Kosovo and the 106th Congress

Order Code RL30729

Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Kosovo and the 106th Congress

Updated January 18, 2001

name redacted

Specialist in International Relations

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Kosovo and the 106th Congress

Summary

The Kosovo crisis and aftermath dominated U.S. foreign policy during much of

the 106th Congress. From 1999 to 2000, international focus on Kosovo evolved from

peace negotiations to a NATO air war to post-war peacekeeping and an international

protectorate for the province. Scenarios regarding the use of U.S. military forces in

and around Kosovo were a central issue in the Congress. Before, during, and after

NATO’s air operation against Serbia in early 1999, some Members of Congress

challenged the President’s authority under the Constitution to engage U.S. armed

forces in military operations in the Balkans without congressional approval. A greater

number of others, however, abandoned or rejected options that might have dictated

a forced removal of U.S. armed forces from Kosovo operations. Antagonistic

relations between Congress and the White House, as well as divisions within both

parties, at times undermined the effort to reach consensus on legislation. For the most

part, Congress supported the President’s requests for funding for military operations,

but was less supportive of funding requests for civilian reconstruction programs.

During Operation Allied Force, Members of Congress spoke out for and against

the mission. The constitutional role of Congress in decisions regarding the use of

force became a prominent focus of debate. However, Congress rejected resolutions

that would declare outright war against Serbia or, alternatively, mandate the removal

of U.S. armed forces from the region. Congress also considered alternative strategies

such as preparing for a possible ground invasion of Serbia and promoting the

democratic opposition to Milosevic’s rule in Serbia.

After Milosevic agreed to NATO’s terms to terminate the air operation in June

1999, attention turned to peacekeeping and the international administration of the

Kosovo province. The commitment of U.S. resources and burden-sharing with the

European allies became a major concern in Congress. Several pieces of legislation

reflected this concern.

Near the end of the 106th Congress, events took a dramatic turn in Serbia.

Slobodan Milosevic was forced to step down from power after losing democratic

elections and facing massive public demonstrations against his continued rule. The

new situation in Serbia and the ongoing peace efforts in Kosovo are likely to be

prominent issues of interest to the new Administration and the 107th Congress.

Changes in the post-Milosevic period may carry implications for the NATO-led

military presence in the Balkans.

This report first reviews key developments in Kosovo and U.S. policy during

1999 and 2000. It then examines the congressional responses to the Kosovo peace

talks at Rambouillet, the NATO air war against Yugoslavia, the aftermath and lessons

learned from the conflict, and the subsequent efforts by the United States and other

countries to reconstruct and stabilize Kosovo. A concluding section looks to

potential trends that may become important in the 107th Congress. Appendices

provide a survey of key legislative provisions on Kosovo.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Developments in Kosovo and U.S. Policy, 1999-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Congressional Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Rambouillet and the Prospect of U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping . . . . . 6

Operation Allied Force and the Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Ongoing Operation and Alternative Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Arming the Kosovars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Preparing for a ground invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Removing Milosevic from power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Conflict Aftermath and Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Resources and Burden-Sharing in Post-Conflict Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Appendix 1. 106th Congress, Major Legislation on Kosovo – Status . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix 2. 106th Congress, Major Legislation on Kosovo – Summaries

by Theme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Kosovo and the 106th Congress

Introduction

The Kosovo crisis and aftermath dominated U.S. foreign policy during much of

the 106th Congress. Members of Congress considered a steady stream of legislative

proposals over the two-year period, held dozens of hearings on the subject,

participated in frequent consultative briefings with the Clinton Administration, and

many traveled to the region. Congress succeeded in enacting into law expressions of

the sense of Congress on various aspects of Kosovo policy. Some of the

appropriations bills set spending caps on U.S. military and reconstruction

contributions and imposed reporting requirements on executive branch agencies.

However, attempts by some to fundamentally alter U.S. policy, to require explicit

congressional authorization for military operations, or to impose concrete policy

conditions on military spending proved unsuccessful. No clear consensus in Congress

on current or alternative policies in Kosovo emerged before the 2000 elections.

Scenarios regarding the use of U.S. military forces in and around Kosovo were

a central issue for the 106th Congress. These scenarios evolved with changing events.

Anticipating the creation of a peacekeeping force to implement the Rambouillet

accords in early 1999, Congress considered legislation to approve, condition, or block

U.S. participation in such a force. As the situation in Kosovo turned away from peace

talks and toward enforcement action, Congress reviewed proposals that supported or

disapproved of the NATO air operation; the Senate, but not the House, endorsed the

air strikes. Congress later considered but did not agree to resolutions that invoked

the War Powers Resolution in an effort by sponsors to assert Congress’ role in

authorizing the military action. Some Members of Congress challenged the President’s

authority under the Constitution to engage U.S. armed forces in military operations

in the Balkans without congressional approval. A greater number of others, however,

abandoned or rejected options that might have dictated a forced removal of U.S.

armed forces from Kosovo operations.

In spite of some serious misgivings about the NATO air operation in Kosovo,

most Members of Congress strongly supported providing full funding for Department

of Defense expenditures in the Balkans, out of concern for perceived budgetary

shortfalls in the U.S. military. Thus, even Members who vehemently opposed

Operation Allied Force voted to substantially increase funds for U.S. military forces

participating in the operation. The same kind of support was not evident for meeting

the Clinton Administration’s request for emergency supplemental funds for civilian

reconstruction and regional financial stabilization efforts. On these matters, Congress

established spending limits and cut back on requested funds for regional stabilization

assistance. Several pieces of legislation sought to address burden-sharing concerns

in Congress, especially with regard to the European-led non-military reconstruction

efforts in Kosovo.

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Politics played a conspicuous if inconsistent role in the Kosovo debates. At the

start of the Kosovo crisis, relations between the White House and Congress were,

arguably, at their lowest point of the Clinton Administration. Mired in impeachment

proceedings, the President struggled to rally Republicans and even some Democratic

Members around a case for armed intervention in Kosovo. While openly distrustful

of the President, the Republican leadership in Congress did not press for passage of

legislation that opposed the war or directly challenged the President’s authority to

deploy U.S. armed forces. Instead, Republican leaders opted to keep largely silent

on Kosovo, leaving responsibility for and ownership of the conflict to the President.1

Some Members referred to the Kosovo operation as “Clinton’s war.” One result of

the intentionally weak direction by the leadership was a seemingly inconsistent voting

record by Members on Kosovo-related legislation. In some cases, the final outcome

of votes hinged upon last-minute interventions by individual party leaders or by

President Clinton and other officials.

Positions on Kosovo did not fall cleanly along party lines, however. As with the

case of Bosnia some years earlier, many Democratic Members of Congress supported

a relatively hawkish stance against the aggressive actions of Slobodan Milosevic. In

contrast, many Republicans claimed that no vital U.S. interests were at stake in

Kosovo and were wary of additional commitments and burdens on the U.S. military.

The positions of other Members of Congress remained even less predictable. Some

Democrats, such as Senator Byrd, strongly asserted legislative prerogatives in matters

relating to U.S. military deployments. Some Republicans, among them Senator

McCain, pressed for consideration of deeper military engagement, including

deployment of U.S. combat forces, against Milosevic. Republican Representative

Campbell, an opponent of U.S. participation in the NATO air war, defied the wishes

of his party’s leadership by introducing resolutions on Kosovo that invoked the War

Powers Resolution.

The Kosovo debates revealed a lack of consensus more generally on the use of

force in international conflicts and the appropriate U.S. role in such affairs. The

Kosovo conflict touched upon several controversial subjects, including the

international legal basis for military intervention, the role and mission of NATO, and

the conduct of a limited war reliant on air power. In the run-up to the 2000

presidential elections, U.S. participation in Balkan peacekeeping became a prominent

campaign issue, with Republican candidate George W. Bush and his advisors

indicating that a Bush Administration would move to withdraw U.S. armed forces

from the Balkan operations. Democratic candidate Al Gore, in contrast, denounced

this proposal as “risky.”

The issue of presidential versus congressional responsibility for war powers also

reared its head during the 106th Congress. Some Members of Congress were far more

willing than others to challenge the President’s authority to deploy U.S. armed forces

in overseas operations without congressional endorsement. Legislative proposals

seeking to enhance congressional controls did not solely target the Clinton presidency,

since some proposals (considered late in the 106th Congress) would have imposed

deployment deadlines on Clinton’s successor in the White House.

1

“Hill GOP Leaders Take Cautious Course on Kosovo,” Washington Post, April 28, 1999.

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The Kosovo debates also demonstrated a variety of means of influence available

to the Congress. Among the many stand-alone bills and resolutions introduced on

Kosovo, few came to the floor for consideration, and none were enacted. Instead,

many bills or new proposals on Kosovo were considered as amendments to mandatory

spending or authorizing legislation. The defense authorization and appropriations

bills, for example, were prominent vehicles for Kosovo-related legislation. In addition

to legislation, Members expressed their positions in formal hearings and in informal

consultations with the Clinton Administration, although several complained that the

consultation process was lacking. Many Members also traveled to the Balkans region

before, during, and after the conflict.

Some observers contend that Members of Congress can informally influence the

decision-making process by conveying likely trends of support or dissent in the

Congress. For example, the perception that Congress would revolt against the

introduction of U.S. ground combat troops in Serbia may have influenced the White

House’s decision to state initially that no ground forces would become involved in

Operation Allied Force. Congressional focus on burden-sharing in the reconstruction

process and the threat to pull out U.S. armed forces unless Europe fulfilled

commitments may have increased pressure on the European Union to implement its

programs more quickly.

This report first reviews key developments in Kosovo and U.S. policy during

1999 and 2000. It then examines the congressional responses to the Kosovo peace

talks at Rambouillet, the NATO air war against Yugoslavia, the aftermath and lessons

learned from the conflict, and the subsequent efforts by the United States and other

countries to reconstruct and stabilize Kosovo. A concluding section looks at potential

trends that may become important in the 107th Congress. Appendices provide a

survey of key legislative provisions on Kosovo.

Developments in Kosovo and U.S. Policy, 19992000

At the start of the 106th Congress in January 1999, the situation in Kosovo had

reached a crisis stage. Tensions between the mostly Albanian population (led by the

insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army-KLA) in the southern Serbian province and the

Serbian security forces had exploded into violence in early 1998.2 Over the next

months, the U.N. Security Council and the international Contact Group3 repeatedly

demanded that both parties to the conflict cease hostilities and resume dialogue on a

political settlement. In October 1998, NATO threatened Belgrade with air strikes if

it did not comply with U.N. demands, including the withdrawal of most of its forces

from Kosovo. Air strikes were avoided by a last-minute deal with Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia (FRY) President Milosevic on complying with U.N. demands and

allowing an unarmed monitoring mission into Kosovo. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomats led

2

For more information on Kosovo, see CRS Issue Brief IB98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy,

by Steve Woehrel and (name redacted) (updated regularly).

3

The Contact Group comprises the United States, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

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“shuttle diplomacy” talks between the Serb and Albanian parties on autonomy

arrangements for Kosovo. The October cease-fire agreement broke down, however,

by the end of the year. The killing of about 45 ethnic Albanians in the village of

Racak on January 15, 1999, prompted several emergency international meetings

among Contact Group members to address the Kosovo situation.

International leaders called for convening direct negotiations with the parties to

the conflict and increasing preparations for possible NATO air strikes. Peace

negotiations sponsored by the Contact Group opened in Rambouillet, France, on

February 6, 1999. As talks at Rambouillet focused on autonomy arrangements in

Kosovo, President Clinton pledged to contribute up to 4,000 U.S. troops to an

envisaged NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, should the parties reach a strong

peace agreement.4 U.S. participation in the security force was seen to be essential for

securing Kosovar Albanian agreement to the Rambouillet draft peace plan. After

several deadlines had passed, the Kosovar Albanian delegation to Rambouillet

conditionally accepted the draft peace plan of the Contact Group; it formally accepted

the accords in Paris on March 15. The Serb delegation maintained several objections

to the accords, especially with regard to an armed international force to oversee

implementation of the peace agreement. The talks were adjourned unsuccessfully on

March 19. On a last-ditch mission to Belgrade, U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke met

with Milosevic for a final discussion, but reported no significant change in the Serbian

leader’s position.

