China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei

Congressional research reportJan 5, 2015

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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China”

Policy—Key Statements from Washington,

Beijing, and Taipei

(name redacted)

Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

January 5, 2015

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

RL30341

China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy

Summary

Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains

somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what

the policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions

and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy.

This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, analyzes the “one China” policy since

U.S. Presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China

(PRC). Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China (ROC) and does not recognize the PRC. There

are three sets of issues: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan;

and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has

maintained non-diplomatic engagement with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The

State Department claims an “unofficial” relationship with Taiwan. The United States did not

explicitly state Taiwan’s status in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982.

The United States “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have articulated a “one China” policy

in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements

and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing’s “one China” principle—on questions of

sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a

sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. With added conditions,

U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a

“peaceful resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and without unilateral changes. In short,

U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. policy in the absence of a

diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of

Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among

the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” to

the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States; “to

provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacity of the United

States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social

or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining

security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

President Reagan also offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei in 1982, partly to continue arms sales.

Policy makers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context

of the policy has changed dramatically since the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, U.S. interests in

the military balance as well as Taiwan’s security and democracy have been challenged by the

PRC’s military buildup (particularly in missiles) and potential coercion, moves perceived by

Beijing for Taiwan’s de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP’s)

president (2000-2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to investing in

self-defense. After the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, Taipei and Beijing

reduced tension and resumed talks—beyond seeking detente. With President Obama since 2009, a

rhetorical convergence emerged about “peaceful development” of cross-strait ties. However,

disagreements remain about the PRC’s goal of political talks for unification, Taiwan’s status,

Taiwan’s self-defense, and U.S. arms sales and other cooperation with Taiwan. On September 23,

2014, 29 Members of the House sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for a new

Taiwan Policy Review (after 20 years) to examine expanded engagement with Taiwan.

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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy

Contents

Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China” ................................................................................................. 1

Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 1

Congressional Concerns ............................................................................................................ 2

Key Statements and Ambiguity ................................................................................................. 6

Has U.S. Policy Changed?......................................................................................................... 8

Overview of Issues .................................................................................................................. 30

Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei ................................... 32

Statements During the Nixon Administration.......................................................................... 32

Statements During the Ford Administration ............................................................................ 35

Statements During the Carter Administration.......................................................................... 35

Statements During the Reagan Administration........................................................................ 39

Statements During the George H. W. Bush Administration .................................................... 46

Statements During the Clinton Administration........................................................................ 48

Statements During the George W. Bush Administration ......................................................... 66

Statements During the Obama Administration ........................................................................ 79

Tables

Table 1. Visits by Cabinet-Rank Officials to Taiwan After 1979..................................................... 5

Table 2. Summary of Cross-Strait Agreements (2008-2014) ......................................................... 82

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 83

Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 83

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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy

Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China”

Historical Background

Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC

set up in 1912 after the revolution that started on October 10, 1911, in China to overthrow the

Qing Dynasty. The ROC uses October 10 to commemorate the national day, celebrated as

“Double Ten.” The ROC does not recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) founded in

Beijing by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949. The PRC claims that the ROC ceased to

exist in 1949 and that Taiwan is a province of “one China.” (The Qing Empire had incorporated

Taiwan as a full province in 1885-1895, when more settlers moved from China to the island.) The

PRC and ROC do not recognize each other or two Chinas. The ROC refers to the other side of the

strait as the “mainland.” The PRC opposes recognition of the ROC and seeks unification of

Taiwan with the mainland as a part of “one China,” without renouncing the use of force. In any

case, since 1949, the ROC has governed only on Taiwan, and the PRC has ruled mainland China.

Previously called Formosa, Taiwan never has been ruled by the CPC or as a part of the PRC, and

until 1945, had never been ruled by the ROC. In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, or

“Retrocession Day,” marked the ROC’s claim of “recovering” Formosa from Japan. However,

upon Japan’s surrender, that was the first time that the ROC’s military forces had occupied the

island of Formosa. When the Qing Empire ceded in perpetuity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty

of Shimonoseki of 1895, the ROC was not yet in existence. Moreover, the colony’s people did not

have a say in self-determination of their status or identity. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist

Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at Japan’s surrender in August

1945, with no country challenging the island’s status. The ROC under KMT forces led by Chiang

Kai-shek retreated to Taipei in 1949, when the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong took over

mainland China. Taiwan’s people have faced social, ethnic, linguistic, and political issues of

whether to identify with Taiwan or China, with two major groups of local “Taiwanese” and

“Mainlanders” (people who retreated to Taiwan with the KMT forces and their descendants).

One of the first major powers to support reforms and the new republic of progressive leaders in

early 20th century China, the United States recognized the ROC from 1913 until the end of 1978.1

The United States then shifted to recognize the PRC, with its capital in Beijing, under the U.S.

“one China” policy. By the early 1970s, the United States had looked to switch the diplomatic

recognition to the PRC, while figuring out a framework to sustain engagement with Taiwan.

Since 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed policy toward Taiwan.

Paying particular attention to congressional influence on policy, Part I of this CRS Report

discusses the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan since the United States (under President

Nixon) began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

government in Beijing, which has insisted on its “one China” principle. Part II comprehensively

reviews the evolution of policies as affected by legislation and articulated in key statements by

Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. On an overview of U.S. policy on Taiwan, see CRS Report

R41952, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues. On U.S. security assistance to

Taiwan, see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.

Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (W. W. Norton & Company, 1990); President Woodrow Wilson’s

telegram, dated May 2, 1913, to ROC President Yuan Shih-Kai (TECRO’s display, Twin Oaks, October 8, 2014).

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Congressional Concerns

Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. military

intervention), U.S.-Taiwan engagement, and U.S.-PRC contacts. In the 1990s, some Members in

Congress pushed for changes in policy toward Taiwan. Questions about the “one China” policy

arose again after Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui characterized cross-strait relations as “special

state-to-state ties” on July 9, 1999. Beijing responded vehemently with calls for Lee to retract the

perceived deviation from the “one China” position and reiterated long-standing threats to use

force if necessary to prevent a declaration of independence by Taiwan. The PRC also opposed

U.S. military intervention. The Clinton Administration responded that Lee’s statement was not

helpful and reaffirmed the “one China” policy.2 Some questioned whether the TRA requires U.S.

defense of Taiwan against an attack from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military.

Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, at a July 21, 1999, hearing,

said that Lee “created an opportunity to break free from the anachronistic, Beijing-inspired oneChina policy which has imprisoned U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan for years.”

Representative Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the International Relations Committee, wrote in a

September 7, 1999, letter to Clinton that it is a “common misperception” that we conceded

officially that Beijing is the capital of the “one China” that includes Taiwan. He wrote, “under no

circumstances should the United States move toward Beijing’s version of ‘one China.’”3

Since 2001, some congressional leaders have stressed continuity in maintaining the “one China”

policy. During the George W. Bush Administration, leaders of the House and Senate stressed

support for Taiwan as a democracy, rather than its independent status. Moreover, Members voiced

concerns about cross-strait tension arising from actions taken by both Beijing and Taipei.

Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote in May 2001 that

“for many years, successive U.S. administrations have affirmed that there is one China and that

the people on Taiwan and the people of China should work out a plan for peaceful unification.”

He also referred to a debate on the nature of the U.S. obligation to “defend democracy in Taiwan”

and to prevent a “forceful military unification of Taiwan and China.”4 Representative Henry

Hyde, chairman of the International Relations Committee, spoke in Beijing in December 2002

and dismissed notions that U.S. support for Taiwan was geared toward containing or dividing

China. He said that “the bedrock of the very strong support for Taiwan in the U.S. Congress” is

the shared experience as democracies. Moreover, Hyde highlighted Taiwan’s significance as a

model of a “Chinese democracy” that proved democracy is compatible with Chinese culture.5

U.S. views were shaped by developments in Taiwan and concern about cross-strait tension. On

August 3, 2002, President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gave a

speech using the phrase “one country on each side” of the strait, surprising Washington even

before the first anniversary of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Leading up to the

presidential election on March 20, 2004, Chen advocated holding the first referendums (on the

Department of State, Press Briefing by James Rubin, July 15, 1999; Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s remarks

on visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, July 20, 1999.

Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, hearing chaired by Senator Craig Thomas

on “Chinese-Taiwanese Relations,” July 21, 1999; Mary Dalrymple, “Taiwanese President’s Comment Inspires GOP to

Renew Attack on Clinton’s ‘One China’ Policy,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, July 24, 1999; and Letter from

Representative Benjamin Gilman to President Clinton, September 7, 1999.

Richard Lugar, “Timely Exit for Ambiguity,” Washington Times, May 17, 2001.

Henry Hyde, “Remarks at Tsinghua University,” Beijing, December 10, 2002.

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same day as the election) and drafting a new constitution with a timetable. Though symbolic

steps, Beijing reacted with alarm and warnings.

On the eve of his visit to Washington, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao warned on November 22, 2003,

that China would “pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland.”6 On November 29,

President Chen surprisingly announced that he would use one provision in the referendum law

passed by the opposition-dominated legislature two days earlier and hold a referendum on

China’s threats on the day of the presidential election. During his meeting with Premier Wen in

the Oval Office on December 9, 2003, President Bush stated that he opposed Chen’s efforts to

change the status quo, drawing criticisms that Bush sided with Beijing’s belligerence. The Taiwan

Caucus in the House wrote a letter to President Bush, criticizing his stance as a victory for the

authoritarian regime of the PRC at the expense of Taiwan’s democratic reforms.7

On the TRA’s 25th anniversary, the House International Relations Committee held a hearing on

April 21, 2004. After congratulating President Chen Shui-bian on his re-election in March 2004,

the Administration further clarified U.S. policy toward Taiwan and warned of “limitations” in

U.S. support for constitutional changes in Taiwan. At that hearing on the TRA, Representative

James Leach, chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the

Pacific, stated that Taiwan has the unique situation in which it can have de facto selfdetermination only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty. He urged

Taiwan’s people to recognize that they have greater security in “political ambiguity.” He called

for continuity, saying that “together with our historic ‘one China’ policy,” the TRA has

contributed to ensuring peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.8 In his second inaugural address

on May 20, Chen responded to U.S. concerns, excluding sovereignty issues and a referendum

from his plan for a new constitution by 2008. Leach represented the United States at Chen’s

inauguration. At a subcommittee hearing on June 2, 2004, Leach praised Chen’s address as

“thoughtful, statesmanlike, and helpful” as well as “constructive” for dialogue with Beijing.9

Later, to mark the 25th anniversary of the TRA on April 10, 2004, the House voted on July 15,

2004, to pass H.Con.Res. 462 (Hyde) to reaffirm “unwavering commitment” to the TRA.10

Some in Congress also had concerns about challenges to U.S. interests in reducing tensions and

fostering dialogue across the strait. In March 2005, China adopted an “Anti-Secession Law.” On

March 16, the House passed (424-4) H.Con.Res. 98 (Hyde) to express grave concern about the

“Anti-Secession Law,” and the House Taiwan Caucus heard a briefing by Taipei’s Representative.

On April 6, 2005, the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held a

hearing on China’s “Anti-Secession Law.” President Chen announced on February 27, 2006, that

he will “terminate” the National Unification Council and Guidelines. Senator John Warner,

chairman of the Armed Services Committee, told Admiral William Fallon, Commander of the

Pacific Command, at a committee hearing on March 7, 2006, that “if conflict were precipitated by

just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese elected officials, I’m not

entirely sure that this nation would come full force to their rescue if they created that problem.”11

Interview with the Washington Post, published November 23, 2003.

Sherrod Brown, Steve Chabot, Dana Rohrabacher, and Robert Wexler, “Congressional Taiwan Caucus Urges

President Bush to Reconsider Position on Taiwanese Referendum,” December 11, 2003.

House International Relations Committee, hearing, “The Taiwan Relations Act: the Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.

House International Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Hearing on U.S. Policy in East Asia and

the Pacific, June 2, 2004.

The vote was 400 yeas, 18 nays, 4 present, and 11 not-voting.

Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the FY2007 Defense Department Budget, March 7, 2006.

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In July 2007, Representative Tom Lantos, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said

that it was impractical for Taiwan to seek membership in the U.N.

A convergence emerged rhetorically among the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States on crossstrait “peaceful development” after Ma Ying-jeou became president in Taiwan in May 2008 and

cross-strait tension reduced (partly due to a resumption of dialogue). As Taiwan and the PRC

became closer, U.S.-Taiwan engagement strengthened. Congressional concerns included issues

about whether and how the United States and Taiwan might strengthen political, defense, and

economic cooperation, partly to sustain U.S. interests in security, democracy, and prosperity in

Taiwan and its international space. On March 24, 2009, the House passed (by voice vote)

H.Con.Res. 55 (Berkley), and 30 Senators sent a letter to President Barack Obama to mark the

TRA’s 30th anniversary. On June 16 and October 4, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Committee,

chaired by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, held hearings on “Why Taiwan Matters.” At the

latter hearing with an official panel, Ros-Lehtinen stressed adherence to President Reagan’s Six

Assurances to Taipei. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campell

used his testimony for a rare reaffirmation of the Six Assurances, reiterating in particular the

assurance of not having any prior consultation with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The

Administration and Congress supported Taiwan’s inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).

Congress passed legislation in support of Taiwan’s participation in the International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO). The chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign

Relations Committees, Representative Ed Royce and Senator Robert Menendez, introduced bills

to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at ICAO.

Signed by President Obama, H.R. 1151 (Royce) became P.L. 113-17 on July 12, 2013.

Among other legislation for consideration, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the

House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced, on September 14, 2011, the Taiwan Policy Act

(H.R. 2918) to enhance ties with Taiwan in comprehensive ways. On August 1, 2013, the House

Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013, H.R. 419 (Ros-Lehtinen).

On March 14, 2014, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing to mark the 35th

anniversary of the enactment of the TRA. On April 3, the Senate Foreign Relations

Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held a hearing on the TRA. In response to

Senator Marco Rubio, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel

Russel did not clearly reaffirm the Six Assurances. After the hearing, Russel clarified to reporters

that the Administration remained committed to the Six Assurances as well as the TRA and three

Joint Communiques.12 On April 7, the House agreed (by voice vote) to pass H.R. 3470, which

combines H.Res. 494 (to affirm the TRA) and the Naval Vessel Transfer and Arms Export Control

Amendments Act (to authorize the transfer by sale of up to four excess U.S. Navy Perry-class

frigates to Taiwan, among other stipulations). On April 9, 52 Senators, led by Senators Menendez

and James Inhofe, sent a letter to President Obama to mark the TRA.

