France and the United States: Allies and Rivals

Congressional research reportAug 15, 2000

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France and the United States: Allies and Rivals

August 15, 2000

Paul E. Gallis

Specialist in European Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

France and the United States: Allies and Rivals

Summary

France, while a key ally, has developed policies in pursuit of its national interests

that challenge the United States on issues of importance to both countries. The end

of the Cold War has altered a balance that once placed security above political and

economic competition. The leading European Union members, including France, are

enhancing political cooperation, raising questions about traditional areas of U.S.

leadership in Europe. At the same time U.S. and French interests often intersect, and

the two countries cooperate in important endeavors.

France, like the United States, believes that it has a special role in the world. For

many years, French leaders have believed that France has a “mission” to encourage

human rights and democracy. For the past half-century, a version of France’s mission

is that the country must play a key role in shaping the European Union.

Key French leaders are critical of U.S. culture and the U.S. government,

including Congress. They have described Congress as isolationist and “unilateralist”

on such issues as sanctions and national missile defense. They also believe that U.S.

leaders have a tendency in foreign policy to seek to “fix things,” or find a full solution,

when at best in their view a particular problem can only be managed but not

eliminated. Some French leaders and intellectuals view U.S. cultural and economic

influence as materialistic and insidious.

The European Union is central to French political and economic life. France

wishes to see institutional reforms in the EU to make the Union more flexible in

decision-making. To wield greater influence in the world, the EU, in the view of

France and some other member governments, must have a military capability. To this

end, France and Britain have taken the lead in building a European Security and

Defense Policy (ESDP).

While some U.S. officials believe that ESDP could enhance burdensharing and

encourage stability in Europe, others fear that it may marginalize NATO by assuming

current NATO tasks and reducing the role of the United States in Europe. In

addition, some Congressional and Administration critics believe that ESDP will create

a “hollow force” that borrows U.S. assets and degrades the readiness of U.S. forces.

A range of regional issues are on the U.S.-France bilateral agenda. France often

buffers U.S. interests by assuming peacekeeping responsibilities in different parts of

the world and through other means that encourage stability. At the same time, the

two countries sometimes compete for political and economic influence in the Middle

East, Africa, and elsewhere.

The common interests of the United States and France remain greater than their

differences. In instances where the two countries’ interests have been seriously

challenged, they have tended to work together. In European security issues above all,

France is seeking to bear a greater burden, with the trade-off that Washington must,

in the French view, cede a greater measure of influence to Paris.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Political Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Overview of French Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

France and the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

France’s EU Presidency, July-December 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Miscellaneous EU-U.S. Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

European Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

U.S. Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

NATO’s Integrated military structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

NATO Enlargement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Restructuring France’s Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

European Defense Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Concerns over ESDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Regional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Balkans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

The Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

The Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Syria and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

France and the United States: Allies and Rivals

Introduction

France, while a key ally, has developed policies in pursuit of its national interests

that often present a challenge to the United States on issues of importance to both

countries. The end of the Cold War has altered a balance that once placed security

above political and economic competition. A clear intention of the leading European

Union members, including France, to enhance political cooperation is raising

questions about traditional areas of U.S. leadership in Europe.

During the past decade an increasingly critical perception among French political

leaders and intellectuals toward the United States, including Congress, has led to

more than the traditional barbs aimed at U.S. policy and culture. This changed

perception is finding expression in concrete policies in part intended to set EU

members on a course more independent of U.S. influence. France, and several other

countries to a lesser degree, are seeking to enhance EU influence in shaping the U.S.

debate over issues that affect European interests. The French government’s

perception of and reaction to threats to security, its faith in multilateral institutions to

manage international problems, and a popular belief that “globalization” is an

American-dominated trend harming French interests, set France apart from the United

States on a range of questions.

At the same time key interests of France and the United States remain

intertwined, and government policies in Paris and Washington on many issues are

mutually beneficial. On many questions, the policy and objectives of the two

countries converge.

This report begins with a brief analysis of French political and economic

developments, followed by a sketch of French views of France’s role in the world and

of the United States. An examination of the key role that the EU occupies in French

policymaking follows, with an eye on affected U.S. interests. Next follows an analysis

of competing French and U.S. efforts to shape European security policy, with special

attention to French military modernization and intentions in promoting development

of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), with emphasis on implications

for U.S. leadership of NATO. The next section examines French and U.S. policies

on several regional issues, followed by a concluding analysis of paths that the two

countries’ relationship might take in the future.

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Background

The Political Setting

France is in a period of cohabitation, with a president of one party and a prime

minister of another. In 1997, Gaullist President Jacques Chirac ill-advisedly called

legislative elections, in which his party, the Rally for the Republic (RPR) and its

centrist governing partner, lost a large majority. The Socialists gained a plurality, and

Chirac appointed Lionel Jospin to form a leftist coalition government. Prime Minister

Jospin has given mostly minor ministerial posts to the Greens and the Communists.

The constitution gives a preponderant role to the president as decisionmaker in

foreign and defense policy, but Jospin has capitalized on disarray within the right by

occasionally taking initiatives without Chirac’s clear approval. However, both the

Jospin government and Chirac agree that France must seek to strengthen the political

development of the European Union, and build an EU that enjoys a real voice in

global affairs. Jospin is expected to challenge Chirac in coming presidential elections.

Both legislative and presidential elections will occur in 2002. Jospin, from the

moment he became prime minister, has pledged to break established traditions and

practices. He has emphasized efforts to end corruption in government and business,

and sought to open the economy to greater outside investment, in part due to the

EU’s urging. In March 2000 Jospin replaced unpopular and ineffective ministers, and

brought in Socialists who would broaden the government’s base on the left and in the

center. On the right, Chirac saw his party split apart after the failed legislative

elections of 1997. A sizable faction, led by former RPR member Charles Pasqua, is

criticizing Chirac for supposedly abandoning Gaullist principles by agreeing to cede

more sovereignty to the European Union, and for his political leadership. Pasqua and

others from the center-right may challenge Chirac for the presidency. Both Chirac

and Jospin remain popular with the French public, with Chirac viewed as

“statesmanlike” and Jospin as “courageous” and “modern.”1

A well-performing economy has bolstered the fortunes of the Socialist-led

coalition. When Jospin became prime minister in June 1997, unemployment stood at

13%; by July 2000, it had fallen to 9.7%. In 1998, the government pushed a law

through parliament that reduced the work week from 39 to 35 hours. Critics contend

that, while the law may encourage hiring, it may ultimately reduce productivity. They

also contend that many jobs created under the Socialists are low-paying, and often

part-time, and that there is a “brain drain” of young people trained for the high

technology sector going to the United States and Britain both for education and for

jobs. Inflation is low and has remained steady, perhaps helped by European Monetary

Union, which both Jospin and Chirac have strongly supported. To many observers’

surprise, the Socialists have proceeded with gradual privatization where there was

previously considerable intervention in key industries, such as defense, banking,

telecommunications, and insurance. The OECD describes the public sector as still

“vast,” but also acknowledges that privatization is making companies “more

“Jacques Chirac améliore sa position sans surclasser Lionel Jospin,” Le Monde (henceforth

LM), April 4, 2000. p. 6; “Jacques Chirac, le retour,” Le Monde des livres, May 19, 2000,

p. VIII.

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accountable by lessening the sense of reassurance for stakeholders [employees, banks,

customers, and suppliers] stemming from the presence of a majority stakeholder [the

government] that cannot be declared bankrupt.” Of political importance, many

economists believe the economy will expand through 2002, a factor that could aid

Jospin as the architect of government economic policy.2

Overview of French Perspectives

France, like the United States, believes that it has a special role in the world.

