Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests

Congressional research reportMar 11, 2010

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Central Asia’s Security: Issues and

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Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs

March 11, 2010

Congressional Research Service

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CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests

Summary

The Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)

face common security challenges from crime, corruption, terrorism, and faltering commitments to

economic and democratic reforms. However, cooperation among them remains halting, so

security in the region is likely in the near term to vary by country. Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s

futures are most clouded by ethnic and territorial tensions, and corruption in Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan could spoil benefits from the development of their ample energy resources.

Authoritarianism and poverty in Uzbekistan could contribute to a succession crisis. On the other

hand, Kyrgyzstan’s beleaguered civil society might eventually help the relatively small nation

safeguard its independence. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan might become regional powers able to

champion policy solutions to common Central Asian problems and to resist undue influence from

more powerful outside powers, because of their large territories and populations and energy and

other resources.

Internal political developments in several bordering or close-by states may have a large impact on

Central Asian security. These developments include a more authoritarian and globalist Russia, an

economically growing China, instability in Iran and the South Caucasus region, and re-surging

drug production and Islamic extremism in Afghanistan.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the former Bush

Administration established bases and other military access in the region to support U.S.-led

coalition operations in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration has highlighted U.S. interests in

such continued access as well as the long-term security and stability of the region. U.S. interests

in Central Asia include combating terrorism, drug production, and trafficking; assisting the

development of oil and other resources; and fostering democratization, human rights, free

markets, and trade. The United States also seeks to thwart dangers posed to its security by the

illicit transfer of strategic missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies,

materials, and expertise to terrorist states or groups, and to address threats posed to regional

independence by Iran. Some critics counter that the United States has historically had few

interests in this region, and advocate only limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other

friends and allies to ensure U.S. goals. They also urge these friends and allies to enhance their

energy security by taking the lead in the development of diverse export routes for Central Asia’s

energy resources.

Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and reforms in Central

Asia. The 106th Congress authorized a “Silk Road” initiative for greater policy attention and aid

for democratization, market reforms, humanitarian needs, conflict resolution, transport

infrastructure (including energy pipelines), and border controls. The 108th and subsequent

Congresses have imposed conditions on foreign assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, based

on their human rights records. Congress has continued to debate the balance between U.S.

security interests in the region and interests in democratization and the protection of human

rights.

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Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

Central Asia’s External Security Context .....................................................................................1

Security Problems and Progress ..................................................................................................2

Islamic Extremism and Terrorism..........................................................................................3

Terrorist Activities ..........................................................................................................4

Attacks in Uzbekistan .....................................................................................................5

Attacks in Kyrgyzstan .....................................................................................................7

Incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan .....................................................................7

Civil War in Tajikistan.....................................................................................................8

Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan ................................................8

Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere................................................ 10

Border Tensions .................................................................................................................. 11

Crime and Corruption ......................................................................................................... 14

Economic and Defense Security .......................................................................................... 15

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) .................................................... 17

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) ............................................................ 18

Water Resources ........................................................................................................... 20

Energy and Transport .................................................................................................... 21

Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction............................................................... 26

Illegal Narcotics Production, Use, and Trafficking............................................................... 27

Implications for U.S. Interests ................................................................................................... 29

Reactions to U.S.-Led Coalition Actions in Iraq .................................................................. 31

Designations of Terrorist Organizations............................................................................... 32

Military Cooperation........................................................................................................... 34

Closure of Karshi-Khanabad ......................................................................................... 36

Emphasis on Kazakhstan as Strategic Partner ................................................................ 36

The Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan ................................................................................. 37

The “Transit Center” Agreement ................................................................................... 38

The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan.................................................. 39

U.S. Security Assistance...................................................................................................... 40

Nonproliferation ........................................................................................................... 41

Counter-Narcotics Aid................................................................................................... 42

Military Assistance........................................................................................................ 44

Conditions on Assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ............................................... 45

Safety of U.S. Citizens and Investments .............................................................................. 46

Embassy Security.......................................................................................................... 47

Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................. 48

Should the United States Play a Prominent Role in Central Asia? ........................................ 48

What Are U.S. Interests in Central Asia? ............................................................................. 49

What Roles Should Outside Powers Play in the Region? ..................................................... 50

How Significant Are Regional Energy Resources to U.S. Interests? ..................................... 51

What U.S. Security Involvement is Appropriate?................................................................. 52

Should the United States Try to Foster Democratization?..................................................... 53

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Tables

Table A-1. Central Asia: Basic Facts.......................................................................................... 62

Table A-2. U.S. Government Cumulative Budgeted Security Assistance to Central Asia

FY1992-FY2008, FREEDOM Support Act and Agency Budgets............................................ 64

Table A-3. Peace and Security Assistance and Total Budgeted Assistance to Central Asia

FY1992-FY2008, FREEDOM Support Act and Agency Budgets............................................ 66

Appendixes

Appendix. Selected Outside Players .......................................................................................... 55

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 67

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Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests

Introduction

The Central Asian region—bordering regional powers Russia, China, and Iran—is an age-old

east-west and north-south trade and transport crossroads.1 After many of the former Soviet

Union’s republics had declared their independence by late 1991, the five republics of Central Asia

followed suit. Since this beginning of independence, surprising to most of the region’s population,

the Central Asian countries have taken some uneven steps in building defense and other security

structures and ties. In some respects, the states have viewed their exposure to outside influences

as a mixed blessing. While welcoming new trade, aid, and other ties, the leaders of Central Asia

have been less receptive to calls to democratize and respect human rights.

This report discusses the internal and external security concerns of the Central Asian states.

Security concerns faced by the states include mixes of social disorder, crime, corruption,

terrorism, ethnic and civil conflict, border tensions, water and transport disputes, the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and trafficking in illegal narcotics and persons. The

Central Asian states have tried with varying success to bolster their security forces and regional

cooperation to deal with these threats. The United States has provided assistance for these efforts

and boosted such aid and involvement after the terrorist attacks on the United States on

September 11, 2001, but questions remain about what should be the appropriate level and scope

of U.S. interest and presence in the region.

Central Asia’s External Security Context

Central Asia’s states have slowly consolidated and extended their relations with neighboring and

other countries and international organizations that seek to play influential roles in Central Asia or

otherwise affect regional security. These include the bordering or close-by countries of Russia,

Afghanistan, China, Iran, Turkey, and the South Caucasus states (see below, Appendix), and

others such as the United States, Germany, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South

Korea, and Ukraine. In terms of ties with close-by states, Turkmenistan may be concerned more

about bordering Iran and Afghanistan than with non-bordering China, while Kazakhstan may be

concerned more about bordering Russia than with non-bordering Afghanistan. While soliciting

and managing ties with these states, the Central Asian countries also seek assistance through

regional and international organizations, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund

(IMF), Economic Community Organization (ECO), Organization of the Islamic Conference

(OIC), the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), and NATO.

Outside powers, while sometimes competing among themselves for influence in Central Asia,

also have some common interests. After September 11, 2001, Russia, China, and the United

States cooperated somewhat in combating terrorism in the region. This cooperation has appeared

to ebb since then, but as the security situation in Afghanistan becomes more complicated,

Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan. For overviews, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by (nam

e redacted); CRS Report 97-690,

Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by (name redacted); CRS Report 98-594,

Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by (name redacted); CRS Report 97-1055,

Turkmenistan: Recent

Developments and U.S. Interests, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RS21238,

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and

U.S. Interests, by (name redacted).

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cooperation may improve. Cooperation is also needed to combat drug, arms, and human

trafficking, manage water resources, develop and deliver energy, and tackle infectious diseases.

Iran and Russia have collaborated since the latter 1990s to hinder the United States and Turkey

from further involvement in developing Caspian Sea oil and natural gas resources. Some

observers warn that increasing collaboration or similarity of interests among Russia, Iran, and

China in countering the West and in attempting to increase their influence could heighten threats

to the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states. Others discount such threats,

stressing the ultimately diverging goals of the three states.

Security Problems and Progress

The problems of authoritarian regimes, crime, corruption, terrorism, and ethnic and civil tensions

jeopardize the security and independence of all the new states of Central Asia, though to varying

degrees. Kazakhstan has faced the potential of separatism in northern Kazakhstan where ethnic

Russians are dominant, although this threat has appeared to ebb in recent years with the

emigration of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians. Tajikistan faces threats from economic

mismanagement and the possibility of separatism, particularly by its northern Soghd (formerly

Leninabad) region. In Kyrgyzstan, northern and southern regional interests vie for influence over

central political and economic decision-making. Turkmenistan faces clan and provincial tensions

and widespread poverty that could contribute to instability. Uzbekistan faces escalating civil

discontent and violence from those whom President Islam Karimov labels as Islamic extremists,

from a large ethnic Tajik population, and from an impoverished citizenry. Ethnic Uzbeks and

Kyrgyz clashed in 1990 in the Fergana Valley. This fertile valley is divided between Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and contains about one-fifth of Central Asia’s population. All the

states are harmed by drug and human trafficking and associated corruption and health problems.

Despite these problems, Turkmenistan’s oil and gas wealth could contribute to its long-term

stability. Also, its location at a locus of Silk Road trade routes potentially could increase its

economic security. Uzbekistan’s large population and many resources, including oil, natural gas,

and gold, could provide a basis for its stable development and security. Kyrgyzstan’s beleaguered

civil society might eventually succeed in reducing authoritarianism and boosting entrepreneurial

activity and good governance, which eventually might permit the country to increase its

budgetary expenditures for defense and security.

It would seem that affinities among the current regional elites would facilitate cooperative ties.

Many of the officials in the states learned a common language (Russian) and were Communist

Party members. Religion (Islam) and ethnicity (Turkic or Persian) are other seeming grounds for

links among most in the region. In actuality, however, regional cooperation has been halting.

The vast majority of the people in the Central Asian states suffered steep declines in their quality

of life in the first few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The gap widened between

the rich and poor, accentuating social tensions and potential instability. Social services such as

health and education, inadequate during the Soviet period, declined further. In the new century,

however, negative trends in poverty and health have been reversed in much of Central Asia,

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according to one World Bank report, although the quality of life remains far below that of

Western countries.2

Economic difficulties associated with the world financial crisis that began in 2008 could

exacerbate social tensions, separatism, and extremism, although large percentages of the states’

populations remain employed in the agricultural sector where economic gyrations have been

somewhat buffered. This sector has a surfeit of manpower, however, and cannot readily absorb

new workers as the populations continue to increase. In the past, substantial out-migration by

many workers to Russia and the return of remittances to relatives in Central Asia somewhat eased

poverty and tension and buttressed national GDPs. However, Russia’s economic problems have

caused these remittances to fall off and have forced many of these guest workers to return to their

countries of origin.3

Islamic Extremism and Terrorism

Calls for government to be based on Sharia (Islamic law) and the Koran are supported by small

but increasing minorities in most of Central Asia. Most of Central Asia’s Muslims appear to

support the concept of secular government, but the influence of fundamentalist Salafist and

extremist Islamic groups is growing. 4 Tajikistan’s civil conflict, where the issue of Islam in

political life contributed to strife, has been pointed to by Central Asian leaders to justify

crackdowns. They also point to Russia’s conflict with its breakaway Chechnya region and other

areas in Russia’s North Caucasus as evidence of the threat. In many cases, government

crackdowns ostensibly aimed against Islamic extremism have masked clan, political, and

religious repression. In some regions of Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan’s portion of the Fergana

Valley, some Uzbeks kept Islamic practices alive throughout the repressive Soviet period, and

some now oppose the secular-oriented Uzbek government. Islamic extremist threats to the

regimes may well increase as economic distress fails to dissipate or widens as a result of the

global economic crisis. Heavy unemployment and poverty rates among youth in the Fergana

Valley are widely cited by observers as making youth more vulnerable to recruitment into

religious extremist organizations.5

Although much of the attraction of Islamic extremism in Central Asia is generated by factors such

as poverty and discontent, it is facilitated by groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and

elsewhere that provide funding, education, training, and manpower to the region. Some of these

ties were at least partially disrupted by the U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan and the U.S.

call for worldwide cooperation in combating terrorism.6

Asad Alam, Mamta Murthi, Ruslan Yemtsov, Edmundo Murrugarra, Nora Dudwick, Ellen Hamilton, and Erwin

Tiongson, Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, The World Bank, 2005.

Michael Mihalka, “Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, State-Building and Security Cooperation in Central

Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006. pp. 131-151.

Most Central Asian Muslims traditionally have belonged to the Sunni branch and the Hanafi school of interpretation.

Islamic Sufiism has been significant, as have pre-Islamic customs such as ancestor veneration and visits to shrines.

Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale: Yale University Press, 2002; T. Jeremy

Gunn, Sociology of Religion, Fall 2003, pp. 389-410; Pinar Akcali, Central Asian Survey, June 1998, pp. 267-284; Aziz

Niyazi, Religion, State & Society, March 1998, pp. 39-50.

Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus:

Implications for the EU, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2006.

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The Central Asian states impose several controls over religious freedom. All except Tajikistan

forbid religious parties such as the Islamic Renewal Party (Tajikistan’s civil war settlement

included the IRP’s legalization), and maintain Soviet-era religious oversight bodies, official

Muftiates, and approved clergy. The governments censor religious literature and sermons.

According to some analysts, the close government religious control may leave a spiritual gulf that

underground radical Islamic groups seek to fill.

Officials in Uzbekistan believe that the country is increasingly vulnerable to Islamic extremism,

and they have been at the forefront in Central Asia in combating this threat. Reportedly,

thousands of alleged Islamic extremists have been imprisoned and many mosques have been

closed. Restrictions were tightened when the legislature in 1998 passed a law on “freedom of

worship” banning all unregistered faiths, censoring religious writings, and making it a crime to

teach religion without a license. The Uzbek legislature also approved amendments to the criminal

code increasing punishments for setting up, leading, or participating in religious extremist,

separatist, fundamentalist, or other illegal groups. Public expressions of religiosity are

discouraged. Women who wear the hijab and young men who wear beards are faced with

government harassment and intimidation. As recommended by the U.S. Commission on

International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), then-Secretary Rice in November 2006 designated

Uzbekistan a “country of particular concern” (CPC), where severe religious and human rights

violations could lead to U.S. sanctions. Since 2000, USCIRF also has recommended that

Turkmenistan be designated as a CPC.7

Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states have arrested many members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT;

Liberation Party, a politically oriented Islamic movement calling for the establishment of Sharia

rule), sentencing them to lengthy prison terms or even death for pamphleteering, but HT

reportedly continues to gain adherents. Uzbekistan argues that HT not only advocates terrorism

and the killing of apostates but is carrying out such acts.8 Kyrgyz authorities emphasize the antiAmerican and anti-Semitic nature of several HT statements and agree with the Uzbek government

on designating the group as an illegal terrorist organization, but some prominent observers in

Kyrgyzstan argue that the group is largely pacific and should not be harassed. 9

Terrorist Activities

Terrorist actions aimed at overthrowing regimes have been of growing concern in all the Central

Asian states. Some analysts caution that many activities the regimes label as terrorist—such as

hijacking, kidnapping, robbery, assault, and murder—are often carried out by individuals or

groups for economic benefit or for revenge, rather than for political purposes. Also, so-called

counter-terrorism may mask repressive actions against religious or political opponents of the

regime.