Broad policy issues include whether to review U.S. policy in view of significant changes since

the last Taiwan Policy Review in 1994. Some observers have said that the improved cross-strait

engagement and reduction of tension since 2008 help U.S. attention to shift to expanding

cooperation with a rising China. Others have argued that the self-imposed restrictions on the

relationship with Taiwan go beyond the TRA (which did not stipulate “unofficial” ties), the reality

of official contacts, or the U.S.-PRC joint communiques. They also have concerns that the

House Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Promise of the Taiwan Relations Act,” March 14; Senate Foreign Relations

Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Evaluating U.S. Policy on Taiwan on the 35th Anniversary of the

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),” April 3; “U.S. Offers Reassurances on Commitment to Taiwan,” CNA, April 4, 2014.

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restrictions undermine critical communication with and denigrate Taiwan, undermining U.S.

leverage and interests. An overall issue is whether to pursue further normalization of the

relationship and expand engagement with Taiwan, including in the defense, diplomatic, and

economic domains. Congress could examine the State Department’s restrictions on contacts

between Executive Branch officials and Taiwan’s officials in the “Guidelines on Relations with

Taiwan” to carry out an “unofficial” relationship. A related issue has been whether to resume and

continue visits by Cabinet-rank officials to Taiwan.

On the 20th anniversary of the Taiwan Policy Review of 1994, Representative Ed Royce,

Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led a total of 29 Members to send a letter, on

September 23, 2014, to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for expanding engagement with

Taiwan. The Members stated that “in view of the fact that there is now a fully free and democratic

Taiwan, we feel strongly that there is a need today to undertake a new and thorough Taiwan

Policy Review, laying the basis for further expanding relations with Taiwan and thereby

enhancing continued peace and stability in the region.” The State Department, on October 14,

acknowledged that, under the TRA, the United States maintains commercial, cultural, and other

ties with Taiwan’s people, dropping an insistence of the State Department that the bilateral

cooperation is “unofficial.” The Department’s letter cited the “one China” policy as based on the

three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques and the TRA but did not cite the Six Assurances. The State

Department acknowledged that it continually reviews and improves the interactions with Taiwan

but did not refer to specific ways of improving cooperation.13

Table 1. Visits by Cabinet-Rank Officials to Taiwan After 1979

1992

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Carla Hills

1994

Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena

1996

Small Business Administrator Phil Lader

1998

Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson

2000

Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater

2014

Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Gina McCarthy

Source: U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, sponsor of economic conferences; and AIT.

The Obama Administration’s strategic “rebalancing” of comprehensive diplomatic, defense, and

economic priorities to the Asia-Pacific raised issues about Taiwan’s roles and whether the strategy

considers Taiwan’s security role narrowly in the Taiwan Strait or more broadly in the region. At a

hearing in October 2011, Assistant Secretary of State Campbell testified that the United States

sought a “rebalancing” of comprehensive priorities to focus more on the Asia-Pacific region. He

stated that “a critical part of that overarching strategy is building a comprehensive, durable, and

unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan.” Campbell stressed that “the

bedrock of that relationship is our security relationship.” After not mentioning Taiwan in an

article in Foreign Policy on “America’s Pacific Century” in October 2011, Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton gave a speech on the same subject the next month in Honolulu and added that the

United States has a strong relationship with Taiwan as an “important security and economic

partner.” At a conference of defense ministers in Singapore in June 2012, Defense Secretary Leon

Panetta discussed the strategic refocus to Asia and mentioned Taiwan by saying that the United

States strongly supports the efforts of both the PRC and Taiwan to improve the cross-strait

Department of State, letter to Chairman Edward Royce, House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 14, 2014.

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relationship. He added that “we have an enduring interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan

Strait.” Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Jose Fernandez visited

Taipei in August, and he spoke about economic exchanges with Taiwan in the context of the

rebalancing toward Asia.14

In sum, Congress has exercised important roles in legislating and overseeing the TRA of 1979, as

Congress and the President have recalibrated the U.S. “one China” policy over the decades. Since

the early 1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as Taiwan’s security and democracy

have faced continued challenges due to the PRC’s military modernization, moves perceived by

Beijing as promoting de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s

president (2000-2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to raising

defense spending and strengthening self-defense. Moreover, since 2000, political polarization in

Taiwan has raised the importance of U.S. policy toward Taiwan for fostering U.S. interests there.

These interests include sustainable stability, U.S.-PRC engagement, Taiwan’s democracy, peace,

and prosperity (with a global impact), and economic ties with a major trading partner—ultimately

a “peaceful resolution” of the dispute over Taiwan. At the same time, the dominance of partisan

politics in Taiwan has reduced U.S. leverage to advance some U.S. priorities. The United States

also has monitored how the KMT and DPP in Taipei have handled disputes with the Communist

Party of China (CPC) in Beijing over Taiwan’s status, “one China,” and cross-strait ties.

Key Statements and Ambiguity

Five key documents stand out among U.S. policy statements on Taiwan. Among these, since

1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has had bipartisan support in guiding policy with a firm

foundation and flexible framework for the maintenance of the relationship with Taiwan.

•

Shanghai Communique of 1972

Normalization Communique of 1979

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (P.L. 96-8) of 1979

Six Assurances to Taipei of 1982

August 17 Communique (on arms sales) of 1982.

(See excerpts of these and other statements in Part II of this CRS report.)

Despite apparently consistent formal statements and closed-door assurances since the end of

World War II (and the end of Taiwan’s status as a colony of Japan that began in 1895), the “one

China” question has been left somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations among

Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. The concept of “one China” has been complicated by the coexistence of the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan since 1949, while they have not

recognized each other. Taiwan was never ruled by the CPC or as part of the PRC.

Changing Context

Moreover, the political and strategic context of those key statements has experienced significant

changes. After political liberalization began in 1986, Taiwan became a democracy, with a new

basis for the government’s legitimacy and greater say by voters about Taiwan’s status. The PRC’s

House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing on “Why Taiwan Matters,” October 4, 2011; Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Honolulu, HI, November 10, 2011; Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Remarks

at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2, 2012; and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business

Affairs Jose Fernandez, “The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations,” Taipei, August 7, 2012.

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Tiananmen Crackdown of 1989 dramatically proved the limits to liberal change on the mainland.

The original strategic rationale for U.S.-PRC rapprochement faded with the end of the Cold War.

In May 2000, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian became President of the ROC, ousting the KMT as the

ruling party in Taiwan for the first time in 55 years. Under the DPP, the government in Taipei

made greater use of the name “Taiwan” (vs. “ROC”).15 The KMT reemphasized “ROC” in 2008

and pursued closer ties with “mainland China.” The two sides held the first formal meeting since

1949 between officials in charge of cross-strait affairs on February 11, 2014. Taipei’s Mainland

Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Wang Yu-chi met with Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO)

Director Zhang Zhijun in Nanjing, the ROC’s capital before KMT forces retreated to Taiwan.

Definitions

There are complications about the language in the key statements. First, “China” was not defined

in the three joint communiques. In the Normalization Communique, the United States recognized

the PRC government as the sole legal government of China, but the PRC has never ruled Taiwan

and other islands under the control of the ROC government. The PRC’s late paramount leader

Deng Xiaoping’s 1984 proposal of “one China, two systems” sought to define Taiwan as a

Special Administrative Region under the PRC after unification. On the other hand, “Taiwan” was

defined in Section 15(2) of the TRA essentially to be the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores,

plus the people, entities, and governing authorities there.

Unsettled Status

Second, there has been disagreement as to whether Taiwan’s status actually was resolved or

determined. In secret talks in 1972, President Nixon assured PRC Premier Zhou Enlai that the

United States viewed the status of Taiwan as “determined” to be part of one China. The PRC’s

December 1978 statement on normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States said

that the Taiwan question “has now been resolved between the two countries.” However, the U.S.

statement of December 1978 on normalization stated the expectation that the Taiwan question

“will be settled” peacefully by the Chinese themselves. The TRA of 1979 also stipulated the U.S.

expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. A Representative

who managed the legislation for the TRA as the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Lester Wolff, wrote that “in no sense of the word,

through the TRA and/or other relevant documents including the Shanghai Communique, has

Congress of the United States ever attempted, except to support self-determination for the people

of Taiwan, to determine the final destiny of Taiwan.”16

President Reagan’s 1982 statement on arms sales to Taiwan declared that “the Taiwan question is

a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.” Under U.S. policy,

“settlement” or “resolution”—not stated as “unification” or “reunification”—of the Taiwan

question is left open to be determined peacefully and with a shift to stress a resolution by both

sides of the strait (rather than involving the United Nations (U.N.) or another country). In a rare

public statement on this U.S. stance, in August 2007, a National Security Council official said

Such as: the addition of “Taiwan” in the title of the ROC Yearbook; the addition of “Taiwan” in English on ROC

passports beginning on September 1, 2003; changing the title of a government publication, Taipei Review, to Taiwan

Review beginning with the March 2003 issue; and requests to use “Taiwan” instead of “Taipei” in the names of

representative offices in the United States and other countries. In April 2007, Taiwan unsuccessfully applied for

membership in the World Health Organization under the name “Taiwan.”

Lester Wolff, Jon Holstine, John Brady III, A Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, Vol. 4, March 2004.

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that “the position of the United States Government is that the ROC—Republic of China—is an

issue undecided ... for many, many years.”17

Peaceful Settlement

Third, the questions of the PRC’s possible use of force, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and possible

U.S. help in Taiwan’s self-defense were left contentious and critical for U.S. interests.

Washington consistently has stated its strong interest that there be a peaceful settlement, but the

PRC has not renounced its claimed sovereign right to use force if necessary. Washington has not

promised to end arms sales to Taiwan, although the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 was

terminated on December 31, 1979.18 In the surprise announcements of December 1978 on

diplomatic recognition, the United States stated its interest in a peaceful resolution, but the PRC

countered that Taiwan is China’s internal affair. President Reagan agreed to the 1982

Communique on reducing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan—premised on the PRC’s declared policy of

peaceful unification. In the early 1990s, the PLA began to build up its theater missile force and to

acquire modern arms, especially from Moscow.

The 1979 TRA states that the United States will provide necessary defense articles and services to

Taiwan for its sufficient self-defense, and will consider with “grave concern” any non-peaceful

means to determine Taiwan’s future. In deciding on that language in 1979, Members of Congress

debated whether the wording on U.S. military intentions was clear or ambiguous. Since the mid1990s, a new debate has arisen over how to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait, including whether

ambiguity or clarity in U.S. statements about a possible military role serves U.S. interests in

preventing conflict or provocations from either Beijing or Taipei.19 There have been issues about

whether and how U.S. statements of intentions might be clarified to specify the conditions under

which the U.S. military might help to defend Taiwan and the U.S. stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty

or efforts to change its declared political status.20 Questions also have persisted about the extent

of the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan, given President Clinton’s 1996 deployment of two

aircraft carriers near Taiwan, President Bush’s initial statement in 2001 of doing “whatever it took

to help Taiwan defend herself,” and Taiwan’s budgetary limitations in self-defense capabilities.

Has U.S. Policy Changed?

Apart from questions about the language in the key statements on “one China,” policy questions

have arisen about whether successive Administrations have changed the U.S. position since 1971

to adapt to changing circumstances and whether such shifts have advanced U.S. interests.21

Dennis Wilder, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC, White House, “Press Briefing on the President’s Trip to

Australia and the APEC Summit,” August 30, 2007.

Article 10 of the Mutual Defense Treaty allowed for its termination one year after notice is given by either side (on

January 1, 1979).

In the 106th Congress, the House International Relations Committee debated this issue of “ambiguity” and other

issues in the markup of H.R. 1838, “Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,” on October 26, 1999.

See for example: Joseph Nye, Jr., “A Taiwan Deal,” Washington Post, March 8, 1998; Heritage Foundation and

Project for the New American Century, “Statement on the Defense of Taiwan” by 23 conservatives, including Richard

Armitage and Paul Wolfowitz, August 20, 1999; Thomas Christensen, “Clarity on Taiwan,” Washington Post, March

20, 2000; Richard Bush, “American Ambiguity on Taiwan’s Sovereignty Increases the Island’s Safety,” Insight

Magazine, December 10, 2002.

While this report discusses U.S. policy since the first understanding with the PRC in 1971, some say that the U.S.

position on “one China” dates back to World War II. (See Henry Kissinger, “Storm Clouds Gathering,” Washington

Post, September 7, 1999.) In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, or “Retrocession Day,” marked the

Republic of China (ROC)’s claim of “recovering” Taiwan (then called Formosa) from Japan. However, that was the

(continued...)

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Successive Administrations have generally maintained that “long-standing” U.S. policy has been

consistent. Some in Congress and others, however, have contended that U.S. policy has changed

in some important areas. There also are issues as to whether any elements of the “one China”

policy should be reviewed for modification. The “one China” policy has evolved to cover three

issue areas: sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue.

Issue Area 1: Sovereignty

One issue area for U.S. policy concerns sovereignty, including Taiwan’s juridical status, future

unification vs. independence, referendums, a new constitution, and international participation.

The U.S. “one China” policy has differed from the PRC’s principle on “one China,” and there

have been questions about whether U.S. policy is one of support, non-support, or opposition to

unification or independence. In short, U.S. policy has stressed the process (peaceful resolution,

cross-strait dialogue, with the assent of Taiwan’s people, and no provocations or unilateral

changes by either side) rather than the outcome (e.g., unification, independence, confederation).

At the same time, the ROC, or Taiwan, has continued to assert its sovereignty, seeking

membership or observership in the United Nations or other international organizations.

Even while recognizing the ROC government and its “jurisdiction” over Taiwan, on the eve of the

Nixon Administration’s contacts with PRC leaders in Beijing, the State Department testified to

Congress in 1969 and 1970 that the juridical matter of the status of Taiwan remained

undetermined. The State Department also wrote that

In neither [the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 nor the Treaty of Peace between the

Republic of China and Japan of 1952] did Japan cede this area [of Formosa and the

Pescadores] to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by

any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question

subject to future international resolution. Both the Republic of China and the Chinese

Communists disagree with this conclusion and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores

are part of the sovereign state of China. The United States recognizes the Government of

the Republic of China as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan

and the Pescadores.22

(...continued)

first time that the ROC’s forces had been on Formosa to occupy the colony, upon Japan’s surrender. When the Qing

Empire ceded in perpetuity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the ROC was not in existence.