The core of the perceptions of France’s role in the world stems from the Revolution

that began in 1789. The Revolution was an event of broad popular involvement:

widespread bloodshed, expropriation of property, and execution of the king fed the

notion that there could be no turning back to monarchical government. Not only was

the monarchy overthrown and a powerful church structure forcibly dismantled, but

French armies, and ultimately French administrators in their wake, also transformed

much of the continent into societies where more representative institutions could

ultimately take root. The Revolution was therefore a central, formative element in

modern European history. The cultural achievements of France before and since the

Revolution have added to French influence. French became the language of the élite

in many European countries. By 1900, French political figures of the left and right

shared the opinion that France was and must continue to be a beacon for the rest of

the world.3

The view that France has a “mission” in the world endures today. French

intellectuals of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment laid the basis for many of

today’s precepts about human rights and democracy, later forged into concrete form

by the Revolution and evinced by the modern French state. For many years, the

French government emphasized the message of human rights and democracy,

particularly in the developing world and in central Europe. By the mid-20th century,

some French colonies, such as Algeria and Morocco, sharply disputed whether actual

French policy met the ideals of this message. In a different form, through much of the

1990s, French officials, particularly Gaullists, were highly assertive in seeking to

engender French views in European Union initiatives, sometimes in concert with

Germany and sometimes alone. In 1996, the former Gaullist Prime Minister Alain

Juppé called for an “inner circle” in the EU, defined as “a small number of states

around France and Germany” that must move forward to secure European Monetary

Union, a common foreign and security policy, and a military force able to protect the

Union’s interests. His foreign minister added that such policies, “far from weakening

OECD Economic Surveys: France (Paris: OECD, 1999), pp. 9-18, 75-84; a more extensive

discussion of US-EU economic issues can be found in Library of Congress. CRS. (name r eda

cted), EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and Magnitude. CRS Report

RL30608. July, 18, 2000.

In a vast literature, see John Weightman, “Fatal Attraction,” New York Review of Books.

Feb. 11, 1993, p. 10; and François Furet, La Révolution de Turgot à Jules Ferry, 1770-1880

(Paris, 1988), pp. 511-512, 516-517.

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France’s influence and authority in the world... will increase their impact and

audience.”4

These ambitious objectives have sometimes become entangled in rhetorical

fusillades aimed at the United States. President Chirac has said that he wishes to see

the European Union become “an active and powerful center, the equal of the United

States,” and “one of the great centers of decision-making and action in the world,”

with France playing a “catalytic role” in forging such leadership.5 Prime Minister

Jospin has said that he sees “a tendency to hegemony” in U.S. security policy in

Europe. French officials criticize what they view as “unilateralist” U.S. initiatives or

actions, against the interest of the European allies and taken without consultation,

and say that they wish to see important international issues undertaken in a

multilateral context.6

Congress is increasingly the target of French criticism. French officials and media

cite the Senate’s defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the fall of

1999, sanctions legislation against Cuba and Iran, and support for the national missile

defense program as examples of unilateralism. President Chirac has said that

Congress “all too often succumbs to the temptations of unilateralism and

isolationism.” A leading foreign policy analyst, in a notably vitriolic editorial, has

attacked the Senate as “irresponsible” for its vote on CTBT, and charged that “the

majority of [U.S.] elected officials are totally ignorant of international issues.”7

Some observers of France and the United States see a fundamental clash in the

way in which the two countries pursue international policies. In this view, the United

States, now the lone superpower, and protected for much of its history by two

oceans, has a tendency to wish to “fix things,” to achieve a full solution in short order

to a problem.8 In contrast, France has been invaded many times in its history, and

thereby lives with an inescapable sense of vulnerability and limitations. Having

experienced a long and often violent path to stability and democracy, France is more

likely to seek to manage an international problem and to seek a long-term solution

with a potentially dangerous adversary such as Russia or Iraq. Foreign Minister

Védrine has offered a veiled criticism of what he views as the U.S. tendency during

the last decade to attempt to “export” democracy as if it were a “religion,” with

EU: Report examines countries’ views on IGC issues. FBIS-WEU-96-052. March 15, 1996,

p. 11; and “Débat au Sénat sur la CIG: Intervention du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères M.

de Charette.” March 14, 1996, unpaginated text.

Jacques Chirac. “Discours devant l’IHEDN,” Paris, June 8, 1996; and “Pour un modèle

européen,” Libération. March 25, 1996, p. 1.

“M. Jospin critique la réintégration de la France dans l’OTAN,” LM, Feb. 5, 1997; “Védrine

mutes, a little, mistrust of US,” International Herald Tribune (IHT), June 10-11, 2000, p.

“Chirac’s attack on Congress has a bigger target,” IHT, Nov. 9,1999, p. 2; for the policy

analyst, see Thierry de Montbrial, “Essais nucléaires: un vote désastrueux du Sénat

américain,” Le Figaro, Oct. 21, 1999, p. 12.

The idea was well developed by Philip Gordon of the Center on the United States and France

at a conference on U.S-French relations, Washington, May 24, 2000.

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supposedly receptive populations ripe for conversion. In his government’s view, free

elections and ideology cannot alone yield democracy, and sanctions cannot force a

government to change its ways. Instead, many years must pass, with an evolution of

civic institutions and attitudes, before a people decide to adopt and develop its own

model of democracy.9

More than rhetorical sparring over specific issues is at play because there is also

a perception that U.S. power and influence are affecting the substance of every-day

life in France. This is not altogether a new development. Since the end of the First

World War, many French have viewed the American evocation of technology and the

virtues of industriousness as having yielded a culture in the United States that values

materialism more than intellectual endeavor. An original meaning of the French word

“américanisation” was “mass production,” with negative connotations about the loss

of individualism and creativity.

Today, in a global economy, many French politicians and commentators are

portraying U.S. practices as invasive and insidious. While some French observers

believe that American individualism contributes positively to global economic growth

because U.S. entrepreneurs are often unafraid of the risks of restructuring old

industries to make them more competitive, and some invest in U.S. companies, others

believe that “unbridled U.S. capitalism” leads to a rapacious materialism and a society

where the poor are left by the side of the road.10 Interior Minister Jean-Pierre

Chevènement, the most nationalistic voice in the government, contends that

“globalization” – often used negatively in France as a synonym for “Americanization”

– risks making Europe “a rich suburb of the American empire.” Such sentiments are

sometimes reflected in the street. The violent sacking of a McDonald’s in 1999 in

reaction to U.S. tariffs on French agricultural goods and as a symbol of American

capitalism and culture received wide coverage in the French media. Many French

investors appear to believe that U.S. money managers who demand high rates of

return have bought heavily into French companies, forcing their restructuring and

leading to employees being thrown out of work. U.S. Ambassador Felix Rohatyn has

spent considerable effort countering this perception by noting that it is a company’s

own managers and competition in the international marketplace, and not a Wall Street

clique, that bring about decisions over restructuring.11

“Intervention du ministre des affaires étrangères,” Warsaw Conference on Democracy, June

26, 2000. [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr]

Criticism of U.S. society is common. According to the President of the National Assembly,

“it’s no longer slavery, it’s no longer institutionalized racial segregation, it’s the death penalty.

Injection, firing squad, electrocution, gassing, hanging: in the country of innovation, invention

is also at the service of death....A strange country that where religion is omnipresent, even an

obsession,... redemption doesn’t stand a chance.” “Raymond Forni dénonce la ‘sauvagerie’

de la peine de mort aux Etats-Unis,” LM. June 13, 2000, p. 9.

Comments at conference on U.S.-French relations, Center on U.S.-France, Washington,

May 24, 2000; “French Minister puts case for nation states,” Financial Times (FT), June 1,

2000, p. 2; and Felix Rohatyn, “Remarks at Université d’Auvergne,” May 12, 2000.

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France and the European Union

The European Union is central to French political and economic life. In a

concrete sense, France shares sovereignty with other EU members through agreement

on EU legislation that guides French laws on a wide range of social and economic

issues. Because Brussels has significant influence over daily life, the French

government must constantly make the case to citizens that the EU is beneficial, and

not a distant, decision-making bureaucratic entity overriding the democratic process.

