North Korean Actions, 1950 - 2007: Controversy and Issues

Congressional research reportApr 20, 2007

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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

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This selective list of events provides information on instances of North Korean provocative

actions between June 1950 and 2007. The purpose of this report is to place current provocations

in the context of past actions to better judge their significance and to determine changes in trends.

The term “provocation” is defined to include armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of

armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including assassination and

bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions;

incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government; actions undertaken to

impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.

Information in this report was taken from South Korean and Western sources, but typically is

denied by the North Korean government.

The most intense phase of the provocations was in the latter half of the 1960s, when North Korea

(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) staged a series of limited armed actions

against South Korean and U.S. security interests. Infiltration of armed agents into South Korea

was the most frequently mentioned type of provocation, followed by kidnapping and terrorism

(actual and threatened). From 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of

3,693 armed agents into South Korea, with 1967 and 1968 accounting for 20% of the total.

Instances of terrorism were far fewer in number, but they seemed to have had a continuing

negative impact on relations between the two Koreas. Not counting North Korea’s invasion of

South Korea that triggered the Korean War (1950-1953), North Korea’s major terrorist

involvement includes attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; a

1983 attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan’s life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma

(Myanmar); and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in

1987. Reported provocations have continued intermittently in recent years, in the form of armed

incursions, kidnappings, and occasional threats to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into “a

sea of fire” and to silence or tame South Korean critics of North Korea. Then, in July 2006, North

Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, and in October 2006, it tested a nuclear

bomb.

For information on current U.S. policy and relations with North Korea, see CRS Report

RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL33590,

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by (name redacted); CRS Report

RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by (name redacted); or CRS

Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by (name redacted). This report will be

updated as circumstances warrant.

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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Provocative Actions: 1950 - 2007 ................................................................................................... 2

1950........................................................................................................................................... 2

1958........................................................................................................................................... 2

1965........................................................................................................................................... 3

1968........................................................................................................................................... 3

1969........................................................................................................................................... 3

1970........................................................................................................................................... 4

1971........................................................................................................................................... 4

1974........................................................................................................................................... 5

1975........................................................................................................................................... 5

1976........................................................................................................................................... 5

1977........................................................................................................................................... 5

1978........................................................................................................................................... 5

1979........................................................................................................................................... 6

1980........................................................................................................................................... 6

1981........................................................................................................................................... 6

1982........................................................................................................................................... 7

1983........................................................................................................................................... 7

1984........................................................................................................................................... 8

1985........................................................................................................................................... 8

1986........................................................................................................................................... 8

1987........................................................................................................................................... 8

1988........................................................................................................................................... 9

1990........................................................................................................................................... 9

1991........................................................................................................................................... 9

1992........................................................................................................................................... 9

1993........................................................................................................................................... 9

1994......................................................................................................................................... 10

1995......................................................................................................................................... 10

1996..........................................................................................................................................11

1997..........................................................................................................................................11

1998......................................................................................................................................... 13

1999......................................................................................................................................... 15

2000......................................................................................................................................... 16

2001......................................................................................................................................... 19

2002......................................................................................................................................... 20

2003......................................................................................................................................... 20

2004......................................................................................................................................... 22

2005......................................................................................................................................... 23

2006......................................................................................................................................... 26

2007......................................................................................................................................... 27

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 28

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This selective list of events provides information on reported instances of North Korean

provocations against South Korea, the United States, and Japan between June 1950 and 2007 and

related actions.1 The term “provocation” is defined to include armed invasion; border violations;

infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including

assassination and bombing); threat/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and

institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government; actions

undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear

weapons. Reports of North Korean involvement in drug trafficking and “political and other

extrajudicial killing” are outside the purview of this report.2 Information in this report was taken

from South Korean and Western sources, but typically has been denied by the North Korean

government.

North Korean provocations remain a congressional concern because of North Korea’s programs

to develop nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, the danger of proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction, and the danger that a North Korean provocation could escalate into hostilities

(e.g., if a North Korean fighter plane collided with a U.S. reconnaissance plane in a manner

similar to the 2001 collision off the coast of China of a Chinese fighter plane with a U.S. EP-3

reconnaissance plane). Since President Bush’s inclusion of North Korea (with Iraq and Iran) as an

“axis of evil” in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union address, tensions between North Korea

and the United States have been rising. This can be seen in the following list of provocations.

For information on current U.S. policy and relations with North Korea, see CRS Report

RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL33590,

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by (name redacted); CRS Report

RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by (name redacted); or CRS

Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by (name redacted).

The sources used for this list of provocations include South Korean newspapers (Choson Ilbo,

Chungang Ilbo (aka JoongAng Ilbo), Hanguk Ilbo, Hangyore Sinmun, Korea Herald, Korea

Times, Tong-A Ilbo (aka Dong-A Ilbo), and Yonhap News Service; the North Korean ruling

party’s organ (Nodong Sinmun); [North] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) wire service

reports; and Japanese newspapers (Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Sankei Shimbun, and

Yomiuri Shimbun) and Kyodo News Service; U.S. dailies such as the Washington Post, New York

Times, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times; other sources cited in the

This report is an expanded, revised, and updated version of a CRS memo on the “History of North Korean Terrorist

Activities,” March 27, 1997, by (name redacted). For the earlier version, see Congressional Record, vol. 143, no. 101,

July 16, 1997, pp. S7528-S7530. The provocations listed from 1950 to 2000 in this report were compiled by (name red

acted), former CRS Analyst in Asian Affairs.

For information, see CRS Report RL32167, Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy, by (name redac

ted), and CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by (name redacted). The United States

Department of State report, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2000, VIII 39-41, states “There

have been regular reports from many official and unofficial sources for at least the last 20 to 30 years that [North

Korea] encourages illicit opium cultivation and engages in trafficking of opiates and other narcotic drugs as a criminal

state enterprise. These reports continued in 1999.” Other documents that may be of interest include 2006 Country

Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, March 6, 2007; “UN Says N Korea

Ships ‘Heavily Involved’ in Drug Trade,” Associated Press, February 23, 2000.

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Foreign Broadcast Information Service daily reports; Associated Press, Reuters wire service

reports, and chronologies maintained by Global Insight.

CRS has not attempted to verify independently any of these media reports. This report will be

updated as circumstances warrant.

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06/1950 — On June 25, North Korean troops launched a full-scale invasion of South Korea—“an

act of aggression” that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea

determined was “initiated without warning and without provocation, in execution of a

carefully prepared plan.”3 The Korean War ended in July 1953 with an armistice.

Total U.S. casualties included 33,629 killed in action and 20,617 killed in non-battle

situations for a total of 54,246 deaths, and 103,284 wounded for total U.S. casualties

of 157,530. The Republic of Korea suffered 58,127 combat deaths and 175,743

wounded. Other countries under the United Nations Command had an estimated

2,800 killed and 10,783 wounded. Neither China nor North Korea has released

numbers for their casualties, but they are estimated at 900,000 for China and 520,000

for North Korea. In addition, the two Koreas each suffered estimated casualties of

one million civilians.4

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02/1958 — North Korean agents hijacked a South Korean airliner to Pyongyang that had been en

route from Pusan to Seoul; 1 American pilot, 1 American passenger, 2 West German

passengers, and 24 other passengers were released in early March, but 8 other

passengers remained in the North.

The invasion followed North Korea’s proposal on June 19, 1950, that the two Koreas should “fully implement all

measures related to peaceful reunification” of Korea by August 15; and that, to that end, “North Korea was prepared to

dispatch a parliamentary delegation Seoul on June 21, 1950, or to receive a South Korean delegation in Pyongyang” to

negotiate unification procedures. For Independent and Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (Documents). [In

Korean] Pyongyang: Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, 1971, p. 22. For a comment that, on June

15, 1950, the North Korean high command had actually begun moving troops toward the 38th parallel, see “The Korean

War” by Billy C. Mossman in Encyclopedia of the American Military, vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,

1994), p. 1027. For a disclosure by a former North Korean ambassador to the Soviet Union that Kim Il Sung initiated

the invasion of the South after consultations with Stalin, see “Former Official Finally Confesses North’s Ruse Started

Korean War,” Washington Times, July 5, 1990, A9. For a scholarly presentation on Kim Il Sung’s role in the events

leading up to the war, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and

the Korean War ( Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 136-154.

A virtually total embargo on U.S. commercial and financial transactions and freezing of North Korean assets in the

United States has been in force since the North Korean invasion of 1950.

