Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer Personnel Management Program

Order Code RL30609

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of

1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer

Personnel Management Program

July 18, 2000

(name redacted)

National Defense Fellow

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986:

Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer Personnel

Management Program

Summary

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of

1986, commonly called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, is considered landmark legislation

as it reorganized the Department of Defense (DoD) to a more unified military

structure. Joint personnel officer management (organizing, directing, educating and

evaluating military members of two or more military departments to accomplish an

assigned mission) was established as a major aspect of GNA’s design to improve

war-fighting capabilities. The objective was to improve the quality of officers

assigned to joint organizations, increase educational and experience levels of these

officers, and expand the interaction among the military services’ officers corps by

addressing inter-service issues.

While many experts believe the GNA has been a success, the passage of time, the

constraining provisions of the law, and some implementation issues have led some to

believe the GNA joint officer personnel management program could benefit from

reexamination and possible revision. Indeed, the original framers of the GNA

predicted that change would be necessary as the DoD evolved into a more jointoriented military force. Reinforcing this view, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff has indicated a need for joint officer personnel management change.

A major problem is that the current provisions of the law for joint officer

personnel management are so specific that the DoD predicts it can not continue to

meet the requirements. This is in part because the DoD has drawn down its military

personnel strength by nearly 40% while operational requirements have increased.

Further, the law does not allow all officers to be credited with all their joint

experience. And, technological advances in distributive and distance learning can not

be utilized to fulfill joint education requirements for the officers assigned to these

positions.

This report covers the background and intent of the GNA, as well as the present

joint officer personnel management program. The DoD has proposed options for its

revision, to Congress; they include replacing the joint specialty officer designation

with a special duty identifier, decoupling promotion comparisons, and employing

distributive and distance learning for joint professional military education. The Senate

version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2549,

introduced language concerning joint officer personnel management which is

consistent with the DoD proposal, with two exceptions. The first difference is noted

in the area of promotion comparisons and the second is in Joint Professional Military

Education. Other potential options include forming a commission or special

committee, conducting hearings, or mandating a study to further assess the program.

Changes to joint officer personnel management would require legislative changes to

the GNA.

Contents

Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background on the GNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Joint Officer Personnel Management Under the GNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Specific GNA Joint Officer Personnel Management Directives . . . . . . . . . . 5

Understanding Joint Officer Personnel Management in Relation to the GNA . . . 8

Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL), Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)

and Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Assignments and Joint Tour Lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Promotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Joint Waivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Reserve Officer Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

DoD Compliance Reports to Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Unintended Developments of the GNA for Joint Officer Personnel

Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Joint Specialty Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Career Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Promotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Critical Occupational Specialty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Careerism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Current DoD View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Legislation in the 106th Congress, Second Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Options for Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Continue the Status Quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Adjust the GNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Pursue Other Options: Commission, Hearing, Special Committee,

Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

The GNA in Relation to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act . . . . . 30

Appendix A: Historical Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Appendix B: Abbreviation/Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Appendix C: Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Appendix D: DoD Compliance with the GNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Appendix E: For Additional Reading/Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Journals/Articles/On-line Sources/Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

List of Figures

Figure 1. Typical Officer Career Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

List of Tables

Table 1. Joint Duty Position Distribution by Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Table 2. Critical Occupational Specialties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Table 3. Summary of Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Table 4. Summary of Critical Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Table 5. Average Length of Tour of Duty in Joint Duty Assignments . . . . . . . 39

Table 6. GO/FO Joint Equivalency Waivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Table 7. Summary of COS Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Table 8. JSO with COS Who Are Serving in Second Joint Assignment . . . . . . 41

Table 9. Army Promotion Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Table 10. Air Force Promotion Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Table 11. Marine Corps Promotion Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Table 12. Navy Promotion Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization

Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint

Officer Personnel Management Program

Introduction and Background

Introduction

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

(GNA),1 also called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, changed the Department of Defense

(DoD) joint officer personnel management, setting in law a course for more

interaction among the U.S. military services. Prior to the enactment of the law, each

service existed independently of, and in relative isolation to, the other services; they

were not “joint”2 oriented. Training, missions, equipment, etc., tended to be “servicespecific”, thereby limiting service interoperability and joint operations. The GNA

brought the services closer and most experts believe that this has resulted in more

coordinated military operations, and increased the war fighting capabilities of the

DoD.3 However, over time a number of factors, such as changes in the strategic

environment, the implementation of the specific provisions of the law, and the nearly

40% downsizing of military personnel strength, have changed, and, in the view of

many experts, may have made revisiting the GNA necessary. One aspect of the GNA

which some, including General Hugh Shelton, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

have singled out specifically is joint officer personnel management. Any changes

would be subject to congressional oversight.

Due to the complexity of joint officer personnel management, this report is

divided into eight primary sections: (1) the background section provides a description

1

Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986; 100 Stat. 992, et. seq.

2

The law, PL 99-433, section 668, does not define “joint”. However, it defines “joint

matters” as matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces,

including matters relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and

contingency planning; and, (3) command and control of combat operations under unified

command. The DoD Dictionary of Military Terms defines joint as activities, operations,

organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more military departments participate. (for

additional DoD joint definitions see the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms,

[http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/]). Throughout this report “joint duty, jointness, joint

assignments” and like references apply to officers who are assigned or who have previously

been assigned to a joint duty assignment in the Joint Staff, joint agencies or other joint

activities. See Appendix B for abbreviations/acronyms; Appendix C for definitions.

3

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective. Edited by

Dennis J. Quinn. Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1999.

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of the situations that preceded the GNA and the provisions of the law, (2) the “joint

officer personnel management under the GNA” section examines officer personnel

management provisions and administrative changes of the law, (3) this section,

understanding joint officer personnel management in relation to the GNA, describes

specific terms and concepts of joint officer personnel management in relation to the

law, (4) the DoD compliance reports to Congress section examines the current

compliance by the DoD and a shortfall in reporting requirements, (5) unintended

developments of the GNA are reviewed, (6) this section outlines the DoD proposal,

which was submitted in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omnibus in early 2000,

to address perceived problems with the GNA, (7) the section on Legislation in the

106th Congress, 2nd Session, examines the differences in the DoD proposal and the

proposed legislation, and (8) finally, some congressional options are addressed in the

last section.

This report does not provide a general discussion of overall officer personnel

management issues outside the boundaries of the GNA, particularly those governed

by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).4 Broader aspects of

DOPMA, which established the basic parameters of overall officer personnel

management for the U.S. armed forces and not joint management, are briefly analyzed

at the end of this report to clarify some specific joint officer personnel management

points.

Background on the GNA

An Act to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority

in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the

President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place

clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant

commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and

ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that

responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to

contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to

improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness

of military operations and improve the management and administration of the

Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

- Opening Statement, Goldwater-Nichols Department

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

Congressional authority over the organization of the military establishment, with

regard to the rules and regulations of the land and naval forces, is found in the

Constitution of the United States (art 1, sec 8). After World War II, the Cabinet-level

Departments of War and Navy, and a newly independent Department of the Air

Force, were brought under considerable central control of a new Department of

Defense, via the National Security Act of 1947, and the 1949 Amendments to the

1947 Act. Congressional intent was to provide three separate, fairly autonomous,

military departments, independently administered, yet unified in effort and subject to

a more centralized supervision under the Secretary of Defense. However, the Act

allowed the services to maintain their respective identities and missions. Indeed, some

4

Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980; 94 Stat 2835, et. seq.

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have noted that this structure encouraged the services to compete for limited

resources. In some cases, such competition encouraged independence and selfsufficiency, and in others discouraged interoperability or mutual support.

The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 increased the subordination of the military

departments to the central authority of the Secretary of Defense. The 1958 Act also

clarified that the military departments were to be separately organized versus

separately administered, continuing a trend of steadily reducing the independence of

the military departments. This amendment also established the chain of command

from the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to

the unified/specified commands which controlled the operational forces of the DoD

around the world.

From 1958 until the early 1980s, there was little relevant congressional action

concerning the organization of the DoD. Then, as a result of interoperability

problems and shortcomings during significant military operations – the 1980 Iran

hostage rescue attempt, the 1982 destruction of the U.S. Embassy and Marine

Barracks in Beirut, and the 1983 invasion of Grenada – the need for defense

reorganization became apparent. Experts highlighted the lack of cross-service

communications, interoperability and imbalances in service/joint,

centralization/decentralization, functional/geographic, and specialist/generalist

tensions as inherit shortcomings of the pre-GNA structure.

The services had evolved with their own unique identities, missions,

languages/jargons, personnel systems, etc. There were real concerns and some

evidence that senior military leaders lacked an understanding and appreciation of joint

operations as well as the other services’ capabilities. The services did not value joint

operations or staffs – they had no desire to “waste” their most talented officers in a

joint assignment. Officers were rewarded and promoted for working within their

respective services. Assignments outside the service, while necessary, were often

shunned and viewed as “career ending” tours. To some extent, specific service

practices seemed almost foreign to members of the other services.

The senior uniformed leadership of the services was virtually unanimous in

opposing the GNA and arguing that the then - current joint operational architecture

needed major fixing. One conspicuous dissenter from this mind-set, however, was

General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who appeared

before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on February 3, 1982 and

testified that, “It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapon systems;

we must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy,

necessary planning and the full war-fighting capability....We do not have an adequate

organizational structure today.”5 His call for defense reform set into motion four

years and 241 days of discussions and debates resulting in the passage of the GNA.6

The effect was to move away from the service chiefs responding first and foremost

to service-specific parochial interests and to move toward a more centralized

5

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective. p. 13.

6

See Appendix A for a Historical Timeline detailing defense reorganization.

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decision-making structure involving greater mutual support and interoperability

among the services.

The GNA passed by Congress in 1986 contained the following objectives:

!

Enhance civilian authority within DoD by increasing the Secretary’s

authority and control over program planning and contingency

planning.

!

Improve the military advice provided to the President, the National

Security Council and the Secretary of Defense by vesting the duties

and staff resources of the entire body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) in the CJCS, and creating a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (VCJCS) to assist the newly empowered CJCS with his

duties.

!

Ensure the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified

commanders-in-chief (CINCs) is fully commensurate with the

responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of

assigned missions, by giving them command authority along with the

right to convene courts martial.

!

Provide more efficient use of defense resources by requiring the

CJCS to solicit budgetary requirements from the CINCs, to evaluate

the requirements and to establish prioritization of the requirements.

The VCJCS was given the lead of oversight – chairing the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).7 Furthermore, the CJCS

was charged with establishing a uniform system for evaluating the

readiness of each CINC to meet mission requirements.

!

Improve joint officer management policies. The GNA specifically

addresses the policies, procedures and practices for the management

of active duty officers in relation to joint duty. (This report deals in

depth with this area.)

The main objective of the GNA was to enhance jointness8 without damaging the

positive aspects of the services’ identities. The idea was to pull the best service

aspects into integrated operations both “in the field” and at the headquarters level.

Joint officer personnel management was a significant aspect utilized to facilitate the

7

Formed in 1984, renamed the JROC in 1986, it is comprised of the Services’ Vice Chiefs

of Staff and operates as a clearinghouse of information for independent service weapons. The

JROC accounts for the CINC’s warfighting needs and seeks to accommodate the CINC’s

requirements and the services’ financial constraints to attain the best balance for DoD. In

addition, they review future weapons systems in relation to joint warfighting potentials. (For

additional information, see CRS Report 97-346F, Defense Budget: Role of the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council, March 12, 1997)

8

Jointness - a unified direction of the armed forces governed by joint doctrine and policies

for the employment of multi-service military forces and the efficient use of defense resources.

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integration and to add support for the general effort to ensure a higher level of joint

interaction.

Joint Officer Personnel Management Under the GNA

Joint officer personnel management was designed to improve the quality of

officers assigned to joint positions, to increase both educational and experience levels

of the assigned officers, and to expand jointness of officers via increased exposure to

joint matters. The GNA established the joint specialty officer (JSO)9 and the critical

occupational specialty (COS),10 defined the specific educational and experience

requirements for an officer to be designated as a JSO, requested a career path11 for

such an officer, and set promotion objectives for officers assigned to joint duty. The

GNA contained specific requirements to ensure the quality of the officers assigned to

joint duty was equivalent to the quality of the officers assigned to the specific service

headquarters. The GNA also set specifically defined joint duty tour lengths and

established a minimum requirement of one joint duty assignment (JDA) for all officers

promoted to general officer/Navy flag officer (GO/FO).