Most notably, qualifying for EMU meant imposition by Paris of austerity budgets that

curbed government expenditures and reduced public debt, as well as acceptance of the

European Central Bank (ECB) that set monetary policy for the eleven countries

adopting a single currency. In a real sense, France and its EMU partners have ceded

to the ECB sovereign power to determine price stability, interest rates, and exchange

rates. In return, member states believe that EMU will make the European Union

more competitive in international markets, more influential in international trade and

financial institutions, and their individual societies wealthier, with diminished

unemployment, less costly social programs, and greater social peace. EMU is both

an economic and a political act, meant to deepen integration of member states’

political, economic, and social life.

In contrast to the preceding Gaullist government, an important change of tone

on the French government’s role in the EU is noticeable under Jospin. Today, to

Chirac and Jospin, the EU is a “union,... a deepening of the nation.... European affairs

are no longer foreign affairs, and the European debate is not separate from the

national debate.”12 These views are a step back from those of the Gaullist government

of the mid-1990s, which described France as the “catalytic force” shaping key EU

policies. Jospin in particular is more likely to describe France as a medium-range

power, unable to play the role of the EU’s arbiter, and he recognizes France’s

limitations for influencing events on the global stage. Such a change is politically

significant because it could diminish concerns in such countries as Britain, Italy, and

the Netherlands that Paris is attempting to impose a “French model” on the Union,

and is more willing instead to seek compromises that clearly acknowledge the

interests of states with differing views.

France has long joined with Germany in undertaking the key steps to build the

European Union. Most recently, the two countries were the driving force for EMU,

implemented in 1999 among 11 of the Union’s 15 members. The French and German

governments agree that EU institutions must be reformed to streamline decisionmaking before the Union enlarges further, although France has less enthusiasm for

enlargement. But the close working relationship from the years when the late French

President Mitterrand and former German Chancellor Kohl drove major EU initiatives

is less apparent today. Some French officials believe that German Chancellor

Schroeder has less interest in France than his predecessor, and that his principal goals

are to consolidate unification, build German economic power and cement relations

with central European states. Germany’s declining defense budgets dim prospects for

Statement of the Prime Minister on the priorities of the French Presidency of the EU, before

the National Assembly, May 9, 2000; and Jacques Chirac, “European Defense,” speech

before the WEU parliamentary assembly and the IHEDN. May 30, 2000.

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French efforts to build an effective European defense policy. And some French

officials quail before German Foreign Minister Fischer’s desire to build a “federal”

Europe because of the implications for diminished national sovereignty.13

France’s EU Presidency, July-December 2000

Throughout the European Union, populations evince a sense that there is a

“democratic deficit,” that Brussels is out of touch with the needs of the man in the

street, that the Union is a “sediment of treaties and regulations.”14 Member

governments face the institutional challenge of making EU decision-making machinery

more efficient, and the political challenge of persuading their citizens that the Union

is bettering their lives and not robbing countries of their national identities.

The French government, during its EU presidency of July-December 2000, has

as its goal to make EU decision-making more flexible, and the Union appear less

technocratic and more responsive to citizens’ needs. Jospin, in a speech to the

National Assembly made after consultation with Chirac, outlined the objectives of the

French EU presidency. Among these were:

Reform EU institutions to diminish the possibility of deadlock, and weight

votes on the basis of population in the European Council to reflect a more

“democratic” proportional representation before the EU enlarges, a step

that would strengthen the influence of more populous members such as

France and Germany.15

Enhance economic integration to promote job creation, and further member

states’ coordination of social policies.

Strengthen defense and security cooperation in EU structures.

Provide for more “reinforced cooperation,” exemplified by EMU, to allow

willing states to deepen integration on selected issues, even when other

states do not wish to participate.16

The French government’s ambitious agenda contains several important political

signals. To member state populations, the agenda promises that continued political

integration will not sacrifice the people’s democratic voice. To critics of the EU’s

bureaucratic machinery and to governments leery of enlargement, it promises reform

“La France et l’Allemagne ont trouvé un accord...,” LM, June 2, 2000, p. 4; and CRS

Report RL30407, Germany in Transition: Relevant Issues for Congress. Updated July 20,

2000.

“Comment sortir du malaise et du ‘déficit démocratique’,” LM, May 10, 2000, p. 2.

For a discussion of the operation of EU institutions, see CRS. Karen Donfried, European

Union: the European Community Evolves, Report 94-412F, updated August 1995; and

Desmond Dinan, An Ever Closer Union, Boulder, Co., 1994.

“Statement of the Prime Minister...,” May 9, 2000.[http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr]

CRS-8

in decision-making. And to countries wary of greater “deepening,” such as the United

Kingdom, it warns that political integration will continue.

U.S. Perspectives and the French EU Presidency. For many years, U.S.

Administrations and Congress have strongly supported enhanced political cooperation

and economic growth in the European Union as means to build stability on the

continent and to provide a market for U.S. products and an attractive environment for

investment. The EU is the United States’ largest trading partner, purchasing one-fifth

of U.S. exports of goods and over one-half of U.S. exports of services. The United

States and the EU also have an enormous cross-ownership relationship; each is the

largest investor in the other’s market.17

At the same time, U.S. officials and Congress are often impatient with the pace

of EU decision-making. Especially since the end of the Cold War, Congress and both

the Bush and Clinton Administrations have urged the Union to move more quickly in

accepting new member states as a parallel to (or, in some cases, a substitute for)

NATO enlargement to encourage the growth of democratic societies and market

economies. U.S. officials also regularly press representatives of EU governments to

accept specific countries for membership.

France, not alone in the Union, has preferred to move cautiously on EU

enlargement, and views U.S. support for particular candidates as an inappropriate

intervention on a matter of sovereignty for EU governments. In particular, French

(and many other European) officials resist U.S. support for Turkey, a controversial

candidate due to its human rights record, its Muslim population, its antiquated

agricultural economy, and the potential for large-scale emigration to current EU

states. French officials agree that Turkey is of pivotal strategic importance for

Europe, but note that qualifying for the EU is a process that requires an extended

period of time. The Union has designated Turkey as a candidate state for

membership. EU members agree that Union institutions often function in a halting

manner; to enlarge the Union before those institutions are made more efficient would

result in increased deadlock over difficult issues. More broadly, France, and most

other EU members, believe that candidate states must reform their economies and

learn to accept shared sovereignty in order to build a coherent, truly integrated Union.

Some French officials are also concerned that continuing enlargement will place too

many countries within Germany’s political and economic orbit.

To some U.S. officials, there is a particular French edge to the enlargement issue

aimed at the United States. Officials from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary

– each of which joined NATO in 1999 – say that French officials have told them, in

effect, “make a choice, be Atlanticist or European, but you cannot be both.” Central

European governments have sought NATO membership to ensure against the

potential threat of a revived, aggressive Russia; NATO membership today means

following U.S. leadership in most security and many political issues. It is the

interpretation of some central European officials that the French call to “make a

choice” means that, to join the Union, they must put EU institutions and objectives

first and not treat their NATO membership as an acknowledgment of U.S. leadership

CRS. Cooper, EU-U.S. Economic Ties.

CRS-9

in Europe and the world.18 French officials strongly deny that such conversations have

taken place. Another possible interpretation of such discussions is that France is

attempting to persuade candidate states to take EU requirements for membership

more seriously, and put greater domestic political capital into meeting guidelines that

can be economically painful for elements of their populations. It is also possible that

some central European officials emphasize these discussions to pressure France and

other EU countries to “prove them wrong” and move more quickly on enlargement.

U.S. support for greater EU political integration may have its limits. Since

summer 1999, when France and Britain began to make concrete proposals for a

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), discussed more fully below, U.S.

officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concern that the EU is

creating a duplicate security institution to NATO, without creating a real military

capability able to respond to threats.