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04/1965 — Two North Korean MiG jet fighters “attacked and damaged” a U.S. RB-47

reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, about 50 miles east of the nearest North

Korean coast.

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01/1968 — A 31-member commando team, disguised as South Korean soldiers and civilians,

infiltrated within striking distance of President Park Chung Hee’s office/residence

complex (The Blue House) before they were intercepted by South Korean police; 29

commandos were killed and one committed suicide; one who was captured revealed

that their mission was to kill President Park and other senior government officials.5

Two South Korean policemen and five civilians were killed by North Korean

infiltrators.6

01/1968 — Two days after the commando attempt on President Park, North Korea attacked and

seized the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo with a crew of 83 officers and men off

Wonsan in international waters outside the 12-mile limit claimed by North Korea;

one American crewman was killed in the initial attack. The remaining crew were

finally released in December 1968, but not the vessel.

10/1968 — One hundred and thirty sea-borne commandos infiltrated the Ulchin and Samchok

areas on the eastern coast of South Korea; 110 were killed, 7 were captured, and 13

fled.7

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03/1969 — Six North Korean infiltrators killed a South Korean policeman on guard duty in an

eastern coastal area near Chumunjin, Kangwon province.

04/1969 — North Korean MiG jet fighters shot down an unarmed U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance

plane over the Sea of Japan, about 90 miles off the North Korean coast, resulting in

the loss of 31 lives.8

06/1969 — North Korean agents infiltrated Huksan Island off the west coast; 15 were shot dead.

In a secret meeting with South Korea’s Yi Hu-rak in May 1972, then-head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency,

then-Premier Kim Il Sung reportedly acknowledged that the Blue House raid was staged by North Korean “leftwing

adventurers,” a raid Kim Il Sung claimed had nothing to do with “his or Party’s intention” and, in fact, “we did not

even know about it at the time.” See “Top Secret: The Full Text of a Secret Meeting Between Yi Hu-rak and Kim Il

Sung,” Wolgan Choson in Korean [Seoul], January 1991, pp. 352-353.

The peak years of infiltration were 1967 and 1968, accounting for 743 armed agents out of some 3,693 infiltrators

between 1954 and 1992. Vantage Point [Seoul], November 1995, p. 17.

North Korea described these armed infiltrators as “South Korean revolutionary armed guerrillas” engaged in the

armed struggle to “drive out the U.S. imperialist aggressors and to overthrow their lackeys...” KCNA in English,

November 8, December 10, and December 28, 1968.

In response to U.S. appeal for assistance, the Soviet Union dispatched two destroyers for cooperation with the U.S. in

a search for survivors and debris from the downed plane.

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07/1969 — North Korea unveiled the formal establishment of a United Revolutionary Party

(a.k.a. the Party for Unification and Revolution) as “an underground revolutionary

organization of South Korea.” The aim of the organization was to overthrow the

South Korean government and replace it with a pro-North Korean “democratic

regime.”9

10/1969 — Four U.S. soldiers were ambushed and killed by North Korean intruders near the

southern boundary of the DMZ.

12/1969 — North Korean agents hijacked a South Korean airliner YS-11 to Wonsan en route

from Kangnung to Seoul with 51 persons aboard; in February 1970. 39 of the crew

and passengers were released. As of January 2001, the remaining 12 were still

detained in North Korea, along with 454 other South Koreans abducted since 1955,

according to the South Korean government. In March 1999, South Korea’s National

Intelligence Service disclosed the names of 454 South Koreans being detained in the

North; also disclosed was the identification of 407 South Korean prisoners of war

(POWs) in the North. According to a revised January 2001 estimate by the South

Korean defense ministry, 268 POWs (compared with 351 announced in September

2000) were presumed to be still alive in North Korea.10

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03/1970 — North Korea provided sanctuary to 9 members of a Japanese radical left-wing “Red

Army” group who had hijacked a Japanese airliner to Pyongyang. (For recent

developments, see 10/2000 below.)

04/1970 — Three North Korean infiltrators were shot to death at Kumchon, Kyonggido, south of

the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas. Five South Korean

soldiers were wounded during the encounter.

06/1970 — North Korean patrol boats seized a South Korean broadcast vessel with 20 crew on

board off the west coast near the military demarcation line.

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01/1971 — A North Korean attempt to hijack a Korean Airline plane F-27 en route from Seoul to

Sokcho on the east coast was foiled.

In July 1985, the United Revolutionary Party was renamed “the [South] Korean National and Democratic Front,” with

a parallel, new emphasis on an intensified campaign against U.S. military presence in South Korea.

Yonhap in English, March 9, 1999. As of September 2000, a total of 16 South Korean POWs have returned home

since 1994, after years of hard labor and re-education in North Korea. Choson Ilbo (Internet version) in English,

September 3, 2000. See also Korea Herald (Internet version) in English, September 6, 2000; Korea Herald (Internet

version) in English, December 9, 2000; Korea Times (internet version) in English, January 28, 2001. According to a

revised estimate by the South Korean defense ministry, 268 POWs were presumed to be still alive in North Korea.

Korea Herald (Internet version) in English, January 29, 2000.

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02/1974 — North Korean patrol vessels sunk two South Korean fishing boats and detained 30

fishermen.

11/1974 — A first North Korean infiltration tunnel dug across the DMZ was discovered.

08/1974 — South Korean President Park Chung Hee’s wife was killed during another attempt on

his life. An agent of a pro-North Korean group in Japan who entered Seoul disguised

as a tourist fired several shots at Park at a major public function; Park escaped

unhurt, but the First Lady was hit by stray bullets and died several hours later. The

agent, Mun Se-gwang, was tried and convicted, and executed.

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09/1975 — Two North Korean infiltrators were intercepted at Kochang, Cholla Pukdo; one was

shot dead. During the encounter, two South Korean soldiers were killed and two

wounded.

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06/1976 — Three North Korean infiltrators were shot to death in the eastern sector south of the

DMZ, and the South Korean side suffered the loss of six soldiers and injuries to six

others.

08/1976 — A group of North Korean soldiers, wielding axes and metal pikes, attacked a U.S.South Korean tree-trimming work team in a neutral area inside the DMZ at

Panmunjom, killing 2 U.S. army officers and wounding 4 American enlisted men and

5 South Korean soldiers. In a message to UN Commander General Richard G.

Stillwell, North Korea’s Kim Il Sung described the incident as “regrettable,” without

admitting North Korean responsibility for what the U.S. government condemned as a

“vicious and unprovoked murder” of the officers.

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07/1977 — A North Korean attempt to abduct a South Korean couple failed in Belgrade,

Yugoslavia.

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02/1978 — South Korean actress Choi Eun-hee and her film-director husband Shin Sang-ok were

kidnapped in Hong Kong and taken to Pyongyang. (In April 1984, South Korean

government officials stated that the kidnappees were working in North Korea

producing propaganda films that glorified Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il). The

couple escaped to South Korea in 1986 while on a filming assignment in Vienna.

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10/1978 — A third North Korean infiltration tunnel dug under the DMZ was discovered. The

tunnel is considered especially significant because of its location, extending 400

meters south of the DMZ, barely two kilometers southwest of a forward U.S. army

base and four kilometers from the truce village of Panmunjom. Military experts judge

that 30,000 fully armed men accompanied by light artillery could pass through every

hour.11

11/1978 — A team of three North Korean armed agents killed four South Korean citizens—two in

Hongsong County and one in Kongju County, Chungchong Namdo; and one at Osan,

Kyonggido.

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06/1979 — A South Korean teacher Ko Sang-moon was abducted by North Koreans in the

Netherlands.

10/1979 — Three North Korean agents were intercepted while trying to infiltrate the eastern

sector of the DMZ; one was killed.

07/1979 — A North Korean attempt to abduct Han Yong-gil, an employee of the Korea Trade

Promotion Agency, failed in France.

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03/1980 — Three North Koreans tried to infiltrate the South across the estuary of Han River; all

were killed.

11/1980 — Three North Korean infiltrators were shot to death at Whenggando, Cholla Namdo.

One South Korean civilian was killed and six others wounded.

12/1980 — Three North Korean agents were shot dead off the southern coast of Kyongsang

Namdo. Two South Korean soldiers were killed and two others wounded.

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03/1981 — Of three North Korean infiltrators at Kumhwa, Kangwondo, one was shot dead.

