly equivalent to those anticipated for a major theater

war, and even then were heavily tasked.”10 Further, the number of aircraft that could

be fielded at any one time may have been unnecessarily decreased by several

operations and maintenance shortfalls – such as a shortage of spare parts and too few

aircraft trainers. Also, the effectiveness of jamming aircraft may have been degraded

by their lack of key technologies such as night vision devices, and advanced

communications. Finally, experience in Operation Allied Force suggests that the

7

(...continued)

Warfare: EA-6B Aircraft Modernization and Related Issues for Congress, p. 15-23.

8

General Wesley Clark, SACEUR, Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee.

Washington, DC. July 1, 1999.

9

Kozaryn, Linda. Air Chief’s Lesson: Go for Snake’s Head First. American Forces Press

Service. October 1999. and Moniz, Dave. Eye-to-Eye with a New Kind of War. Christian

Science Monitor. March 23, 2000:1. and Grant, Rebecca. Airpower Made it Work. Air Force

Magazine. November 1999. p.34.

10

Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review. Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Public Affairs) New Release. No. 478-99. October 14, 1999.

CRS-6

electronic attack community would benefit from additional training and experience in

supporting low-observable aircraft.11

There are 235 F-16CJs in the total active inventory, and this number appears to

have been sufficient to adequately pursue the SEAD mission in Kosovo. However,

Operation Allied Force did suggest some numerical shortfalls that may have hindered

SEAD operations. According to the commander of the Air Force’s 20th Fighter Wing,

the lack of HARM Targeting System (HTS) pods (a key system on the F-16CJ) in

Kosovo may have reduced the Air Force’s ability to generate SEAD sorties. “In Allied

Force, there were more F-16 aircraft capable of carrying the pod than there were pods

to go around.” He also said that a lack of personnel also limited SEAD operations.12

Perhaps a greater SEAD concern emanating from Kosovo was the great

difficulty U.S. forces had detecting, tracking, and destroying Serbian SAMs that

minimized their radar emissions or used “shoot and scoot” tactics13. Part of the

challenge is that the primary SEAD weapon, the HARM, quickly loses its guidance

once an adversary turns off his radar; even for a short period of time. A compounding

problem is that the targeting cycle for mobile SAM sites takes too long. According

to a veteran Air Force General:

One damning shortfall, is it takes a matter of days – perhaps longer than it did

during the Persian Gulf war – to locate the emissions from Yugoslav radars

controlling antiaircraft weapons, and get that information to aircrews flying the

bombing missions. I’d like to see a (radar) signal come up and 20 seconds later a

bomb going in on the air defense site. That’s the way we ought to be operating. I

believe the response time has gotten longer, not shorter as you would have

thought....”14

Secretary of Defense Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Shelton

stated in their Kosovo After Action report that the United States must reduce the time

between detecting targets and attacking them.

The difficulty of destroying Serbia SAM launchers can be derived by looking at

a different set of Operation Allied Force numbers:

11

For a more detailed discussion of Kosovo “lessons learned,” see CRS Report RL30639,

Electronic Warfare: EA-6B Aircraft Modernization and Related Issues for Congress.

12

Tirpak, John. Dealing with Air Defenses. Air Force Magazine. November 1999. p. 25-29

13

Ibid

14

Fulghum, David A. NATO Unprepared for Electronic Combat. Aviation Week & Space

Technology. May 10, 1999. p.35.

CRS-7

Serbian SAM Batteries

SEAD sorties flown

SAM Batteries Destroyed

22

4,50015

216

This inability to destroy Serbia’s SAM launchers is particularly worrisome because

according to Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Gen. Hugh Shelton,

“...although among the most capable that the United States has faced in combat,

the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) air defense systems did not represent

the state of the art. Much more capable systems are available for sale in the

international arms market. In the years ahead, we may face an adversary armed

with state-of-the-art systems, and we need to prepare for that possibility now.”17

Despite these perceived shortcomings, forces involved in Operation Allied Force

employed their aircraft and refined tactics in ways that may hint at future solutions to

the problem of destroying elusive SAMs. For example, The Air Force paired different

variants of the F-16 aircraft together to exploit their various strengths.18 Like the

HARM, the F-16CJs sensors are optimized to find and attack radiating radars. Also

like the HARM, the CJ has difficulty finding and targeting the radar if the adversary

is careful to limit its emissions. The F-16C/D Block 40, however, has an all weather

precision strike capability and carries laser-guided bombs. By using their datalink

capability, F-16CJ pilots in Kosovo passed bearing information on SAM radar sites

from their HTS to Block 40 F-16s. The Block 40 aircraft were then able to launch

precision-guided munitions (PGMs) at the fleeting and non-emitting targets.19 One

Operation Allied Force participant remarked:

We did have one big success when we teamed Block 40 and Block 50 on an early

warning radar in Montenegro. This particular early warning radar was a problem

through most of the war. When we got a tip where it was located, we had a Block

50 F-16 go in and shoot a HARM at it. The HARM hit real close and did some

damage. Then a pilot in a Block 40 used his targeting pod to drop an LGB on the

site to completely destroy it.”20

15

Correspondence from Lt.Gen C.W. Fulford, (USMC) Director, Joint Staff to Mr. Daniel

Mulhollan, Director, Congressional Research Service. October 19, 1999.

16

Haffa, Robert P. and Barry D. Watts. Brittle Swords: Managing the Pentagon’s LowDensity, High Demand Assets. Northrop Grumman Corp. Washington, DC. p.9.

17

Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review. Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Public Affairs) New Release. No. 478-99. October 14, 1999.

18

This technique of pairing aircraft into “hunter killer teams” is not new. The F-16CJ’s SEAD

predecessor – the F-4G Wild Weasel – was also used in this way.

19

20

Cook, Nick. Survival of the Smartest. Jane’s Defense Weekly. March 1, 2000. p.22-26.

Allied Force Debrief. Code One Magazine, October 1999. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics

Corp.

CRS-8

This experience suggests to many observers that rapid target detection, identification,

and geo location will be important to the success of future SEAD missions.

Figure 2. Key SEAD Assets

F-16CJ Source: Lockheed Martin

EA-6B Source: U.S. Navy

HARM Source: U.S. Air Force

The primary topic of ECM-related conversation following Operation Allied

Force, was widespread praise of towed radar decoys. Although they did not debut in

Kosovo, towed decoys were used more pervasively in this conflict than in the past.

These ECM were credited with saving several aircraft such as the B-1 bomber from

Serbian SAMs. Some have described towed decoys as “...one of the key enablers of

last year’s bombing campaign.”21 However, there were ECM deficiencies as well as

successes. The ALE-39 countermeasures dispenser, for instance, was not sufficiently

reliable. The ALE-39 – which is found on EA-6B, F-14, F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft

– at times did not dispense countermeasures (flares or chaff) when it was supposed

to. Conversely the dispenser also ejected countermeasures without prompting, leaving

the pilot with none available when they were needed.