Miscellaneous EU-U.S. Issues

France joins with other EU members in formulating a policy, often after lengthy

negotiation, on many issues. The French government and other members normally

refuse to engage in detailed bilateral discussions of such issues with a U.S.

Administration or Congress, and refer such matters to the Commission, the Union’s

executive office, which has competence to undertake international negotiations and

propose legislation on these issues.

The United States and the EU discuss a range of economic issues.19 France has

played an important, but not necessarily singular, role in persuading the EU to adopt

its final position on some of these issues. A small sampling of such issues follows.

At the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States has won decisions

requiring the EU to allow entry of a range of products of genetically modified

organisms (GMO). France has led an effort in the EU to overturn a Commission

decision to permit the entry of a selected group of such products, an effort that has

led to retaliatory tariffs by the Clinton Administration. The EU has restricted licenses

of importation of bananas, many from former French colonies or current overseas

possessions, to mostly European importers, to the detriment of U.S. and Latin

American entities; the WTO has ruled in favor of the United States and other

countries and against the EU on banana imports, but the EU has not yet formulated

an acceptable regime for licensing. Disputes between the United States and the EU

persist over telecommunications, and S.2793, the Foreign Government Investment

Act, would prohibit any foreign company that is more than 25% state-owned from

purchasing a U.S. telecommunications firm. The European Commission has attacked

this legislation as contrary to a WTO ruling that abolishes restrictions on foreign

ownership of a telecommunications company. Some observers believe that U.S.-EU

Discussions with central European officials; “Poland is pressed to choose between Europe

and U.S.,” New York Times (NYT), June 4, 2000, p. 6; and the joint French and Polish

rebuttal, “Poland and Europe,” NYT, June 29, 2000, p. A30.

For a more detailed discussion, see Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue, House International

Relations Committee. 106th Congress, 2nd sess., compiled by committee staff and CRS, June

2000 (periodically updated).

CRS-10

cross-investment will ultimately lead to the internationalization of the industry,

thereby dampening such disputes. On another issue, the EU has strongly supported

China’s entry into the WTO to open China to foreign trade and investment, and as a

means to influence political developments in China by exposing it to broader, more

democratic international currents.

The United States and the Union cooperate, often quietly, on a range of sensitive

international political issues.20 In October 1999, the EU and the United States agreed

to a cooperative framework to combat money laundering, international organized

crime, and computer crime. Through frequent bilateral meetings with French and

other European police agencies, and meetings with INTERPOL, the United States

works with Europe to combat organized crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in people,

weapons trafficking, and terrorism. There is sharing of intelligence on a range of

highly sensitive issues among the United States, France, and other EU countries.

Political differences persist in some areas, as in EU opposition to U.S. sanctions

policy against Iran, which Washington believes curbs Iran’s support for terrorism.

European Security Issues

The transition underway in most key European NATO allies from heavy forces

geared for the Cold War to lighter, more mobile forces for crisis management and

conflict beyond the allied treaty area has its reflection in new directions being explored

for European security institutions. France views NATO’s future role as one that

ensures collective defense against a revitalized Russia, should it prove hostile. France

and Britain are leading an effort to provide the European Union with a credible

military capability, one day able to operate independently of NATO.

Congress has had an important role in influencing the transatlantic debate over

European security institutions. During the 1998 NATO enlargement debate, the U.S.

Senate passed the Kyl Amendment, which stated, in part, that new threats such as

proliferation, terrorism, and obstruction of the flow of natural resources “will require

that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces

over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate

jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts.”21 Administration officials say

that they had the amendment in mind when, in the following months, they sought to

designate such threats as requiring consideration of a NATO military response in

negotiating language for a new Strategic Concept. France, and some other allies,

opposed such language, and prevailed in emphasizing political and diplomatic means

instead to counter such threats. A supposed U.S. tendency to resort too quickly to

military action in a crisis has become an issue in U.S.-French relations.

The French government also believes that U.S. domination of allied decisionmaking is detrimental to Europe’s long-term interests. In part due to initial reluctance

of the United States to become involved in the Bosnian conflict in the early 1990s,

Ibid.

Exec. Amendment No. 2310 (Sen. Kyl), Congressional Record, April 27, 1998, p. S3657.

CRS-11

and in part due to significant Congressional opposition to U.S. involvement in both

Bosnia and the Kosovo conflict, many French officials are concerned that one day the

United States may not wish to be involved in a crisis that the Europeans believe

threatens their security. This sentiment, shared in a number of continental capitals,

has fueled interest in developing a more independent European military capability.

NATO

In a broad sense, the French government agrees with Congress and the

Administration that proliferation, terrorism, and instability in oil-rich regions are

threats to security. But the French government does not agree that NATO is

necessarily the instrument that should respond to such threats.

In any discussion of NATO’s future French officials tend to underscore first the

enduring links of transatlantic relations: cultural and economic ties, philosophical

values, and concern over Russia’s course. They note that the United States and

France seek to guarantee human rights and spread democracy, and build stability in

the Balkans.

But in the view of Defense Minister Alain Richard, “Europe has its own analysis

of threats and interests in the world.” France’s analysis differs from that of the United

States on several key issues. In contrast to the United States, France, and other

European countries, believe that the UN should legitimize NATO crisis management

operations. France views Russia as a “partner of the first order” in crisis management

operations, an evident reference to European sentiment during the Kosovo conflict

that the Clinton Administration initially sought to keep Russia at arms length in

resolving the crisis. While France welcomes U.S. involvement in the Balkans, Paris

also believes that Balkan stability does not reach the same level of importance in

Washington as it does in European capitals. The French government is particularly

concerned that Congress will curtail or end U.S. involvement in the Balkans before

the region has been stabilized.

French officials also hold a general European view that recourse to military

action must be “subordinate” to political and diplomatic efforts to resolve a crisis, and

that military action at all levels must be clearly under civilian control.22 The French

government believes that the U.S. tendency to seek “to fix things” is part of a U.S.

inclination that can lead too rapidly to a decision to use force before other available

options have been exhausted. In the Gulf War in 1991, the French government

thought that the United States moved too quickly to the military option. Before the

Kosovo conflict of 1999, France thought that the United States initially was moving

too quickly towards use of the military. In both wars, France concurred in the final

decision to use force, then participated in both conflicts. In the allied debate over a

new Strategic Concept in 1999, France led an effort to ensure that the document did

not reflect the language and sense of the Kyl Amendment, interpreted by the

Europeans as urging early consideration of the use of military force against such

Alain Richard, Opening remarks, Transatlantic Forum, Washington, DC, June 28, 2000.

Author’s notes and text provided by French embassy; discussions with French officials.

CRS-12

threats as proliferation and terrorism. These differences are components of the

transatlantic debate over the future of European security institutions.

U.S. Leadership. The Clinton Administration does not wish to see NATO

marginalized as an instrument primarily for use against a revived Russian threat. In

the Administration’s view, crisis management and political initiatives, such as the

encouragement of democracy in NATO candidate states, are important parts of the

agenda for the post-Cold War era.

France, in the words of Chirac, wishes to see “a better balance” in the alliance,

with the European pillar and European influence enhanced. French officials believe

that the United States, without adequate consultation, sometimes makes unilateral

decisions on security issues that affect European interests. While France

acknowledges that peace could not have been brought to Bosnia without U.S.

leadership, nor the Kosovo conflict resolved without strong U.S. military engagement,

it often questions U.S. actions. In Kosovo, for example, the French government

believes that the principle of taking key steps only after reaching consensus was

violated when the United States, without going through the allied command structure,

fired cruise missiles against Serb targets.23

In the political realm, French officials cite U.S. steps on arms control that they

believe adversely affect French (and European) interests. In August 1999, Chirac said

that the world “must carefully avoid anything that might jeopardize the ABM Treaty,

as this could lead to a breakdown of the strategic balance and a revival of the nuclear

arms race aggravated by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.”24 France believes that

the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty combat proliferation. After the Cold War, France

decided to reduce its nuclear weapons force, dismantling its land-based systems,

scaling back plans for nuclear submarine modernization, and closing its nuclear test

site. The government in large part based these decisions on a belief that these treaties

would be observed, and as a means to encourage other countries to follow suit. The

Senate’s defeat in October 1999 of the CTBT, in the French view, was a serious blow

in the effort to curb proliferation, and it adversely affected strategic decisions about

France’s nuclear forces.