06/1981 — A North Korean spy boat was sunk off the coast of Sosan, Chungchong Namdo; 9

agents were shot to death and one was captured.

07/1981 — Three North Korean agents were shot to death in the upper stream of Imjin River,

while trying to cross the river into the South.

Korean Overseas Information Service, Tunnels of War: North Korea Catacombs the DMZ. Seoul, Korea, November

1978, p. 2.

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05/1982 — Two North Korean infiltrators were spotted on the east coast; one was shot to death.

08/1982 — Police in Canada uncovered a North Korean plot to assassinate South Korean

President Chun Doo Hwan during a visit to that country.

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10/1983 — The explosion of a powerful bomb, several minutes before South Korean President

Chun was to arrive to lay a wreath at the Martyr’s Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma

(Myanmar), killed 17 senior South Korean officials and injured 14 who were

accompanying President Chun, then on the first leg of a six-nation Asian tour. Among

the killed were: presidential chief-of-staff and another senior presidential assistant;

deputy prime minister/minister of economic planning; three cabinet members

including foreign minister; 3 deputy ministers; and the South Korean ambassador to

Burma. The explosion also killed four Burmese nationals and wounded 32 others.

President Chun stated that the killings were “a grave provocation not unlike a

declaration of war,” and warned the North that “should such a provocation recur,

there would be a corresponding retaliation in kind.”12 North Korean leader Kim Il

Sung dismissed Chun’s statement as “a preposterous slander.”13 Two suspects were

arrested and tried in the Rangoon Divisional Court: North Korean army major, Zin

Mo, and captain, Kang Min Chol. Captain Kang Min Chol confessed to the bombing

and gave details of his training in North Korea and transport to Burma on a North

Korean freighter. He also disclosed that after the arrival of his assassination team in

Burma, the team stayed in the home of a North Korean embassy councilor. On

November 4, Burma broke off diplomatic relations with North Korea.14 In February

1984, the Burmese Supreme Court sustained the death penalty handed down by the

lower court.

12/1983 — Two North Korean armed spies, Chon Chung-nam and Yi Sang-gyu, were captured at

Tadaepo.

As cited in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives [London], December 1983, pp. 32566-32567. Senior Reagan

administration officials reportedly stated October 12 that the United States had urged South Korea to show “restraint”

and not to retaliate with force even if the North was discovered to be behind the bombing.

For Pyongyang’s suggestion that the bombing incident was “masterminded” by Chon Doo Hwan for a “hideous

purpose,” see a commentator’s article (“With No Fabrication Can They Conceal the Truth”) in Nodong Sinmun in

Korean, October 18, 1983.

North Korean foreign ministry termed the Burmese government action as “an unjustifiable act of ignoring

international law and usage and infringing upon the dignity and authority of our Republic.” It also proclaimed: “We

had already made it clear that we had nothing to do with the incident. We, by nature, have never resorted to individual

terrorism and assassination and such thing is alien to us.” A foreign ministry statement as carried by KCNA in English,

November 4, 1983. As of January 2001, diplomatic relations remained severed, despite Pyongyang’s unofficial gestures

since 1997 aimed at resuming such relations. The Myanmar government reportedly is moderating its earlier rigid

position that North Korea should acknowledge its terrorist act in 1983 and make an official apology prior to any

diplomatic resumption. The Nation (internet version) in English [Bangkok], July 7, 2000; Asahi Shimbun in Japanese

(Morning Edition), August 24, 2000; Hanguk Ilbo in Korean, July 29, 2000.

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02/1984 — Two Canadians, Charles Yanover and Alexander Gerol, testified in a Canadian court

that North Korean agents hired them in 1981 for $600,000 to assassinate South

Korean President Chun Doo Hwan. They were convicted and sentenced to prison

terms of one-to-two years. The assassination was to take place during Chun’s visit to

the Philippines in July 1982.

09/1984 — A North Korean agent killed 2 residents of Taegu, South Korea, and severely

wounded another before committing suicide.

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10/1985 — A North Korean spy ship was sunk by the South Korean navy off the coast of Pusan,

South Korea.

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09/1986 — A bomb blast at Kimpo International Airport in Seoul killed five and wounded over

30. The chief of the South Korean National Police believed that North Korean agents,

or individuals under North Korean direction or influences, planted the bomb.

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01/1987 — A North Korean attempt to abduct a South Korean citizen (Yoon Tae-shik) failed in

Hong Kong.

01/1987 — A South Korean fishing boat (#27 Tongjin-ho) was abducted along with 12

crewmen.15

08/1987 — A South Korean student at MIT, Lee Chae-hwan, was kidnapped in Austria.

11/1987 — A bomb planted by two North Korean terrorists on a Korean Airline Boeing 707, with

20 crew members and 95 passengers aboard, exploded in midair over the Andaman

Sea off the coast of Burma. The plane was en route from Baghdad to Seoul. Kim

Hyon-hui, one of the terrorists who was arrested in Bahrain and confessed to the

crime, was tried and convicted in a Seoul court. The sabotage bombing was

reportedly a North Korean warning against those planning to take part in the Seoul

Olympics. (In January 1988, Kim, the self-confessed agent, stated that she had been

trained for two years to pass as Japanese by a Japanese woman of Korean descent, Yi

Un-hye, who Japanese police believe had been kidnapped by North Korean agents).

In April 1999, North Korea claimed that these crewmen were “voluntary defectors” to the North.

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01/1988 — U.S. Secretary of State determined “that North Korea is a country which has

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” under the authority

of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. App.2405(j)).16

06/1988 — The head of a North Korean trading company revealed after his defection to the South

that North Korean embassies around the world had been ordered to do everything

possible to stop other countries from participating in the Seoul Olympics.

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03/1990 — Another North Korean infiltration tunnel dug under the DMZ was discovered; this

was the fourth one uncovered since November 1974. (The second one was discovered

in March 1975.) South Korean authorities believe that there may be as many as 17

tunnels in all (see 10/1978 above).

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06/1991 — The North Korean ruling party’s daily news organ, Nodong Sinmun, called on South

Korean youths, students, and people to “eliminate the Roh Tae-woo fascist regime

and establish a genuine democratic regime.”

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05/1992 — Three North Koreans, in South Korean uniforms, were shot dead at Cholwon,

Kangwondo, south of the DMZ. Three South Koreans were wounded in this

encounter.

10/1992 — A North Korean 400-member spy ring in South Korea, directed by North Korean

Communist party official Lee Son-sil, was uncovered by South Korea’s Agency for

National Security Planning. It was revealed that the mission of the spy ring was to

establish an underground command center for subversive operations in the South.

According to the South Korean agency, North Korean agents had infiltrated through

South Korea’s coastlines.

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12/1993 — Vice Marshal Choe Kwang, Chief of the General Staff of the North Korean military

(and defense minister, 1995-1997), declared at a major state function that the military

As a result, exports to North Korea of goods or technology that are determined of being able to make a significant

contribution to its military potential, or enhance its ability to support acts on international terrorism, require a validated

license. Denial of the license, in effect, would constitute a ban on such exports.

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“has the heavy and honorable task of reunifying the fatherland with guns in the

nineties without fail.”17

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03/1994 — For the first time in more than two decades, North Korea issued a threat of war in an

inter-Korean meeting in Panmunjom. In response to Seoul’s chief delegate

mentioning the possibility of UN sanctions against the North for its refusal to accept

full international nuclear inspections, Pyongyang’s chief delegate reportedly replied:

“Seoul is not far away from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will turn into a sea of

fire.”18

06/1994 — A North Korean attempt to abduct a South Korean professor, Lee Jin-sang, from an

Ethiopian university in Addis Ababa was foiled.

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05/1995 — A North Korean patrol boat fired on a South Korean fishing vessel, killing three South

Korean fishermen; North Korea released 5 other fishermen in December 1995.

06/1995 — North Korean soldiers threatened the captain of a South Korean vessel with harm in a

North Korean port unless he hoisted the North Korean flag while the vessel was there

to deliver a South Korean humanitarian rice shipment to the North.

07/1995 — A team of three North Korean agents and their two Korean-Chinese collaborators in

Jilin19 abducted a South Korean pastor, the Reverend Ahn Seung-woon, in southern

Manchuria. Pyongyang claimed that Reverend Ahn defected voluntarily. (A North

Korean, convicted in a Chinese court of masterminding the abduction, was deported

to North Korea by China in July 1997 upon serving a two-year prison term.)