Moreover, the colony’s people did not have a say in determining their status. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist

Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at Japan’s surrender in August 1945, with no country

challenging the island’s status. (See Stephen Chen, former ROC representative to Washington in 1997-2000, “Taiwan

Belongs to the Republic of China,” paper given to author in March 2008). Following the ROC government’s retreat to

Taiwan in 1949 and the start of the Korean War, the U.S. stance shifted on sovereignty over Taiwan. On January 5,

1950, President Harry Truman stated that the United States would not get involved in the civil conflict in China. After

the Korean War started, however, President Truman declared on June 27, 1950, that “the occupation of Formosa by

Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing

their lawful and necessary functions in that area.” The President said that he ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack

on Formosa and also called upon the ROC government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the

mainland. President Truman added that “the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of

security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.” (Quoted in: Senate

Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, record of hearing on

November 24, 1969; and Alan Romberg, Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice, Stimson Center, 2003).

Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, hearings on the

Republic of China, November 24, 25, 26, 1969, and May 8, 1970. Also: State Department memorandum on the legal

status of Taiwan, July 13, 1971, a copy of which Nat Bellochi, former chairman of AIT, provided.

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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy

However, accounts of President Nixon’s secret talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai in China in

1972 reported that Nixon made promises on the question of Taiwan in return for diplomatic

normalization that went beyond the communique issued at the end. The Carter Administration

later called the promises: “Nixon’s Five Points.”23 Also, according to Assistant Secretary of State

Stanley Roth’s March 1999 testimony, Nixon pledged no U.S. support for Taiwan independence

(second time after Kissinger’s 1971 promise): “We have not and will not support any Taiwan

independence movement.”24 With the release on December 11, 2003, of declassified memoranda

of conversation of the secret talks between Nixon and Zhou, there was confirmation that Nixon

stated as first of Five Principles that “there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will

be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of

Taiwan is undetermined.”

The United States did not explicitly state its own position on the status of Taiwan in the three

U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques. In 1972, while still recognizing the ROC, the Nixon

Administration declared that it “acknowledges” that “all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan

Strait” maintain that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of China, and that the United States

did not challenge that position. After shifting diplomatic recognition to the PRC, the United

States, in 1979 and 1982, again “acknowledged the Chinese position”25 of one China and Taiwan

is part of China. However, the 1982 communique further stated that the United States has no

intention of pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” while President

Reagan’s accompanying statement said that “the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese

people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.” The TRA did not discuss the “one China”

concept. In 1994, the Clinton Administration stated after its Taiwan Policy Review that the United

States had “acknowledged” the Chinese position on one China and that “since 1978, each

Administration has reaffirmed this policy.”

Despite these apparent similarities in U.S. policy statements, some contend that the U.S. position,

since originally formulated in 1972, has adopted the PRC’s “one China” principle—rather than

steadily maintaining neutrality and equal distance from Beijing and Taipei. In 1982, Senator John

Glenn criticized both the Carter and Reagan Administrations:

The ambiguous formulation agreed upon in the 1979 joint communique went

considerably further in recognizing the PRC’s claim to Taiwan. Although the word

“acknowledged” remained, the object of our acknowledgment shifted noticeably. We no

longer just acknowledged that both Chinas asserted the principle that there was one

China, but instead acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China. By

dropping the key phrase “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain” one

could interpret that we had moved from the position of neutral bystander noting the

existence of a dispute, to a party accepting the Chinese assertion that there is one China.

Clearly, this was the PRC’s interpretation.... More recently, Peking’s threats to

downgrade relations with the United States, unless Washington agreed to end all arms

sales to Taiwan, prompted President Reagan to write to China’s Communist Party

James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 46; Harding, Harry, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972

(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 43-44. According to Holdridge, Nixon reiterated the position against an

independent Taiwan that Kissinger told Zhou in July 1971.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on United States-Taiwan Relations: The 20th Anniversary of the

Taiwan Relations Act, March 25, 1999, written response to Senator Helms’ question about precedents for President

Clinton’s June 1998 “Three Noes” statement, citing a Memorandum of Conversation, Tuesday, February 22, 1972, 2:10

pm-6:00 pm (declassified version).

The Chinese text said “recognized China’s position.”

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Chairman, Hu Yaobang, in May 1982, and assure him that, “Our policy will continue to

be based on the principle that there is but one China.... ” We now assert that it is our

policy, U.S. policy, that there is but one China, and although not stated, indicate

implicitly that Taiwan is a part of that one China. The use of the qualifier

“acknowledged” has been dropped altogether.... I do not believe that anyone can dispute

that the U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan has changed dramatically over the last 10

years. Let me reiterate one more time, in 1972, we acknowledged that the Chinese on

both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained that there was but one China. Today it is U.S.

policy that there is but one China. Despite this remarkable shift over time, the State

Department, at each juncture, has assured us that our policy remained essentially

unchanged.26

President Clinton’s “Three Noes”

In August 1995 (earlier than the first public statements showed in 1997), President Clinton sent a

secret letter to PRC President Jiang Zemin to state that the United States: (1) would “oppose”

Taiwan independence; (2) would not support “two Chinas” or one China and one Taiwan; and (3)

would not support Taiwan’s admission to the U.N.27 The opposition to Taiwan independence

seemed to go beyond the promises made by former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger

and President Nixon in 1971 and 1972 of no U.S. support for Taiwan independence. Later, that

wording was apparently changed from opposition to a neutral stance of non-support. This letter

reportedly formed the basis of what were later known publicly as the “Three Noes.”

At the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit in Washington, the two leaders issued a joint statement which

included a U.S. position: “the United States reiterates that it adheres to its ‘one China’ policy and

the principles set forth in the three U.S.-China joint communiques.” While that joint statement did

not include the “Three Noes,” the Administration designated the State Department’s spokesperson

to say two days later that “we certainly made clear that we have a one-China policy; that we don’t

support a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. We don’t support a two-China policy. We don’t support

Taiwan independence, and we don’t support Taiwanese membership in organizations that require

you to be a member state.” While in China for a summit in June 1998, President Clinton chose an

informal forum to declare: “I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t

support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t believe

that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”

Some questioned whether the “Three Noes,” especially as it was publicly declared by the U.S.

President while in the PRC, was a change in U.S. policy.28 U.S. non-support for a one China, one

Taiwan; or two Chinas can be traced to the private assurances of the Nixon Administration in the

early 1970s. However, the Clinton Administration, beginning with its Taiwan Policy Review of

1994, added non-support for Taipei’s re-entry into the U.N., which became an issue after Taipei

launched its bid in 1993. In response to President Clinton’s “Three Noes,” concerned Members in

Statement of Senator John Glenn on China-Taiwan Policy, July 22, 1982, in: Lester Wolff and David Simon,

Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act (New York: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982).

Garver, John W., Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (University of Washington

Press, 1997); James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to

Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).

For example: Stephen J. Yates, “Clinton Statement Undermines Taiwan,” Heritage Foundation, July 10, 1998; Ted

Galen Carpenter, “Let Taiwan Defend Itself,” Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, August 24, 1998; Stephen J. Yates,

“Promoting Freedom and Security in U.S.-Taiwan Policy,” Heritage Foundation, October 13, 1998; James Lilley and

Arthur Waldron, “Taiwan is a ‘State,’ Get Over It,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1999; Harvey J. Feldman, “How

Washington Can Defuse Escalating Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” Heritage Foundation, August 19, 1999.

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both the Senate and the House nearly unanimously passed resolutions in July 1998, reaffirming

the U.S. commitment to Taiwan.

The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, argued that the “Three Noes” did not represent a change

in policy. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 25, 1999, Assistant

Secretary of State Stanley Roth stated that “every point made there [in the “Three Noes”] had

been made before by a previous Administration and there was no change whatsoever.” In a

written response to a question from Senator Helms, Roth cited as precedents for the “Three Noes”

a 1971 statement by Kissinger, a 1972 statement by Nixon, a 1979 statement by Deputy Secretary

of State Warren Christopher, and President Reagan’s 1982 Communique.

President Bush on Taiwan’s Independence, Referendums, Constitution

On April 25, 2001, when President George W. Bush stated the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an

obligation to use “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself,” he also said that “a declaration

of independence is not the one China policy, and we will work with Taiwan to make sure that that

doesn’t happen.” Visiting Beijing in February 2002, Bush said that U.S. policy on Taiwan was

unchanged, but he emphasized U.S. commitment to the TRA and a peaceful resolution, along

with opposition to provocations by either Beijing or Taipei. After Taiwan President Chen Shuibian said on August 3, 2002, that there is “one country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait, the

U.S. National Security Council (NSC) stated, in a second response, that “we do not support

Taiwan independence.” With Jiang Zemin at his side at a summit in Crawford, TX, in October

2002, President Bush himself stated that “we do not support independence.”

However, there have been questions about whether the Bush Administration adjusted U.S. policy

after President Chen Shui-bian surprised the United States in August 2002 with a speech on “one

country on each side” and a call for a holding referendums. Specifically, there was the issue of

whether President Bush gave assurances, at closed meetings starting at that summit in October

2002, to PRC President Jiang Zemin and later President Hu Jintao that the United States was

“against” or “opposed” (vs. non-support of) unilateral moves in Taiwan toward independence

and/or the status of Taiwan independence, in the interest of stability in the Taiwan Strait.29 A

position in “opposition” to Taiwan independence would represent a shift in policy focus from the

process to the outcome and go beyond President Nixon’s “Five Principles,” which expressed the

neutral stance of “non-support” for Taiwan independence. But U.S. opposition to Taiwan

independence would be consistent with President Clinton’s secret letter reportedly sent in 1995 to

PRC leader Jiang Zemin, as the basis for the “Three Noes.” U.S. opposition would also conflict

with the stance of the government of Taiwan, which, under the DPP, argued that Taiwan is already

independent, as evident since the first democratic presidential election in 1996.30

After Chen, during campaigns for Taiwan’s presidential election in March 2004, advocated

holding referendums and adopting a new constitution by 2008—moves that could have

implications for Taiwan’s sovereignty and cross-strait stability, the Bush Administration called on

Chen to adhere to his pledges (“Five Noes”) in his inaugural address of 2000 (including not

According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (April 22, 2004), President Bush met with his AIT officials, Therese

Shaheen and Douglas Paal, in the summer of 2003 on policy toward Taiwan, and Bush said “I’m not a nuance guy—

’Do not support.’ ‘Oppose.’ It’s the same to me.”

Chen Ming-tong, a Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan, spoke at a conference of the Global

Alliance for Democracy and Peace in Houston, TX, on October 31, 2003, and contended that Taiwan is already a

sovereign, democratic country that is in a “post-independence period” and does not need to declare independence.

Joseph Wu, Deputy Secretary General of the Presidential Office of Chen Shui-bian, wrote in Taipei Times on January

6, 2004, that Taiwan’s independence is the “new status quo.”

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promoting a referendum to change the status quo). On September 28, 2003, Chen started his call

for a new constitution for Taiwan (with a draft constitution by September 28, 2006; a referendum

on the constitution on December 10, 2006; and enactment of the new constitution on May 20,

2008). National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on October 14, 2003, that “nobody

should try unilaterally to change the status quo.”31 A White House official said in an interview on

November 26, 2003, that “Taiwan shouldn’t be moving towards independence; and mainland

China shouldn’t be moving towards the use of force or coercion.”32 Then, Chen announced on

November 29—two days after the opposition-dominated legislature passed a restrictive law

authorizing referendums—that he would still use one provision to hold a “defensive referendum”

on election day.33 Chen argued that the referendum would be a way for Taiwan’s people to

express their opposition to the PLA’s missile threat and would have nothing to do with the

question of unification or independence.

Nonetheless, Administration officials had concerns about the volatile course of current and future

political actions in Taiwan (with elections, referendums, and a new constitution), reforms geared

for governance vs sovereignty, and unnecessary effects on stability, given U.S. commitments to

help Taiwan’s self-defense. The Administration added a new, clearer stance on December 1, 2003,

when the State Department expressed U.S. “opposition” to any referendum that would change

Taiwan’s status or move toward independence. On the same day, the Senior Director of Asian

Affairs at the NSC, James Moriarty, reportedly was in Taiwan to pass a letter from Bush to Chen

with concerns about “provocations.”34 Apparently needing a public, stronger, and clearer U.S.

message to Taiwan, Bush appeared next to visiting PRC Premier Wen Jiabao at the White House

on December 9, 2003, and stated an opposition to any unilateral decision by China or Taiwan to

change the status quo, as well as opposition to efforts by Taiwan’s President Chen to change the

status quo, in response to a question about whether Chen should cancel the referendum.

However, Bush did not make public remarks against the PRC’s threats toward democratic

Taiwan. Bush also did not counter Wen’s remarks that Bush reiterated “opposition” to Taiwan

independence. Bush raised questions about whether he miscalculated the willingness of Chen to

back down during his re-election campaign and risked U.S. credibility, since Chen responded

defiantly that he would hold the “anti-missile, anti-war” referendums as planned and that his

intention was to keep Taiwan’s current independent status quo from being changed.35

American opinions were divided on the Bush Administration’s statements toward Taiwan. Some

saw Chen as advancing a provocative agenda of permanent separation from China while trying to

win votes, and supported Bush’s forceful stance against Chen’s plan for referendums.36 Others

Previously, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in May 1996—two months after President Clinton deployed

two aircraft carriers near Taiwan and days before an inauguration address by Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui—that

“we have emphasized to both sides the importance of avoiding provocative actions or unilateral measures that would

alter the status quo or pose a threat to peaceful resolution of outstanding issues.”

Background interview with Senior White House Official, Phoenix TV, November 26, 2003.

Article 17 of the referendum law passed on November 27, 2003, in the Legislative Yuan authorizes the president to

initiate a referendum on national security issues “if the country suffers an external threat that causes concern that

national sovereignty will change.”

Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, December 1, 2003; New York Times, December 9, 2003.

Chen Shui-bian responded to Bush in a meeting with visiting Representative Dan Burton on December 10, 2003,

reported Taipei Times, December 11, 2003; and Chen’s meeting with author and others at the Presidential Palace,

Taipei, December 11, 2003.

Wall Street Journal, “The End of Ambiguity,” December 10, 2003; Ross Munro, “Blame Taiwan,” National Review,

December 18, 2003; Peter Brookes (Heritage Foundation), “Why Bush Acted on Taiwan,” Far Eastern Economic

Review, December 25, 2003; Michael Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.