French officials are critical of Administration discussions with Russia to revise

the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972 in order to deploy a national missile

defense (NMD). Paris believes that the treaty enhances stability in the nuclear era

because it strengthens deterrence by ensuring that nuclear powers remain vulnerable

to reprisal, and because it discourages would-be nuclear states from developing

nuclear weapons. In addition, French officials do not share U.S. assessment of a

nuclear threat from countries such as Iran or North Korea, which they believe could

respond to diplomatic initiatives. In Paris’ view, both defeat of the CTBT and

Lessons from Kosovo, Ministry of Defense, Paris, 1999, pp. 9, 19.

Chirac, cited in Arms Control, disarmament and non-proliferation: French policy. Paris,

2000. French government publication, p. 56.

CRS-13

development of NMD are “unilateral” steps taken to the detriment of the allies

because they encourage proliferation.25

NATO’s Integrated military structure. NATO’s military command structure

consists of multinational staffs (filled by officers from member countries) at the higher

levels, integrated with national units at the lower levels. The senior officer, the

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), is always a U.S. officer. France

withdrew from the integrated military structure in 1966, but has remained in the

political structure of NATO, with a representative on the North Atlantic Council, the

alliance’s political governing body. France’s absence from the command structure has

meant, until quite recently, that French forces seldom trained with other allied forces.

Some U.S. officials contend that French absence from the command structure

contributed to the poor performance of French forces in the Gulf War. A

longstanding objective of the United States and other allies has been to encourage

France to return to the command structure.

France’s return to the integrated military structure, however, is highly unlikely.

President Chirac, in the mid-1990s, said that France would consider returning to the

command structure if NATO were “renovated,” meaning that more Europeans would

be given influence in allied political and military decision-making, and that the

alliance’s structure and doctrine would be reshaped to fit the post-Cold War era.

Jospin, before coming to power as prime minister, seemed to oppose French return

to the integrated command structure. In contrast to the Gulf War, French forces

performed well in the Kosovo conflict, a view held by U.S. as well as French officials.

In light of this performance and France’s ability to participate in key decision-making

during prosecution of the conflict, French officials say that Paris is no longer

considering return to the integrated command structure.26 French officials contend

that ad hoc formulas under which France is engaged with the allies, as in the Kosovo

conflict, have worked well, and that French forces mesh smoothly at the operational

level with other allied forces. In their view, there is therefore no need to return to the

integrated command structure. The development of ESDP, discussed below, also

makes unlikely France’s return.

NATO Enlargement. France has joined other NATO members in endorsing the

principle of further enlargement of the alliance. At the 1997 NATO summit, France

supported the candidacies of two unsuccessful aspirants, Slovenia and Romania.

France has never been enthusiastic about enlargement of the alliance, in part due to

the belief that it first had to be “renovated.”27 Now, as is true of most European

allies, the French government is concentrating its energies more on EU than on

NATO enlargement.

Chirac, “European Defense,” IHEDN, May 30, 2000; Daniel Vernet, “Les Européens

craignent une relance de la course aux armements,” LM, June 6, 2000, p.2.

See, for example, Interview with Richard, Defence News, May 15, 2000.

CRS. Paul E. Gallis, NATO Enlargement: The Process and Allied Views, CRS Report 97666. July 1, 1997, pp. 11-14.

CRS-14

Restructuring France’s Defense Forces

France is in the midst of a military modernization plan that acknowledges that

the threat of a large land invasion from Russia has passed. In 1996 the French

government approved a program for1997 through 2002, to enable France to respond

to “a multitude of unstable local situations around the world,” including terrorism,

organized crime, and proliferation. Once completed, the plan will end conscription;

reduce the armed forces from 500,000 to 357,000; streamline nuclear forces; and

replace a heavy, armored force with a mobile, lighter one capable of power projection,

including a 50-60,000 man French rapid-reaction force. A political component of this

plan includes promotion of arms control agreements, already noted, such as the CTBT

and NPT, a policy in concert with French nuclear arms reductions.

The French government has acknowledged deficiencies in its forces during the

Kosovo conflict. While France contributed the most aircraft and flew the most

offensive and reconnaissance missions of any European ally, it nonetheless

experienced a shortfall in all-weather sensors, at times grounding its planes, as well

as in precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles. The French

government is encouraging other European countries to join in building an air tanker

fleet, and an improved satellite intelligence capability.28

Questions remain whether the new force, once in place, can achieve its

objectives. For several years the French defense budget has been declining. Training

costs could increase with the new, rapid-response mission. Some defense analysts say

that the smaller force will pressure Paris to make hard choices about the range and

number of missions to be undertaken. At the same time, analysts also believe that the

overall French force, if one includes, for example, the gendarmes to be used in

Balkans peacekeeping, is highly flexible in comparison to most allied forces.29

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

For decades, EU members have discussed creation of a common security and

defense policy. British opposition to new security institutions that might imply a

challenge to NATO’s primacy had been a roadblock to concrete steps. But in the fall

of 1998, the British government joined France in steps that ultimately led, at the

December 1999 EU Helsinki summit, to a Union statement “to develop an

autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged,

to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international

crises.”30 The EU set a goal for having a rapid reaction force of 50-60,000 men by

2003 for crisis management operations, with a “capabilities commitment conference,”

See Arms Contol, disarmament..., pp. 16-50; Lessons from Kosovo, pp. 8-21; and

“Operation Allied Force,” DOD document, attachments 1 and 2, Oct. 19, 1999.

Jacques Isnard, “La révolution doctrinale de l’armée française,” LM, June 6, 2000, p. 1.

For a more extensive discussion of ESDP, see CRS. Karen Donfried and (name redacted),

European Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union, CRS Report RL30538,

April 25, 2000. For an interesting analysis of French motives, see Peter Schmidt, “Where’s

the Boeuf?”, in D.G. Haglund, The France-US Leadership Race, Toronto, 2000.

CRS-15

at which member states will pledge military components, to be held in November

2000. The Clinton Administration has supported a European Security and Defense

Policy (ESDP), but has expressed concern, as has Congress, that it might conflict with

NATO in mission and organization.

French and British officials are supporting ESDP because they believe that the

European effort to bring peace to Bosnia and to resolve the Kosovo conflict was

ineffective. They also state that ESDP, should it succeed in enhancing European

capabilities, will lead to a greater sharing of the military burden with the United

States. In addition, they believe that the United States dominated decision-making

on Balkans issues where European interests and long-term resolve are greater than

those of the United States. For France, clear-cut political issues relating to the EU’s

larger role are involved. Defense Minister Alain Richard has written that the EU, to

achieve the desired political and economic weight in the world, must assume greater

responsibilities in the defense field. Such a weight “is incompatible with military

weakness.” Chirac has said that, during the Kosovo conflict, “the Europeans did not

convey the impression that they were fully in control of the fate of their own

continent....What we have achieved in the commercial and monetary spheres, we must

now achieve in the fields of security and defense.”31

The mission of military forces under ESDP is to handle the “Petersberg tasks”

(search and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking).

