Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Congressional research reportDec 13, 2017
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
(name redacted)
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
(name redacted)
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
December 13, 2017
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL30588
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
The United States, partner countries, and the Afghan government are attempting to reverse recent
gains made by the resilient Taliban-led insurgency since the December 2014 transition to a
smaller international mission consisting primarily of training and advising the Afghanistan
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Afghan government has come under
increasing domestic criticism not only for failing to prevent insurgent gains but also for its
internal divisions that have spurred the establishment of new political opposition coalitions. In
September 2014, the United States brokered a compromise to address a dispute over the 2014
presidential election, but a September 2016 deadline was not met for enacting election reforms
and deciding whether to elevate the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position to a prime
ministership. The Afghan government has made some measurable progress in reducing corruption
and implementing its budgetary and other commitments. It has adopted measures that would
enable it to proceed with new parliamentary elections, but no election date has been set.
The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in 2011, is reportedly
about 15,000, of which most are assigned to the NATO-led “Resolute Support Mission” (RSM)
that trains, assists, and advises the ANDSF. About 2,000 of the U.S. contingent are involved in
combat against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, including the Afghanistan branch of the
Islamic State organization (ISIL-Khorasan), under “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel” (OFS). In
August 2017, after several months of deliberation, President Trump announced a new strategy
that includes several thousand additional U.S. forces to help Afghan forces break a “stalemate” in
combat against insurgent groups, as well as expanded authorities to strike Taliban targets. The
strategy also appears to signal a U.S. intent to more assertively pressure Pakistan to deny safe
haven to Afghan militants.
U.S. officials assert that insurgents control or contest about 40% of Afghan territory, but still are
not positioned to overturn the government. In May 2016, the vulnerabilities of the Taliban were
exposed when the United States tracked and killed with an unmanned aerial vehicle strike the
head of the Taliban, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. However, the successor Taliban
leadership has continued to produce battlefield gains and rejects new settlement talks with the
government. One small insurgent group reached a settlement with the government in late
September 2016, but the agreement has not, to date, broadened to other groups. Afghanistan’s
minorities and women’s groups assert concerns that a settlement with the Taliban might erode
post-2001 human rights gains. U.S. forces have helped Afghan units kill several successive
leaders of the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan, but without defeating the group outright.
A component of U.S. policy to help establish a self-sustaining Afghanistan is to encourage
economic development and integration into regional trading patterns. However, Afghanistan will
remain dependent on foreign aid for many years. Through the end of FY2016, the United States
provided about $111 billion to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about 60% has
been to equip and train the ANDSF. These figures do not include funds for U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan. The FY2017 appropriation for the ANDSF is $4.2 billion; allocations
to Afghanistan from economic assistance account appropriations have not yet been finalized. For
FY2018, the Trump Administration has requested $4.9 billion for the ANDSF, as well as funding
for a number of other priorities, including $650 million in economic support.
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Contents
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
18th Century to the early 20th Century ....................................................................................... 1
Independence and the Cold War Era ......................................................................................... 1
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period .................................................................................... 2
The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities .............................................. 2
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ....................................................................... 3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ............................................................... 3
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ..................................................................... 4
U.S. Policy toward the Taliban Regime and its Hosting of Bin Laden ............................... 4
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals ..................................................................................... 5
Bush Administration Afghanistan Policy Before the September 11 Attacks ...................... 6
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ......................................................... 6
Major Combat Operations: 2001-2003 ............................................................................... 7
Afghan Governance ......................................................................................................................... 7
“National Unity Government” of Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah ........................................... 9
Growing Fragmentation .................................................................................................... 10
Way Forward for the NUG.................................................................................................11
U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ..................................................................... 12
General Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................. 14
Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 14
Religious Freedoms .......................................................................................................... 16
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 16
Security Policy: Transition and Beyond ........................................................................................ 18
Who Is “The Enemy”? ............................................................................................................ 18
The Taliban ....................................................................................................................... 18
Al Qaeda and Associated Groups ..................................................................................... 19
The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) .................................................................. 21
Haqqani Network .............................................................................................................. 22
Insurgent Tactics ............................................................................................................... 23
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ...................................... 24
The Anti-Taliban Military Effort: 2003-2009 ......................................................................... 24
Obama Administration Policy: “Surge,” Transition, and Drawdown ..................................... 25
Transition and Drawdown: Afghans in the Lead, 2011-2014 ........................................... 26
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and Further Drawdowns ................................................... 26
Adjustments to Force Levels in Light of Security Deterioration ...................................... 27
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) ................................................................................ 31
Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) ............................................................................ 31
Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .......................................................... 32
Size and Other Features of the ANDSF ............................................................................ 33
ANDSF Funding ............................................................................................................... 34
The Afghan National Army (ANA) .................................................................................. 34
Afghan Air Force (AAF) ................................................................................................... 35
Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 36
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector ................................................................................ 37
Reintegration and Potential Reconciliation with Insurgents ................................................... 38
Hikmatyar Faction (HIG) and its Reconciliation with the Government ........................... 39
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Reintegration ..................................................................................................................... 40
Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 42
Pakistan ................................................................................................................................... 44
U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation on Afghanistan....................................................................... 46
Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 47
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan .......................................................................... 48
India ........................................................................................................................................ 48
Russia, Central Asian States, and China ................................................................................. 50
Russia ................................................................................................................................ 50
Central Asian States .......................................................................................................... 51
China ................................................................................................................................. 53
Persian Gulf States .................................................................................................................. 54
Aid and Economic Development................................................................................................... 55
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan ............................................................................................... 55
Aid Oversight and Conditionality ..................................................................................... 56
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act ..................................................... 56
Direct Support to the Afghan Government ....................................................................... 57
Other Donor Aid/Oversight/Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework ........................... 58
Development in Key Sectors ................................................................................................... 59
Education .......................................................................................................................... 59
Health ................................................................................................................................ 60
Roads ................................................................................................................................ 60
Bridges .............................................................................................................................. 61
Railways............................................................................................................................ 61
Electricity .......................................................................................................................... 61
Agriculture ........................................................................................................................ 62
Telecommunications ......................................................................................................... 63
Airlines.............................................................................................................................. 63
Mining and Gems.............................................................................................................. 63
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines......................................................................................... 64
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones ............................................................. 66
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan ........................................................................................................ 75
Figure 2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ............................................................................................. 76
Tables
Table 1. Post-Taliban Political Process Milestones ......................................................................... 8
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ....................................................... 13
Table 3. Background on NATO Participation and U.N. Mandate ................................................. 25
Table 4. Summary of U.S. Strategy and Implementation .............................................................. 33
Table 5. Major Security-Related Indicators ................................................................................... 41
Table 6. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan ......................................................................... 44
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Table 7. Major Reporting Requirements ....................................................................................... 67
Table 8. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics .................................................................. 68
Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 .......................................................... 69
Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2001 ........................................................ 70
Table 11. Post-Taliban U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan ................................................................. 71
Table 12. NATO/ISAF and RSM Contributing Nations ................................................................ 73
Table 13. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan ......................................................................... 74
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 76
Congressional Research Service
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Background
Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion
and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”
18th Century to the early 20th Century
Afghanistan’s modern history is generally considered to begin with the 1747 foundation of the
Durrani Empire by Ahmad Shah Durrani, a Pashtun military commander in the army of the
Persian ruler Nadir Shah. After Nadir’s assassination, Durrani carved out an Afghan empire,
dominated by Pashtuns, between Persia and the Mughal Empire (a Muslim-ruled empire that
controlled much of the Indian subcontinent from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries).
After the collapse of the Durrani Empire in 1823, a strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged
in Kabul in 1826, becoming the emir (or ruler) of Afghanistan and founding the Barakzai dynasty.
For much of the nineteenth century, Afghanistan served as a sort of buffer in the ‘Great Game’
between the Russian and British empires as they solidified control over Central Asia and the
Indian subcontinent, respectively. British fears of Russian expansion southward sparked three
Anglo-Afghan wars over eighty years (from 1839 until Afghan independence in 1919) as the
British sought to expand their own sphere of influence northward, and Afghan rulers periodically
appealed to the Russian Empire for support. In the First World War, the Afghan government
remained neutral, resisting popular pressure to respond to the Ottoman Empire’s call for panIslamic solidarity against Russia and Great Britain.
Independence and the Cold War Era
King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (in what is
referred to as the Third Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete
independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was
considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities
participated. After a brief seizure of power by an ethnic Tajik, King Habibullah Kalakani, King
Mohammad Nadir Shah reasserted Barakzai rule, and was succeeded by his son Mohammad
Zahir Shah in 1933. The last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah (1933-1973) is remembered fondly
by some older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national
legislature and promoting freedoms for women.
Zahir Shah sought U.S. support to counterbalance a newly assertive Soviet Union, and
Afghanistan successfully played the Cold War rivals off each other to win military and
development assistance from both. The Soviets built large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan
during Zahir Shah’s time, such as the north-south Salang Tunnel and Bagram airfield. For its part,
the United States provided agricultural and other development assistance; among the major U.S.funded projects was a large USAID-led irrigation and hydroelectric effort in Helmand Province,
Kajaki Dam (see below).
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s, during the Nixon Administration, when
the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While
receiving medical treatment in Italy in 1973, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin,
Mohammad Daoud, who abolished the monarchy, declaring himself the first President of
Afghanistan, and established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the economy. Daoud
was overthrown and killed in April 1978 by military officers under the direction of two People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammad Taraki,
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
1
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
in the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president, but was himself displaced in a
September 1979 coup led by Amin. Both leaders came from the Khalq (“Masses”) faction of the
PDPA, drawing their strength from rural ethnic Pashtuns, and tried to impose radical socialist
change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing more women into
government. The attempt at rapid modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to
such moves.
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period
The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent further gains by
the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Amin with another PDPA Saur Revolution leader who the Soviets apparently perceived
as pliable, Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham (“Banner”) faction of the PDPA.
Soviet occupation forces numbered about 120,000. They were assisted by Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan (DRA) military forces of about 25,000-40,000, supplemented by about 20,000
paramilitary and tribal militia forces, including a paramilitary organization called the Sarandoy.
Soviet and Afghan forces were not able to pacify rural areas, in part because DRA forces were
plagued by desertions. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons, provided through the CIA in
cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI).
The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities
The mujahedin were also relatively well organized and coordinated by seven major parties that in
early 1989 formed what they claimed was a government-in-exile—a Peshawar-based “Afghan
Interim Government” (AIG). The seven party leaders and their parties—sometimes referred to as
the “Peshawar 7”—were:
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Islamic Revolutionary Movement of
Afghanistan);
Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Afghan National Liberation Front);
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hezb-i-Islam—Gulbuddin, Islamic Party of Gulbuddin,
HIG);
Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-Islami/Islamic Society);
Yunus Khalis (Hezb-i-Islam);
Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf (Ittihad Islami/Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan); and
Pir (religious honorific) Ahmed Gaylani (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan,
NIFA).1
The mujahedin weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems
called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States
decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the mujahedin after substantial debate within the
Reagan Administration over whether they could be used effectively. Some warned that a postSoviet occupation power structure in Afghanistan could be adverse to U.S. interests because
much of the covert aid was being channeled to the Islamist groups.
1 Mohammadi, Khalis, and Gaylani died of natural causes in 2002, 2006, and 2017, respectively, and Rabbani was
assassinated in September 2011. The others are still active in Afghan politics and governance.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
2
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft, the Soviet Union’s losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the
war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after
the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of
Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name)—a Ghilzai Pashtun from the
Parcham faction of the PDPA.2
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal
On April 14, 1988, then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the
Geneva Accords) requiring the Soviet Union to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by
February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. A warming of relations
moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict,
a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity
for supporting communist regimes abroad. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington
agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants as of January 1, 1992.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military
assistance was provided by the United States to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of
the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20
million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.3 The Soviet
pullout was viewed as a decisive U.S. “victory.” The Soviet pullout caused a reduction in
subsequent covert funding and, as indicated in Table 9, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained
at relatively low levels because support for a major effort to rebuild Afghanistan’s economy was
lacking. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was
completing its pullout, and it remained so until the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
Despite the Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989, Najibullah still enjoyed Soviet financial and
advisory support and he defied expectations that his government would collapse soon after a
Soviet withdrawal. However, his position weakened subsequently after the Soviets cut off
financial and advisory support as of January 1, 1992. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly
agreed to step down once an interim government was formed, an announcement set off by
rebellions by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan (particularly Abdul
Rashid Dostam) who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud of the
Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masoud was revered for
preventing the Soviets from conquering his power base in the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul.
Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.4
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed rifts among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of the smaller
parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, was
president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became
president in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to
2 Ghilzai Pashtuns predominate in eastern Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani Pashtuns, who are predominant
in the south.
3 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year
to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
4 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban
movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
3
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor.
That decision was strongly opposed by other mujahedin leaders, including Gulbuddin Hikmatyar,
a Pashtun, and leader of the Islamist conservative Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin mujahedin party.
Hikmatyar and several allied factions fought unsuccessfully to dislodge Rabbani. Rabbani
reached an agreement for Hikmatyar to serve as Prime Minister, but because of mutual mistrust,
Hikmatyar never formally took office and fighting eventually destroyed much of west Kabul.
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.5 Some say this interpretation of Islam is
similar to the “Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also
consonant with conservative Pashtun tribal traditions. The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Muhammad
Umar, had been a fighter in Khalis’s Hezb-i-Islam party during the anti-Soviet war, even though
Khalis’ party was generally seen as moderately Islamist at that time. Like Umar, most of the
senior figures in the Taliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns.