08/1995 — North Korea seized a South Korean rice delivery vessel and arrested its crew in a

North Korean port after a South Korean crewman took photographs from the ship.

The ship was released 12 days later.

10/1995 — Two armed North Koreans were intercepted at the Imjin River just south of the DMZ;

one was shot to death and the other escaped.

10/1995 — Two North Korean agents were intercepted at Puyo, about 100 miles south of Seoul;

one was shot to death and the other was taken alive. The captured agent disclosed that

he had infiltrated two months earlier, with a mission to contact anti-government

dissidents, politicians, and an organization of underground cells.

[North] Korean Central Broadcasting Network [Pyongyang], December 23, 1993.

North Korea’s “Sea of Fire” Threat Shakes Seoul, Financial Times [London], March 22, 1994, p. 6.

As reported by Sang-ho Yoon, “North Korean Secret Agents in China Operate in the Guise of Defectors,” Tong-A

Ilbo in Korean, February 22, 2000.

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04/1996 — On three occasions, a combined total of several hundred armed North Korean troops

crossed the military demarcation line into the joint security area of the DMZ at

Panmunjom and elsewhere in violation of the Korean armistice agreement, after

Pyongyang’s unilateral announcement that it no longer would abide by the armistice

provisions concerning the integrity of the DMZ.

05/1996 — Seven North Korean soldiers crossed the military demarcation line facing South

Korean defensive positions just south of the DMZ, but withdrew when South Korean

troops fired warning shots.

05/1996 — Five North Korean naval patrol craft crossed into South Korean-defended waters off

the west coast and withdrew after a four-hour standoff with South Korean naval

vessels. A similar three-hour incursion by three North Korean craft in the same area

occurred in June 1996.

07/1996 — A North Korean spy was captured in Seoul after posing as a Filipino professor for 12

years. Chung Su Il (alias: Mohammed Kansu), 62, told police that “scores, perhaps

hundreds” of North Korean spies were operating in the South.

09/1996 — A disabled North Korean submarine was spotted bobbing off the shore near the city of

Kangnung. Twenty-six North Korean military personnel landed on the east coast

from the submarine that was found to be on an espionage/reconnaissance mission.

According to South Korea, eleven of the infiltrators were shot to death by North

Korean commandos who were on the submarine; 13 others refused to surrender and

were killed in battle with South Korean troops; one was captured and one escaped.

During the South Korean hunt for the infiltrators, North Koreans killed 11 South

Korean military personnel and civilians and wounded five others.20

10/1996 — Choi Duk Keun, a South Korean diplomat, was murdered in Vladivostok, Russia,

following a North Korean threat to “retaliate” for the submarine incident.

Circumstantial evidence initially pointed to North Korean complicity in the murder,

and later autopsy results showed that poison found in Choi’s body was the same type

of poison carried by North Korean infiltrators from the grounded submarine in

September.

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02/1997 — In Seoul, Lee Han-yong was shot by two hit men believed to be North Korean agents.

Nephew of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s former wife, Song Hye-rim, Lee had

defected to the South in 1982. The shooting took place three days after Hwang Jangyop, a high ranking North Korean party official, walked into the South Korean

consulate in Beijing for defection to the South. After being in a coma, Lee died 10

After three weeks of negotiations with U.S. officials, North Korea on December 29 expressed its “deep regret” for

the infiltration and vowed it would “make efforts to ensure that such an incident will not recur.” Facts on File

Yearbook 1996, p. 1008.

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days later in a Seoul hospital. The shooting was believed to be a warning to Hwang

and other would-be defectors to the South.21

02/1997 — North Korea threatened unspecified “retribution” against the South Korean

newspaper Chung’ang Ilbo for publishing an account of Kim Il Sung’s death

occurring in the course of a heated verbal exchange between Kim Il Sung and Kim

Jong Il in July 1994—a story attributed to Hwang Jang-yop, a North Korean defector

via Beijing in February 1997.

03/1997 — Japan’s daily newspaper Sankei Shimbun, based on an interview with a former North

Korean agent An Myong-chin (who defected to South Korea in September 1993),

reported that in November 1977, Megumi Yokota, a 13-year-old Japanese school girl

was abducted in Niigata City and taken to North Korea for use as a teaching aide at a

North Korean school for spy training. Japanese authorities disclosed that An’s

description of the girl matched the profile of a girl reported missing in Niigata, Japan,

at that time. Japanese authorities suspect that North Korea may have kidnapped at

least nine other Japanese nationals since the mid-1970s.22

04/1997 — Five North Korean soldiers opened fire at South Korean positions after crossing the

Military Demarcation Line in the Cholwon sector.

06/1997 — Three North Korean patrol boats slipped into South Korean-controlled waters in the

Yellow Sea, about two miles south of the Military Demarcation Line, and opened fire

at South Korean patrol boats, the first such attack since October 1995 when a North

Korean shore battery at Ongjin did so against South Korean naval vessels.

06/1997 — North Korea’s ruling party organ, Nodong Sinmun, continued to incite “prodemocratic” South Koreans to “overthrow” South Korea’s Kim Young Sam

government as “an urgent requirement” in a patriotic, anti-fascist struggle for

“independence, democracy, and reunification.”

06/1997 — North Korea issued a threat to deliver “a merciless retaliatory blow” to South Korea’s

daily newspaper Choson Ilbo for its June 24 editorial urging Kim Jong Il to

relinquish power in favor of “a new reform-oriented [North Korean] group.”

A member of a North Korean spy ring uncovered by South Korean authorities in November 1997 reportedly

confirmed the fact that Lee was assassinated by a three-man North Korean terrorist ring. Korea Times (Internet version)

in English, November 23, 1997.

Kyodo in English, March 31, 1998. North Korean maintains, “not only does kidnaping not exist in our country, but it

also has never occurred in our country... No one in our country is interested in terrorism such as kidnaping and

murder.... Based on our investigation, we already notified Japan that there were no such people in our country ... In

other words, the issue has already been settled.” [North] Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean, February 11,

2000. On March 10, 2000, the North Korea Red Cross Society announced a “restart” of an investigation into the

whereabouts of ‘missing’ Japanese under an accord it had reached with its Japanese counterpart on December 21, 1999.

KCNA in English, March 10, 2000. Currently, some 25 Japanese civic groups are reported to be actively seeking the

whereabouts of Megumi Yokota and nine other missing nationals. Kyodo in English, October 10, 2000; “Japanese Press

North Korea on Old Kidnapings,” New York Times, October 15, 2000. On January 12, 2001, the Japanese government

reportedly stated that the abduction issue must be resolved as a precondition for normalizing North Korea’s bilateral

ties with Japan. Tokyo Shimbun in Japanese, January 13, 2001.

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Denouncing the editorial as “the most provocative declaration of war against us,”

North Korea retorted that it had the right to retaliate “until ... the Choson Ilbo ceases

to exist.”

07/1997 — Fourteen North Korean soldiers intruded some 70 meters south of the military

demarcation line—the midpoint of the four-kilometer-wide DMZ—ignoring South

Korean broadcast warnings to withdraw. The incursion led to a 23-minute exchange

of heavy gunfire, the most serious since the intrusion of September 1996.

11/1997 — North Korea threatened to “demolish” South Korea’s state-run Korean Broadcasting

System (KBS) alleged to be “a mouthpiece of fascist dictatorship.” It vowed to “kill

everyone involved” in the production of a KBS TV mini-series depicting the life of

repression and corruption in North Korean society “without so much as waking up a

mouse or a bird” unless the KBS dropped the production forthwith.23

11/1997 — A North Korean ring of six espionage agents was uncovered in Seoul, including a

noted professor emeritus, Ko Yong-pok, at the elite Seoul National University. Often

hailed as “the founder of sociology” in Korea, Ko repeatedly spied for the North

since 1973, while posing as a “conservative” consultant to the South Korean

government on inter-Korean issues.

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04/1998 — A South Korean news dispatch quoted a member of the North Korean delegation to an

inter-Korean conference in Beijing as making a “provocative statement” to the effect

that North Korea would rather have a “liberation war” than capitulating to the South

Korean attempt to “politicize” the food-and-fertilizer aid issue.24

06/1998 — In a show of defiance against the United States, North Korea declared its intention to

continue to develop, test, and deploy missiles as a means of countering the alleged

U.S. military threat, adding that it had few options of earning foreign currency other

than exporting missiles as a result of the U.S. policy aimed at “economic isolation” of

the North. It also asserted that the United States should lift its economic embargo and

compensate for losses that could be caused by termination of missile sales, if it is

really concerned over North Korean missiles.25

KCNA in English, December 16, 1997; Yonhap in English [Seoul], November 17, 1997.