U.S. Department of State. International Religious Freedom Report 2006, September 15, 2006. U.S. Commission on

International Religious Freedom. Annual Report, May 2, 2005; Annual Report, May 3, 2006; Annual Report, May 1,

2007; Annual Report, May 1, 2008; Annual Report, May 1, 2009. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a

CPC in its 2005 report.

Cheryl Bernard has argued that HT writings borrow heavily from Marxism-Leninism and rely much less on Islamic

principles. HT publications have stated that the movement “has adopted the amount [of Islam] which it needs as a

political party,” that the Islamic world is the last hope for establishing communism, and that terrorist acts against

Western interests are appropriate. Hizb ut Tahrir—Bolsheviks in the Mosque, RAND Corporation, nd.

HT literature has demanded the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces and the closure of the coalition’s Manas

airbase in Kyrgyzstan. CEDR, March 13, 2003, Doc. No. CEP -104; CEDR, January 7, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-91.

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Terrorist activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and similar groups in the

region were at least temporarily disrupted by U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan, where

several of the groups were based or harbored. 10 Many observers, however, warn that terrorist cells

have re-formed and are expanding in Central Asia and that surviving elements of the IMU and

other terrorist groups are infiltrating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere.11 Ominously, the

IMU and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU; see below), have become even more

closely allied with international terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda. Moreover, the IMU and

IJU have expanded their activities beyond Central and South Asia to other areas of the globe.

Attacks in Uzbekistan

Several explosions outside government buildings in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, were

variously reported to have killed 13-28 and wounded 100-351 individuals. Uzbek officials

detained hundreds or thousands of suspects, including political oppositionists and HT members.

The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 resulted in six receiving the death sentence. Karimov in

April 1999 alleged that Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the

banned Erk Party) was the mastermind of the plot, and had received support from the Taliban and

Uzbek Islamic extremist Tohir Yuldash. The 22 suspects were described in court proceedings as

receiving training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban), Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia (by Al Qaeda

terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and as led by Solikh and Yuldash and his ally Jama Namanganiy,

the latter two the heads of the IMU. Testimony alleged that Solikh had made common cause with

Yuldash and Namanganiy in mid-1997, and that Solikh, Yuldash, Namanganiy, and others had

agreed that Solikh would be president and Yuldash defense minister after Karimov was

overthrown and a caliphate established. According to an Uzbek media report in early July 1999,

the coup plot included a planned attack on Uzbekistan by Namanganiy and other Tajik rebels

transiting through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (see below).

Another secret trial in August 1999 of six suspects in the bombings (brothers of Solikh or

members of his Erk Party) resulted in sentences ranging from 8 to 15 years. In November 2000,

the Uzbek Supreme Court convicted twelve persons of terrorism, nine of whom were tried in

absentia. The absent Yuldash and Namangoniy were given death sentences, and the absent Solikh

15.5 years in prison. U.S. officials criticized the apparent lack of due process during the trial.

Solikh has rejected accusations of involvement in the bombings or membership in the IMU.

Yuldsash too has eschewed responsibility for the bombings, but warned that more might occur if

Karimov does not step down.

On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of bombings and armed attacks were launched in

Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. President Karimov asserted on March 29 that the violence was

aimed against his government, in order to “cause panic among our people, to make them lose

their trust in the policies being carried out.” An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG;

Also, Russia’s military operations in its breakaway Chechnya region after 1999 may have helped disrupt Al Qaeda

plans for Central Asia. The terrorist group was operating terrorist training camps in Chechnya in the late 1990s that it

planned to use in part as launching pads for establishing new cells and camps throughout Central Asia. Defense

Intelligence [Agency] Report Details al Qaeda’s Plans for Russia, Chechnya & WMD, Judicial Watch, Press Office,

November 16, 2004. The declassified Intelligence Information Report is dated October 1998.

CEDR, March 6, 2003, Doc. No. 217. In testimony in October 2003, then-Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth

Jones stated that “there is a resurgence of the ability of the IMU to operate” in Central Asia and that it “represents a

serious threat to the region and therefore to our interests.” U.S. Congress. House International Relations Committee.

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Hearing, October 29, 2003.

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Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, reportedly an alias of the IMU or a breakaway part of the IMU)

claimed responsibility for the violence.12 After the attacks, media censorship intensified. The first

national trial of fifteen suspects accused of attempting to overthrow the government ended in late

August 2004. They all confessed their guilt and received sentences of 11-16 years in prison. Some

of the defendants testified that they belonged to the IJG and were trained by Arabs and others at

camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that IMU member Najmiddin Jalolov (one of

those convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of the IJG and linked him to Taliban head

Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. Over 100

individuals reportedly were convicted in various trials.

Suicide bombings occurred in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on July 30, 2004, at the U.S. and Israeli

embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office. Three Uzbek guards reportedly were killed

and about a dozen people were injured. All U.S. and Israeli diplomatic personnel were safe. The

next day, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell condemned the “terrorist attacks.” The IMU and

the IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the bombings were aimed against the Uzbek and

other “apostate” governments (see also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan:

Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, by (name redacted)).

Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek

troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to

demand the end of a trial of 23 prominent local businessmen charged with belonging to an

Islamic terrorist group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held

and released hundreds of inmates. There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group

contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed mainly of the friends and families of the

accused. Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings. President

Islam Karimov flew to the city to direct operations and reportedly had restored order by late on

May 13. The United States and others in the international community have called for an

international inquiry, which the Uzbek government has rejected (see also CRS Report RS22161,

Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by (name redacted)).

On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took

place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial

district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,

although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly

claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,

shooting took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and the

apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had been

involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent. In early December

2009, the Andijon regional court reportedly convicted 22 individuals on charges of involvement

in the May 2009 events, and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from five to 18 years.

The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005. According to Uzbek reporter Aleksey

Volosevich, the group “was headed by Najmiddin Jalolov, born in Andijon in 1972, and his deputy, Mansur Sohayil,

whose nickname is Abu Huzaifa. Both of them are ethnic Uzbeks. They fell out with Tohir Yuldash unhappy with the

absence of active combat actions on the territory of Uzbekistan.... Jalolov managed to get the backing of Al Qaeda

regional leaders, after promising them to set up something like a Central Asian structural body of the organization.”

CEDR, October 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950261.

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Attacks in Kyrgyzstan

In recent years there have been sporadic suicide bombings and other attacks seemingly aimed

against the government. One took place at the Oberon market in Bishkek in December 2002, one

at a currency exchange outlet in Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan in May 2003, and one in Bishkek

that targeted policemen in November 2004. The explosion at the Oberon market killed seven

Kyrgyz citizens and injured over 20 people. One person was killed in Osh. Five people, including

three Uzbeks, a Uighur citizen of China, and a Kyrgyz, were charged in July 2003 with

involvement in the first two bombings. Kyrgyz security officials claimed that they were IMU

members trained in Chechnya (by Al Qaeda’s Khattab) and Afghanistan and that they had also

planned to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek but were foiled by tight security around the

embassy.13 In contrast to these terrorist incidents, the former Bush Administration regarded the

March 2005 ouster of Akayev as a popular uprising.

Incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

Several hundred Islamic extremists and others who fled repression in Uzbekistan and settled in

Tajikistan (some of whom were being forced out at Uzbekistan’s behest), and rogue groups from

Tajikistan that refused to disarm as part of the Tajik peace settlement, entered Kyrgyzstan in JulyAugust 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group. The guerrillas seized hostages,

including four Japanese geologists, and occupied several Kyrgyz villages, stating that they would

cease hostilities if Kyrgyzstan provided harborage and would release hostages if Uzbekistan

released jailed extremists. The guerrillas were rumored to be seeking to create an Islamic state in

south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. In mid-October 1999, Kyrgyzstan’s

defense minister announced success in forcing virtually all the guerrillas into Tajikistan (some

critics argued that the onset of winter weather played an important part in the guerrilla retreat).

Uzbek aircraft targeted several alleged guerrilla hideouts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, eliciting

protests from these states of violating airspace. Uzbek President Islam Karimov heavily criticized

Kyrgyzstan’s then-President Askar Akayev for supposed laxity in suppressing the guerrillas. The

Tajik government, which had mercurial relations with Uzbekistan, incensed it by allowing the

guerrillas to enter Afghanistan rather than wiping them out.

According to many observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorists in Afghanistan,

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia (Chechnya and Dagestan) and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan’s

security forces in combating threats to its independence. Observers were split on whether this

terrorism was related more to Islamic extremism, or to efforts to control narcotics resources and

routes.

Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000,

in Kyrgyzstan taking foreigners hostage and leading to thousands of Kyrgyz fleeing the area.

Uzbekistan provided air and some other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for

defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. In Uzbekistan, the insurgents launched attacks near

Tashkent and in the southeast that were defeated by Uzbek troops.

Limited engagements by Kyrgyz border troops with alleged insurgents or drug traffickers were

reported in late July 2001. According to some reports, the IMU did not engage in major attacks in

CEDR, February 16, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-237; June 23, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-178; and May 14, 2003, Doc. No. CEP443.

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2001 because of its increasing attention to bin Laden’s agenda, particularly after September 11,

2001, when IMU forces fought alongside bin Laden and the Taliban against the U.S.-led

coalition. The activities of the IMU appeared to have been dealt a blow by the U.S.-led coalition.

Civil War in Tajikistan

Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward

independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of

nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and movements—largely consisting of members of

Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power—tried to take

over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a

successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and

up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. In 1993,

the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan. These forces consisted of Russia’s 201st Rifle

Division, based in Tajikistan, and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kyrgyz and

Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-1999).

Terrorist actions were carried out by both sides, and international terrorist groups provided some

support to the Tajik opposition. Reportedly, these groups included the IMU, Iran’s Revolutionary

Guards, and Al Qaeda.14 As the civil war wound down in the late 1990s, most of these forces left

Tajikistan.

After the Tajik government and opposition agreed to a cease-fire in September 1994, the UNSC

established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994 with a

mandate to monitor the cease-fire, later expanded to investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the

demobilization of Tajik opposition fighters, assist ex-combatants to integrate into society, and

offer advice for holding elections. In December 1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National

Reconciliation Commission (NRC), an executive body composed equally of government and

opposition members. On June 27, 1997, Tajik President Emomaliy Rakhman and opposition

leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed the comprehensive peace agreement, under which Rakhman

remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allotted to the opposition. Benchmarks of

the peace process were largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel

forces, legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of elections. In March 2000, the NRC

disbanded, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. The CIS declared its peacekeeping mandate

fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing agreement. Stability in

Tajikistan remains fragile.

Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan

According to some estimates, there are some 4,000 IMU fighters in Afghanistan. Pakistan

reported in November 2006 that it had arrested IJU members who had placed rockets near

presidential offices, the legislature, and the headquarters of military intelligence in Islamabad.

Reportedly, the IJU was targeting the government because of its support for the United States.15

Pakistani media reported in March-April 2007 that dozens of IMU members had been killed in

Osama bin Laden in mid-1991 began dispatching mujahidin to assist in overthrowing the then-communist regime in

Tajikistan. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report, July 23, 2004, pp. 58, 64.

BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 4, 2006.

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northern Pakistan when local tribes turned against them, possibly reducing their strength or

forcing them to move into Afghanistan and Central Asia. More alleged IMU and IJU members

were reported killed by Pakistani forces during fighting in North Waziristan in October 2007.

Indicating a widening of the IMU’s focus, Tohir Yuldash called in January 2008 for creating a

Shariah state in Pakistan.

Among other incidents:

•

In January 2008, an IJU website seemed to indicate that Abu Laith al-Libi—an al

Qaeda official who had been killed by the United States in Pakistan—had been

one of the leaders of the IJU. 16

•

In March 2008, an IJU website claimed that one of its members—the Germanborn Cunyt Ciftci (alias Saad Abu Fourkan)—had assisted Taliban forces in

Afghanistan by carrying out a suicide bombing that killed two Afghan and two

U.S. troops and wounded several others.17 According to the IJU website and other

sources, IJU is playing a more significant role in fighting in Afghanistan.

•

In June 2008, an IJU video claimed that one Uzbek IJU member had taken part in

the 1999 attack in Kyrgyzstan, and later had fought in Afghanistan against the

Northern Alliance and then against U.S. and NATO forces. Another Uzbek

member had been trained in Chechnya by Khattab in 1998 and also had fought

against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.18

•

In July and September 2009, ISAF and the Afghan military reportedly carried out

operations in the northern Konduz province against IMU terrorists who

supposedly had moved into the province after being forced out of Pakistan.

•

Tohir Yuldash allegedly was killed in Pakistan by a U.S. predator missile on

September 26, 2009. A Russian Tatar, Abdur Rakhman, allegedly became the new

leader of the IMU.

•

On October 11, 2009, 10 terrorists attacked the army headquarters in Rawalpindi,

resulting in 20 deaths. The government alleges that three of the attackers

belonged to the IMU.

•

In late October 2009, Pakistani armed forces reportedly were attacking an IMU

base in the town of Kaniguram in South Waziristan.

•

In February 2010, Pakistani media reported that a U.S. predator missile killed

several terrorists in North Waziristan, including four Uzbek citizens. The

terrorists were said to be linked to Al Qaeda.

•

In February 2010, alleged IMU terrorists attacked a police station in Bannu,

North West Frontier Province, Pakistan, killing 15 police and civilians.

Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism,

Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2008; U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Prepared Testimony of

Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell: The Annual Threat Assessment, February 5, 2008.

Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda; UPI, March 17, 2008.

CEDR, August 4, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-318001.

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Some officials in Central Asia have warned that the crackdown on the IMU and IJU in Pakistan

and Afghanistan may be forcing some of the terrorists to return to Central Asia. Other officials

have stated that a large-scale influx has not yet occurred.

Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere

Officials in Germany arrested four individuals on September 5, 2007, on charges of planning

explosions at the U.S. airbase at Ramstein, at U.S. and Uzbek diplomatic offices, and other targets

in Germany. The IJU claimed responsibility and stated that it was targeting U.S. and Uzbek

interests because of these countries’ “brutal policies towards Muslims,” and targeting Germany

because it has a small military base in Termez, Uzbekistan, which is used to support NATO

operations in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the suspects had received their orders from Gofir Salimov

(not apprehended), who is wanted in Uzbekistan in connection with the 2004 bombings. The

suspects were part of a larger IJU branch in Germany. In U.S. congressional testimony on

September 10, 2007, the then-Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, John Redd, and

the then-Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, stated that U.S. communications

intercepts shared with Germany had facilitated foiling the plot. In July 2009, German media

reported that the suspects had confessed that they were trained at an IJU terrorist training camp in

Afghanistan. The leader of the IJU was identified as Najmiddin Jalolov (mentioned above), a.k.a.

“commander Ahmad.” In testimony in September 2009, two of the defendants admitted that while

in Afghanistan in 2006, they had launched attacks against two U.S. military camps.19

Among other incidents:

•

In May 2008, French, German, and Dutch authorities reported that they had

detained 10 individuals for suspicion of running a network to funnel money to

the IMU in Uzbekistan.

•

In late September 2008, German authorities reported the arrest of two suspected

members of IJU and issued wanted posters for two other suspected members. The

four allegedly had received terrorist training in Pakistani IJU camps. German

authorities also arrested two people allegedly attempting to leave the country to

undergo terrorism training in Pakistan by the IJU (they later were released on the

grounds of inconclusive evidence).20

•

A video released by the IJU in late October 2008 stated that as long as Germany

supports NATO operations in Afghanistan, and uses a base in Uzbekistan to

support these operations, it is subject to IJU attacks.

•

A video was released by the IJU in January 2009 that threatened German

“occupation” troops in Afghanistan.

•

Turkish authorities arrested over three dozen alleged IJU members in April 2009.

Guido Steinberg has argued that several dozen recruits of various ethnic groups have travelled from Germany to

Pakistan for training in IMU and IJU camps. Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report, August 10, 2009, Doc. No.

EUP-72003.

Simon Sturdee, “German Commandos Arrest Two Terror Suspects on Aircraft,” Agence France Presse, September

26, 2008; Craig Whitlock, “Germany Pulls Two Suspected Terrorism Trainees from Plane,” Washington Post,

September 27, 2008, p. A14.

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•

German media reported in June 2009 that a video released by the IJU provided

more evidence that the terrorist organization was linked to al Qaeda.21

Border Tensions

Borders among the five Central Asian states for the most part were delineated by 1936, based

partly on where linguistic and ethnic groups had settled, but mainly on the exigencies of Soviet

control over the region. The resulting borders are ill-defined in mountainous areas and extremely

convoluted in the fertile Fergana Valley, parts of which belong to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and

Uzbekistan. Over a dozen tiny enclaves add to the complicated situation, as does Soviet-era

decisions to build roads and railways with scant regard to intra-regional borders. Some in Central

Asia have demanded that borders be redrawn to incorporate areas inhabited by co-ethnics, or

otherwise dispute the location of borders.

Caspian Sea borders have not been fully agreed upon, mainly because of Iranian intransigence,

but Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan also have not resolved their mutual claims to undersea oil and

gas resources. In August 2009, Turkmenistan called for the issue of the disputed offshore

resources to be adjudicated, presumably by the International Court of Justice. In November 2009,

Senior Advisor to the US State Department in Eurasian Energy Affairs, Daniel Stein, reportedly

offered U.S. good offices to mediate the dispute, but stated that even if such a settlement is not

soon reached, the United States believed that trans-Caspian pipelines still could be built. Iran’s

foreign minister Manoucher Mottaki reportedly denounced the U.S. offer, asserting that the

littoral states will be the sole arbiters of the borders.22 Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on

delineation and shared exploitation of seabed oil resources.

China has largely settled border delineation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan,

reportedly involving “splitting the difference” on many of the disputed territories, which are

usually in unpopulated areas. Popular passions were aroused in Kyrgyzstan after a 1999 ChinaKyrgyzstan border agreement ceded about 9,000 hectares of mountainous Kyrgyz terrain. Kyrgyz

legislators in 2001 opened a hearing and even threatened to try to impeach then-President

Akayev. He arrested the leader of the impeachment effort, leading to violent demonstrations in

2002 calling for his ouster and the reversal of the “traitorous” border agreement. Dissident

legislators appealed the border agreement to the Constitutional Court, which ruled in 2003 that it

was legal. In June 2006, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev visited China and assuaged

Chinese concerns by signing a joint declaration with Chairman Hu Jintao which re-affirmed that

“the parties will abide strictly by all the agreements and documents signed between the two

countries on the border issue.” In July 2009, the Kyrgyz Border Service reportedly rebutted

claims by some Kyrgyz legislators and others that some territory was being ceded to China and

confirmed that all border demarcation issues with China had been resolved. 23

The problem of delineating their 4,200 mile border has been an important source of concern to

Russia and Kazakhstan. During most of the 1990s, neither Russia nor Kazakhstan wished to push

border delineation, Russia because of concerns that it would be conceding that Kazakhstan’s

heavily ethnic Russian northern regions are part of Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan because of

Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report (hereafter EDR), June 5, 2009, Doc. No. EUP-85023.

Open Source Center. Iran: Daily Report, November 25, 2009, Doc. No. IAP-434001.

CEDR, February 28, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-284; March 9, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-27; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP950306; ITAR-TASS, July 14, 2009.

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concerns that delineation might inflame separatism. In 1998, Russia established border patrols

along its border with Kazakhstan for security reasons, and determined to delineate the border. By

late 2004, most of the Russian-Kazakh border had in principle been delimited, but the sides are

still involved in the placement of border signs and border posts.24 To head off separatist

proclivities in the north, Kazakhstan reorganized administrative borders in northern regions to

dilute the influence of ethnic Russians, established a strongly centralized government to limit

local rule, and moved its capital northward. These and other moves apparently contributed to

political resignation among many ethnic Russians, and many emigrated to Russia.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have agreed on the delimitation of about one-half of their 579 mile

shared border and pledged in September 2007 to peacefully settle contentious disputes involving

borders in the Fergana Valley. These disputes have resulted in some deaths and injuries. Tensions

have increased because of demographic shifts along the border. Some Kyrgyz allege that Tajiks

have moved into lands in Kyrgyzstan that have been vacated by Kyrgyz, who have moved to

cities or become migrant workers. Conversely, some Tajiks allege that Kyrgyz have moved into

their lands. 25 In January 2010, Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi stated that the

delineation of borders with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was “very complicated since quite often

the borderline crosses towns, cities, streets and even separate houses,” but that Russia recently

had provided archival information that might facilitate the settlement of border disputes.26

Uzbekistan has had contentious border talks with all the other Central Asian states. According to

Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, about 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s 680-mile border with

Uzbekistan remains to be demarcated. 27 Legislators and others in Kyrgyzstan in 2001 vehemently

protested a border delineation agreement with Uzbekistan reached by the two prime ministers that

ceded a swath of the Kyrgyz Batken region, ostensibly to improve Uzbek access to its Sokh

enclave in Kyrgyzstan. Faced with this protest, the Kyrgyz government sent a demarche to

Uzbekistan repudiating any intention to cede territory. Similarly, in late 2004 Kyrgyz legislators

demanded that Uzbekistan’s Shohimardon enclave in Kyrgyzstan (ceded in the 1930s) be

returned.28 These and other contentious issues resulted in the cessation of border talks between

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for five years until they resumed in December 2009.

Uzbekistan’s unilateral efforts to delineate and fortify its borders with Kazakhstan in the late

1990s led to tensions. In September 2002, however, the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents announced

that delineation of their 1,400 mile border was complete, and some people in previously disputed

border villages began to relocate if they felt that the new borders cut them off from their

“homeland.” However, many people continued to ignore the new border or were uncertain of its

location, leading to several shootings of Kazakh citizens by Uzbek border troops. In one case,

transit between the villages of Arnasay and Kostakyr in South Kazakhstan and the rest of

Kazakhstan was cut off when an area of the sole roadway from the towns was ceded to

ITAR-TASS, August 7, 2008.

CEDR, September 18, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950239; December 24, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950130; August 11, 2009,

Doc. No. CEP-950103; “Kyrgyzstan: Ambiguous Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Increases Risk Of Conflict,” Eurasia Insight,

February 2, 2009.

CEDR, January 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP950107; ITAR-TASS, January 18, 2010.

CEDR, February 17, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088; September 8, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950162; December 13, 2007,

Doc. No. CEP-950238; January 12, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950025; May 14, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950537; January 24,

2009, Doc. No. CEP-950013; December 29, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950177.

CEDR, November 6, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-130.

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Uzbekistan. Residents complained that Uzbek border guards were constantly arresting them for

violating the border, while Kazakh officials called for the residents to relocate. 29

The Uzbek and Tajik presidents signed an accord in October 2002 delimiting most of their 720mile joint border. Contention has continued over about 15-20% of the border. In October 2006,

the head of the Tajik border guard service complained that demarcation was being hindered by

Uzbekistan’s peremptory placement of border markers, barbed wire and fences.30 Some Tajiks

have raised concerns that Uzbekistan wants to redraw borders in order to take possession of the

Farhod reservoir on the Syr Darya River. 31

Besides border claims, other problems revolve around whether borders are open or closed. Open

borders within the Central Asian states after the breakup of the Soviet Union were widely viewed

as fostering trafficking in drugs and contraband and free migration, so border controls

increasingly have been tightened in all the states.

Uzbekistan mined areas of its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1999, intending to

protect it against terrorist incursions, but in fact leading to many civilian Kyrgyz and Tajik

casualties. Kyrgyzstan has demanded that Uzbekistan clear mines it has sown along the borders,

including some allegedly sown on Kyrgyz territory, but Uzbekistan has asserted that it will

maintain the minefields to combat terrorism. (Kyrgyzstan too has raised tensions by sowing

mines and blowing up mountain passes along its borders with Tajikistan.) Border tensions

between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also flared in late 2002, after Turkmenistan accused

Uzbek officials of complicity in the coup attempt. Uzbekistan’s economic problems led it in mid2002 to impose heavy duties on imports and at the beginning of 2003 to close its borders to

“suitcase trading” (small-scale, unregulated trading), heightening tensions with bordering states.

Sharp disagreements remain between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on mine clearing, Uzbek

restrictions on Tajik transportation, clashes between Uzbek and Tajik border guards, and the

Uzbek visa regime with Tajikistan. In July 2009, Tajikistan began building a short railway spur to

link the capital more directly with the Qurghonteppa region to the south, to circumvent a longer

route through Uzbekistan that involved complicated customs requirements.32

After terrorists carried out several attacks in Uzbekistan in May 2009, Uzbekistan alleged that

they had entered the country from Kyrgyzstan, and built more concrete walls, trenches, and

ditches along the border. The Kyrgyz Border Service stated in June 2009 that Uzbekistan was

violating bilateral accords that stipulated that such border fortifications should not be built “until

the delineation and demarcation of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan state borders is completed.” Uzbek

officials reportedly alleged that they were forced to make unilateral decisions about the location

of borders while emplacing fortifications because Kyrgyzstan had refused to meet to demarcate

borders. One trench reportedly was moved to accommodate Kyrgyz concerns.33

CEDR, January 15, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950078.

CEDR, October 20, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950282. In the case of contention between the residents of the Batken

region in southern Kyrgyzstan and the bordering Soghd region in northern Tajikistan, the U.N. Development Program

has implemented initiatives to create mutual trust and the sharing of trans-border resources such as water. CEDR,

March 20, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950134; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950045.

Victoria Naumova, “Tajikistan, Uzbekistan to Hold Next Border Delineation Negotiations in Late April,” Asia-Plus,

April 18, 2009; CEDR, April 9, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950027; July 24, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950177.

CEDR, January 24, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088.

CEDR, October 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950261; September 4, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950154.

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Iran’s intransigence in settling on Caspian Sea borders has contributed to the build-up of naval

forces and the failure to build trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines. In August 2002, Russia

conducted the largest naval maneuvers in its history in the northern Caspian. Kazakhstan

announced its intent to form a navy in early 2003, leading to protests from the Russian Foreign

Ministry, but Kazakh military officials emphasized their determination to proceed with plans to

protect their offshore oil fields and maritime borders. There reportedly were about 3,000 naval

personnel in late 2008. Turkmenistan’s dispute with Azerbaijan over sea borders and the

ownership of offshore oilfields also has stymied the development of trans-Caspian pipelines.

Crime and Corruption

Organized crime networks have expanded in all the Central Asian states, and have established ties

with crime groups worldwide that are involved in drug, arms, and human trafficking. All the

states serve as origin, transit, or destination states for human trafficking. Crime groups collude

with local border and other officials to transport people to the Middle East or other destinations

for forced labor or prostitution.34

Corruption is a serious threat to democratization and economic growth in all the states. The

increasing amount of foreign currency entering the states as the result of foreign oil and natural

gas investments, the low pay of most government bureaucrats, and inadequate laws and norms are

conducive to the growth of corruption. Perhaps most significantly, the weakness of the rule of law

permits the Soviet-era political patronage and spoils system to continue.

According to the World Bank:

•

in Kazakhstan, corruption showed relatively little change over the period from

1996-2008. The country was at the 16th percentile in 2008 (that is, 178 of 212

countries had better records in combating corruption);

•

in Kyrgyzstan, corruption increased over the time period 1996-2007, but declined

slightly in 2008. The country was at the 13th percentile in 2008;

•

in Tajikistan, corruption declined slightly over the time period 1996-2007, but

increased in 2008. The country was at the 14th percentile in 2008;

•

in Turkmenistan, corruption showed relatively little change over the time period

1996-2008. The country was at the 5th percentile in 2008;

•

in Uzbekistan, corruption showed relatively little change over the time period

1996-2008. The country was at the 11th percentile in 2008.35

Corrupt officials in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have been able to siphon off massive revenues

from oil and gas exports, according to some observers. The Turkmen president controls a

“presidential fund,” that receives 50% of gas revenues and is ostensibly used for economic

U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 12, 2007. In the 2006 and 2007 reports, Uzbekistan

was placed in “tier three,” among those countries that do not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of

trafficking and are not making significant efforts to do so. Tier three countries may be subject to U.S. aid restrictions.

The World Bank. Governance Matters 2009: Country Data Reports, online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/

wgi/sc_country.asp. See also Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, online at

http://www.transparency.org/.