A clear consensus in the EU on the exact definition of those tasks is lacking. Some

French officials and some German officials define “crisis management” broadly, to

include a mission that would capture NATO’s conflict in 1999 with Serbia over

Kosovo. French officials acknowledge that today the EU countries lack, for example,

the air transport necessary, as well as air combat aircraft, to undertake such a mission,

and that the EU’s rapid reaction force in the planning stages would have been

insufficient for a ground invasion of Kosovo, had that been necessary. These officials

say that ESDP is in its earliest stages, that European defense budgets must increase,

and that considerable development and training of multinational forces must take

place in the coming years for the policy to be credible. But in contradiction to Paris’

stated desire to lead the way for a stronger European defense, the French defense

budget has been declining modestly. In 2000, the French defense budget as a

percentage of GDP stands at 2.8%, down from 3% in 1997 (The comparable U.S.

figures are 3.2% for 2000 and 3.4% for 1997.).32

ESDP envisions two types of missions, and the EU is creating an organizational

structure to prepare for them. One mission would borrow NATO assets (mostly U.S.

assets such as lift, intelligence, and command-and-control); the other would be

undertaken “without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities,” using national

command structures or multinational forces. The EU is creating structures to exercise

political control and strategic authority in directing an operation, and military entities

Richard, “Kosovo: le bilan et l’avenir,” LM, March 26-27, 2000, p. 14; Chirac, “European

Defense,” speech to general assembly of North Atlantic Treaty Association, Strasbourg, Oct.

19, 1999.

The Military Balance,1999-2000 (London, 2000), p. 300.

CRS-16

to plan and carry out operations. The EU members state that they will seek to avoid

“unnecessary duplication” with NATO structures.33

European Defense Industry. France contends that ESDP strengthens the

alliance because it will enhance military capabilities. A component of ESDP is an

effort to develop a stronger European defense industry. The French government is

advocating “convergence criteria” for EU members in defense technology research;

many of the criteria concentrate on technologies in which the Europeans were

deficient during the Kosovo conflict.

Defense Minister Richard has said that enhanced European defense technologies

should allay some U.S. concerns that the alliance is becoming “two-tiered.” U.S.

officials have criticized the allies for failing to develop or purchase advanced

technologies, leaving the United States to bear the brunt of the military burden, for

example, in night missions over Serbia during the Kosovo conflict. While the Clinton

Administration has encouraged development of a stronger European defense industry

and has said that the United States will be more open to European mergers and

acquisitions of U.S. defense companies to encourage cost savings, some U.S.

companies are clearly uneasy that political preferences will cause European

governments to “buy European.” In one view, “the consolidation of defense industries

on both sides of the Atlantic may lead to more bidding situations that pit a single

European entity against an American company, and where the political leaders face

pressure to buy at home.”34

U.S. Concerns over ESDP. Some Administration officials and some Members

of Congress believe that ESDP contains an unspoken agenda to develop an

organization responsible for European defense, with the intention of marginalizing

NATO. They wish to see ESDP concentrate upon building military capabilities that

will contribute to burdensharing in the alliance, and are wary of EU organizational

structures that appear to emulate NATO’s North Atlantic Council in political

decision-making, or its military planning and field staffs. In some instances, the

Administration has sought aggressively to influence ESDP. In late 1999, for example,

a State Department official reportedly submitted a document with U.S. wording for

the Helsinki summit statement on ESDP, a move seen by many EU members,

including some sympathetic to U.S. concerns, as an ill-conceived intrusion on their

sovereignty.

Of central concern to the United States and other allies not in the EU is the

Union’s political decision-making and military planning process for a crisis. Under

ESDP, non-EU allies, like the United States, will be involved in “consultation” with

the EU in the event of a crisis. Upon a decision by the EU “to launch an operation,

the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event

Presidency Conclusions, EU Helsinki Summit, Dec. 10-11, 1999.

“Defense Industry in U.S. is snubbed,” IHT, May 17, 2000, p. 1. An aide to British Prime

Minister Blair has reportedly said that in some instances buying U.S. technology would

expose European governments to the unwanted position of having to ask the U.S. Congress

for permission to sell a European defense product that contains U.S. technology. “U.S.

Defense Industry takes a hit,” IHT, May 18, 2000, p. 1.

CRS-17

of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a

decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not

use NATO assets.” The EU “will exercise... the political control and strategic

direction of the operation.” The EU is designing structures for ongoing consultation

with NATO before and during a crisis.35 Some U.S. officials see only a “hollow [EU]

force” that would borrow key NATO assets and use them for operations led by the

EU.

Under such guidelines, the United States and other NATO members, such as

Turkey and Norway that are not in the EU, would have a clear voice in decisionmaking only after permission is given to utilize NATO assets. In the U.S. view, such

missions might affect U.S. interests, and might diminish U.S. readiness by using its

assets; the United States and non-EU allies believe that they should therefore be

closely involved in both planning for an operation and in decisions leading to the

launch of the operation. Some executive-branch officials and some Members of

Congress believe that it is unlikely that the United States would be willing to provide

assets without having a significant role in decision-making for a conflict. French

officials counter that the structure, yet to be created, to link the EU and NATO will

provide for adequate consultation that should allay such concerns.

In the view of French, and other European, officials, Congress has been more

negative toward ESDP than the Administration. S. Res. 208, passed on November

8, 1999, drew criticism from many European officials because it stated that ESDP

should undertake an “autonomous mission...only after NATO had been offered the

opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for

action.” Some French officials viewed this as an effort to undermine the sovereignty

of EU members, arguing that there is no hierarchy of status or decision-making

between NATO and the EU, and that there can thus be no right of review by NATO

over the EU.

Some French officials appear to believe that non-EU European members of

NATO would represent the voice of Washington in EU councils, a development that

they oppose. Foreign Minister Védrine has said that the six European NATO

members that are not in the EU have been demanding closer association with EU

decision-making for possible missions “either in anticipation of joining the Union, or

as an affirmation, encouraged by the United States, of a right of review by NATO.”36

To some U.S. officials, the last phrase lends credibility to the contention that French

officials have told central European governments seeking EU membership to “make

a choice” between EU and U.S. leadership in security issues.

U.S. officials also believe that ESDP has left NATO’s Combined Joint Task

Forces (CJTF) in limbo. At NATO’s 1996 Berlin Ministerial meeting, NATO created

two types of CJTF, one using a “deployable” NATO headquarters outside the member

states, with a strong U.S. contingent and led by a U.S. officer; the other, more

Presidency Conclusions, EU Helsinki summit, Dec. 10-11, 1999, Annex I to Annex IV,

unpaginated.

Védrine, “Environnement stratégique et construction de l’Europe,” testimony before the

National Assembly’s National Defense and Armed Forces subcommittee, March 8, 2000.

CRS-18

distantly perceived, would also have a deployable headquarters but composed

primarily or entirely of European forces and led by NATO’s deputy SACEUR. U.S.

officials do not wish to see CJTF supplanted by ESDP, where a senior NATO officer

would not be in command. Other non-EU members of NATO, such as Turkey, have

also vigorously objected that the demise of CJTF would rob them of a role in

decision-making, and that some ESDP missions could escalate to situations implying

collective defense, where U.S. leadership would be necessary, but absent.37

Regional Issues

France and the United States share interests in several key regions. The Balkans,

Russia, the Middle East, and Africa currently raise issues of importance to both Paris

and Washington.

Balkans

France’s policy in the Balkans is largely decided in concert with the EU and

NATO, and there are continuing discussions with the U.S. government. The French

government has urged that European countries take the lead in implementing the

Dayton peace accord in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and in stabilizing Kosovo. France,

during its EU presidency, is sponsoring a conference on stabilization of the Balkans.

The EU has agreed to a long-term goal of “integration and association” of

Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, and post-Milosevic Yugoslavia with EU

countries. France, like the United States, is seeking to isolate Milosevic and engage

opposition movements and the diminishing remnants of independent Serbian society,

such as non-governmental organizations and churches. Unlike the United States,

France and several other EU members contend that sanctions targeting the Serbian

population, rather than Milosevic and his power structure, should be lifted.