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criticized President Bush for being one-sided in appeasing a dictatorship at the expense of

Taiwan’s democracy while failing to warn against and even possibly inviting aggression from

Beijing.37 The co-chairmen of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus in the House wrote a letter to

President Bush, criticizing his stance as a victory for the authoritarian regime of the PRC at the

expense of Taiwan’s democratic reforms.38 Some critics argued for a new approach, saying that

the “one China” policy became “irrelevant” and that there were national security interests in

preventing the “unification” of Taiwan with China.39 In contrast, another opinion advocated the

continuation of arms sales to Taiwan with no position on its independence and staying out of any

conflict in the Taiwan Strait.40

Still, uncertainty remained about the Bush Administration’s implementation of U.S. policy on

questions such as options to recalibrate policy in exercising leverage over Taipei or Beijing;

capacity to maintain the delicate balance in preventing provocations by either side of the strait

rather than swerving to one side or another; perceptions in Taipei and Beijing of mixed messages

from Washington; the U.S. stance on referendums and a new constitution in Taiwan; definition of

“status quo”; deference to democracy in Taiwan; Taiwan’s long-standing, de facto independence

from China; stronger separate national identity in Taiwan; a proactive U.S. political role (such as

urging dialogue, facilitating talks, or mediating negotiations) in addition to proactive pressures on

defense; the extent of the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense; the increasing PLA

threat; and U.S. worries about Taiwan’s defense spending, acquisitions, and the will to fight.41

On January 16, 2004, Chen gave the wording for the two questions, saying that the referendums

will ask citizens (1) whether the government should acquire more missile defense systems if the

Chinese Communists do not withdraw missiles and renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and

(2) whether the government should negotiate with the Chinese Communists on a framework for

cross-strait peace and stability. Chen also promised that if re-elected, he will maintain “the status

quo of cross-strait peace.”42 On the election day of March 20, 2004, the two referendums failed to

be considered valid when 45% of eligible voters cast ballots (less than the 50% needed).

After the election in March 2004, the White House sent the Senior Director for Asian Affairs,

Michael Green, to Taiwan to urge President Chen to exclude sovereignty-related issues from

constitutional changes.43 In testimony by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly on April 21,

2004, the Administration warned Chen of “limitations” in U.S. support for constitutional changes.

In his inaugural address on May 20, 2004, Chen responded to a number of U.S. concerns.

For example, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Gary Schmitt (Project for the New American Century), “U.S.-ChinaTaiwan Policy,” December 9, 2003; Washington Post, “Mr. Bush’s Kowtow,” editorial, December 10, 2003; and

Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “Stand by Taiwan,” Weekly Standard, December 22, 2003.

Sherrod Brown, Steve Chabot, Dana Rohrabacher, and Robert Wexler, “Congressional Taiwan Caucus Urges

President Bush to Reconsider Position on Taiwanese Referendum,” December 11, 2003.

For example, conference at the Heritage Foundation, “Rethinking ‘One China’,” February 26, 2004; and Thomas

Donnelly, “Taiwan: Test Case of the Bush Doctrine,” AEI, National Security Outlook, April 2004.

Ted Galen Carpenter, “President Bush’s Muddled Policy on Taiwan,” CATO Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing,

March 15, 2004.

Based in part on the author’s visit to Taiwan, December 5-13, 2003. Also, for critiques in a longer-term context, see

for example: Bates Gill (Center for Strategic and International Studies), “Bush Was Correct but Clumsy on Taiwan

Policy,” Financial Times, December 12, 2003; Kenneth Lieberthal (University of Michigan), “Dire Strait: The Risks on

Taiwan,” Washington Post, January 8, 2004.

President of the Republic of China, news releases (in Chinese and English), January 16, 2004. Chen’s use of the

phrase “the status quo of cross-strait peace” was translated simply as “status quo” in the official English version.

Far Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 2004.

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In President Chen’s second term, President Bush did not support Taiwan’s independence or

membership in the U.N. and opposed unilateral changes to the “status quo.” Leading up to

Taiwan’s presidential election on March 22, 2008, Bush Administration officials expressed

opposition to referendums on Taiwan’s membership in the U.N. that were held on the same day.

Visits (or “Transits”) by Taiwan’s President

One issue has concerned the appropriate U.S. response to requests from Taiwan’s president to

enter the United States for visits or transits; to visit Washington, DC; to hold public events; and to

meet with Executive Branch officials and Members of Congress. Congress has expressed strong

support for granting such visits. Since 1994, the U.S. response has evolved from initially denying

Lee Teng-hui entry into the United States to relaxing restrictions on “transits” for stops by Chen

Shui-bian, and back to strict conditions for Chen’s transits in May 2006.

In May 1994, the Clinton Administration allowed President Lee Teng-hui to make a refueling stop

and rest in Hawaii but denied him a visa. In 1995, Lee received a visa to visit Cornell University,

his alma mater. (Beijing responded with PLA exercises and missile launches in 1995 and 1996.)

The Administration acknowledged that Congress’s view was an important factor in the reversal.

In August 2000, the Clinton Administration allowed the newly-elected President Chen Shui-bian

to transit in Los Angeles, but, according to Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry, Washington and Taipei had

an understanding that Chen would not hold public events. Representative Sam Gejdenson

organized a meeting between Chen and about 15 Members of Congress (some of whom were in

town for the Democratic National Convention), but Chen told them he was “unavailable.”44

In 2001, in granting President Chen “private and unofficial” transits through New York (May 2123) and Houston (June 2-3) en route to and from Latin America, the Bush Administration took a

different position on such meetings. As the State Department spokesperson said, “we do believe

that private meetings between Members of Congress and foreign leaders advance our national

interests, so [Chen] may have meetings with Members of Congress.”45 On the night of May 21,

2001, 21 Representatives attended a dinner with Chen in New York, and Representative Tom

DeLay later hosted Chen in Houston.

In 2003, while considering his safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity, the Bush Administration

again granted President Chen’s requests for transits to and from Panama through New York

(October 31-November 2) and Anchorage (November 4-5).46 Some Members of Congress

personally welcomed Chen, including 16 Members who were already in New York and met with

him. No Administration officials met with Chen, other than AIT officials based in Washington.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver reportedly canceled a planned meeting with

Chen in New York, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage talked with Chen by phone.47

Chen Shui-bian enjoyed extended transits through Honolulu and Seattle in August-September

2004, though these were less high-profile than that in New York. In January 2005, Chen stopped

in Guam on the way back to Taiwan from Palau and the Solomon Islands. In September 2005, the

Bush Administration allowed Chen to stop one day in Miami on his way to Latin America and in

CNA, August 9, 2000; “Taiwan Leader Stops in Los Angeles,” Washington Post, August 14, 2000; Sam Gejdenson,

“Taiwan Deserves Better: Why We Should Have Met with President Chen,” Washington Times, August 21, 2000.

Department of State, press briefing by Richard Boucher, May 14, 2001.

Department of State, press briefing by Richard Boucher, October 7, 2003.

Far Eastern Economic Review, November 13, 2003.

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San Francisco on his return to Taiwan. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus, via

teleconference, awarded Chen a human rights award while he was in Miami.

However, in May 2006, the Bush Administration was not pleased at repeated statements from

President Chen Shui-bian and responded by tightening restrictions on his proposed U.S. stops so

that they would be strict transits (with no activities), conditions similar to those for Lee Teng-hui

in 1994. Chen requested stops in San Francisco and New York for his visit to Latin America, but

President Bush countered with transits in Honolulu and Anchorage, and Chen refused those U.S.

cities. Representatives Thomas Tancredo and Dana Rohrabacher sent a letter on May 5, 2006, to

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, questioning the decision’s consistency with legislation;

possible linkage to ties with Beijing; use of “humiliating” conditions on the transits; reversal of

policy despite President Bush’s affirmation of a consistent policy; impact on future U.S. stops;

and implication for “playing politics” given the contrast with Deputy Secretary of State Robert

Zoellick’s high-level meeting in Washington with the opposition KMT chairman, Ma Ying-jeou,

two months earlier. In September 2006, the Administration allowed Chen to stop in Guam, but he

had to switch to a civilian aircraft instead of his “Air Force One” that flew him to Palau.

In January 2007, the Administration allowed President Chen to stop overnight in San Francisco

and to refuel in Los Angeles on his way to and from Nicaragua. In response to restrictions on

Chen’s transits, Representative Dana Rohrabacher and 14 other Members wrote a letter to House

Speaker Nancy Pelosi on January 12, 2007, calling for the removal of all restrictions on bilateral

high-level visits with Taiwan. A week later, Representative Tancredo criticized (in extension of

remarks) Mexico’s ban of Chen’s plane from Mexican airspace on his way to Los Angeles, a

move similar to U.S. treatment toward Taiwan. In August 2007, the Administration restricted

Chen’s transits to 50-minute refueling stops in Anchorage on his way to and from Central

America, with no overnight stays. For his last U.S. transit in January 2008, the Bush

Administration allowed Chen to stop in Anchorage for two hours to refuel and rest.

After Ma Ying-jeou won the election on March 22, 2008, he expressed a desire to visit the United

States before his inauguration in May (after which U.S. policy would allow only transits). But the

Bush Administration denied his request. President Ma later “transited” in the United States, where

he sometimes met with Members of Congress and joined public activities (in Los Angeles,

Austin, and San Francisco in 2008; in San Francisco and Honolulu in 2009; in San Francisco and

Los Angeles in 2010; in New York and Los Angeles in 2013; in Los Angeles in January 2014; and

Honolulu and San Francisco in June-July 2014).

“International Space” and International Organizations

The United States, with congressional backing, has voiced some support for Taiwan’s quest for

“international space” (representation at international organizations), including “meaningful

participation” in certain international organizations on transnational issues. Some advocates view

such participation as preserving a democratic government’s international presence and promoting

the interests of Taiwan’s people, while others support Taiwan’s separate identity or independence.

The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review promised to support Taiwan’s

membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite and to support opportunities

for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible.

The focus of Taiwan’s international participation was at the World Health Organization (WHO),

and the annual meetings in May in Geneva of its governing body, the World Health Assembly

(WHA). On May 11, 2001, President Bush wrote to Senator Frank Murkowski, agreeing that the

Administration should “find opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations in order

to make a contribution, even if membership is impossible,” including concrete ways for Taiwan to

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benefit from and contribute to the WHO. On April 9, 2002, Representatives in the House formed

a Taiwan Caucus, and, as its first action, it wrote a letter on April 19, 2002, to the President,

seeking support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. With worldwide attention on the severe

acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy

Thompson expressed support for Taiwan in a speech at the WHA on May 19, 2003, saying that

“the need for effective public health exists among all peoples” and “that’s why the United States

has strongly supported Taiwan’s inclusion in efforts against SARS and beyond.”

By the meeting of the WHA in 2005, Taiwan lamented that the United States did not speak up and

that the WHO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the PRC to govern the

WHO’s technical exchanges with Taiwan.48 Still, the Bush Administration “applauded” the WHO

and China for taking steps in 2005 to increase Taiwan’s participation in WHO conferences.49

Taiwan did not gain observer status at the WHA in May 2008, even as the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou

was inaugurated as President after Chen Shui-bian’s terms ended. In January 2009, the WHO

included Taiwan in the International Health Regulations (IHR) which entered into force in 2007.

President Ma shifted Taiwan’s focus to the WHA meeting (rather than the WHO). In its required

report submitted to Congress on April 1, 2009, the State Department stated that it supported

Taiwan’s observership in the WHA and welcomed the decrease in politicization over Taiwan’s

participation in the WHO due to improvements in cross-strait ties over the past year. Taiwan’s

Minister of Health participated for the first time as an observer at the WHA in May 2009.

However, there are concerns that the invitation required the PRC’s approval, came under the

WHO-PRC MOU, and was ad hoc (only for a KMT President). Indeed, the State Department’s

report to Congress in April 2010 acknowledged that the WHA invited Taiwan in 2009 after the

PRC “agreed to Taiwan’s participation.” The State Department also expressed support, assessing

that Taiwan’s participation in the WHA was a “positive development” and could provide a model

for Taiwan’s participation as an “observer” in other U.N. bodies. In its report to Congress of April

2011, the State Department stated that it worked for Taiwan’s observership at the WHA again in

2010 and has sought regular invitations from the WHO to Taiwan every year. However, in May

2011, a secret WHO Memorandum dated September 14, 2010, came to light, showing that the

WHO had an “arrangement with China” to implement the IHR for the “Taiwan Province of

China.” That month in Geneva, Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius

protested to the WHO that no U.N. body has a right to determine unilaterally Taiwan’s status.

President Ma decided to be more flexible than his DPP predecessor in pressing Taiwan’s bid to

rejoin the U.N., which it left in 1971 (as the ROC). On August 14, 2008, Taiwan submitted

instead a letter (via some countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations) to allow Taiwan

to “participate meaningfully” in U.N. specialized agencies.50 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

David Shear stated in March 2010 that “the United States is a strong, consistent supporter of

Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.” He also stated that “Taiwan

should be able to participate in organizations where it cannot be a member, such as the World

Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and other important

In May 2007, the Formosan Association of Public Affairs (FAPA) released the “Implementation of the Memorandum

of Understanding between the WHO Secretariat and China.”

Melody Chen, “Support for WHO Bid Dries Up,” Taipei Times, May 18, 2005; State Department, “Taiwan: The

World Health Assembly,” May 19, 2006. In November 2005, Taiwan’s Center for Disease Control participated in a

WHO conference on bird flu.

United Nations General Assembly, A/63/194, “Need to Examine the Fundamental Rights of the 23 Million People of

the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Participate Meaningfully in the Activities of the United Nations Specialized

Agencies,” dated August 22, 2008.

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international bodies whose activities have a direct impact on the people of Taiwan.” Taiwan has

sought status as an observer in the WHO, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Visa Waiver Program (VWP)

Under President Obama, on December 22, 2011, the State Department nominated Taiwan as a

candidate for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), though there is no diplomatic recognition of

Taiwan. On October 2, 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Taiwan in the VWP,

effective on November 1. Taiwan’s citizens may travel to the United States for business or

tourism for up to 90 days without a visa. Taiwan became the 37th country to join the VWP. For

implementation of domestic laws, Section 4(b)(1) of the TRA provides that “whenever the laws

of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar

entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.”

Select Major Legislation

During the 103rd Congress, Congress passed and President Clinton signed (on April 30, 1994) the

Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) that, inter alia,

directed the State Department to register foreign-born Taiwanese-Americans as U.S. citizens born

in Taiwan (rather than China); and called for the President to send Cabinet-level officials to

Taiwan and to show clear U.S. support for Taiwan in bilateral and multilateral relationships.