Song Dae-su, North Korea: “Liberation War Rather Than Negotiations,” Hanguk Ilbo [U.S. edition], April 18, 1998.

KCNA in English, June 16, 1998. Kevin Sullivan, “N. Korea Admits Selling Missiles,” Washington Post, June 17,

1998, A1, A2. In August 1998, North Koreans told a visiting delegation of congressional staffers that Pyongyang

would stop ballistic missile sales to countries such as Iran in exchange for U.S. compensation of $500 million annually.

See Staffdel Kirk Final Report to Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), Chairman, International Relations Committee, U.S.

House of Representatives: Mission to North Korea and China, August 11-23, 1998, p.4. On a related matter, the

Department of State (Public Notice 2798) announced sanctions against North Korea, effective April 17, 1998, for

engaging in missile technology proliferation activities pursuant to the Arms Export Control, as amended, and the

Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (as carried out under Executive Order 12424 of August 19, 1994).

Federal Register, vol. 63, no. 85, May 4, 1998, p. 24585. North Korean exports of missiles to Iran and Syria since the

1980s as well as the recent transfer of missile technology including major components to Pakistan remain a concern of

the U.S. government.

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06/1998 — On June 22, a North Korean midget submarine was seized after it was spotted

entangled in South Korean fishing nets off the South Korean town of Sokcho, south

of the DMZ. When brought to shore three days later, the nine crew aboard were

found dead from an apparent group suicide.

06/1998 — On June 27, breaking a four-day silence on the incident, North Korea blamed the

South for the death of the North Korean crew and demanded the immediate return of

the bodies and the submarine. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, stating that the

submarine intrusion violated the armistice agreement as well as the basic interKorean agreement of 1992 for reconciliation, exchange and cooperation, urged North

Korea to “admit responsibility and take reasonable measures.”26

07/1998 — A body of a North Korean frogman was found on a beach south of the DMZ, along

with paraphernalia suggesting an apparent infiltration/espionage mission.

08/1998 — U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly “detected a huge secret underground complex in

North Korea that they believe is the centerpiece of an effort to revive the country’s

frozen nuclear weapons program,” a development that could possibly signify

Pyongyang’s decision to abandon a 1994 “agreed framework” on suspending its

suspected nuclear weapons program.27 However, North Korea maintained that the

underground complex in question was a civilian economic facility under construction

as part of an unspecified economic undertaking. North Korea also claimed that the

United States “should ... compensate for groundlessly humiliating and slandering us

with fabrication and for infringing on our sovereignty and defaming us.”28 In the days

following the disclosure on the underground complex, Washington and Seoul

reportedly concluded that the underground facilities do not violate the 1994 agreed

framework freezing the North’s suspected nuclear weapons program.29 (In May 1999,

a group of U.S. inspectors visited the underground site; the suspected site at

Kumchang-ri reportedly was “an extensive, empty tunnel complex”).30

08/1998 — On August 31, North Korea test-fired a new 3-stage Taepodong-1 missile in an arc

over Japan, causing angry reactions from Japan and the United States as a

provocation that stoked tensions in Northeast Asia. Several days later, however,

North Korea claimed that it used a multistage rocket to successfully launch a satellite

into orbit for peaceful exploration of space, not a ballistic missile as alleged by U.S.

and other sources.31

South Korea played down the incident in an apparent effort to sustain President Kim Dae Jung’s so-called “sunshine

policy” toward the North, or a conciliatory policy of engagement. The Korea Herald [Internet version], July 16, 1998.

David E. Sanger, “North Korea Site an A-Bomb Plant, U.S. Agencies Say: Could Break ‘94 Accord,” New York

Times, August 17, 1998, A1, A4; “North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” New York Times, August 19, 1998, A34;

“Politics of Blackmail,” Washington Post, August 24, 1998, A18.

[North] Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean, September 19, 1998.

“Pyongyang’s Provocation,” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1998, A18.

Yonhap in English, June 5, 1999.

North Korea also claimed to have reached “a world-class level in the technological and engineering field of rocketry

and developing artificial satellites” and been “lauded by mankind as a powerful state of ideas, military, and creation.”

[Political Essay]: “Magnificent Gun Roaring of Building a Powerful State,” [North] Korean Central Broadcasting

(continued...)

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11/1998 — A North Korean high-speed spy boat got away from pursuers in South Korean waters

near the west coast island of Kanghwa, aborting an apparent operation to infiltrate

agents into or ferry agents back from the South.32

12/1998 — At a Pyongyang rally, North Korean youths and students vowed to turn Washington

into “a sea of fire and to crush Seoul and Tokyo.”33

12/1998 — In a firefight, the South Korean navy sank a North Korean semi-submersible highspeed boat some 150 kilometers southwest of Pusan. The body of a North Korean

frogman was recovered near the site. The vessel was first spotted two kilometers off

the port city of You.34

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03/1999 — Two suspected spy ships of North Korea entered Japanese territorial waters off Noto

Peninsula facing the Sea of Japan (a.k.a. the East Sea), disguised as Japanese fishing

trawlers (without fishing nets but bristling with an array of antennas)35. They led a

small armada of Japanese coast guard and naval ships and aircraft on a high-speed

chase before fleeing into the North Korean port of Ch’ongjin, known to be frequented

by North Korean spy operations vessels. North Korea denied its involvement in the

reported incident.36

(...continued)

Network in Korean, October 6, 1998. The International Civil Aviation Organization condemned North Korea for its

test-launching, without advance notification, over an area affecting the safety of some 180 daily flights between North

America and Asia. Kyodo in English [Internet Version], October 3, 1998. On February 9, 2000, U.S. CIA official in

charge of strategic and nuclear issues was reported to have told the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee that

North Korea appeared to be “continuing its ballistic missile program and selling technology to other nations despite a

well-publicized testing moratorium” [as agreed in Berlin between the United States and North Korea in September

1999]. Tom Raum, Associated Press, February 9, 2000; “N. Korea Continuing Missile Program: CIA Official,” Kyodo

in English, February 9, 2000.

After warning North Korea to cease “provocative actions,” the South Korean Ministry of Defense disciplined six

military officers for failing to capture or sink the boat. North Korea claimed innocence, saying that the South Korean

charge was a premeditated anti-North Korean slander. This infiltration came on the day President Clinton landed in

Seoul for talks with President Kim Dae Jung; it also coincided with the start of an inter-Korean tourism cooperation

project involving scenic Mt. Kumgang (Diamond) north of the DMZ. Korea Herald [Internet version] in English,

November 23, 1998; Yonhap in English, November 26, 1998; and KCNA in English November 23, 1998.

This belligerent rhetoric was in reaction to a media report on a putative U.S. operational plan to deal with “any

possible North Korean invasion” of South Korea. [North] Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean, December

10, 1998; Richard Halloran, “S. Korea, U.S. Draft Deadly Response Plan: If North Invades, Destruction is Goal,”

Washington Times, November 19, 1998, A1, A13. In a similar vein, a North Korean vice minister of defense is quoted

as having declared that the Korean People’s Army will “blow up the U.S. territory as a whole”; a day earlier, North

Korea had disclosed that it had its “own operation plan” to deal with its enemies. KCNA in English, December 2 and 3,

1998.

Yomiuri Shimbun in Japanese [Tokyo], December 19, 1998.

The area of incursion is off the coastal region where the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents was

reported to have taken place in the 1970s and 1980s. Asahi Shimbun in Japanese (Morning Edition), March 25, 1999,

p.5.

In the course of the chase, for the first time in the postwar era, Japanese naval and air patrol pursuers fired warning

shots at the unidentified ships and dropped four bombs in the waters nearby. Ibid.; Yomiuri Shimbun in Japanese,

March 25 and 26, 1999.