On March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, an air campaign

against Serb targets in Kosovo and the rest of the FRY. In a televised address,

President Clinton said that NATO’s objectives were to demonstrate NATO’s resolve,

deter President Milosevic from continuing his attacks on Kosovo’s civilians, and

damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war. Placing confidence in the air strike option,

President Clinton stated that he “did not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight

a war.” U.S. objectives and interests at stake in the Kosovo crisis, as cited by the

Clinton Administration, were to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, preserve stability

in a key part of Europe, and maintain the credibility of NATO.5

The U.N. Security Council, which had not explicitly authorized the air operation,

considered but failed to pass a Russian-sponsored resolution to demand an end to the

NATO operation by a vote of 3 in favor, 12 against. In Kosovo, Milosevic accelerated

his ethnic cleansing campaign, driving hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians

into neighboring Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro, and greatly destabilizing the

southern Balkan region. After the first few days of limited strikes, NATO expanded

its target list to include downtown Belgrade and other Serbian cities. In April, NATO

formulated five core demands for Milosevic to meet before air strikes would cease.

He must: stop all military action in Kosovo; withdraw his forces from Kosovo; agree

to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence, agree to the return

4

The estimate on the U.S. share of troops in the NATO force was later revised to 5,000-7,000,

corresponding to an increase in the estimated total size of the force.

5

“U.S. and NATO Objectives and Interests in Kosovo,” U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet,

March 26, 1999.

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of all refugees; and agree to work on a political framework agreement for Kosovo on

the basis of the Rambouillet accords.

The United States and its NATO allies carried out Operation Allied Force for

a total of 78 days. Allied unity was upheld, although some differences among the

nineteen alliance members emerged during the course of the campaign. Some allies,

led by Britain, pressed for NATO to begin immediate preparations for a ground

invasion of the FRY. U.S. officials demurred, although some Members of Congress

supported the call for invasion preparations. President Clinton pledged to Congress

that he would ask for congressional support before agreeing to commit U.S. armed

forces to Kosovo in a non-permissive environment. Other European countries, such

as Greece, supported a pause in the air campaign to allow Milosevic to comply with

NATO’s terms. The April 1999 summit commemorating NATO’s 50th anniversary,

held in Washington, D.C., emphasized allied unity and resolve in Operation Allied

Force. As the air campaign wore on, however, some Members of Congress as well

as observers around the world questioned NATO’s strategy, especially after the

accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and with the rising civilian

casualty toll of the bombing. In May, the International Criminal Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia publicly indicted Milosevic and other top Serbian leaders for war

crimes.

Finally on June 3, President Milosevic agreed to a peace plan brought to

Belgrade by EU representative and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and Russian

Balkans envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. The plan was based on NATO demands and a

proposal from the Group of Eight countries (the Contact Group plus Canada and

Japan). Several foundational agreements ensued. On June 9, NATO and the

Yugoslav Armed Forces concluded a Military Technical Agreement outlining terms

of a complete Yugoslav military withdrawal from Kosovo. Claiming victory, NATO

leaders ended the air strike operation on June 10. On the same day, the U.N. Security

Council approved UNSC Resolution 1244, which incorporated the AhtisaariChernomyrdin plan and the G-8 principles. On June 20, the KLA and NATO signed

a document on the demilitarization of the KLA.

In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, President Clinton briefly espoused a new

principle for military intervention in global conflicts. Addressing U.S. troops

stationed in Macedonia in June 1999, Clinton stated that, if “it is within our power to

stop it, we will stop” the killing of innocent civilians being targeted because of their

race, ethnic background, or religion. Later, the so-called “Clinton doctrine” appeared

to be tempered by statements by Clinton Administration officials and by the limited

U.S. response to violence in East Timor. Moreover, the spate of violent revenge

attacks by returning Kosovar Albanians on the Serb population appeared to diminish

somewhat the sense of triumph about the western intervention.

NATO’s peacekeeping force in Kosovo, dubbed KFOR, has been charged with

the task of establishing a secure environment throughout the province. Its strength

in mid-2000 was around 45,000 troops, including about 6,700 U.S. troops. U.N.

Resolution 1244 established a U.N.-run transitional administration in Kosovo, the

U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to oversee the process of building peace,

democracy, and self-government in Kosovo. UNMIK holds executive authority on

a provisional basis until new elections for interim autonomous institutions are held.

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UNMIK is headed by former French Minister Bernard Kouchner, the Special

Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General. Within a remarkably short time after

the Serb withdrawal, over 800,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees returned to the

province from abroad. On the other hand, most Serbs from Kosovo have left the

province. Remaining Serb communities have continued to be the target of attacks

throughout the province, leading many observers to question the prospects for

peaceful co-existence among Kosovo’s ethnic groups.

Two international donors’ conferences have been held, the first in July 1999 for

immediate humanitarian needs and the second in November 1999 for longer-term

reconstruction projects. At the donors’ conferences, the United States pledged over

$220 million in reconstruction funds and $270 million in humanitarian assistance. The

European Union and the United States are also leading an international initiative, the

Stability Pact for southeast Europe, to promote cooperation and development in all

of southeastern Europe. The FRY had been excluded from the Stability Pact until late

October 2000.

Kosovo’s first post-war elections held at the municipal level on October 28,

2000, registered a victory for the moderate Democratic League of Kosovo Party.

While most of the province’s ethnic Albanian population registered for the vote, very

few (about 1,000) of the Serb population had. Elections to Kosovo-wide positions

will be held sometime in 2001. Kosovo’s final status, meanwhile, has yet to be

addressed by the United Nations. All of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian political parties

support independence for Kosovo. The Clinton Administration has maintained

throughout the Kosovo conflict that it supports autonomy, not independence, for

Kosovo.6 In Serbia, meanwhile, Slobodan Milosevic was defeated in Yugoslav

presidential elections in September 2000 and stepped down in early October in the

face of mass demonstrations. The ascendance to power of democratic opposition

leader Vojislav Kostunica appeared to usher in a dramatically different environment

in Serbia, with possibly far-reaching consequences.

Congressional Response

Rambouillet and the Prospect of U.S.

Peacekeeping

Participation in

After the start of the Kosovo conflict in early 1998, and especially after the

January 1999 Racak massacre, most Members of Congress, consistent with prevailing

international opinion, lay most of the blame for the conflict on FRY President

Slobodan Milosevic. Some Members expressed sympathy with the plight of the

Kosovo Albanian population and introduced resolutions recommending recognition

6

Kosovo enjoyed autonomous status within the former Yugoslavia until Milosevic ushered in

constitutional changes to remove this status and eliminate Kosovo’s governmental structures

in 1989 and 1990.

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of the Kosovo Albanians’ right to self-determination.7 Some pressed for NATO to

follow through on its earlier threats of air strikes in order to compel Milosevic to

comply with U.N. demands.

With the commencement of the peace talks at Rambouillet in February 1999,

Members of Congress focused on the possibility of sending U.S. armed forces to

Kosovo as part of an international peacekeeping presence in Kosovo. President

Clinton pledged in principle to contribute U.S. troops to such a military presence;

specifics on the mission, command arrangements, costs, composition, and other

aspects were to await the successful conclusion of a peace agreement. The NATOled Stabilization Force (SFOR) implementing the Dayton accords in Bosnia was seen

to be a model example for a future Kosovo force – commanded by NATO and with

substantial troop contributions from other NATO and Partnership for Peace

countries.8 Clinton Administration officials indicated that the U.S. share of

peacekeeping troops in Kosovo would be smaller than in Bosnia. Unlike Bosnia, the

Kosovo Force was to be under European, rather than U.S., command.

In several hearings and consultations with Members of Congress, Clinton

Administration officials presented reasons for the United States to be engaged in

Kosovo peacekeeping once a peace agreement was reached. They argued that the

United States had a strong interest in ensuring regional stability and reducing

possibility of conflict spillover. They said it had an interest in preventing a

humanitarian disaster in Kosovo and suffering throughout the region. Upholding

NATO’s credibility as the most effective military organization in Europe was another

key interest cited.9 Preliminary estimates foresaw a force of about 28,000 troops, of

which the United States would contribute up to 4,000 at an estimated cost of $1.5

billion to $2 billion per year.

For their part, Members of Congress appeared divided in their opinions of the

prospect of U.S. participation in peacekeeping in Kosovo. In view of the likelihood

of imminent intensified conflict in Kosovo if the situation there was not stabilized,10

some expressed the view that U.S. armed forces should participate in a postsettlement peacekeeping force. Many supporters felt, however, that Europe had

stronger interests at stake and therefore should take the leading role in manning such

a force, with the United States contributing a smaller share. Others viewed the

Kosovo peacekeeping option more negatively. They expressed wariness over

supporting the KLA, the leading resistance force in Kosovo but also a group seen by

7

See H.Con.Res. 9 and H.Con.Res. 32. See also, “Independence for Kosovo,” Washington

Post op-ed by Senator Mitch McConnell, January 22, 1999.

8

For more information on the role of Congress with regard to SFOR in Bosnia, see Bosnia

Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR): activities of the 104th

Congress, by (name redacted). CRS Report 96-723, January 6, 1997.

9

“The U.S. Role in Kosovo.” Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. U.S.

House of Representatives. February 10, 1999. “Hearing on Kosovo.” Hearing before the

Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate. February 24, 1999.

10

For example, see testimony of George Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency Director, Senate

Armed Services Committee hearing, February 2, 1999.

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many as a “shady organization” charged by the Clinton Administration with having

committed terrorist activities. They pointed out that Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, was not

a sovereign country and that U.S. and NATO troops would be deployed on the

territory of the FRY for the first time. They argued that Kosovo failed to present a

compelling U.S. interest, an achievable military objective, or a clear exit strategy.

They also expressed concerns about the impact such a deployment would have on

U.S. military readiness.11

Above all, several Members of Congress demanded that the Clinton

Administration provide detailed information and consult with Congress in a timely

fashion about the potential U.S. peacekeeping engagement. Many went further and

asserted that Congress had a constitutional responsibility to exercise a stronger role

in matters regarding the overseas deployment of U.S. armed forces. In early March,

House and Senate leaders hastened to bring up Kosovo legislation for floor

consideration. Expressing concern about the practice of “the Administration (taking)

action without congressional action or approval,” Senate Majority Leader Lott said

it was important to have a debate in Congress on the matter before U.S. troops were

actually deployed.12 Several Republican leaders expressed frustration that the Clinton

Administration appeared to want to circumvent Congress on such policy decisions,

as they argued it did with Bosnia, and expected Congress later to approve

supplemental funding for the operation.

The Clinton Administration argued that, under the Constitution, it did not require

congressional authorization to commit U.S. troops to a Kosovo peacekeeping force,

although it said it would welcome expressions of congressional support for U.S.

troops engaged in the deployment. Clinton Administration officials criticized the

timing of the congressional debates as premature and potentially disruptive to the

ongoing peace proceedings at Rambouillet.

In early March, Rep. Gilman introduced H.Con.Res. 42, a bill to authorize the

deployment of U.S. military personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping

operation. Neither criticizing nor opposing the deployment, the resolution as

introduced was intended to allow the House to participate in the decision to deploy

U.S. armed forces to Kosovo. House Speaker Hastert took up the Gilman resolution,

though he declined to provide a leadership position on it. In opposing the rule

permitting floor consideration, Rep. Gephardt stated that the timing of it was wrong

and irresponsible, given that the peace talks were still ongoing. Over 50 amendments

to the resolution were filed, including one (offered by Rep. Fowler) to prohibit U.S.

ground troops from deploying to Kosovo.13 Supporters of the Fowler amendment

said that Kosovo was a humanitarian crisis that did not warrant a U.S. troop

deployment. After extensive and divisive debate, the House passed a final amended

version of the resolution that conditioned authorization of the deployment on the

requirement that U.S. armed forces comprise no more than 15% of the total force,

11

For example, see “Autonomy for Kosovo Isn’t Worth American Blood,” Wall Street Journal

op-ed by Rep. Tom DeLay, March 9, 1999.