Specific GNA Joint Officer Personnel Management Directives

The joint officer personnel management directives of the GNA are listed below:12

!

Establish a joint specialty occupational category (designation) for the

management of officers specifically trained in and oriented toward

joint matters. This applies to field grade officers – pay grades 0-4,

0-5, 0-6 or rank of major, lieutenant colonel and colonel/Navy

lieutenant commander, commander and captain. The GNA also sets

some joint duty requirements for promotion to brigadier

general/Navy rear admiral (lower half).

9

Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) - an officer who is specifically trained in and oriented toward

joint matters; eligibility includes completion of Joint Professional Military Education, and

completion of a full Joint Duty Assignment, in order. There are four basic methods for the

services to produce JSOs/JSO-nominees: (a) The officer attends JPME, serves a joint tour

as a JSO-nominee, and is eventually designated a JSO. The majority of officers adhere to this

method. (b) A critical occupational specialty (COS) (see note 7) officer can serve a joint tour

and then complete joint professional military education (JPME). (c) A COS officer can serve

a joint tour, additional tours, and then complete JPME (SecDef waiver required for JSO

status). (d) An officer can complete two joint tours without attending JPME (SecDef waiver

required for JSO status).

10

Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) - a joint military occupational specialty officer from

among the combat arms of the military departments; specialties engaged in the operational art

to attain strategic goals in a theatre of conflict through the design, organization, and conduct

of campaigns and major operations.

11

Members of the active duty armed services are eligible for retirement following the

completion of 20 years of honorable service.

12

Public Law 99-443, Sec 401.

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!

JSOs will be selected by the Secretary of Defense from nominations

submitted by the secretaries of the military departments.

!

An officer cannot be selected as a JSO until a defined program of

joint professional military education (JPME) and a full joint tour are

completed (exception: can be a JSO after two full JDAs without

JPME).

!

Requires that at least 50% of JDAs be filled by officers nominated for

or selected as JSOs.

!

Directed the Secretary of Defense to designate a set number of joint

military positions as critical joint duty assignments which must

always be filled by JSOs.

!

Requires the Secretary of Defense to establish career guidelines for

JSOs.

!

Prescribes specific tour lengths required for consideration of a full

joint tour of duty.

!

Precludes the inclusion of joint training assignments and assignments

within a specific military department to be included as a JDA.

!

Establishes promotion board processes:

!

!

Requires the Secretary of Defense to provide the secretaries of

the military departments guidelines to ensure appropriate

consideration is given to joint duty performance by all

promotion boards.

!

Directs the CJCS to review all promotion board reports before

they are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

!

Authorizes the secretaries of the military departments to return

the promotion board report to the board/convene a special

promotion board if it is determinated that board did not act in

accordance with the Secretary of Defense guidance concerning

joint duty performance.

!

Directs the Secretary of Defense to act on any unresolved

disagreements concerning promotions between the secretaries

of the military departments and the CJCS.

Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure the quality of the

officers assigned to joint duty are such that specific promotion rates

are comparable to like service promotion rates.

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!

Requires that an officer cannot be promoted to GO/FO unless the

officer has served in a JDA.

!

Requires that all officers promoted to GO/FO rank must attend a

specific GO/FO joint educational course known as CAPSTONE. 13

!

Requires the CJCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of all

officers recommended for the GO/FO grades of 0-9 and O-10

(lieutenant general/Navy vice admiral and general/Navy admiral).

!

Requires the Secretary of Defense to advise the president of the

specific joint qualifications required of officers to serve in the grades

of 0-9 and O-10.

In early 1987, the DoD suggested some modification of the GNA joint officer

personnel management based upon complications with implementing the directives.

As a result, in the fiscal year (FY) 1988 and FY1989 National Defense Authorization

Acts, Congress altered the law to allow waivers in education and experience

requirements, to give authority to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for designating

joint specialists, and to allow cumulative credit toward joint tour length requirements.

In addition, although not suggested by the DoD, Congress made changes to

restricting career specialties which could be designated COS.

In 1993, recognizing the changing environment of employing troops, Congress

made another change to allow joint duty credit for Operations DESERT SHIELD and

DESERT STORM.14 With the assignment of JPME graduates, a minimum of at least

50% mandated to joint duty, Congress also afforded the military services the

opportunity to assign JPME graduates to joint positions in either their primary or

secondary assignment.15

13

The CAPSTONE course is a six-week course consisting of seminars, case studies, informal

discussions, and visits to key U.S. military commands, with the objective of making attendees

more effective in planning and employing joint and combined operations. The curriculum

examines major issues affecting national security decision making, military strategy,

joint/combined doctrine, interoperability and key allied nation issues. Created in 1982, as a

voluntary participation course for GO/FOs, in 1986 the GNA mandated that all newly selected

GO/FOs attend. [http://www.ndu/edu/ndu/capstone]

14

Kathleen van Trees Medlock, “A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Defense

Reorganization Act on American Officership” (Public Law 100-180, section 1301),

unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, 1993, p. 67.

15

Public Law 103-357, sections 932-933.

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Understanding Joint Officer Personnel Management in

Relation to the GNA

Although very detailed and sometimes very tedious, it is essential to examine the

intended goals and the specific aspects of joint officer personnel management in order

to understand possible future change. The specific aspects to be examined include

the establishment of the JDAL, JSO, and COS, and the restrictions set forth for

assignments, joint tour lengths, promotions and JPME. Joint waivers and reserve

component officer personnel management in relation to the Act are also covered.

Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL), Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)

and Critical Occupational Specialty (COS)

The GNA created a number of new provisions with regard to personnel

management. Specifically, these include JDAL, JSO and COS. In addition, specific

requirements were created with regard to these. However, for a number of reasons

explained later, the services have sometimes fallen short of meeting all the

requirements established under the GNA.

The following describes JDAL, JSO and COS. These are described in terms of

how they were designed under the GNA. In addition, the manner in which they have

evolved is considered.

Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL). Under the GNA, the Secretary of

Defense is required to establish a JDAL. The JDAL is a listing of military positions

involving joint duty that satisfies the requirements of the GNA. This list includes

military positions in multi-service/multi-national commands or activities involved with

the integrated employment or support of the land, sea and air forces of at least two

of the three military departments. Designated military positions are those which

include involvement in matters related to national military strategy, joint doctrine and

policy, strategic planning, strategic and contingency planning, and command/control

of combat operations.16 Not all military positions in a multi-service environment are

designated as JDA and included in the JDAL. In addition, this list explicitly details

the requirements of each position. For example, the JDAL contains the rank and

primary specialty of the officer to serve in a particular position. Although a position

may be “filled” by an officer who has been designated to carry out the particular

duties of the position, the officer may not be of the required rank. Thus, the position

is occupied, but the specific requirements of the designation is not viewed as being in

compliance with the GNA. Initially in 1987, the Secretary of Defense designated

8,000+ JDA positions for inclusion in the JDAL. Of the 8,000+ JDAs, GNA

mandated that 1,000 of them would further be designated as COS positions. Today

the JDAL consists of 9,100+ joint positions and 850+ of those are designated as COS

military positions.17

Table 1 details the positions of the JDAL by service and

assignment.

16

17

10 United States Code, Chapter 38, sec 668 (a)(1-3).

Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing, 7 January

2000.

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Table 1. Joint Duty Position Distribution by Service

(as of Sep 30, 99)

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Total

Joint Staff (JCS)

278

280

67

228

853

Other Joint Duty

2,900

3,153

488

1,768

8,309

Total Joint Duty

3,178

3,433

555

1,996

9,162

% of Total Joint

34.7%

37.5%

6.1%

21.8%

100%

% of Total Officers (note)

29.8%

36.8%

9.0%

24.3%

100%

Note: total commissioned officers: 0-3 through 0-10 minus professional categories

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). By law, the DoD was mandated to create the

occupational category JSO. As noted in the introduction and background section, in

order to be designated a JSO, an officer is required to have JPME (such as

satisfactory completion of the National War College), to be in a qualifying joint duty

assignment (such as antiterrorism action officer on the Joint Staff) which is included

in the JDAL, and to be nominated by the secretary of the service and so designated

by the Secretary of Defense. Merely being assigned in a joint arena or attending a

joint war college is insufficient to receive designation as a JSO.

The services have utilized two methods to produce JSOs. The first method was

employed from 1987 to 1989. During this period, the established requirements of the

law were so new that it was reasonable to acknowledge that few military officers

could satisfy the criteria. Nevertheless, in order to fulfill the requirements of the law,

Congress provided the DoD with the authority to designate individuals as JSOs via

“transition boards.” Individuals so designed by these transitional boards were not

subject to all the educational and assignment requisites of the law. In other words,

this original period provided DoD with the flexibility to “jump start” the personnel

requirements in order to have a sufficient number of officers designated as JSOs. As

a result of this designation method, by FY1990, more than 12,000+ officers were

designated as JSOs.

In 1990, the GNA had been in place for a sufficient period for officers to have

had the opportunity to meet the established criteria of the JPME, JDA and Secretary

of Defense designation. Therefore, in FY1990, the GNA required that all the

requirements of the law to be designated a JSO be met. Currently there are about

6,000 JSOs.

Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). Within the JSO designations, the law

created the COS. COS officers are those JSOs who are trained and educated

primarily in joint operational war skills. Table 1 lists these war skills by service. In

creating COSs, Title IV of the GNA gives some special considerations to this group

CRS-10

of officers who were identified as having a need to concentrate on developing,

maintaining and then passing on to other officers very specific war-fighting skills. It

was noted that excessive time away from the operational military position/specialty

would result in quick deterioration of the skills; thus, this category of officers has less

stringent timing requirements for JPME and usually serves shorter tour lengths.

Currently there are 850+ COS positions, with a fill rate of 81%, designated within the

JDAL.

Table 2. Critical Occupational Specialties

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Infantry

Pilot

Infantry

Surface

Armor

Navigator

Tanks/AAV**

Submarine

Artillery

Command/Control

Operations

Artillery

Aviation

Air Defense

Artillery

Space/Missile

Operations

Air Control/

Air Support

SEALS***

Aviation

Anti-Air Warfare

Special

Operations

Special

Operations

Aviation

Combat

Engineers

Engineers

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

** AAV - amphibious assault vehicles (personnel carriers)

*** SEALS - sea, air and land special warfare teams (counterinsurgency force for offensive

operations)

Currently there is no definitive analytical study which specifically notes the

optimum number of JSOs/COSs, either for the current force or on a per capita basis

which would hold no matter the size of the force.18 Two views as to why there has

been no determination of the optimum number: (1) some consider the optimum JSO

and COS numbers to be a moot point since the law sets the numbers and others have

18

In 1996, RAND released a study which analyzed supportability of assignments and careers,

promotion objectives and JPME allocations; and in a second 1996 study RAND released

algorithm results for ranking joint military positions to determine a potential JDAL size. But,

neither study addressed the optimum number of JSOs for the current force or for a per capita

basis. [Margaret C. Harrell, John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Clifford Graf, Paul Steinberg,

How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments. RAND: MR-593-JS, 1996.

John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Jennifer Kawata, Margaret C. Harrell, Clifford Graf, Paul

Steinberg. Who Is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List. RAND: Mr-574,

1996.]

CRS-11

difficulty embracing a study of the optimum number since the determination might not

result in a change to the numbers designated in the law; (2) still others have found this

determination to be in the “too hard to do” category since the ever-changing missions

of the services and world strategic situations should drive the JDAL numbers –

defining the optimum number today would likely be obsolete tomorrow.

Despite the goals in establishing the JDAL as well as the JSO and COS, various

forces have modified how they were originally implemented and/or how they have

since evolved. Beginning first with the JDAL, it is interesting to note that since the

end of the Gulf War, the size of the military has decreased by nearly 40%. In other

words, the DoD now has just over one-third fewer military personnel in uniform.

However, the list of positions on the JDAL has not been reduced to reflect this

decrease.

There is continually a lag between what is reflected in the JDAL and the actual

joint requirements. Based upon the joint activities being dynamic organizations –

changing organizational structures, areas of responsibility and mission priorities are

a constant – requirements change. Therefore, ever-changing future needs of the joint

community may well be different from what is produced by the JSO program or is

reflected in the JDAL. It takes the services a minimum of four years to produce the

inventory to meet the requirements. The actual length of time required to reflect joint

mission changes in the JDAL, coupled with the time the services require to

produce/train/educate the officers of specific specialties necessary for joint duty, falls

short of real-time mission changes. The time lag between mission changes appearing

in the JDAL and the reality of joint mission requirements is primarily an

administratively driven lag. And, this lag is even more evident in critical military

positions.