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06/1999 — Several North Korean ships provoked a nine-day naval confrontation off South

Korea’s western coast in disputed waters on the Yellow Sea—over the disputed sea

border known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL)37. On June 15, 1999, when the

confrontation ended in an exchange of fire, both sides blamed each other for starting

the firefight. One North Korean torpedo boat caught fire and sank with its entire crew

on board, while five others were heavily damaged. Two of the more modern South

Korean vessels sustained minor damage. It was the most serious naval clash since the

end of the Korean War—and the second such incident since December 1998 (see

above). Since the June encounter, North Korea asserted that more bloodshed would

be “inevitable” unless the South Korean intrusion into “our territorial waters is

checked.” It also called on the U.S. side to renounce the NLL and to “withdraw all its

ships from the disputed waters.”38

09/1999 — On September 9, 1999, the South Korean National Intelligence Service announced the

arrest of five South Koreans, alleged to be members of a pro-North group called the

“Revolutionary Party for People and Democracy.” It was reported that the group had

been formed in March 1992 to radicalize South Korean college campuses for

revolutionary and anti-American activities, getting instructions from Pyongyang

through the “Hotmail” web-based e-mail service39—this despite Pyongyang’s solemn

pledge in 1992 to the South not to attempt to sabotage or undermine it.40 On October

7, 1999, South Korean security authorities identified nearly 20 more members as

alleged members of the “Revolutionary Party for People and Democracy.41

09/1999 — According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, South Korean businessman

Chang Se-chol was abducted in Dandong, China to North Korea.42

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01/2000 — South Korean Rev. Dong-Shik Kim, a legal resident of Lynchburg, Virginia, was

reported missing in Yanji, northeastern China, since January 16, 2000.43 Rev. Kim is

The NLL was drawn (“unilaterally,” according to Pyongyang) by the United Nations Command (UNC) after the

Korean War to prevent armed clashes between the two Koreas. While North Korea never accepted its validity, the NLL

as the de facto maritime border was honored by the North until it decided to force the issue in June 1999. Pyongyang

reportedly violated the NLL 37 times from 1994 to 1997 and 35 times in 1998, more in the seasonal crab-catching

months of May to September. Choson Ilbo in English (Internet version), September 5, 1999; Choson Ilbo in English

(Internet version), September 8, 1999.

“Five-Point Proposal Set Forth by KA Side,” KCNA in English, July 2, 1999. North Korea claims that the disputed

waters belongs to the North under the international maritime law defining 12 nautical miles as territorial waters. See

“Balderdash About ‘Northern Limit Line,” KCNA in English, July 11, 1999.

JoongAng Ibo in English (Internet version), September 9, 1999; Korea Herald (Internet version) in English,

September 10, 1999.

Articles 1 through 4 in the historic inter-Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and

Cooperation , effective February 19, 1992.

Choson Ilbo in English (Internet version), October 7, 1999. An extensive coverage on how this spy ring operated

appeared in Wolgan Choson in Korean, October 1999, pp. 66-89 (available in English translation by the Foreign

Broadcast Information Service, SK1710141199).

Korea Times, October 24, 2000, p. 2.

Rev. Kim is reported to have been actively involved since 1995 in evangelical work among North Korean

escapees/refugees in Yanji, Jilin Province, China, where he ran a restaurant. Chinese authorities reportedly are

suspicious that Rev. Kim was kidnaped by North Korean agents but that, according to the South Korean foreign

(continued...)

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said to have told his coworkers on that day that he would go out for lunch with two

North Korean defectors. Citing the report in Dong-A Ibo, a Seoul daily (February 3,

2000), Seoul’s Yonhap news agency reported that those defectors were actually North

Korean agents disguised as defectors and that ten people were involved in Rev. Kim’s

kidnapping. In October 2000, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reportedly

confirmed that Rev. Kim was kidnapped by North Koreans in Yanbian, China, on

February 1, 2000.44 In October 2000, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service

reportedly confirmed that Rev. Kim was kidnapped by North Koreans in Yanbian,

China, on February 1, 2000.45

03/2000 — On March 9, North Korea rejected a U.S. request that it stop providing shelter to

members of the now-defunct Japanese Communist League-Red Army faction, who

had hijacked a Japanese airliner to Pyongyang in 1970 (see 03/1970 above), and

expel or deport those members still in the North. In a statement carried by the official

KCNA news agency, North Korea claimed, “It is the sovereign state’s legitimate right

recognized by international law to protect members of the Japanese ‘Red Army’ who

sought political asylum in the DPRK, and nobody can put his nose into this issue.”46

A State Department counter-terrorism expert was reported as saying that sheltering

hijackers remained a serious offence, even if they had not carried out acts of violence

for years.

03/2000 — On March 23, North Korea unilaterally declared new navigation “zones and

waterways” in the Yellow Sea in disputed waters near the Northern Limit Line

(NLL), which the United States-led United Nations Command has maintained as a de

facto sea border between the two Koreas since August 30, 1953.47 The declaration

covers waters near five South Korea-held islands, all located west and south of the

NLL but within North Korea’s claimed territorial waters. It would allow passage by

South Korean ships near, to and from, the islands but only within and through the

North Korean-designated zones and waterways. North Korea threatened military

action against intruders “without warnings.” South Korea responded that

Pyongyang’s violation of the NLL would constitute “a provocation” and reaffirmed

its resolve to “defend” the sea border48

(...continued)

ministry, there was no official confirmation from the Chinese side. In 1999, Rev. Kim reportedly led a signature drive

to urge the United Nations to recognize North Korean escapees as refugees. Yonhap in English 0006 GMT February 3

and 0624 GMT February 3, 2000.

According to a tape-recorded testimony of a former North Korean agent now in hiding in Jilin, China, “a substantial

number” of North Korean refugees in China are actually North Korea’s undercover agents disguised as refugees

assigned to abduct North Korean escapees/defectors. As reported by Sang-ho Yoon on “the realities of abduction

revealed by a North Korean agent” in China, Tong-A Ilbo in Korean, February 22, 2000.

“2 S. Koreans Abducted to NK,” Korea Times, October 24, 2000, p.2.

“Statement of Spokesman for DPRK Society for Human Rights Studies,” KCNA in English, March 9, 2000; KCNA in

Korean, March 13, 2000; “N Korea Vows to Protect Japanese ‘Red Army’ terrorists,” Associated Press, March 8, 2000.

The declaration is seen as a follow-up to Pyongyang’s unilateral statement on territorial waters in the disputed areas

made on September 2, 1999. See “Northern Limit Line is Invalid: Special Communique of KPA General Staff,” KCNA

in English, September 2, 1999; Choson Ilbo (Internet version)in English, March 23, 2000; “DPRK Sea Border Claim

Heightens Tension,” Korea Herald (Internet version) in English, March 27, 2000.

The NLL issue seems likely to receive a new attention on June 12-14, 2000, against the backdrop of North-South

Korean summit talks in Pyongyang that also coincides with the first anniversary of the nine-day North-South Korean

(continued...)

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07/2000 — Through its Radio Pyongyang broadcast beamed to South Korea, North Korea

threatened to “blow up” (p’okp’a) the conservative mass-circulation daily Choson

Ilbo for “slandering our Republic” by claiming that the Korean War was started by a

southward invasion of North Korea. North Korea argued that the newspaper’s action,

harmful to national unity and reunification, “is not a matter of freedom of the press

but of high treason.”49

07/2000 — North Korea assailed South Korea’s opposition leader, Lee Hoi-chang, as “an antireunification element...a traitor, a fool, and an imbecile.” Lee was accused of

defaming the authority of North Korean leadership when he spoke in the South

Korean National Assembly on July 6, on, among other things, the need for reciprocity

in inter-Korean cooperation.50

10/2000 — On October 6, North Korea and the United States issued a joint statement agreeing to

oppose all forms of terrorism, to exchange information regarding international

terrorism, and to resolve outstanding issues in this regard between the two sides. The

two sides also underscored their commitment to cooperate in taking effective

measures to fight against terrorism, such measures including “not providing material

support or resources, including safehaven, to terrorists and terrorist groups, bringing

terrorists to justice, and fighting terrorist acts against the safety of civil aviation and

maritime navigation.”51 The U.S. side noted that it will work toward removing North

Korea from a U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, if North Korea will meet the

requirements of U.S. law.

10/2000 — On October 19, North Korea claimed that any South Korean attempt to link the North

with the 1983 terrorist bombing in Rangoon, Myanmar, would amount to a

provocation against North Korea, “a criminal attempt to brand the North as a

‘sponsor of terrorism.’” Stating that it will never tolerate such an “anti-North

diatribe,” at a time when inter-Korean relations are evolving favorably since the

North-South summit in June 2000, North Korea repeated its “unequivocal” position

that it had nothing to do with the bombing incident.52

(...continued)

naval standoff ending in a firefight on June 15,1999 (see 06/1999 above).