The ALQ-126 self protection jammer’s performance was also found

unsatisfactory during Kosovo. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft that used this jammer

– F-14s and F/A-18s – were not allowed to fly over land where the most hostile

threats were located. Only those Navy and Marine Corps aircraft protected by more

modern jammers were allowed to fly these missions.22

Operation Allied Force flight operations also suggest that passively guided

SAMs are a self-protection concern that may merit close scrutiny. Shorter range

SAMs can exploit infrared (IR) or electro-optical (EO) guidance 23 to target lowflying aircraft. Because these missiles do not emanate radar signals, they are difficult

to detect. When asked which surface-to-air threat concerned him most, one Marine

Corps officer replied “the unobserved missile.”24 Air forces that must fly at low

altitudes – such as Army helicopters and special operations forces – have been forced

to focus on this threat and are seeking to develop effective countermeasures. Aircraft

21

Cook, Nick. Survival of the Smartest. Jane’s Defense Weekly. March 1, 2000. p.22-26.

22

Conversation with Department of the Navy Requirements Officers, January 3, 2001.

23

Generally speaking IR systems are “heat seeking” and EO systems use TV guidance.

24

Conversation between the author and Marine Corps EA-6B pilot. January 3, 2001.

CRS-9

that don’t have to fly low, often reduce this threat by flying high. Allied air forces in

Kosovo were able to reduce much of the threat posed by shorter range surface-to-air

systems by flying at altitudes above 15,000 feet. But, large, transport aircraft that

need to deliver men and material to the theater are vulnerable to short range SAMs.

It was reported that “during Operation Allied Force last year, Yugoslav anti-aircraft

threats forced AMC planners to sometimes choose less efficient air routes for AMC

aircraft to ensure crews’ safety.”25

Select FY2001 Congressional Action on ECM and SEAD

Programs26

The Clinton Administration’s DoD budget request for FY2001 was the 106th

Congress’ first opportunity to exercise oversight of ECM and SEAD programs in the

post-Kosovo era. The variety of programs that affect ECM and SEAD is great, and

they pervade DoD’s budget at all levels: operations and maintenance, research,

development, testing and evaluation, and procurement. Examined singly, these

disparate EW programs may appear minor, both in terms of budgetary and

warfighting importance. Yet, when considered as a whole, the programs described in

this section and summarized in Appendix 2 – while not a complete accounting of

DoD’s EW programs – amount to approximately $859,391,000 in budget authority

and constitute significant enablers of today’s and tomorrow’s air campaign.

Congressional appropriations and authorization conferees matched or exceeded

DoD’s request for ECM programs to ensure the survivability of numerous aircraft.

This oversight included appropriating and authorizing $9.0 million in additional funds

to procure improved ECM capabilities for the B-52, and $1.0 million more than

requested to improve the antenna on the F-14's radar warning receiver. Legislators

supported the BOL IR countermeasures for F-15 squadrons, appropriating $7.6

million more than requested and authorizing $26.4 million in additional funds.27

The BOL IR countermeasure and the ALR-69 RWR were also deemed Special

Interest Items by Appropriations conferees, who wrote “The conferees expect the

component commanders to give priority consideration to the following items:...F15

BOL systems...C–130 ALR–69 Radar Warning Receiver...”28 Appropriations and

Authorization conferees agreed that the F-15's ALQ-135 system was experiencing

delays and technical problems, which merited a decrement of $10.4 million from the

budget request.

25

Butler, Amy. Electronic Warfare to Remain Under Info Ops Umbrella, Official Says. Inside

the Air Force. September 22, 2000.

26

A detailed account of FY2001Congressional action on electronic attack programs can be

found in CRS Report RL30639, Electronic Warfare: EA-6B Aircraft Modernization and

Related Issues for Congress.

27

The BOL dispenser is described on page 17 of this report. BOL is not an acronym, but the

name of the system.

28

106th Congress. 2nd Session. House of Representatives. Making Appropriations for the

Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2001, and For Other

Purposes. Report 106-754. H.R. 4576. July 17, 2000. p. 217.

CRS-10

Congress also supported EW research, development, test and evaluation

(RDT&E) programs by appropriating increased funding of $14.7 million for the Air

Force’s Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD), Precision Location and

Identification (PLAID) and other survivability enhancements. Navy RDT&E on the

Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) program was also

enhanced by an appropriation of $3 million more than requested. Appropriations

conferees considered the Navy’s plan to produce IDECM RFCMs to be premature,

and reduced their request by almost $30 million.29

The 106th Congress (second session) also provided oversight of several important

DoD SEAD programs. The Air Force’s primary SEAD aircraft, the F-16C/J received

considerable congressional attention. Appropriations conferees provided $122 million

to acquire four new F-16C/Js while authorization conferees provided $51.7 million

for two aircraft.

Appropriations and authorization conferees also agreed to provide $10 million

in procurement funding for the acquisition of the Improved Tactical Air Launched

Decoy (ITALD). This decoy was used with great success during the 1991 war with

Iraq (Operation Desert Storm). Iraqi radar operators frequently mistook ITALDs for

manned aircraft, and tracked them with their fire control radars. This alerted the

Coalition allies of the Iraqi radar’s position and allowed them to avoid or attack them.

Appropriations conferees also made available an additional $15 million for the

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) and an additional $5 million for

the Quick Bolt program. Both programs are advanced technology demonstrations

designed to improve the HARM’s ability to track and engage enemy radars even if

they shut down emissions. Authorization conferees supported AARGM with $5

million.

Authorization conferees added $200 million in RDT&E to fund a demonstration

project to explore the feasibility and effectiveness of unmanned combat aircraft. The

goal of this provision was to stimulate DoD efforts in unmanned vehicles, such that

“within 10 years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft will be

unmanned...”30 Conferees also recommended that these efforts should focus on the

highest risk mission areas. “For aircraft, this mission area is defined as those early

entry deep strike missions for suppression of enemy air defenses and other highest

priority targets.”31

29

Ibid. p. 168

30

106th Congress. 2nd U.S. House of Representatives. Report 106-945. H.R. 4205. Enactment

of Provisions of H.R. 5409, the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2001.Section 220, p. 720-721.

31

Ibid

CRS-11

Overview of Recent DoD EW Activities32

The Department of Defense is engaged in numerous activities – such as R&D

programs, procurement programs, training, and experimentation – that are designed

to improve various EA, ECM and SEAD capabilities both in the near and long-term.