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development, though budgetary transparency is lacking on how the fund is used.36 Perhaps the

most sensational allegations of corruption have involved signing bonuses and other payments in

the 1990s by U.S. energy companies operating in Kazakhstan (or by their proxies) that allegedly

were funneled into Swiss bank accounts linked to Kazakh officials, allegedly including

Nazarbayev. U.S. officials concurred with a Swiss decision to freeze the funds and open

investigations in 1999-2000. The New York Times reported that Nazarbayev unsuccessfully raised

the issue of unfreezing some of these accounts during his visit with then-President Bush in

December 2001.37 Kazakhstan set up a National Fund in 2001 under the National Bank for receipt

of oil revenues that reportedly operates under strict international accounting standards.

Economic and Defense Security

The Central Asian states have worked to bolster their economic and defense capabilities by

seeking assistance from individual Western donors such as the United States, by trying to

cooperate with each other, and by joining myriad international organizations. Regional

cooperation has faced challenges from differential economic development and hence divergent

interests among the states, and from more nationalistic postures. Cooperation also is undermined

by what the states view as Uzbekistan’s overbearing impulses. Regional cooperation problems are

potentially magnified by the formation of extra-regional cooperation groups such as the CIS

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Each group reflects the diverging interests of Russia,

the United States, and China, although the fact that each group stresses anti-terrorism would seem

to provide motivation for cooperation.

All of the Central Asian states have been faced with creating adequate military and border forces

and have had vexing problems with military financing and training. At first dependent on the

contract service of Russian troops and officers in their nascent militaries, the states now rely little

on such manpower, but continue to depend heavily on training and equipment ties with Russia.

After September 11, 2001, the states benefitted from boosted U.S. military training and

equipment aid.

The capabilities of the military, border, and other security forces are limited, compared to those of

neighboring states such as Russia, China, or Iran. Military forces range in manpower from about

16,300 in Tajikistan (excluding Russians) to 87,000 in Uzbekistan (see Table A-1). The states

have variously solicited training and technical assistance from the United States, Turkey, China,

and other countries, have forged security ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) and NATO’s PFP, and cooperated in regional bodies such as SCO.

The global economic downturn that began in 2008 contributed to halting or even reversing the

growth of per capita income in the Central Asian states in 2008-2009, the first such lack of

The non-governmental organization Global Witness alleged in 2006 that the late Turkmen President Niyazov

personally controlled a vast portion of this gas wealth. The NGO raised concerns that organized crime groups were

involved in these exports and urged the European Union to limit trade ties with Turkmenistan. Global Witness. It’s a

Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, April 2006.

New York Times, December 11, 2002, p. A16; Interfax-Kazakhstan, February 5, 2003; Washington Post, June 10,

2002, p. A12; Financial Times (London), April 16, 2002, p. 12; Agence France Presse, September 24, 2001; PR

Newswire, January 10, 2001; Washington Post, September 25, 2000, p. A1; Peter Maass, “The Fuel Fixers,” The New

York Times, December 23, 2007; “Prosecutors Drop Some Charges Against Oil Dealer Giffen,” Platts Commodity

News, December 10, 2008..

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growth in several years. Reductions in remittances from migrant workers and rising food and fuel

costs account for some of the decline. Regional currencies depreciated against the dollar,

contributing to plummeting imports, and fluctuating world commodity prices contributed to

declining exports. The banking sectors were severely stressed by a jump in non-performing loans,

and banks cut back private sector lending. These economic stresses threaten government spending

on health, education, and other social programs. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been able to tap

sovereign wealth funds to support these programs and to partly ameliorate rising budget deficits.38

Kyrgyzstan has been able to somewhat cushion the economic blow by means of budgetary

support from Russia and the IMF, a large grain harvest, and its ample trade with China, much of

which is re-exported by Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian states.

Economic cooperation among the Central Asian states began to develop by the mid-1990s,

leading to several initiatives, but results have been scant. Cooperation was stymied by

Uzbekistan’s price controls and restrictions on currency convertibility, tariffs levied by the states

on Kyrgyzstan because of its membership in the World Trade Organization, and border

restrictions that stifled trade.39 A customs union formed between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in

January 1994 (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined later) achieved some modest early success as a

regional forum. It was renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in July 1998.

Criticizing its scant achievements, Karimov in early 2001 proposed that it become a forum for

“wide-ranging” policy discussions, and it was renamed the Central Asian Cooperation

Organization in late 2001 (CACO). CACO suffered a serious blow in September 2003 when

Kazakhstan joined Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in proclaiming the building of a “common

economic space.” In October 2004, CACO abandoned its focus on creating a regional identity

separate from Russia by admitting Russia as a member. Finally, in October 2005, CACO

announced that its membership would be “integrated” into the Eurasian Economic Community

(EEC; a Russia-led economic cooperation group then consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,

and Tajikistan). In recent years, EEC members Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have

concentrated on common customs tariffs, which are to come into effect in mid-2010. Uzbekistan

notified that EEC in October 2008 that it was suspending membership in the EEC.40

Among other regional economic cooperation initiatives, the Asian Development Bank in 1997

helped launch the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program (CAREC; members are

China, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Mongolia, and all the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan)

to improve living standards and reduce poverty in its member states through regional economic

collaboration. Also participating in CAREC are the European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (EBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Islamic Development Bank,

the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank. These institutions

provided about $2.0 billion in loans and grants to CAREC countries (excluding China) in 2008

CAREC. Presentation by David Owen, International Monetary Fund, Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on

CAREC Countries, October 16, 2009; The World Bank. The Crisis Hits Home: Stress-Testing Households in Europe

and Central Asia, 2010. Uzbekistan has claimed that its economy continued to grow in 2009, but some observers have

questioned this claim.

Analyst Martin Spechler has argued that the Central Asian region lacks the impetus to cooperation provided by a

perceived outside threat. Problems of Post-Communism, November/December 2002, p. 46.

Farkhad Tolipov, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, December 1, 2004; CEDR, November 2, 2005, Doc. No. CEP379002; November 9, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27030.

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and $3.9 billion in 2009. The priority areas for grants and loans are transport, energy, and trade

development.41

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

In 1992, Armenia, Russia, and most of the Central Asian states signed a Collective Security

Treaty that stated that the members would mutually defend against security threats and would not

join other security alliances. At an April 2003 summit, Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a charter to create a Collective Security Treaty Organization

(CSTO) with a permanent secretariat for operational military planning and budget coordination

(Uzbekistan joined in 2006).42 It was stated that this secretariat would permit a quicker response

to threats to internal or external security. On internal security, Russian Gen. Nikolay Bordyuzha,

the secretary general of CSTO, has pledged that the organization would not intervene in political

conflicts, but only by consensus “to resolve military, local and border conflicts, as well as to

prevent ... terror acts of armed groups and to stop drug trafficking.... In addition, they will be used

to fulfill special tasks such as protection of pipelines,” or disaster relief.43 On external security,

Russia’s national security strategy, approved by President Medvedev in May 2009, has

proclaimed the CSTO as “the main instrument designed to counter ... challenges and threats of a

military-political and military-strategic nature” emanating from outside the member-states.44

Many observers have viewed the CSTO as a mainly Russian initiative to increase security

influence over member-states and to counter U.S. and other outside influence.45 Its possible

usefulness appeared sorely tested by the “tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005.

Although Bordyuzha allegedly urged intervention, Kyrgyzstan’s then-President Askar Akayev

vetoed his offers and fled the country. It also was not used during the unrest in Andijon in

Uzbekistan in May 2005 or during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.

In early 2009, the CSTO announced that an air-assault Collective Operational Reaction Force

(CORF) would be set up. However, Uzbekistan raised concerns about the vague character of the

force and balked at contributing troops. President Medvedev stated that the force was needed to

deal with rising tensions along CSTO borders and boasted that the force would “be as good as

that of NATO.”46 The main participants in CORF are Russia and Kazakhstan.

In early 2010, Bordyuzha announced that there were actually two CSTO rapid reaction forces.

The first, the new CORF, is composed of over 20,000 special operation troops and is focused on

defending Eurasian borders and undertaking international missions (see below), while an older

(founded in 2001) and largely moribund Collective Rapid Deployment Force of 4,000 troops is

being revitalized to respond to threats to Central Asia emanating from Afghanistan. According to

CAREC. Report of Senior Officials to the 8th Ministerial Conference on Central Asia Regional Economic

Cooperation, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, October 16, 2009.

Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), April 29, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-96; April 29,

2003, Doc. No. CEP-132.

ITAR-TASS, March 2, 2009.

CEDR, May 13, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-557001. The Russian military doctrine similarly highlights the role of the

CSTO in deterring and preventing conflict. The Kremlin. President of Russia. The Military Doctrine of the Russian

Federation, February 5, 2010.

Ibragim Alibekov and Sergei Blagov, Eurasia Insight, April 29, 2003.

ITAR-TASS, February 4, 2009.

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one Russian report, another objective of the latter force is the protection of energy resources and

transit routes in Central Asia that benefit Russia.47

Although most members of the CSTO have bilateral ties to NATO under the Partnership for Peace

program, the CSTO long has called for NATO to cooperate with it as an organization on counternarcotics, anti-terrorism, and other issues. However, the real purpose of such cooperative

overtures is to receive recognition by NATO of a Russian sphere of influence in Soviet successor

states, according to many observers. Bordyuzha claimed that he sent a letter to NATO in 2004

proposing cooperation, but NATO reportedly did not respond. Attempts by the CSTO to

encourage NATO to establish formal ties were set back in mid-2009 when Russia urged

Partnership for Peace members Armenia and Kazakhstan to boycott NATO’s Partnership for

Peace military exercises in Georgia. In October 2009, Foreign Minister Lavrov urged Secretary

Clinton to support NATO cooperation with the CSTO as an element of the “reset” of U.S.-Russia

relations.48

The CSTO also has attempted to play a role in global security analogous to that of NATO. Since it

became an observer organization at the U.N. General Assembly in December 2004, the CSTO has

urged the specialized U.N. agencies such as UNODC and the Terrorism Committee and its

Executive Directorate to cooperate more with it. The CSTO also has proclaimed that it has

created a “peacekeeping force” that the U.N. may use. In March 2010, the U.N. General

Assembly approved a resolution drawn up by Russia that called for greater U.N. cooperation with

the CSTO in “regional cooperation in such areas as strengthening regional security and stability,

peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and combating illicit trafficking in drugs and weapons,

combating transnational organized crime, human trafficking, the fight against natural and manmade catastrophes.”49

President Medvedev stated in early 2009 that the CSTO would combat terrorism and offer other

support benefiting ISAF operations in Afghanistan, so that the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan—

which supported U.S. and NATO troop transport to and from Afghanistan—could be closed.50

Kyrgyzstan, however, decided to continue to permit U.S. troop transport by a renamed “Manas

Transit Center.” Although offering some assistance to ISAF, Lavrov and Bordyuzha have stressed

that the CSTO will not send troops to support ISAF operations in Afghanistan.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai Treaty” with

China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they

signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,000 mile former Soviet-Chinese border. In 2001,

Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The states

signed a Shanghai Convention on joint fighting against what President Jiang Zemin termed “the

forces of separatism, terrorism and extremism.” China has used the SCO to pressure the Central

Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s

Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In addition to security

CEDR, February 25, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950282.

CEDR, October 15, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-379001.

United Nations General Assembly. 64th Session. Plenary Meeting. Cooperation between the United Nations and the

Collective Security Treaty Organization, A/RES/64/256, March 2, 2010.

CEDR, February 3, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950352 and Doc. No. CEP-25001. ITAR-TASS, February 3, 2009.

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cooperation, China stressed the “huge economic and trade potential” of regional cooperation. 51

Both Russia and China have encouraged the regional states to regard their security ties to the

United States as redundant to their ties with the SCO. In an interview explaining why Uzbekistan

joined, President Karimov seemed to indicate that the primary motive was to protect Uzbekistan’s

interests against any possible moves by the SCO. He appeared to stress the possible military aid

the SCO might provide to beef up the Uzbek armed forces and help it combat terrorism, and to

dismiss the capability of the SCO engaging in effective joint action. He also indicated that

Uzbekistan wished to forge closer relations with China.52

Although Karimov had criticized the SCO as ineffective, in August 2003 he insisted that

Uzbekistan host the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). Appearing to return to his

earlier assessment, in April 2004 he criticized the SCO for failing to aid Uzbekistan during the

March-April 2004 attacks and concluded that Uzbekistan should “rely on its own power.” Some

observers argued that these vacillations reflected a policy of playing off the major powers to

maximize aid. This policy appeared to pay dividends at the June 2004 SCO summit, when China

reportedly proffered up to $1.25 billion in grants and loans to Karimov and Russia up to $2.5

billion in investment.

Indicating Uzbekistan’s closer ties after the 2005 events in Andijon (see below) with both Russia

and China, Karimov traveled to Shanghai in June 2006 to attend the SCO summit and endorsed a

communique criticizing U.S. foreign policy. In a speech just before leaving for the summit,

Karimov urged “joint action” by the SCO members to combat terrorism (seemingly contradicting

his 2001 speech; see above), rather than mere diplomatic statements. 53 In September 2006, the

first deputy head of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) became the leader of RATS, perhaps

indicating Russia’s growing role in the SCO. According to some reports, however, the Uzbek

security service closely oversees the work of RATS, reflecting Karimov’s distrust of Russia

despite the closer Russian-Uzbek security ties since the events in Andijon. In August 2007, an

SCO military exercise took place in Xinjiang and southern Russia, the first that included

representatives of all member countries (although Russian and Chinese forces predominated).

For the Central Asian states, the SCO is seen as balancing Russian and Chinese influence, since

the regional states also belong to the economic and security organizations that are part of the

Russia-led CIS.54 At the same time, according to some observers, regional leaders have preferred

the economic and security cooperation offered by the SCO over what they view as U.S. advocacy

of democratic “color revolutions.”55 It may also be the case that Central Asian leaders value the

SCO’s economic prospects more than its security prospects, given the history of the group. The

regional leaders may have devalued SCO as a security organization after September 11, 2001,

when U.S. and Western military activities in Afghanistan demonstrated the lack of effectiveness

of the SCO in combating terrorism. SCO members did not respond collectively to U.S. requests

for assistance but mainly as individual states. Further challenges to the prestige of the SCO as a

Open Source Center. China: Daily Report, September 10, 2002, Doc. No. CPP-131.

The Times of Central Asia, June 17, 2001.

CEDR, June 18, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950084.