In both Bosnia and Kosovo, French officials do not share the once-emphasized

U.S. view that multi-ethnic societies can be created. Foreign Minister Védrine has

written that “a truly multi-ethnic Kosovo [is] a chimera; security for all and

coexistence... is our objective.” But like the United States, France favors autonomy

and not independence for Kosovo. French officials are explicit in their view that an

independent Kosovo would likely be irredentist, seeking to unite with Albania and

merge Albanian-inhabited territory in Macedonia into a larger state, a development

that would further destabilize the region.38

Both Congress and the Administration view financial assistance and

peacekeeping in the Balkans as issues in which the Europeans must take the lead,

particularly after the United States bore the brunt of the military effort in Kosovo. The

See, for example, Sukru Eledag, “Turkey is justified!”, Istanbul Milliyet, July 4, 2000.

FBIS doc. GMP20000705000222.

Védrine, “La gestion de la crise du Kosovo,” LM, March 25, 2000, p. xvi; and

“Environnement stratégique,” [parliamentary testimony], March 8, 2000.

CRS-19

EU and the World Bank are coordinating funds for stabilization of the Balkans.

Donor states pledged $2.4 billion for regional infrastructure and other projects at a

March 29-30, 2000, conference. The United States pledged $80.56 million, and

France $25 million; France has also pledged funds through the European Union.39

France’s EU presidency will host a fall 2000 conference on the western Balkans,

the precise objectives of which remain unclear, according to some European officials.

The conference may serve to clarify the EU’s relationship to countries in the region,

and underscore that a democratic Yugoslavia could develop closer relations with the

Union. Among the issues to be discussed are whether to continue sanctions against

Serbia. Some observers believe that the conference, as now designed, may be too

restrictive, in that Romania and Bulgaria have not been invited.

France is playing a leading role in peacekeeping operations both in Bosnia and

in Kosovo. The United States remains the principal contributor to the Stabilization

Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, with 4,250 troops, and France is second with 2,850. For the

NATO-established force in Kosovo (KFOR), the U.S. contingent remains the largest

at 5,600, with France third, contributing 4,550.40 The French government wants the

United States to remain in KFOR and SFOR. Some Members of Congress view the

use of U.S. combat forces in the Balkans as a drain on readiness, and believe that such

forces should protect greater U.S. interests outside the region. France played the key

role in persuading other NATO countries to allow the five-country Eurocorps to

assume headquarters command of KFOR in April 2000, for a period of six months.

Over half of the 350 officers of the Eurocorps HQ are French. France views the

Eurocorps, while not an EU entity, as a symbolic precursor to an independent

European military capability.

Many Members of Congress have criticized the allies for not providing the police

pledged for the UN police mission in Kosovo. Some countries, particularly France,

Italy, and Spain, have national police forces well-qualified for handling crowd control

and detention of criminals. To this end, France is leading an effort to develop a police

force of 5,000 from EU countries by 2003 that could assume a peacekeeping role in

the Balkans and elsewhere.

Russia

The French government has sought to strike a balance with the Putin government

by encouraging reform in Russia, but at the same time criticizing Russia on such

issues as human rights, corruption, and lack of reform. Foreign Minister Védrine has

said that “there cannot be security and stability on the European continent without a

positive contribution by a cooperative Russia,” and that “to be too hard on Russia

would render her dangerous” for Europe. At the same time, he has repeatedly

criticized the Putin government for its repression in Chechnya, calling Russian actions

“barbaric” and the effort to impose a military solution “brutal and illusory.” France

has called for an OSCE role in Chechnya to monitor human rights violations. The

For a discussion of financial burdensharing issues in Kosovo, see (name redacted),

Kosovo:

Reconstruction and Development Assistance, CRS Report RL30453, updated June 8, 2000.

“Number of personnel in Kosovo and Bosnia...,” DOD document, June 2000.

CRS-20

French government has urged reforms on Moscow, and proposed that the EU assist

in developing stable institutions, the rule of law, an end to corruption, and an efficient

tax system. In addition, in the French view, the EU should tie reforms to assistance,

and members should not reschedule debt, for example, unless the course to reform is

clear.41 In the Paris Club,42 France has opposed debt forgiveness to Russia. The Putin

government’s response to French criticism, especially over Chechnya, has often been

harsh, and Putin notably excluded Paris from a European trip in spring 2000 that

included stops in Berlin, Rome, and London.

Védrine has characterized Clinton Administration policy on Chechnya as soft.

In his view, the Administration’s statements and actions on Chechnya have been

restrained because Washington, not wanting to antagonize Moscow, places greater

emphasis on renegotiation of the ABM Treaty.

The Middle East

France has had a presence in the Middle East since the early nineteenth century,

and was a colonial power in the region until the middle of the twentieth century.

French political, economic, and cultural interests in the region endure. With some

exceptions, French policy, sometimes expressed through the European Union, is

convergent with that of the United States.

The Peace Process. The Jospin government views U.S. engagement in the

Middle East peace process as “indispensable but not sufficient” to bringing about an

agreement. From the mid-1960s, French policy, reflecting the country’s past

involvement in the region, was seen as pro-Arab and critical of Israel. There has been

some adjustment in policy under Jospin. The French government played a key role

in drafting an EU communiqué of March 1999 that stated that the Union “declares its

readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian state in due course,” in the

context of a negotiated settlement based on “land for peace” between Israel and the

Palestinian Authority. Congress and the Administration oppose endorsement of a

Palestinian state while negotiations are continuing. Under Jospin, French relations

with Israel have improved, and the two countries agreed in April 2000 to resume

high-level technical and industrial cooperation after years of difficult relations.

Syria and Lebanon. One of the principal reasons for improvement in FrenchIsraeli relations has been the Jospin government’s strong criticism of Syria. In

February 2000, Jospin told the Knesset that Hezbollah militants operating in southern

Lebanon were guilty of “terrorist actions,” and condemned Syria for supporting them.

In the early 1980s, terrorist actions orchestrated by Syria killed French soldiers in

Lebanon. There is a resulting legacy of distrust of Syria among many French officials.

Members of the Jospin government were reportedly critical of President Chirac for

attending the funeral of Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad in June 2000; he was the only

Védrine, “La question de la crise du Kosovo...”; “Environnement stratégique...”; and

Védrine and Laurent Fabius, “How Russia can be helped to help itself,” FT, April 25, 2000,

p. 17.

CRS. (name r edacted),Russia’s Paris Club Debt and U.S. Interests, CRS Report RL30617,

July 24, 2000.

CRS-21

western head of state to do so. Foreign Minister Védrine, according to media reports,

told the French cabinet that Asad’s son and successor, Bashar, might not be able to

exercise power in Syria in the long run, and was unlikely to liberalize the country.

These remarks were interpreted as critical of Chirac’s decision to go to the funeral

and thereby implicitly endorse Bashar’s succession.43

France praised Israel’s decision to remove its forces from southern Lebanon in

May 2000, and expressed a willingness to send a force of 1,600 peacekeepers if

UNIFIL is reinforced to number 4,500 men. Paris is demanding that Lebanon, Syria

– with a heavy influence over the Beirut government – and Israel first guarantee the

security of a peacekeeping force there, and that UNIFIL have “robust” rules of

engagement that would permit it to defend itself. Some French officials believe that

the new Syrian government continues to desire a highly unstable situation in southern

Lebanon that would permit terrorists to harass northern Israel.44 French willingness

to be heavily engaged in Lebanon relieves some of the pressure on the United States

to be present in important peacekeeping efforts around the world.

Iraq. France, together with Russia and China, contends that the U.S.-driven UN

policy of sanctions against Iraq has failed because no weapons inspection regime is

in place. France also contends that sanctions are adversely affecting the Iraqi

population, without preventing Saddam Hussein from developing covert weapons

programs. The French government favors an end to sanctions in return for

reinstitution of an inspection regime of indefinite duration. Paris believes that U.S.

policy is intended primarily to bring Saddam Hussein’s downfall, and that the United

States would not be satisfied with any reasonable degree of Iraqi compliance with an

inspection regime. Some U.S. officials privately criticize the French position as

inspired, at least in part, by contracts signed by French firms with Iraq for petroleum

development that would take effect after sanctions have ended. Some U.S. companies

express a similar interest in such contracts with Iraq.