These activities often cut across bureaucratic boundaries and defy easy categorization

and oversight, which makes it difficult to determine and assess DoD-wide EW

priorities. In the area of SEAD, for example, the General Accounting Office (GAO)

recently reported that DoD lacks a comprehensive strategy for improving its SEAD

capabilities. Because DoD has no overarching EW coordination strategy, the

Service’s efforts to improve EW capabilities are paramount. However, “...service level

decisions are, in our view, much less likely to reflect the needed priority for closing

the gap (between the services capabilities and their needs) and to be the most costeffective solutions for the Department overall.”33

Electronic Attack-related Activities

Perhaps the most noteworthy activity related to electronic attack is the

Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). The Navy is leading this joint

study, which was funded by FY2001 Defense Appropriations. The AOA’s mandate

is to study and recommend how DoD might best field an EA capability in the 2010

time frame. This is when the EA-6B Prowler is expected to be retired.

The AOA team has divided into various integrated product teams that are

focused on cost, threat, technology, and operational measures of effectiveness. As of

December 2000, the AOA had received over 170 briefings from industry and had

assessed at least 23 different EA platform options. As of January 2001, the AOA was

conducting modeling and simulation runs on various alternatives, and expected to

begin analysis of the computer output in March and April 2001. The AOA team

anticipates briefing the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Service

leadership in the August 2001 time frame, and delivering their final report to OSD by

their deadline of December 15, 2001. The FY2004 budget cycle will be the first

opportunity to begin implementing the AOA recommendations toward a 2010 initial

operating capability (IOC).

It is unlikely that the AOA will recommend a single point solution to DoD’s

2010 electronic attack needs. Instead, the AOA will probably recommend multiple

alternatives designed to give the services flexible and redundant capabilities.

In addition to chairing the AOA, the Navy has been engaged in several activities

over the past two years designed to address electronic attack shortfalls identified in

32

The activities described in this and the following section do not include all DoD activities.

Electronic warfare is an area in which much secret work (often called black programs, or

special access programs) is probably conducted. It would be inappropriate for the

Congressional Research service to report on, or for DoD sources to comment on, this work.

33

Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses.

General Accounting Office. GAO-01-28. January 2001. p.3.

CRS-12

Kosovo. First, the EA-6B community has begun acquiring and training with night

vision devices (NVDs). The entire EA-6B fleet is expected to be equipped with NVDs

by the fall of 2002. Second, the Navy and Air Force have collaborated in integrating

former EF-111 crews into the EA-6B fleet. Thus far, 24 USAF personnel have

undergone EA-6B training. These additional pilots and electronic countermeasures

officers should help address personnel shortfalls that may have slowed operational

tempo during Operation Allied Force. Third, the Navy is in the process of standing

up a nineteenth EA-6B squadron. This new expeditionary squadron should be fully

operational some time in calendar year 2002.34

In the aftermath of Kosovo – where EA assets played an important role – the

decision to retire the Air Force’s EF-111 Raven and to give responsibility for airborne

radar jamming to the Navy and Marine Corps has been questioned in the press,

defense academia, and government. The Air Force has also questioned its current

footing in electronic attack, and has revamped its overall policy, doctrine and

budgetary positions on EW. On July 7, 2000, for instance, the Air Force’s highest

ranking officers held an “EW Summit.”

Many of the Air Force’s recent activities have been organizational changes that

may greatly affect the service’s electronic attack capabilities in the mid and long term.

For example, the Air Force has created a new organization on the Air Staff – called

XOIE35 – to more effectively develop and coordinate operational EW requirements.

This office, in turn, has developed an EW road map and action plan that will address

the balance between current systems and future technologies. The Air Force has also

established EW offices in its Major Commands (e.g. the Air Mobility Command, Air

Combat Command, Air Force Space Command, Air Force Special Operations

Command) to better rationalize EW resources and priorities across all programs.

In November 2000, Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Michael Ryan

announced his new position on EW: “The USAF is committed to a support jamming

capability adequate to sustain the AEF and Joint air, ground, sea and space operations

across the spectrum of conflict. To fulfill AEF CONOPs, the Air Force will define

adequate AF EW force structure required to meet projected AEF deployments.36

In addition to these organizational changes, the Air Force has also embarked on

activities designed to improve, more immediately, their EA capabilities. For instance,

the Air Force continues to maintain its only EA asset, the EC-130H Compass Call.

The Air Force has an inventory of 14 of these communications jamming aircraft.

According to the Air Force, the Compass Call “has achieved some significant

34

CAPT Doug Swoish. Commander VAQ Wing Pacific. EA-6B Prowler Overview Briefing.

January 16, 2001.

35

The Air Staff, that supports General Michael Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is

divided into several offices. The letters, XOIE are used to indicate where the new EW office

fits in the larger bureaucracy. XOIE is found under XOI, The Director of Intelligence,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance. XOI, is found under XO, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

and Space Operations. XO reports to General Ryan.

36

CSAF Electronic Warfare (EW) Position Statement. November 2, 2000. HQ USAF

Washington, DC.

CRS-13

performance advances as part of several classified upgrade programs” over the past

several years.37

The Air Force is also working on improving its ability to combine LO and EW

operations. According to XOIE officials, at least two combat training exercises have

been conducted at Nellis AFB in the post-Kosovo time frame which were designed

to improve the integration of EA and LO platforms. Also, general officer-level

coordination meetings have been initiated in the Pentagon to address EA and LO

training and infrastructure needs. General Ryan has stated that “The USAF believes

that a combination of EW and low observables (LO) are required to assure air

superiority in the 21st century battlespace.”38

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

To improve their ability to destroy enemy air defenses, the Navy is engaged in

programs designed to improve the HARM missile’s ability to target enemy radars that

have been turned off. The Advanced Anti Radiation Guided Munition (AARGM)

Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD), for example, aims to add INS/GPS

midcourse guidance and a millimeter wave (MMW) radar seeker to the HARM

missile’s active radar homing (ARH). The targeting information from all three sensors

will be fused on-board the missile, with the goal of providing a robust targeting

capability. If an enemy turns off his radar to defeat the ARH seeker, the MMW radar

is designed to continue searching for the radar and guide the missile to it. AARGM

is also designed to maneuver at the end of its flight to find and destroy the SAM

site’s highest value target, such as the missile launcher itself. The current HARM can

only zero in on the SAM radar, often leaving the missile launcher intact.

The Navy is also working with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) on

the Quick Bolt Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). Quick Bolt

is designed to improve the AARGM’s targeting capabilities by allowing the launchaircraft to update the missile’s targeting library with information that it receives from

“off-board” sources (e.g. satellites). Quick Bolt is also designed to improve SEAD

battle damage assessment (BDA) capabilities – a significant challenge in Kosovo.

Quick Bolt will add a transmitter to the AARGM that is designed to allow it to

transmit back to headquarters its exact location just prior to striking the target. This

information can then be assessed to help determine the probability of destruction. The

Quick Bolt ACTD is scheduled to be completed in FY2004.