12

AP, March 9, 1999.

13

The Fowler amendment was defeated, 178 to 237.

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and called for the President to submit detailed reports on the deployment. While the

March 11 vote, 219 in favor to 191 against, did not run counter to Clinton

Administration policy on Kosovo, neither was it seen to be a ringing endorsement.

Most of the “no” votes were cast by Republican Members.

In the Senate, Republican leaders agreed to consider an amendment on Kosovo

with debate on an emergency spending bill unrelated to Kosovo (S. 544). The

Kosovo amendment, sponsored by Senator Hutchison, sought to bar defense funds

for the deployment of U.S. ground forces to the FRY unless several conditions were

met, including the conclusion of a peace agreement and the submission of a

Presidential report on aspects of the deployment. The amendment would have also

required the President to submit bi-monthly reports on the benchmarks that were to

be established to measure progress and determine the ultimate withdrawal of U.S.

armed forces from Kosovo.

While the Senate was considering this amendment, however, the situation with

regard to Kosovo changed from one focused on reaching an agreed settlement and

considering a peacekeeping force to one of imminent war against the holdout party,

Serbia. In briefings with House and Senate Members on March 18 and 19, President

Clinton and other Administration members made clear that the United States was

prepared to lead NATO forces in military actions against the FRY. Subsequent

legislation and debate turned its focus to that prospect.

Operation Allied Force and the Role of Congress

On March 18, the Kosovo Albanian delegation to the Rambouillet talks signed

the draft peace plan in Paris. With the Yugoslav delegation offering no sign of

agreement, NATO countries made final preparations for air attacks against the FRY.

Before the Congress, U.S. armed services chiefs gave testimony on the likely risks

involved in such an operation. They anticipated that the majority of aircraft would

come from the United States. The turn of events appeared to catch many in Congress

by surprise and left little time to consider legislative responses. President Clinton and

Administration officials held several meetings and briefings with Members of

Congress just prior to and after the start of Operation Allied Force.

On March 19, Senate Majority Leader Lott introduced an amendment to reflect

evolving circumstances, amending an existing amendment of a supplemental spending

bill (the Hutchison amendment, see previous section). Lott and other supporters of

the amendment argued that Congress should be involved and take a stand on military

action by the United States. The Lott amendment sought to bar Department of

Defense funds for the purpose of conducting any military operations in the FRY (with

the exception of intelligence and logistics support operations), unless Congress first

authorized U.S. participation in such an operation. The amendment specified that

“United States national security interests in Kosovo do not rise to a level that

warrants military operations by the United States.” On March 23, after several

Members met with President Clinton, the Senate voted, 55 to 44, not to invoke

cloture on the Lott amendment, eliminating the prospect for an up-or-down vote on

the amendment. The Hutchison amendment, and therefore also Senator Lott’s seconddegree amendment, was ultimately withdrawn the same day.

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Instead the House and Senate considered new resolutions on the pending NATO

operation. In a March 23 letter to the Senate leadership, President Clinton asked for

“legislative support as we address the crisis in Kosovo,” “without regard to our

differing views on the Constitution about the use of force.”14 S. Con. Res. 21

(sponsored by Senators Biden, Warner, Levin, Byrd, and McConnell), stated that “the

President is authorized to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in

cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”

Opponents cited many objections to the policy, among them: trying to coerce the

FRY into a peace agreement; becoming directly involved in a civil war; expanding

NATO’s mission beyond the collective defense of the allies; and, leaving unspecified

what might follow air strikes. Opponents questioned why the United States should

become involved in the Kosovo conflict when it did not respond to humanitarian

crises elsewhere in the world. Fearing descent by the U.S. armed forces into a

military quagmire, Senator Stevens sought to add language to S. Con. Res. 21 barring

funds for ground forces in a non-peacekeeping role, but later dropped the provision.15

Proponents of the resolution said it was appropriate for NATO to act in response to

the security threat and humanitarian crisis resulting from Milosevic’s actions in

Kosovo. They cited the lack of alternative options and the need to maintain U.S. and

NATO credibility. The Senate approved S. Con. Res. 21 on March 23 by a vote of

58 in favor, 41 against. Nearly all of the votes against the resolution were from

Republican Members.

NATO’s Operation Allied Force commenced the following day. Instead of

addressing the air campaign directly, the House took up a resolution, H. Res. 130,

with a different focus. By a vote of 424 to 1, the House resolved that it supported

members of the U.S. armed forces who were engaged in military operations against

the FRY. Now that the operation was underway, Members stressed the importance

of putting aside differences about policy and uniting behind U.S. military personnel

carrying out the policy. Members spoke both for and against the mission, but all

expressed support for U.S. armed forces. The Senate followed by passing S. Res. 74,

an identical resolution praising members of the U.S. armed forces, by unanimous

consent.

Contrary to some expectations, Milosevic showed no signs of capitulating after

a few days of air strikes, and even accelerated the drive to expel hundreds of

thousands of Kosovo Albanians, creating a refugee crisis in neighboring countries.

After a congressional recess, during which time several Members visited the region,

Congress revisited the question of its role in the military campaign in Yugoslavia.

Individual Members made numerous statements for and against the NATO operation

and other options, and some introduced legislation on the subject. The congressional

leadership, however, remained reluctant to push forward any major Kosovo legislation

while the operation continued and the President urged continued resolve. Some

observers saw this “hands off” approach to be deliberate, with some Members

14

Congressional Record, S3101, March 23, 1999.

15

“Members Rally Around Kosovo Mission Despite Misgivings About Strategy,”

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 27, 1999, p. 763-764.

CRS-11

referring to the operation as “Clinton’s war.”16 Several committees convened hearings

on Kosovo. In late April-May, however, Congress was compelled to consider

legislation under the War Powers Resolution and the President’s request for

emergency funding to pay for the military operation.

Rep. Tom Campbell, who opposed the bombing operation, initiated the move to

consider legislation that invoked the controversial War Powers Resolution, thus

expediting floor consideration. The War Powers Resolution was passed over a

presidential veto in 1973 with the intent to increase congressional authority on the use

of U.S. armed forces abroad.17 In defiance of party leadership, Rep. Campbell

challenged other Members of Congress to make explicit their positions on the Kosovo

campaign and carry out their constitutional responsibility on matters relating to war.

On April 12, he introduced two resolutions. H.J.Res. 151 declared that a state of war

existed between the United States and Yugoslavia. H.Con.Res. 82 directed the

President to remove U.S. armed forces from operations against Yugoslavia within

thirty days of passage of the resolution. Rep. Campbell and other House Members

later filed suit in Federal District Court on whether the President was required to

obtain congressional authorization before continuing the war against Yugoslavia.18

On April 27, the House International Relations Committee reported out both

resolutions unfavorably. Neither resolution appeared likely to pass, as Members

expressed little interest in declaring war or forcing a pull-out of U.S. armed forces.

As put by House Majority Leader Armey, “the choices are too stark.”19 Two other

bills were put forward for simultaneous consideration. H.R. 1569, sponsored by Rep.

Fowler, set a ban on defense funds for the deployment of U.S. ground troops in

Yugoslavia unless specifically authorized by Congress. The House was also to

consider S. Con. Res. 21, the Senate-passed bill authorizing military air operations

against Yugoslavia.

The House votes on April 28 produced a muddled message on Kosovo policy.

H.R. 1569 on restricting the use of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo passed by a vote

of 249 in favor to 180 against. H. Con. Res. 82, directing the President to remove

U.S. armed forces from military operations in Yugoslavia, failed by a vote of 139 in

favor, 290 against. H.J.Res. 44, declaring war on Yugoslavia, failed, 2 to 427.

Finally, S.Con.Res. 21, authorizing air strikes, failed passage in a tie vote, 213 to 213.

The last vote prompted mutual recriminations from the two parties. House Minority

Leader Gephardt called the House’s inability to support the air operation a “low

moment in American foreign policy” and blamed efforts by Republican Party Majority

16

“Congress Set to Provide Money, But No Guidance, for Kosovo Mission,” Congressional

Quarterly Weekly Report, May 1, 1999, p. 1036-1040.

17

For more information on the War Powers Resolution, see War Powers Resolution:

Presidential Compliance, by (name redacted).

CRS Issue Brief IB81050, updated

regularly.

18

See CRS Issue Brief IB81050 for status of the Campbell suit; see also Declaration of War

Against Yugoslavia: Implications for the United States, by David A. Ackerman and (name r

edacted). CRS Report RL30146, April 30, 1999.

19

Knight-Ridder Information Services, April 28, 1999.

CRS-12

Whip DeLay to defeat the authorizing measure. Republican leaders countered that

the Democrats had not worked hard enough to gain support for their resolution.20

In the Senate, Majority Leader Lott initially moved to introduce a resolution

similar to H.R. 1569, just passed by the House, to require congressional approval

prior to the introduction of ground troops to Kosovo, but dropped the measure as the

Senate instead took up a different proposal on the ground force option (see section

on “Preparing for a Ground Invasion,” below). Other Members in both chambers

made additional efforts to block funding for military operations in Yugoslavia unless

specifically authorized by Congress, but failed to see their passage. President Clinton

threatened to veto any bill that included such restrictions.21

In spite of serious misgivings on the part of some Members of Congress about

Operation Allied Force, congressional leaders pledged to provide all the funding

support needed by the U.S. military participating in the NATO operation. On April

19, President Clinton sent to Congress an emergency supplemental funding request

for about $6 billion in Fiscal Year 1999 to cover unanticipated costs of the Kosovo

operation and its impact on military readiness. $5.1 billion of the request was for the

Kosovo air campaign, munitions replenishment, and readiness funding. About

$900,000 was for refugee and humanitarian assistance. Members of the House

immediately announced their intention to add billions to the request to redress

perceived defense spending shortfalls not directly related to Kosovo.

The House version of the emergency spending bill, H.R. 1664, included nearly

$13 billion in supplemental funding for defense, including military construction, a

military pay increase, and munitions. About $5 billion of the total was to cover

Balkan operations. The House rejected (by a vote of 117 ayes to 301 noes) an

amendment sponsored by Rep. Istook that sought to bar funds for any plan to invade

Yugoslavia with U.S. armed forces, except in time of war. Rep. Istook noted that the

amendment was identical, with the exception of the country in question, to one filed

in 1967 during the Vietnam War. Several House Members who voted in favor of a

similar bill one week earlier (H.R. 1569) and who agreed with the intent of the Istook

amendment, opposed its inclusion in the supplemental bill, fearing it might delay or

threaten passage of the spending bill. H.R. 1664 was later incorporated into H.R.

1141, a bill to provide emergency supplemental funds for Central America and U.S.

farmers. Numerous add-ons to the bill (unrelated to Kosovo) and veto threats from

the Clinton Administration threatened final passage of the supplemental funding bill,

but all issues were resolved in mid-May. The final version met the President’s request

for $5.5 billion for NATO’s air campaign, and provided $1 billion in humanitarian

assistance and about $5 billion more in other military spending.

20

“GOP’s Abiding Distrust of Clinton Doesn’t Stop at Water’s Edge,” Congressional

Quarterly Weekly Report, May 1, 1999, p. 1038-1039. Speaker Hastert, who voted in favor

of S.Con.Res. 21, later expressed regret that he did not promote its passage on the House

floor. “Hastert Regrets Not Leading Push for Airstrikes Resolution,” Washington Post, May

7, 1999.

21

See House and Senate amendments to H.R. 1401 and S. 1059, the Department of Defense

authorization bills for FY 2000.