Turning next to the management of JSOs, following the end of the “transition

board” and the beginning of the stricter adherence to the GNA requirements in

FY1990, the number of officers designated as JSOs has decreased. This decrease

occurred for various reasons. First, as noted above, the number of officers has

decreased as a result of the number of JSO-designated officers who left the service

following the Gulf War. Second, the more rigid adherence to the requirements has

meant that fewer officers qualify as JSOs.

The original concept of the law was to produce a JSO who would follow a jointdominated career path, but JSO careers have not evolved in this manner. The CINCs

and joint agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense

Organization, Defense Logistics Agency, etc.) continually express a need for officers

with a high degree of expertise in their designated career specialities for their

respective services. Officers with this current service expertise, rotating in and out

of the joint arena, have become the nucleus of the joint environment, rather than a

JSO for whom joint duty assignments are more common than assignments in their

service. Apparently the CINCs and directors of joint agencies believe that previous

joint experience can be of value, but it does not outweigh the CINCs’/joint activities’

perceived need for officers current in the most recent development in their specialty

and service doctrine. Likewise, the continual cross flow of officers with both joint

and service expertise is perceived as valuable to the services by creating linkage

between the operational world and the joint environment. As it has evolved, it would

CRS-12

appear that the original concept of a joint-dominated career path JSO does not meet

the needs of either the joint arena or the services.

As a result of the above issues, the JSO population has fallen from 12,000+

officers in 1990 to approximately 6,000 today. By FY2005, it is anticipated that this

number will fall below 4,000. This shrinking JSO population will eventually lead the

DoD to report non-compliance with the GNA.19 The DoD will be forced to not fill

military positions of the JDAL and report non-compliance in maintaining the endstrength of the JDAL. Or conversely, the DoD could maintain the end strength of the

JDAL with personnel who do not meet the promotion criteria of the Act, thus

reporting non-compliance with promotion expectations.

Assignments and Joint Tour Lengths

Specific assignments and tour lengths were established to provide stability within

the joint community and to ensure officers obtained a credible level of joint

experience. The GNA requires that of all military positions in the JDAL, at least 50%

must be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected as a JSO. All COS

positions must be filled by designated JSOs. All JSOs and at least 50% plus one

officer, of all officers attending a JPME school, must be assigned to joint duty within

the first or second assignment following JPME.

The law sets minimum tour lengths for joint military positions at 36 months for

field grade officers and 24 months for general/flag officers. The law does allow for

a restricted number of waivers of these time minimums in relation to all joint military

positions. Joint policy further states that the tour length shall not exceed 48 months

without Secretary of Defense approval.

The law specifies that to become a GO/FO, one must have served in a joint duty

assignment in the grades of 04-06. A specific JPME course, CAPSTONE, is also

required for all newly selected general officers/flag officers.

Promotions

The GNA contains numerous requirements and restrictions concerning the

promotion of officers in relation to joint duty so as to ensure that the JSOs and Joint

Staff officers being assigned to the joint arena were equal in quality to, and were

promoted at least at the same rates as, the officers being assigned to service-specific

headquarters staffs. They thus mandated that specific promotion statistics be

maintained for officers assigned to joint positions above the grade of captain/Navy

lieutenant.20

19

The DoD utilizes the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS)

to track JSOs/JSO-nominees with joint experience in compliance with the GNA. The

JDAMIS tracking number assigned to each eligible officer is independent of the service

position number to which the individual is assigned and these differing numbers can contribute

to administrative tracking burdens of the GNA.

20

The multiple comparisons require a very detailed understanding of promotion data and

require a substantial amount of time to assess. In a 1996 RAND study (Margaret C. Harrell,

CRS-13

The promotion statistics by which joint officers are measured against depends

upon the type of joint position or organization to which an officer is assigned and

whether an officer has received the JSO designation. Three categories were

established within the law: Joint Staff, JSO and other joint. The Joint Staff category

is for current and previously assigned officers who serve with the Joint Staff. The

JSO category is for officers who have been designated as a JSO by the Secretary of

Defense. Officers can be counted in both of these two latter categories. The other

joint category is for all others, not counted as Joint Staff or JSO, who are currently

or who were previously assigned to a joint military position listed in the JDAL.

Officers coded Joint Staff or JSO are not included in the other joint category.

Promotion rates for officers of the Joint Staff and JSO categories are compared to

promotion rates of officers of the service-specific headquarters staffs; promotion rates

for officers in the other joint category are compared to the promotion rates for the

service-specific averages. The promotion rates for each category are compared for

every field grade promotion board. These assessments are further calculated for

officers competing for promotion in-the-promotion zone (IPZ), above-the-promotion

zone (APZ), and below-the-promotion zone (BPZ).21 Within each assessment, the

promotion rates are also compared for officers currently serving joint and for those

having served joint previously in their first post joint promotion cycle. In total, there

are 40+ promotion categories tracked: five grades, three promotion zones, three joint

categories and two assignment categories.

The intent of monitoring promotions within GNA was to first increase and then

to maintain quality of officers placed in joint assignments. The “serving in” and “have

served in” comparison standards were designed to raise the quality of officers

assigned within the joint arena, and to ensure those serving in the joint arena were not

discriminated in the service-specific arena for having served joint. The GNA provides

that the quality of officers serving in the joint environment will be

competitive/comparable to the officers serving in service-specific headquarters staffs.

The intent was not, however, for joint officers to be promoted at an increased rate or

before any other officer who was better qualified for promotion.

John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Clifford Graf, Paul Steinberg, How Many Can Be Joint?

Supporting Joint Duty Assignments. RAND: MR-593-JS, 1996.), “How Many Can Be

Joint?”, the authors noted that the promotion comparisons are complicated and oblique, and

do not necessarily reflect or measure the actual objectives established by Goldwater-Nichols.

Many find that the utility of these comparisons has been lost in the tracking efforts.

21

CRS Report 96-824. (name redacted), Defense Officer Personnel Management: The

‘Up-or-Out’ System. October 11, 1996. “Officers being considered for promotion to pay

grades 0-3 to 0-8 are promoted on a ‘best qualified’ basis. The ‘best qualified’ method of

promotion generally requires that those officers judged best qualified for promotion against

a specified maximum number of officers that can be promoted be selected for

promotion...eligibility for consideration for promotion is not rigidly tied to a particular cohort

or cohort-related group of officers. Officers can be promoted ‘above the zone’ (i.e., after

having been previously considered, along with their regular cohort, for promotion, and failing

of selection). ‘A small number of promotions also go to officers who have demonstrated

outstanding potential and are selected before the majority of their cohort.’ These are know as

‘below-the-zone’ promotions.” (Most pertinent statutes are in chapter 36, title 10, 10 USC

611, et. seq.)

CRS-14

Many analysts and personnel involved in the tracking and reporting of the

multiple comparisons believe that the process has become bureaucratic and

burdensome, and offers minimum value. In addition, many assert that the tracking

process has become an inhibitor to assigning the right person to a specific, defined

requirement due to the overarching requirement to meet promotion standards. The

mandated promotion targets have become the priority. The result of the long-term,

higher standards for JSOs has been a relatively small pool of highly

qualified/promotable personnel which does not allow for matching the best qualified

officer to the joint requirement. The small pool appears to be counter to the original

intent of GNA to expand the population to ensure all joint qualified officers were

identified for/available to meet joint requirements.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

Joint education has its origins in the GNA and the House Armed Services

Committee Panel on Military Education of 1989 (known as the Skelton Panel for its

chairman, Representative Ike Skelton).22 It was intended that a joint perspective be

ensured by immersion of officers into a multi-service environment of academics,

sports and living accommodations in which the student body and faculty are

proportionally representative of all military departments. Becoming a joint team

player, communicating with members of other services, and understanding the

services’ capabilities and limitations for mission accomplishment are goals of the

JPME programs.

GNA authorized statutory Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

requirements for officers to be designated as JSOs. As noted earlier, to be designated

a JSO, an officer must have completed an “appropriate program at a joint professional

military education school” (10USC 663). This can be accomplished in two ways.

First, an officer can graduate from the National War College (NWC) or the Industrial

College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at the National Defense University in

Washington, DC (these are the only two joint senior service schools -“war colleges”

– with an academic year-long curriculum for officers in the grades of lieutenant

colonel/Navy commander or colonel/Navy captain; NWC and ICAF produce about

300 graduates a year). Second, an officer can also fulfill the JSO JPME requirement

by graduating from (1) either a service-specific senior service school (“war college”

with an academic-year curriculum for officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel or

colonel/Navy commander or captain) or intermediate service school (“staff college”

with an academic-year curriculum for officers in the grades of major/Navy lieutenant

commander) by residence, seminar or correspondence programs, and (2) by

graduating from the 12-week course of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in

Norfolk, Virginia – another joint school.

The second method, referenced above, is the primary tool for most officers to

obtain JSO status. The educational focus is upon the joint operational art of war,

although the largest number of graduates fill strategic level JDAs within the Joint Staff

or on CINC headquarter staffs. The annual graduates number around 900. In

22

Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee

on Armed Services, 101st Congress, first Session, April 21, 1989.

CRS-15

addition, each course must contain a balanced student body from the three service

departments.

An issue arises in relation to the timing of the AFSC courses. Given that the

course dates and reassignment timings do not necessarily align, most students report

to the JDA and then return on temporary duty (TDY) to AFSC for the required

course. For example, the AFSC course begins the first duty Monday in March and

the assigned officer had a reporting date of 10 January to the CINC’s staff in the

Hawaii Pacific Command. The officer reports to the new assignment in Hawaii by 10

January and works for about 40 days prior to being sent back to Virginia for 12 weeks

to complete the AFSC course. During the time at the course, the officer’s duties in

Hawaii either go undone or must be completed by other officers who have their own

duties. In addition, the military must pay for the officer’s return travel expenses and

pay per diem, living expenses, for the duration of the course. While this officer is in

Virginia, the family has possibly been left to settle the household and themselves into

a completely new environment. The impact of the TDY and return JPME completion

results in the temporary assignment/loss of primary duty performance of an equivalent

of 210 officers per year.23

With the limited seating currently offered in JPME, a substantial number of

military members serving in JDAs are never formally educated in joint matters. The

total JPME production today is around 1200 graduates annually. With a JDAL of

9400 based upon a 36-month average tour length. It is not feasible for the DoD to

produce enough JSOs under the current laws to fulfill requirements. To further

compound the issue, many joint positions are currently filled or augmented by reserve

component officers;24 yet, today’s JPME virtually never reaches these officers.25

Given scheduling, career requirements, manpower needs and availability, as well

as operational contingencies (some being emergency deployments which can not be

anticipated), it is very difficult to produce sufficient numbers of qualified JSOs under

the current legislative requirements of the GNA. JPME is one limiting factor, based

upon seat availability, for the services in producing JSOs. Couple the JPME

requirements with those of the assignment process, and it becomes clear that the DoD

can not succeed under the current provisions.

23

Colonel Frank H. Ayers, Jr., “JPME 2010," JCS/J-7 Briefing, February 4, 2000.

24

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), RSC: DD-RA(M)

1147/1148, FY1998. “The Ready Reserve (reserve components) is comprised of military

members of the Reserve and National Guard, organized in units or as individuals, liable for

recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national emergency.”

25

The provisions of the GNA are not specifically applied to the reserve components (see

Reserve Officer Personnel Management section below). With the active duty services actively

seeking JPME assignments for their eligible officers and with the GNA currently not applying

to reservists, seats are virtually non-existent their attendance.

CRS-16

Joint Waivers

Virtually every aspect of the GNA joint officer personnel management can be

waived for some reason, at some level. During the early years following enactment

of the law, the services commonly utilized every available waiver. Under the

oversight of Congress and within the spirit of the law, the services have steadily

declined the utilization of, but by no means eliminated, joint waivers as joint officer

personnel management has evolved. Utilization of waivers varies by service, but the

bottom line is that there are multiple ways, consistent with the law, to bypass the

requirements. For example, it is not uncommon for a 36-month joint tour length

requirement to be waived to 24 months, and full credit for the tour rendered in order

for an officer to move to a needed command position. From grade designation to

JPME to mandatory JSO-designees in COS military positions, waivers can be and are

granted. Although permissible, these waivers are a reflection of requirements in the

law and implementation of personnel management issues which arguably do not

support sound joint officer personnel management.