Air Force planners have taken a fresh look at SEAD capabilities in the post

Kosovo era. As directed by the aforementioned EW Summit, the Air Combat

Command (ACC) has developed a concept of operations called “Countering Air

Defenses,” or CAD. This document is intended to serve as the foundation for

improving the Air Force’s SEAD capabilities. Air Force personnel describe CAD as

the most comprehensive document of its type ever written by the Air Force.

37

Fact Sheet. U.S.A.F. Legislative Liaison. Weapons systems Division. 1160 Air Force

Pentagon. January 9, 2001.

38

Ibid

CRS-14

The Air Force has also led training activities designed to improve SEAD

capabilities. For instance, the USAF hosted a Joint SEAD test and evaluation at Nellis

air force base in August and September 2000 designed to update and test SEAD

tactics. The Air Force also annually runs Joint Expeditionary Force Exercises. The

one held September 11-14, 2000 at Nellis AFB focused on improving time critical

targeting capabilities; such as destroying SAMs that employ shoot-and-scoot tactics.

The Air Force is engaged in a variety of programs to improve its SEAD

capabilities. Perhaps the most prominent are upgrades to the Harm Targeting System

(HTS), the Advanced Targeting Pod (ATP) and the Miniature Air Launched Decoy

(MALD).

Since the fielding of the original HTS, the Air Force has pursued a pre-planned

product improvement program that has resulted in fielding two HTS upgrades;

Revision 5 (R5) in 1996 and Revision 6 (R6) in 2000. The R-6 software/hardware

modification improved the HTS’ geolocation capability. HTS Revision 7 (R7) is

currently funded and under development. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is

expected in FY 2006. The goal of the R7 upgrade is to further improve the HTS

geolocation capability. R7 is designed to allow faster precision HARM employment

and enable the targeting of JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition), JSOW (Joint Stand

Off Weapon) and potentially other standoff precision guided munitions against fixed

and mobile enemy air defense systems employing emission control tactics. 39 The

dispersal of JSOW submunitions would also increase the likelihood of destroying all

of a SAM battery’s assets: radars, missile launchers and command and control

vehicles.

The ATP is designed to give the SEAD-capable F-16CJ the same precision

targeting capability as the F-16C/D models; essentially turning the F-16CJ into a true

multi-mission aircraft. The exact features will probably include a high-resolution,

forward-looking infrared sensor (which displays an IR image of the target to the pilot)

and a laser designator for precise delivery of laser-guided munitions. The combination

of the HTS R7 and ATP should give a single F-16CJ the very promising capabilities

against mobile SAMs demonstrated in Kosovo (see preceding pages 7 and 8) by two

different F-16 models working together.

The MALD is designed to improve both SEAD capabilities and contribute to

aircraft self-protection by attracting the attention of enemy SAM radars. This small

(25 inch wing span), turbo-jet powered decoy will employ a signature augmentation

system (SAS) that will make it look like a much larger, manned fighter aircraft to

enemy radar operators. When enemy radars or SAMs attempt to engage the MALD,

real fighter aircraft will be free to attack or avoid the SAM. The MALD SEAD

concept of operations (CONOPs) could include several strategies, including: 1)

preemptive destruction; 2) reactive suppression; 3) diversion (as just described); or

4) saturation. A key program goal is to keep the cost of MALD below $30,000 per

decoy for a 3,000 unit purchase. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

(DARPA) announced on January 22, 2001 that it is transferring the MALD program

39

Fact Sheet. U.S.A.F. Legislative Liaison. Weapons systems Division. 1160 Air Force

Pentagon. January 9, 2001.

CRS-15

to the Air Force, for a possible limited procurement of 100 to 150 decoys over a three

year period, starting in FY2002.40

Another post-Kosovo SEAD activity is DARPA’s Advanced Tactical Targeting

Technology (AT3) program. This program will seek to “...demonstrate a passive

tactical targeting system for the lethal suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).”41

The crux of the AT3 program is to widely distribute passive radar receivers

throughout the battle space and to network them together. No single asset will be

tasked with sensing or destroying enemy SAM systems; they all will. This program

is an example of the type of SEAD technological innovation recently discussed by the

General Accounting Office.42

The first element of the AT3 concept is advanced electronic warfare support

hardware. The AT3 elements will exploit, and be composed of, Global Positioning

System receivers, precision clocks, and low-cost wideband receiver/processors.

Although the exact size of the AT3 hardware has not yet been determined, the

program hopes to make them small enough to fit on a UAV or other “vehicles of

opportunity.”

The second element of AT3 is advanced networking. By linking the electronic

warfare support modules together – say with Link 1643 – every element on the

network would function cooperatively. Different AT3 sensors would pick up a threat

enemy radar signal from different points in time, space and frequency. DARPA hopes

that by rapidly calculating the difference between when and where each receiver

intercepts the threat radar signal, the AT3 network will pinpoint and disseminate the

enemy’s location in 10 seconds or less.

DARPA says that the biggest technical challenge to this approach is “PVTF,” or

the ability to synchronize position, velocity, time and frequency among all the

participants in the network. Synchronizing the time difference and frequency

difference of arrival for all participants in the network is both a computer processing

and software challenge. The network’s accuracy increases with the number of

modules involved, but so does the technical complexity of PVTF.

In its most successful manifestation, DARPA hopes AT3 will make dedicated

SEAD aircraft unnecessary. The AT3 network’s ability to identify a target within 10

seconds could enable any shooter – such as the Army Multiple Launch Rocket

System, Navy five-inch guns, or Air Force fighter or bomber aircraft – to attack nonemitting or “shoot-and-scoot” SAMs. DARPA plans to conduct flight tests in

FY2002 in which it will geo-locate a radiating target in near real time.

40

Woods, Randy. DARPA Transferring Air Launched Decoy to Air Force. Defense

Information and Electronics Report. January 26, 2001.

41

http://www.darpa.mil/spo/Programs/att.htm

42

Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Enemy Air Defenses. General

Accounting Office GAO-01-28. January 3, 2001. p. 11.

43

Link 16 is a high data rate, jam resistant communications data link.

CRS-16

Self Protection

The services are engaged in myriad efforts to improve defenses against surfaceto-air and air-to-air guided missiles. Almost every aircraft in DoD’s inventory

employ’s systems to detect approaching missiles, generate appropriate electronic or

IR techniques to jam or deceive the threat, and a system to deliver the technique. As

enemy SAMs and AAMs improve, the Services are continually seeking to modify or

improve these self protection systems.44

Some of the more prominent DoD self-protection activities include the

Integrated Defense Countermeasures (IDECM) system, the Large Aircraft IR

Countermeasures program (LAIRCM), the Precision Location and Identification

(PLAID) upgrade to the ALR-69 radar warning receiver, and the BOL IR

countermeasures dispenser.