The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as weak, corrupt, and anti-Pashtun, and the four
years of civil war between the mujahedin groups (1992-1996) created popular support for the
Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the help of defections, the Taliban took control of the
southern city of Qandahar in November 1994. Umar reportedly entered the Qandahar shrine
containing a purported cloak used by the Prophet Mohammad and donned it in front of hundreds
of followers.6 By February 1995, the movement’s fighters were near Kabul. In September 1995,
the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its Tajik governor, Ismail
Khan (ally of Rabbani and Masoud), who later escaped to Iran. In September 1996, Taliban
victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masoud to the Panjshir Valley (north of
Kabul); the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen entered the
U.N. facility in Kabul that was sheltering Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and hanged them.
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)
During the Taliban regime, Mullah Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the
Faithful.” He remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar and made no public appearances,
although he did occasionally meet foreign officials.
The Taliban lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic
customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The
Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use
physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western
music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In March 2001 the
Taliban blew up Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, considering them idols.
U.S. Policy toward the Taliban Regime and its Hosting of Bin Laden
The Clinton Administration opened talks with the Taliban after it captured Qandahar in 1994 and
continued to engage the movement after it took power. However, the Administration was unable
5 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train
Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.
6 According to press reports in December 2012, the cloak remains in the shrine, which is guarded by a family of
caretakers who, despite professions of political neutrality, have suffered several assassinations over the years.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
4
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
to moderate the Taliban’s policies, and the United States withheld recognition of the Taliban as
the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government.
The United Nations continued to seat the Rabbani government. The State Department ordered the
Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolutions
1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination
against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the
Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res. 68 called on the President not to
recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s
overriding agenda item with the Taliban. Umar reportedly forged a political and personal bond
with Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, who relocated to Afghanistan from Sudan in May 1996,
and refused U.S. demands to extradite him. In April 1998, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson headed a small U.S. delegation to Afghanistan, but the group did not
meet Mullah Umar or persuade the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden. After the August 7, 1998, Al
Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration increased
pressure on the Taliban to extradite him by imposing U.S. sanctions on Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, the
United States fired cruise missiles at Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan.7 Some
observers assert that the Administration missed several opportunities to strike Bin Laden,
including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed Predator drone at a location called Tarnak
Farm in the fall of 2000.8 Clinton Administration officials asserted that U.S. domestic and
international support for U.S. intervention to oust the Taliban militarily at that time was lacking.
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals
The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the Tajik core of the antiTaliban opposition—the ousted President Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masoud, and their ally in the
Herat area, Ismail Khan. Joining the Tajik factions in the broader “Northern Alliance” were
Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed below. Virtually all
these figures remain key players in politics in Afghanistan.
Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major faction of the Northern Alliance was the
Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan)
of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one
of the “warlords” who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first
joined those seeking to oust Rabbani during his 1992-1996 presidency, but later
joined him and the other Northern Alliance factions opposed to the Taliban.
Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are
prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces of central Afghanistan,
as well as Kabul city. The main Hazara Shiite militia in the Northern Alliance
was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, composed of eight groups). In 1995, the
Taliban captured and killed Hizb-e-Wahdat’s leader Abdul Ali Mazari. The most
prominent current Hazara faction leader is Mohammad Mohaqeq.
7 A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believed to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck
that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.
8 Lisa Myers, “Osama bin Laden: missed opportunities,” NBC News, March 17, 2004.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
5
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Among the Pashtuns that joined the Northern
Alliance was a conservative Islamist mujahedin faction, Ittihad Islami, headed by
Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. He accused the Taliban of allying with Al Qaeda.
Bush Administration Afghanistan Policy Before the September 11 Attacks
Bush Administration policy initially continued the existing policy of applying economic and
political pressure on the Taliban while retaining some dialogue with it, and refraining from
militarily assisting the Northern Alliance. The September 11 Commission report said that, prior to
the September 11 attacks, Administration officials leaned toward providing such aid, as well as
aiding anti-Taliban Pashtuns. Additional covert options were reportedly also under consideration.9
In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State
Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York closed, although a Taliban
representative continued to operate informally in the New York area.10 In March 2001,
Administration officials received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral issues, and the
Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban,
amid widespread allegations that Pakistani military advisers were helping the Taliban.
Even though the Northern Alliance was supplied with Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and
military support, the Taliban continued to gain ground, even in areas not inhabited by Pashtuns.
By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country,
including almost all provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on
September 9, 2001 (two days before, and possibly linked to the September 11 attacks), when
Ahmad Shah Masoud was assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. He was
succeeded by a top lieutenant, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran Tajik figure (Fahim died of natural
causes in 2014 while serving as First Vice President).
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused a U.S. demand to extradite Bin Laden. President Bush articulated a policy
that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists themselves, and asserted that a friendly
regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to search for Al Qaeda members there.
The Administration sought U.N. backing for military action. U.N. Security Council Resolution
1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Council “expresses its readiness to take all necessary
steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks.” This was widely interpreted as a
U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks, but it did not explicitly authorize
Operation Enduring Freedom or reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for
responses to threats to international peace and security.
In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.
107-40, signed September 18, 2011) authorized11
9 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.
10 Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government, and serves as one of the deputy leaders of the
70-member High Peace Council on political reconciliation.
11 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding
for it for FY2002.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
6
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.
Major Combat Operations: 2001-2003
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001.
The U.S. effort initially consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces,
facilitated by the cooperation between reported small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special
operations forces and Central Intelligence Agency operatives. The purpose of these operations
was to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces advance by directing U.S. air
strikes on Taliban positions. In October 2001, about 1,300 Marines were deployed to pressure the
Taliban at Qandahar, but there were few U.S.-Taliban pitched battles.
The Taliban regime unraveled after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces led by
Dostam.12 Northern Alliance forces—despite promises to the United States that they would not
enter Kabul—did so on November 12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost
the south and east to U.S.-supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The Taliban
regime ended completely on December 9, 2001, when the Taliban and Mullah Umar fled
Qandahar, leaving it under tribal law. Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted
“Operation Anaconda” in Paktia Province in March 2002. On May 1, 2003, U.S. officials
declared an end to “major combat.”
Afghan Governance13
The George W. Bush Administration argued that the U.S. departure from the region after the 1989
Soviet pullout contributed to Afghanistan’s descent into chaos. After the Taliban regime was
deposed in 2001, the Administration and its international partners decided to build a relatively
strong, democratic, Afghan central government. The effort, which many outside experts described
as “nation-building,” was supported by the United Nations. The Obama Administration’s strategy
review in late 2009 initially narrowed official U.S. goals to preventing terrorism safe haven in
Afghanistan, but policy in some ways expanded the preexisting nation-building effort. Building
the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance have been consistently judged to be key to the
success of U.S. policy, even after the 2014 security transition to Afghan lead. Table 1 briefly
depicts the process and events that led to the formation of the post-Taliban government of
Afghanistan and subsequent developments.
12 In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to
suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili.
13 Detail on governance issues is provided in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance, by (name redacted) .
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
7
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Table 1. Post-Taliban Political Process Milestones
Interim
Administration
Constitution
Presidential Election
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan
assembly.)
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency
without a prime ministership to balance presidential power, but gave parliament
significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women equal rights under the law,
allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic;” allows for court rulings
according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Named ex-King Zahir Shah to
non-hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Elections for president and two vice presidents, for five-year term, held October 9,
2004. Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad
Zia Masoud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah
Masoud, who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks,
and Karim Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents, including a female.
Funding: $90 million from donors, including $40 million from U.S. (FY2004, P.L. 108106).
Parliamentary
Elections
Elections held September 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System;
candidates stood as individuals, not in party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected
lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga, including 347
women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million registered. Upper house
is appointed by the president (34 seats, half of which are to be women), and by the
provincial councils (68 seats). When district councils are elected, they will appoint 34
of those 68 seats. Funded by $160 million in aid, including $45 million from U.S.
(FY2005 supplemental, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial
Elections
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary
elections. Powers vague, but have taken the lead in deciding local reconstruction.
Provincial council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council.
Total seats are 420, of which 121 held by women. 13,185 candidates, including 279
women. District elections not held due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing
district boundaries.
Presidential and provincial elections were held August 20, 2009, but required a runoff
because no candidate received over 50% in certified results. Runoff cancelled when Dr.
Abdullah dropped out. Election costs: $300 million.
Held September 18, 2010. Result disputed but resolved through Afghan negotiations
that overturned results in some districts. Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, an ethnic Uzbek, is
lower house speaker, and upper house speaker is Muslim Yaar, a Pashtun.
First round held on April 5, 2014, and runoff between Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and
Ashraf Ghani held on June 14. Allegations of widespread fraud not fully resolved by a
full recount, but Ghani was declared the winner on September 22 pursuant to a U.S.brokered power-sharing agreement between Abdullah and Ghani under which Ghani
became President and Abdullah became Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Ghani was
sworn in on September 29. The two did not nominate a new cabinet until January 12,
2015. Under the agreement, a constitutional loya jirga (Afghan assembly) was to
convene within two years (by the end of September 2016) to decide whether to
convert the CEO position into a position of Prime Minister, but holding a constitutional
loya jirga is contingent on first holding parliamentary elections (below). The next
presidential election is to be held in 2019.
Initially scheduled for October 15, 2016, but required election reforms were not
finalized and elections were not held. Nor was a loya jirga held to review the NUG
agreement and CEO position, planned for September 2016. The existing parliament
remains in office, but the passage of an election law and appointments to electoral
bodies in late 2016 have removed the major impediments to scheduling the vote. No
new election date has been set.
Second
Presidential/Provincial
Elections
Second Parliamentary
Elections
Third
Presidential/Provincial
Election
Third Parliamentary
Elections
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
8
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
“National Unity Government” of Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah
Virtually every U.S. and outside assessment has concluded that Afghanistan’s central and local
governments have increased their capacity since 2001. However, the 2014 U.S.-brokered
leadership partnership (national unity government, or NUG) between President Ashraf Ghani and
CEO Dr. Abdullah Abdullah has encountered difficulties to the point where Dr. Abdullah publicly
accused Ghani in August 2016 of acting unilaterally and refusing to meet regularly with him,
reportedly saying, “if someone does not have the patience for discussion, then they are not fit for
the presidency, either.”14 Outward signs of tensions seem to have receded since as the two have
since met on several occasions to try to resolve their mutual differences and complaints, and the
NUG has remained intact.
When the NUG was formed, Ghani and Abdullah agreed to share the role of appointing a cabinet
and to try to balance competence and factional interests. However, their differences over
appointments caused the first cabinet nominations to be delayed well beyond the constitutionally
required 30-day period for such nominations (October 28, 2014).15 In April 2016, Ghani and
Abdullah completed appointments to the 34 provincial governorships and the major
ambassadorships. In April 2016, the National Assembly confirmed an Interior Minister, Taj
Mohammad Jahid, to replace ex-Communist military leader Nur-ul-Haq Ulumi, who resigned in
February 2016, and an Attorney General.
The appointment of a Defense Minister has long eluded consensus. The chief of staff of the
Afghanistan National Army (ANA), Sher Mohammad Karimi, was the original nominee, but he
was voted down in large part because Tajik parliamentarians argued that Pashtuns were
dominating appointments to the security institutions. In May 2015, Ghani and Abdullah
nominated Masoom Stanekzai, who headed the government’s insurgent fighter reintegration
program (discussed below). However, he, too, is an ethnic Pashtun and non-Pashtuns in the
National Assembly led a successful effort to vote him down in June 2015. He served as acting
Defense Minister until May 2016, when he was nominated to become the next Intelligence
Director (head of the National Directorate for Security, NDS). Also in May 2016, Ghani
nominated General Abdullah Habibi as Minister of Defense. In July 2016, the National Assembly
confirmed both Habibi and Stanekzai to their new positions. However, Habibi, along with the
Afghan army chief of staff, was forced to resign after a major Taliban infiltration of an Afghan
military base in normally quiet Mazar-e-Sharif in April 2017. The acting Minister of Defense is
General Tariq Shah Bahrami.
The NUG has been somewhat more active than was the Karzai administration on corruption
issues. The government has sought to enforce court punishments of the convicted perpetrators of
the Kabul Bank scandal. And, press reports indicate that the Major Crimes Task Force has
become more active in investigating officials accused of corruption. Ghani also has established a
High Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption and, with U.S. financial help and advice,
is establishing an anti-corruption justice center. These steps, as well as Ghani’s insistence on
holding to account those responsible for the 2011 near failure of the Kabul Bank, were praised by
the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Olson in
testimony on September 15, 2016. On the other hand, the U.S. Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction stated in a September 2016 report that Afghanistan’s long-standing
14 Mujib Mashal. “Senior official in Afghanistan Calls President Unfit to Serve.” New York Times, August 12, 2016.
15 Sources include various press reports and author conversations with Kabul and Europe-based Afghan observers.
January 2015.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
9
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
anti-corruption body, the High Office of Oversight (HOO), suffers from a lack of independence,
authority, and capability to fulfill its mandate.