CRS-13

Ongoing Operation and Alternative Strategies

While most attention remained focused on operational aspects of Allied Force

at the start of the campaign, some Members of Congress proposed some alternative

strategies to the Kosovo crisis as well. As it became clear that the NATO air

campaign was going to last well beyond most initial estimates, some Members also

began to call for preparations for additional measures, including the introduction of

ground troops. The Republican leadership in both houses, however, provided little

guidance on party positions; indeed, both parties revealed a wide range of opinions

on these issues.

Arming the Kosovars. As early as at the start of Operation Allied Force,

Senator McConnell and Senator Lieberman announced their intention to introduce the

“Kosovo Self-Defense Act (S. 846),” a bill to provide up to $25 million to arm and

equip the Kosovo Albanian forces for their self-defense. In the House, Rep. Engel

introduced a complementary bill on Kosovo’s self-defense (H.R. 1408). The bill

sponsors said that their intention was to provide a follow-on strategy to the Kosovo

crisis if the bombing campaign alone did not achieve peace. They argued that the

United States had a moral obligation to enable the Kosovo population to defend

themselves, especially if NATO had no intention of introducing ground troops into

Kosovo in a non-permissive environment. Assisting the Kosovars to provide for their

own defense against Milosevic’s forces, they argued, would provide the United States

with an exit strategy in the absence of a peace agreement. They hearkened to earlier,

extensive and divisive debates in the Congress over arming and training the Bosnian

government during the Bosnian war in the early 1990s.

Others, including the Clinton Administration, viewed this initiative as

inappropriate in the midst of a major military operation and likely to fuel an arms race.

They said this policy would violate the U.N. arms embargo and run counter to the

goal of achieving the demilitarization of both parties to the conflict. Arming the

Kosovars might also imply support for Kosovo’s independence, which the Clinton

Administration opposed. Some argued that such a move would constitute an

invitation for Russia, theoretically a partner in international efforts to end the Kosovo

conflict, to provide arms to Serbia.

While neither chamber brought the Kosovo self-defense bills to the floor for

consideration, the Senate voted to include some funds for a similar purpose in the FY

2000 appropriations bill for foreign operations. The Senate bill (S. 1234) earmarked

$20 million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act funds for “training

and equipping a Kosovo security force.” The Clinton Administration opposed this

provision since it could be interpreted as military aid designated for the Kosovo

Liberation Army.22 The earmark was later dropped in conference.

Preparing for a ground invasion. President Clinton’s explicit exclusion

of a ground force option at the start of the NATO operation came under criticism in

Congress. Some Members emphasized the need for victory above all other

22

Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1234, Office of Management and Budget, June 30,

1999.

CRS-14

considerations and urged planning for a possible ground force invasion of Kosovo.

Senator McCain emphasized that “we are in it; now we must win it.”23 He warned of

negative consequences around the globe if NATO were to fail in Yugoslavia. He

stated that the ground force option should be held open as a credible threat. Senator

Lugar called for the immediate, conspicuous planning for the use of NATO ground

troops to demonstrate to Milosevic NATO’s resolve.24 In response, Clinton

Administration officials continued to insist that air strikes (albeit intensified) would

eventually succeed in altering Milosevic’s behavior. They repeated arguments against

a ground force invasion and estimated that an invasion operation would have to

involve hundreds of thousands of troops under very dangerous circumstances. They

also indicated that there was no consensus within NATO to embark on such plans,

and that any move to consider this option would threaten allied cohesion.

On April 20, 1999, Senator McCain and Senator Biden introduced S.J.Res. 20,

a resolution to authorize the President to use “all necessary force” to meet NATO’s

goals in Kosovo. The phrase “all necessary force” was intended to mean a possible

ground invasion of Yugoslavia. Sponsors of the bill inadvertently triggered deadlines

under the War Powers Resolution that required expedited procedures through the

legislative process. On April 30, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported

out S.J.Res. 20 without a recommendation. However, the bipartisan Senate

leadership agreed to move to “table,” or set aside, the bill rather than put it to a direct,

up-or-down vote. The leadership apparently wanted neither to endorse an escalated

war nor to reveal to Milosevic a lack of resolve. Other Senators expressed concerns

that the resolution’s authorization was too broad and that the timing of it was

premature. President Clinton, meanwhile, told congressional leaders that he had no

plans to introduce U.S. ground forces into the conflict and would in any case ask for

congressional support before such an event.25 Senator McCain sharply criticized the

Senate leadership as well as the Clinton Administration for not seeking an open debate

and vote on the issue. He urged Senators at least to declare, during floor debate,

unequivocally their support or opposition for the war. He said, “Shame on the

President if he persists in abdicating his responsibilities. But shame on us if we let

him.”26 The Senate voted, 78 to 22, to table S.J.Res. 20 on May 3, 1999.

In another attempt to exercise some control over the possible introduction of

combat ground troops into Kosovo, Senator Specter introduced an amendment to the

FY 2000 defense authorization bill (S. 1059) that sought to bar funds for the

23

“As Kosovo Crisis Escalates, Calls Increase to Reconsider Use of Ground Troops,”

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 3, 1999, p. 809-811.

24

Ibid. Other Senators cited in this article as supportive of ground force preparations were

Senators Gordon Smith, Hagel, and Biden. Several other Members in both chambers later

made statements urging the President to leave all military options open, including the use of

U.S. ground troops.

25

“Congress Set to Provide Money, But No Guidance, for Kosovo Mission,” Congressional

Quarterly Weekly Report, May 1, 1999, p. 1036-1040; Congressional Record, May 3, 1999,

S4531.

26

Congressional Record, May 3, 1999, S4514; “Senate Shelves McCain Proposal on Kosovo,”

Washington Post, May 5, 1999..

CRS-15

deployment of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel,

unless Congress issued a declaration of war or passed a joint resolution authorizing

the use of military force. The Senate voted to table the Specter amendment on May

25, by a vote of 52 to 48. The following day, the Senate rejected another amendment,

this one by Senator Robert Smith, to block funds for either combat or peacekeeping

military operations in Kosovo.

An effort in the House to forge a bipartisan approach on an “all necessary force”

resolution was reportedly rejected by the House leadership.27 However, had

Milosevic not agreed to NATO demands in early June, and had the Clinton

Administration changed its policy on this issue, discussion in Congress of a possible

ground force invasion of Yugoslavia would most likely have been revived.

Removing Milosevic from power. At the start of Operation Allied Force,

Senator Helms introduced legislation that targeted Slobodan Milosevic’s rule in the

FRY. He argued that the only way to stop Milosevic’s “reign of terror” in the

Balkans was to address the underlying cause of the Balkans wars: Slobodan

Milosevic’s continued rule. Senator Helms argued that “our objective must change

from appeasing Milosevic to sponsoring democratic change in Serbia and Milosevic’s

removal from power.”28 On May 24, 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the

former Yugoslavia indicted Milosevic and other top Serbian political and military

leaders for war crimes committed in Kosovo.

The Clinton Administration supported this measure and other like endeavors.

At the Sarajevo summit meeting that launched the Stability Pact for southeast Europe

on July 30, 1999, President Clinton said he would provide $10 million to promote

democracy in Serbia, maintain sanctions against the Milosevic regime, and support the

democratically-elected government in Montenegro. After Milosevic’s withdrawal

from Kosovo, some observers predicted that Milosevic would soon fall from power

or be defeated at the polls.

Co-sponsored by Senators Helms, Lugar, Gordon Smith, Lieberman, and

Lautenberg, among others, the Serbia Democratization Act (S. 720) aimed to

promote the democratic development of Yugoslavia. It included an authorization of

$100 million to implement programs to assist the democratic opposition, nongovernmental organizations, and the independent media. It also codified sanctions

against Yugoslavia, as well as exemptions to the sanctions. Backed by the Clinton

Administration, the Senate passed S. 720 on November 4, 1999.

In its version of the FY 2000 appropriations bill for foreign operations, export

financing, and related programs (S. 1234), the Senate approved on June 30 an

amendment offered by Senator Helms that provided $100 million in assistance to

promote democracy in Serbia. This amendment was later dropped in conference

committee. In 2000, a version of the Serbia Democratization Act reappeared as Title

27

“Hill GOP Leaders Take Cautious Course on Kosovo,” Washington Post, April 28, 1999.

28

“Our Exit Strategy,” Washington Post op-ed by Senator Jesse Helms, March 25, 1999.

CRS-16

V of S. 2382, a foreign aid authorization bill. Title V authorized $50 million in

assistance to democratic programs in Serbia and Montenegro.29

On September 25, 2000, the House passed H.R. 1064, its version of the Serbian

Democratization Act, one day after Milosevic appeared to have lost elections to the

democratic opposition in Serbia. H.R. 1064 provided $50 million to Serbian

opposition groups and $55 million to Montenegro, and codified sanctions against

Serbia. The House bill’s sponsor, Rep. Christopher Smith, noted that both opponents

and supporters of the U.S. troop deployments to the region supported the bill. 30

Further consideration of H.R. 1064 stalled in the Senate, although Congress

eventually agreed, in the FY2001 foreign operations appropriations measure, to

provide $100 million for assistance to Serbia, subject to certain conditions, in

response to Milosevic’s ouster.

In a related manner, legislative provisions barring reconstruction funds from

being used in Serbia or codifying sanctions against Belgrade aimed at isolating the

Milosevic regime and encouraging its eventual demise. Several such sanctions were

included in the appropriations bills for foreign operations, export financing, and

related programs for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. In the aftermath of Milosevic’s fall

from power in October 2000, however, the Clinton Administration moved toward

lifting sanctions. Congress and the Clinton Administration agreed to provide

assistance to Serbia bilaterally and to review Yugoslavia’s status in multilateral

lending institutions.

Conflict Aftermath and Lessons Learned

With Milosevic’s acceptance of the international peace plan on June 3, 1999, and

the end of Operation Allied Force on June 10, the international focus on Kosovo

swiftly turned from war operations to peacekeeping. President Clinton claimed

victory and pledged to “finish the job” of helping bring peace to Kosovo, along with

other allies. The United States assumed command of one of five Kosovo Force

(KFOR) sectors. Congress remained engaged with the issue of U.S. participation in

the KFOR and the U.S. role in rebuilding Kosovo. Congress was also interested in

examining “lessons learned” from the air operation, especially for the Defense

Department.

In June 1999, while the House was considering a bill to authorize Department

of Defense spending for Fiscal Year 2000 (H.R. 1401), it rejected proposals to limit

use of defense funds for military operations in Kosovo. Rep. Skelton succeeded in

removing from the bill a controversial provision on preventing defense funds to be

used for combat or peacekeeping missions in Kosovo. The Skelton amendment

retained a provision that required the president to request supplemental funding for

peacekeeping. In a letter to Congress, President Clinton pledged to request

29

For more information on this bill, see Foreign Aid Authorization: the Technical Assistance,

Trade Promotion, and Anti-Corruption Act of 2000, by (name redacted).CRS Report

RL30530.

30

“Congress Backs Clinton’s Push for Yugoslav Leader to Step Down,” Congressional

Quarterly Weekly Report, September 30, 2000, p. 2288.

CRS-17

supplemental appropriations for the Kosovo peacekeeping deployment rather than

draw funds from other defense accounts. This pledge reportedly convinced many

Republican Members to agree to strike the restriction.31 The cost of U.S.

participation in peacekeeping in Kosovo, not included in the regular appropriations

bills, was estimated to total about $2 billion for Fiscal Year 2000. The Clinton

Administration submitted its request for supplemental Fiscal Year 2000 funds for the

KFOR operation in April 2000.