The IDECM program is jointly run by the Navy, Air Force, and Army, and

composed of three sub programs: the Radio Frequency Countermeasures (RFCM)

jammer; the Common Missile Warning System (CMWS); and, the Advanced Strategic

and Tactical Expendable (ASTE) program. The Navy is leading the RFCM program,

which is developing the ALQ-214 radar jammer to replace the Airborne Self

Protection Jammer (ASPJ) and other legacy jammers, and the ALE-55 fiber optic

towed decoy, which improves upon the ALE-50 decoy. The systems are planned for

employment on the F/A-18E/F, followed by the B-1B and F-15. The Army is leading

IDECM’s Common Missile Warning System, which is intended to alert a variety of

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft of attack by IR guided missiles.

The Air Force leads ASTE. This self-propelled flare is designed to increase aircraft

survivability against next generation IR and electro-optical (EO) threats.

The PLAID upgrade to the Air Force’s ALR-69 radar warning receiver will be

composed of “digital RWR technology and specialized receiver software algorithms

for greatly improved geographical location, azimuth accuracy, and slant range

measurements and determination of specific emitter identification information on

detected threats.”45 These capabilities will improve combat threat identification

capabilities for the aircrews on aircraft which operate the ALR-69: the F-16, C-130,

C-141, and A-10 aircraft.

Large aircraft require large engines. Large engines tend to produce lots of power

and heat, and generate large IR signatures. To protect these aircraft from heat seeking

missiles, the Air Force is pursuing a variety of directed IR countermeasures

(DIRCM).46 The LAIRCM program, for example, is a laser-based aircraft self-

44

Examples of other ECM upgrade efforts include: B-1 Defensive Systems Upgrade (DSUP),

Improvements or upgrades to ALQ-172 jammers on B-52, MC-130E/H, AC-130U, and AC130H.

45

Svitak, Amy. Senate Approves Funding Boost for Air Force Radar Warning Upgrade.

Defense Information and Electronics Report. June 30, 2000.

46

Klass, Philip. New Lasers Enhance DIRCM Capabilities. Aviation Week & Space

(continued...)

CRS-17

protection system designed to defeat all IR guided missiles and is intended to be more

effective than traditional flare countermeasures. The Air Force believes that the most

promising R&D efforts include two-color missile warning efforts and the Laser IR

Flyout Experiment (LIFE), designed to be a more advanced LAIRCM follow-on

system.47 BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman recently delivered their first AAQ-25

DIRCM, which will be used on C-130 airlifters.48

The Air Force and Navy are both interested in using the BOL chaff and IR

countermeasures dispenser. This six foot long canister is designed to very rapidly eject

up to 160 small IR countermeasures that will give aircraft a “preemptive self

protection” capability. The BOL is manufactured by Sweden’s Celsius Technologies

and is already employed on the F-14 and foreign aircraft. The F-15E is the Air Force’s

leading candidate for hosting the BOL dispenser.

The Way Ahead: Likely EW Priorities in FY2002

Navy and Air Force officials have indicate that their electronic warfare priorities

for FY2002 will likely be very similar to those in FY2001. For the Navy, this 2001-to2002 consistency is due to the fact that the Navy believes its EW responsibilities are

clear and the challenges well understood. The Air Force’s FY 2002 EA priorities will

resemble those of FY 2001 more for reasons of momentum. The fundamental

organizational, policy, doctrinal, and budgetary changes that the Air Force has

initiated on EW are still solidifying. Thus, for example, those responsible for

developing the service’s FY2002 budget request were not guided by XOIE’s EW

Roadmap.49 FY2003 will probably be the first Air Force budget strongly influenced

by the Air Force’s new position and policies on electronic attack.

Electronic Attack

The many different parties within the Navy’s EA community speak with one

voice on 2002 requirements. They want, in order of priority; 1) improved EA-6B

readiness; 2) ICAPIII; 3) improvements to jamming capabilities; and 4) Link-16

implementation. With only 124 EA-6B aircraft in the inventory to support all DoD

combat flight operations, it would appear prudent to them to keep as many of these

aircraft in a ready state and at the highest level of effectiveness as possible. According

to the Navy “the most significant near term challenge facing the EA-6B community

is the gradual decline in aircraft readiness.”50 The EA-6B Operational Advisory Group

46

(...continued)

Technology. May 22, 2000. p. 56.

47

Fact Sheet. U.S.A.F. Legislative Liaison. Weapons systems Division. 1160 Air Force

Pentagon. January 9, 2001.

48

Aerospace Daily. February 6, 2001.p. 196.

49

Discussions with XOIE officials December 27, 2000.

50

EA-6B ESC Top Ten War-Fighting Requirements. EA-6B Operational Advisory Group.

(continued...)

CRS-18

(OAG) believes that readiness will be improved by addressing shortfalls in the Prowler

supply system, including parts such as flaps, rudders, radomes, and struts. The Navy

has experienced a continuous shortfall in O&M funding for ALQ-99 pod repair and

refurbishment is particularly bothersome. Making sure that these pods are maintained

appropriately could increase the Prowler fleet’s readiness rate by 30 percent. 51

Once the Navy ensures that the EA-6B fleet is as ready as it can be, its second

priority is to improve the Prowlers’ effectiveness. The best way to do that, Navy

planners believe, is by implementing the ICAP III upgrade to the Prowler’s ALQ-99

and USQ-113 jammers. ICAP III should improve the EA-6B’s capabilities against

“frequency hopping” radars, and provide better geo-location of threats. The EA-6B

OAG endorses ICAP III production “at the maximum rate allowable.” Two ICAP III

trainers, one for Whidbey Island, WA and one for Cherry Point, NC, would help the

Navy sooner realize the ICAP III’s capabilities, Navy planners say.

Making additional improvements to the EA-6Bs jamming pods is the Navy’s next

EA priority for FY2002. A number of improvements are believed to be required to

improve the Prowler’s capabilities over the long term, and to enhance joint strike

aircraft survivability. In order of priority, the Navy would: 1) continue funding the

research and exploitation of enemy radar systems to improve EA-6B jamming

techniques; 2) upgrade the EA-6B’s low band transmitter to increase its frequency

coverage; and 3) acquire an additional 61 USQ-113 (V)3 communications jammers

so that all 124 EA-6Bs in the fleet could field this capability.52

The third way the Navy would improve the EA-6B’s capabilities, and their fourth

overall EA priority, would be to accelerate the fielding of Link 16. “As the sole

provider of tactical electronic attack capability on the joint battlefield, it is imperative

that the EA-6B have uninterrupted connectivity with strike and support assets,” states

the EA-6B OAG.