Radio Pyongyang to South Korea in Korean, July 8, 2000 (Full text of this broadcast is published by Choson Ilbo

(Internet version) in Korean, July 9, 2000); KCNA in English, July 11, 2000. Earlier, on June 27, 2000, North Korea

had banned a Choson Ilbo reporter from entering the North on assignment to cover the inter-Korean Red Cross talks on

family reunion. In early December 2000, a Choson Ilbo photographer was detained in Pyongyang for three hours while

covering an event of inter-Korean family reunions; North Koreans asked him to apologize for his paper’s allegedly

unflattering account of North Korea relating to the family reunions in Pyongyang and forced him to delete filed

photographs in his digital camera and notebook computer. Korea Herald (Internet version) in English, December 6,

2000; Choson Ilbo (Internet version) in English, December 4, 2000.

North Korea also argued that if Lee Hoi-chang came to power, “the South Korean people will not be able to live in

peace ... and the improving North-South relations will return to the time of confrontation.” KCNA in English, July 11,

2000; Korea Herald (Internet version), July 15, 2000. Radio Pyongyang to South Korea in Korean, July 11, 2000.

A specific example of “safehaven” is the U.S. demand that North Korea expel members of the radical leftist Japanese

Red Army who hijacked a Japanese airliner to Pyongyang in 1970 and who have since been given refuge in North

Korea as political asylum seekers. U.S. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. Joint U.S.-DPRK Statement on

International Terrorism, October 6, 2000; KCNA in English, October 7, 2000; Reuters, October 6, October 8, 2000.

North Korea’s complaint and denial came in the wake of a memorial service held at South Korea’s National

Cemetery on October 9 in remembrance of the 17th anniversary of the North’s terrorist bombing in Rangoon, Myanmar.

(continued...)

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11/2000 — Japanese authorities arrested Kang Song-hui, a former high ranking official of a proNorth Korean organization of Korean residents in Japan, initially on insurance fraud

charges. Investigation revealed that Kang, after receiving espionage training in 1979

in the North, served as a North Korean spy for 20 years collecting information on

South Korea while based in Japan in a bid to build an underground communist

network in South Korea.53

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4/9/01 — North Korean patrol boats briefly entered ROK waters, on the southern side of the

Northern Limit Line that is the de-facto border in the Yellow Sea. The boats, which

ostensibly were guiding North Korean fishing vessels, retreated after being

challenged by ROK naval ships. The incident was repeated on April 10. Similar

incidents occurred on February 5 and March 3.

5/27/01 — A North Korean patrol boat infiltrated into the southern side of the Northern Limit

Line (NLL) northwest of Paekryung Island in the Yellow Sea and stayed for 47

minutes before returning to the North. South Korea said that the violation took place

in the process of North Korea cracking down on Chinese fishing boats which were

operating nearby. The incident was the second one in May and the seventh incident of

its kind in 2001.

6/4/01 — The Korea Herald reported that three DPRK cargo vessels crossed into ROK’s

territorial waters Saturday and returned to international waters Sunday after being

challenged by ROK naval vessels.

7/6/01 — A North Korean patrol boat crossed the Northern Limit Line by about two nautical

miles in the Yellow Sea and maneuvered for some 40 minutes before returning to the

North’s territorial waters. This was the 11th intrusion by a North Korean naval vessel

in 2001.

9/17/01 — During Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi’s summit in Pyongyang with Kim Jong-Il,

the North Korea leader admitted that his country had kidnapped 11 Japanese citizens

in the 1970s and 1980s. He said the actions were “unfortunate,” and he apologized.

Four abductees were still alive, and six were confirmed dead.

11/18/01 — A North Korean patrol boat crossed the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea 6.5

nautical miles west of Baekryong Island. The vessel intruded 1.8nm into South

Korean waters for 36 minutes in what was the 12th such incident of the year.

(...continued)

KCNA in English, October 19, 2000; Yonhap (Internet version) in English, October 19, 2000; Choson Ilbo (Internet

version) in Korean, October 9, 2000.

Asahi Shimbun (Internet version) in Japanese, December 26, 2000; The Daily Yomiuri (Internet version) in English,

December 14, 2000; Yomiuri Shimbun in Japanese, December 13, 2000; Choson Ilbo (Internet version) in English,

December 13, 2000.

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11/27/01 — Soldiers in the North fired three rounds at a South Korean guard post leading South

Korean soldiers to respond with about a dozen shots. No one was injured.

12/22/01 — Japan’s Coast Guard sank a North Korean “spy ship” after a chase and exchange of

gunfire when it ignored a warning to stay out of Japan’s 200 nautical mile exclusive

economic zone. The ship may have sunk itself to avoid capture.

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1/5/02 — A North Korean patrol boat briefly infiltrated South Korean waters off Yonpyong

Island in the Yellow Sea.

3/13/02 — The Guinea-Bissau navy discovered a stash of arms aboard the North Korean ship the

Golden Like, which then managed to escape, a source close to the navy said Friday.

The vessel entered Bissau port on Wednesday, officially to seek a fishing license, but

a routine search by the navy’s security services uncovered Kalashnikovs, submachine guns and ammunition in various parts of the ship, the source said.

6/29/02 — A gun battle erupted between South and North Korean naval ships in the Yellow Sea.

North Korean patrol boats allegedly crossed the Northern Limit Line and opened fire

on a South Korean patrol boat. Four South Koreans and an undetermined number of

North Koreans were killed.

10/17/02 — The U.S. State Department revealed that during October 4-6 meetings in Pyongyang

between U.S. envoy James Kelley and North Korea, the North admitted that it was

pursuing a nuclear weapons development program. This was confirmed two days

later by a North Korean delegate to the United Nations, but he said the uraniumenrichment equipment was not yet in operation.

10/22/02 — Facing pressure to scrap a nuclear weapons program, North Korea warned the United

States that it would take unspecified “tougher counteraction” if Washington did not

accept talks on the issue.

12/11/02 — A North Korean ship en route to Yemen was stopped by allied forces in the Persian

Gulf and was found to be carrying Scud missiles hidden under bags of cement. The

ship was released after Yemen said the missiles were for its army.

12/26/02 — North Korea moved approximately 1,000 nuclear fuel rods from storage into the

Yongbyon nuclear power plant.

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1/10/03 — North Korea announced it will withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

immediately because it was “most seriously threatened” by the United States.54

Text of North Korea’s Statement on NPT Withdrawal. KCNA (North Korean news agency), Pyongyang, January 20,

2003.

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1/11/03 — North Korean Ambassador to China, Choe Jin Su, said Pyongyang no longer felt

bound by the 1999 missile test moratorium.

1/20/03 — A North Korean diplomat was quoted in a Hong Kong newspaper as saying that, if the

North was attacked by the United States, it would retaliate against the United States

but would not attack South Korea.55

2/5/03 — North Korea announced it had reactivated its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at

Yongbyon. The reactor could produce enough material for a nuclear bomb in about a

year. North Korea, however, had apparently not restarted the nuclear fuel

reprocessing facility at Yongbyon which could generate weapons-grade plutonium

more quickly from the 8,000 fuel rods in storage.

2/18/03 — North Korea threatened to abandon the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War if

the United States imposed trade sanctions against the North claiming that a blockade

against it would violate article 15 of the armistice. Pyongyang also accused the

United States of plotting an attack.

2/19/03 — A North Korean fighter jet briefly crossed seven miles into South Korean airspace

over the Yellow Sea prompting the South Korean air force to send six fighter planes

of its own and put ground-to-air missiles on alert. The two-minute incursion ended

without incident but nonetheless raised tensions at a time when nerves were already

on edge over the North’s nuclear program and its threat to pull out of the 1953

armistice that ended the Korean War. South Korea’s military said that the flight was

the first such incursion since 1983 and that it would lodge an official protest.

2/24/03 — For the first time in five years, North Korea test-fired a short-range, anti-ship missile

into the Sea of Japan just a few hours before a ceremony inaugurating South Korea’s

new President, Roh Moo- Hyun. North Korea had notified Japan of the impending

tests.

3/2/03 — Four North Korean fighter jets intercepted a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane in

international airspace over the Sea of Japan. This was the first hostile act by a North

Korean aircraft against a U.S. plane since the 1960s.

3/10/03 — For the second time in two weeks, North Korea fired a Silkworm ground-to-ship

nonballistic missile into the Sea of Japan.

4/10/03 — North Korea’s withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty becomes effective.