Growing Fragmentation
A trend that worries some experts is increasing fragmentation along ethnic and ideological
lines—fractures that were largely contained during Karzai’s presidency. A number of high profile
attacks, most claimed by ISKP (see below), have targeted the ethnic Hazara minority. In August
2016, gunmen loyal to First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostam attacked Tajiks who were
reburying in a prominent burial site the body of ex-King Habibullah Kalakani (see above). In
October 2016, Dostam indirectly threatened an armed challenge against the NUG unless he and
his Uzbek constituencies were accorded greater respect. Perhaps suggesting that Dostam and
other regional leaders are taking advantage of central government weakness, Dostam also has
been accused of beating up and detaining a political rival in his northern redoubt. Some experts
assert that the fragmentation might be due, in part, to Ghani’s apparent focus on applying
principles of governance, such as anti-corruption and establishing formal advisory structures, and
his apparent distaste for the consistent engagement with power brokers and ethnic leaders that
characterized Karzai’s presidency.16
Dostam himself left Afghanistan for Turkey, where he has sought refuge in the past, in May 2017;
Dostam allies and Afghan government officials attributed the move to health concerns and
“medical tests,” but others speculate that his departure was an attempt to evade facing justice in
Afghanistan.17 His return to Afghanistan in late July 2017 was blocked by the government.18
Earlier that month, representatives of several other ethnic parties, all senior government officials,
visited Dostam and announced from Ankara the formation of a new coalition (termed the
“Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan”) made up of Dostam’s Uzbek-majority Junbish-eMilli party; the Tajik Jamaat-e-Islami party (led by Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani); and
the Hazara Hizb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami party. The group called on President Ghani to implement
political reforms and introduce a less-centralized decisionmaking process.
While some have cast doubt on the coalition’s long-term viability and claim that its creation is
motivated by political expediency, it represents a challenge to President Ghani’s authority at a
time when public discontent with his government is high19 and clashes among the militias loyal to
figures nominally supporting the central government have accelerated. A May 31, 2017, bombing
in central Kabul left over 150 dead (likely the most deadly such attack in Afghan history) and led
to large anti-government protests in which several demonstrators were killed by security forces.
Those protesters coalesced into a group calling itself the Uprising for Change Movement. The
group, which does not align with any political party, has held several more rallies in Kabul to call
for the resignation of the Interior Minister and other officials and for security sector and
governance reforms.20
Another group, called Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan (the People’s Axis of Afghanistan), was
formed in July 2017 and criticizes the NUG as “unconstitutional” because of overdue elections
16 Ghani’s Management Style Under Scrutiny. Tolo News, August 31, 2016.
17 “Afghan Vice-President Dostum flies to Turkey amid torture claims,” BBC, May 20, 2017.
18 Mujib Mashal and Najim Rahim, “Afghan Vice President’s Return Thwarted as Plane Is Turned Back,” New York
Times, July 18, 2017.
19 Pamela Constable, “Political storm brews in Afghanistan as officials from ethnic minorities break with president, call
for reforms and protests,” Washington Post, July 1, 2017.
20 Sherif Amiri, “Uprising for Change Movement Hold Peaceful Rally In Kabul,” Tolo News, July 3, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
10
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
and other unmet conditions of the September 2014 agreement. Mehwar is seen as being aligned
with former president Karzai, who may harbor ambitions to return to power and has been an
increasingly vocal critic in recent months of the NUG, as well as of the United States and its
operations in Afghanistan.21
Way Forward for the NUG
Abdullah loyalists insist on adhering to the terms of the NUG agreement and holding a
constitutional loya jirga (an Afghan assembly) that would convert Abdullah’s post into a formal
prime ministership. With the loya jirga not held by its planned deadline of September 2016, some
Afghan figures centered around ex-President Karzai seek to hold a traditional loya jirga instead.
The delegates of a traditional loya jirga would be subject to the prerogatives of the conveners of
the assembly, and the format far less structured than a constitutional loya jirga. Such a meeting
could potentially yield unpredictable outcomes such as the replacement of the NUG entirely and
the selection of new leadership. Some perceive that Karzai and his allies might seek to engineer
his return as leader from such a meeting. Some Abdullah supporters criticized Secretary of State
Kerry’s comments in April 2016 that the NUG is intended to be of a five-year duration (the length
of a presidential term) as opposing a government restructuring by the planned loya jirga.
The holding of a constitutional loya jirga is contingent on the holding of parliamentary elections
as well as district elections, which still have not been held in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Parliamentarians and district council members constitute part of the attendance of a constitutional
loya jirga. A deadline that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) set in January 2016 for
new parliamentary elections—October 15, 2016—was not met. A commission on election reform
(“Special Electoral Reform Commission”) was established and Ghani accepted 7 of its 10
recommendations, but the lower house of parliament voted them down. However, in late 2016, a
new IEC and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) were appointed and an election law was
enacted—appearing to remove key impediments to holding the required parliamentary and
district elections.
Going forward, parliamentary and district council elections are scheduled for July 7, 2018.
However, in light of the current delay (parliament’s mandate expired in June 2015 but was
extended indefinitely by a presidential decree due to security concerns), some are skeptical of that
timeline.22 Continued contention among electoral commissioners may further reduce confidence
in the government’s ability to hold elections next year.23 Some observers have called for district
council elections to be delayed further and held alongside the 2019 presidential election, arguing
that holding them next year, before broader questions of local governance and autonomy are
answered, “risks perpetuating the long-standing fallacy in Afghan statebuilding: if subnational
structures are built on paper, state legitimacy will follow.”24
21 Ayaz Gul, “Karzai: Trump’s Afghan Strategy Fueling War, Regional Rivalries,” Voice of America, October 12,
2017.
22 Pamela Constable, “Disputes have put Afghan elections in jeopardy. Is the country’s democracy also at risk?”
Washington Post, December 12, 2017.
23 Ali Yawar Adili, “Afghanistan Election Conundrum (1): Political pressure on commissioners puts 2018 vote in
doubt.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 18, 2017.
24 Frances Z. Brown, “Local Governance Reform in Afghanistan and the 2018 Elections,” United States Institute of
Peace, November 9, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
11
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah
On September 29, 2014, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmedzai was
inaugurated as President, and he appointed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah as
CEO.
Ashraf Ghani, born in 1949, is from Lowgar Province. He is from a prominent tribe, belonging to the
Ghilzai Pashtun tribal confederation, that has supplied many past Afghan leaders, including the last Sovietinstalled leader, Dr. Najibullah Ahmedzai. Ghani attended university at the American University of Beirut, and
received a Ph.D. degree in Cultural Anthropology from Columbia University. He joined the World Bank in
1991, where he helped several countries manage development and institutional transformation projects.
During 2002-2004, he served as Finance Minister in Karzai’s first cabinet and was credited with extensive
reforms and institution of the National Solidarity Program of locally driven economic development. During
2004-2005, he served as chancellor of Kabul University. He subsequently founded the Institute for State
Effectiveness, which helps countries undergoing transition build institutions. After 2009, he served as an
advisor to Karzai on various initiatives, including institutional reform and relations with the U.S.-led coalition
helping secure Afghanistan.
He is married to Rula Ghani, and they have two children. Mrs. Ghani was a Christian when they met at
university in Beirut in the 1970s, and some Afghan clerics allege that there is no public record of her
converting to Islam.
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, born in 1960 in Kabul, is an eye doctor by training. His mother was an ethnic Tajik
and his father was a Pashtun from Qandahar. However, he is widely identified politically as a Tajik because he
was a top aide to legendary Tajik mujahedin commander and Northern Alliance military leader Ahmad Shah
Masoud, who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States.
During the Northern Alliance’s political struggle against the Taliban during 1996-2001, Abdullah served as the
Northern Alliance’s foreign minister—Masoud’s international envoy. He served as Foreign Minister during
2001-2006, a time when the Northern Alliance’s influence on Karzai was substantial. Karzai dismissed him in
an early 2006 cabinet reshuffle.
As noted above, Abdullah lost the 2009 presidential election to Karzai, despite widespread confirmed
allegations of fraud in that vote. He subsequently became chief opposition leader in Afghanistan.
Sources: Various press reporting, author conversations with Afghan figures in Afghanistan and Washington, DC,
2001-2014. Photographs from http://www.facebook.com/ashrafghani and http://www.facebook.com/
Dr.AbdullahAbdullah, respectively.
U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure
U.S. and international civilian institutions have helped build the capacity of the Afghan
government. The U.S. embassy in Kabul, which had closed in 1989 when the Soviets pulled out
of Afghanistan and was guarded by Afghan caretakers, reopened in late 2001. The post of U.S.
Ambassador to Afghanistan is currently unfilled, but the Trump Administration announced in July
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
12
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
2017 its intention to nominate career foreign service officer John Bass (currently ambassador to
Turkey) to the position. In February 2009, the Obama Administration set up the position of an
appointed “Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan” (SRAP), occupied first by
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reporting to the Secretary of State. The position was reportedly
slated for elimination by the Trump administration, though Secretary Tillerson announced in July
2017 that Acting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells would also
serve as acting SRAP, and it was subsequently reported that Secretary Tillerson proposes to
integrate the SRAP position into the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.25
In line with the U.S. military drawdown, the Administration has sought to “normalize” its
presence in Afghanistan. From 2009 to 2014, the U.S. civilian presence expanded to over 1,300
U.S. civilian officials—up from only about 400 in 2009—of which about one-third were serving
outside Kabul. Staff levels dropped by about 20% by the completion of the transition in
December 2014. As of September 2017, there are currently 568 total U.S. direct hires supporting
U.S. Embassy operations in Afghanistan (mostly from the State Department and USAID), who
work alongside 1,500 U.S. contractors.
Consulates. In June 2010, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns formally inaugurated a U.S.
consulate in Herat city, a location considered pivotal to U.S. engagement with the Tajik and
Uzbek minorities of Afghanistan. The facility was attacked by the Taliban in September 2013, and
its staff were relocated to ISAF’s Camp Arena; it is unclear what the mission’s current status is.
The State Department spent about $80 million on a facility in Mazar-e-Sharif that was slated to
replace the existing facility, but the new site was abandoned in 2012 because of concerns about
security and plans for consulates in other cities like Qandahar and Jalalabad appear to be on hold,
perhaps indefinitely.26
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict
resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). During October 2014 until March 2016, the head of UNAMA was Nicholas
Haysom, of South Africa. He was succeeded by Tadamichi Yamamoto of Japan. UNAMA’s mandate is subject to
Security Council renewal, in the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution, at the end of March of each year.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to strengthen
cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In
concert with the Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA opened offices in many of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Resolution 2096 of March 2013 reiterates the expanded UNAMA mandate, while
noting that UNAMA and the international community are moving to a supporting role rather than as direct
deliverers of services in Afghanistan. Resolution 2096 restated UNAMA’s coordinating role with other high-level
representatives in Afghanistan and election support role, as well as its role in reintegration of surrendering
insurgent fighters through a “Salaam (Peace) Support Group” that coordinates with Afghanistan’s High Peace
Council (that is promoting reconciliation and reintegration). UNAMA has always been involved in local dispute
resolution and disarmament of local militias,
UNAMA is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan stability. It was a co-convener of the
January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA
chairs a “Regional Working Group” to enlist regional support for Afghan integration.
On development, UNAMA co-chairs the joint Afghan-international community coordination body called the Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement Afghanistan’s development strategy.
However, UNAMA’s donor coordination role did not materialize because of the large numbers and size of donorrun projects in Afghanistan.
25 Anwar Iqbal, “US to keep special representative’s office, at least for now,” Dawn, July 23, 2017.
26 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Abandons Consulate Plan in Northern Afghanistan.” Washington Post, May 6, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
13
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
See CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, by (name
redact ed) .
General Human Rights Issues
U.S. policy has been to establish and empower human rights institutions in Afghanistan and to
promote the government’s adherence to international standards of human rights practices. As do
previous years’ State Department human rights reports on Afghanistan, the report for 2016
attributes most of Afghanistan’s human rights deficiencies to overall lack of security, loose
control over the actions of Afghan security forces, corruption, and cultural attitudes such as
discrimination against women. The State Department and UNAMA reports cite torture, rape, and
other abuses by officials, security forces, detention center authorities, and police.
One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), an oversight
body on human rights practices, but its members are appointed by the government and some
believe it is not independent. In addition, there has been a proliferation of Afghan organizations
that demand transparency about human rights deficiencies and have sometimes produced
government responses, for example by establishing “human rights units” in security institutions.
Such groups include the Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy Organization, and the
Equality for Peace and Democracy organization.
Countering the influence of institutions such as the AIHRC are traditional bodies such as the
National Ulema Council. The Council consists of the 150 most widely followed clerics
throughout Afghanistan, who represent about 3,000 clerics nationwide. It has taken conservative
positions on free expression and social freedoms, such as the type of television and other media
programs available in Afghanistan. Clerics sometimes ban performances by Afghan singers and
other performers whose acts they consider inconsistent with Islamic values. On the other hand,
some rock bands have been allowed to perform high profile shows since 2011. Because of the
power of Islamist conservatives, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and
stores, although it is not banned for sale to non-Muslims. According to recent State Department
reports on human rights, there continue to be intimidation and some violence against journalists
who criticize the central government or powerful local leaders, and some news organizations and
newspapers have been closed for incorrect or derogatory reporting on high officials.
Advancement of Women
Women’s groups are a large component of Afghan civil society. Freedoms for women have
greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban with their elections to the parliament and their
service at many levels of government. The Afghan government pursues a policy of promoting
equality for women under its National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework requires Afghanistan to implement the NAPWA and all
of its past commitments and laws to strengthen the rights of women and provide services to them.
The major institutional development was the formation in 2002 of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs
dedicated to improving women’s rights. Its primary function is to promote public awareness of
relevant laws and regulations concerning women’s rights. It plays a key role in trying to protect
women from domestic abuse by overseeing the running of as many as 29 women’s shelters across
Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized
$15 million per year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (Economic Support
Funds controlled by USAID). The United States has continued to donate to the Ministry since
AFSA expired.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
14
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
One of the most prominent civil society groups is the Afghanistan Women’s Network. It has at
least 3,500 members and its leaders say that 125 nongovernmental organizations work under its
auspices. In addition, the AIHRC and outside Afghan human rights groups focus extensively on
rights for Afghan women.