CEDR, August 22, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-25001; CDR, August 18, 2007, Doc. No. CPP-94003; Artyom Matusov,

“Energy Cooperation in the SCO: Club or Gathering?” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2007) pp.

83-99.

Konstantin Syroezhkin, “China in Central Asia: from Trade to Strategic Partnership,” Central Asia and the

Caucasus, No. 3 (2007), pp. 40-51.

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collective security organization occurred in 2005, when it failed to respond to the coup in

Kyrgyzstan or to civil unrest in Uzbekistan. 56

Water Resources

Growing demand for limited water resources may threaten the stability of the region and hinder

economic development (although more efficient water use would be ameliorative). The main

sources of water for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and part of Kazakhstan are the Amu Darya and

Syr Darya Rivers that flow from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. During the Soviet period, dozens of

dams and reservoirs and thousands of irrigation canals and pumping stations were built regionwide to maximize cotton production. After the Soviet breakup, the Central Asian states wrangled

over operating and maintaining the inter-dependent facilities they inherited. Since Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan were poor in oil and gas but possessed ample water resources, they reached an

agreement with Uzbekistan in 1998 to exchange oil and gas for water. However, the agreement

foundered, in part because no oversight body was created, and relations between the upstream and

downstream states have suffered. Profligate wasting of water because of ill-designed and

deteriorating irrigation canals, lack of water meters, and efforts to boost cotton production

drained the Amu and Syr Darya Rivers so that ever-smaller amounts of water reached the Aral

Sea bordering Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Also, Kyrgyzstan endeavored to maximize its hydroelectricity generation, which contributed to downstream water shortages in the summer and

floods in the winter. Population growth in downstream countries is a looming problem. The

shrinking of the Aral Sea has exacerbated region-wide environmental problems. Kazakhstan has

built a dam between the northern and southern parts of the Aral Sea, which has resulted in rising

water levels in the northern part and the partial recovery of the local ecosystem. The dam has

stopped water inflow into the previously much larger Southern Aral Sea, however, and it may dry

up within a few more years.57

The lack of regional cooperation is illustrated by Tajikistan’s ongoing efforts to complete the

construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power dam on the Vakhsh River (an upstream tributory

of the Amu Darya River). Uzbekistan alleges that the dam will limit water flows to its territory.

Perhaps in retaliation for Tajikistan’s efforts to finish the dam, Uzbekistan in late December 2008

cut off the transmission of electricity from Turkmenistan across its territory, contributing to a

power crisis in Tajikistan. The Tajik government protested against a statement by Russian

President Medvedev on January 23, 2009, that all the Central Asian states should agree before

dams are built on trans-border rivers, viewing the statement as support for Uzbekistan and against

Tajikistan’s dam building. In late 2009, Uzbekistan accused Tajikistan of stealing electricity and

withdrew from the Unified (electrical) Energy System of Central Asia, an accusation that

Tajikistan denied. Tajikistan stated that the withdrawal mooted regional agreements to exchange

electricity for water, and announced that it would be forced to release more water in the winter for

power generation, which would mean that there would be less water in the summer for

downstream countries.

According to analyst Dru Gladney, security cooperation beyond pro forma exercises has mostly involved “the

occasional repatriation of suspected Uighur separatists.” U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission.

Hearing on China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder? Panel IV: China’s Involvement in the

SCO. China’s ‘Uighur Problem’ and the SCO, August 3, 2006.

“Dying Sea Makes Comeback,” Voice of America, Press Release, May 31, 2007; Rick Docksai, “Reviving the Aral

Sea,” The Futurist, March-April 2010, pp. 11-12; Kai Wegerich, “Hydro-Hegemony in the Amu Darya Basin,” Water

Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp 71–88; Kai Wegerich, “The New Great Game: Water Allocation in Post-Soviet

Central Asia,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 2009, pp. 117-123.

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Uzbekistan similarly opposes Turkmenistan’s planned diversion of water from the Amu Darya to

create a new 150 billion cubic meter lake (currently under construction), which could threaten

Uzbek cotton production. In 2003, Uzbekistan seized a part of the Karshinskiy Canal in

Turkmenistan, the only source of water for Uzbekistan’s Kashkardarya oblast, after bilateral

water-sharing talks broke down.

The need for even wider discussion of water resources is illustrated by China’s efforts to divert

waters of the Ili and Irtysh Rivers to its Xinjiang region, reducing such resources for the

downstream countries of Kazakhstan and Russia.58 Kazakhstan’s concerns led to the creation of a

China-Kazakhstan commission for trans-border rivers in 1999, but China deflected discussion of

water-sharing and only agreed to the exchange of information on pollution. A European

Parliament hearing in mid-2008 warned that China’s water diversion could reduce water flows by

these rivers to Kazakhstan by up to 40% by 2050, and could result in damage to Lake Balkhash in

western Kazakhstan.59 Wider discussion of water sharing also must include Afghanistan, which in

the future might divert a larger share of water from the Amu Darya River for economic

development.

Energy and Transport

The Caspian region is emerging as a notable source of oil and gas for world markets, although

many experts emphasize that regional exports will constitute only a small fraction of world

supplies. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the region’s proven natural gas

reserves are estimated at 232 trillion cubic feet (tcf), comparable to Saudi Arabia.60 The region’s

proven oil reserves are estimated to be between 17-49 billion barrels, comparable to Qatar on the

low end and Libya on the high end. Kazakhstan possesses the region’s largest proven oil reserves

at 9-40 billion barrels, according to DOE, and also possesses 100tcf of natural gas. Kazakhstan’s

oil exports are about 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd). 61 Some U.S. energy firms and other private

foreign investors have become discouraged in recent years by harsher Kazakh government terms,

taxes, and fines that some allege reflect corruption within the ruling elite. Despite these concerns,

some foreign direct investment has continued. 62 Turkmenistan possesses about 100tcf and

Uzbekistan about 65tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE.63

Russia’s temporary cutoffs of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and January 2009 and a brief

slowdown of oil shipments to Belarus in January 2010 (Belarus and Ukraine are transit states for

oil and gas pipelines to other European states) have highlighted Europe’s energy insecurity. The

United States has supported EU efforts to reduce its overall reliance on Russian oil and gas by

CEDR, February 27, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-462002; October 29, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-338.

European Parliament. Hearing of the Working Group ‘C’ on Desertification: Socio-economic, Agricultural, and

Forestry Impacts and Their Political Consequences, May 15, 2008.

Including the countries of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief, February 2008.

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) warned in late 2009 that Kazakhstan has prosecuted myriad foreign investors

for evading taxes and customs duties, for environmental pollution, and for other reasons, and can “demand changes in

the terms of contracts with private investors [such as Kashagan and Karachaganak oilfield investors] on the grounds of

national security.” Nonetheless, the EIU argued that “most foreign investors are maintaining or increasing their

involvement in the country, despite unattractive aspects of the business environment—albeit with delays or reservations

in some cases.” “Kazakhstan Economy: Investors Beware, the Rules Are Changing,” November 13, 2009.

U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Central Asia Country Analysis Brief, February

2008.

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increasing the number of possible alternative suppliers. Part of this policy has involved

encouraging Central Asian countries to transport their energy exports to Europe through pipelines

that cross the Caspian Sea, thereby bypassing Russian (and Iranian) territory, although these

amounts are expected at most to satisfy only a small fraction of EU needs.64

The Central Asian states long were pressured by Russia to yield large portions of their energy

wealth to Russia at prices below world norms, in part because Russia controlled most existing

export pipelines.65 Russia attempted to strengthen this control over export routes for Central

Asian energy in May 2007 when visiting former President Putin reached agreement in

Kazakhstan on supplying more Kazakh oil to Russia. Putin also reached agreement with the

presidents of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the construction of a new pipeline to transport

Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia. The first agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and

Turkish efforts to foster more oil exports through the BTC. The latter agreement appeared to

compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline to link to the

SCP to Turkey. The latter also appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a

pipeline from Turkey through Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria (the so-called

Nabucco pipeline).

Seeming to indicate a direct challenge to these plans by Russia and the West, China signed an

agreement in August 2007 with Kazakhstan on completing the last section of an oil pipeline from

the Caspian seacoast to China, and signed an agreement with Turkmenistan on building a gas

pipeline to China (see also below).66 In March 2008, the heads of the national gas companies of

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan announced that their countries would raise the gas

export price to the European level in future years. They signed a memorandum of understanding

on the price with Russia’s Gazprom state-controlled gas firm, which controls most export

pipelines. According to analyst Martha Olcott, “the increased bargaining power of the Central

Asian states owes more to the entry of China into the market than to the opening of [the BTC

pipeline and the SCP]. Russia’s offer to pay higher purchase prices for Central Asian gas in 2008

and 2009 came only after China signed a long-term purchase agreement for Turkmen gas at a

base price that was higher than what Moscow was offering.”67

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran export electricity to Afghanistan. Major foci of the

U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s (TDA’s) Central Asian Infrastructure Integration Initiative

(launched in 2005) and USAID’s Regional Energy Market Assistance Program (launched in

2006) include encouraging energy, transportation, and communications projects, including the

development of electrical power infrastructure and power sharing between Central Asia,

Afghanistan, and eventually Pakistan and India.68 In 2006, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)

For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by (name redacted). See also

International Crisis Group. Central Asia’s Energy Risks, May 24, 2007.

According to a plan published by Russia’s Institute of Energy Strategy covering the period 2007-2030, “Russian

control over a large share of Central Asian gas needs to be maintained.” See Minpromenergo (Ministry of Industry and

Energy), Institut energeticheskoi strategii, Kontseptsiya energeticheskoi strategii Rossii na period do 2030g., 2007. As

reported by Philip Hanson, “How Sustainable Is Russia’s Energy Power?” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 38 (2008).

An oil and gas conference involving Kazakh, Chinese, and Russian energy ministries and firms has met annually

since 2004 to “exchange views” on possible regional cooperation. ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2007.

Martha Olcott, “A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region.”

U.S. Trade and Development Agency. Press Release: USTDA Launches Central Asian Infrastructure Integration

Initiative, October 14, 2005; Joshua Kucera, “Washington Seeks to Steer Central Asian States Toward South Asian

Allies,” Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2006; Joshua Kucera, “USAID Official Outlines Plan to Build Central-South Asian

(continued...)

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approved $3 million for feasibility and project design studies of the potential for Afghanistan and

Pakistan to import electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In August 2008, an intergovernmental agreement was signed by the four countries to build a 500-kilovolt electric power

transmission line. The first phase is the construction of a 170-mile line from hydropower plants

on the River Vakhsh in Tajikistan to the Afghan border town of Sher Khan Bandar. The project

cost when all phases are completed is estimated to be $935 million to be provided by the World

Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the International Finance Corporation. About twothirds of the electricity would be provided to Pakistan and one-third to Afghanistan. Due

diligence work including environmental impacts is expected to be completed in 2010 and the

power line is planned to be completed by 2013. The ADB withdrew from the project in 2009,

however, because of concerns about the lack of cooperation among the Central Asian countries on

water-sharing, among other issues. The ADB still is funding smaller electricity projects. Among

these, the ADB financed a 220-kilovolt transmission line from Uzbekistan to Kabul, Afghanistan,

that was completed in May 2009.

Dissension among the Central Asian states on electric power transmission and hydro-electric

projects has increased. During 2009, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan accused Tajikistan of illicitly

siphoning electricity from the Soviet-era Central Asian Unified Energy System grid (until

recently, members included these three states and Kyrgyzstan). Kazakhstan twice cut off energy

flows to the regional grid in 2009 in retaliation, but has not yet decided to withdraw completely

from the grid. Tajik officials have denied the Uzbek charges and accused Uzbekistan of illicitly

siphoning electricity. Uzbekistan cut itself off from the regional grid on December 1, 2009. The

cutoff severed the supply of electricity to Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions (since the lines cross

Uzbekistan) and to some parts of Tajikistan, and prevented Tajikistan from importing electricity

from Turkmenistan to address winter weather. One Tajik analyst called for the country to retaliate

against Uzbekistan by reducing cooperation in water-sharing. Another analyst warned that

another Tajik winter without adequate power supplies could further erode popular trust in the

Rahmon government. Tajikistan’s construction of the Roghun hydro-electric power dam on a

tributary of the Amu Darya River also has clouded its relations with Uzbekistan. The latter claims

that the dam will limit water flows downstream to its territory, while Tajikistan is spurred to

complete the power plant by Uzbekistan’s energy policies.

Kazakhstan. The main oil export route from Kazakhstan has been a 930-mile pipeline completed

in 2001—owned by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), in which Russian shareholders have

a controlling interest—that carries 265 million barrels per year of oil from Kazakhstan to Russia’s

Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Lengthy Russian resistance to increasing the pumping capacity

of the pipeline and demands for higher transit and other fees, along with the necessity of

offloading the oil into tankers at Novorossiysk to transit the clogged Turkish Straits, spurred

President Nazarbayev to sign a treaty with visiting Azerbaijani President Ilkham Aliyev in June

2006 to barge Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea to Baku to the BTC pipeline. Kazakhstan began

shipping about 70,000 bpd of oil through the BTC pipeline at the end of October 2008. Another

accord resulted from a visit by President Nazarbayev to Azerbaijan in September 2009 that

provides that up to 500,000 bpd of oil will be barged across the Caspian to enter the BTC or the

Baku-Supsa pipeline. When the volumes exceed 500,000 bpd, a trans-Caspian pipeline may be

built.

(...continued)

Electricity Links,” Eurasia Insight, May 4, 2006.

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Apparently to counter Kazakh’s export plans via Azerbaijan, then-President Putin’s May 2007

agreement with Nazarbayev (see above) envisaged boosting the capacity of the CPC pipeline.

Despite this Russian pledge to increase the capacity of the CPC, Kazakhstan has proceeded to

upgrade its Caspian Sea port facilities and in May 2008, the Kazakh legislature ratified the 2006

treaty. Kazakhstan also barges some oil to Baku to ship by rail to Georgia’s Black Sea oil terminal

at Batumi, of which Kazakhstan became the sole owner in early 2008. Kazakhstan began barging

oil from Batumi to the Romanian port of Constantsa in late 2008 for processing at two refineries

it purchased. Some Kazakh oil arriving in Baku also could be transported through small pipelines

to Georgia’s Black Sea port of Supsa or to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, although in

the latter case Kazakhstan might be faced with high transit charges by Russia.69 In December

2009, the CPC finalized expansion plans for the pipeline, to approximately double its capacity by

2014.