Reserve Officer Personnel Management

The provisions of the GNA are not specifically extended to the reserve

components. Nevertheless, the reserve components are mandated to apply the GNA

active duty joint officer personnel management parameters to the “extent possible”.

Currently, these are not applied and the reserve components lack procedures to

identify/track positions which provide reserve officers with the knowledge and

experience that come from working with other services and from joint operations.

Given the demands of today’s environment, coupled with the military drawdown,

the reserve components are included in most every mission – from disaster relief

within the continental United States to ongoing operations in Iraq, Bosnia and

Kosovo. Effective utilization of the Total Force, the active and reserve components

combined, is viewed as critical to continued success in joint operations.

Realizing the importance of the reserve components and the importance of

capturing reserve component joint utilization, a working group, co-chaired by the

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, and the Assistant Chairman, Joint

Chief of Staff, Reserve Matters, has been established to determine the application of

joint officer personnel management for the reserve components. The charter of the

working group includes: (1) defining reserve component positions which yield joint

experience using the broadest possible definition of joint; (2) establishing DoD policy

to provide guidance to the services concerning joint officer personnel management for

reserve components; (3) assisting the services in creating processes to track reserve

components’ members joint experiences; (4) advising reserve component leaders on

implementing career tracks for the best and brightest officers to gain joint experience;

and (5) encouraging joint duty as a career enhancer for reserve component members.

The working group is targeting the June 2000 reserve component senior leadership

conference to present their findings.

CRS-17

DoD Compliance Reports to Congress

The Secretary of Defense is required to report to Congress each year the

services’ compliance with the personnel requirements of the GNA. The report

contains limited narrative and detailed data charts which supposedly denotes the

DoD’s progress in compliance or non-compliance with the directives of the GNA.

However, in reality, the report provides detailed data which presents a snap shot in

time, and many of the required charts do not demonstrate any specific compliance.

In addition, the report does not cover trend analysis or year-to-year comparisons

which would further demonstrate progression or non-compliance.

For example, in the latest report, DoD covers compliance utilizing FY1999, and

provides a summary of JSOs as specifically required in the GNA:

Table 3. Summary of Joint Specialty Officers (JSO)

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Total

Designated as JSOs

362

223

70

203

858

Designated as JSO

Nominees

714

814

173

574

2,275

JSO Nominees

Designated Under COS

Provisions

368

365

101

316

1,150

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

The DoD reported that 858 officers had been designated as JSOs, that 2,275 officers

had been designated as JSO nominees and that 1,150 JSO nominees were designated

under COS provisions. In addition, the total numbers are reported by service. As

noted earlier, there has never been an optimum JSO number determination. However,

this summary does not demonstrate any specific level of compliance, it merely

provides factual data (a more complete view of the FY1999 compliance charts of the

annual report can be found in Appendix D).

Although DoD has made progress with compliance in accordance with the GNA,

the annual report does not always reflect the magnitude of progress or document

long-term areas of concern. For example, the report (Appendix D, Table 12) shows

that the Navy did not meet the 0-6 promotion objective in the “other joint” category

in FY1999. But, the Joint Staff office, which tracks compliance, has found that the

Navy consistently fails, from year to year, to meet the 0-6 promotion objectives in the

“other joint” category. Thus, a requirement for a multi-year, long-term trend

analysis, versus one-year information, could provide a better understanding of DoD

compliance with the GNA.

CRS-18

Unintended Developments of the GNA for Joint Officer

Personnel Management

There are several joint officer personnel management unintended developments

since GNA’s enactment, which have developed over time. The first development is

that the JSOs did not necessarily evolve as envisioned by the original framers and

COS has become a misnomer. In addition, the time demands upon an officer has

made, not only joint officer personnel management, but all personnel management, a

difficult and precise balancing act to ensure an officer can meet all requirements. The

second development concerns the application of the promotion standards. When

applied they allow for some of the best officers to avoid joint duty until they are

selected for promotion to brigadier general/Navy real admiral lower half. The third

development, compliance reporting, has led to the promotion criteria, rather than

sound personnel management, being a primary factor in joint duty. And, very few

officers serve a second tour in the joint arena. These unintended and unforseen

developments indicate why the DoD predicts significant non-compliance in the near

future and why the DoD has made proposals which follow this section.

Joint Specialty Officers

The JSO career path, as discussed earlier, did not necessarily evolve as

envisioned. The very nature of the skills and expertise which contribute to the joint

culture is possibly a two-edged sword in the management of personnel and in an

individual’s career goals. In addition to joint duty outside the specific career

specialty, the officer must maintain specialty expertise in his/her primary specialization

area (i.e., pilot, submariner, infantryman). Officers need service expertise to be

promoted, and serving in joint duty assignments competes with time available in an

average career to acquire service expertise. It is precisely this expertise which is

most value-added in the joint arena. Thus, there can be a negative effect upon the

officer’s career progress, as well as negative effects for utilization within the service

and within the joint arena.

Career Management. It was never intended in the original concept of the JSO,

that placing an officer in a joint tour for a specified time would create difficulties in

career management. In the course of a twenty-year career, an exceptional officer

often spends one year in primary specialty training followed by three years of primary

specialty duty, two years in-residence professional military education, two to four

years in command and three years on a headquarters staff. This allows for seven years

of a typical career to be devoted to advanced specialty training, JPME, joint duty and

pursuit of higher education.26 Kathleen van Trees Medlock, a noted student of

military personnel management, studied a typical Army officer and found that from

26

An advanced specialty course is designed to provide advanced education in the specific

corps specialty such as aircraft investigation qualification or senior security police

management. The command course offers specific training in issues necessary for

commanding units, i.e., legal, environmental, public affairs. PME provides individual military

members with the skills, knowledge, understanding, appreciation which enables them to make

sound decisions in progressively more demanding positions within the national security

environment; it focuses on service-specific, joint and leadership issues.

CRS-19

the time of eligibility to begin the JSO process, a typical Army officer has twelve years

to become a JSO and prepare for competition for promotion to Brigadier General.

During those twelve years the officer must complete assignments in command, service

headquarters staffs, and two service school rotations as well as devoting three to four

years to JSO qualifications.27 Given this timing, currently only 29% of officers

designated as JSOs return to joint duty once; less than 10% return to joint duty twice.

28

Align these numbers with the end of the Cold War, current

OPTEMPO/deployments and downsizing of the military forces, and a typical career

officer must have extraordinarily precise personnel management to succeed within the

current system – anything which “derails” this progression will throw a career off

track. Plus, it is even more difficult to work joint assignments into the careers of

officers who are promoted below-the-zone.

Figure 1. Typical Officer Career Path

As the services express concern over assigning officers to complete JPME and

serve in joint military positions in order to be designated as a JSO, they are implicitly

relating that it is extremely difficult to fit both the joint experiences and the service

experiences, which they consider equally important, into a typical career path.

Another unintended JSO consequence is related to the initial implementation of

the GNA which allowed for the transitional JSO. The transitional method afforded an

oversized pool of JSOs from which to draw the expertise needed to meet joint

27

Kathleen van Trees Medlock, “A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Defense

Reorganization Act on American Officership”, unpublished doctoral dissertation, George

Mason University, 1993, p. 67.

28

Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Joint Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing,

7 January 2000.

CRS-20

requirements. As noted, the transitional JSO pool, which is 46% of JSOs today, is

rapidly shrinking as this group of officers reaches retirement eligibility, and as it is

nearly impossible for the services to replenish the pool with “by-law” JSOs. The

transitional losses, coupled with the “by-law” losses, are two times the production

rate for JSOs. The pool of eligible JSOs has been on the decline since the high of

12,000+ in 1990 and is projected to be below 4,000 by 2005.29 The ever-shrinking

pool is making it more and more difficult to fill all military positions.

Also unforeseen when enacted, but noted by many, is the concern that the

services are – have to be, by law – meeting the JSO requirements and expectations of

the law at the expense of sound joint officer personnel management. For example,

officers with good records and the potential for promotion to make the grade of

colonel/Navy captain often meet the requirements and are designated as JSOs without

regard for the specialty being required within the JDAL. Likewise, an officer with

high potential for promotion, who has completed PME in residence, who has held a

command and served in a JDA, is likely to be designated a JSO regardless of the

existence of requirements for the officer’s specialty/grade on the JDAL or promotion

potential for GO/FO. Also, the assignment of an officer graduating from the National

Defense University (NDU) is often more influenced by the statutory requirement to

place at least 50% plus one member of each NDU graduating class into an approved

JDA than it is driven by where the individual officer can best be utilized. This desire

to comply with law has developed a gap between the JDAL requirements and the JSO

inventory. In other words, the internal composition of the skills/specialties of the

JSOs are not necessarily the composition required to fill the JDAL. The fact that only

29% of officers having been designated as JSOs ever serve in a JDA following JSO

designation highlights this consequence.

Promotions

As with the case of JSOs, when the promotability standards are applied,

unintended developments appear. Some of the best qualified officers in specific

specialities never serve in joint assignments while other quality officers are denied the

opportunity to serve joint. Compliance with the promotion standards affect today’s

joint officer personnel management.

With the services seeking to promote officers who have the highest potential for

command, leadership and continued promotion, it is not difficult for the best officers

to bypass joint. The law as written, and the current promotion system, allows the

services to “groom/grow” officers without joint experience until they reach the grade

of brigadier general /Navy rear admiral lower half. This pool of officers is usually the

very best of the best.

In addition, promotion standards by design also exclude some excellent officers

from serving in joint positions due to their lack of promotability to colonel/Navy

captain. For example, an officer’s career which has centered around a specific area

of expertise, such as Russia, may not possess the qualities sought for promotion to 0-

29

Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Joint Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing,

January 7, 2000.

CRS-21

6; considered an expert, this officer might be the perfect 0-5 to serve as a desk officer

in the Joint Staff. Paradoxically though, the demand to reserve JDA positions for

promotable officers could preclude service in the joint arena. Promotion standards

were envisioned as ensuring improved the quality of officers assigned within the joint

arena; however, it also eliminates some of the most experienced, best qualified officers

from utilization in the joint arena.

As with JSO assignments, to ensure compliance with the law, promotability

potential has become a top priority when nominating/designating officers as JSOs.

The requirement for a sufficiently large pool of JSOs to meet requirements is often

countered by the promotability issues. The end result is a relatively small, carefully

selected, highly qualified/promotable JSO pool which will not meet JDAL

requirements in the near future. Although not counter productive to efforts to

maintain a highly promotable pool of JSOs, it currently contributes to the gap between

the number of JSOs and the specialty requirements mentioned earlier.

To measure the quality of joint personnel on a narrow continuum of a single

promotion board, for a specific grade and category, does not present the whole

picture of the officer, of the officer’s career or of the officer’s future potential or

utilization. Since officers are promoted based upon their immediate future potential,

a single board only measures performance at the time of eligibility. In essence, the

current promotion comparisons/narrow views do not allow for the distribution of

quality over time to be measured. Thus, it is a misleading measure of long-term

quality. For example, the services could be meeting quality targets over time if an

aggregate were measured, and yet not be meeting every specific board target.

Critical Occupational Specialty

“Critical position” has become a misnomer; within today’s JDAL it is often the

least critical positions which carry the COS designation. When the joint officer

personnel management program cannot deliver the intended COS officer, the

CINCs/joint activities: (1) accept officers who meet the legal requirements, but not

necessarily the mission needs; (2) live with a vacancy because a COS officer to fill the

critical military position is not available; (3) process a waiver for a non-JSO to be

assigned to the critical military position; or (4) move the critical military position

designation to another military position so they can acquire an officer to meet the

mission needs. In all cases, but especially in the case of moving the critical military

position designation, the original intent of the law is manipulated to meet mission

needs. The end result is that the least critical of the military positions, the ones which

can be left vacant or can be filled by a non-JSO, are the ones designated as the critical

military positions. This evolution has developed a system in which it is impracticable

to determine the future COS needs of the joint world and to properly plan/prepare in

advance for the future needs. The process does not allow for keeping pace with realworld, real-time needs.