Among the most notable accomplishments since 2001 is that women are performing jobs that
were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996. The civil service is
22% female, although that is below the 30% target level set in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework. About 4,388 women serve in the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF), making up around 1.4% of the force, though the Afghan government has set a goal to
increase the number of women in the ANDSF to 10%. There are over 260 female judges, up from
50 in 2003, and several hundred female journalists nationwide. Women constitute over one-third
of the seats of the nationwide Community Development Councils (CDCs, discussed above), in
part because each CDC is required to have two women in its executive bodies. Women are legally
permitted to drive and, mainly in larger cities, they exercise that right regularly. Wearing the full
body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, but many women still wear it, in part to
protect themselves from sexual advances. Some women in rural areas are reportedly advancing in
social and economic status through agricultural cooperatives prevalent in several areas.
Despite the gains since 2001, numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and employment
opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. Among the
most widespread abuses reported are the following:
More than 70% of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, despite laws banning the
practice, and a majority of brides are younger than the legal marriage age of 16.
The practice of baad, in which women are given away to marry someone from
another clan to settle a dispute, remains prevalent.
There is no law banning sexual harassment, and women are routinely jailed for a
crime under the penal code called zina. The term means adultery, but under
Afghan law includes defying family choice of a spouse, eloping, or fleeing
domestic violence. Women can be jailed for having a child outside wedlock, even
if the child is a product of rape.
Under the penal code, a man who is convicted of “honor killing” (killing a wife
who commits adultery) can be sentenced to no more than two years in prison.
Women’s rights activists have been assassinated on several occasions.
In an effort to prevent these abuses, on August 6, 2009, then-President Karzai issued, as a decree,
the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” (EVAW) law that makes many of the practices
above unlawful. Partly as a result of the decree, prosecutions of abuses against women are
increasingly obtaining convictions. A “High Commission for the Elimination of Violence Against
Women” has been established to oversee implementation of the EVAW, and provincial offices of
the commission have been established in each province.
On the other hand, despite the EVAW decree, only a small percentage of reports of violence
against women are registered with the judicial system, and about one-third of those proceed to
trial.27 The number of women jailed for “moral crimes” has increased by 50% since 2011. Efforts
by the National Assembly to enact the EVAW in December 2010 and in May 2013 failed due to
opposition from Islamic conservatives who assert that males should decide family issues.
27 Alissa Rubin, “Slow Gains in Justice for Afghan Women,” New York Times, December 12, 2012,
http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Qy9mDiEa5Rw%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
15
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
President Ghani has signaled his strong support for women’s rights by publicly highlighting the
support he receives from his wife, despite the Afghan cultural taboo about mentioning wives and
female family members in public. Ghani nominated a female to Afghanistan’s Supreme Court,
but the National Assembly rejected her nomination in July 2015. He has also appointed two
female governors—one more than was the case during Karzai’s presidency—in Ghor and in
Daykundi provinces. There are four female ministers.
Religious Freedoms
According to State Department reports on international religious freedom, the constitution and
government to some extent restrict religious freedom.28 The government (Ministry of Hajj and
Religious Affairs) is involved in regulating religious practices. Of Afghanistan’s approximately
150,000 mosques, 50,000 are registered and funded by the government. Clerics in these mosques,
paid about $100 per month, are expected to promote the government’s views. There are around
5,000 of these clerics, out of an estimated nationwide total of 300,000, though the Ministry says
that it does not have the resources to comprehensively register all of the country’s mosques or
clerics.
Members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face
discrimination, but members of these communities sometimes serve at high levels of government.
Baha’is fare worse than members of some of the other minorities because the Afghan Supreme
Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of blasphemy in May 2007, and blasphemy is a
capital offense. There are no public Christian churches but Afghan Christians can worship in
small congregations in private homes. Still, several conversion cases drew harsh punishments and
earned international attention. There are four synagogues, but they are not used because there is
only one Afghan national who is Jewish. There are three active gurdwaras (Sikh places of
worship) and five Hindu mandirs (temples). Buddhist foreigners are free to worship in Hindu
temples.
The Hazaras and other Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. Afghan Shiite leaders appreciated the July 2009 enactment and “gazetting”
of a “Shiite Personal Status Law” that gave Afghan Shiites the same degree of recognition as the
Sunni majority, and provided a legal framework for Shiite family law issues. Afghan Shiites are
able to celebrate their holidays openly and some have held high positions, but some Pashtuns
have become resentful of the open celebrations and some clashes have resulted. The Shiite
community has also been aggressively targeted by ISKP.
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was ranked as “Tier 2” in the State Department Trafficking in Persons Report for
2017, an improvement from 2016 when Afghanistan was ranked as “Tier 2: Watch List” on the
grounds that the Afghan government was not complying with minimum standards for eliminating
trafficking and did not demonstrate increased efforts against trafficking since the prior reporting
period.29 As part of the government’s significant efforts to combat trafficking, the 2017 report
cites increased law enforcement and new victim protection measures, including the reopening of a
short term shelter for trafficking victims in Kabul. However, the report says that women from
China, some countries in Africa, Iran, and some countries in Central Asia are being trafficked into
Afghanistan for sexual exploitation, although trafficking within Afghanistan is more prevalent
28 The report for 2016 can be accessed at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/.
29 The 2017 report can be accessed at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271339.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
16
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
than trafficking across its borders. The report asserts that some families knowingly sell their
children for forced prostitution, including for bacha bazi, a practice in which wealthy men use
groups of young boys for social and sexual entertainment (see textbox below) and in which some
ANDSF have allegedly participated. Other reports say that many women have resorted to
prostitution, despite the risk of social and religious ostracism or punishment, to cope with
economic hardship.
Bacha Bazi30
Bacha bazi, which translates as "boy play," is a form of child sexual abuse that has been reported among
Afghanistan’s military and defense forces. While there is no clear legal definition of the term, a DOD Inspector
General report from 2017 describes bacha bazi as the practice of men sexually abusing boys who are trained to
dance in girls' clothing. 31This type of abuse is said to have a long history in Central Asia, and some who practice it
report seeing it as a sign of social status, but Afghan society at large reportedly disapproves strongly.
The Taliban strongly oppose bacha bazi (despite their own use of children for frontline fighting), and had largely
eradicated it when they controlled the country. A former Marine who had served in Afghanistan noted that the
Taliban have used reports of rapes committed by government agents as a recruiting tool.32 The current Afghan
government, after initially failing to address bacha bazi, has pledged to tackle the problem.33 The Department of
State’s 2018 Trafficking in Persons report credits the Ghani Government with some strides toward criminalizing
bacha bazi and enforcing those laws, but the practice continues to be widespread.34
This issue attracted significant congressional concern after the New York Times reported in 2015 that U.S. soldiers
serving in Afghanistan were being punished for protesting against the sexual abuse of boys on military bases.35
Some Members intervened on behalf of several individual soldiers, and 93 Members asked SIGAR to investigate
the problem and the enforcement of Leahy Laws in Afghanistan. The resulting SIGAR report and a subsequent
report by the DOD Inspector General documented an ongoing problem, including a lack of clear guidance for U.S.
forces to report and counter cases of abuse.36 Moreover, some Afghan units receive U.S. assistance despite
committing “gross violation of human rights,” because of the “notwithstanding clause” that allows for exceptions
to the Leahy Laws, and because of procedural flaws in the way Leahy Laws are managed in Afghanistan.37
30 This textbox was written by Carmelina Palmer, Research Intern, and (name redacted), Section Research Manag
er.
31
Office of the Inspector General, Implementing of the DoD Leahy Law Regarding Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse
by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, U.S. Department of Defense, DODIG-2018-018,
2017.
32 Aaron Maclean, “Bacha Bazi and the Afghan Drawdown,” Weekly Standard, October 5, 2015.
33 Matthew Rosenberg, “Ashraf Ghani, Afghan President, Vows to Crack Down on Abuse of Boys,” New York Times,
(2015).
34 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017; the Afghan legislation is Law Prohibiting Human
Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling (1395/11/10) [2017].
35 Joseph Goldstein, “U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies,” New York Times,
September 20, 2015.
36 SIGAR 17-47-IP, “Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan: Implementation of the Leahy Laws and Reports of Assault
by Afghan Security Forces;” Office of the Inspector General, “Implementing of the DoD Leahy Law Regarding
Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces,” U.S.
Department of Defense, DODIG-2018-018, 2017.
37 For more see CRS Report R43361, “Leahy Law” Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview,
coordinated by (name redacted) , Legal Sidebar Legal Obligation of U.S. Armed Forces to Intervene in Acts of Bacha
Bazi in Afghanistan, and CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by
(name redacted).
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
17
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Security Policy: Transition and Beyond
The stated Obama Administration goal in Afghanistan was to prevent terrorist organizations that
can plan attacks against the U.S. homeland, partners, and interests from regaining safe haven in
Afghanistan. To accomplish that goal, U.S. policy is to enable the Afghan government and
security forces to defend the country against the insurgency and to govern effectively and
transparently. In an August 2017 speech, President Trump articulated an intent to reorient
Afghanistan policy around a conditions-based approach, forsaking timelines and public
discussion of troop levels and other benchmarks. The strategy articulated by the President also
appeared to emphasize pressure on Pakistan to deny safe haven to Afghan militants, as well as an
explicit repudiation of past U.S. efforts to “nation-build” in Afghanistan and to build Westernstyle institutions there.
Who Is “The Enemy”?
The insurgent challenge to stability in Afghanistan has been sustained by a number of factors,
including (1) the small numbers of security forces in many rural areas; (2) logistical and other
shortfalls on the part of the ANDSF; (3) safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; (4) a
backlash against civilian casualties caused by military operations; and (5) unrealized public
expectations of economic performance and the effectiveness and integrity of Afghan governance.
There are numerous insurgent groups in Afghanistan, all of which are generally—although not
always—allied with each other. U.S. rules of engagement allow for operations against Al Qaeda,
the Islamic State (as of January 2016), and associated groups by affiliation, and against the
Taliban and other insurgent groups if they pose an imminent threat to U.S. forces or the ANDSF
and the Afghan government (since June 2016).38 Prior to the June 2016 decision by the Obama
administration to loosen rules of engagement, direct U.S. action was limited to defending U.S.
and Afghan government forces under imminent threat by the Taliban. In a January 2017 hearing,
General Nicholson described the new rules of engagement as “instrumental to our successes.”39 In
August 2017, President Trump declared that he would further expand battlefield authorities “to
target the terrorist and criminal networks that sow violence and chaos throughout Afghanistan;”
exactly which groups that might fall into these categories (and that are not already authorized
U.S. military targets) is a subject of some speculation.40 For additional information on Al Qaedaand Islamic State-related groups, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State
Affiliates in Afghanistan, by (name redacted) .
The Taliban
The insurgency is still led primarily by the Taliban movement. The death in 2013 of its original
leader, Mullah Umar, was revealed in a July 2015 Taliban announcement. In a disputed selection
process, he was succeeded by Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who in turn was killed by a U.S.
unmanned aerial vehicle strike on May 21, 2016. Several days later, the Taliban confirmed his
death and announced the selection of one of his deputies, Haibatullah Akhunzadeh, as the new
38 Matthew Rosenberg, “Obama Loosens Restrictions on U.S. Forces Fighting Taliban in Afghanistan,” New York
Times, June 10, 2016.
39 Jim Michaels, “General: More U.S. advisers needed in Afghanistan,” USA Today, February 9, 2017.
40 Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, The White House, August 21, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
18
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Taliban leader. The group announced two deputies: Mullah Yaqub (son of Mullah Umar) and
Sirajuddin Haqqani (operational commander of the Haqqani Network).
Non-Pashtun Taliban. Some press reports also note that non-Pashtun (e.g. Tajik or Uzbek) antigovernment groups are operating in non-Pashtun areas (particularly northern Afghanistan) and are
increasingly affiliating themselves with the Taliban; some reports also note new Taliban efforts to
recruit among non-Pashtun populations.41 The Taliban’s temporary seizure of the northern city of
Konduz in October 2015 was seen by many observers as a consequence of this trend, and a
possible harbinger of greater activity in the region.42 These factions are said to be less ideological
than is the core of the Taliban movement in implementing Islamic law and other restrictions in
areas under their control. However, the rise of an Islamic State affiliate (see below), many
members of which are Uzbek, “constitutes a challenge to the Taleban recruitment strategy among
non-Pashtuns.”43
Pakistani Taliban. A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,
TTP), is now thought to be beset with infighting following a contentious leadership succession in
2013 and number of prominent splits within the organization in 2014. Some TTP fighters
reportedly operate from safe havens in Taliban-controlled areas on the Afghan side of the border,
where many have defected and joined the nascent Islamic State- Khorasan Province (below). The
State Department designated the TTP as an FTO on September 2, 2010.
Al Qaeda and Associated Groups
In May 1996, shortly before the Taliban entered Kabul, Osama bin Laden relocated from Sudan to
Afghanistan, where he had been a recruiter of Arab fighters during the anti-Soviet war. He
initially settled in territory in Nangarhar province (near Jalalabad city), but later had freer reign as
the Taliban captured additional territory in Afghanistan. After the September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda
was largely driven out of Afghanistan by U.S.-supported Afghan forces that ousted the Taliban
from power.