In addition to these oil export routes to Europe not controlled by Russia, Kazakhstan and China

have completed an oil pipeline from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region of China

(a distance of about 597 miles). Kazakhstan began delivering oil through the pipeline in mid2006. As of the end of 2008, the pipeline reportedly had delivered about 92 million barrels (well

below initial capacity of 146.6 million barrels per year). At Atasu, it links to another pipeline

from the town of Kumkol, also in central Kazakhstan. On Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea border,

China has finished construction of an oil pipeline from the port city of Atyrau eastward to the

town of Kerkiyak. The last section of the route from the Caspian Sea to China, a link between the

towns of Kerkiyak and Kumkol, was completed in October 2009. Now that all sections of the

pipeline have been completed, it is expected to carry 200,000 bpd to China.

In November 2007, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement permitting Russia to export 10.6

million barrels of oil per year from Atasu through the pipeline to China. According to Chinese

sources, Russia exported about 5.5 million barrels of oil through this pipeline in 2008. This is the

first Russian oil to be transported by pipeline to China.

At the end of October 2008, China and Kazakhstan signed a framework agreement on

constructing a gas pipeline from western Kazakhstan (near the Caspian Sea) to China that is

planned initially to supply 176.6 bcf to southern Kazakhstan and 176.6 bcf to China. Plans call

for pipeline construction to begin in 2010 and to be completed by 2015.

Kazakh officials have appeared to make contradictory statements about providing gas for the

prospective Nabucco pipeline. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Aset

Magaulov stated at a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Security Forum in June 2009 that

Kazakhstan would not have a surplus of gas that it could send through the Nabucco pipeline. 70

President Nazarbayev appeared to support the possible transit of Kazakh gas through Turkey

when he stated on October 22, 2009, during a visit to Turkey, that “Turkey ... will become a

transit country. And if Kazakhstan’s oil and gas are transported via this corridor then this will be

advantageous to both Turkey and Kazakhstan.”71 In late October 2009, however, the Kazakh

Ministry of Energy reiterated that “the main problem for our country [regarding the supply of

natural gas to Nabucco] is the limited availability of gas” because of existing contracts for

ITAR-TASS, May 29, 2008; CEDR, December 11, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950096; April 26, 2008, Doc. No. CEP950045.

ITAR-TASS, June 25, 2009.

CEDR, October 22, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950337.

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projected gas production. It suggested that Kazakhstan might be a potential supplier for Nabucco

if gas production exceeds expectations, but that Kazakhstan could not transport any gas via

Nabucco until the legal status of the Caspian Sea was resolved, which would permit building a

connection to Nabucco. 72

Turkmenistan. The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with then-President Putin in

2003 on supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of

production), rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028 (perhaps then constituting an

even larger percentage of production). Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of

2004 in an attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter

payments. Turkmenistan and Russia continued to clash in subsequent years over gas prices and

finally agreed in late 2007 that gas prices based on “market principles” would be established in

2009. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed accords in May and December 2007 on

building a new gas pipeline that was planned to carry 353 bcf of Turkmen and 353 bcf of Kazakh

gas to Russia. The Turkmen government appeared to have reservations about building another

pipeline to Russia, however. This stance may have changed by late 2009, when Turkmenistan

indicated some willingness to build this pipeline during negotiations with Russia on the renewal

of Turkmen gas exports (see below).

Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997 Turkmenistan opened

the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline

linkage to Iran. Turkmenistan provided 282.5 bcf of gas to Iran in 2006 and reportedly a larger

amount in 2007. At the end of 2007, however, Turkmenistan suddenly suspended gas shipments,

causing hardship in northern Iran. Turkmen demands for higher payments were the main reason

for the cut-off. Gas shipments resumed in late April 2008 after Iran agreed to a price boost. In

mid-2009, Turkmenistan reportedly agreed to increase gas supplies to up to 706 bcf per year.73 At

the end of 2009, a second gas pipeline to Iran was completed—from a field that until April 2009

had supplied gas to Russia (see below)—to more than double Turkmenistan’s export capacity to

Iran.

As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed

a framework agreement calling for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan

and in building a gas pipeline with a capacity of about 1.0 tcf per year through Uzbekistan and

Kazakhstan to China. Construction of the pipeline began in August 2007 and gas began to be

delivered through the pipeline to Xinjiang and beyond in December 2009.

Perhaps an additional attempt to diversify gas export routes, Berdimuhammedow first signaled in

2007 that Turkmenistan was interested in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Turkmenistan

signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2008 with the EU to supply 353.1 bcf of gas per

year starting in 2009, presumably through a trans-Caspian pipeline that might at first link to the

SCP and later to the proposed Nabucco pipeline. Berdimuhammedow also revived Niyazov’s

proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, but investment

remains elusive.

ITAR-TASS, October 31, 2009.

Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014; April 26, 2008,

Doc. No. IAP-950049; and May 6, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950052.; CEDR, July 12, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950097.

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On the night of April 8-9, 2009, a section of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia

exploded, halting Turkmen gas shipments. Russia claimed that it had notified Turkmenistan that it

was reducing its gas imports because European demand for gas had declined, but Turkmenistan

denied that it had been properly informed.74 After extended talks, visiting President Medvedev

and President Berdimuhamedow agreed on December 22, 2009 that Turkmen gas exports to

Russia would be resumed, and that the existing supply contract had been altered to reduce

Turkmen gas exports to up to 1 tcf per year and to increase the price paid for the gas.

Turkmenistan announced on January 9, 2010, that its gas exports to Russia had resumed. The

incident appeared to further validate Turkmenistan’s policy of diversifying its gas export routes.

At a late April 2009 Turkmen energy conference, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George

Krol reportedly stressed that Turkmenistan and other states should continue to diversify their

energy export routes.75 Turkmen President Berdimuhamedow pledged to continue such

diversification. At an EU energy summit in Prague in early May 2009, U.S. Special Envoy for

Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar endorsed further development of the “southern corridor”

for the shipment of gas and oil to Western markets. However, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan balked at signing a communique pledging the states to back the Nabucco pipeline.

Despite this move, Berdimuhamedow asserted on July 10, 2009, that there are “immense volumes

of natural gas in Turkmenistan [that] make it possible for us to carry out certain work related to

the implementation of various [gas export] projects, including the Nabucco project.”76 In

September 2009, he further suggested that Turkmenistan could provide even more gas than

previously mentioned in 2008 for Nabucco—1.1 tcf per year—because an audit indicated that the

South Yoloten-Osman and Yaslar gas fields held vast reserves. Russia and Iran remain opposed to

trans-Caspian pipelines, ostensibly on the grounds that they could pose environmental hazards to

the littoral states.

Some observers argue that Turkmenistan’s construction of gas pipelines to Iran and China

indicate that it does not envisage a trans-Caspian pipeline to supply gas to Nabucco. Even in the

event that Iran eventually becomes a supplier to Nabucco, these observers maintain, it might

resist permitting Turkmenistan to have direct access to European customers via its pipelines.77

Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

International concerns over the proliferation risks posed by Central Asia’s nuclear research and

power reactors, uranium mines, milling facilities, and associated personnel have been heightened

by Western, Russian, and Central Asian media reports of attempted diversions of nuclear

materials to terrorist states or criminal groups. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear

fuel cycle facilities in the region often were only minimally guarded, and personnel were poorly

paid, creating targets of opportunity. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s

uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of yellow

Open Source Center. OSC Feature, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. FEA-844966; CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP950339; ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2009; Sergey Blagov, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Wonders Whether Russia Still Has Deep

Pockets,” Eurasia Insight, March 26, 2009.

Alexander Vershinin, “U.S. Urges Central Asia to Boost Gas Export Routes,” Associated Press, April 24, 2009.

CEDR, July 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950124.

Igor Naumov, “Turkmenistan No Longer Sees Russia as Reliable Partner,” Bizekon-Russica Izvestia, November 16,

2009; “Energy Agreement between Turkey and Iran Changes Essence of Nabucco Project: Chairman of CSS of

Turkey,” Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan), November 13, 2009.

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cake (low enriched uranium).78 Major customers for Kazakhstan’s yellow cake have included the

United States and Europe. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at its Caspian port of Aktau, the

world’s only nuclear desalinization facility. Decommissioned in April 1999, it has nearly 300

metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel in ill-kept storage pools.

Kazakhstan’s Ulba metallurgical factory in Ust Kamenogorsk provides nuclear fuel pellets to

Russia and other countries with Soviet-type reactors, and is planning to expand production for

other types of reactors. In 2009, Kazakhstan offered some of its Ulba facilities to house a lowenriched uranium “fuel bank” under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) to provide assurance of supply to commercial reactor customers.79

Uzbek’s Navoi mining and milling facility exports yellow cake through the U.S. firm Nukem.

Kyrgyzstan’s Kara Balta milling facility ships low-enriched uranium to Ulba and to Russia.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities

during the Soviet era, raising major concerns about possible proliferation dangers posed by

remaining materials and personnel.

Illegal Narcotics Production, Use, and Trafficking

The trafficking and use of illegal narcotics in Central Asia endanger the security, independence,

and development of the states by stunting economic and political reforms and exacerbating

terrorism, crime, corruption, and health problems. As a conduit, the region has been used as a

transit route by criminal groups smuggling narcotics from Afghanistan, mainly to markets in

Russia and Europe, although drug use within the region also is accelerating. The increased use of

shared needles for drug injection has contributed to rising rates of HIV/AIDS in the region.

Although the bulk of opiates from Afghanistan continue to be transported through Pakistan and

Iran, rising quantities—currently estimated at between 19%-25%—are trafficked through Central

Asia, mainly through Tajikistan.80 In February 2010, President Berdimuhamedow stated that drug

trafficking and drug addiction rates had become “alarming” in Turkmenistan, and called for an

“uncompromising” war on drugs. Despite this call for a punitive war, however, the State

Department reports that although “drug addiction is a prosecutable crime [in Turkmenistan] and

persons convicted are subject to jail sentences ... judicial officials usually sentence addicts to

treatment.”81

After the Soviet breakup, independent Kazakhstan was on paper one of the world’s major nuclear weapons powers,

but in reality these weapons were controlled by Russia. On April 21, 1995, the last nuclear warheads were transferred

to Russia.

During Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s April 2009 visit to Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev suggested

that a Kazakh ‘fuel bank” could assure supplies to Iran. In May 2009, Kazakhstan presented a position paper on the

proposal at the IAEA. Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Is Astana Aiming to Broker US-Iran Nuclear Deal?” Eurasia

Insight, April 8, 2009; Togzhan Kassenova, “Kazakhstan’s ‘Nuclear Renaissance,’” St. Antony’s International Review,

Vol. 4, No. 2, 2009, pp. 51-74; IAEA. Statement by Asset Magauov, Vice-Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources of

the Republic of Kazakhstan at the 53rd Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 15, 2009; Humphrey

Hawksley, “International Nuclear Bank: Helping World Peace?” BBC News, January 8, 2010.

UNODC. World Drug Report 2009, June 24, 2009. In February 2010, Viktor Ivanov, the head of the Russian Drug

Control Service, complained that there were no obstacles to drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, and that all

the Central Asia states served as routes for drug trafficking to Russia. ITAR-TASS, February 4, 2010.

CEDR, February 5, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950276; U.S. State Department. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, February 27, 2009.

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According to the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), drug trafficking in Central Asia

appears to involve many crime groups and drugs change hands several times before delivery to

Russian markets. In this sense, the trafficking is less organized than that involving Central

American drug trafficking to the United States. In the case of Central Asia, some organized crime

groups based in producer countries have been able to expand their influence into the region

because of poorly patrolled borders, lack of cooperation among the states, lawlessness, and

corruption among officials, police, and border guards. Also, ethnic Tajiks residing in northern

Afghanistan can more easily smuggle drugs into Tajikistan. Problems with traditional export

routes for Asian drugs have encouraged the use of Central Asia as a trans-shipment route.

Nigerian organized crime groups reportedly transport some Pakistani heroin through Central Asia

to Russian markets, and sell some in Central Asia. Even Latin American crime groups have

reportedly smuggled drugs into Central Asia destined for Russia, such as cocaine from Brazil.

These and other international organized crime groups are integrating smaller Central Asian crime

groups into their operations. 82

The Taliban, IMU, and other Islamic terrorist groups allegedly are also involved in trafficking

drugs in order to finance their operations. According to some observers, the IMU has been a

major smuggler of heroin through Central Asia, although U.S.-led coalition operations in

Afghanistan in late 2001 at least temporarily disrupted IMU trafficking.83 Some Tajik border

troops along the Tajik-Afghan border allegedly gain revenues from bribes from drug smugglers

from Afghanistan. In Kazakhstan, some police and security personnel reportedly vie to offer their

services to drug traffickers.84 In October 2009, Kyrgyzstan abolished its Drug Control Agency,

raising concerns among some observers about the government’s resolve to combat drug

trafficking.85

Counter-narcotics agencies in the Central Asian states are hampered by inadequate budgets,

personnel training, and equipment, but most have registered ever greater drug seizures. According

to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report:

•

The Kazakh government’s “DEA-like” Committee on Combating and

Controlling Narcotics within the Ministry of the Interior, established in 2004,

contributed to “considerable progress” by Kazakhstan in counter-narcotics

efforts, including drug seizures and tightening drug trafficking penalties. Kazakh

security agents reportedly cracked down on two new drug trafficking routes from

Afghanistan through Kazakhstan to end-users in Australia and Japan.

Nonetheless, Kazakhstan remains an “important transit country, especially for

drugs coming out of Afghanistan.”

Irina Adinayeva, “International Drug Trafficking and Central Asia,” in Building a Common Future, ed. by P.

Stobdan, New Delhi, 1999; Justine Walker, “Beyond Terrorism: the Real Impact of Afghan Drugs Trafficking on

Northern Neighbors,” Drugs and Alcohol Today, November 2005. pp. 39-41.

Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,

2002, p. 229; Svante Cornell and Niklas Swanström, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,”

Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 2006, pp. 10-27. According to analyst Jacob Townsend, the IMU is mostly

involved in drug dealing, and organized crime groups are involved in trafficking. “The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking

in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 1, 2006, pp. 69-91.

Martha Olcott, Kazakhstan, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2002, pp. 219-220.

Erica Marat and Den Isa, “Kyrgyzstan Relaxes Control Over Drug Trafficking,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 4,

2010. They allege that some government officials are involved in drug trafficking, and that “one of the president’s

brothers is allegedly involved in controlling most drug transit through Kyrgyz territory.”

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•

Some of the isolated mountain passes along Kyrgyzstan’s borders with Tajikistan

and China do not have guard posts that are manned throughout the year and these

passes are major drug routes. The State Department also reports that “the city of

Osh, in particular, is the main crossroads for road and air traffic and a primary

transfer point for narcotics into Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and on to markets in

Russia, Western Europe and the United States.”