Careerism

Another significant consequence is the shift from a service to joint orientation,

and in some cases preference. At the time of GNA enactment, the services were

CRS-22

experiencing some “careerism”30 within the officer corps. The services have never

promoted careerism, nor do their core values allow for careerism. At the time of the

GNA, the services were gaining momentum in cataloging careerism as opprobrium.

But today, following the requirements of GNA and the services’ embracement of joint

duty, “joint careerism,” (i.e., jockeying for a Joint Staff or Unified Command position)

is surfacing within the officer corps.31 “Today, personnel from all the services seek

joint assignments, which has become a prerequisite for promotion to general or flag

officer”32 This has the potential to serve as a “positive” consequence when viewed

from the perspective of having the best and brightest officers serve in joint positions.

Or, on the other hand, it can be a “negative” consequence if it grows to counter one

of the armed forces’ strong core values – service before self.

The Current DoD View

In 1996, ten years after the GNA was enacted, one of the initial framers of the

legislation, former Senate staffer James R. Locher noted, “Congress had hoped that

the department, after several years of implementing title IV, would conceptualize a

better approach to joint officer management. That has not occurred. The GoldwaterNichols objective of improving joint officer management has been achieved, but DoD

still lacks a vision of its needs for joint officers and how to prepare and reward

them.”33 Three years later, Secretary Cohen shared the current DoD view in his

January 2000 Report to the President, “...the Department and the Joint Staff are

currently completing an extensive review of both the law and policy governing joint

officer management. The recommendations from this review promise to uphold the

fundamental tenets of Goldwater-Nichols while streamlining the processes that will

allow the Department to continue to meet the challenges of the 21st century.”34 The

DoD believes it has evolved to the point that “joint” is normal, although it has not

evolved to the exact letter of the law.

The DoD has studied and designed a proposal concerning several aspects of the

law governing joint officer personnel management. Their proposal includes replacing

the JSO with a special duty identifier, deleting the COS, separating promotion

comparisons and JSO designations, redesigning promotion comparisons, realigning

joint tour lengths with standard service tours lengths, redesigning and expanding

JPME, and redefining the annual report to Congress. The proposal has been

30

Careerism - positioning to enhance individual prospects for promotion, key assignment

selections, etc. for the betterment of the one without regard for the betterment of the service

31

Colonel Mackubin T. Owens, Jr., USMCR (Ret), “Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year

Retrospective,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1998: 48-53.

32

John M. Shalikashvilli, “A Word from the Chairman,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn

1996: 4-7.

33

James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint Forces Quarterly,

Autumn 1996: 10-14.

34

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to the President and the

Congress,” February 2000: E-1.

CRS-23

approved by the CJCS and presented to some key congressional members and

staffers.

The first and overarching aspect of the proposal is to replace the JSO

designation with a special duty identifier. The GNA focused on a specialist career

track for the JSO which has not evolved within the services, and the DoD proposes

replacing the JSO with a JSO “special duty identifier”. The DoD sees this change as

a means of placing emphasis on building a larger pool of officers with joint expertise

and education. The JSO duty identifier would allow for the automatic granting of

JSO status to every officer who completes the required joint education and joint duty

assignment (there would be no required order of education/assignment as currently

exists in the law). The JSO designation board which selects JSO nominees based

upon meeting criteria and promotion potential would no longer be necessary. This

new designation process would allow for “ever-current” identification of all joint

qualified personnel, thus allowing immediate identification of eligible officers required

to meet ever-changing, immediate joint requirements. The intent is to expand the JSO

pool to include all qualified officers and to provide a greater variety of grades and

specialties. Having the right officer who meets the requirements is the highest priority

of the joint environment, and the expansion of identifying all joint trained/qualified

officers meets this key need.

With the JSO special duty identifier being utilized, the COS would be deleted.

The CINC/joint agency, owners of the joint military positions, would establish all

requirements through the officer requisition process currently utilized by the services

and there would be no requirement for the COS. The DoD proposal to delete the

COS would, supposedly, offer the joint activities the flexibility to determine

requirements and to requisition qualified officers to meet them. With the deletion of

the COS, and the associated restrictions for filling COS military positions, the ability

to quickly locate officers with the desired expertise to fill time-/mission-critical

requirements would, according to the DoD, be enhanced. The DoD envisions the

multiple JDAL fill-rate tracking requirements ceasing as all joint military positions

would be created equal.

The proposal also includes decoupling promotion comparisons from JSO

designation. This delinking will allow identification of all officers who are joint

qualified versus identifying only those select officers who would enhance the statistics

by meeting promotion standards. Although delinked, promotion standards would

continue as a quality indicator for officers assigned to joint military positions.

To ensure the quality of officers assigned to JDAs, promotion comparisons

would be redesigned. The DoD proposal is designed to continue a comparison, but

would delete much of the administrative criteria currently required. It proposes to

compare those currently assigned in the joint staff to those currently serving in the

service headquarters staffs and compare those assigned in the joint agencies to the

service average. The proposal would delete the requirements for comparing those

who have previously served joint and JSO-designees specifically. The DoD believes

its proposal would continue to measure the quality of the officers without allowing

the reporting requirements to become more important than matching the correct

person to the requirement. Thus, an officer’s special background/expertise would be

CRS-24

the driving factor in assignments. The DoD proposal would continue with the current

service quality screening process before an officer could be assigned to a JDA.

The DoD believes that joint tour lengths should be aligned with standard

service tour lengths.35 The current provisions for tour lengths, with its many

exceptions and waivers, can be confusing, and the tracking process requires extensive

oversight. The DoD proposal is designed to advance the intent of the GNA

concerning joint tour stability, yet provide a more simplified process. This proposal

would grant the Secretary of Defense additional authority in determining full joint

credit for a tour of duty and would allow the Secretary of Defense more discretion in

deeming which assignments/situations grant valuable joint experience.

A joint tour of 36 months, like the majority of standard tour lengths, would

remain the standard for most joint duty. However, for example, a joint tour in Korea

would be aligned to the current assignment standard for a short tour – 12 to 18

months. These short tour locations sustain high OPTEMPO, and the joint experience

in this type arena is commensurate to that of officers serving longer tours in less

strained environments. In addition, serving in a Joint Task Force (JTF)

Headquarters36 is considered valuable joint duty. The proposal would allow for full

joint credit to officers who amass 365 days in JTF Headquarters when deployed via

90-day+ rotations. The current cumulative credit authorization enacted in 1996 for

credit after 36 months would be deleted. The proposed credit for short tours in

remote areas and for JTF service would recognize valuable joint experience which

otherwise goes unnoticed and uncredited to the individual officer today.

The DoD proposal would support the original legislation which recognizes there

are legitimate reasons for curtailment of a 36-month tour. And, it would retain 24

months as the minimum service for joint tour credit in most cases. In addition, the

proposal establishes a provision for the owning joint activity to agree to the early

release of an officer; if the owning activity does not agree, the officer will not be

moved prior to completion of the joint tour. The proposal deletes the use of

cumulative credit for partial tours as known today – officers either complete the joint

tour to receive full credit or leave early and receive no credit (an automatic incentive

to enhance stability in tour lengths). If an officer is moved from one joint position to

35

Every authorized military position has an assigned tour length. A most common

length/standard length for a tour is 36 months. However, for military positions authorized

within very intense/demanding areas of operations, tour lengths vary from 12 months to 24

months. A 12 month tour is commonly referred to as a short tour. There are no short tour

authorizations within the continental United States. For example, an assignment in Korea,

specifically in close proximity to the North and South border, would be classified as a short

tour. The area of operation experiences an intense OPTEMPO in a significantly dangerous

area thus affording the uniformed member experience above/beyond that of a uniformed

member performing similar duties in a headquarters/within the United States.

36

A Joint Task Force is a temporary operation which is created to handle a specific mission

for which there are no permanent military positions authorized and for which there is no intent

to authorize permanent military positions. Although the duty is joint and hosts considerable

joint experience of value to CINCs, joint credit is seldom authorized due to the lack of

permanent military positions.

CRS-25

another joint position, joint credit between consecutive joint duty would be

recognized. The tour length proposal is drastically simplified as compared to today’s

requirements. The firm tour length standards, to be rigorously implemented, meet the

requirements of the joint arena and mirror the way the forces operate today.

The DoD believes that the career focus should be a broad joint education and

recommends expanding the capabilities of joint education, as well as opening joint

education to a much greater number of officers. However, to accommodate this

expansion, education must first be delinked from assignments, thus allowing for

the expansion of education and allowing the education to reach a significantly higher

number of officers.

The DoD proposal focuses upon “one stop”, strategic-level JPME which will

delete the TDY and return issues, expand JPME to a much larger Total Force

audience, at a reasonable price, as it deepens and broadens the JPME content. The

proposal includes an elective course design at the current senior service schools,

distributed JPME via joint seminar formats, distance JPME to the individual officer

on-line, and allows for AFSC to be expanded into a joint operations school.

Extending an AFSC exported curriculum (and faculty if requested) as an elective

course at the current senior service schools would meet the joint requirements and

eliminate an extensive number of TDY and return losses as noted earlier. This would

allow joint education within a currently established school (AFSC in-residence

outreach). The expected audience would be approximately 650 officers per year.

The second aspect of distributed JPME would consist of an AFSC exported

curriculum into the joint arena. The program would be taught in seminar format (one

session per week for six months) at the CINC headquarters. This proposal would also

delete TDY and return losses, as well as delivering JPME to officers who currently

have no opportunity for JPME. In addition to the basic curriculum from AFSC,

CINC-specific concerns, issues and topics could be incorporated into the program.

It is estimated that this proposal could reach an additional 600 officers who currently

receive no education in joint matters.

The third aspect employs distance learning by exporting the AFSC curriculum

directly to individual officers on their home/office personal computers. This is

envisioned to be a six month course, using off the shelf technology and “virtual”

seminars. This aspect would greatly expand JPME to the Total Force by providing

“anywhere/anytime” JPME capability. The annual audience could reach 2,500 officers

who currently receive no JPME.

In addition to reaching an expanded officer pool at the strategic JPME level, it

is proposed that the expansion of the current AFSC to a 10-month, 100 student

joint operational school. This residence program would qualify as intermediate

service school and fulfill the requirement of JPME. AFSC would also establish a twomonth summer course which would cover the requirements which are currently in

place as AFSC. This program would reach approximately 100 students annually and

300 students during the summer program.

CRS-26

The DoD proposal would increase the number of officers currently educated in

joint matters annually from 1,200 to approximately 4,350 without significantly

increasing JPME expenses above current spending levels. The DoD proposes

expanding the intent of the GNA by educating additional students for a one-time

investment in advanced distributed learning. The design would allow for all officers

destined for joint duty the opportunity to receive joint education commensurate with

rank and responsibilities. In addition, the DoD sees this proposal as recasting JPME

as an educational component of a continuum of lifelong joint learning.

The entire DoD proposal of the GNA maintains the standards for the Secretary

of Defense to monitor the state of joint officer personnel management and redefines

the measurements which would continue to be reported to Congress in the annual

defense reports. To satisfy the concerns of those who might interpret the DoD

proposal as cutting away too many of the aspects which have enhanced “jointness”,

the DoD would report: (1) JSO special duty identified officers by

grade/service/specialty; (2) analysis of how well the service secretaries are assigning

personnel to joint positions; (3) number of “good of the service” waivers for GO/FO

selected; (4) percent of officers departing from joint duty before earning full joint tour

credit; (5) percent of NDU class seats filled, by course; (6) listing of JTF headquarters

currently approved for joint duty credit; (7) promotion comparisons; and (8)

significant information as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Although

extensive in nature, the DoD believes the proposed reporting will convey the

continued progress of “jointness” without allowing the reporting constraints to

adversely affect personnel utilization/joint officer personnel management.

In sum, the proposal maintains a JDAL of assignments in which officers gain

significant experience in joint matters. But, in doing so, it would delete many of the

current waiver options. Critical military positions would be deleted, the JSO pool

would be greatly expanded and there would be no quota for at least 50% of JDAL

military positions to be manned by JSO nominees. Promotion comparisons would be

for officers currently serving joint. General officers/flag officers would continue to

require joint duty prior to promotion to 0-7 and completion of CAPSTONE. The

sequence rules for JPME prior to JDA would not be required and JPME would be

redesigned to afford a greater number of officers, including Guardsmen and

Reservists, the opportunity to complete joint education. Assignment requirements of

50% plus one would be dropped for NDU graduates. And, the annual report to

Congress would be updated to ensure reported information focused on meeting the

joint arena requirements by reporting what matters to Congress in their oversight role.