The post-2014 U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan focuses largely on Al Qaeda and its
affiliates. From 2001 until 2015, Al Qaeda was considered by U.S. officials to have only a
minimal presence (fewer than 100) in Afghanistan itself, operating mostly as a facilitator for
insurgent groups and mainly in the northeast. However, in late 2015 U.S. Special Operations
forces and their ANDSF partners discovered and destroyed a large Al Qaeda training camp in
Qandahar Province—a discovery that indicated that Al Qaeda had expanded its presence in
Afghanistan. In April 2016, U.S. commanders publicly raised their estimates of Al Qaeda fighters
in Afghanistan to 100-300, and said that relations between Al Qaeda and the Taliban are
increasingly close.44 Afghan officials put the number of Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan at 300500.45 Some have noted cooperation between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, particularly in the east.46
41 Shamil Shams, “Who is fighting in northern Afghanistan?” Deutsche Welle, October 7, 2015.
42 Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “Here’s the Most Disturbing Thing About the Taliban Takeover of Kunduz,” The Diplomat,
October 2, 2015.
43 Obaid Ali, “Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan,” Afghanistan Analysts Network,
September 18, 2017.
44 Press briefing by Resolute Support Mission Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications Brig. Gen. Charles
Cleveland. April 14, 2016.
45 Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan Security Crisis Sets Stage for Terrorists’ Resurgence,” New York Times,
December 2, 2016.
46 Hollie McKay, “Al Qaeda in Afghanistan: How terror group survives, thrives,” Fox News World, June 16, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
19
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Until the killing of Bin Laden by U.S. Special Operations Forces in Pakistan on May 1, 2011,
there had been frustration within the U.S. government with the search for Al Qaeda’s top leaders.
In December 2001, in the course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special
Operations Forces and CIA operatives reportedly narrowed Bin Laden’s location to the Tora Bora
mountains (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass), but Afghan militia fighters failed to prevent his
escape.
U.S. efforts to find remaining senior Al Qaeda leaders reportedly focus on Bin Laden’s successor
Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is presumed to be on the Pakistani side of the border. A U.S. strike
reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January
2006.47 Some senior Al Qaeda leaders had been in Iran, including operational chief Sayf al Adl
and Sulayman Abu Ghaith, son-in-law of bin Laden and Al Qaeda spokesperson, but both
reportedly were forced out of Iran in 2013. Abu Ghaith was subsequently captured by U.S.
authorities, but Adl reportedly was traded to Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen for Iranians diplomats
held there.
U.S. efforts have killed numerous other senior Al Qaeda operatives in recent years, including
chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri (August 2008); two senior operatives allegedly
involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa (January 2009); top leaders Attiyah Abd alRahman and Abu Yahya al-Libi (killed in Pakistan by reported U.S. drone strikes in 2011 and
2012); operative Abu Bara Al Kuwaiti (October 2014, in Nangarhar Province); and Al Qaeda’s
commander for northeastern Afghanistan, Faruq Qahtani (October 2016).
Al Qaeda Affiliated Groups
Some groups that operate in Afghanistan have been affiliated with Al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). AQIS is subfaction of Al Qaeda based in and
including members from various terrorist groups in the countries of South and Central Asia. Its
formation was announced by Zawahiri in 2014. In June 2016, the State Department designated
the group as an FTO and its leader, Asim Umar, as a specially-designated global terrorist.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) originated
as a militant group active primarily against the authoritarian government in Uzbekistan. In
Afghanistan, the IMU has been affiliated with Al Qaeda, although some of its fighters have
realigned with the Islamic State branch there. The group is active throughout northern
Afghanistan and some of its estimated 300 fighters in Konduz Province took part in the
September 2015 capture of Konduz city. The IMU contingent in Afghanistan reportedly is led by
Qari Balal, who escaped from a Pakistani jail in 2010.48 A splinter group, the Jamaat Ansarullah,
is active in Central Asia and northern Afghanistan.49
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. A Pakistani Islamist militant group said to be increasingly active inside
Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET was initially focused on
operations against Indian control of Kashmir, but reportedly is increasingly active elsewhere in
South Asia and elsewhere. The State Department has stated that the group was responsible for the
May 23, 2014, attack on India’s consulate in Herat.
47 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,
2006.
48 Bill Roggio. “U.S. Military Continues to Claim Al Qaeda is ‘Restricted’ to ‘Isolated Areas of Northeastern
Afghanistan.” Long War Journal, November 19, 2014.
49 U.N. report by the sanctions monitoring team established by U.N. resolutions sanctioning the Taliban. U.N. Security
Council Document S/2014/888. December 11, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
20
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Lashkar-i-Janghvi. Another Pakistan-based group that is somewhat active in Afghanistan is
Lashkar-i-Janghvi. It has conducted some suicide attacks in Afghanistan and was accused of
several attacks on Afghanistan’s Hazara Shiite community during 2011-2012.
Harakat ul-Jihad Islami (Movement of Islamic Jihad) is a Pakistan-based militant group that
trained in Al Qaeda camps. Its former leader, Ilyas Kashmiri, was killed in U.S. drone strike in
June 2011. He had earlier been indicted in the United States for supporting LET operative David
Coleman Headley, who planned a terrorist attack on Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.
The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP)
An Islamic State affiliate—Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, often also referred to as
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan, ISIL-K), named after an area that once included
parts of what is now Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—has been active in Afghanistan since mid2014. ISKP was named as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the State Department on
January 14, 2016. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reportedly lived in Kabul during the
Taliban regime and cooperated with Al Qaeda there.50 The group’s presence in Afghanistan has
crystallized from several small Afghan Taliban and other militant factions—such as Da Fidayano
Mahaz and Tora Bora Mahaz—that announced affiliation with the organization in 2013. The
Islamic State presence grew further as additional Taliban factions defected to the group and
captured some small areas primarily in eastern Afghanistan. Its members also reportedly include
former fighters of the Taliban faction in Pakistan, which is discussed above. Afghan affiliates of
the Islamic State have reportedly received financial assistance from the core organization located
in the self-declared “caliphate” in parts of Iraq and Syria.51 U.S. commanders narrowed their
estimate of ISKP fighters in Afghanistan to 1,200-1,300 in September 2016 and again to 700 in
April 2017.52 U.S. officials say the Islamic State’s goal in Afghanistan is to expand its presence
further in northeastern Afghanistan (where it is reportedly active in Jowzjan and Sar-i-Pol
provinces)53 and Qandahar.
To address the ISKP threat, as of December 2015 U.S. commanders have authorization to combat
ISKP fighters by affiliation, whether or not these fighters pose an immediate threat to U.S. and
allied forces. According to General Nicholson on September 23, 2016, cited above, U.S. airstrikes
and other combat against ISKP had reduced the group’s primary presence to one province,
Nangarhar, and their fighters by approximately 25 percent. The group’s leaders have repeatedly
been targeted by U.S. operations, with three killed in less than a year: Hafiz Saeed Khan died in a
July 2016 U.S. airstrike and successors Abdul Hasib and Abu Sayed were killed in April and July
2017, respectively. Still, ISKP has survived these leadership deaths and appears to be a growing
factor in U.S. and Afghan strategic planning. ISKP was the target of the much publicized April
2017 use of a GBU-43 (also known as a Massive Ordnance Air Blast, or MOAB), the first such
use of the weapon in combat. Of the ten U.S. battlefield casualties in 2017 (as of August), seven
50 Ibid. p. 12.
51 Michael Gordon. “Islamic State Building ‘Nests’ in Afghanistan, U.S. Says.” New York Times, December 19, 2015.
52 Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson via Teleconference from Afghanistan, September 23,
2016. Transcript available at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/954839/departmentof-defense-press-briefing-by-general-nicholson-via-teleconference-fr.
53 Noor Zahid and Mohammad Habibzada, “IS Destroys Schools, Bars Female Students in Restive Afghan District.”
VOA, July 3, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
21
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
were killed in anti-ISKP operations.54 At least two CIA personnel have also been killed in clashes
with ISKP in 2017.55
Press reports indicate that Afghans consider the Taliban’s practices in areas of their control as
moderate compared to the brutality practiced by Islamic State adherents. ISKP and Taliban
fighters have sometimes clashed over control over territory or because of political or other
differences. However, at least one Afghan source claims that the two groups conducted a joint
operation in Sar-i-Pol province in August 2017 (a claim the Taliban denied), perhaps an indication
of the increasingly fluid and complex militant landscape in the north.56 ISKP has claimed
responsibility for a number of large-scale attacks, particularly in Kabul, including multiple
bombings targeting Afghanistan’s Shi’ite minority and armed assaults against government targets.
Haqqani Network
The “Haqqani Network,” founded by Jalaludin Haqqani, a mujahedin commander and U.S. ally
during the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet occupation, is often cited by U.S. officials as a
potent threat to U.S. and allied forces and interests, and a “critical enabler of Al Qaeda.”57
Jalaluddin Haqqani served in the Taliban regime as Minister of Tribal Affairs, and his network
has fought against the current Afghan government. Over the past few years, Jalaludin’s son
Sirajuddin has largely taken over the group’s operations and has become increasingly influential
in setting overall insurgency strategy. As noted above, Sirajuddin remains deputy leader of the
Taliban under the new leader, Mullah Akhunzadeh. Two of Sirajuddin’s brothers, Badruddin and
Nasruddin, were killed by U.S. and Pakistani operations in 2012-2013. Another, Anas, is held by
the Afghan government and has been sentenced to death.
Some see the Haqqani Network as on the decline. The Haqqani Network had about 3,000 fighters
and supporters at its zenith during 2004-2010, but it is believed to have far fewer currently.
However, the network is still capable of carrying out operations, particularly in Kabul city, where
it allegedly carried out the devastating May 2017 bombing in Kabul’s diplomatic district that left
over 150 dead and sparked violent protests against the government. The network earns funds
through licit and illicit businesses in the areas of Afghanistan where it has a presence as well as in
Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. The group apparently has turned increasingly to kidnapping to
perhaps earn funds and publicize its significance. It reportedly holds two professors (Timothy
Weeks, an Australian, and American citizen Kevin King, who is reportedly seriously ill)58
kidnapped from the American University of Afghanistan in August 2016; and a journalist (Paul
Overby) seized in 2014 after crossing into Afghanistan to try to interview the Haqqani leadership.
American citizen Caitlan Coleman, along with her Canadian husband Joshua Boyle and the three
children to whom she gave birth during the family’s five-year captivity, were freed in October
2017 by what the Pakistani military called an “intelligence-based operation” conducted in
conjunction with the United States.59
54 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon identifies Special Forces soldier killed battling Islamic State in Afghanistan,”
Washington Post, August 18, 2017.
55 Adam Goldman and Matthew Rosenberg, “A Funeral of 2 Friends: C.I.A. Deaths Rise in Secret Afghan War,” New
York Times, September 6, 2017.
56 “Taliban, ISIS cooperated on Afghan village attack: rights group,” Reuters, August 11, 2017.
57 DOD report on Afghan stability, April 2014. p. 12.
58 “Afghan Taliban say kidnapped U.S. professor is seriously ill,” Reuters, October 30, 2017.
59 Adam Goldman, “American Woman and Family Held for 5 Years in Afghanistan Freed From Militants,” New York
Times, October 12, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
22
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Suggesting it often acts as a tool of Pakistani interests, the Haqqani network has targeted several
Indian interests in Afghanistan. The network claimed responsibility for two attacks on India’s
embassy in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009), and is widely suspected of conducting the
August 4, 2013, attack on India’s consulate in Jalalabad. U.S. officials also attributed to the group
the June 28, 2011, attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul; a September 10, 2011, truck
bombing in Wardak Province (which injured 77 U.S. soldiers); and attacks on the U.S. Embassy
and ISAF headquarters in Kabul on September 13, 2011. Then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Mullen, following September 2011 attacks on U.S. Embassy Kabul, testified (Senate Armed
Services Committee, September 22, 2011) that the Haqqani network acts “as a veritable arm” of
the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Other U.S. officials issued more
cautious versions of that assertion. Some reports also attribute to the group a major January 10,
2017, attack at the Qandahar governor’s compound that killed at least six UAE diplomats,
including the UAE ambassador to Afghanistan, and several Afghan officials.
Haqqani commanders have told journalists that the Haqqani Network would participate in a
political settlement with the Afghan government if the Taliban decided to accept such an
agreement.60 However, the faction’s participation in a settlement could potentially be complicated
by its designation as an FTO under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. That designation was
made on September 9, 2012, after the 112th Congress enacted S. 1959 (Haqqani Network Terrorist
Designation Act of 2012, P.L. 112-168 that required an Administration report on whether the
group meets the criteria for FTO designation.
Insurgent Tactics
Insurgent groups often shift their tactics and targets to accomplish a variety of objectives. In
addition to straightforward combat, insurgent groups have made use of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), surface-to-air missiles, suicide bombs hidden in clothing, and “insider attacks”
using infiltrators or recruiting sympathizers among the ANDSF.61 Suicide bombers killed former
President Rabbani on September 20, 2011, and then-President Karzai’s cousin Hashmat Karzai on
July 29, 2014. Insider attacks were particularly frequent in 2012 constituting nearly half of the
approximately 100 that outside groups have assessed to have occurred to date. In August 2014, an
insider attack killed Major General Harold Greene during his visit to a prestigious Afghan
military academy. U.S. commanders have said they have verified some use of surface-to-air
missiles,62 although missiles apparently were not used in the Taliban’s downing of a U.S.