After the Administration denied President Lee Teng-hui a visa in May 1994, the Senate, from July

to October, passed amendments introduced by Senator Brown to ensure that Taiwan’s President

can enter the United States on certain occasions. Two amendments (for S. 2182 and H.R. 4606)

that passed were not retained, but the amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Technical

Corrections Act of 1994 was enacted. Upon signing it into law (P.L. 103-416) on October 25,

1994, President Clinton said that he construed Section 221 as expressing Congress’s view. Later,

Congress overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan H.Con.Res. 53 expressing the sense of Congress

that the President should promptly welcome a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui to his alma

mater, Cornell University, and a transit stop in Anchorage, Alaska, to attend a conference. The

House passed the resolution by 396-0 on May 2, and the Senate passed it by 97-1 on May 9, 1995

(with Senator Johnston voting Nay and Senators Moynihan and Warner not voting).

During the 106th Congress, in 1999, Congress legislated a requirement for semi-annual reports on

such U.S. support, in Section 704 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 2000 and

2001 (P.L. 106-113). Also in 1999, Congress passed legislation (P.L. 106-137) requiring a report

by the Secretary of State on efforts to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. In January

2000, the State Department submitted the report, saying that the United States does not support

Taiwan’s membership in organizations, such as the U.N. or WHO, where statehood is a

requirement for membership, but that it supports any arrangements acceptable to the WHO

membership to allow for Taiwan to participate in the work of the WHO.51 In October 2000, the

House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 390, expressing the sense of Congress that the State

Department’s report failed to endorse Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and

that the United States should fulfill the commitment of the Taiwan Policy Review to more

actively support Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.

Department of State, “Report Required by P.L. 106-137, Fiscal Year 2000, Taiwan Participation in the World Health

Organization (WHO),” January 4, 2000.

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In the 107th Congress, on May 17, 2001, Members agreed without objection to H.Con.Res. 135

to welcome President Chen Shui-bian upon his visit. Congress enacted legislation, P.L. 107-10,

authorizing the Secretary of State to initiate a U.S. plan to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the

annual summit of the WHA in May 2001 in Geneva. Then, Representative Sherrod Brown and

Senator Torricelli introduced H.R. 2739 and S. 1932 to amend the law to target the May 2002

meeting. H.R. 2739 was passed and enacted as P.L. 107-158 on April 4, 2002.

As enacted on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L.

107-228) authorized—at the Bush Administration’s request—U.S. departments or agencies

(including the Departments of State and Defense) to assign or detail employees to the American

Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the non-profit corporation (with offices in Washington and Taipei) that

has handled the U.S.-Taiwan relationship in the absence of diplomatic ties since 1979 under the

TRA. (Personnel at AIT were technically “separated” from government service for a period of

time, raising issues about employment status, benefits, recruitment, etc.) The legislation also

expressed the sense of Congress that AIT and the residence of its director in Taipei should

publicly display the U.S. flag “in the same manner as United States embassies, consulates, and

official residences throughout the world.”

In the 108th Congress, the House and Senate passed S. 243 to authorize the Secretary of State to

initiate a U.S. plan to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the WHA in May 2003. Upon signing

the bill as P.L. 108-28 on May 29, 2003, President Bush stated that “the United States fully

supports the overall goal of Taiwan’s participation in the work of the WHO, including

observership” but considered the act to be consistent with the “one China” policy. On October 30,

2003, the House passed H.Con.Res. 302 (416-0) to welcome President Chen to the United States.

On April 21 and May 6, 2004, the House and Senate passed H.R. 4019 and S. 2092 in support of

Taiwan’s efforts to gain observer status in the WHO and to make it an annual requirement to have

an unclassified report from the Secretary of State on the U.S. plan to help obtain that status for

Taiwan. An implication of this change was the end of annual focused congressional statements

and votes. In signing S. 2092 into law (P.L. 108-235) on June 14, 2004, President Bush stated that

the United States fully supported the participation of Taiwan in the work of the WHO, including

observer status. However, he also declared that his Administration shall construe the reporting

requirement by using his authority to “withhold information” which could impair foreign

relations or other duties of the executive branch.

While the State Department initially stopped short of publicly supporting Taiwan’s observership

in ICAO, Congress supported that goal. In July 2010, the House passed H.Con.Res. 266

(Berkley) to express the sense of Congress that Taiwan should be accorded observer status in

ICAO. In the 112th Congress, in September 2011, the Senate agreed to S.Con.Res. 17 (Menendez)

with the same sense of Congress. The House also agreed to S.Con.Res. 17 in September 2012.

In the 113th Congress, on June 18 and 19, 2013, the House and Senate, respectively, passed H.R.

1151 (Royce) and S. 579 (Menendez), to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to

obtain observer status for Taiwan at the triennial ICAO Assembly next held in September-October

2013 in Montreal, Canada. The House passed H.R. 1151 (by 424-0). The Senate passed H.R. 1151

(by unanimous consent) on June 27. President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 113-17) on

July 12. He issued a statement of support for Taiwan’s participation at ICAO, while construing

the act to be consistent with the “one China” policy. On August 28, the State Department

submitted a report as required by Section 1(c) of the legislation. The State Department told

Congress of U.S. support for “observer status” for Taiwan in all of the meetings of ICAO. The

report pointed to the ICAO Council, which meets regularly, in contrast to the ICAO Assembly,

which meets triennially. The State Department noted that U.S. support for Taiwan in ICAO is

consistent with the “one China” policy and the TRA.

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Issue Area 2: Use of Force

The PRC has never renounced its claimed right to use force in what it sees as an internal problem

and, moreover, has voiced more explicitly and demonstrated clearly its willingness to use force

for political if not military objectives—despite its announced policy of “peaceful unification.”

Since the early 1990s, the PRC has purchased advanced arms from the Soviet Union/Russia and

built up its missile force. In December 1992 and March 1993, top PRC ruler Jiang Zemin and

Premier Li Peng warned of “drastic” or “resolute” measures to prevent Taiwan’s independence.

Jiang reportedly ordered the PLA in January 1993 to win “high-tech local wars” focused on the

Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that the CPC’s Central Military

Commission (CMC) decided at a meeting in June 1993 to focus the PLA against Taiwan.52

In the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, the PRC launched provocative military exercises,

including missile “test-firings,” to express displeasure with President Lee Teng-hui’s private visit

to the United States and to intimidate voters before Taiwan’s first democratic presidential

election. President Clinton deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan in March 1996.

The United States believed that the PLA accelerated its buildup since the crisis. The PRC raised

tension again in 1999, after Lee said the cross-strait relationship was “special state-to-state ties.”

In February 2000, on the eve of another presidential election in Taiwan, the PRC issued its second

White Paper on Taiwan, reaffirming the peaceful unification policy but adding a new precondition

for the use of force. As one of “Three Ifs,” the PRC warned that even if Taiwan indefinitely

refuses to negotiate a peaceful settlement, the PRC would be compelled to use force to achieve

unification. No deadline was issued. The White Paper warned the United States not to sell arms to

Taiwan or pursue any form of alliance with Taiwan, including cooperation in missile defense.

Before the presidential election in 2004, a PRC official on Taiwan affairs who was a PLA major

general issued a threat, on November 18, 2003, to use force against what Beijing perceives as the

“open promotion of Taiwan independence.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage

responded by saying that “there’s an election and campaign going on in Taiwan, and I think one

shouldn’t over-emphasize comments that are made in the heat of an election” and that the United

States “has full faith that the question of Taiwan will be resolved peacefully.”53

Concerned about the PRC’s provocations, President Bush did not support DPP President Chen

(2000-2008) nor Taiwan’s independence or membership in the U.N. President Bush also opposed

referendums on membership in the U.N. during Taiwan’s presidential election on March 22, 2008.

For that election, President Bush sent two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, whose largely symbolic

referendums were nonetheless targets of the PRC’s belligerent condemnation. The referendums

failed to be valid, and the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou won as president. (See CRS Report RL34441,

Security Implications of Taiwan’s Presidential Election of March 2008, by Shirley Kan.)

The PRC’s Military Strategic Guideline of 1993 for “Winning Local Wars Under High Technology Conditions” has

focused the PLA on preparations for potential operations against Taiwan. See John Lewis and Xue Litai, “Making

China’s Nuclear War Plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2012 (citing Jiang Zemin); and Hsu Shao-hsuan, “PRC’s

Preparations to Attack Taiwan Accelerate,” Taipei Times, July 19, 2010. In its 2005 book, The Science of Military

Strategy, the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS) assessed Taiwan’s strategic significance that “if Taiwan

should be alienated from the mainland, not only our natural maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a

sea gateway to outside forces, but also a large area of water territory and rich reserves of ocean resources will fall into

the hands of others.”

“Taiwan Office’s Wang Zaixi: Taiwan Independence Means War, Use of Force is Difficult to Avoid,” Xinhua,

November 18, 2003; Richard Armitage, press availability, Exhibit Hall, Washington, DC, November 18, 2003.

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Commitment to Help Taiwan’s Self-Defense

Since the 1950s, the United States government, with a critical congressional role, has expressed

the consistent position for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. Implementation of U.S.

policy included the U.S.-ROC Defense Treaty of 1954 and the Formosa Resolution, P.L. 84-4.54

After termination of the treaty, Congress passed and President Carter signed the TRA of 1979,

adding U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense and a potential U.S. role in maintaining

peace in the strait. The TRA left the U.S. obligation to help defend Taiwan somewhat ambiguous

and did not bind future U.S. decisions. Section 2(b)(4) states that the United States will consider

with “grave concern” any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future. The TRA also

excluded the islands off the mainland (e.g., Quemoy and Matsu) in its security coverage over

Taiwan. Nonetheless, the Section 2(b)(6) of the TRA declares it to be policy to maintain the U.S.

capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security,

or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan [emphasis added].

In 1982, President Reagan signed the Joint Communique on reducing arms sales to Taiwan, but

he also stated in public and internal clarifications that U.S. arms sales will continue in accordance

with the TRA and with the full expectation that the PRC’s approach to the resolution of the

Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful. President George H. W. Bush decided in September

1992 to sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan, citing concerns about the cross-strait military balance.

On March 10 and 11, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced decisions to deploy two

aircraft carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan, after the PRC announced renewed PLA

exercises that would include further missile “test-firings” toward Taiwan and Congress introduced

legislation on helping to defend the ROC. President Clinton demonstrated that there might be

grave consequences, as well as grave concern, to non-peaceful efforts to determine Taiwan’s

future. However, the Joint Statement at the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit did not mention the TRA.

Congress, in the 1950s, started to debate critical issues about whether to use U.S. military forces to defend the ROC

government on the island of Taiwan, whether to include the small off-shore islands close to the mainland in any

security coverage, and the role of Congress in such decision-making. After KMT forces, led by Chiang Kai-Shek,

retreated to Taiwan in 1949, President Truman stated in January 1950 that the United States would not interfere in

China’s civil war to defend Taiwan. After North Korea’s attack on South Korea in June 1950, however, Truman

ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent attacks by both sides across the Taiwan Strait. In March 1953, the ROC asked for a

mutual defense treaty, but the United States was concerned about extending any defense commitment to the off-shore

islands, changing the “no-defense policy.” PLA forces increased activities around the off-shore islands in mid-1953,

seizing some small islands. In August 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that there would be a

U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (signed on December 2, 1954), and PRC bombardment and attacks on off-shore

islands started the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-1955. (See Ralph Clough, Island China, Harvard University Press,

1978; Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, University of North Carolina Press, 1996.) On January 24, 1955,

President Eisenhower, in a message to Congress, requested a resolution to authorize the use of force to protect

Formosa, the Pescadores, and “related positions and territories.” He said that he did not suggest that “the United States

enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores as provided by the treaty now awaiting

ratification.” He also argued that it was important that Formosa remained in friendly hands and if in unfriendly hands,

the situation would create a breach in the “island chain” of the western Pacific for U.S. and allied security. The

President cited Communist firing of heavy artillery on Quemoy island that started in September 1954, followed by air

attacks against the Tachen islands and seizure of Ichiang island. After significant debate, Congress passed H.J.Res. 159

on January 29, 1955. The Formosa Resolution was enacted as P.L. 84-4. The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee

on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad held extensive hearings on November 24, 25, 26, 1969, and

May 8, 1970, to review “United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad with the Republic of China.”

Congress later repealed the Formosa Resolution in the Department of State and United States Information Agency

(USIA) Appropriations Authorization Act, enacted as P.L. 93-475 on October 26, 1974.

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In April 2001, President George W. Bush publicly stated the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an

obligation to do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself” [emphasis added].55 Visiting

two allies then China in February 2002, the President, in Tokyo, cited the U.S. commitment to

Taiwan in the context of support for five regional allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia,

Philippines, and Thailand)—to applause from the Diet, or Japan’s legislature. Then, in Beijing,

Bush emphasized U.S. commitments to the TRA and a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan

question, while voicing opposition to provocations from either side.

However, indicating concerns about miscalculations of U.S. views in Taiwan, Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless told Taiwan’s Deputy Defense Minister Chen Chao-min in

February 2003 that, while the President said we will do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend

itself, Taiwan “should not view America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the

Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense.”56

In November 2003, with concerns about PRC threats and Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s

efforts to hold referendums, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that the TRA is not

a defense treaty. Armitage added that the TRA guides policy in providing Taiwan “sufficient

defense articles for her self-defense” and “also requires the United States to keep sufficient force

in the Asia Pacific area to be able to keep the area calm.” Armitage reaffirmed that the U.S.

commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense, with no defense treaty, “doesn’t go beyond that in the

Taiwan Relations Act, and we have good, competent military forces there.”57 President Bush

appeared with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao in the Oval Office on December 9, 2003, and stated U.S.

opposition to any unilateral decisions made by the leader of Taiwan to change the status quo.