With the intent of staying within the GNA provisions of the law, the proposed

changes are suggested to offer more flexibility in joint officer personnel management

and to afford a greater chance of getting the correct officers with the appropriate

skills/education matched to real-world requirements – the proposal synchronizes the

joint management process with the services’ personnel management processes.

CRS-27

In his most recent posture statement,37 General Shelton, CJCS, assured Congress

he is not seeking to weaken jointness, but to improve it, “to champion it”. Just as is

supported by “Joint Vision 2020",38 he is seeking the flexibility in personnel

management to fulfill the strategic concept of decisive force, power projection,

overseas presence and strategic agility. The DoD’s goal is to transform joint

personnel management, balanced with the performance of missions in a dynamic

environment, to maximize JSO production, as early as possible in a career, for better

personnel utilization.

The new DoD proposal is not without controversy. Some find the proposal to

be too far-reaching in lifting the GNA joint officer personnel management constraints

and reporting aspects of the Act. Concerns of this nature focus on the fact that the

proposal gives additional authority to the Secretary of Defense and JCS which could

fall short of the original intent of the GNA. Given the DoD’s reluctance to seek

jointness at the time of its enactment, some hold a distrustful view of the DoD’s

ability to self-manage joint officer personnel.

Still others have expressed

disappointment in the DoD view; they have described it as making administrative and

mechanical change to ease the burden of reporting and have found that the proposal

lacks innovation and major redesign for the future of joint officer personnel

management. The proponents of the DoD proposal believe it will streamline the

process, while maintaining the original intent of the GNA, and will allow for sound

joint officer personnel management.

Legislation in the 106th Congress, Second Session

The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2001, S. 2549 (Subtitle B, Joint Officer Management, Sec. 521-528), provides the

following language concerning joint officer personnel management:39

The committee recommends a series of provisions that would streamline the

designation and management of joint speciality officers. The recommended

provisions would simplify the requirements to be designated as a joint speciality

officer, would require that Joint Professional Military Training be conducted in

residence, would establish the promotion objectives for joint speciality officers as

a group to be equal to or greater than the rate of officers of the same armed force

in the same grade and competitive category serving on the headquarters staff of

that armed force, would establish the minimum tour length to qualify for joint tour,

and would modify the required contents of the annual report to comply with the

simplified management requirements.40

37

“CJCS 2000 Posture Statement to Congress,” Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

8 February 2000: 24. [http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/Posture00.html]

38

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, Joint Chiefs of Staff , 2000.

[http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020]

39

40

106th Congress, 2nd Session, S.Rept. 106-292, May 12, 2000.

Ibid, p. 298. As used speciality refers to specialty and Joint Professional Military Training

refers to Joint Professional Military Education.

CRS-28

This legislative language from S.2549 is consistent with the DoD proposal with

two major exceptions. First, section 522 of the bill would alter promotion

comparisons to compare all officers serving in and having previously served in a joint

duty assignment, to officers of the same armed force, in the same grade and

competitive category who are serving on the headquarters staff of that armed force;

whereas the DoD proposal, would discontinue the comparison of officers having

previously served. In addition, the DoD proposal called for comparing Joint Staff

assigned officers to headquarters staffs and all other officers in joint duty assignments

outside the Joint Staff to the service average. As a result, the Senate language would

increase non-compliance reporting, because it raises the promotion criteria standards

above what is currently expected. If the Army and Air Force placed every promotion

allocation toward joint officer (none toward the Service), most likely they could not

meet the criteria set by the Senate language. The second major exception is that there

were no significant changes to Joint Professional Military Education in the legislative

language. Specifically, there was no change to allow the utilization of current

technology, specifically distributive or distance learning, for accomplishing joint

education.

Options for Congress

Framers of the GNA wrote of a need for congressional oversight and

congressional fine-tuning of the law to ensure the continual progression set in motion

by the original legislation. As already mentioned, the DoD has made a proposal to

make changes in the joint personnel officer management program. In early February

2000, General Shelton, CJCS, submitted these suggested program changes in the

GNA to Congress in the posture statement to the House and Senate Committees on

Armed Services. This and other congressional options are presented below.

Options for Congressional Action

Continue the Status Quo. There are those who believe DoD did not originally

embrace “jointness” and that more effort should be made to make it work on its own

terms before altering it. If this option is elected, the DoD believes a dilemma is

quickly approaching under the rules of the current law. The DoD will have the option

to produce additional JSOs to meet requirements, but doing so will draw the DoD

into a situation where the promotion targets are not met. Or, the DoD could maintain

the current promotion standards and fail to fill the requisite number of JDAL military

positions, thus creating an impact on joint operations which has yet to be defined.

Either DoD choice would lead to reporting non-compliance to Congress. In addition,

maintaining the status quo will not allow the DoD the utilization of current

technological advances to expand JPME within the current active force and to

introduce JPME to the reserve components.

Adjust the GNA. Congress could accept the pledge of the DoD to progress

with the original intent of the GNA and allow flexibility concerning how to best

proceed. Proponents of the DoD proposal believe it will allow the DoD to grow and

groom the required airmen/soldiers/sailors/Marines with an appropriate joint view to

CRS-29

meet the ever-expanding, future needs of both joint operations and the military

departments.

Congress could modify the GNA by accepting only select aspects of the

proposal:

!

Establishment of JSO duty identifiers to expand the JSO

population

!

Deletion of critical positions

!

Decoupling of promotion comparisons from JSO designations

!

Redesigned promotion comparisons

!

Adjusted tour lengths

!

Delinking of JPME and the assignment process

!

Redesigned JPME

Or, Congress could modify the DoD proposal by adding additional aspects:

41

!

Solicit CINC-specific and service-specific Chiefs of Personnel

opinions of and suggestions concerning the overall DoD proposal

(DoD did solicit in 1997 prior to proposal formulation of their

current proposal)

!

Offer joint credit to all officers regardless of grade when serving

joint; offer joint credit to all 0-3s when serving joint41

!

Require complete review/deletion of duplication of effort within the

offices of the Secretary of Defense and JCS concerning joint officer

personnel management

!

Require a complete DoD business plan defining the future joint

officer – exactly how many/what specialty are required prior to

proceeding with any proposal – and, requiring a recruitment business

plan to meet requirements

With consideration to allowing joint credit for additional grades, a couple of significant

points surface: a) joint agencies and CINC staffs would be allowed greater personnel

management flexibility based upon the number of 0-3s assigned (the joint Staff and OSD

would experience little impact based upon the small number of 0-3 assignees); b) expanding

the eligibility criteria to include 0-3s would expand the JSO pool, increasing the number of

GO/FO eligible officers, and would offer relief for the 50% assignment rules; and c)

expanding the eligibility could also negatively affect the promotion targets based upon the

difficulty to predict 0-3 promotion potential at such a young career point and it could increase

the assignment gap between serving joint and GO/FO promotion.

CRS-30

Furthermore, Congress could adjust the GNA as presented in the Senate committee's

report (S.Rept. 106-292). Congress might accept the language in S. 2549 and doing

so will enhance some aspects of joint officer personnel management, such as allowing

joint duty identifiers to track all joint experience. But, the language concerning

promotion criteria will intensify the non-compliance reporting predicted by the DoD,

and it will not allow for the expansion of joint education by utilizing available

technologies.

Pursue Other Options: Commission, Hearing, Special Committee, Study.

Congress could elect to establish a commission, hold hearings, appoint a special

committee or mandate a study to further investigate the DoD’s proposal. Such action

would allow Congress to seek opinions from academics, senior current/retired

military, and other experts before determining a course of action. Choosing the

correct mix of persons to participate in a commission, hearing, special committees,

or study is important because of the intricacies of the GNA.

The GNA in Relation to the Defense Officer Personnel

Management Act

Although the focus of this report is joint officer personnel management in

relation to the GNA, Congress may also want to consider military personnel

management in relation to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act

(DOPMA).42 As the GNA focused on the DoD organization and manning for joint

operations, DOPMA created uniform laws for the military services with the intent to

allow for the recruitment and retention of an appropriate number of quality officers,

and to afford all officers consistent career opportunities. DOPMA addresses grade

tables, authority to manage the officer force, field-grade allocations, promotion

procedures/opportunities/timelines, provisions for career expectations/appointment

of regular officers, competitive categories, and tenure issues. A change in the

DOPMA could have residual effects on joint officer personnel management, but it

probably would not change the challenges presented in this report.

Some believe that an extension of the retirement eligibility of 20 years could

resolve the joint officer personnel management issues. They profess that extending

the years required in a career would allow for additional time for the fulfillment of

joint requirements. Although adding man-years by any means, whether it be via

extending career lengths or expanding authorized end-strengths, could have a positive

effect – decrease OPTEMPO, increase quality of life, etc. – it would not address the

joint officer personnel challenges faced today, such as bureaucratic complexity, the

prospect on non-compliance reporting, and other issues discussed above. In addition,

many believe that the negative effects – if not grandfathered, a view of a broken

promise or decreased retention, etc. – could far outweigh any net gain. To increase

effectiveness and efficiency of joint officer personnel management, change must be

addressed within the governing laws of the GNA.

42

Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980. At the time of its enactment, DOPMA was the

first comprehensive change in officer personnel management laws since 1947.

CRS-31

Appendix A:

Historical Timeline

July 1947

National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253

August 1949

Amended National Security Act of 1949, Public Law 216

May 1954

Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA), PL 83-349

August 1958

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Public Law

85-599

January 1968

North Korea seizes USS Pueblo, U.S. Navy intelligence ship, in

Sea of Japan

March 1973

End of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam via Peace Accord

May 1975

Khmer Rouge seize Mayaguez, U.S. freighter, off coast of

Cambodia; Marines attempt crew rescue

April 1980

Unsuccessful attempt to rescue U.S. embassy employees taken

hostage in Tehran

November 1980

Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), PL 96513

January 1982

General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

criticizes the JCS structure and speaks out for reorganization

Spring 1982

House Armed Services Committee, Investigations

Subcommittee, began five months of “JCS reform” hearings

August 1982

House passes the JCS reform bill introduced by the

Investigations Subcommittee.

Senate Armed Services

Committee elects not to entertain the House bill which

disappears at the end of the session

June 1983

Chairman, Armed Services Committee, Senator John Tower (RTex), begins a series of hearings on defense management, not

limited to but including JCS reform

CRS-32

August 1983

Fall 1983

Again the House passes the JCS reform bill introduced by the

Investigations Subcommittee, chaired by Bill Nichols (D-AL)

and again the Senate Armed Services Committee elects not to

consider the bill

Senator John Tower appoints staffer James Locher to conduct a

reorganization study

October 1983

Terrorist bombing of Marines barracks in Beirut

Invasion of Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury

Summer 1984

In an effort to engage Senate consideration of the House JCS

reform efforts, Representative Nichols introduces legislation

which resulted in a multi-listing of questions forwarded to

Department of Defense by the Senate Armed Services

Committee

January 1985

Following the retirement of Senator John Tower, Senator Barry

Goldwater (R-Ariz) becomes Chairman, Armed Services

Committee and encourages James Locher to complete the

reorganization study charged in mid-1984

March 1985

The Department of Defense, led by Secretary Casper

Weinberger, responds to the Senate Armed Service Committee

inquiries; DoD opposes reorganization

May 1985

Senate calls for the establishment of the Blue Ribbon Panel on

Defense Management

July 1985

The President creates a Presidential Commission on Defense

Management chaired by David Packard (Packard Commission,

A Quest for Excellence)

October 1985

Staffer James Locher reorganization staff study to the

Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, S. Prt. 9986, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, is published;

the study calls for significant reform

With strong involvement by Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wis), a

bill was introduced and passed in the House in late 1985

November

- December 1985

The Senate Armed Services Committee hosts extensive

JCS reform hearings

December 1985

- January 1986

The Senate Armed Services Committee staff draft their

version of JCS reform bill

CRS-33

February 1986

The interim Packard Commission report is released; it supports

the reform arguments heard in the Senate Armed Services

Committee hearings

March 1986

Following extensive debate and more than 85 amendments, the

Senate Armed Services Committee approves the JCS reform bill

on March 6, The Barry Goldwater Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986