In the next year the Air Force will continue evolving its policy, organizational,

and doctrinal positions on electronic attack. It will continue to participate in the EA

AOA. It will continue to develop and coordinate new CONOPs like Countering Air

Defenses. The communications jamming EC-130H Compass Call is the only line item

in the Air Force’s budget that legislators may have to consider. The Air Force

currently has sufficient funding to upgrade 11 of its 14 EC-130H aircraft to the most

capable configuration. In FY2002 it is likely that the Air Force will request funding

to upgrade the remaining three aircraft. No new Air Force radar jamming platforms

will emerge prior to the EA AOA recommended EA-6B follow on in the 2010 time

frame.

50

(...continued)

September 27, 2000.

51

52

Ibid.

The shortage of USQ-113 (V) 3 jammers is both an effectiveness and also a readiness

issue. Currently the Navy constantly swaps the 63 USQ-113 jammers they own among the

124 Prowler airframes, which creates an unnecessary bottleneck in the system.

CRS-19

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Two important SEAD lessons have emerged from Kosovo. First, there is a need

to more quickly locate and target SAM systems. Second, there is a need to more

effectively target SAM systems that limit their radar emissions. The Air Force, as part

of its desire to move from today’s reactive suppression of enemy air defenses to the

ability to preemptively destroy enemy air defenses, the Air Force is likely to

emphasize programs that will also help solve these two problems.

Perhaps the most powerful technique for shortening the SEAD targeting time

line is sensor fusion. It may be that by emphasizing programs in their FY2002 budgets

that fuse airborne sensor data, the Air Force and Navy may more effectively destroy

future enemy air defenses. On February 5, 2001, DoD announced its new ACTDs for

FY2001. One of them, called “Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT),

is an example of this sort of SEAD approach. This program will attempt to network

operational ISR sensors found or platforms such as RC-135 Rivet Joint, JSTARS,

AWACs, Global Hawk, Predator, U2 and the Navy’s EP-3 in an attempt to

significantly improve the capability to detect, identify and locate time critical targets

such as enemy air defenses. These sensors have different but complementary

capabilities. By networking these sensors and processing the data in a collaborative

way, DoD hopes to reduce target location error and targeting time lines. The U.S.

Central Command is the operational sponsor of this program, which has a planned

completion date of FY2005.

Another high priority to more quickly attack enemy SAM systems is the

acceleration of the fielding and integration of Link-16 on as many combat aircraft as

feasible. This capability could facilitate the automated sharing of fused information

among battle space participants and could significantly improve tactical command and

control. Especially when coupled with a PLAID capability, Link-16 capable aircraft

may more quickly pass location, cuing, and targeting information to other aircraft that

may be better positioned or better armed to prosecute that attack. The acceleration

of the procurement of the HTS version 7 and the Advanced Targeting Pod may also

be important SEAD priorities. The Air Force eventually wants enough F-16CJs with

ATPs to support all 10 AEFs.

One way to attack an enemy SAM radar that won’t emit, is to trick it into

emitting. The MALD and ITALD may be high Air Force and Navy priorities in

FY2002, because they should be able to use these decoys to stimulate enemy

integrated air defenses. Once turned on, the enemy radar will be more easily avoided

or attacked. The Air Force is aiming for a MALD production run in FY2002.

The Navy’s AARGM and Quick Bolt programs are other approaches to

destroying enemy radar that limit their emissions, and these will likely be emphasized

in the FY2002 budget cycle. The AARGM ATD is expected to be complete at the

end of calendar year 2001, and will include test firings at the Navy’s China Lake range

in March and August. A critical juncture for the program, say industry officials, is the

FY2003 budget, when the Navy must decide to commit $300 million to the program

for systems development and demonstration. Industry representatives also say that the

AARGM is anticipated to cost no more than the baseline HARM missile, if bought in

CRS-20

the 1,800 unit production desired.53 The Quick Bolt ACTD – the U.S. European

Commands top priority ACTD in FY 2000 – is in its first phase. Navy scientists and

engineers hope to integrate the Quick Bolt receiver and transmitter with AARGM to

begin demonstrating improved situational awareness.

Self Protection

In terms of self protection, Navy priorities appear very focused. The F/A-18E/F

is the top aviation priority, and IDECM is the top self protection priority. The Navy

considers the ALQ-126 RFCM to be obsolete. During Kosovo, any Navy or Marine

Corps aircraft that operated the ALQ-126 (F-14s and F/A-18s) were not allowed to

fly over land, where Serbia’s most threatening SAMs were located. IDECM’s ALQ214 RFCM will replace the ALQ-126 and ASPJ. IDECM’s ASTE and the BOL IR

countermeasures dispenser are also important to the Navy and may play an important

role in FY2002 activities.

Air Force requirements officials indicate that they would like to replace many of

the older self protection systems such as the ALQ-131 and ALQ-184 jamming pods,

but believe that the numbers involved would require funding currently beyond what

is likely available. It may be, then, that these improvements will be on the Air Force’s

FY2002 unfunded priority list.54

In addition to these legacy jamming pods, the Air Force self protection efforts

will likely focus on completing the engineering, manufacturing and development

(EMD) phase of the PLAID system, increasing ALE-50 production, and making

progress on the ASTE program, the LAIRCM program, and long duration IR threat

protection systems like the BOL dispenser.

Considerations for Congress

The previous sections provide a snapshot of DoD’s activities to improve its

electronic attack, SEAD and self protection capabilities, and where improvements

reportedly still need to be made. During the research and study of these issues, a

number of concerns related to congressional interests emerged. These concerns can

be divided into two groups, those that could be addressed immediately, and those that

have a longer time horizon.

The first, and over arching congressional concern may be the EW budget.

Considering the importance of EW, are the services spending an appropriate amount

on EW programs? Many argue that, as the United States moves toward warfighting

concepts that emphasize the use of information and communications technology to

make better and faster decisions on the battlefield, EW becomes increasingly

53

AARGM/QB Program Summary. Presentation by Science and Applied Technology, Inc.

January 17, 2001.

54

Fact Sheet. U.S.A.F. Legislative Liaison. Weapons systems Division. 1160 Air Force

Pentagon. January 9, 2001.

CRS-21

important. Have the Services and DoD accepted this perspective, and if so, is it

reflected in their spending priorities? A sub issue concerns the emphasis the Services

place on electronic attack versus SEAD versus self protection. Generally speaking,

the Navy’s budgeting priorities suggest an emphasis on electronic attack. The Air

Force’s budgetary priorities suggest an emphasis on SEAD. Both services appear to

put less emphasis on self protection relative to the other sub components of EW. This

raises the issue of finding the best balance of EW resources..