•

Tajikistan is “a major center for domestic and international drug trafficking

organizations.” Tajikistan claimed to seize more illicit drugs in 2007 than the

previous year, but the amounts smuggled also had increased.

•

Turkmenistan is centrally located for smuggling opiates from Afghanistan and

Iran northward and westward. In 2008, the government created the State CounterNarcotics Service to more effectively combat drug trafficking. Although

Turkmenistan directs most of its efforts to combating drug-smuggling across its

shared border with Afghanistan, drugs also enter the country through Iran and

Uzbekistan. From Turkmenistan, illicit drugs often are smuggled by Caspian Sea

ships into Russia and Azerbaijan.

•

In Uzbekistan, the National Center for Drug Control attempts to coordinate antidrug efforts carried out by police, security, customs, and defense personnel, but

has difficulty accomplishing this goal. Drug addiction has increased in the

country. Drug smuggling into Uzbekistan often involves families or small groups

rather than national rings.86

Implications for U.S. Interests

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the former Bush

Administration stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia focused on three inter-related

activities: the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy development.87 The September

11, 2001, attacks led the Bush Administration to realize that “it was critical to the national

interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian

countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism, according to former Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony in June 2002. According to this

thinking, the instability that is characteristic of “failed states”—where central institutions of

governance and security are unable to function throughout a state’s territory—can make these

states attractive to terrorist groups as bases to threaten U.S. interests.

Although then-U.S. Caspian emissary Elizabeth Jones in April 2001 carefully elucidated that the

United States would not intervene militarily to halt incursions by Islamic terrorists into Central

Asia, this stance was effectively reversed after September 11, 2001. U.S.-led counter-terrorism

efforts were undertaken in Afghanistan, including against terrorists harbored in Afghanistan who

aimed to overthrow Central Asian governments and who were assisting the Taliban in fighting

against the coalition. Added security training and equipment were provided to the Central Asian

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, February 27, 2009; See also CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan:

Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted).

U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central

Asia. Hearing: U.S. Policy in Central Asia. Testimony by Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South

and Central Asian Affairs, April 26, 2006.

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states, supplemented by more aid to promote democratization, human rights, and economic

reforms, because the latter aid addressed “root causes of terrorism,” according to Jones in

testimony in December 2001. She averred that “we rely on [Central Asian] governments for the

security and well-being of our troops, and for vital intelligence,” and that the United States “will

not abandon Central Asia” after peace is achieved in Afghanistan.

In October 2003, then-Assistant Secretary Jones in testimony stressed that “our big strategic

interests [in Central Asia] are not temporary” and that the United States and its international

partners have no alternative but to “be a force for change in the region.” Then-Defense Secretary

Donald Rumsfeld similarly stressed in February 2004 that “it is Caspian security ... that is

important for [the United States] and it is important to the world that security be assured in that

area.”

The 2004 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

(The 9/11 Commission) and the President’s 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism call

for the United States to work with Central Asian and other countries to deny sponsorship, support,

and sanctuary to terrorists. The Report and Strategy also call for assisting the states to

democratize, respect human rights, and develop free markets to reduce underlying vulnerabilities

that terrorists seek to exploit.88

Participating with Members on November 18, 2009 in launching the Congressional Caucasus on

Central Asia, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake, Jr. stated that the Obama Administration

“has placed a high priority on building partnerships and enhancing our political engagement in

Central Asia.” Signs of this enhanced engagement include the establishment of high-level annual

bilateral consultations with each of the regional states on counter-narcotics, counter- terrorism,

democratic reform, rule of law, human rights, relations with NGOs, trade and investment, health,

and education, he stated. Other initiatives include the creation of a working group within the State

Department to encourage the regional states to work out water-sharing arrangements, including

the possibly bolstered supply of water from Tajikistan to Afghanistan and from Tajikistan to

Pakistan. In testimony on December 15, 2009, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Krol

listed five objectives of U.S. policy in Central Asia: to maximize the cooperation of the regional

states with coalition counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan; to increase the

development and diversification of the region’s energy resources and supply routes; to promote

the eventual emergence of good governance and respect for human rights; to foster competitive

market economies; and to prevent state failure in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, including by

enhancing food security assistance.89

The State Department in 2006 included Central Asia in a revamped Bureau of South and Central

Asian Affairs. According to former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Mann,

“institutions such as NATO and the OSCE will continue to draw the nations of Central Asia closer

to Europe and the United States,” but the United States also will encourage the states to develop

“new ties and synergies with nations to the south,” such as Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.90 In

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report, July 23, 2004; The White House.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 14, 2003.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs.

Hearing on Re-evaluating U.S. Policy in Central Asia. Testimony of George Krol, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,

Bureau of South And Central Asian Affairs, December 15, 2009.

U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central

Asia. Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia. Testimony of Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant

(continued...)

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May 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged Asian countries to provide Central Asia with

road and rail, telecommunications, and electricity generation and distribution aid to link the

region with Asia; to help it combat terrorism and narcotics trafficking; to send technical advisors

to ministries to promote political and economic reforms; to offer more military trainers,

peacekeepers, and advisors for defense reforms; and to more actively integrate the regional states

into “the Asian security structure.”91

Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned in testimony on February 3, 2010, that

although the Central Asian states generally have been stable so far, “The region’s autocratic

leadership, highly personalized politics, weak institutions, and social inequality make predicting

succession politics difficult and increase the possibility that the process could lead to violence or

an increase in anti-US sentiment.” He also raised concerns about the ability of Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan to combat Islamic extremist influences from Afghanistan and

Pakistan. The potential for instability in the region, he stated, is heightened by “competition over

water, cultivable land, and ethnic tensions,” by the global economic crisis, which has resulted in

reduced migrant worker remittances to the region, and by perennial food and energy shortages in

some parts of the region.92

Reactions to U.S.-Led Coalition Actions in Iraq

U.S. ties to the Central Asian states appeared generally sound in the immediate wake of U.S.-led

coalition operations in Iraq in March-April 2003 to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and

weapons of mass destruction. Initial responses in the region ranged from support by Uzbekistan

to some expressions of concern by Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan that diplomacy had not been

given enough of a chance. Alleged incidents where civilians have been killed during U.S.

operations have been criticized by some Islamic groups and others in Central Asia.93

•

Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state to join the “coalition of the willing”

that supported upcoming operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan joined later). Uzbek

President Islam Karimov on March 6, 2003, stated that the Iraq operation was a

continuation of “efforts to break the back of terrorism.” On May 8, his National

Security Council endorsed sending medical and other humanitarian and

rebuilding aid to Iraq, but on August 30, Karimov indicated that plans to send

medics to Iraq had been dropped. He has argued for greater U.S. attention to

terrorist actions in Afghanistan that threaten stability in Central Asia.

•

The Kazakh foreign minister on March 28, 2003, voiced general support for

disarming Iraq but not for military action. However, on April 24 Kazakh

President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated that Saddam’s removal in Iraq enhanced

(...continued)

Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, July 25, 2006. The State Department appointed a Senior Advisor on

Regional Integration in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert Deutsch, who focused on bolstering

trade and transport ties between South and Central Asia.

U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Documents. International Institute for Strategic Studies Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Singapore, June 1, 2007.

U.S. Senate. Select Committee On Intelligence. Hearing on Current and Projected Threats to the United States.

Statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.

CEDR, January 1, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950051; January 6, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950089; December 29, 2006, Doc.

No CEP-950214.

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Central Asian and world security. Reportedly after a U.S. appeal, Nazarbayev

proposed and the legislature in late May approved sending military personnel to

Iraq. About two dozen Kazakh combat engineers were deployed to Iraq in late

August 2003 and served with Polish and Ukrainian units until pulling out in late

2008.

•

Tajik President Emomaliy Rakhman reportedly on March 13, 2003, refused

Russia’s request to denounce coalition actions in Iraq. Tajik political analyst

Suhrob Sharipov stated on April 3 that Tajikistan was neutral regarding U.S.-led

coalition actions in Iraq because Tajikistan had benefitted from U.S. aid to

rebuild the country and from the improved security climate following U.S.-led

actions against terrorism in Afghanistan.

•

The Kyrgyz foreign minister on March 20, 2003, expressed “deep regret” that

diplomacy had failed to resolve the Iraq dispute, raised concerns that an Iraq

conflict could destabilize Central Asia, and proclaimed that the Manas airbase

could not be used for Iraq operations. During a June 2003 U.S. visit, however, he

reportedly told then-Vice President Cheney that Kyrgyzstan was ready to send

peacekeepers to Iraq (and Afghanistan). The Kyrgyz defense minister in April

2004 announced that Kyrgyzstan would not send troops to Iraq, because of the

increased violence there.

•

Turkmenistan’s late President Saparmurad Niyazov on March 12, 2003, stated

that he was against military action in Iraq and, on April 11, called for the U.N. to

head up the creation of a democratic Iraq and for aid for ethnic Turkmen in Iraq

displaced by the fighting.

Designations of Terrorist Organizations

The U.S. government has moved to classify various groups in the region as terrorist

organizations, making them subject to various sanctions. In September 2000, the State

Department designated the IMU, led by Yuldash, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that

the IMU resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The

“main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” it warned, linking the

IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. The IMU is being aided by

Afghanistan’s Taliban and by terrorist bin Laden, according to the State Department, and it

stressed that the “United States supports the right of Uzbekistan to defend its sovereignty and

territorial integrity from the violent actions of the IMU.” At the same time, the United States has

stressed that efforts to combat terrorism cannot include widespread human rights violations. The

designation made it illegal for U.S. entities to provide funds or resources to the IMU; made it

possible to deport IMU representatives from, or to forbid their admission to, the United States;

and permitted the seizure of its U.S. assets. It also permitted the United States to increase

intelligence sharing and other security assistance to Uzbekistan.

On September 20, 2001, then-President Bush in his address to a Joint Session of Congress

stressed that the IMU was linked to Al Qaeda and demanded that the Taliban hand over all such

terrorists, or they would be targeted by U.S.-led military forces. According to most observers, the

President was stressing that Uzbekistan should actively support the United States in the Afghan

operation.

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Among other terrorist groups, then-CIA Director Porter Goss testified to the Senate Armed

Services Committee on March 17, 2005, that the IJG/IJU “has become a more virulent threat to

U.S. interests and local governments.” On May 25, 2005, the State Department designated

IJG/IJU as a global terrorist group, and on June 1, 2005, the U.N. Security Council added IJG/IJU

to its terrorism list. Officials in Germany arrested several individuals on September 5, 2007, on

charges of planning explosions at the U.S. airbase at Ramstein, at U.S. and Uzbek diplomatic

offices, and other targets in Germany. The IJU claimed responsibility and stated that it was

targeting U.S. and Uzbek interests because of these countries’ “brutal policies towards Muslims,”

and targeting Germany because it has a small military base in Termez, Uzbekistan, which is used

to support NATO operations in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the suspects had received training at

IMU and al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Pakistan. In U.S. Congressional testimony on

September 10, 2007, John Redd, then-director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and Mike

Mcconnell, then-Director of National Intelligence, stated that U.S. communications intercepts

shared with Germany had facilitated foiling the plot.

In August 2002, the United States announced that it was freezing any U.S. assets of the East

Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur group operating in Central Asia, since the group

had committed numerous terrorist acts in China and elsewhere and posed a threat to Americans

and U.S. interests. In September 2002, the United States, China, and other nations asked the U.N.

to add ETIM to its terrorism list. China reported that its military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in

November 2002 were aimed at helping Kyrgyzstan to eliminate the group.

On the other hand, the United States has not yet classified Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) as a terrorist

group. According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, “radical

extremist groups such as HT may also present a danger to the region. HT [is] an extremist

political movement advocating the establishment of a borderless, theocratic Islamic state

throughout the entire Muslim world.... The United States has no evidence that HT has committed

any acts of international terrorism, but the group’s radical anti-American and anti-Semitic

ideology is sympathetic to acts of violence against the United States and its allies. HT has

publicly called on Muslims to travel to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight Coalition Forces.” 94

Nonetheless, U.S. officials have criticized Central Asian governments for imprisoning HT

members who are not proven to be actively engaged in terrorist activities, and for imprisoning

other political and religious dissidents under false accusations that they are HT members.

According to a November 2002 State Department factsheet, HT has not advocated the violent

overthrow of Central Asian governments, so the United States has not designated it a Foreign

Terrorist Organization. The factsheet also urges Central Asian government to “prosecute their

citizens for illegal acts, not for their beliefs.”95 Among other Western countries, Germany

outlawed HT activities in January 2003, declaring that HT was a terrorist organization that

advocates violence against Israel and Jews.96

U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, April 2007, p. 114. According to Rashid, the U.S.

government debated the status of HT in 2000 but declined to classify it as a terrorist group. Jihad, pp. 132-135.

U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Frequently Asked Questions, November 21, 2002.

Washington Post, December 27, 2004, p. A4.

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Military Cooperation

The United States and the Central Asian states signed defense cooperation accords prior to

September 11, 2001, that provided frameworks for aid and joint staff and working group contacts

and facilitated enhanced cooperation after September 11, 2001. According to the 9/11

Commission, such pre-September 11, 2001, ties included Uzbek permission for U.S. clandestine

efforts against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. 97 According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense

Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation

have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September 11th.” Kyrgyzstan, he relates, is a

“critical regional partner” in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF; military actions in Afghanistan),

providing basing for combat and combat support units at Manas Airport for U.S. and other

coalition forces.

Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad and a base for German units

at Termez, and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at

Termez. It also leased to the coalition IL-76 transport airlift for forces and equipment. Kazakhstan

provided overflight rights and expedited rail transhipment of supplies. Turkmenistan permitted

blanket overflight and refueling privileges for humanitarian flights in support of OEF. Tajikistan

permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for U.S., British, and French refueling and

basing. While the former Bush Administration rejected the idea of permanent military bases in

these states, Crouch stated in June 2002 that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and security

cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat terrorist threats”

and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.

According to a late November 2002 State Department fact sheet, the United States does not

intend to establish permanent military bases in Central Asia but does seek long-term security ties

and access to military facilities in the region for the foreseeable future to deter or defeat terrorist

threats. The fact sheet also emphasizes that the U.S. military presence in the region likely will

remain as long as operations continue in Afghanistan. In mid-2004, tents at the Manas airbase

reportedly were being replaced with metal buildings. U.S. officers allegedly denied that the

buildings were permanent but averred that there was no end yet in sight for operations in

Afghanistan.