The House Armed Services Committee embarks on a series of

hearings concerning the general issue of Defense Management

April 1986

President Reagan directs the Department of Defense to

implement virtually all the recommendations from the interim

Packard Commission report

April - May 1986

The William Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act,

calling for more extensive reform than the Senate bill, is passed

from the House Armed Services Committee in late June

May 1986

The Senate unanimously approves the Barry Goldwater

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

July 1986

Final version of the Packard Commission report, A Quest for

Excellence, is published

August

- September 1986

The House-Senate Conference confers on the William

Nichols/Barry Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganization

Acts of 1986

October 1986

Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986

December 1989

Operation Just Cause, invasion of Panama

August 1990

Operation Desert Shield, Kuwait

January 1991

Operation Desert Storm, Kuwait

December 1992

Operation Restore Hope, Somalia

September 1994

Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti

December 1995

NATO-led multinational force, Bosnia-Herzegovina

March 1999

Operation Allied Forces, Kosova

CRS-34

Appendix B:

Abbreviation/Acronyms

APZ: Above the Promotion (Primary) Zone

BPZ: Below the Promotion (Primary) Zone

CINC: Commander-in-Chief/Commander-in-Charge

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations

COS: Critical Occupational Specialty

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force

DA: Department of the Army

DoD: Department of Defense

DoDD: Department of Defense Directives

FITREP: Fitness Report

FO: Flag Officer

FY: Fiscal year

GAO: Government Accounting Office

GO: General Officer

GNA: Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986

HASC: House Armed Services Committee

ICAF: Industrial College of the Armed Forces

IPZ: In the Promotion (Primary) Zone

ISS: Intermediate Service School

JDA: Joint Duty Assignment

JDAL: Joint Duty Assignment Listing

JPME: Joint Professional Military Education

JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JSO: Joint Specialty Officer

JCS: Joint Chief of Staffs

NDU: National Defense University

NWC: National War College

OPTEMPO: Operating Tempo

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense

OUSD: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

PERSTEMPO: Personnel Tempo

PME: Professional Military Education

POC: Point of Contact

PL: Public Law

SASC: Senate Armed Services Committee

SecDef: Secretary of Defense

SSS: Senior Service School

USA: United States Army

USAF: United States Air Force

USD: Under Secretary of Defense

USMC: United States Marine Corps

USN: United States Navy

VCJCS: Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CRS-35

Appendix C:

Definitions

CAPSTONE - A course is a six-week course consisting of seminars, case studies,

informal discussions, and visits to key U.S. military commands, with the objective of

making attendees more effective in planning and employing joint and combined

operations. The curriculum examines major issues affecting national security decision

making, military strategy, joint/combined doctrine, interoperability and key allied

nation issues. Created in 1982, as a voluntary participation course for GO/FOs, in

1986 the GNA mandated that all newly selected GO/FOs attend.

Combatant Commander - A commander-in-chief of one of the unified or specified

combatant commands established by the President.

Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) - A military occupational specialty selected

from among the combat arms of the Military Departments. Military specialities are

those engaged in the operational art to attain strategic goals in a theatre of conflict

through the design, organization, and conduct campaigns and major operations.

Critical Joint Duty Assignment, Military Position - A joint duty assignment position

for which, considering the duties and responsibilities of the position, it is highly

important that the assigned officer be particularly trained in, and oriented toward,

joint matters. Critical military positions are selected by heads of joint organizations,

approved by the Secretary of Defense and documented in the Joint Duty Assignment

List.

Cross-Department Joint Duty Assignment - An assignment in which an officer serves

full-time duties with another Military Department or with the armed forces of a

foreign nation.

Dual Hat Joint Duty Assignment - An assignment in which the officer has

responsibilities to both a parent Service and to a joint activity.

Field Grade - An officer serving in the grade of 0-4 (Major or Lieutenant

Commander) through 0-6 (Colonel or Navy Captain)

Joint - Activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more

military departments participate.

Joint Doctrine - Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two

or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is promulgated

by the CJCS in coordination with the CINCs, services and joint staff.

Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) - An assignment to a designated position in a multiservice, joint or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated

employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three

military departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters

relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning,

CRS-36

contingency planning and command and control of combat operations under a unified

or specified command.

Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL)- A consolidated listing of all field grade

positions designated as joint duty assignments as approved by the Secretary of

Defense and maintained by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Force - A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements,

assigned or attached, of tow or more military department, operating under a single

joint force commander.

Joint Force Commander - A general term applied to a combatant commander,

subunified commander or joint task for commander authorized to exercise combatant

command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force.

Joint Matters - The law, PL 99-33, section 668, defines “joint matters” as matters

relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters

relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency

planning; and, (3) command and control of combat operations under unified

command.

Joint Operations - a general term to describe military actions conducted by joint

forces, or by service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority),

which, of themselves do not create joint forces.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) - Resident professional military

education programs of the National Defense University and other programs as

designated by the Secretary of Defense. The National War College, The Industrial

College of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces Staff College are designated as

institutions of JPME.

Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) - An officer on the active duty list who is particularly

trained in and oriented toward joint matters. In order to be eligible to become a JSO,

an officer must complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and then

complete a full Joint Duty Assignment (JDA).

Joint Specialty officer Nominee - An officer who has completed a program of joint

professional military education or an officer who has a critical occupational specialty

tour. In either instance, the officer has been designated as a joint specialty officer

nominee by the concerned military service.

Joint Staff - The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate

unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component which

includes members from two or more of the military departments. Included in this

definition is the staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Task Force (JTF) - A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the

Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an

existing joint task force commander. (A temporary operation which is created to

CRS-37

handle a specific mission for which there are no permanent military positions

authorized and for which there is no intent to authorize permanent military positions)

Joint Vision 2010 - A publication originally released by General John M. Shalikashvili

(USA Retired), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provides an operationally based

template for the evolution of the armed forces for a challenging and uncertain future.

Joint Vision 2020 - An updated version of JV 2010 released by General Henry H.

Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in June 2000, which extends the original

concepts of JV 2010 out to the year 2020 and continues to focus of a fully joint force

which will be dominant across a full spectrum of military operations.

Jointness - a unified direction of the armed forces governed by joint doctrine and

policies for the employment of multi-service military forces and the efficient use of

defense resources

Personnel - Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to

accomplish the assigned mission.

Professional Military Education - Provides individual military members with the skills,

knowledge, understanding, appreciation which enables them to make sound decision

in progressively more demanding positions within the national security environment.

*NOTE - unless stated other wise, these definitions refer to words and/or phrases as

defined by the DoD. [Http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/]

CRS-38

Appendix D:

DoD Compliance with the GNA

The DoD compliance with the GNA depicted in the following tables, is based

upon FY1999 data extracted from the SecDef’s annual report to the President and

Congress:

Table 4. Summary of Critical Positions

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Total

Critical Positions

347

319

56

155

877

Vacant Critical

Positions

52

78

11

26

167

% Critical Positions

Filled

86%

78%

80%

83%

81%

Critical Positions filled

by JSOs

204

187

10

68

469

Critical Positions filled

by non-JSOs

39

54

35

61

241

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

DoD reported that there were 877 COS positions with 81% of these positions

filled. Various reasons exist as to why the critical positions are filled by officers who

are not JSOs: (1) the positions could have been filled by a non-JSO before it was

designated on the JDAL; (2) the positions are being converted from critical to noncritical, or being deleted; or, (3) a JSO was not available and, the best qualified

officers assigned to these positions were not JSOs. Mission changes drive

redesignations of critical positions and can affect the percentage of fill.

CRS-39

Table 5. Average Length of Tour of Duty in Joint Duty Assignments

(In months)

General/Flag Officers

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Total

Joint Staff (JCS)

24.0

24.5

24.5

22.0

23.8

Other Joint

25.3

27.9

25.3

31.8

27.3

Joint Total (note1)

25.0

27.3

24.8

29.3

26.5

Field Grade Officers

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Total

Joint Staff (JCS)

35.7

34.8

41.5

36.0

35.7

Other Joint

37.6

38.3

38.3

38.8

38.1

Joint Total (note 2)

37.5

37.9

38.5

38.5

37.9

Note 1: GNA requires a tour length of 24 months

Note 2: GNA requires a tour length of 36 months

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

Tour lengths, as reported in Table 5, are not tracked by JSO, JSO nominee and

non-JSO categories, but rather, at the request of Congress, the reporting is by the

assignment categories of Joint Staff, other joint and total. In 1999, only the

compliance within the joint staff fell short of the designated 24 months for GO/FO and

36 months for field grade officers. Navy tour lengths are the primary reason that the

GO/FO statistics fell short, and both the Army and the Air Force tour lengths are

highlighted as the reason the field grade officers, joint staff, did not meet the

requirements. In addition, there are numerous reasons for tour length exclusion:

retirement; separation; suspension from duty; compassionate/medical reassignment;

assignment to other joint duty following promotion; reorganization; joint overseas

short tours; second tours; joint accumulation; and, reassignment to another critical

specialty officer military position.

Table 6. GO/FO Joint Equivalency Waivers

USA

USAF

USMC

Officers Selected for 0-7

40

40

15

35

130

Officers Joint Qualified

32

34

15

24

105

Percent Joint Qualified

80%

85%

100%

69%

81%

0

0

0

0

0

Joint Equivalency

Waivers Used

USN

Total

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

CRS-40

In early year assessments of GO/FO compliance, it was fairly routine for the

DoD to fall short of expectations. The DoD cites a significant reduction in the

number of joint duty, “good of the service”,43 waivers over any previous year for

officers attaining GO/FO rank as a positive indicator of their commitment to the GNA

(see Table 6). The narrative of the SecDef Annual report states that there were a total

of 102 GO/FO waivers granted in FY1999.

Table 7. Summary of COS Officers

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Total

Completed JPME

1,539

2,074

525

1,452

5,590

Designated as JSO

977

1,168

398

888

3,431

JSO-nominees

2,227

2,951

573

2,332

8,083

JSO-nominees without

JPME

1,627

1,988

422

1,764

5,801

JSO-nominees serving

in JDA

1,075

1,245

244

1,017

3,581

6

11

0

11

28

JSO-nominees

completed JDA

currently attending

JPME

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

Congress requires reports related specifically to COS officers as shown above

in Table 7. A positive highlight, but not visible in the above chart, is the increase in

JPME completion by COS officers. In addition, the narrative of the SecDef report

notes that the number of officers who have completed Phase I JPME by

correspondence or seminar is increasing.

43

“Good of the Service” waivers allow SecDef to waive the requirement for joint duty prior

to promotion to 0-7. The number of waivers is unlimited and the language in the law does not

require the service to give defined/logical reason as to why the officer did not serve a joint

tour.

CRS-41

Table 8. JSO with COS Who Are Serving in Second Joint Assignment

Field Grade

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Total

Have Served

255(94)

282(112)

30(15)

88(41)

655(262)

Are Serving

123(54)

153(62)

19(5)

68(21)

363(142)

USA

USAF

USMC

USN

Total

GO/FO

Have Served

14(6)

37(10)

11(7)

13(6)

75(29)

Are Serving

17(7)

29(13)

3(3)

3(1)

52(24)

NOTE: Number in parenthesis indicates number of second joint assignments which were to a critical

joint military position

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

The DoD continues to see an increase in number of COS officers filling JDA

assignments twice. Many proponents of GNA note this increase as another positive

step in the evolution of the Act.

The narrative of the SecDef report reveals that a total of 284 field grade waivers:

18 JSO sequence, 32 JSO two-tour, 5 JDA assignment and 229 JDA tour length

waivers were utilized in FY1999.

The following charts provide promotion comparisons of joint officers in relation

to service officers. These comparisons were intended to offer a view of the quality of

the officers assigned to joint positions.