The second immediate concern pertains to the EA-6B fleet and may be as

important as any other issue raised in this paper. Can DoD wring the most warfighting

effectiveness from the 124 airframe fleet as possible over the next 10 years? Kosovo

clearly illustrated both the importance of these radar jamming aircraft to the success

of the air campaign and, also, how thinly stretched the fleet could become. PostKosovo, the Navy has taken steps to increase the Prowler’s combat capability,

including procuring NVDs and taking steps to create a new squadron. Yet, they are

still constrained to a finite number of airframes. It appears unlikely that the Navy will

acquire more radar jamming airframes before 2010, and the Air Force has stated that

they will develop their own radar jamming capabilities, based on the EA AOA

recommendations, to be fielded in the 2010 time frame.

One approach that may generate more combat effectiveness out of the Prowler

fleet would be to create a fifth Marine Corps EA-6B squadron from the current

Marine Corps inventory of 20 aircraft. The Marine Corps currently divides these 20

aircraft into four squadrons of five aircraft each. All 14 Navy squadrons, as a point

of comparison, are composed of four Prowlers each.

Navy requirements and operational officers say that all EA-6B squadrons are

deployed on an equal basis. The Navy tries to schedule deployments so that no single

squadron gets burnt out, while another rests, regroups and trains in the United States.

Thus, if all squadrons are deployed equally, those containing five aircraft may get less

work than those with four. It has been suggested that by reducing today’s Marine

Corps squadrons to four aircraft each, and creating an additional Marine Corps EA6B squadron, the overall EA-6B fleet workload would be more equitably distributed,

and the fleet more able to address its far-flung responsibilities. If maintenance or other

issues make it difficult for the Marine Corps to organize their aircraft into four-plane

squadrons, an alternative suggestion, coming from a recent professional journal, is to

surrender this mission to the Navy. 55 The issue of which of the various schemes for

best organizing the EA-6B force is most viable remains unresolved.

In addition to getting the most “bang for the buck” from the EA-6B fleet,

improving DoD’s capability to suppress or destroy enemy air defenses is another

important consideration. Currently, the Navy and Air Force appear to have distinctive

approaches to this problem. The Navy is attempting to improve its missile’s ability to

find non-emitting enemy radars and target them, and other high value SAM battery

assets – such as the missile launcher. The Air Force, on the other hand, is attempting

to improve the aircraft’s ability to find the adversary, and will use less expensive

55

Moloko, John. Let the Navy do the Prowling. Marine Corps Gazette. December 2000. p.

42.

CRS-22

weapons, or weapons that dispense sub-munitions to attack the target. In short, the

Navy is “putting the smarts” on the missile, while the Air Force is “putting the smarts”

on the aircraft, or targeting pod.

More broadly speaking, the Air Force appears to favor more advanced platforms

to perform tomorrow’s SEAD mission than does the Navy. The Air Force proposes

that the F-22 Raptor is the platform best able to achieve and maintain air superiority,

both by clearing the skies of enemy fighters, and by destroying enemy air defenses.56

Recent statements by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and other Air Force officials

on the compatibility of EW and low observable platforms, and the Air Force’s need

to populate Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) with EW aircraft, suggest that

the F-22 would operate with support from these assets. The Navy, implicitly, takes

a more modest approach to achieving tomorrow’s SEAD goals proposing to use the

more conventional F/A-18E/F Super Hornet – also supported by an electronic attack

aircraft – to attack enemy air defenses.

Considering the importance and difficulty of suppressing or destroying enemy

air defenses, it may be that pursuing two different strategies is a prudent overall

approach. But questions persist on matters of continuing congressional interest: Does

achieving tomorrow’s SEAD goals require relatively modest upgrades to today’s

platforms and munitions? Or, does the United States need significantly more advanced

aircraft and targeting capabilities than it has today? Congress may wish to consider

whether one of these approaches is superior to the other and whether cost savings

could be achieved by pursuing only one strategy.

Another SEAD issue pertains to training. Naval aviators, for example develop

and hone their jamming and SEAD skills at Fallon Naval Air Station by flying against

real Russian SAM radars and other foreign military equipment. However, officials at

the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon report that they suffer a chronic

shortage of these very useful radars, not because they don’t exist, but because U.S.

intelligence agencies own them, but, these officials say, apparently won’t lend them

to Fallon.57 This too, is an ongoing issue.

A fourth concern that Congress may wish to address in the near term is the

continuing difference of opinion between Congress and DoD on the effectiveness of

current radar warning receivers. Upgrading aircraft RWRs does not appear to be a

high priority for DoD. Yet, Congress has expressed consistent concern that older

RWRs offer inadequate protection against emerging enemy SAMs. Senate

appropriators, for instance wrote:

The Committee is concerned that many of the Defense Department’s active and

reserve fighter aircraft have inadequate radar warning receivers. Most fighter

aircraft have no infrared warning systems. However, it is clear to adversaries that

56

Wall, Robert. “USAF Updates Plans for Future Air Wars.” Aviation Week & Space

Technology. January 29, 2001. For more information on the F-22 Raptor, see CRS Issue

Brief IB87111.

57

NSWAC Threat Emitter Briefing. Mr. Richard Gent & Mr. John Smith. January 18, 2001.

Fallon NAS.

CRS-23

U.S. forces rely on the ability to achieve air dominance. Further, these adversaries

have greater access than ever to anti-aircraft missile systems with advanced seeker

technologies. While future aircraft are being designed with protection systems, we

cannot afford to leave today’s forces ill-equipped to face the threat. While data

links and information from other sensors can contribute to a pilot’s situation

awareness, it is not clear this will be adequate for a pilot to avoid an unexpected

threat.58

This difference of opinion remains unresolved.

The final near term issue for Congress is the EA AOA, which should conclude

its study late in this calendar year. Many EA AOA participants have indicated that the

study will probably not recommend a single solution to replacing the Prowler, but

instead will recommend a menu of solutions that the different services can implement

as they see fit. Such an approach may have merit because it affords flexibility.

However, this approach can also risk falling prey to making recommendations based

on the “least common denominator,” and make not the best recommendation, but the

one that all parties can agree on. Congress may wish to closely monitor this activity.

There is another set of issues pertaining to EW and SEAD that don’t necessarily

need to be addressed immediately; Yet because they are complex and multifaceted,

their resolution may take considerable time and effort, and therefore they invite

scrutiny.

The first issue pertains to persistent reports of DoD’s fractionated EW efforts.

It has been noted by several different bodies that DoD does not have a coherent

approach to EW issues. GAO’s January 3, 2001 report “Comprehensive Strategy

Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses,” notes that “Within the Department of

Defense, no comprehensive, cross-service strategy for closing the gap between the

services’ suppression capabilities and needs exists – and no coordinating entity has

been tasked with preparing such a strategy.”(p.3) The Department of Defense itself

recognizes that its overall EW efforts are unsatisfactory. In March 2000, Under

Secretary of Defense Jacques Gansler initiated a study of 18 different EW programs

that proved disappointing. Gansler wanted to determine how OSD and the Services

may have contributed to these disappointments and to identify what processes could

be developed to improve on these results.59 Congress may wish to consider how it

could help DoD approach EW challenges from the more unified perspective its

leadership appears to seek.