In April 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly further clarified U.S. policy after Chen

Shui-bian’s re-election in March and warned Taiwan not to dismiss PRC statements as “empty

threats” and warned of “limitations” to U.S. support for constitutional changes in Taiwan. At the

same time, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman

warned Beijing that its attempt to use force would “inevitably” involve the United States.58

In September 2005, the Defense Department further clarified the mutual obligations under the

TRA and limits to the U.S. ability to assist Taiwan. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard

Lawless issued a speech, stressing the TRA’s focus on Taiwan’s self-defense. He declared that,

inherent in the intent and logic of the TRA is the expectation that Taiwan will be able to

mount a viable self-defense. For too long, the Taiwan Relations Act has been referenced

as purely a U.S. obligation.... Under the TRA, the U.S. is obligated to “enable” Taiwan to

maintain a sufficient self-defense, but the reality is, it is Taiwan that is obligated to have a

Assessments differed on the implications of Bush’s interpretation of the U.S. commitment. Congress expressed

mixed reactions. Senator Joseph Biden wrote that “we now appear to have a policy of ambiguous strategic ambiguity. It

is not an improvement.” (Washington Post, May 2, 2001.) Senator Richard Lugar contended that the President’s

statement “reflected a common-sense appraisal of the strategic situation in Asia.” (Washington Times, May 17, 2001.)

The Wall Street Journal (April 26, 2001) wrote that Bush sent a message to Beijing that Washington has a “strong

national interest in preserving Taiwan’s democracy” and there is “now less chance of a miscalculation by China’s

leaders.” Others, including Michael O’Hanlan (New York Times, April 27, 2001), said Bush departed from ambiguity,

which serves U.S. interests in preserving all options and in discouraging provocations by Taipei. A third argument was

that the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan should be limited to arms sales and that “preserving Taiwan’s de facto

independence” is not a vital U.S. security interest (Ted Galen Carpenter, “Going Too Far: Bush’s Pledge to Defend

Taiwan,” CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, May 30, 2001).

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council conference, San Antonio, TX, February 2003.

Richard Armitage, press availability, Exhibit Hall, Washington, DC, November 18, 2003.

Hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,” held by the House International Relations Committee,

April 21, 2004.

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sufficient self-defense. There is an explicit expectation in the TRA that Taiwan is ready,

willing, and able to maintain its self-defense. Taiwan must fulfill its unwritten, but clearly

evident obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act by appropriately providing for its

own defense while not simply relying on the U.S.’ capacity to address a threat in the

Strait. The TRA requires both parties to do their part to deter aggression or coercion visa-vis Taiwan.59

Aside from the issue of whether the U.S. strategy on assisting Taiwan’s self-defense should be

ambiguous or clear in a policy seeking deterrence towards Beijing and Taipei, a third view

advocates the removal of any defense commitment (implicit or explicit) while continuing to sell

weapons for Taiwan’s self-defense.60

Arms Sales and Military Cooperation

Despite the absence of diplomatic and alliance relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been

significant. A related issue has been whether to pursue normalization of ties with Taiwan. After

tensions in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996, the Pentagon under the Clinton Administration quietly

expanded the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to levels unprecedented since 1979.

These broader exchanges reportedly have increased attention to so-called “software” (discussions

over strategy, logistics, command and control, and plans in the event of an invasion of Taiwan).

The George W. Bush Administration continued and expanded the closer military ties at different

levels. In April 2001, President Bush announced he would drop the 20-year-old annual arms sales

talks used with Taiwan’s military in favor of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan’s requests

on an as-needed basis. Then, the Bush Administration granted a visa for ROC Defense Minister

Tang Yiau-ming to visit the United States to attend a private conference held by the U.S.-Taiwan

Business Council on March 10-12, 2002, in St. Petersburg, FL, making him the first ROC defense

minister to come to the United States on a non-transit purpose since 1979.61 Also in 2002, the

Bush Administration requested legislation to authorize the assignment of personnel from U.S.

departments and agencies to AIT, with implications for the assignment of active-duty military

personnel to Taiwan for the first time since 1979. (See the discussion below of the Foreign

Relations Authorization Act for FY2003.) One objective was to select from a wider range of

personnel, without excluding those on active duty. The first active-duty defense attaché since

1979, an Army Colonel began his duty in Taipei in August 2005 with civilian clothes and a status

similar to military attaches assigned to Hong Kong, except that military personnel in Hong Kong

may wear uniforms at some occasions.62 While allowing military representatives in Taiwan, the

Administration maintained a ban on visits by U.S. general and flag officers to Taiwan, under the

State Department’s “Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan.”

A DSCA official, Ed Ross, read the Defense Department’s speech on September 19, 2005, in San Diego, CA, at the

U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, while Lawless was delayed in Beijing

at the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

Ted Galen Carpenter (Cato Institute), America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan, 2005.

In December 2001, the ROC Defense Minister, Wu Shih-wen, transited on his way to the Dominican Republic.

In addition to Colonel Al Willner, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) assigned Army Colonel Peter

Notarianni to oversee security assistance at AIT in Taipei. Department of Defense, notice, “DSCA contract awarded to

AIT to support DSCA active-duty military and civil service personnel,” September 24, 2005. In the past, from 1951 to

1979, the United States assigned to Taiwan the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Ministry of National

Defense, U.S. MAAG – Taiwan: an Oral History, Taipei: 2008. One of the officers interviewed was retired Colonel

Mason Young, Jr., father of Stephen Young who served as AIT Director from 2006 to 2009.

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Although there has been much interest among U.S. academic circles and think tanks in pursuing

talks with China on its military buildup and increased U.S. security assistance to Taiwan,63 a

catalyst for this debate among policy makers arose out of the U.S.-PRC summit in Crawford, TX,

on October 25, 2002. As confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen,

and reported in Taiwan’s media, PRC leader Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a freeze or

reduction in China’s deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraints in U.S.

arms sales to Taiwan.64 President Bush reportedly did not respond to Jiang’s linkage. Policy

considerations include the TRA (under which the United States has based its defense assistance to

Taiwan on the threat that it faces), the 1982 Joint Communique (which discussed reductions in

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan premised on the PRC’s peaceful unification policy), and the 1982 “Six

Assurances” to Taiwan (which said the United States did not agree to hold prior consultations

with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). On April 21, 2004, Assistant Secretary of State

James Kelly testified to the House International Relations Committee that if the PRC meets its

stated obligations to pursue a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and matches its rhetoric

with a military posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to Taiwan, “it follows

logically that Taiwan’s defense requirements will change.”

Select Major Legislation

Since the 1990s, particularly given the PLA’s provocative exercises and missile launches in 19951996, Congress has asserted its role vis-a-vis the President in determining arms sales under

Section 3(b) of the TRA, and in exercising its oversight of the TRA, including Section 2(b)(6) on

the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.

In the 103rd Congress, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Foreign Relations

Authorization Act for FY1994-FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) that, inter alia, declared that Section 3 of

the TRA (i.e., on arms sales) takes primacy over statements (i.e., the 1982 joint communique).

During the 104th Congress, in early 1996, Congress became increasingly concerned about

provocative PLA exercises held the previous summer and again on the eve of Taiwan’s

presidential election in March 1996 (with “test-firings” of M-9 short-range ballistic missiles to

target areas close to the two Taiwan ports of Kaohsiung and Keelung). Introduced by

Representative Chris Cox on March 7, passed by the House on March 19, and passed by the

Senate on March 21, 1996, H.Con.Res. 148 expressed the sense of Congress that the United

States should assist in defending the ROC. On March 13, 1996, during markup of H.Con.Res. 148

in the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Delegate Eni

Faleomavaega noted that House and Senate resolutions prompted the Clinton Administration to

deploy the USS Independence and USS Nimitz carriers. The resolution cited Section 3(c) of the

TRA, which directs the President to inform Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the

social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and to determine the U.S. response along with

Congress. However, on March 14, 1996, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific

Affairs Winston Lord told the subcommittee that “however serious, the present situation does not

constitute a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude contemplated by the drafters of the Taiwan

See David Lampton and Richard Daniel Ewing, “U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11th World,” Nixon

Center, August 2002; David Shambaugh’s remarks at conference held by the Carnegie Endowment, Stanford

University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, on

“Taiwan and U.S. Policy: Toward Stability or Crisis?,” October 9, 2002; Michael Swaine, “Reverse Course? The

Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief, February 2003; and David Lampton,

“The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations,” National Interest, Fall 2003.

Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], November 22, 2002; Taipei Times, November 23, 2002.

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Relations Act” and that “if warranted by circumstances, we will act under Section 3(c) of the

TRA, in close consultation with the Congress.”

In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 105-261)

required the Secretary of Defense to study the U.S. missile defense systems that could protect and

could be transferred to “key regional allies,” defined in the conference report as Japan, South

Korea, and Taiwan.65 In addition, the conference report (H.Rept. 105-746 of the FY1999 Defense

Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-262) required a report from the Pentagon on the security situation in

the Taiwan Strait, in both classified and unclassified forms.66

In the 106th Congress, the FY2000 NDAA (P.L. 106-65) enacted a requirement for the Pentagon

to submit annual reports on PRC military power and the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.

In asserting its role in decision-making on arms sales to Taiwan, Congress passed language,

introduced by Senator Lott, in the FY2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (in Div. B of

P.L. 106-113), requiring the Secretary of State to consult with Congress to devise a mechanism

for congressional input in determining arms sales to Taiwan. Again, in the FY2001 Foreign

Operations Appropriations Act (§581 of P.L. 106-429), Congress passed the Taiwan Reporting

Requirement, requiring the President to consult on a classified basis with Congress 30 days prior

to the next round of arms sales talks. (Those consultations took place on March 16, 2001.)

In addition to examining arms sales, Congress looked closer at U.S. military deployments. The

Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113) required a report on the operational

planning of the Defense Department to implement the TRA and any gaps in knowledge about

PRC capabilities and intentions affecting the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.67

In the 107th Congress, the NDAA for FY2002 (P.L. 107-107), enacted December 28, 2001,

authorized the President to transfer (by sale) the four Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan (§1011),

under Section 21 of the AECA. Also, Section 1221 of the act required a section in the annual

report on PRC military power (as required by P.L. 106-65) to assess the PLA’s military

acquisitions and any implications for the security of the United States and its friends and allies.

The scope of arms transfers to be covered was not limited to those from Russia and other former

Soviet states, as in the original House language (H.R. 2586).68

The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115), as enacted on January 10,

2002, brought unprecedented close coordination between the executive and legislative branches

on arms sales to Taiwan. Section 573 required the Departments of State and Defense to provide

detailed briefings (not specified as classified) to committees (including those on appropriations)

within 90 days of enactment and not later than every 120 days thereafter during FY2002. The

briefings were to cover U.S.-Taiwan discussions on potential sales of defense articles or services.

Some Members in the House and Senate called for ensuring regular and high-level consultations

with Taiwan and a role for Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan, after President Bush

announced on April 24, 2001, that he would drop the annual arms talks process with Taiwan in

favor of normal, routine considerations on an “as-needed” basis. Enacted as P.L. 107-228, the

Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific

Region,” May 1999.

Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, The Security Situation in the

Taiwan Strait,” February 1, 1999.

Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act,” December 2000.

Still, the Pentagon’s report, issued on July 12, 2002, discussed China’s military acquisitions from states of the former

Soviet Union, and not other countries (e.g., Israel).

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Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 authorized—at the Bush Administration’s

request—the Department of State and other departments or agencies (including the Department of

Defense) to detail employees to AIT (Section 326); required that Taiwan be “treated as though it

were designated a major non-NATO ally” (Section 1206); required consultations with Congress

on U.S. security assistance to Taiwan every 180 days (Section 1263); and authorized the sale to

Taiwan of the four Kidd-class destroyers (Section 1701). Section 326, amending the Foreign

Service Act of 1980, had significant implications for the assignment of government officials to

Taiwan, including active-duty military personnel for the first time since 1979.

In signing the bill into law on September 30, 2002, President Bush issued a statement that

included his view of Section 1206 (on a “major non-NATO ally”). He said that “Section 1206

could be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‘one China’ policy of the United States when, in

fact, that U.S. policy remains unchanged. To the extent that this section could be read to purport

to change United States policy, it impermissibly interferes with the President’s constitutional

authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.” Nonetheless, the Acting Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Michael Wynne, submitted a letter to

Congress on August 29, 2003, that designated Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally.”

The House-passed FY2003 NDAA contained Section 1202 seeking to require the Defense

Secretary to implement a comprehensive plan to conduct combined training and exchanges of

senior officers with Taiwan’s military and to “enhance interoperability” with Taiwan’s military.

The language was similar to that of Section 5(b) in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA)

proposed in the 106th Congress. The Senate’s version did not have the language. As enacted on

December 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314 contained a revised section (1210) requiring a Presidential report

180 days after the act’s enactment on the feasibility and advisability of conducting combined

operational training and exchanges of senior officers with Taiwan’s military. (Military exchanges

may take place in the United States, but U.S. flag/general officers may not visit Taiwan.)69

In the 110th Congress, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved, on September 26, 2007,

H.Res. 676 (Ros-Lehtinen) that noted the Bush Administration’s lack of response to Taiwan’s

interest in buying F-16C/D fighters and that urged the Administration to determine security

assistance “based solely” upon the legitimate defense needs of Taiwan (citing Section 3(b) of the

TRA). The House passed H.Res. 676 on October 2, 2007. The House also passed H.R. 6646 on

September 23, 2008. Some Members suspected that Bush had a “freeze” on arms sales to Taiwan

until notifications to Congress on October 3, 2008.

In the 111th Congress, Senator John Cornyn introduced on July 23, 2009, an amendment to the

NDAA for FY2010 to require President Obama to report on an assessment of Taiwan’s air force,

in examining Taiwan’s need for new F-16C/D fighters. In conference, the Senate Armed Services

Committee receded on the section to require in the legislation for a Presidential report on

Taiwan’s air force and U.S. options. Still, the conference report (H.Rept. 111-288) directed the

Defense Secretary to submit an assessment to Congress on Taiwan’s air defense. The bill was

enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009. Secretary Gates submitted an unclassified study to

Congress in February 2010. The Obama Administration later submitted on September 22, 2011,

the Defense Department’s comprehensive, classified report on Taiwan’s air power.

In the 112th Congress, Members passed the NDAA for FY2013 (P.L. 112-239) with Section 1281

to express the sense of Congress that the President should take steps to address Taiwan’s shortfall

Department of State, “Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan,” memo, February 2, 2001.

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in fighters, whether through the sale of F-16C/D aircraft or other aircraft of similar capability. The

conference report for the FY2013 NDAA required a briefing on Taiwan’s air force by April 15.