Chinook helicopter that killed 30 U.S. soldiers on August 6, 2011. In January 2010, thenPresident Karzai issued a decree banning importation of fertilizer chemicals (ammonium nitrate)
commonly used for the roadside bombs, but there reportedly is informal circumvention of the ban
for certain civilian uses, and the material still comes into Afghanistan from production plants in
Pakistan. It has also been reported that U.S. arms provided to the Afghan military have, through
both corruption and battlefield losses, been obtained by the Taliban; these weapons, including
Humvees and night vision devices, have reportedly given Taliban forces an advantage in some
provinces over less-well armed ANDSF units.63
60 Jibran Ahmad. “Afghan Haqqani Factions Would Consider Talks Under Taliban.” Reuters, November 13, 2012.
61 For more information on the insider attack, see CRS General Distribution memorandum “Insider Attacks in
Afghanistan,” October 1, 2012, available to congressional clients on request.
62 Major General John Campbell, commander of RC-E, July 28, 2010, press briefing.
63 Shawn Snow, “US weapons complicate Afghan war,” Military Times, July 25, 2017. A 2014 SIGAR investigation
found that 43% of weapons recorded in DOD information systems had missing information and/or duplication, and
recommended a number of reforms to better track weapons supplied to the ANDSF. SIGAR 14-84 Audit Report,
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
23
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods64
All of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit, at least in part, from narcotics trafficking.
However, the adverse effects are not limited to funding insurgents; the trafficking also
undermines rule of law within government ranks. The trafficking generates an estimated $70
million-$100 million per year for insurgents—perhaps about 25% of the insurgents’ budgets that
is estimated by some U.N. officials at about $400 million. In November 2017, the United Nations
reported that the total area used for poppy cultivation in 2017 was 328,000 hectares, an increase
of 63% from 2016 and 46% higher than the previous record in 2014; similarly, opium production
increased by 87%.65 Taliban drug production facilities are a major new focus of the Trump
Administration’s strategy in Afghanistan, and late 2017 has seen a number of high-profile strikes
on Taliban narcotics laboratories and other related sites.66 For a detailed analysis of narcotics
issue and U.S. and coalition counternarcotics efforts, see CRS Report R43540, Afghanistan: Drug
Trafficking and the 2014 Transition, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) .
The Obama Administration sought to reduce other sources of Taliban funding, including
continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. On June 29, 2012, the
Administration sanctioned (by designating them as terrorism supporting entities under Executive
Order 13224) two money exchange networks (hawalas) in Afghanistan and Pakistan allegedly
used by the Taliban to move its funds earned from narcotics and other sources.
The Anti-Taliban Military Effort: 2003-2009
During 2003 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent
violence with focused combat operations mainly in the south and east where ethnic Pashtuns
predominate. These included “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche”
(December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004); “Operation Lightning
Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil” (Elephant, October 2005). By
late 2005, U.S. and partner commanders considered the insurgency mostly defeated and
NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan during 2005-2006. The
optimistic assessments proved misplaced when violence increased significantly in mid-2006.
NATO-led operations during 2006-2008 cleared key districts but did not prevent subsequent
reinfiltration. Nor did preemptive combat and increased development work produce durable
success.
Taking into account security deterioration, the United States and its partners increased force
levels. U.S. troop levels started 2006 at 30,000 and increased to 39,000 by April 2009. Partner
forces also increased during that period to 39,000 at the end of 2009—rough parity with U.S.
forces. In September 2008, the U.S. military and NATO each began strategy reviews, which were
briefed to the incoming Obama Administration.
“Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability,” July 2014.
64 For detail on the issue of Afghanistan counternarcotics, see CRS Report R43540, Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and
the 2014 Transition, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) .
65 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics,
“Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: Cultivation and Production,” November 2017.
66 Dan Lamothe, “The U.S. beings bombing Taliban drug labs as Trump’s Afghanistan strategy takes hold,”
Washington Post, November 20, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
24
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Table 3. Background on NATO Participation and U.N. Mandate
Partner forces have always been key to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. During 2006-2014, most U.S. troops in
Afghanistan served in the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF), which consisted of all 28
NATO members states plus partner countries—a total of 50 countries. The International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), which ended its mission at the end of 2014, was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution).67 The mission was initially limited to Kabul
but, in October 2003, Germany’s contribution of an additional 450 military personnel enabled ISAF to expand to
Konduz and to other cities, an expanded mission authorized on October 14, 2003, by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1510. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—previously the ISAF command rotated
among donor forces including Turkey and Britain.
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security
responsibility for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2,
Regional Command West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the
formal handover of the security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,”
a British/Canadian/Dutch-led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed for Helmand, Qandahar, and
Uruzgan, the command of which rotated among the three. “Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of
peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus all of Afghanistan) was completed in October 2006.
The ISAF mission was renewed yearly by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Resolution 2069 of October 10, 2013,
was the last renewal until the ISAF mission ended at the end of 2014. Resolution 2189 of December 12, 2014,
welcomed the establishment of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) as the follow-on to ISAF.
Obama Administration Policy: “Surge,” Transition, and Drawdown
Upon taking office, the Obama Administration articulated that the Afghanistan mission was a
high priority, but that the U.S. level of effort there needed to be reduced over time. The
Administration integrated the late 2008 policy reviews into a 60-day inter-agency “strategy
review,” chaired by South Asia expert Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by then-SRAP Holbrooke and
then-Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy. President Obama announced a
“comprehensive” strategy on March 27, 2009,68 that announced deployment of an additional
21,000 U.S. forces.
In June 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, who headed U.S. Special Operations forces from
2003 to 2008, replaced General McKiernan as top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan. In
August 2009, General McChrystal delivered a strategy assessment that recommended that the
goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population rather than to focus on searching out
and combating Taliban concentrations, warning of the potential for “mission failure” in the
absence of a fully resourced, comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. His assessment stated
that about 44,000 additional U.S. combat troops would be needed to provide the greatest chance
for success.69
The assessment set off debate within the Administration and another policy review. Some senior
U.S. officials argued that adding many more U.S. forces could produce a potentially
counterproductive sense of “U.S. occupation.” President Obama announced the following at West
Point academy on December 1, 2009:70
67 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005);
and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).
68 “White Paper,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
69 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
70 President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
25
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (a “surge”) would be sent to “reverse the
Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen the ANDSF. The addition brought U.S.
force levels to 100,000, with most of the additional forces deployed to the south.
Beginning in July 2011, there would be a transition to Afghan security leadership
and a corresponding drawdown of U.S. forces. The Administration argued this
transition would focus the Afghan government on training its own forces. To
address Afghan concerns that the deadline signaled decreasing U.S.
involvement,71 a November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon decided on a gradual
transition to Afghan leadership that would be completed by the end of 2014.
When the surge was announced, the Afghan Interior Ministry estimated that the government
controlled about 30% of the country, while insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364 districts) and
influenced or operated in another 30%, and tribes and local groups with varying degrees of
loyalty to the central government controlled the remainder. The Taliban had named “shadow
governors” in 33 out of 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces, although some were merely symbolic.
Transition and Drawdown: Afghans in the Lead, 2011-2014
The surge was assessed as having reduced areas under Taliban control substantially and the
transition to Afghan security leadership began on schedule in July 2011. The process culminated
with June 18, 2013, U.S. and Afghan announcements that Afghan forces were now in the security
lead throughout Afghanistan. In concert with the transition, and asserting that the killing of
Osama Bin Laden represented a key accomplishment of the core U.S. mission, on June 22, 2011,
President Obama announced that
U.S. force levels would fall to 90,000 (from 100,000) by the end of 2011.
That U.S. force levels would drop to 68,000 by September 2012.
In the February 12, 2013, State of the Union message, President Obama announced that the U.S.
force level would drop to 34,000 by February 2014, which subsequently occurred. Partner
countries drew down their forces at roughly the same rate and proportion as the U.S. drawdown,
despite public pressure in the European countries to end or reduce military involvement in
Afghanistan. During 2010-2012, the Netherlands, Canada, and France, respectively, ended their
combat missions, but they continued to train the ANDSF until the end of 2014. As noted in Table
12, several countries are contributing trainers and advisers to the Resolute Support Mission.
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and Further Drawdowns
As international forces were reduced in 2014, Afghan and international officials expressed
uncertainty about U.S. and partner plans for the post-2014 period. On May 27, 2014, President
Obama clarified Administration plans by announcing the size of the post-2014 U.S. force and
plan for a U.S. military exit. Asserting that a full U.S. military departure from Afghanistan would
continue to focus the Afghans on improving their skills, the President announced in May 201472
71 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009.
72 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” May 27, 2014. Available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
26
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
The U.S. military contingent in Afghanistan would be 9,800 in 2015, deployed in
various parts of Afghanistan, consisting mostly of trainers in the “Resolute
Support Mission” (RSM). About 2,000 of the U.S. force would be Special
Operations Forces, of which half would conduct counterterrorism missions.73 The
U.S. military renamed the Afghanistan and related operations “Operation
Freedom’s Sentinel”—replacing the post-September 11 mission Operation
Enduring Freedom.
The U.S. force would decline to about 5,000 by the end of 2016 and to
consolidate in Kabul and at Bagram Airfield.
After 2016, the U.S. military presence would be consistent with normal security
relations with Afghanistan (about 1,000 military personnel) under U.S. Embassy
authority (without a separate military chain of command in country). Their
mission would be to protect U.S. installations, process Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) of weaponry to Afghanistan, and train the Afghans on that weaponry.
During 2014, the United States and its partners prepared for the end of the ISAF mission. U.S.
airpower in country was reduced, ISAF turned over the vast majority of the about 800 bases to the
ANDSF, and the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were turned over to Afghan
institutions.74
Adjustments to Force Levels in Light of Security Deterioration
U.S. and other concerns about the post-2014 drawdown plan intensified after the June 2014
offensive in Iraq by Islamic State fighters. Critics of Administration plans for Afghanistan force
levels asserted that the decision to leave no significant residual troop force in Iraq after 2011
contributed to the growth of the Islamic State there, and that similar events could happen in
Afghanistan if U.S. forces leave.
Despite assertions by U.S. commanders that the ANDSF is performing well despite taking heavy
casualties, concerns of U.S. commanders and outside observers have grown since early 2015. The
Taliban has made gains in Helmand Province, and the Taliban’s week-long capture of Konduz
city in September 2015 was the first seizure of a significant city since the Taliban regime fell in
2001. It has captured parts of that city and encroached on population centers in several parts of
southern and eastern Afghanistan since, although many such gains were quickly reversed by the
ANDSF. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford testified in September 2016 that
the battlefield situations represented “roughly a stalemate,” an assessment that was echoed by
General Nicholson in February 2017 and again in November 2017.
73 Votel Pledges Support for Special Operations Forces. DOD News, July 10, 2014.
74
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provided
safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government.
First formed in December 2002, PRTs performed activities ranging from resolving local disputes to coordinating local
reconstruction projects, although PRTs in combat-heavy areas focused on counterinsurgency. During his presidency,
Karzai consistently criticized the PRTs as holding back Afghan capacity-building and repeatedly called them “parallel
governing structures.”
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
27
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Growing Taliban gains were further highlighted with their purported capture of Helmand’s
Sangin district in March 2017, though some Afghan and U.S. officials disputed that narrative and
described the actions as a preplanned, orderly withdrawal. Sangin is important both strategically,
as a link between Helmand and Qandahar, and symbolically, as one of the most deadly districts in
all of Afghanistan- according to The New York Times, “more British troops and, later, American
marines died in Sangin than in any of Afghanistan’s roughly 400 districts” through 2013.75 By
most measures, the amount of territory controlled or contested by the Taliban has grown in recent
years, and that trend may be accelerating. In December 2016, General Nicholson estimated that
64% of the Afghan population lived under government control, a decrease from September 2016
when he put the figure at 68-70%.76 According to the most recent SIGAR report (October 2017),
just under 60% of Afghan districts are under government control or influence.
In the past several months, multiple U.S. commanders have warned of increased levels of
assistance, and perhaps even material support, for the Taliban from Russia and Iran.77 Both
nations were opposed to the Taliban
U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan since 2009
government of the late 1990s, but
June
2009-June 2010: General Stanley McChrystal
reportedly see the Taliban as a useful
July 2010-July 2011: General David Petraeus
point of leverage vis-a-vis the United
July 2011-February 2013: General John Allen
States. Russia and Iran publicly cite the
February 2013-August 2014: General Joseph Dunford
growth of IS-aligned fighters in
August 2014-March 2016: General John Campbell (as ISAF
Afghanistan (more below) to justify their
commander through December 2014, afterwards as RSM
involvement, though in some cases their
commander)
assessments of IS strength far outpace
March 2016-present: General John Nicholson
those offered by U.S. and Afghan
78
officials.
Still, no U.S. official has publicly assessed that the insurgency, by itself, poses a threat to overturn
the Afghan governing structure. And, the killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour by a U.S.
strike in May 2016 demonstrates Taliban vulnerabilities to U.S. intelligence and combat
capabilities, although it has not to date had a measurable effect on Taliban effectiveness.
Alterations to the 2016-2017 Drawdown Schedule and Rules of Engagement
Concerns about insurgent gains have led to several alterations to the U.S. mission in
recent years under both the Obama and Trump Administrations.
On March 24, 2015, in concert with the visit to Washington, DC, of Ghani and
Abdullah, the President announced that U.S. forces would remain at a level of
about 9,800 for all of 2015, rather than reduce to 5,500 by the end of the year, as
originally announced.
In January 2016, U.S. commanders in Afghanistan were authorized to attack
ISKP forces by affiliation, as noted above.
In June 2016, the President authorized U.S. forces to conduct preemptive combat.
According to Secretary of Defense Carter on July 12, 2016, U.S. forces can now
“anticipate battlefield dynamics and ... deploy and employ their forces together
75 Taimoor Shah and Rod Norland, “Taliban Take an Afghan District, Sangin, That Many Marines Died to Keep,” New
York Times, March 23, 2017.