The Overseas Basing Commission (OBC), in its May 2005 Report, concurred with the former

Bush Administration that existing bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had been useful for

supporting OEF. The OBC considered that there could be some possible merit in establishing

cooperative security locations in the region but urged Congress to seek further inter-agency

vetting of “what constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area that would require [a] long-term U.S.

presence.”98

Prior to September 11, 2001, the United States fostered military-to-military cooperation through

NATO’s PFP, which all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan had joined by mid-1994. With

encouragement from the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), Tajikistan indicated in mid2001 that it would join PFP, and it signed accords on admission in February 2002. At the signing,

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission). Final Report, July 23,

2004, p. 197.

Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States. Interim Report, May 9,

2005.

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a NATO press release hailed Tajikistan’s support to the coalition as “of key importance” to

combating international terrorism. Central Asian officers and troops have participated in PFP

exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in exercises in

Central Asia since 1997. Many in Central Asia viewed these exercises as “sending a message” to

Islamic extremists and others in Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere against fostering regional

instability. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan appeared to vie to gain services from NATO.

U.S. security accords were concluded with several Central Asian states after September 11, 2001.

These include a U.S.-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership signed on March 12,

2002, that included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirmed that “it would

regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with

Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledged to intensify military

cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan. Similarly, then-Kyrgyz

President Askar Akayev and then-President Bush issued a joint statement on September 23, 2002,

pledging to deepen the strategic partnership, including cooperation in counter-terrorism, and the

United States highlighted its aid for Kyrgyzstan’s border security and military capabilities.

USCENTCOM in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military engagement activities, planning,

and operations in Central Asia (the region was previously under the aegis of European

Command). It states that its peacetime strategy focuses on ties between the regional military

forces and U.S. and NATO forces, and to foster “apolitical, professional militaries capable of

responding to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian needs” in the region. USCENTCOM

Commanders visited the region regularly, setting the stage for more extensive military ties postSeptember 11, 2001. Besides these continuing visits by USCENTCOM Commanders, other U.S.

military officials regularly have toured the region.

A U.S.-Uzbek Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed on October 7, 2001, and the air

campaign against Afghanistan began an hour later.99 The SOFA provided for use of Uzbek

airspace and for up to 1,500 U.S. troops to use a Soviet-era airbase (termed Karshi-Khanabad or

K2) 90 miles north of the Afghan border near the towns of Karshi and Khanabad. In exchange,

the United States provided security guarantees and agreed that terrorists belonging to the Islamic

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) who were fighting alongside Taliban and Al Qaeda forces would

be targeted. According to some reports, the problems in negotiating the U.S.-Uzbek SOFA further

spurred the United States to seek airfield access at the Manas International Airport in Kyrgyztan,

which in early 2002 became the primary hub for operations in Afghanistan.100 U.S. military

engineers upgraded runways at the Manas airfield and built an encampment next to the airport,

unofficially naming it the Peter J. Ganci airbase, in honor of a U.S. fireman killed in New York on

September 11, 2001.

Besides these airbases, Uzbekistan also has provided a base for about 300 German troops at

Termez and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at

Termez. Over 100 French troops have used the Dushanbe airport in Tajikistan for refueling and

The State Department. Fact Sheet, November 27, 2002; Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary Forces, RAND,

2005. Some classified US-Uzbek cooperation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda had been carried out before September

11, 2001.

100

Deborah E. Klepp. The U.S. Needs a Base Where? How the U.S. Established an Air Base in the Kyrgyz Republic,

National Defense University, 2004. Perhaps in contrast to the more visible air operations, Uzbekistan more readily

accommodated less visible special operations. See Senate Armed Services Committee. Subcommittee on Emerging

Threats. Statement by General Charles R. Holland, Commander, Special Operations Command, March 12, 2002.

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Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests

humanitarian shipments. Kazakhstan has allowed overflight and transhipment rights, and U.S.Kazakh accords were signed in 2002 on the emergency use of Kazakhstan’s Almaty airport and

on military-to-military relations. Turkmenistan, which has sought to remain neutral, allowed the

use of its bases for refueling and humanitarian trans-shipments. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Uzbekistan have sent several military liaison officers to USCENTCOM.

Closure of Karshi-Khanabad

On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a declaration at

an SCO summit that stated that “as large-scale military operations against terrorism have come to

an end in Afghanistan, the SCO member states maintain that the relevant parties to the antiterrorist coalition should set a deadline for the temporary use of ... infrastructure facilities of the

SCO member states and for their military presence in these countries.”101 Despite this declaration,

none of the Central Asian leaders immediately called for closing the coalition bases. However,

after the United States and others interceded so that refugees who fled from Andijon to

Kyrgyzstan could fly to Romania, Uzbekistan on July 29 demanded that the United States vacate

K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the United States officially ceased operations to

support Afghanistan at K2. Perhaps indicative of the reversal of U.S. military-to-military and

other ties, former pro-U.S. defense minister Qodir Gulomov was convicted of treason and

received seven years in prison, later suspended. Many K2 activities shifted to the Manas airbase

in Kyrgyzstan.102

Some observers viewed the closure of K2 and souring U.S.-Uzbek relations as setbacks to U.S.

influence in the region and as gains for Russian and Chinese influence. Others suggested that U.S.

ties with other regional states provided continuing influence and that U.S. criticism of human

rights abuses might pay future dividends among regional populations.103

Emphasis on Kazakhstan as Strategic Partner

With the closure of K2 and the cooling of U.S.-Uzbek relations, the United States appeared to

shift more of its regional emphasis to Kazakhstan. In a joint statement issued at the close of

Nazarbayev’s September 2006 U.S. visit, the two countries hailed progress in “advancing our

strategic partnership.” The two presidents called for “deepen[ing] our cooperation in fighting

international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD,... strengthen[ing] our cooperation to

enhance regional security and economic integration,... expand[ing] our joint activities to ensure

the development of energy resources,... supporting economic diversification and reform,... [and]

accelerating Kazakhstan’s efforts to strengthen representative institutions.” In a speech on U.S.Kazakh relations in August 2006, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evan Feigenbaum

affirmed that the United States firmly supported Kazakhstan’s efforts to become the economic

powerhouse in the region.104

101

CEDR, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CPP-249.

102

According to a mid-2006 report, nine million pounds of fuel were being off-loaded and 4,000 tons of cargo and

13,500 people were being transported each month through Manas to Afghanistan. USAFE/CC Revisits Manas,

Impressed with Improvements, US Fed News, July 10, 2006.

103

On growing Chinese regional influence, see Michael Mihalka, “Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, StateBuilding and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, May 2006.

104

U.S. Department of State. Kazakhstan and the United States in a Changed World, Aug. 23, 2006. The White

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Defense analyst Roger McDermott has warned that these apparently closer U.S.-Kazakh relations

mask tightening Russian military influence over Kazakhstan. He has argued that the United States

needs to match the rhetoric of partnership with increases in defense aid to Kazakhstan that are

closely monitored to cut down on corruption within Kazakhstan’s armed forces. 105

The Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan

In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease payments for use of the

Manas airbase be increased to more than $200 million per year and at the same time re-affirmed

Russia’s free use of its nearby base.106 After reportedly drawn-out negotiations, the United States

and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement on July 14, 2006, that they had resolved the issue of the

continued U.S. use of airbase facilities at Manas. Although not specifically mentioning U.S.

basing payments, it was announced that the United States would provide $150 million in “total

assistance and compensation over the next year,” subject to congressional approval (some reports

indicated that the “rent” portion of this amount would be $17-$20 million). Kyrgyz Security

Council Secretary Miroslav Niyazov and former U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary James

MacDougall also signed a Protocol of Intentions affirming that the United States would

compensate the Kyrgyz government and businesses for goods, services, and support of coalition

operations. Some observers suggested that increased terrorist activities in Afghanistan and a May

2006 terrorist incursion from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan may have contributed to a Kyrgyz

evaluation that the U.S. coalition presence was still necessary. Visiting Central Asia in late July

2006, USCENTCOM’s then-head Gen. John Abizaid stated that the United States probably would

eventually reduce its military presence in the region while increasing its military-to-military

cooperation. 107

Following the shooting death of a civilian by a U.S. serviceman at the U.S.-leased Manas airbase

in Kyrgyzstan on December 6, 2006, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev the next day reportedly

ordered his foreign ministry to re-examine provisions of a late 2001 status of forces agreement

precluding U.S. soldiers serving in Kyrgyzstan from prosecution in local courts. Although Kyrgyz

authorities insisted that the U.S. serviceman stand trial in Kyrgyz courts, he was rotated back to

the United States.

During a February 3, 2009, meeting in Moscow with Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev,

Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that the U.S. Manas airbase would be

closed. 108 Bakiyev claimed that U.S. compensation for use of the base had been inadequate and

(...continued)

House. Office of the Press Secretary. Joint Statement, Sept. 29, 2006.

105

Roger N. McDermott, Kazakhstan’s Defense Policy: An Assessment Of the Trends, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, February 2009.

106

For background, see CRS Report RS22295, Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and

Implications, by (name redacted).

107

Associated Press, July 24, 2006.

108

The U.S. Air Force reported at that time that the “Manas airbase currently serves as the premier air mobility hub for

the International Security Assistance Force and coalition military forces operating in Afghanistan.... In 2008, the [376th

Air Expeditionary Wing] ... flew 3,294 refueling missions passing 194,453,400 lbs of gas to 11,419 aircraft over the

skies of Afghanistan. Manas [airbase] also supported more than 170,000 coalition personnel transiting in and out of

Afghanistan and processed 5,000 short tons of cargo.... Currently, 1,000 personnel from Spain, France and the United

States are assigned to the base, along with 650 U.S. and host-nation contractor personnel.” Maj. Damien Pickart,

“Manas Air Base Continues To Support Operations In Afghanistan,” 376th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, Air

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that the Kyrgyz public wanted the base to be closed. He also argued that counter-terrorism

operations in Afghanistan had been concluded, which had been the main reason for keeping the

airbase open. 109 At the meeting, Medvedev had offered a $1.7 billion loan to Kyrgyzstan for

building a dam and hydroelectric power station and a $300 million loan and a $150 million grant

for budget stabilization. Russia also agreed to cancel a $180 million debt owed by Kyrgyzstan in

exchange for some properties. Many observers suggested that the assistance was a quid pro quo

for Krygyzstan’s agreement to close the base, but both Russian and Kyrgyz officials denied the

link.

Responding to Bakiyev’s announcement of the base closure, Medvedev stated that “our states will

continue to support regional operations of the anti-terrorist coalition.”110 As outlined

subsequently, such support ostensibly was to include the provision of transit privileges for

nonlethal supplies for operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

(see below) and protection by the CSTO from terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

On February 19, the Kyrgyz legislature overwhelmingly approved a government request to cancel

the status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the United States on using the airbase. The next day,

President Bakiyev signed the bill into law. The SOFA between the United States and Kyrgyzstan

calls for the airbase to be vacated within 180 days upon notification that the agreement is

cancelled.

The “Transit Center” Agreement

The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of “mutual benefit” had

been concluded with the Kyrgyz government “to continu[e] to work, with them, to supply our

troops in Afghanistan, so that we can help with the overall security situation in the region.”111 The

agreement was approved by the legislature and signed into law by President Bakiyev, to take

effect on July 14, 2009. According to Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev, the

government decided to conclude the annually renewable “intergovernmental agreement with the

United States on cooperation and the formation of a transit center at Manas airport,” because of

growing alarm about “the worrying situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” A yearly rent payment

for use of land and facilities at the Manas airport would be increased from $17.4 million to $60

million per year and the United States had pledged more than $36 million for infrastructure

improvements and $30 million for air traffic control system upgrades for the airport. Sarbayev

also stated that the United States had pledged $20 million dollars for a U.S.-Kyrgyz Joint

Development Fund for economic projects, $21 million for counter-narcotics efforts, and $10

million for counter-terrorism efforts.112 All except the increased rent had already been

(...continued)

Force Print News Today, February 5, 2009.

109

Bakiyev also complained that he had received an unsatisfactory response from the United States regarding the

December 2006 shooting incident at the airbase. He appeared to argue that drug trafficking in Afghanistan was now a

more pressing problem for Central Asia than combating terrorism in Afghanistan. Daniyar Karimov, “Kurmanbek

Bakiyev: Manas Airbase to be Shut Down,” Bishkek News Agency Twenty-Four, February 4, 2009; CEDR, February 4,

2009, Doc. No. CEP-950347; December 28, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950085.

110

CEDR, February 3, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950352 and Doc. No. CEP-25001. ITAR-TASS, February 3, 2009.

111

U.S. Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing, June 24, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State. Daily Press

Briefing, June 25, 2009.

112

Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Kyrgyzstan Allows U.S. to Keep Using Base,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2009.

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appropriated or requested (see below, Congressional Concerns). The agreement also reportedly

includes stricter host-country conditions on U.S. military personnel. One Kyrgyz legislator

claimed that the agreement was not a volte-face for Kyrgyzstan because Russia and other Central

Asian states had signed agreements with NATO to permit the transit of supplies to Afghanistan

(see below). 113

Undersecretary William Burns visited Kyrgyzstan in early July 2009 and reportedly stated that

“we welcome a new decision of President Bakiyev regarding the set up of a transport and

logistics hub in Manas Airport.... [The agreement] is an important contribution into our common

goals in Afghanistan.” He also stated that “the new administration believes that we should expand

and deepen the level and scope of our bilateral relations” with Kyrgyzstan, and he announced that

a U.S.-Kyrgyzstan bilateral commission on trade and investment would be set up.114 In early

2010, it was reported that more facilities were being constructed at the “transit center” to handle

the increased numbers of U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan.

Kyrgyzstan had also requested that French and Spanish troops who were deployed at Manas had

to leave, and they had pulled out by October 2009. The French detachment (reportedly 35 troops

and a tanker aircraft) moved temporarily to Dushanbe. The Spanish unit (reportedly 60 troops and

two transport aircraft) moved temporarily to Herat, west Afghanistan, and Dushanbe is being used

temporarily as a stopover for troop relief flights. France and Spain are negotiating with

Kyrgyzstan on their return to Manas.

The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan

Because U.S.-coalition and NATO supplies transiting Pakistan to Afghanistan frequently were

subject to attacks, the Central Asian region has become an important alternative transit route.

Gen. David Petraeus, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan and

Tajikistan in late January 2009 to negotiate alternative air, rail, road, and water routes for the

commercial shipping of supplies to support NATO and U.S. operations in Afgha

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