In the 113th Congress, the House, on June 14, 2013, passed H.R. 1960 (McKeon), the FY2014

NDAA, with Section 1265 to direct the President to sell 66 F-16C/D fighters (approved as

language offered by Representative Gerald Connolly for amendments en bloc). The Senate Armed

Services Committee’s report of June 20 (S.Rept. 113-44) for the FY2014 NDAA, S. 1197,

extended the deadline to July 15, 2013, for the Defense Department to brief on Taiwan’s air

power and requested a classified report on Taiwan’s air force by December 1. The briefing took

place on July 17. The House-Senate agreement on the NDAA of December 10 did not include

Section 1265, while calling on the President to continue to take steps to enable Taiwan’s air force

to contribute to a “sufficient” self-defense capability. The Defense Department delivered a

classified report on Taiwan’s air force to Congress on January 3, 2014.

On April 7, 2014, the House passed H.R. 3470 (Royce), which incorporated H.Res. 494 and was

renamed the Taiwan Relations Act Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2014 (which

would, inter alia, authorize transfers by sale of up to four excess U.S. Navy Perry-class frigates to

Taiwan). (H.Res. 494 (Royce) would affirm the importance of the TRA on its 35th anniversary of

enactment.) On December 4 and 10, respectively, the Senate and House passed S. 1683

(Menendez) to authorize transfers of frigates to Taiwan (by sale) and Mexico. S. 1683 became

P.L. 113-276 on December 18.

Representative Forbes introduced language in the House Armed Services Committee’s report on

the FY2015 NDAA, H.R. 4435 to direct the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to report by October

1, 2014, on any benefits and associated costs and security requirements of integrating Taiwan’s

early warning radar with other U.S. missile defense and sensor systems to improve U.S. missile

defense capabilities. In December 2014, Congress passed the FY2015 NDAA (H.R. 3979;

enacted as P.L. 113-291). Section 1256 retained the previous House-passed H.R. 4435’s

requirement for the Defense Secretary to report on Taiwan’s maritime capabilities but expanded

the scope of the report to cover its self-defense capabilities. The FY2015 NDAA also retained the

language of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s S. 2410 and H.R. 4435 in Section 1259A to

express the sense of Congress that the United States should consider opportunities to help

enhance the maritime capabilities and nautical skills of Taiwan’s navy to contribute to Taiwan’s

self-defense and to regional peace and stability; and that the PRC and Taiwan should be afforded

opportunities to participate in (not just observe) the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

(HA/DR) portions of future multilateral exercises, such as RIMPAC. The final legislation dropped

a section in the House-passed bill to require a sale of F-16C/D fighters.

Issue Area 3: Dialogue

President Nixon in 1972, President Carter in 1978, and President Reagan in 1982 publicly stated

the U.S. expectation that “the Chinese” themselves will settle the Taiwan question. Reagan also

gave “Six Assurances” to Taiwan. The assurances, made just before the United States and the

PRC issued the August 17, 1982, Joint communique, included assurances that Washington will

not mediate between Taipei and Beijing, and will not pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing.

Urging Cross-Strait Dialogue

One policy question concerns the extent of U.S. encouragement of cross-strait dialogue and the

U.S. role in any talks or negotiations to resolve the Taiwan question. As Taipei and Beijing’s

economic relationship grew to significant levels by the early 1990s and the two sides began to

talk directly through quasi-official organizations, the Clinton Administration increasingly voiced

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its support for the cross-strait dialogue, encouraging Taipei in particular. Like a bystander, the

State Department said in its Taiwan Policy Review of 1994 that “the United States applauds the

continuing progress in the cross-strait dialogue.” After talks broke off and military tensions

flared, however, the Administration, after 1996, privately and publicly urged both sides to hold

this dialogue as an added part of a more proactive U.S. policy. In July 1996, National Security

Advisor Anthony Lake visited China and planned a meeting (later canceled) with Wang Daohan,

head of the PRC’s organization for cross-strait talks. At the 1997 U.S.-PRC summit, President

Clinton urged for a peaceful resolution “as soon as possible” and that “sooner is better than later.”

In March 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stan Roth raised the possibility of “interim

agreements” between Beijing and Taipei, after several prominent former Clinton Administration

officials made similar proposals. Roth’s mention of possible “interim agreements” raised

concerns in Taipei that it was a proposal by the Clinton Administration to pressure Taipei into

negotiating with Beijing. Roth’s remarks came in the context of suggestions to reduce cross-strait

tensions issued by former or future Clinton Administration officials. In January 1998, a

delegation of former officials led by former Defense Secretary William Perry had visited Beijing

and Taipei, reportedly passing a message from the PRC that it was willing to resume talks with

Taiwan. The February 21, 1998, Washington Post reported that the delegation was part of the

Administration’s effort to have a “track two” dialogue with Beijing and Taipei and to encourage

resumption of cross-strait talks. At a February 1998 conference in Taipei, Kenneth Lieberthal (a

University of Michigan professor who later joined the NSC as the Senior Director for Asian

Affairs in August 1998) had proposed a 50-year “interim arrangement” in which the PRC (as

“China”) would renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and the ROC (as “Taiwan, China”)

would agree not to declare independence (Reuters, March 1, 1998).

In the March 8, 1998, Washington Post, Joseph Nye (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs) had proposed a “three-part package” that would include a

clarification that Washington would not recognize or defend Taiwan independence but also would

not accept the use of force against Taiwan, and a “one country, three systems” approach. Also in

March 1998, former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had visited Taiwan and reportedly

encouraged resumption of cross-strait talks. In Foreign Affairs (July/August 1998), Chas Freeman

(former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) had urged Washington

to encourage Beijing and Washington to defer negotiations on their long-term relationship for a

certain period, such as 50 years, and to reevaluate arms sales to Taiwan. In February-March 1999,

Perry had led another delegation, including retired Admiral Joseph Prueher (later nominated in

September 1999 to be ambassador to Beijing), and the group made suggestions to the PRC and

Taiwan on how to reduce cross-strait tensions, according to Notes from the National Committee

(Winter/Spring 1999). Later, on September 5, 1999, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan

Shirk reportedly mentioned “one country, three systems” as a possible approach for “one China.”

Three Pillars and “Assent” of Taiwan’s People

In July 1999, the Clinton Administration’s stance on cross-strait dialogue culminated in the

President’s articulation of a new phrase: that U.S. policy has “three pillars” (one China, peaceful

resolution, and cross-strait dialogue). Nonetheless, recognizing Taiwan’s newly established status

as a democracy, President Clinton in February 2000 added the U.S. expectation that the crossstrait dispute be resolved not only peacefully but also “with the assent” of Taiwan’s people.

Re-emphasis of the “Six Assurances”

The George W. Bush Administration began after Chen Shui-bian of the DPP became President in

May 2000. The Administration indicated that it would not pressure Taipei to hold cross-strait

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dialogue, re-emphasizing the “Six Assurances” given to Taipei by President Reagan in 1982. At a

hearing in March 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell assured Senator Jesse Helms that the “Six

Assurances” remained U.S. policy and that the Administration would not favor consulting the

PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.70 On June 12, 2001, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly

testified to the House International Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific that U.S.

arms sales to Taiwan make a peaceful cross-strait resolution more likely. He said that “the central

question is how cross-strait relations can move from a focus on the military balance toward a

focus on ways to begin resolving differences between Taipei and Beijing.” While calling for a

resumption of direct dialogue, economic cooperation, and mutual understanding, Kelly also said

that “the PRC cannot ignore the elected representatives of the people of Taiwan.” While visiting

Taiwan at about the same time that PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen signaled a new receptive

policy toward the ruling DPP in Taiwan, Richard Bush, chairman of AIT, said on January 28,

2002, that “the United States favors and encourages dialogue but has no intention of serving as a

mediator in this dispute or of pressuring Taiwan to negotiate.” He added that “it does not seem

constructive for one side to set pre-conditions for a resumption of dialogue that the other side

even suspects would be tantamount to conceding a fundamental issue before discussion begins.”

In March 2002, Assistant Secretary of State Kelly told attendees at a conference that the Bush

Administration would continue to uphold the “Six Assurances,” meaning no U.S. mediation and

no pressure on Taiwan to go to the bargaining table.71 In testimony at a hearing in April 2004,

after Chen Shui-bian’s re-election in the March election, Kelly again reaffirmed the “Six

Assurances,” but explicitly warned that “a secure and self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is

more capable of engaging in political interaction and dialogue with the PRC, and we expect

Taiwan will not interpret our support as a blank check to resist such dialogue.” He urged both

Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue “as soon as possible” and “without preconditions.”72

Moreover, the George W. Bush Administration started by emphasizing deterrence and approved

Taiwan’s requests for major arms in 2001. In 2004, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice

did urge Beijing to resume cross-strait talks and offered a vague U.S. role “to further dialogue if it

is helpful.”73 Though the Administration repeatedly stated that Beijing should talk to the dulyelected leaders in Taipei, the Administration continued the approach of non-mediation in any

talks. In 2005, in answer to Representative Leach about a U.S. role as “facilitator,” Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver vaguely testified that good U.S. relations with

Beijing and Taipei allow Washington to “assist the two sides in getting to the negotiating table on

mutually agreeable terms.”74

Obama Administration and Convergence on “Peaceful Development”

In 2005, the KMT and CPC agreed on a party-to-party platform of cross-strait “peaceful

development.” After the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou became president in Taiwan in 2008, CPC General

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on U.S. Foreign Policy, March 8, 2001.

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, defense industry conference, St. Petersburg, FL, March 10-12, 2002.

House International Relations Committee, “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.

Philip Pan, “Rice Rebuffs China on Taiwan Arms Sales,” Washington Post, July 9, 2004.

Responses for the record of a hearing on China’s “Anti-Secession Law” and developments across the Taiwan Strait

held by the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, April 6, 2005. Lamenting a

“graveyard of missed opportunities” in cross-strait ties, a former AIT Chairman, Richard Bush, thoroughly assessed

this question of possible U.S. roles and concluded that greater involvement to encourage direct dialogue makes sense

and that the role should be limited to “intellectual facilitation” to clarify policy stances and objectives of each side.

(Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Brookings Institution, 2005.)

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Secretary Hu Jintao issued a policy toward Taiwan of “peaceful development.” A related issue

was whether the United States should encourage or play another role in the increasing cross-strait

dialogues that would include confidence-building measures (CBMs). In September 2009, Deputy

Secretary of State James Steinberg stated that the Administration “encouraged” the PRC and

Taiwan to explore CBMs that would lead to closer ties and greater stability across the strait. His

encouragement of CBMs raised expectations of an active U.S. role and injected new U.S.

pressure in a sensitive domestic debate in Taiwan over whether such CBMs were premature and

would serve Taiwan’s security interests. President Obama held a summit in Beijing in November

2009 with Hu Jintao, and they issued the first U.S.-PRC Joint Statement in 12 years since the

Clinton-Jiang Joint Statement of 1997. In the statement, the United States did not use

“encouragement” of cross-strait CBMs. In the 2009 Joint Statement, the United States declared

that it welcomed the “peaceful development” of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looked

forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and

other fields, and develop more positive and stable cross-strait relations.75 AIT Chairman Ray

Burghardt clarified at a news conference in Taipei on November 24, 2009, that the Joint

Statement should not be interpreted as putting pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.

The Obama Administration also reaffirmed the Six Assurances to Taipei. As discussed above,

Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell testified at a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs

Committee in October 2011. Campbell testified that the “Taiwan Relations Act plus the so-called

Six Assurances and Three Communiques form the foundation of our overall approach.”

Select Major Legislation

As enacted on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L.

107-228), reaffirmed President Clinton’s February 2000 condition for settling Taiwan’s status and

expressed the sense of Congress that any resolution of the Taiwan question must be peaceful and

“include the assent of the people of Taiwan.”

Overview of Issues

In short, since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have continued to articulate a

“one China” policy in understandings with the PRC. Nonetheless, policy makers have continued

to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed

dramatically since the early 1970s. Congressional oversight of successive Presidents has watched

for any new agreements with Beijing and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing’s

“one China” principle—on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Since the 1990s,

successive Administrations also have shown more explicit opposition—through arms sales, force

deployments, deeper U.S.-Taiwan military ties, and public statements—to PRC efforts to use

force or coercion to determine Taiwan’s future. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan or

Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. U.S. policy

leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a “peaceful

resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and without unilateral changes. In other words,

U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.

This approach, however, encounters challenges from Taiwan as it denies being an ambiguous

non-entity and asserts a sovereign status, as the ROC under the KMT or Taiwan under the DPP.

James Steinberg, “Administration’s Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship,” September 24, 2009; White House,

“U.S.-China Joint Statement,” November 17, 2009.

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Even as the United States has opposed a unilateral change from Beijing or Taipei to the status

quo, the meaning of “status quo” remains a question. Some say that instead of a “status quo,” the

situation in the Taiwan Strait has changed significantly, including the shifting military balance to

favor the PRC and the rapid rapprochement and extensive engagement—beyond détente—

between the PRC and Taiwan under the CPC and KMT’s dialogues, particularly since 2008.

There has been no comprehensive review of U.S. policy since 1994. Some said that a U.S.

strategy or a policy review might be needed to seek positive objectives and sustain U.S. security,

political, and economic interests with Taiwan or with the PRC.76 For a hearing on January 13,

2009, on Hillary Clinton’s confirmation to be Secretary of State, the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee asked a question for the record about whether the Administration would hold another

Taiwan Policy Review, but she did not answer the question. Still, Admiral Robert Willard,

Commander of the Pacific Commander (PACOM) in Honolulu, initiated in January 2010 reviews

of approaches toward the PRC and toward Taiwan (among other concerns like North Korea) by

“Strategic Focus Groups (SFGs),” narrower efforts than a review by the Obama Administration.

In any examination of U.S. policy or strategy, whether through recalibrations or review, Congress

and the Administration face critical issues under the rubric of the “one China” policy, including:

•

Is the Administration adhering to the TRA in making available defense articles

and defense services in such quantity as might be necessary to enable Taiwan to

maintain a “sufficient” self-defense capability?

How are internal as well as cross-strait political, economic, and military trends

serving or undermining U.S. interests and leverage over Beijing and Taipei?

What are the implications for U.S. interests and policies of the significant

engagement (including the CPC-KMT cooperation) across the Taiwan Strait?

What are likely outcomes (e.g., unsettled status, unification, independence,

confederation, commonwealth), and what are impacts on U.S. interests?

What are the implications of strategies conducted by Beijing and Taipei?

Are policy elements of diplomacy and deterrence balanced?

Should Washington change any assurances or positions?

Should U.S. policy positions (support, non-support, opposition) be clarified to

deter provocations from Beijing or Taipei (e.g., on use of force or coercion)?