Iran. France, like all EU members, pursues a policy of “global dialogue,” or

limited engagement, with Iran. France views Iran as a major country of great

influence that cannot meaningfully be isolated. Paris has been sharply critical of the

Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, as an extraterritorial action; ILSA imposes

U.S. sanctions on foreign countries that make a substantial investment in energy

projects in Iran (and Libya). The French company Total-Fina-Elf is developing a

major Iranian oilfield; the United States has not imposed sanctions over this project.

France has ceased all cooperative nuclear projects with Iran, and has criticized Russia

for its nuclear assistance to Iran. U.S. and French policy have grown closer since the

election of reformist president Mohammed Khatemi in 1997; both the United States

and France are making greater efforts to engage Iran politically and economically.

Khatemi made an official state visit to France in October 1999.

“In Paris, official discord on the Syrian transition,” IHT, June 15, 2000, p. 1. Védrine

denied having made the remarks.

Interviews of U.S. and European officials; “La France pose les conditions et les limites de

son intervention,” LM, May 26, 2000, pp. 2-3; “Réponse du premier ministre à une question

d’actualité...,”May 24, 2000. [http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr]

CRS-22

Africa

France’s long involvement in Africa began in the colonial period, during the

nineteenth century; the French government administered colonies there until the early

1960s. French interests have centered on cultural, geostrategic, and economic issues.

France continues to promote the use of French and the spread of French culture in

francophone Africa. The Jospin government emphasizes strategic issues in Africa less

than other French governments in the post-colonial era. France’s stated policy is that

it will no longer support authoritarian governments in Africa as a means to preserve

cultural and economic ties. Through the 1990s, French forces, often used to prop up

unpopular regimes, numbered 7,000-8,000; today, there are approximately 4,500

French troops, confined to Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Chad, and Djibouti. The

principal military objective of French forces now appears to be to train indigenous

forces for peacekeeping. France, like the United States, now encourages regional

peacekeeping organizations in Africa to stabilize countries in conflict. To this end,

France contributes resources both to the “Reinforcement of Capabilities of African

Missions of Peacekeeping” (RECAMP) and to the “African Crisis Response

Initiative” (ACRI).

France has extensive economic involvement in many francophone African

countries, and is the principal trading partner of several of them. France provides a

greater proportion of its GDP to development assistance than any G8 country, with

over 60% of that aid going to African countries. In April 2000, the French

government announced that by 2004 it would write off approximately $7 billion of

debt owed by Africa’s poorest countries.45

Conclusion

Two long sought objectives of both the United States and its allies have

ironically created friction in the U.S.-European relationship. While the end of the

Cold War has led to a diminished threat to security, it has also led to important

differences among the NATO allies over the response to threats that remain. And the

deepening integration in the European Union promises greater stability and economic

potential on the continent, but also carries in some quarters a desire for greater

independence from the United States, especially in security matters.

France is at the forefront of European efforts to ensure that new threats are met

through multilateral responses that exhaust political measures before military options

are raised, and to sustain the pulse of EU integration. In part because many elements

in French society are critical of American values and what is perceived as domineering

American leadership in NATO, U.S. officials and media often point to Paris,

sometimes unjustly, as the focal point for the genesis of debates between the United

States and the Europeans. Several other European governments quietly share the

French perspective that ESDP must be strengthened because U.S. involvement in

future European crises is uncertain, and that executive branch and congressional

“France plans priority list for aid recipients,” FT, Jan. 29, 1999; “France ready to write off

$7 billion of debt,” FT, April 5, 2000, p. 8.

CRS-23

actions in arms control, against terrorism, or in trade matters are heavy-handed and

impulsive.

Some French observers see paradoxes in U.S. reactions to European initiatives.46

These paradoxes are of some consequence. French officials do not believe that their

U.S. counterparts have sorted through the logic of the differing perceptions that the

paradoxes express. In a first paradox, French officials know that Congress and

Administrations of both parties have pressed European allies for 50 years to assume

greater burdensharing in NATO, a stated goal of ESDP, but they also see a reluctance

by U.S. officials to surrender a measure of leadership to reflect any altered balance in

military capabilities.

When U.S. officials charge that ESDP is about institution-building in the EU

rather than real military capabilities, French officials reply that it is both. To France,

and to some other EU countries, further political integration in the European Union,

to have real weight, must be accompanied by enhanced military capability and a

capacity to take military action independently of the United States, if necessary.

Many European officials assume as a matter of course that enhanced European

capabilities must be reflected in an enhanced European leadership role in security

matters, including within NATO.

In a second paradox, European officials have heard fears expressed by U.S.

Administrations for years of a “European caucus” in NATO that might present

Washington with a fait accompli in the North Atlantic Council before a fully engaged

debate could occur. Now, however, they believe that the United States is seeking a

“NATO caucus” within the EU by insisting that non-Union states, such as Norway,

Poland, and Turkey – each politically close to Washington – be included in EU

decision-making on potential crises to be handled through ESDP.

French officials object to any early role in decision-making for an ESDP mission

by non-EU members because they believe that those states have not assumed the

political risk, understanding, and cost that have accompanied the long years of

constructing a Union of shared sovereignty. Paris sees Washington, and Ankara and

Oslo, as late-comers to the party that did not pay the sizeable price of admission.

In a third, much disputed, paradox, French observers saw Congress and the

Clinton Administration chafe at the “war by committee”during the Kosovo conflict,

while Europeans feared prosecution of a war by U.S. generals guided more by

domestic concerns about American casualties than by strategic needs on the ground

in Yugoslavia.

This third paradox held within it a change in policy by a country – Britain – that

has been for many years Washington’s closest ally. The smoldering transatlantic

disagreements during the Kosovo conflict, in part charged by Congressional doubts

and criticism, are having concrete consequences. The differing perceptions on the

two sides of the Atlantic fueled sentiment in Europe, especially in Britain, once a

See above all Daniel Vernet, “Paradoxes euro-américains sur la défense,” LM, June 2,

2000, p. 13.

CRS-24

reluctant partner for France, to build ESDP. In the view of many European officials,

Britain has taken an important step with clear potential for developing an independent

European capacity in security matters.

Many U.S. and French interests remain closely intertwined. French officials do

not want the United States to leave the alliance, and, as clearly demonstrated in

Bosnia and Kosovo, they desire U.S. forces to play a central role in any conflict in

Europe. In security matters, France has proved important to protection of U.S.

interests. French forces were present during the Gulf War, for example, and they

played a significant role in the Kosovo conflict, especially when compared to the

forces of other allies. French officials point out that while they opposed a Strategic

Concept in 1999 that would outline military responsibilities for the alliance beyond

Europe, France might nonetheless join the United States in a future conflict, as France

did during the Gulf War, should French interests be endangered. France enjoys

considerable political weight in Africa and the Middle East, and is a key country in the

United Nations.

For those in Congress and in the executive branch who desire continued U.S.

leadership and primacy of NATO in European security matters, French efforts to build

a politically strengthened EU and an effective ESDP could reduce the U.S. role and

U.S. influence on the continent. For those who desire greater contributions by other

countries in peacekeeping, or in international financial institutions, or in development

assistance, French influence and policy often buttress U.S. interests and diminish the

need for greater expenditure of U.S. resources. For those who desire greater

European burdensharing in the alliance, ESDP holds at least the possibility of greater

military capability among continental allies. And for those who wish to reduce the

U.S. troop presence in Europe, and with it U.S. responsibilities for European stability,

ESDP, largely driven by France, might also one day serve U.S. interests if it

contributes to stability in a region of the world of great importance to American trade

and investment.

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