After the air campaign, Congress became interested in shaping the U.S. role in

the international reconstruction of Kosovo, particularly with regard to U.S. policy visà-vis Serbia and to the U.S. share of the reconstruction burden. Several provisions

in the foreign operations appropriations bill for Fiscal Year 2000 set forth prohibitions

on reconstruction aid to Serbia and barred assistance to states harboring war

criminals. Reconstruction aid for Kosovo was conditioned on the Secretary of State

certifying that the U.S. pledge at an upcoming international donors’ conference would

not exceed 15% of the total amount pledged.32 The bill also barred U.S. funds from

large-scale infrastructure projects in Kosovo. The topic of the appropriate U.S. share

of international reconstruction aid would be revisited in more depth in 2000 (see

discussion on burden-sharing, next section).

Many committees convened hearings on the “lessons learned” from the Kosovo

conflict. At hearings with U.S. and NATO political and military leaders, Members

reviewed events and decisions that led to the start and conclusion of the Allied Force

operation. U.S. officials emphasized the mission’s “unqualified success;” Defense

Secretary Cohen said that “every single objective that was set out by NATO in fact

has been achieved.”33 Generally lauding the conduct of the operation, Members

questioned some aspects of strategy and command, heard initial battle damage

estimates, and discussed implications for U.S. and allied military planning and

procurement. Some Members, however, continued to question the justification for

NATO intervention and the wisdom of supporting the Kosovar Albanian side in the

conflict.

As required by the Fiscal Year 2000 defense authorization and defense

appropriations laws, the Department of Defense issued its final “after-action” report

on Allied Force on January 31, 2000.34 The report proclaimed “extraordinary

success” in the operation. In 78 continuous days of operation, NATO aircraft flew

38,000 sorties and suffered no combat fatalities. The United States contributed the

majority of military assets to the operation. The report identified the Department’s

31

“Republicans’ Unease with Clinton Marks House Passage of Defense Bill,” Congressional

Quarterly Weekly Report, June 12, 1999, p. 1395-1396.

32

On December 3, 1999, Secretary of State Albright certified that the U.S. pledge at the

November 17, 1999 Kosovo donors’ conference amounted to 14.82% of the total pledges [FR

Doc. 99-32072].

33

Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Kosovo. Federal Document Clearing House

transcript. July 20, 1999.

34

P.L. 106-65, Section 1211 and P.L. 106-79, Section 8125. The DoD report is available at

[http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs]

CRS-18

view on key lessons learned and actions needed to correct shortcomings and improve

military capabilities.35

Many U.S. officials touted the importance of sustained allied unity in achieving

eventual success. However, they pointed out that the operation also revealed a wide

technological gap between the United States and its allies in military capabilities.36

They indicated that addressing these disparities would become a priority for the

Clinton Administration in alliance relations.

Resources and Burden-Sharing in Post-Conflict Kosovo

The issue of equitable burden-sharing between the United States and its

European allies in European security affairs has long been of interest to the Congress.

In recent years, some Members of Congress have contended that the United States

should withdraw its military forces from Bosnia and allow the European allies to take

over that peacekeeping operation. Some Members have argued the same for Kosovo,

believing that Europe’s closer proximity to and therefore greater national interests at

stake in the Balkans should be reflected in greater responsibility for the military and

economic reconstruction burden. In particular, they have pointed to the

disproportionately large contributions made (and costs incurred) by the United States

to Operation Allied Force. The United States contributed the largest number of

aircraft, which flew the largest number of sorties, and brought to the mission the most

high-performance equipment and weaponry. Proponents of this view argue that

overseas missions such as the Balkan operations have strained military readiness and

diverted attention and resources from core U.S. national security interests.

The Clinton Administration has maintained that the United States should

continue to participate in international programs to stabilize the Balkans, but that the

European nations should lead the post-war reconstruction effort. In early 2000, U.S.

officials and Members of Congress openly began to criticize the European allies’

contributions to date in efforts to secure in the peace in Kosovo. Defense Secretary

Cohen pointed to a “clear failure” by participating nations, and especially by NATO

allies, to provide sufficient numbers of civilian police to the U.N. administration in

Kosovo. He criticized the need for KFOR soldiers to perform police activities in the

absence of a fully-deployed civilian police force.37

Some Members of Congress who had visited the Balkans region over the

legislative recess registered concerns about the poor security environment in Kosovo,

ethnic Albanian revenge attacks against the Serb population, and the slow pace of

establishing the international civil administration in the province. In hearings and in

public statements, Members sharply criticized Europe’s record to date in leading the

35

Months after the end of Allied Force, however, media reports continued to emerge that

questioned NATO’s claims of battle damage as well as levels of civilian casualties.

36

See also Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force, coordinated by (nam

e redacted).

CRS Report RL30374, November 19, 1999, and originally prepared at the request of

Senator Roth.

37

Congressional Record, February 10, 2000, S593.

CRS-19

civil implementation and reconstruction efforts in Kosovo. International organizations

such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe, according to Senator Warner, were “simply not doing their

job.” Moreover, he pointed out that the ability of U.S. armed forces eventually to

withdraw from Kosovo (and from Bosnia) was directly tied to the ability of these

organizations to fulfill the objectives of their mission.38

In early March, the President submitted a request to Congress for emergency

supplemental funding for FY 2000 that would provide about $2 billion for military

costs for U.S. participation in KFOR and about $600 million for reconstruction and

other economic aid to the region, including $92.8 million for Kosovo reconstruction.39

Senator Warner and Senator Levin, among others, warned that they would introduce

amendments to the supplemental funding bill to address burden-sharing issues in

Kosovo. They said they would propose restricting military funds or imposing a

withdrawal date for U.S. armed forces unless the President could give assurances on

the pace of implementation of the European allies’ commitments to civilian and

reconstruction efforts in Kosovo. Senator Byrd argued that the United States should

take steps to turn over the Kosovo operation to the European allies; since the United

States won the war, Europe should keep the peace.40

The House considered the President’s supplemental funding request in H.R.

3908. The House Committee on Appropriations recommended fully funding the

President’s request for $2 billion for Kosovo peacekeeping. It cut nearly by half the

President’s request for economic assistance for southeast Europe and Kosovo. Citing

concerns about other nations’ contributions to Kosovo peace implementation, the

committee allocated only $12.4 million of the $92.8 million requested for Kosovo,

and allocated this amount only for U.S. police officers serving in the U.N. civil police

force. It also said that the President’s request for additional resources for Kosovo

reconstruction ran counter to the Clinton Administration’s assurances that the United

States would not lead the rebuilding effort of post-conflict Kosovo.41

Rep. Kasich introduced an amendment to H.R. 3908, based on an amendment

developed by Senator Warner, that would withhold half of the funds for the Kosovo

peacekeeping deployment until the President certified that the European allies had

obligated a significant percentage of their financial or personnel pledges in Kosovo.

These included 33% pledged for reconstruction assistance, 75% for humanitarian

assistance, 75% pledged for Kosovo’s budget, and 75% of personnel pledged for the

U.N. international police force. If the President did not submit the report by June 1,

38

Ibid; Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Kosovo, February 2, 2000 (Reuters

transcript).

39

For more information on the entire supplemental request and congressional response, see

Supplemental Appropriations for FY 2000: Plan Colombia, Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief,

Home Energy Assistance, and Other Initiatives, by (name redacted), (name redacted), (nam

e redacted),

and Nina Serafino and (name r edacted).

CRS Report RL30457, updated July 5, 2000.

40

“Europe’s Turn to Keep the Peace,” New York Times op-ed by Robert C. Byrd, March 20,

2000.

41

H.Rept. 106-521.

CRS-20

2000, the remaining 50% of funds would be available only for the purpose of

withdrawing U.S. military personnel from Kosovo. Rep. Kasich said that the

amendment was intended to make the European allies live up to their existing pledges.

Other Members agreed with the sentiment of the Kasich amendment but argued that

it was on the wrong legislative vehicle. The funds provided by the supplemental

funding bill were not for the deployment of U.S. troops or for Kosovo’s

reconstruction, they argued, but were to replace monies that have already been spent

by the Defense Department. The Kasich amendment was defeated by a vote of 200

in favor, 219 against, on March 29. The House passed H.R. 3908 the same day.

The Senate leadership chose not to consider H.R. 3908, but to attach portions

of the supplemental funding request to regular FY 2001 appropriations bills. On May

9, the Senate Appropriations Committee adopted (by a vote of 23 to 3) the ByrdWarner amendment to the FY 2001 military construction appropriations bill (S.

2521/H.R. 4425). The amendment contained three main provisions. First, no funds

were to be available for the continued deployment of U.S. armed forces in Kosovo

after July 1, 2001, unless the President submitted a report requesting a specific

authorization for a continued deployment and Congress enacted a joint resolution

authorizing a continued deployment. The President would be able to waive (for a

maximum 180 days) the limitation on funding in emergency situations. U.S. military

personnel providing intelligence support, air surveillance, and related activities were

exempted from the restriction. Second, the President was to develop a plan on the

transition to a Kosovo force that did not include U.S. armed forces by July 2001. The

President would have to report regularly on the remaining number of U.S. troops in

Kosovo and the costs of the Kosovo operation. The third section of the amendment

said that not more than 75% of the funds provided by this bill for FY 2000 could be

used until the President certified, by July 15, 2000, that the European allies had

obligated at least 33% of the amounts they pledged for reconstruction assistance in

Kosovo, 75% of pledges for humanitarian assistance, 75% of pledges for the Kosovo

budget, and 75% of pledges of police personnel for the U.N. international police

force. If the President did not submit the report by July 15, 2000, the remaining 25%

of funds would be available only for the purpose of withdrawing U.S. military

personnel from Kosovo, unless Congress enacted a joint resolution that authorized

that amount to be used for purposes other than withdrawal. This last provision

removed the “automatic trigger” of withdrawal that was implicit in the failed Kasich

amendment in the House.

Elaborating on the Appropriations Committee’s approval, Senator Warner said

that the amendment, which had been circulating in draft form since March, had

already served as a “wake-up call” to the European allies to expedite the process of

fulfilling their commitments on rebuilding Kosovo. He acknowledged that the allies

had indeed improved the pace of obligating their contributions, but argued that the

amendment was still needed as a means for Congress to “exercise its constitutional

duty.” He said that the amendment would allow the next President (after the 2000

presidential elections) to seek and receive in mid-2001 congressional authorization to

continue the deployment of U.S. armed forces in Kosovo.42 Senator Byrd said that

the intent of the provision was not to force a pull-out of U.S. armed forces from

42

Congressional Record, May 11, 2000, S3887-S3893.

CRS-21

Kosovo, but to restore congressional oversight and to return to Congress its

constitutional authority in such matters.

The Clinton Administration strongly opposed the Byrd-Warner amendment and

threatened to veto the entire appropriations bill if it included the amendment. It said

that the provision would damage U.S. credibility abroad, undermine NATO, and

increase uncertainty in Kosovo. While the Clinton Administration shared the concern

that the European allies should live up to their military and economic commitments,

officials argued that the deadlines in the legislation were tied to arbitrary burdensharing criteria. They also pointed out that European Union members were already

providing about 65% of the troops in Kosovo and over 70% of reconstruction

funding. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Wesley Clark argued that

adoption of the amendment would produce a negative response by the European allies

and encourage greater instability in the Balkans. Some Members of Congress,

including Senator Levin and Senator McCain, said the amendment would send the

wrong message to the allies and to the rest of the world, and signify a clear intent to

pull U.S. troops out of the Balkans.43 On the eve of the Senate vote on the bill,

Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush also came out against the ByrdWarner provision. A Bush campaign spokesman called it “legislative overreach on

the powers of the presidency.”44 On May 18, the Senate voted to remove the ByrdWarner provision (through an amendment by Senator Levin) by a vote of 53 in favor,

47 against.45 Vice President and Democratic Party candidate Gore presided over the

close vote. Senator Warner stated afterward that the “George W. Bush factor”

played a significant role among Republican Members in defeating his provision.