76 Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson in the Pentagon Briefing Room, December 2, 2016.
77 Phil Steward and Idrees Ali, “Russia may be helping supply Taliban insurgents: U.S. general,” Reuters, March 23,
2017.
78 Najib Sharifi, “Russia’s new game in Afghanistan,” Al Jazeera, February 26, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
28
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
[with the ANDSF] in a way that stops a situation from deteriorating; interrupts an
enemy in the early stages of planning and formulating an attack.” Some have also
interpreted this authority as additional latitude to use more airstrikes.
On July 6, 2016, President Obama again adjusted planned U.S. force levels,
stating that U.S. force levels would drop to 8,400 at the end of 2016—and not
drop to the 5,500 that was previously announced. The announcement took into
account General Nicholson’s initial assessment, which he reportedly submitted to
his superiors in June 2016. The announcement differed from Section 1215 of the
House-passed FY2017 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4909) that expressed the
sense of Congress to keep U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan at 9,800 after 2016.
The communique of the NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland (July 8-9, 2016),
announced that other NATO countries would continue to support RSM beyond
2016, both with force contributions and donations to the ANDSF (the latter until
2020). No numbers were specified in the declaration, but the announcement
appeared to imply that other countries would continue to contribute a total of
about 6,000 forces to RSM and about $1.25 billion per year to the ANDSF.
Developments During the Trump Administration
At a February 2017 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, General Nicholson indicated that
the United States has a “shortfall of a few thousand” troops that, if fulfilled, could help break the
“stalemate.” He further clarified that while the number of Special Operations forces is sufficient
to conduct operations, more troops are needed for advising and training Afghan forces,
particularly at lower levels in the chain of command.79 Initial reports indicated that the Trump
Administration was likely to approve Nicholson’s request, in whole or in part, while perhaps also
indicating that more U.S. forces will not, in and of themselves, resolve the Afghanistan conflict.
However, an NSC-led review of U.S. strategy that included plans for more troops was reportedly
held up due to disagreements within the administration over the path forward in Afghanistan. 80
Some expressed skepticism that a few thousand more troops could meaningfully impact dynamics
on the ground, pointing to previous ‘surges’ that did not do so, and raised concerns about an openended U.S. commitment in a country where U.S. troops have already been deployed for nearly
two decades. Others countered that the relative cost of the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan is a
worthy investment when viewed against the cost of a terrorist attack U.S. forces’ absence could
allow, comparing it to “term-life insurance.”81
The Pentagon long reported the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan at the authorized level of
8,400, but in August 2017 it was reported that the actual figure, due to units rotating in and out of
theater, is actually between 11,000 and 12,000 on any given day.82 Secretary Mattis seemed to
confirm this discrepancy when he stated a need that same month to “account for everyone that is
on the ground there now” before approving new troops;83 the level was officially confirmed by
79 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. General Seeks ‘a Few Thousand’ More Troops in Afghanistan,” New York Times,
February 9, 2017.
80 Susan Glasser, “The Trump White House’s War Within,” Politico, July 24, 2017.
81 Asawin Suebsaeng and Spencer Ackerman, “$700 Billion and 16 Years at War Is a ‘Modest Amount,’ U.S. Officers
Say,” Daily Beast, July 24, 2017.
82 Gordon Lubold and Nancy Youssef, “U.S. Has More Troops in Afghanistan Than Publicly Disclosed,” Wall Street
Journal, August 22, 2017.
83 Tara Copp, “Mattis: DOD to account for actual number of forces in Afghanistan before asking for more,” Military
Times, August 22, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
29
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
the Pentagon in August 2017. President Trump delegated the authority to set force levels,
reportedly limited to around 3,900 additional troops, in June 2017.84 As of November 2017, those
additional forces (all of which are dedicated to RSM) have arrived in Afghanistan, putting the
total number of troops in the country at around 15,000.85 NATO also announced plans that month
to increase its own forces in Afghanistan by around 3,000, bringing the RSM level to about
16,000.86
In a national address on August 21, 2017, President Trump announced a “new strategy” for
Afghanistan and South Asia that includes several pillars: abandoning timetables in favor of a
conditions-based approach; integrating diplomatic and economic assets into the military effort;
and a revised regional approach that features a more aggressive stance toward Pakistan and
further development of a strategic partnership with India. Some of these elements appear similar
to facets of the Obama Administration’s approach. Despite widespread expectations that he would
describe specific elements of his new strategy, particularly the prospects for additional troops,
President Trump declared “we will not talk about numbers of troops or our plans for further
military activities.”87 Some have criticized the strategy as “short on details” and argue that its
focus on diplomatic engagement is contradicted by the deep cuts the administration has proposed
to the State Department.88 Others welcomed the decision, contrasting it favorably with proposed
alternatives such as a full withdrawal of U.S. forces (which President Trump conceded was his
“original instinct”) or heavy reliance on contractors.89
Beyond additional troops, the strategy also features broader authority for U.S. forces to operate
independently of Afghan forces and “attack the enemy across the breadth and depth of the battle
space,” expanding the list of targets to include those related to “revenue streams, support
infrastructure, training bases, infiltration lanes.”90 This was demonstrated in a series of strikes
against Taliban drug labs in Helmand province in late 2017. Those strikes, highlighted by U.S.
and Afghan officials, have sought to combat what is widely viewed as one of the Taliban’s most
important sources of revenue, namely the cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotics.
Operations have been carried out by U.S. B-52 and F-22 combat aircraft (the first use of the latter
in combat in Afghanistan) alongside Afghan A-29s. General John Nicholson, the U.S. commander
in Afghanistan, has cited both new troops and expanded authorities in saying that, with the new
strategy, “we’ve set all the conditions to win.”91
84 Jim Garamone, “President Gives Mattis Authority to Set U.S. Troop Strength in Afghanistan,” Department of
Defense, June 14, 2017.
85 Dan Lamothe, “Trump added troops in Afghanistan. But NATO is still short of meeting its goal,” Washington Post,
November 9, 2017.
86 Robin Emmott, “NATO to send more troops to Afghanistan after U.S. shift,” Reuters, November 7, 2017.
87 For more on the debate around the merits of revealing troop levels, see Jon Donnelly, “Analysis: Why Won’t Trump
Discuss Troop Numbers?” CQ News, August 23, 2017.
88 Rebecca Kheel, “Dems: Trump ‘has no strategy” for Afghanistan,” The Hill, August 21, 2017.
89 Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Sending more troops to Afghanistan is a good start,” Long War Journal, August
21, 2017; Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, “‘It’s a hard problem’: Inside Trump’s decision to send more troops to
Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August 21, 2017.
90 Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson via teleconference from Kabul, Afghanistan, November
20, 2017.
91 Hans Nichols and Jonathan Allen, “‘Still in a stalemate,’ top U.S. commander in Afghanistan says,” NBC News,
November 24, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
30
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)
The post-2014 U.S. military presence is based on a Bilateral Security Accord (BSA), which
includes the U.S. demand for legal immunities for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The immunity was
authorized by a special loya jirga in November 2013.92 On September 30, 2014, almost
immediately after Ghani took office, the BSA—as well as a similar document providing for the
presence of NATO forces—was signed between then U.S. Ambassador Cunningham and National
Security Advisor Mohammad Hanif Atmar. Afghanistan’s parliament ratified the BSA in late
November 2014, and it was considered by the Administration as an executive agreement and was
not submitted for U.S. Senate ratification. During the March 2015 visit of Ghani and Abdullah,
the Administration announced that the U.S and Afghan governments agreed to form the bilateral
Joint Commission stipulated by the BSA to oversee its implementation.
Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)
The BSA followed a broader “Strategic Partnership Agreement” (SPA) signed by President
Obama and President Karzai in Afghanistan on May 1, 2012. The SPA, which terminates at the
end of 2024, signaled an extended U.S. commitment to Afghan stability. It was signed after a long
negotiation that focused on resolving Afghan insistence on control over detention centers and a
halt to or control over nighttime raids on insurgents by U.S. forces.
Major SPA provisions include93
A commitment to continue to foster U.S.-Afghan “close cooperation” to secure
Afghanistan. This strongly implied, but did not state outright, that U.S. troops
would remain in Afghanistan after 2014, but no U.S. troop number was specified.
A U.S. commitment to request appropriations to provide training and arms to the
Afghan security forces. No dollar amounts or weapons systems were specified.
U.S. designation of Afghanistan as a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” a designation
reserved for close U.S. allies. In keeping with that pledge, on July 7, 2012, thenSecretary Clinton announced that designation, opening Afghanistan to extensive
defense research cooperation with the United States and facilitating U.S. training
and leasing of defense articles to Afghanistan.
A U.S. pledge not to establish “permanent” U.S. bases or use Afghan facilities
against neighboring countries. The agreement allows long-term U.S. use of
Afghan facilities. Successive National Defense Authorizations have contained
provisions prohibiting the establishment of permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan.
A U.S. commitment to request economic aid for Afghanistan for the duration of
the agreement (2014-2024). No dollar amounts were specified.
A commitment to form a U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Commission to monitor
implementation of the SPA. Secretary of State Kerry’s visit to Kabul on April 9,
2016, was partly to reconvene the commission after a three-year hiatus.
92 Anne Gearan, “U.S., Afghanistan Reach Post-2014 Security Accord,” Washington Post, October 13, 2013.
93 “Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan,” Available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/244487.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
31
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
The final SPA was ratified by the Afghanistan National Assembly on May 26, 2012, by a vote of
180-4 after previous approval by a loya jirga called by Karzai.94
Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law
Key to the security of Afghanistan is the effectiveness of the ANDSF, which consists primarily of
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Among the major concerns
raised in DOD and other reports are (1) absenteeism and the fact that about 35% of the force does
not reenlist each year, and the rapid recruitment might dilute the force’s quality;95 (2) widespread
illiteracy within it, which prompted an increasing focus on providing literacy training (as of
2010); (3) casualty rates that U.S. commanders call “unsustainable,” including over 6,700 combat
deaths in 2016 (up from 5,500 the previous year), (4) inconsistent leadership that sometimes
causes Afghan commanders to overestimate insurgent strength or to panic at the first sign of
insurgent assault; and (5) a deficit of logistical capabilities, such as airlift, medical evacuation,
resupply, and other associated functions. Many units also still suffer from a shortfall in weaponry,
spare parts, and fuel. Some key metrics related to ANDSF performance, such as casualties,
attrition rates, and personnel strength, were newly classified by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) in the October 2017 SIGAR quarterly report; SIGAR previously published those and
related metrics as part of its quarterly reports.96 The training component of RSM supersedes the
prior training institutions such as the “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan”
(CSTC-A) and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). In 2012, CSTC-A’s mission
was reoriented to building the capacity of the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministries and to
provide financial resources to the ANDSF. CSTC-A pays the salaries of the ANA and provides
financial and advisory input to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA),
discussed below, that pays the Afghan police.
94 The SPA replaced an earlier, more limited strategic partnership agreement established on May 23, 2005, when Karzai
and President Bush issued a “joint declaration.” The declaration provided for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan
military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent
extremism.” Karzai’s signing of the declaration was supported by a consultative jirga in Kabul in May 2005. The jirga
supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision to
request such a presence.
95 An October 2017 SIGAR report revealed that nearly half of all foreign military trainees that went absent without
leave (AWOL) while in U.S.-based training (152 of 320). Those 152 AWOL Afghan trainees make up around 6% of
the 2,537 Afghans who came to the U.S. for training between 2005 and 2017, compared with just .07% of trainees from
other countries. SIGAR-18-03-SP, “U.S.-Based Training for Afghanistan Security Personnel: Trainees Who Go Absent
Without Leave Hurt Readiness and Morale, And May Create Security Risks,” October 17, 2017.
96 Shawn Snow, “Report: US officials classify crucial metrics on Afghan casualties, readiness,” Military Times,
October 30, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
32
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Table 4. Summary of U.S. Strategy and Implementation
Stated and Implied Goals: To prevent Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from using Afghanistan to plan attacks on
the United States, and to prevent the Taliban insurgency from overthrowing the Afghan government.
U.S. Strategy Implementation: U.S. forces train, advise, and assist the ANDSF to secure Afghanistan and to conduct
counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province. Combat is also authorized
to counter imminent Taliban and other insurgent threats to U.S. forces and to Afghan forces and the Afghan
government.
Drawdown and Provision of U.S. Enablers: Following the 2009 “surge,” U.S. force levels reached a high of 100,000 in
mid-2011, then fell to 68,000 (“surge recovery) by September 20, 2012, and to 34,000 by February 2014. Current
U.S. force level is about 9,800 plus about 6,400 forces from NATO partners in the “Resolute Support Mission.”
The U.S. force remained at 9,800 during 2015-16 and declined to 8,400 (the current authorized level) at the end of
2016. It was reportedly in August 2017 that the actual number of U.S. troops serving in Afghanistan averages
between 11,000 and 12,000 at any given time, a product of units overlapping as they transition in and out of the
country.97 No subsequent drawdowns have been stipulated by the Trump Administration, which authorized
Secretary of Defense James Mattis in June 2017 to send around 4,000 additional troops to the country.
Long-Term Broad Engagement: The SPA (see above) pledges U.S. security and economic assistance to Afghanistan
until 2024. U.S. economic and Afghan force train and equip funding pledged by U.S. to remain roughly at current
levels through at least FY2017.
Political Settlement/Pakistan Cooperation: U.S. policy is to support a political settlement between the Afghan
government and the Taliban. As part of that effort, U.S. officials attempt to enlist Pakistan’s commitment to deny
safe haven in Pakistan to Afghan militants and to promote talks between the Afghan government and Taliban
representatives.