Should the United States proactively deepen its role (e.g., facilitation, mediation)

to encourage cross-strait negotiation and/or appoint a special envoy/coordinator?

See Randall Schriver, “Taiwan Needs Six New Assurances,” Taipei Times, August 22, 2007, and “In Search of a

Strategy,” Taiwan Business Topics, American Chamber of Commerce-Taipei, September 2007. On a debate over

whether a policy review is needed, particularly after the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou became president in May 2008, and

whether to reduce or strengthen the relationship with Taiwan, see Robert Sutter, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the

United States—Policy Adjustments Needed,” PacNet Newsletter #17, March 5, 2009; and Richard Bush and Alan

Romberg, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States – A Response to Robert Sutter,” PacNet Newsletter #17A,

March 12, 2009 (Pacific Forum CSIS); Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Straits,” NBR Analysis, May

2011; controversial academic articles with a theme of abandoning Taiwan in Foreign Affairs by Bruce Gilley, “Not So

Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security,” January/February 2010; responses in May/June

2010; Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” March/April 2011;

and a response by Daniel Blumenthal, “Rethinking U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Taiwan,” Foreign Policy’s Shadow

Government blog, March 2, 2011; Joseph Prueher, Charles Freeman III, Timothy Keating, David Michael Lampton,

James Shinn, et al., “A Way Ahead with China,” University of Virginia, January 2011.

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•

How should defense policies be carried out to increase U.S. leverage in Taiwan,

strengthen its self-defense, deter conflict, and counter coercion?

What is the extent of the U.S. commitment to help Taiwan’s self-defense?

How might the United States support Taiwan in its participation in international

organizations and preservation of international space—distinct from the PRC?

How well are U.S. policies coordinated with those of allies, including European

countries in NATO, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia?

Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by

Washington, Beijing, and Taipei

In Part II below, this CRS Report provides excerpts from key statements on “one China” as

articulated by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, in addition to the three Joint Communiques and

the TRA, since the United States first reached understandings with the PRC in 1971. Based on

unclassified citations and consultations, the highlights also give a comprehensive look at

significant statements and contexts in Washington, Beijing, as well as Taipei. This compilation

identifies new, major (not all) elements in the policies of the governments. The statements also

include accounts of presidential assurances. The three perspectives on “one China” are placed in

chronological order under successive U.S. Administrations. The texts are placed in italics.

Statements During the Nixon Administration

Kissinger’s Secret Talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai77

July 9, 1971

Our military presence in Taiwan at this moment is composed of two elements, the two-thirds of it

which is related to activities in other parts of Asia [the Vietnam War] and the one-third of it which

is related to the defense of Taiwan. We are prepared to remove that part related to activities other

than to the defense of Taiwan, that’s two-thirds of our force ... within a specified brief period of

time after the ending of the war in Indochina. We are prepared to begin reducing our other forces

on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military questions need not be a principal

obstacle between us. I may say, incidentally, that these are personal decisions of President Nixon

Holdridge, John, Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers, 1997), p. 90. See also James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship

with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 33 (citing a declassified chronology from

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by Richard Solomon, U.S.-PRC Political Negotiations, 1967-84, An Annotated

Chronology, December 1985, released to Mann (a Los Angeles Times reporter) under the Freedom of Information Act).

Mann reports that what Kissinger pledged to Zhou went beyond previous U.S. promises and contradicted the official

U.S. position that sovereignty over Taiwan was “an unsettled question subject to future international resolution.” At a

Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on March 25, 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth also cited

Kissinger’s promise as recorded in the CIA’s chronology in his written response to Senator Helms’ question about

precedents for President Clinton’s June 1998 “Three Noes” statement. Also see Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New

York: PublicAffairs, 1999), p. 98. On February 27, 2002, the National Security Archive released declassified copies of

U.S. documents on U.S.-PRC rapprochement in 1970-1971, including transcripts of National Security Adviser Henry

Kissinger’s secret meetings in China. Quotations are from the White House Memorandum, dated July 29, 1971, written

by Winston Lord for Kissinger on his conversations with Zhou on July 9.

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which have not yet been discussed with our bureaucracy or with Congress, and so should be

treated with great confidence.

As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a “two Chinas” solution or a “one

China, one Taiwan” solution.

[On Zhou Enlai’s question of whether the United States would support the Taiwan independence

movement]: We would not support this.

Secretary of State William Rogers on Dual Representation at the U.N.

August 2, 197178

Representation in an international organization need not prejudice the claims or views of either

government. Participation of both in the United Nations need not require that result. Rather it

would provide governments with increased opportunities for contact and communication. It

would also help promote cooperation on common problems which affect all of the member

nations regardless of political differences. The United States accordingly will support action at

the General Assembly this fall calling for seating the People’s Republic of China. At the same

time, the United States will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive

it of representation in the United Nations.

Nixon’s “Five Principles” in Secret Talks with Zhou Enlai

February 22, 197279

Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more

statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of Taiwan is

undetermined.

Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement.

Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into

Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan

independence movement. I will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the

U.S. has influence with Japan—we have in this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister’s

James C.H. Shen (ROC Ambassador to the United States in 1971-1978), The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S.

Sold Out Its Ally (Washington DC: Acropolis Books, 1983). Shen reported that “President Chiang wasn’t satisfied but

said he would go along.” Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in July 1971 complicated intense diplomatic efforts, starting from

the 1950s, by the State Department to safeguard the ROC’s seat at the U.N. (in the General Assembly and the Security

Council). On August 2, 1971, Secretary of State William Rogers announced U.S. support for dual representation at the

U.N. General Assembly, which changed policy from opposition to the seating of the PRC to preservation of

representation of the ROC. See also Department of State, “Chinese Representation in the United Nations,” Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969-1972; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China

Confidential (Columbia University Press, 2001); and Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle

for Modern China (Harvard University Press, 2009). A vote at the United Nations in October 1971 allowed the PRC to

join the U.N. as the only representative of China. The General Assembly’s Resolution 2758 of October 25, 1971,

however, did not mention Taiwan’s status in expelling Chiang Kai-shek’s representatives.

White House, Memorandum of Conversation, February 22, 1972, 2:10pm-6:00pm. On December 11, 2003, the

National Security Archive, an organization in Washington, DC, was able to release the declassified Top Secret

Memoranda of Conversation on President Nixon’s meetings in Beijing in February 1972, which led to the Shanghai

Communique. On the American side, only President Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and two NSC

staff, John Holdridge and Winston Lord, were in the meetings.

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government—we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing

so.

The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be

worked out. And related to that point, we will not support any military attempts by the

Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the Mainland.

Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. We know that the issue

of Taiwan is a barrier to complete normalization, but within the framework I have previously

described, we seek normalization and we will work toward that goal and will try to achieve it.

Nixon on Withdrawing U.S. Military Forces from Taiwan

February 24, 197280

With regard to Taiwan, I do not believe a permanent American presence—whatever happens in

our meetings—is necessary to American security.... My goal is the withdrawal of our remaining

forces, not just two-thirds, but all forces, including the remaining one-third.... It must be

consistent with ... the so-called Nixon Doctrine. Under that Doctrine, we are cutting our forces in

Korea.... Two-thirds will go, hopefully as soon as we can finish our Vietnam involvement. My plan

also is one which reduces the one-third and withdraws it during the period I have the power to

act. But I cannot do it before January of next year. It has to be over a period of four years. Now if

someone asks me when I return, do you have a deal with the Prime Minister that you are going to

withdraw all American forces from Taiwan, I will say “no.” But I am telling the Prime Minister

that it is my plan.... 81

U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (Shanghai Communique)

February 27, 1972

The Chinese reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the

normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s

Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which

has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in

which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations

must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which

aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,”

and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges82 that all Chinese on either side of the

Taiwan Strait83 maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United

White House, Memorandum of Conversation, February 24, 1972, 5:15pm-8:05pm, classified as Top Secret until

release as declassified documents on December 11, 2003.

As part of his response, Zhou Enlai remarked to Nixon that “you hope for and will not hinder a peaceful liberation

[of Taiwan].” Nixon did not correct Zhou.

The Chinese text used “ren shi” (“to acknowledge”). The Chinese term was changed in the 1979 communique to

“recognize.”

Holdridge (p. 89), then a senior staff member for East Asia at the NSC under Henry Kissinger, wrote that “it was

helpful that both the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] and the Kuomintang [(KMT) or Nationalist Party] regarded

Taiwan as part of China, for by accepting this point and affirming our interest in the settlement of the sovereignty

question ‘by the Chinese themselves’ we would affront neither side.” Holdridge (p. 93) also recounted that the wording

of “all Chinese” was originally formulated as “all people,” and the State Department objected to the word “people,”

because some on Taiwan regarded themselves as “Taiwanese” and did not agree that Taiwan was a part of China.

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States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful

settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms

the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan.

In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the

tension in the area diminishes.

Mao Zedong on Use of Force84

November 12, 1973

As for the question of our relations with Taiwan, that is quite complex. I do not believe in a

peaceful transition.... They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries [the Nationalists on Taiwan].

How could they cooperate with us? I say that we can do without Taiwan for the time being, and

let it come after “100 years.”

Statements During the Ford Administration

President Ford’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress85

August 12, 1974

To the People’s Republic of China, whose legendary hospitality I enjoyed, I pledge continuity in

our commitment to the principles of the Shanghai communique. The new relationship built on

those principles has demonstrated that it serves serious and objective mutual interests and has

become an enduring feature of the world scene.

Statements During the Carter Administration

U.S. Statement on Diplomatic Recognition of the PRC86

December 15, 1978

As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People’s Republic of China as

the sole legal government of China.

Tyler, p. 172, citing Henry Kissinger, Memorandum of Conversation with Mao Zedong, Chairman Mao’s residence,

November 12, 1973. One year later, in a meeting with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, Tyler writes that Kissinger stated his

understanding that Mao had said that the leadership would ultimately have to solve the Taiwan question by force and it

could take 100 years. Deng said that “100 years” was symbolic. Kissinger was concerned about a military solution to

the Taiwan question shortly after U.S.-PRC normalization.

Public Papers of the Presidents, Gerald Ford, 1974.

In great secrecy, the White House made its final decision to normalize the relationship with the PRC. President

Carter, along with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and his aide, Michel Oksenberg, did not consult

with Congress on the timing and final wording of the communique. Congress was surprised to be informed hours

before the December 15, 1978, announcement. See Patrick Tyler, “The (Ab)normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations,”

Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); (name r

edacted) (CRS), “Executive-Legislative Consultations on China Policy, 1978-79,” Foreign Affairs Committee Print,

June 1980. In a speech at Stanford University in honor of Michel Oksenberg on May 6, 2002, Carter said he became

President in 1977 determined to establish a full diplomatic relationship with China. He said he kept negotiations

instructions to his envoy, Leonard Woodcock, secret from the State Department, and only Secretary of State Cyrus

Vance went to the White House, which sent direct communications to Woodcock. For a critique, see George H.W.

Bush, “Our Deal with Peking: All Cost, No Benefit,” Washington Post, December 24, 1978.

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In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural

and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.

The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance

of commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental relationships in the new circumstances that

will exist after normalization. The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a

peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful

resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the

Chinese themselves.87

PRC Statement on Establishing China-U.S. Diplomatic Relations88

December 16, 1978

As is known to all, the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government

of China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing

the normalization of relations between China and the United States. It has now been resolved

between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint

efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the two

countries. As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and

reunifying the country, it is entirely China’s internal affair.

ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo’s Statement89

December 29, 1978

The Republic of China is an independent sovereign state with a legitimately established

government based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is an effective government,

which has the wholehearted support of her people. The international status and personality of the

Republic of China cannot be changed merely because of the recognition of the Chinese

Communist regime by any country of the world. The legal status and international personality of

the Republic of China is a simple reality which the United States must recognize and respect.

President Carter announced the new policy, despite the International Security Assistance Act (P.L. 95-384) enacted

on September 26, 1978. Congress passed it with Senator Robert Dole’s amendment, saying that it is the sense of

Congress that it be consulted on any proposed policy changes affecting the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. Senator

Jacob Javits later wrote that the President made his announcement “with only the briefest notice to congressional

leaders,” and regarding the abrogation of the defense treaty, “the President’s action ignored a specific amendment

adopted by the Congress only two months before, in the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, calling for

‘prior consultation’ on ‘any proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force’ of that treaty.” (“Congress and

Foreign Relations: the Taiwan Relations Act,” Foreign Affairs, Fall 1981).

“Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China in Connection with the Establishment of ChinaU.S. Diplomatic Relations,” printed in Harding.

“President Chiang Ching-kuo’s Five Principles on U.S.-ROC Relations in the Post-Normalization Period,” December

29, 1978, printed in Martin L. Lasater, The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations (Boulder: Westview

Press, 1984). Lasater notes that Chiang informed U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher that future U.S.ROC ties must rest on five underlying principles of reality, continuity, security, legality, and governmentality. The

statement was summarized by James Soong, Deputy-Director of the ROC’s Government Information Office.

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PRC’s New Year’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan90

January 1, 1979

Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times.... Taiwan’s separation from the

motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and against our national interests and

aspirations, and this state of affairs must not be allowed to continue....

Unification of China now fits in with the direction of popular feeling and the general trend of

development. The world in general recognizes only one China, with the Government of the

People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government. The recent conclusion of the ChinaJapan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the

United States show still more clearly that no one can stop this trend....

We place great hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan authorities. The

Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and opposed an independent

Taiwan. This is our common stand and the basis for our cooperation....

The Chinese Government has ordered the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] to stop the

bombardment of Quemoy and other islands as of today. A state of military confrontation between

the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Strait. This can only create artificial tension. We hold

that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the

Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the

necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts and

exchanges in whatever area....

U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

(Normalization Communique)

January 1, 1979

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the

sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain

cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges91 the Chinese92 position that there

is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

“Text of NPC Standing Committee Message to Taiwan Compatriots,” New China News Agency, December 31, 1978.

This policy of “unification” replaced the earlier one of “liberation” of Taiwan. The PRC later elaborated on this policy

of peaceful unification in Marshal Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point Proposal” of September 30, 1981.

In the Chinese text, the word for “acknowledge” is “cheng ren” (recognize), a change from “ren shi” (acknowledge),

used in the 1972 Shanghai Communique. During debate on the TRA in February 1979, Senator Jacob Javits noted the

difference and said that “it is very important that we not subscribe to [the Chinese position on one China] either way.”

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded that “we regard the English text as being the binding text. We

regard the word ‘ackno

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