Democrats cited the Clinton Administration’s lobbying efforts to be a factor affecting

the outcome of the vote.46

One day earlier, however, the House approved another burden-sharing

amendment put forward by Rep. Kasich, this time to the defense authorization bill for

FY 2001 (H.R. 4205), by a vote of 264 in favor to 153 against. The Kasich

amendment would require the President to certify, by April 1, 2001, that certain

burden-sharing goals had been met. These were for the European Union and

European NATO members to obligate 50% of their pledges for reconstruction, 85%

of pledges for humanitarian assistance, 85% of pledges for Kosovo’s budget, and 90%

43

Congressional Record, May 11, 2000, S3899-S3900; “Cohen Warns of Veto Over Kosovo

Pullout Bill,” Washington Post, May 16, 2000.

44

“Bush Tells Hill of Doubts on Kosovo Deadline,” Washington Post, May 17, 2000; “Bush

Deblates GOP Senators’ Plan to Confront Clinton over Kosovo,” Congressional Quarterly

Weekly Report, May 20, 2000, p. 1199-1201.

45

On July 13, 2000, the President signed the FY 2001 military construction appropriations bill

into law (P.L. 106-246). It included emergency Fiscal Year 2000 supplementing funding for

U.S. military operations in Kosovo (about $2 billion) and for some economic assistance to

Kosovo, Croatia, and Montenegro ($50 million).

46

The conference report on HR. 4425 provided, as emergency FY 2000 funding, $2.025 for

U.S .military operations in Kosovo, $50 million in SEED funds for Croatia and Montenegro,

and $12.4 million to assist police activities in Kosovo. H.R. 4425 was signed into law on July

13, 2000 (P.L. 106-246).

CRS-22

of their pledges for the U.N. police. If no certification was provided, the amendment

would restrict any further funds for the continued deployment of U.S. armed forces

in Kosovo except for the purpose of withdrawing them. The President would have to

provide a plan for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops within 30 days. The President

would be able waive the restriction for a maximum of 180 days (which could be

further extended if Congress so authorized). The Kasich amendment withheld no

funds at the outset. The addition of the waiver appeared to attract additional

supporters from both parties, in contrast to the earlier Kasich amendment that

narrowly failed in March.

In October, congressional conferees on the defense authorization bill, led by

Senator Warner, agreed to drop the controversial Kasich amendment in the face of

strong Clinton Administration opposition and the possible risk of a presidential veto.

Senator Levin argued that the Kosovo provision was not an appropriate way for

Congress to exercise its authority on this issue. The final bill did include provisions

requiring the President to provide a report to Congress on its exit strategy for U.S.

armed forces in Kosovo with militarily significant benchmarks. The President was

also required to submit semi-annual reports on the level of contributions of European

nations to Kosovo peacekeeping.

With regard to funding, the defense authorization bill limited Department of

Defense funds for Kosovo peacekeeping to $1.65 billion in FY 2001, with the

possibility of a presidential waiver to provide more. In the defense appropriations bill,

Congress appropriated about $2 billion for ongoing military operations in Kosovo

(H.R. 4586, P.L. 106-259). For civilian reconstruction assistance in FY 2001,

Congress (in the foreign operations appropriations bill, P.L. 106-429) limited U.S.

funds to 15% of the total amount pledged for calendar year 2001. After Milosevic’s

fall from power on October 5, appropriators included $100 million for assistance to

Serbia, available until March 31, 2001, after which, in order for more funding to be

available, the President must certify that Belgrade was cooperating with the Hague

Tribunal and implementing the Dayton peace agreement on Bosnia.

Outlook

Toward the end of the 106th Congress, events took a dramatic turn in Serbia.

Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, unwisely gambling on renewing his term in

office, lost direct presidential elections in late September 2000 to democratic

challenger Vojislav Kostunica. At first refusing to recognize his defeat, Milosevic

eventually stepped down from power amidst massive demonstrations against his

continued rule. The emergence of a new Yugoslav leader and government without

Milosevic has added a new dimension to U.S. policy in the region, with possibly large

implications for Kosovo.47 Some Members of Congress have already warned that aid

47

For more information, see Serbia and Montenegro: Political Situation and U.S. Policy, by

Steve Woehrel. CRS Report RL30371. Updated August 22, 2000.

CRS-23

to Serbia should be conditioned on the willingness of Belgrade’s new regime to

surrender war criminals, including Slobodan Milosevic, to the Hague Tribunal. 48

The U.S. commitment of military forces to Kosovo and Bosnia also emerged as

a prominent campaign issue in the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections. In

October, the Bush campaign indicated that it would establish as a goal the withdrawal

of U.S. armed forces from the Balkans and hand over peacekeeping responsibilities

to the Europeans. The Gore campaign criticized the proposal as risky and

irresponsible, and said it would maintain the U.S. presence in these operations.

Kosovo and the surrounding region are likely to remain prominent foreign policy

concerns to the United States in the coming years. The continued deployment of U.S.

military forces in the region and the status of political and economic efforts to

establish peace will continue to be subjects of interest to the next Administration and

Congress. The emergence of a democratic regime in Serbia will present new policy

challenges to the international community. The impact of the change in Serbian

leadership on the Kosovo situation, however, remains unclear, as the positions of both

the Albanian and Serbian parties on Kosovo’s permanent status appear no closer than

before.

Terms of the U.S. engagement of military and financial resources to Kosovo may

be further questioned and debated in the 107th Congress. Members of Congress who

objected to the initial deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo may again express

opposition to their continued deployment. They may be joined by those who

supported U.S. participation at first, but now wish to see the United States articulate

some exit strategy for U.S. troops, such as turning over the mission to the European

allies. Some may see the fall of Milosevic in Serbia as a positive sign for the eventual

withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from the region. Some Members, both supporters

and opponents of the Kosovo mission, may try again to assert what they view to be

Congress’ authority and legislative prerogatives in matters relating to the use of U.S.

armed forces abroad.

Finding consensus on Kosovo policy in Congress has proven difficult in the past

and is likely to remain elusive. In part, this arises from the inherent complexity of the

issues involved with Kosovo. For opponents to continued military deployment,

Kosovo represents an ill-defined, potentially dangerous, and open-ended mission.49

The Kosovo deployment incurs substantial annual incremental costs to the U.S.

military and, opponents would argue, damages military readiness for deterring and

fighting wars. Opponents would cite the disproportionate U.S. contribution to

Operation Allied Force as a rationale for turning over the peacekeeping mission to the

European allies (perhaps with the United States continuing to provide intelligence and

logistics support). In contrast, supporters of continued deployment believe that the

United States maintains a significant interest in peace and stability in Kosovo. They

48

“No Handouts Without a Handover,” New York Times op-ed by Senators Mitch McConnell

and Patrick Leahy, October 16, 2000.

49

Reportedly, U.S. military officials have expressed frustration about the lack of a specified

end-state for the mission. “In Kosovo, an Uncertain Mission,” Washington Post, September

20, 2000.

CRS-24

may view Kosovo as a positive example of how the use of limited force, in concert

with allies and regional partners, can contribute to building peace in a region vital to

U.S. interests. They may argue that the United States should fulfill its commitments,

especially since it is already providing a much smaller share of military and financial

resources to Kosovo than the European allies. Finally, they may predict negative

consequences to follow a unilateral U.S. withdrawal of troops from Kosovo. Still

others may fall somewhere in-between – supportive of efforts to find an exit strategy

for the U.S. military in Kosovo, but unwilling to try to impose such a strategy on the

President or on NATO.

Another challenge to consensus-building are the means available to Congress to

address Kosovo policy. Legislative proposals considered during the 106th Congress

often used the blunt threat of withholding or cutting off funds to achieve various

policy objectives. Many proposals included complex formulations that tied military

funding to specific dates, presidential certifications, or other non-military criteria.

Many Members of Congress have been wary of mandated troop withdrawals that they

believe could adversely affect the U.S. military, and have been inclined to defer to

presidential authority on such matters. Proposals requiring executive branch reports

on the achievement of tangible “benchmarks” have elicited wider support.

How Kosovo plays in domestic politics may again prove to be an important

factor. The state of executive-legislative relations after the 2000 elections may shape

the congressional response on Kosovo. The new President’s ability to exert

leadership and communicate a convincing strategy on Kosovo may influence positions

of the Congress. Party leadership may also play a key role, especially since positions

on Kosovo in both chambers frequently cut through party lines in the past.

The congressional response will obviously also be tied to events as they unfold

in Kosovo and in the region. For example, Kosovo’s future permanent status has

remained unresolved. The international community has sought thus far to devise

autonomous political structures in Kosovo without redrawing international borders.

Most countries, including the United States, do not officially support independence

for Kosovo. The issue of whether independence is inevitable, what other options are

available, and what consequences may arise from Kosovo’s independence, is likely to

come under closer scrutiny in the near future. Some observers contend that ongoing

attacks by Albanians on the Serb population in Kosovo have further diminished

international support for Kosovo’s independence. Others argue that not moving

forward on this issue will only provoke more violence. Prospects for peace in Kosovo

will also remain closely tied to events in volatile Serbia. Many observers predict that

the key for a successful exit for U.S. armed forces from Kosovo will depend on

Serbia’s successful transition to a peaceful, democratic country. Milosevic’s fall from

power in October and the emergence of a democratic regime in Belgrade may or may

not facilitate a solution to the Kosovo problem. The democratic development of

Serbia, and the appropriate U.S. response to this process, is likely to become a major

foreign policy focus in the 107th Congress.

CRS-25

Appendix 1. 106th Congress, Major Legislation on

Kosovo-Status50

Enacted Legislation

Bill Number/Title

Status

P.L. 106-31 (H.R. 1141), making emergency

supplemental appropriations for FY1999

Signed by President, 5/21/99,

P.L. 106-31 (113 STAT. 57)

--Provided about $12 billion for Kosovo defense and

humanitarian operations and other defense needs

--Required report by President by 9/30/99 on efforts to

seek equitable reimbursement for costs associated with

Operation Allied Force (Sec. 2005a)

--Required report by President 30 days after enactment on

U.S. participation in Operation Allied Force (Sec. 2006a)

Considered but Not Enacted:

--Amendment to S. 544 by Senator Hutchison to bar

funds for the deployment of U.S. ground forces in the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), unless certain

conditions were met; required President to submit report

on benchmarks for the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces

from Kosovo

Hutchison amendment

withdrawn, 3/23/99 (Senate

passed S. 544, 3/23/99)

--Amendment to H.R. 1664 by Rep. Istook to bar funds to

implement any plan to invade the FRY with U.S. ground

forces

Istook amendment failed House,

117-301, 5/6/99

(House passed H.R. 1664, 5/6/99;

H.R. 1664 later incorporated into

H.R. 1141)

P.L. 106-65 (S. 1059), authorizing defense

appropriations for FY2000

Signed by President, 10/5/99,

P.L. 106-65 (113 STAT. 512)

--Required President to submit a supplemental

appropriations request for costs of conducting combat or

peacekeeping operations in the FRY in FY 2000

(Sec.1004)

--Required Defense Secretary to submit report on the

effect of continued operations in the Balkans on military

readiness (Sec. 1035)

--Required Defense Secretary to submit report by 1/31/00

on the conduct of Operation Allied Force (Sec.1211)

--Sense of Congress on providing support and resources

to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia (Sec.1212)

--Required report by President by 3/1/00 on prioritizing

ongoing global missions involving US forces (Sec. 1235)

50

This appendix provides brief summaries and the status of legislation or sections of

legislation specifically related to Kosovo; not all steps of the legislative process are included

for each bill. First listed are enacted bills in chronological order, followed by bills receiving

floor votes in either House or Senate, and then selection of introduced bills.