The second issue pertains to the continued organizational placement of EW

under Information Operations (IO) in the Air Force bureaucracy. The chief

recommendation of a group commissioned to independently study how to improve the

Air Force’s EW activities was that the Air Force should promote EW from its current

position as a subset of information operations, and refocus it under new acquisition

58

106th Congress. 2nd Session. U.S. Senate. Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2001.

Report 106-298. S.2593. May 18, 2000. P. 96-97.

59

Butler, Amy. OSD Polls Contractors on How to Improve EW Acquisition Strategies.

Defense Information and Electronics Report. April 7, 2000.

CRS-24

and requirements offices charged with improving aircraft survivability.60 Although the

Air Force has made organizational changes designed to elevate EW issues within

budget and acquisition debates, congressional EW advocates may wonder whether the

booming cyberwarfare sphere will continue to overshadow EW needs in the Air Force

requirements process.

The final issue pertains to expediting the transition of promising EW and SEAD

programs to the warfighter; notably innovative network-based approaches that the

GAO and others endorse. Programs such as the AT3 and Network Centric

Collaborative Targeting must overcome technological challenges and affordability

constraints to become a reality. What can be even more challenging, however, is

overcoming the acquisition system. Programs like AT3 exploit many different

technologies and platforms such as aircraft, UAVs, communications links, radar

warning receivers, GPS/INS systems, precision clocks, and digital terrain maps. There

is no single System Program Office, acquisition authority or end user of these

systems, which makes guiding the program through the acquisition cycle difficult.

Officials who work on the AT3 programs have described the difficulty they face trying

to transition this program to the warfighter. As DoD increasingly moves toward

“network centric”61 approaches to warfighting, it may increasingly find that the

acquisition system is not optimized for these types of programs. Congress may wish

to consider how it can help DoD to pursue such innovative approaches to EW and

SEAD.

60

USAF EW Management Process Study. October 1, 1999. Butler, Amy. Electronic Warfare

to Remain Under Info Ops Umbrella, Official Says. Inside the Air Force. September 22,

2000.

61

For a discussion of “network-centric warfare” see CRS Report RS20557, Navy

network-centric warfare concept: key programs and issues for Congress.

CRS-25

Appendix 1. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA

Anti Aircraft Artillery

AAM

Air-to-Air Missile

AARGM Advanced Anti-Radiation

Guided Munition

ACC

Air Combat Command

ACTD

Advanced Concept

Technology Demonstration

AEF

Aerospace Expeditionary

Force

ANG

Air National Guard

AOA

Analysis of Alternatives

ARH

Active Radar Homing

ASPJ

Airborne Self Protection

Jammer

ASTE

Advanced Strategic and

Tactical Expendable

AT3

Advanced Tactical Targeting

Technology

ATD

Advanced Technology

Demonstration

ATP

Advanced Targeting Pod

BDA

Battle Damage Assessment

CAS

Close Air support

CMWS Common Missile Warning

System

CONOP Concept of Operation

DARPA Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency

DEAD

Destruction of Enemy Air

Defenses

DoD

Department of Defense

EA

Electronic Attack

ECM

Electronic Countermeasures

EMD

Engineering Manufacturing

and Development

EO

Electro Optical

EW

Electronic Warfare

FME

Foreign Military Equipment

FRY

Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia

GAO

General Accounting Office

HARM High Speed Anti-Radiation

Missile

HTS

HARM Targeting System

IDECM

Integrated Defensive

Electronic Countermeasures

ICAP III Improved Capability III

IO

Information Operations

IOC

Initial Operating Capability

IR

Infra Red

ITALD Improved Air Launched

Decoy

JDAM

Joint Direct Attack Munition

JSOW

Joint Stand Off Weapon

LAIRCM Large Aircraft Infra Red

Countermeasures

LIFE

Laser Infra Red Flyout

Experiment

LO

Low Observable

MALD Miniature Air Launched

Decoy

MMW

Millimeter Wave

NRO

National Reconnaissance

Office

NVD

Night Vision Device

OAG

Operational Advisory Group

O&M

Operations and Maintenance

OSD

Office of the Secretary of

Defense

PGM

Precision Guided Munition

PLAID Precision Location and

Identification

QDR

Quadrennial Defense Review

RDT&E Research Development Test

and Evaluation

RFCM

Radio Frequency

Countermeasure

RSTA

Reconnaissance, Surveillance

and Target Acquisition

RWR

Radar Warning Receiver

SAM

Surface to Air Missile

SAS

Signature Augmentation

System

SEAD

Suppression of Enemy

Defenses

UAV

Unmanned Air Vehicle

CRS-26

Appendix 2. FY2001 Appropriations for Select EW

and SEAD Programs

(in thousands of dollars)

Request

Approp

Conf.

RDT&E USN

EW Technology

26,043

26,043

Advanced EW Tech

17,583

17,583

EW Development

97,281

134,781

EW Readiness

support

9,924

9,924

HARM Improvement

21,355

41,355

RDT&E - USAF

Electronic Combat

Technology

25,882

26,882

EW Development

58,198

53,098

-19,800 AF withdrawal from CMWS

+1,200 MALD

+10,000 PLAID for ALR-69

+3,500 Survivability enhancements

F-15E Squadrons

61,260

68,860

+7,600 BOL IR

Procurement- USN

EA-6B

203,102

189,302

-16,800 ICAP III Training System

+3,000 EA-6B Ready Room Mission

Rehearsal System

F/A-18 Hornet

2,818,553

2,775,953

-29,600 Premature IDECM RFCM

Production Quantities

F-14 Series

30,481

31,481

Common ECM Equip

41,889

41,889

Drones & Decoys

0

15,000

ITALD

Air Expendable

Countermeasures

39,293

45,793

+6,500 MJU-52/B IR expendable

countermeasures

0

122,000

Four Block 50/52 aircraft

B-52

8,425

42,525

+9,000 Electronic countermeasures and

situational awareness

Advanced Target. Pod

34,921

34,921

F-15

256,247

322,197

Program

Procurement - USAF

F-16 C/D

Details

+8,500 Spray cooling technology for

ICAPIII

+3,000 Location of GPS jammers

+23,000 EA-6B Link-16 connectivity

+3,000 IDECM

+15,000 AARGM

+5,000 Quick Bolt ACTD

+1,000 RWR antenna replacement and

systems enhancement

+26,400 BOL IR for ANG

-10,450 ALQ-135 Delays and Problem

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