Table 9. Army Promotion Comparisons

Are Serving In

Grade

0-8

0-7

Category

In

Zone

%

Have Served In

Below Above

Zone Zone

%

%

In

Zone

%

Total in Zone

Below Above

Zone Zone

%

%

Con

Sel

%

Joint Staff

100

N/A

N/A

80

N/A

N/A

8

7

88

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

23

10

44

Service HQ

67

N/A

N/A

60

N/A

N/A

11

7

64

Other Joint

80

N/A

N/A

40

N/A

N/A

15

8

53

Board Avg

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

62

32

52

Joint Staff

9

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

86

4

5

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

730

13

2

Service HQ

5

N/A

N/A

1

N/A

N/A

194

7

4

Other Joint

5

N/A

N/A

3

N/A

N/A

272

13

5

JSO

CRS-42

0-6

0-5

0-4

Board Ave

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A 1725

40

2

Joint Staff

63

0

8

74

5

0

45

31

69

JSO

38

0

4

65

4

0

125

74

60

Service HQ

37

2

2

58

3

0

184

96

52

Other Joint

56

0

4

19

1

3

246

91

37

Board Avg

42

2

3

42

2

3

806

341

42

Joint Staff

92

22

0

N/A

0

N/A

12

11

92

JSO

100

0

0

86

0

N/A

7

6

86

Service HQ

72

5

0

84

13

0

114

88

77

Other Joint

81

6

5

52

2

7

317

233

74

Board Avg

69

4

3

69

4

3 1386

954

69

Joint Staff

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

Service HQ

78

0

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

9

7

76

Other Joint

75

0

0

0

N/A

N/A

5

3

60

Board Avg

78

4

19

78

4

19 1732

1353

78

NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

Table 10. Air Force Promotion Comparisons

Grade

0-8

0-7

Are Serving In

Have Served In

In

Zone

%

Below

Zone

%

Above

Zone

%

In

Zone

%

Below

Zone

%

Above

Zone

%

Con

Joint Staff

33

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

9

1

11

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

61

19

31

Service HQ

29

N/A

N/A

13

N/A

N/A

21

5

24

Other Joint

0

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

5

0

0

Board Avg

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

93

28

30

Joint Staff

10

N/A

N/A

3

N/A

N/A

51

3

6

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

565

26

5

Service HQ

7

N/A

N/A

2

N/A

N/A

144

8

6

Other Joint

1

N/A

N/A

3

N/A

N/A

229

4

2

Category

Total in Zone

Sel

%

CRS-43

0-6

0-5

0-4

Board Avg

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

1615

40

3

Joint Staff

86

12

25

55

4

0

47

34

72

JSO

61

0

5

57

2

0

125

71

57

Service HQ

53

2

6

61

6

0

150

89

59

Other Joint

47

2

4

34

2

17

204

84

41

Board Avg

41

2

1

41

2

1

798

330

41

Joint Staff

95

5

0

N/A

0

0

19

18

95

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

0

0

0

Service HQ

80

9

9

81

9

0

183

147

80

Other Joint

71

4

6

59

2

4

386

262

68

Board Avg

65

4

3

65

4

3

1817

1179

65

Joint Staff

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

Service HQ

96

N/A

100

100

N/A

N/A

31

30

97

Other Joint

86

N/A

100

80

N/A

0

27

23

85

Board Avg

86

N/A

13

86

N/A

13

1953

1689

87

NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

CRS-44

Table 11. Marine Corps Promotion Comparisons

Grade

0-8

0-7

0-6

0-5

0-4

Are Serving In

Have Served In

In

Zone

%

Below

Zone

%

Above

Zone

%

In

Zone

%

Below

Zone

%

Above

Zone

%

Con

0

N/A

N/A

50

N/A

N/A

3

1

33

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

17

9

53

Service HQ

22

N/A

N/A

100

N/A

N/A

12

5

42

Other Joint

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Board Avg

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

22

10

46

Joint Staff

13

N/A

N/A

11

N/A

N/A

35

4

11

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

200

9

5

Service HQ

4

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

67

2

3

Other Joint

6

N/A

N/A

3

N/A

N/A

76

3

4

Board Avg

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

490

15

3

Joint Staff

53

0

0

100

0

N/A

18

11

61

JSO

40

0

0

50

0

0

31

13

42

Service HQ

25

0

0

50

0

0

38

15

40

Other Joint

55

0

0

21

0

0

41

19

46

Board Avg

44

0

0

44

0

0.01

207

92

44

Joint Staff

57

0

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

8

4

50

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

Service HQ

77

0

0

73

0

0.04

95

71

75

Other Joint

81

0

7

78

0

0

78

63

81

Board Avg

68

0

5

68

0

0.05

563

381

68

Joint Staff

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

Service HQ

91

0

50

0

0

N/A

12

10

83

Other Joint

100

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4

4

100

Board Avg

84

0

12

84

0

0.12

788

658

84

Category

Joint Staff

Total in Zone

Sel

%

NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

CRS-45

Table 12. Navy Promotion Comparisons

Grade

0-8

0-7

0-6

0-5

0-4

Are Serving In

Have Served In

In

Zone

%

Below

Zone

%

Above

Zone

%

In

Zone

%

Below

Zone

%

Above

Zone

%

Con

0

N/A

N/A

50

N/A

N/A

16

7

44

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

22

7

32

Service HQ

22

N/A

N/A

67

N/A

N/A

18

8

44

Other Joint

40

N/A

N/A

50

N/A

N/A

14

7

50

Board Avg

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

46

22

48

Joint Staff

22

N/A

N/A

6

N/A

N/A

110

10

9

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

411

11

3

Service HQ

7

N/A

N/A

1

N/A

N/A

260

12

5

Other Joint

3

N/A

N/A

3

N/A

N/A

247

7

3

Board Avg

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

1249

35

3

Joint Staff

93

0

50

73

0

0

48

38

79

JSO

25

0

0

69

0

13

110

67

61

Service HQ

56

3

14

64

1

11

115

61

53

Other Joint

38

0

4

41

1

0

166

70

42

Board Avg

47

1

11

47

1

11

792

375

47

Joint Staff

88

8

0

67

0

0

11

9

82

JSO

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

Service HQ

89

0

8

76

1

0

72

58

81

Other Joint

71

3

9

76

14

0

164

120

73

Board Avg

65

1

6

65

1

6

1164

759

65

Joint Staff

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

JSO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

0

Service HQ

60

0

33

100

0

0

16

12

75

Other Joint

69

0

0

91

0

0

42

31

74

Board Avg

69

14

19

69

14

19

1706

1178

69

Category

Joint Staff

Total in Zone

Sel

%

NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”

[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

As detailed earlier and as can be noted in Tables 9-12, promotion comparisons

are complex.

CRS-46

Appendix E:

For Additional Reading/Bibliography

Books

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Headquarters Department of the Army, 1987.

Art, Robert J., Vincent Davis and Samuel P. Huntington. Reorganizing America’s

Defense: Leadership in War and Peace. Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey,

1985.

Barrett, Archie D. Reappraising Defense Organization. Washington DC: National

Defense University Press, 1983.

Besson, Paul M. The Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Ten Year Report Card. Cambridge

MA: Harvard University, 1998.

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: A Primer. Arlington VA:

Association of the United States Army, 1986.

Deully, Gary W. Joint Organization: Where Do We Go After Goldwater-Nichols?

Maxwell AFB AL: United States Air University, 1989.

The Emerging Strategic Environment: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century.

Edited by Williamson Murray. Chapter 7, “Goldwater-Nichols After a Decade”

by Frank Hoffman. Westport CT: Praeger, 1999.

Flanagan, Linda H. The Goldwater-Nichols Act: The Politics of Defense

Reorganization. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective. Edited by

Dennis J. Quinn. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1999.

Harrell, Margaret C. John F. Schank. Harry Thie. Clifford Graf. Paul Steinberg. How

Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments. RAND: MR-593-JS,

1996.

Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986. Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on

Armed Services House of Representatives, 100th Congress. Washington DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.

Jenks, Darrell. The RMA and Post Goldwater-Nichols World: More Tinkering Ahead

for the JCS? Newport RI: Naval War College, 1995.

Lacy, James L. Studies in Defense Organization: A Guide to Title III of the

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Santa Monica, CA:

RAND, 1987.

CRS-47

Lederman, Gordon. Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols

Act of 1986. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1999.

Locher, James R. III. Defense Organization: The Need for Change. Staff Report

to the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 99th Congress.

Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

LoPresti, Thomas T. The JCS System Before and After Goldwater-Nichols. Carlisle

Barracks PA: United States Army War College, 1991.

Lovelace, Douglas C. Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing

the1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Carlisle Barracks PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.

Management Study of The Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington DC:

Department of Defense OSD Study Team, 1987.

McNaugher, Thomas L. Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols

Reorganization of the Department of Defense. Washington DC: Brookings

Institute, 1994.

Military Reform Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment for the

Remainder of the Century (Senior Conference XX). Edited by Peter W.

Chiarelli. West Point NY: United States Military Academy, 1983.

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Army Reserve. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 1988.

Odom, William E. America’s Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the

Cold War. Washington DC: American University Press, 1993.

Packard, David. A Quest for Excellence. Final Report to the President, Blue Ribbon

Commission of Defense Management. Washington DC: Government Printing

Office, 1986.

Palmer, Bruce, Jr,. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: The

University Press of Kentucky, 1984.

Powell, Colin L. My American Journey. New York, NY: Random House, 1995.

Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces. Washington DC: Office of the

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989.

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National War College, 1994.

Seeley, Mark T. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986:

Genesis and Postscript. Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1987.

CRS-48

Schank, John F. Harry Thie. Jennifer Kawata. Margaret C. Harrell. Clifford Graf.

Paul Steinberg. Who Is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List.

RAND, MR-574, 1996.

Tighe, Dennis W. Unification of Forces: The Road to Jointness? Fort Leavenworth,

KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991.

United States Department of the Army. Army Study of Defense Agencies and DOD

Field Activities: Title III, the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Washington

DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1987.

United States Department of Defense. Reinventing the Department of Defense.

Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1996.

Yuknis, Christopher A.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment. Carlisle Barracks PA:

United States Army War College, 1992.

Journals/Articles/On-line Sources/Other

Adolph, Robert B, Jr. “Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Far Enough”. Joint Force

Quarterly (Spring 1995): 48-53.

Ayers, Colonel Frank H., Jr. “PME 2010.” JCS/J-7 Briefing (4 February 2000).

Chiarelli, Peter W. “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols.” Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn

1993): 71-81.

“CJCS 2000 Posture Statement to Congress,” Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs

of Staff, 8 February 2000: 24. [http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/Posture00.html]

Cohen, William S. Secretary of Defense. “Annual Report to the President and the

Congress.” Washington DC (February 2000).

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[http://www.afa.org/magazine/editorial/07edit98.html]

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[http://www.afa.org/magazine/editorial/08edit96.html]

Cropsey, Seth. “It’s the Future.” Proceedings (October 1995): 9-10.

CRS Report 96-824. Goldich, Robert L. Defense Officer Personnel Management:

The ‘Up-or-Out’ System. (October 11, 1996).

CRS Report 97-346. Hawkins, Thomas. “Defense Budget: Role of the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council.” (March 12, 1997).

CRS-49

Davis, M. Thomas. “Separate Definitions Hobble ‘Joint’ Forces”, Government

Executive (February 2000).

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(Autumn 1996). [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine]

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1999).

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Post (25 May 1995): 23.

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CRS-50

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy).

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Strategic Approach.” The Pentagon. Washington DC, 30 June 1997.

[http://www.dtic.mil/stinet/]

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[http://jgraham@potomacinstitute.org]

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Retrospective.” Marine Corps Gazette (December 1998): 48-53.

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[http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/mayjun98/pet.htm]

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Proceedings (May 1997): 14.

Prina L. Edger. “Reorganization and Reality–The Goldwater-Nichols Act: Pitfalls

and Promises.” Sea Power (January 1987): 19-23.

Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980: 94 Stat. 2835, et. seq.

Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986: 100 Stat. 992, et.seq.

Public Law 103-357, October 14, 1994: 932-933, et seq..

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Committee on Armed Services, 101st Congress, first Session, April 21, 1989.

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Parochialism to Jointness.” Political Science Quarterly (Spring 1998):

91-111.

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available at same site) [http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

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(Autumn 1996): 4-7.

Skelton, Ike. “Joint and Combined Operations in the Post-cols War Era.” Military

Review (September 1993): 2.

Trainor, Bernard E. “Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War.” Joint Forces

Quarterly (Winter 1993/1994): 74.

United States Code. 10 USC, Chapter 38, Sec 668(a)(1-3).

CRS-51

United States Congress. House. HR 96-1462:6345.

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[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine]

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[http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020]

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1996): 18-22.

106th Congress, 2nd Session, S.Rept. 106-292, May 12, 2000.

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