CRS-26

Bill Number/Title

Status

Considered but Not Enacted:

Amendment to S. 1059 by Senator Specter to bar funds

for deployment of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo, except

for peacekeeping, unless authorized by declaration of war

or a joint resolution authorizing use of military force

Specter amendment tabled, 5248, 5/25/99

--Amendment to S. 1059 by Senator Smith to bar funds

for military operations in the FRY unless authorized by

Congress

Smith amendment tabled, 77-21,

5/26/99

(Senate passed S. 1059, 5/27/99)

--Amendment to H.R. 1401 by Rep. Skelton to delete

language in House bill on prohibiting funds for combat or

peacekeeping operations in the FRY after 9/30/99, and to

retain language requiring President to request

supplemental appropriations

Skelton amendment passed

House, 270-155, 6/10/99

--Amendment to H.R. 1401 by Rep. Souder to prohibit

DoD funds for military operations in the FRY

Souder amendment failed House,

97-328, 6/10/99

(House passed H.R. 1401,

6/10/99)

P.L. 106-79 (H.R. 2561, S. 1122), making DoD

appropriations for FY 2000

Signed by President, 10/25/99,

P.L. 106-79 (113 STAT. 1212)

--Required report by Secretary of Defense by 1/31/00 on

the conduct of Operation Allied Force (Sec. 8125)

--Barred funds from this or any other act for

reconstruction activities in the Republic of Serbia

(excluding Kosovo) as long as Slobodan Milosevic

remained FRY President (Sec. 8142)

P.L. 106-113 (H.R. 3194), making consolidated

appropriations for FY2000 [included H.R. 3422 - Foreign

Operations Appropriations and H.R. 3427 - Foreign

Relations Authorization]

--Provided not less than $150 million for bilateral

assistance to Kosovo; no funds to be available until

Secretary of State certified that U.S. pledge at Kosovo

donors conference did not exceed 15% of total resources

pledged by all donors (appendix B/H.R. 3422, Title II)

--Prohibited funds under this act to be available for

Serbia, except for assistance for Kosovo or Montenegro or

for assistance to promote democratization in Serbia (Sec.

537)

--Prohibited assistance, except for humanitarian and

democratization aid, to be provided for any country or

entity providing sanctuary to criminals indicted by the

war crimes Tribunal (Sec. 566)

--Deemed the FRY to be a state sponsor of terrorism for

the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7); not to apply to

Montenegro and Kosovo (Sec. 591)

--Continued “outer wall” of sanctions against the FRY

during FY 2000 unless the President certified that a

number of conditions were met (Sec. 599)

Signed by President, 11/29/99,

P.L. 106-113 (113 STAT. 1501)

CRS-27

Bill Number/Title

Status

Considered but Not Enacted:

S. 1234 (Senate bill for foreign operations appropriations)

designated $20 million for training and equipping a

Kosovo security force; $85 million for Albania; $60

million for Romania; $55 million for Macedonia; $45

million for Bulgaria; and $35 million for Montenegro

Provisions dropped in conference

(Senate passed S. 1234, 6/30/99;

incorporated into H.R. 2606 as

an amendment; H.R. 2606 vetoed

by President 10/18/99)

S. 1234 designated the FRY as a terrorist state and

imposed sanctions (Sec. 525)

S. 1234 authorized $100 million for assistance to promote

democracy in the FRY (Sec. 586)

S. 1234 called for convening of an international

conference on the Balkans (Sec. 593)

P.L. 106-246 (H.R. 4425), making appropriations for

military construction, family housing, and base

realignment and closure for DoD for FY2001 [included

supplemental appropriations for FY2000]

Signed by President, 7/13/00,

P.L. 106-246 (114 STAT. 511)

--Approved $2.025 billion, as requested, for U.S. military

operations as part of KFOR in FY2000; legislation also

provided $50 million in supplemental appropriations for

economic aid to Croatia, Montenegro, and $12.4 million

for Kosovo police activities

Considered but Not Enacted:

--Amendment to H.R. 3908 offered by Rep. Kasich to

withhold half of military funds until President certified

that burden-sharing requirements with European allies on

aid and civil reconstruction efforts in Kosovo had been

met

Kasich amendment failed House,

200-219, 3/29/00

(House passed H.R. 3908,

3/29/00 [Senate did not consider

H.R. 3908, but attached portions

of it to regular FY

2001appropriations bills])

--Amendment to S. 2521 by Senator Levin to strike

Section 2410 (Byrd-Warner amendment) requiring

withdrawal of U.S. troops by July 2001 unless Congress

authorized such deployment, with a 180-day waiver

provision; also limited obligation of funds until President

certified that burden-sharing requirements with European

allies on aid and civil reconstruction efforts in Kosovo

had been met

Levin amendment passed Senate,

53-47, 5/18/00

(Senate Appropriations

Committee passed Byrd-Warner

amendment, 23-3, 5/9/00)

(Senate passed S. 2521, 5/18/00)

P.L. 106-259 (H.R. 4576), making DoD appropriations

for FY2001

Signed by President, 8/9/00, P.L.

106-259 (114 STAT. 656)

--Appropriated over $4 billion for ongoing military

contingency operations in Kosovo (about $2 billion),

Bosnia, and the Persian Gulf

--Barred funds from this or any other Act for

reconstruction activities in Serbia (excluding Kosovo) as

long as Slobodan Milosevic remains FRY president (Sec.

8106)

CRS-28

Bill Number/Title

Status

P.L. 106-398 (H.R. 4205), authorizing defense

appropriations for FY 2001

Signed by President, 10/30/00,

P.L. 106-398 (114 STAT 1654)

--Limited funds for Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping to

$1.4 billion and $1.65 billion, respectively, for FY2001.

President could waive limitation with written certification

(Sec. 1005)

--Required annual report by Defense Secretary on effect

of continued operations in the Balkans on military

readiness (Sec. 1211)

--Required President to establish benchmarks for

conditions in Kosovo that would allow for the withdrawal

of U.S. armed forces from Kosovo, develop a

comprehensive political-military strategy for the Balkan

region, and submit semi-annual progress reports (Sec.

1212)

--Required President to submit semi-annual reports on the

contributions of European nations to Kosovo

peacekeeping, with the first report to be submitted by

12/1/00 (Sec. 1213)

Considered but Not Enacted:

--Amendment to H.R. 4205 by Rep. Kasich to require the

withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Kosovo unless the

President certified by 4/1/01 that burden-sharing goals

had been met; limited waiver provision included (Sec.

1205)

Kasich amendment passed

House, 264-153, 5/17/00;

dropped in conference

(House passed H.R. 4205,

5/18/00)

P.L. 106-429 (H.R. 4811), making appropriations for

foreign operations, export financing, and related

programs for FY2001

Signed by President, 11/6/00,

P.L. 106-429 (114 STAT 1900)

--Set limit of U.S. aid to Kosovo to 15% of total funds

pledged by donors, as of 3/31/01, for calendar year 2001

--Prohibited assistance, except for humanitarian and

democracy aid, to countries providing sanctuary to

indicted war criminals (Sec. 564)

--Provided $100 million for assistance to Serbia;

President to certify by 3/31/01that the FRY is meeting

certain requirements (Sec. 594)

Considered but Not Enacted:

--S. 2522 (Senate bill) barred funds for Kosovo until

certification by Secretary of State that amount not exceed

15% of total; 50% of funds for Kosovo to go to nongovernmental organization

--S. 2522 restricted assistance to Serbia (Sec. 537)

--S. 2522 designated the FRY to be state sponsor of

terrorism (Sec. 582)

--S. 2522 continued application of certain sanctions

against Serbia (Sec. 584)

Provisions dropped in conference

(Senate passed S. 2522, 6/21/00;

House passed H.R. 4811,

7/13/00)

CRS-29

Bill Number/Title

--S. 2522 imposed sanctions against Russia for providing

Serbia with loans, economic assistance, and oil (Sec.

599D)

--H.R. 4811 (House bill) limited funding for Kosovo to

$150 million

Status

CRS-30

Other Legislation Considered But Not Enacted

Bill Number/Title

Status

H.R. 1569, prohibiting use of DoD funds for deployment

of U.S. ground troops in the FRY unless such deployment

was specifically authorized by law

House passed, 249-180, 4/28/99

S. 720/H.R. 1064 (“Serbia Democratization Act");

similar bills authorizing an assistance program (over

$100 million) to promote democracy and civil society in

Serbia and Montenegro while codifying certain sanctions

against the FRY until the President certified that several

conditions were met

Senate passed S. 720, 11/4/99;

House passed H.R. 1064, 9/25/00

H.J.Res. 44, declaring a state of war between the United

States and the FRY, pursuant to section 5(b) of the War

Powers Resolution

Failed passage in House, 2-427,

4/28/99

S.J.Res. 20, authorizing the President to use all necessary

force and other means, in concert with our allies, to

accomplish U.S. and NATO objectives in the FRY

Tabled in Senate, 78-22, 5/4/99

H.Con.Res. 42, regarding the use of U.S. Armed Forces

as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo

House passed, 219 to 191,

3/11/99

--Authorized president to deploy U.S. Armed Forces to

Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation

--Authorization subject to limitation that the number of

U.S. Armed Forces not exceed 15% of the total NATO

force

H.Con.Res. 82, directing the President, pursuant to

section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove

U.S. Armed Forces from their positions in operations

against the FRY within 30 days

Failed passage in House, 139290, 4/28/99

S.Con.Res. 21, authorizing the President to conduct

military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation

with NATO allies against the FRY

Senate passed, 58-41, 3/23/99

Failed passage in House, 213213, 4/28/99

S.Con.Res. 40, commending the President and the armed

forces for the success of Operation Allied Force

Senate passed, u.c., 6/17/99

H.Res.130, expressing the support of the House of

Representatives for the members of the U.S. Armed

Forces who were engaged in military operations against

the FRY

House passed, 424-1, 3/24/99

H.Res.451, calling for lasting peace, justice, and stability

in Kosovo

House passed, voice vote,

10/10/00

S.Res.74, expressing the support of the Senate for the

members of the U.S. Armed Forces who were engaged in

military operations against the FRY

Senate passed, voice vote,

3/24/99

CRS-31

Other Legislation Introduced But Not Considered

Bill Number/Title

Status

H.R. 4053 (“The United States-Southeastern Europe

Democratization and Burden-Sharing Act of 2000"), to

authorize assistance for democratization in Serbia and

Montenegro, and to require equitable burden-sharing in

multilateral assistance programs for southeastern Europe,

limiting total amount of bilateral U.S. assistance to 15%

or less of total amount of multilateral assistance provided

to southeastern Europe

Introduced in House and referred

to Committee on International

Relations, 3/22/00

S. 2680 (“Balkans Peace and Prosperity Act of 2000"), to

authorize necessary sums for a Balkan Stabilization

Conference, to be convened by the U.S. to consider all

outstanding issues related to Bosnia and Serbia

Introduced in Senate and referred

to Committee on Foreign

Relations, 6/6/00

H.Con.Res. 99, expressing Sense of the Congress on

support for the Balkans peace initiative launched by the

U.S. Congress and Russian Duma on April 30-May 1,

1999; the initiative recommended termination of the

NATO air strikes, withdrawal of FRY forces from

Kosovo, and cessation of military activities by the Kosovo

Liberation Army

Introduced in House and referred

to Committee on International

Relations, 5/5/99; HIRC held

hearings, 5/13/99

S. 846, H.R. 1408 (“The Kosova Self-Defense Act”),

authorizing $25 million for training and support to the

interim government of Kosova to defend and protect the

Kosova population against armed aggression

Introduced in House and referred

to Committee on International

Relations, 4/14/99; introduced in

Senate and referred to

Committee on Foreign Relations,

4/21/99

CRS-32

Appendix 2. 106th Congress, Major Legislation on

Kosovo – Summaries by Theme

Below is a selection of legislation and legislative proposals from the 106th

Congress organized by theme (listed in chronological order under each heading).

Congressional Authorization and War Powers

•

H.Con.Res. 42. This concurrent resolution authorized the President to deploy

U.S. armed forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping

operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement. The resolution set forth

several reporting requirements.

[Status: passed House, 219-191, on March 11, 1999.]

•

S.Con.Res. 21. This concurrent resolution authorized the President to conduct

military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, Serbia-Montenegro).