Economic Development: U.S. policy supports Afghan efforts to build an economy that can be self-sufficient by 2024
by further developing agriculture, collecting corporate taxes and customs duties, exploiting vast mineral deposits,
expanding small industries, and integrating Afghanistan into regional diplomatic and trading and investment
structures.
Size and Other Features of the ANDSF
On January 21, 2010, a joint U.N.-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB)
decided that the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000, (total ANDSF of
305,600) before the end of 2011. In August 2011, a larger target size of 358,000 (196,000 ANA
and 162,000 ANP) was set, to be reached by November 2012. The size of the forces—which do
not include the approximately 30,000 local security forces discussed below—is about 330,000,
roughly 8% below target levels. Both higher and lower ANDSF target sizes (378,000 and
228,000) were discussed within NATO but not adopted over various concerns.
Ethnic Composition of the ANDSF. After the 2001 ousting of the Taliban regime, Northern
Alliance (see above) figures took key security positions and weighted recruitment toward ethnic
Tajiks. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment, but the naming of a Pashtun as Defense
Minister in December 2004 mitigated that difficulty. The problem was further alleviated with
better pay and other reforms, and the force composition is now roughly in line with that of the
Afghan population. Tajiks are still slightly overrepresented in the command ranks. Some of the
difficulties in forming a new cabinet after the NUG was formed in September 2014 concerned
maintaining ethnic balance in the leadership of security institutions.
Literacy Issues. Regarding literacy, the U.S. goal was to have all ANDSF have at least first-grade
literacy, and half to have third-grade literacy, by the end of 2014. It is unclear whether those goals
were met, though literacy in the ANDSF has been improved by the program, by some accounts.
However, a SIGAR audit from January 2014 cautioned that the goals were “unrealistic” and
97 Courtney Kube, “U.S. Has Thousands More Troops in Afghanistan Than the Pentagon Admits,” NBC News, August
23, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
33
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
“unattainable” given authorized force levels, and warned that efforts to measure the effectiveness
of ANDSF literacy programs were limited.98
ANDSF Funding
It costs an estimated $5 billion per year to fund the ANDSF. The Administration contributed $4.1
billion for the ANDSF for FY2015 and $3.65 billion for FY2016 (Consolidated Appropriation for
FY2016, P.L. 114-113)—slightly lower than the $3.75 billion requested by the Administration.
For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested about $3.45 billion for the ANDSF. At the
NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016, U.S. partners pledged $1 billion annually for the ANDSF
during 2017-2020.99 Afghanistan is assessed by U.S. officials as contributing its pledged funds—
$500 million (as calculated in Afghan currency)—despite budgetary difficulties. U.S. funding is
authorized yearly in the National Defense Authorization. The FY2017 NDAA (S. 2943P.L. 114328) extended authority to provide Afghan Security Forces Funding (ASFF) for the ANDSF, and
both bills set as a goal the use of $25 million to increase the recruitment of women to the ANDSF.
NATO Trust Fund for the ANA and Law and Order Trust Fund for the ANP
Some of the donations for the ANDSF are channeled through Trust Funds. In 2007, ISAF set up a
Trust Fund for the ANA, used to fund the transportation of donated military equipment and
training of the ANA. The fund’s mandate was expanded in 2009 to include sustainment costs and
in 2010 to support literacy training for the ANA. Since inception, 26 donor nations have given the
ANA Trust Fund over $1.5 billion, according to the DOD report on Afghanistan issued in June
2016.
There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan” (LOTFA), run by the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP). It pays salaries of the ANP as well as food costs. Since 2002,
donors have contributed $4.96 billion to the Fund, of which the United States contributed about
$1.7 billion. Japan contributes about $250 million per year and South Korea contributes about
$100 million per year. The fund is in the process of transition from management by UNDP to the
Afghan government.
Other Bilateral Donations. Other bilateral donations to the ANDSF, both in funds and in arms
and equipment donations, include the “NATO Equipment Donation Program” through which
donor countries supply the ANDSF with equipment. Since 2002, over $3 billion in assistance to
the ANDSF has come from these sources. There is also a NATO-Russia Council Helicopter
Maintenance Trust Fund. Launched in March 2011, this fund provides maintenance and repair
capacity to the Afghan Air Force helicopter fleet, much of which is Russian-made.
The Afghan National Army (ANA)
The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct
continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That army
disintegrated entirely during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban
period. The ANA is reportedly highly regarded by Afghans as a symbol of nationhood and
factional nonalignment.
98 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported
Successes, Concerns Remain about Literacy Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment,”
SIGAR 14-30 Audit Report, January 2014.
99 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Afghanistan. September 15, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
34
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Of its authorized size of 195,000, the ANA (all components) has about 170,000 personnel. Its
special operations component, trained by U.S. Special Operations Forces, numbers nearly 21,000,
and U.S. commanders say it might be one of the most proficient special forces in the region.100
Afghan special forces are utilized extensively to reverse Taliban gains, and their efforts reportedly
make up 70 to 80 percent of the fighting.101
The problem of absenteeism within the ANA is in large part because soldiers do not serve in their
provinces of residence. Many in the ANA take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to
their families. However, absenteeism has eased somewhat in recent years because almost all of
the ANA is now paid electronically.
The United States and other donors have given the ANA primarily light weapons rather than large
numbers of heavy arms such as tanks. The ANA operates a few hundred Russian-built T-55 and T62 tanks left over from the Soviet occupation. The United States is also helping the ANDSF build
up an indigenous weapons production capability. However, in line with U.S. efforts to cut costs
for the ANDSF, the Defense Department shifted in 2013 from providing new equipment to
maintaining existing equipment.
Afghan Air Force (AAF)
Afghanistan’s Air Force is emerging as a key component of the ANDSF’s efforts to combat the
insurgency. It has been mostly a support force but, since 2014, has progressively increased its
bombing operations in support of coalition ground forces, mainly using the Brazil-made A-29
Super Tucano discussed below. The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed
prior to the Soviet invasion, and its equipment was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S.
combat against the Taliban regime. It has about 8,400 personnel, matching its target size. Since
FY2010, the United States has obligated over $3.2 billion for the AAF, including nearly $1 billion
for equipment and aircraft. Still, equipment, maintenance, logistical difficulties, and defections
continue to plague the Afghan Air Force.
The Afghan Air Force has about 104 aircraft including four C-130 transport planes and 46 Mi-17
(Russian-made) helicopters. The target size of its fleet is 140 total aircraft. Defense Department
purchases for the AAF of 56 Mi-17s has been mostly implemented to date. The AAF also has
taken delivery of the first eight out of 20 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft that it has purchased. Other
platforms available to the AAF include the MD-530 helicopter, and 3 Cheetah helicopters donated
by India. The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 114-113) prohibits U.S. funding of any
additional C-130s (acquisition of four more is planned by the AAF) until DOD provides a report
on Afghanistan’s airlift requirements, a provision maintained in Sec. 9020 of the FY2017
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-31). U.S. plans do not include supply of fixed-wing
combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan wants to acquire eventually, according to U.S.
officials.
Afghanistan also is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to
safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. In 2010, Russia and
Germany supplied MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Air Force.
100 Author conversations with U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, visiting Washington DC, September 2016.
101 Helene Cooper, “Afghan Forces Are Praised, Despite Still Relying Heavily on U.S. Help,” New York Times, August
20, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
35
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Afghan National Police (ANP)
U.S. and Afghan officials believe that a credible and capable national police force is critical to
combating the insurgency. DOD reports on Afghanistan assess that there have been “significant
strides [that] have been made in professionalizing the ANP.” However, many outside assessments
of the ANP are negative, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens
mistrust and fear the ANP. DOD reports acknowledge that the force has a far higher desertion rate
(about 2% a month) than does the ANA; substantial illiteracy; and involvement in local factional
or ethnic disputes because the ANP works in the communities its personnel come from.
The target size of the ANP, including all forces under the ANP umbrella (except the Afghan Local
Police), is 162,000 personnel. The force has about 154,000 personnel. About 3,110 ANP are
women, and in January 2014—for the first time—a woman was appointed as a district police
commander.
The ANP is increasingly being provided with heavy weapons and now have about 5,000 armored
vehicles countrywide. Still, most police units lack adequate ammunition and vehicles. In some
cases, equipment requisitioned by their commanders was sold and the funds pocketed by the
police officers.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), but DOD took over the lead role in April 2005. Police
training has been highlighted by SIGAR and others as a potentially problematic area where
greater interagency cooperation is needed.102
Supplements to the National Police: Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Others
In 2008, the failure of several police training efforts led to a decision to develop local forces to
protect their communities, despite long-standing hesitance to recreate militias prone to
committing abuses and arbitrary execution of justice. To try to mitigate that risk, the United States
and Afghanistan placed the newly empowered local forces firmly under Afghan Ministry of
Interior control. Among these forces (which are in addition to the ANP forces) are the following:
Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP concept grew out of earlier programs. In
2008, the “Afghan Provincial Protection Program,” funded with DOD (CERP)
monies, was implemented in a district of Wardak Province in 2009 with 100
recruits, and was eventually expanded to 1,200 personnel. U.S. commanders said
that weapons were supplied to the militias by the Afghan government, using U.S.
funds. Participants were given $200 per month in salary. In February 2010, a
similar effort called Village Stability Operations (VSO) began in Qandahar
Province when U.S. Special Operations Forces organized about 25 villagers into
a local armed watch group. The program was expanded in 2012 into the ALP
program in which the U.S. Special Operations Forces set up and trained local
security organs of about 300 members each, under the control of district police
chiefs. Each fighter is vetted by local elders as well as Afghan intelligence. The
current number of ALP members (known as “guardians”) is around 29,000, close
to the Defense Department’s target of 30,000. The ALP have the authority to
detain criminals or insurgents temporarily, and transfer them to the ANP or ANA,
but the ALP have been cited by Human Rights Watch and other human rights
102 Alex Horton, “Some U.S. troops watch ‘Cops’ to train Afghan police. That’s a problem, watchdog says,”
Washington Post, September 21, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
36
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
groups, as well as by DOD investigations, for killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions,
land grabs, and sexual abuse of young boys.103 Others characterize ALP forces as
unaccountable militias serving the interests of local strongmen, criticizing the
ALP as incompatible with the goal of creating nationalized defense and security
forces.104 The ALP are completely funded by the United States (ASFF funds
disbursed by CSTC-A) at around $90 million a year.
Afghan Public Protection Force. This force, operating as a state-owned enterprise
under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, guards sites and convoys. It was
formed to implement Karzai’s August 17, 2010, decree (No. 62) that private
security contractor forces be disbanded and their functions performed by official
Afghan government forces by March 20, 2012. The unit, which bills customers
for contracted work, numbers about 22,000, but there is no formal target size.
The local security forces above resemble but are not traditional local security structures called
arbaki, which are private tribal militias with no connection to national institutions. Some believe
that the arbaki concept should be revived as a means of securing Afghanistan, as they did during
and prior to the reign of Zahir Shah.105 The programs discussed above somewhat reverse earlier
efforts to disarm local sources of armed force.106
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector
Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the
criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been
discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule
of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court
construction. The FY2016 consolidated appropriation (P.L. 114-113) requires that at least $50
million in Economic Support Funds or International Narcotics and Law Enforcement funding be
used for rule of law programs in Afghanistan in FY2016; the FY2017 measure makes $7 million
available for such programs to a number of countries including Afghanistan. The rule of law issue
is covered in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance, by (name redacted) , and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and
Justice Sector Assistance, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) .
103 Ernesto Londono, “U.S. Cites Local Afghan Police Abuses,” Washington Post, December 16, 2011.
104 Mujib Mashal, “Afghan Plan to Expand Militia Raises Abuse Concerns,” New York Times, October 16, 2015.
105 See, for example, Ali Seraj, “The Arbaki can secure Afghanistan better than the US,” Al Jazeera, November 5,
2014.
106 The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the “DDR” program—Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration—and it formally concluded on June 30, 2006. The major donor for the program was Japan, which
contributed about $140 million. The DDR program was initially expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters. Of those
demobilized, 55,800 former fighters exercised reintegration options provided by the program: starting small businesses,
farming, and other options. Some studies criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of
rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen. For an analysis of the
DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June 6, 2005,
http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
RL30588 · VERSION 278 · UPDATED
37
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Reintegration and Potential Reconciliation with Insurgents
For years, the U.S., the Afghan government, and various neighboring states have engaged in
efforts to bring about a political settlement with insurgents that could involve Taliban figures’
obtaining ministerial posts, seats in parliament, or control over territory.
On September 5, 2010, an “Afghan High Peace Council” (HPC) was formed to oversee the
settlement and reintegration process. Then-President Karzai appointed former President/Northern
Alliance political leader Burhanuddin Rabbani to head it, largely to gain Northern Alliance
support for negotiations with the Taliban. On September 20, 2011, Rabbani was assassinated and
his son, Salahuddin Rabbani, was named by the HPC to succeed him in April 2012. Rabbani is
currently Foreign Minister in the NUG cabinet; his successor as HPC head, Ahmad Gaylani (a
Pashtun former mujahedin party leader mentioned earlier), died of natural causes in January
2017.
In 2011, U.S. diplomats held their first meetings with Taliban officials, and subsequent U.S.Taliban meetings discussed proposals for the United States to transfer five senior Taliban captives
from the Guantanamo detention facility to a form of house arrest in Qatar; and the Taliban would
release the one U.S. prisoner of war it held, Bowe Bergdahl. The talks broke off in March 2012
but were resurrected in 2013, and, in June 2013, the Taliban opened a representative office i
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.