[Status: passed Senate, 58-41, on March 23, 1999. Resolution failed passage

in the House on April 28, 1999, by a vote of 213 to 213.]

•

S. 544 (FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations). Senator Lott

submitted an amendment (to an amendment by Senator Hutchison) that barred

DoD funds to be used for the purpose of conducting military operations in the

FRY unless Congress first enacted a law containing specific authorization for

such operations. The Lott amendment included the finding that U.S. national

security interests in Kosovo did not rise to a level that warranted U.S. military

operations.

[Status: Introduced as an amendment to Hutchison’s amendment on March 19,

1999. On March 23, Senate voted, 55-44, not to invoke cloture on the Lott

amendment. Hutchison’s amendment, including Lott’s amending amendment,

was withdrawn on March 23, 1999.]

•

H.R. 1569, “Military Operations in the FRY Limitation Act.” This act

prohibited use of Department of Defense funds for the deployment of U.S.

ground forces to the FRY without specific authorization by law.

[Status: House passed, 249-180, on April 28, 1999.]

•

H.Con.Res. 82. This concurrent resolution directed the President, pursuant to

section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces from

their positions in operations against the FRY within 30 days.

[Status: House rejected, 139-290, on April 28, 1999.]

•

H.J.Res. 44. This joint resolution declared a state of war existed between the

United States and the FRY, pursuant to section 5(b) of the War Powers

Resolution and article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution.

[Status: House rejected, 2-427, on April 28, 1999.]

CRS-33

•

S.J.Res. 20. This joint resolution authorized the President to use all necessary

force and other means, in concert with our allies, to accomplish U.S. and NATO

objectives in the FRY.

[Status: Senate voted, 78-22, to table resolution on May 4, 1999.]

•

H.R. 1664 (FY 1999 Supplemental Appropriations). An amendment by Rep.

Istook barred DoD funds for the implementation of any plan to invade the FRY

with U.S. ground forces, except in time of war.

[Status: House rejected Istook amendment, 117-301, on May 6, 1999.]

•

S. 1059 (FY 2000 Department of Defense Authorization). A modified

amendment by Senator Specter barred DoD funds for deployment of U.S.

ground forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless authorized

by declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force.

[Status: Senate tabled amendment, 52-48, on May 25, 1999.]

•

S. 2521 (FY 2001 Appropriations for Military Construction). Among several

provisions regarding U.S. ground forces in Kosovo, Section 2410 of the Senate

bill withheld funds for the continued deployment of U.S. armed forces in Kosovo

after July 1, 2001, unless and until the President requested congressional

authorization for the continued deployment and Congress enacted a joint

resolution giving such specific authorization. The section provided for a 90-day

waiver that could be exercised twice.

[Status: The so-called Byrd-Warner provision removed by an amendment by

Senator Levin. Levin amendment passed the Senate, 53-47, on May 18, 2000.]

Exit Strategy for U.S. Armed Forces

•

S. 544 (FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations). An amendment

introduced by Senator Hutchison included a requirement for the President to

submit a report every 60 days on the benchmarks established to measure

progress and determine the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from the foreseen

Kosovo peacekeeping operation. Each report was to detail progress on

achieving the benchmarks and include an estimated timetable for successful

achievement of the benchmarks.

[Status: Hutchison amendment withdrawn from S. 544 on March 23, 1999.]

•

H.R. 1408, S. 846, “Kosovo Self-Defense Act.” Rep. Engel in the House and

Senator McConnell and Senator Lieberman in the Senate introduced these bills

to provide funding for a security assistance training and support program for the

self-defense of Kosovo. Stating that “it shall be the policy of the United States

to provide the interim government of Kosova with the capability to defend and

protect the civilian population of Koosova against armed aggression,” the bill

provided $25 million for a training and support program. Sponsors of the bill

suggested that this program would provide an “exit strategy” for U.S. armed

forces by enabling the Kosovars to defend themselves.

[Status: H.R. 1408 introduced and referred to Committee on International

Relations, April 14, 1999. S. 846 introduced and referred to Committee on

Foreign Relations, April 21, 1999.]

CRS-34

•

P.L. 106-398 (H.R. 4205, FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act). Section 1212

of the Act required the President to develop, by May 31, 2001, militarily

significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in

Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the United States military

presence in Kosovo. The President would also develop a comprehensive

political-military strategy for addressing U.S. objectives in the Balkan region.

The President was to report on progress in reaching the benchmarks not later

than June 1, 2001, and every six months thereafter.

[Status: became law, October 30, 2000]

Burden-sharing

•

P.L. 106-31 (FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act). In an

effort to increase burden-sharing, Section 2005a of the Act required the

President to seek equitable reimbursement from NATO for the costs incurred in

connection with Operation Allied Force. The President was to submit a report

to Congress by September 30, 1999, on these efforts.

[Status: became law, May 21, 1999.]

•

H.Res. 268, “Kosovo Burden-sharing Resolution.” This resolution sponsored

by Rep. Bereuter, expressed the sense that the United States should not pay

more than 18 percent of the aggregate total costs associated with the military air

operation, reconstruction in Kosovo, and, when conditions permit, in other parts

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kosovo peacekeeping force, and

programs of the United Nations and other international organizations in Kosovo

[Status: introduced and referred to Committee on International Relations, July

30, 1999.]

•

P.L. 106-113 (FY 2000 Consolidated Appropriations Act). Assistance for

Kosovo was conditioned upon the Secretary of State certifying that the

resources pledged by the United States at the Kosovo donors conference not

exceed 15 percent of the total resources pledged by all donors.

[Status: became law, November 29, 1999.]

•

H.R. 4053, “The United States-Southeastern Europe Democratization and

Burden-Sharing Act.” This bill, sponsored by Rep. Gilman, authorized

assistance for democratization in Serbia and Montenegro and required equitable

burden-sharing in multilateral assistance programs for the countries of

southeastern Europe. The bill limited the total amount of bilateral U.S.

assistance to the region to an amount not to exceed 15% of the total amount of

multilateral assistance provided to southeastern European countries.

[Status: introduced and referred to Committee on International Relations,

March 22, 2000.]

•

H.R. 3908 (FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act).

Amendment sponsored by Rep. Kasich withheld 50% of funds until the President

certified that the European Union and NATO allies had obligated: 33% of

amounts pledged for Kosovo reconstruction; 75% of amounts pledged for

humanitarian assistance in Kosovo; 75% of amounts pledged for the Kosovo

consolidated budget; and had deployed 75% of the number of police to the U.N.

CRS-35

police force in Kosovo. If the President did not provide certification by June 1,

2000, then the remaining 50% of funds could only be used for conducting a

phased withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Kosovo.

[Status: House rejected amendment, 200-219, March 29, 2000.]

•

H.R. 4205 (FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act). An amendment sponsored by

Rep. Kasich barred funds for the continued deployment of U.S. armed forces in

Kosovo after April 1, 2001, unless the President certified to Congress that a

number of burden-sharing goals had been met. For these goals to be met, the

European allies must have obligated 50% of their pledges for the reconstruction

of Kosovo, 85% of funds committed for humanitarian assistance, 85% for the

Kosovo consolidated budget, and 90% of the amount of police forces to the

U.N. police force in Kosovo.

[Status: Kasich amendment passed House, 264-153, on May 17, 2000.

Provision was dropped in conference.]

•

S. 2521 (FY 2001 Appropriations for Military Construction). Among several

provisions regarding U.S. ground forces in Kosovo, Section 2410 of the Senate

bill said that not more than 75% of FY 2000 may be obligated until the President

certified that the EU and NATO allies has obligated 33% of amounts pledged for

Kosovo reconstruction; 75% of amounts pledged for humanitarian assistance in

Kosovo; 75% of amounts pledged for the Kosovo consolidated budget; and had

deployed 75% of the number of police to the U.N. police force in Kosovo.

[Status: The so-called Byrd-Warner provision removed by amendment by

Senator Levin. Levin amendment passed the Senate, 53-47, on May 18, 2000.]

•

P.L. 106-398, (H.R. 4205, FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act). Section 1213

of the conference report required the President to submit a semi-annual report

on the contributions of European nations and organizations to the peacekeeping

and civil operations in Kosovo.

[Status: became law, October 30, 2000]

•

P.L. 106-429, (H.R. 4811, FY 2001 Appropriations for Foreign Operations).

Set limit of U.S. assistance to Kosovo to 15% of total donors funds pledged for

calendar year 2001.

[Status: became law, November 6, 2000]

Sanctions

•

P.L. 106-79 (FY 2000 Department of Defense Appropriations Act). Section

8142 of the Act barred funds from this or any other Act for reconstruction

activities in Serbia (excluding Kosovo) as long as Slobodan Milosevic remained

President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[Status: became law, October 25, 1999.]

•

S. 720/H.R.1064, “Serbia Democratization Act.” In addition to authorizing an

assistance program for the development of democratic and civil society in

Yugoslavia, these similar bills sponsored by Senator Helms in the Senate and

Rep. Smith in the House enumerated several sanctions already in effect against

Belgrade and conditioned the lifting of sanctions on several criteria.

CRS-36

[Status: Senate passed S. 720, November 4, 1999. House passed H.R. 1064,

September 25, 2000.]

•

S. 2382, “Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion, and Anti-Corruption Act of

2000.” This bill authorized a range of foreign aid activities. Title V of the bill

incorporated the Serbia Democratization Act, above.

[Status: Reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2000.]

•

P.L. 106-113 (FY 2000 Consolidated Appropriations Act). Section 537 of the

Act prohibited funds to be made available for Serbia, except for assistance to

Kosovo or Montenegro or for promoting democracy in Serbia. Section 566

prohibited assistance, except for humanitarian and democratization aid, to be

provided for any country or entity failing to apprehend war criminals to the war

crimes Tribunal. Section 599 continued the “outer wall” of sanctions against the

FRY during FY 2000 unless the President certified that a number of conditions

were met.

[Status: became law, November 29, 1999]

•

P.L. 106-429 (FY 2001 Appropriations for Foreign Operations Act). Section

564 of the Act restricted assistance to countries providing sanctuary to indicted

war criminals. Other sanctions against Serbia in House and Senate bills were

dropped in conference, in favor of $100 million in assistance to Serbia (sec. 594)

provided that President determined that Serbia had met a number of conditions.

[Status: became law, November 6, 2000]

Alternative Policy

•

Regarding the right of self-determination: H. Con. Res. 9 and H. Con. Res. 32

expressed the sense that the United States should support the right of selfdetermination of the Albanians of Kosovo. Both were referred to the Committee

on International Relations.

•

H.Con.Res. 99. This concurrent resolution, sponsored by Rep. Weldon,

expressed support for the recommendations of the United States

Congress-Russian Duma meeting in Vienna, Austria, held April 30, to May 1,

1999, on the situation in Kosovo. Among other things, the conference called for

the end of NATO bombing against the FRY, the withdrawal of Serbian forces

from Kosovo, and the cessation of military activities of the Kosovo Liberation

Army (KLA).

[Introduced and referred to Committee on International Relations, May 5,

1999; Committee held hearings, May 13, 1999.]

•

S. 720/H.R. 1064, “Serbia Democratization Act.” These similar bills,

sponsored by Senator Helms in the Senate and Rep. Smith in the House,

authorized an assistance program of over $100 million to promote democracy

and civil society in Serbia and Montenegro and to assist the victims of Serbian

oppression. The bills applied certain measures against the FRY.

[Status: Senate passed S. 720, November 4, 1999. House passed H.R. 1064,

September 25, 2000.]

CRS-37

•

S. 2680, “Balkans Peace and Prosperity Act.” Senator Hutchison introduced

this bill to authorize funds for the convening of a Balkans Stabilization

Conference. The purpose of the conference was to consider all outstanding

issues related to the execution of the Dayton Accords and the peace

agreement with Serbia that ended Operation Allied Force.

[Status: introduced and referred to Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6,

2000.]

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