4/18/03 — KCNA’s English edition quotes a North Korean foreign ministry spokesman as saying

that North Korea has learned from the US-led war on Iraq that it needs “a powerful

deterrent” and admits it is successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods.

However, analysts note the initial Korean-language version of the article says that

North Korea is only on the verge of reprocessing. The English version is pulled from

the KCNA website.

DPRK Consul General: DPRK Will Not Attack ROK in Order to Confront the United States, Ming Pao, January 20,

2002, p. A18. Translation by OpenSource.gov.

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5/29-31/03 — Visiting North Korea to discuss the nuclear crisis, a delegation of U.S. lawmakers, led

by Representative Curt Weldon meet with senior North Korean leaders. Weldon

reported said that the North Koreans “admitted to having nuclear capability” as well

as trying to “expand their nuclear production program.”56

7/1/03 — The New York Times reports the CIA has informed U.S. allies in Asia that U.S.

satellites have identified an advanced testing site at Yongdok where North Korea

could be developing the technology to fit nuclear warheads onto its missiles.57

7/8/03 — During an informal meeting in New York, North Korean Ambassador to the U.N.

Park Gil Yon tells the State Department’s envoy for North Korean affairs Jack

Pritchard that North Korea finished reprocessing all of the 8,000 spent nuclear fuel

rods stored at its Yongbyon complex on June 30.

7/17/03 — South and North Korean soldiers briefly exchange machine-gun fire at the DMZ.

8/23/03 — The South Korean navy fires warning shots after a North Korean navy vessel crossed

the northern limit line (NLL).

10/3/03 — KCNA reports that all the country’s nuclear facilities, including the 5-megawatt

reactor at Yongbyon, are fully operational, adding that “all the technological matters

have been solved fully in the process of making a switch-over in the use of

plutonium.” The report also says the reprocessing of the 8,000 irradiated fuel rods

was completed in June.58

10/20/03 — A spokesman for the South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff says North Korea has testfired a surface-to-ship missile as part of annual military exercises.59

11/24/03 — The South Korean navy fires five warning shots after a North Korean patrol boat

crossed the northern limit line (NLL).

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5/23/04 — The New York Times reports that IAEA inspectors have discovered evidence North

Korea sold nearly two tons of uranium hexafluoride, a key element necessary to

make an atomic bomb, in 2001 to Libya.60

8/8/04 — North Korean agents operating along the Chinese border reportedly kidnapped Ms.

Jin Kyung-sook (also spelled out Gyeong-suk), a former North Korean refugee and

current South Korean passport holder, while retrieving her camcorder along the

Kenji Hall, “U.S. lawmaker: North Korea says it will build more nukes,” Associated Press Worldstream, June 2,

2003.

David E. Sanger, “C.I.A. Said to Find Nuclear Advances By North Koreans,” New York Times, July 1, 2007, p. 1.

Text of Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on nuclear weapons. KCNA, Pyongyang, October 3, 2003, at

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

Agence France Presse, “North Korea test-fires missile: South Korea,” October 20, 2003.

David E. Sanger and William H. Broad, “Evidence is cited linking Koreans to Libya Uranium,”New York Times,

May 23, 2004, p. 1.

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Tumen River. Ms. Jin’s husband, Mun Joung-hun, was not captured by the North

Koreans and disputes the allegation that the couple was spying. 61

9/12/04 — Sources in Seoul and Beijing report seeing a huge mushroom cloud in northern North

Korea on September 9, the anniversary of the founding of the DPRK. President Bush

reportedly is briefed that the cloud may have resulted from a nuclear test. North

Korea claims the cloud resulted from a detonation associated with a hydroelectric

dam, but when it transports foreign ambassadors to the area for a visual inspection, it

brings them to a site 60 miles away from where the cloud was reported. South

Korean authorities later say the episode may have been an unusual cloud formation.

9/27/04 — In a speech before the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly, North Korean

Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon says “the ever intensifying U.S. hostile policy”

and the lack of clarity about “the secret nuclear related experiments in South Korea ...

makes us unable to participate in the talks aimed at discussing the nuclear weapon

program.” Later, at a news conference, Choe says “We have already made clear that

we have already reprocessed 8,000 wasted fuel rods and transformed them into

arms.”62

11/1/04 — South Korean patrol boats fire warning shots to repel three North Korean patrol boats

that reportedly crossed the northern limit line (NLL) in two separate incidents.

12/6/04 — In an interview with the New York Times, IAEA Director General Mohamed

ElBaradei says that he is “sure” that North Korea has reprocessed all the 8,000 rods

of spent fuel that the IAEA had watched over until December 2002.63

12/8/04 — Japanese officials announce that the results of DNA tests on a box of bones and ashes

that North Korea had said contained the remains of Megumi Yokota, a Japanese

woman kidnapped by North Korea, proved that the remains belong to a number of

other people. “It would be difficult under such circumstances to provide further

assistance to North Korea,” says chief cabinet secretary, Hiroyuki Hosoda.

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2/2/05 — The New York Times reports that scientific tests have led American intelligence

agencies and government scientists to conclude with near certainty that North Korea

sold uranium hexaflouride, the material that can be fed into nuclear centrifuges and

enriched into bomb fuel, to Libya.64

Translation into English of the Seoul Chungang llbo, “ROK Daily: Husband, Spy Chief at Odds Over Kidnap,”

September 9, 2004, from Open Source at http://www.opensource.gov.

Yonhap (South Korean Newspaper), “Pyongyang Already ‘Weaponized’ Spent Nuclear Fuel: N. Korean Envoy,”

September 28, 2004.

David E. Sanger and William H. Broad, “North Korea Said to Expand Arms Program,” New York Times, December

6, 2004, p. 6.

David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Tests said to tie deal on uranium to North Korea,” New York Times,

February 2, 2005, p. 1.

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2/10/05 — A rare statement by the North Korean Foreign Ministry says that it has “manufactured

nuclear weapons for self-defense” and will “suspend participation in the Six-Party

Talks for an indefinite period.” The statement asserts that the emphasis on ending

tyranny in President Bush’s State of the Union address, combined with naming North

Korea as an “outpost of tyranny” in Condoleezza Rice’s confirmation testimony,

indicates that the Bush Administration has intensified its “hostile policy” toward the

North.65

3/2005 — Sometime in March 2005 (exact date unknown) in Longjing City in Jilin Province,

Kang Gun (male, age 36) was reportedly seized by North Korean agents in China and

taken to Pyongyang. Kang was a defector from North Korea who had become a

South Korean citizen. He was responsible for the footage of the Yoduk political

prison camp that aired on Japanese television. Because of his involvement in getting

information out about North Korea’s political prison camps, it is not known if he is

alive or dead.66

3/31/05 — A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry releases a statement on the allegation

that the U.S. keeps nuclear arms on the Korean peninsula. He writes, “Now that the

DPRK has become a full-fledged nuclear weapons state, the Six-Party Talks should

be disarmament talks where the participating countries negotiate the issue on an

equal footing ... if the Six-Party Talks are to creditably fulfill their mission, it is

necessary to convert them into a place where ways are sought to completely remove

the U.S. nuclear threat from the peninsula and its vicinity.”67

4/19/05 — In an interview with USA Today, North Korean deputy ambassador to the United

Nations Han Songryol says North Korea has shut down its nuclear reactor and plans

to remove the fuel to make bombs and “increase our deterrent” against a possible

U.S. attack. It is reported that the CIA has estimated that North Korea possesses from

two to eight nuclear bombs; reprocessing this reactor fuel could give it an additional

six. Anonymous U.S. and South Korean officials reportedly confirm that the

Yongbyon reactor was shut down earlier in April.68

4/21/05 — An ethnic Korean from China, Yoo Young-hwa, who is an alleged North Korean

agent, was sentenced by the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) to 10 years in

prison for his role in the abduction of Kim Dong Shik, a missionary who worked with

North Korean refugees in China.69

Text of Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on nuclear weapons. KCNA, Pyongyang, February 10, 2005, at

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

Translation from Open Source via the Internet of the Seoul Democracy Network Against North Korean Gulag

reporting, “ROK Civic Group Urges ROTG To protect Defectors’ Human Rights,” September 5, 2005.

Text of Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on nuclear weapons. KCNA, Pyongyang, April 1, 2005, at

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

Barbara Slavin, “N. Korea arsenal may be growing,” USA Today, April 19, 2005, p. 1A.

U.S. Department of State, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

2005, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61612.htm, accessed April 18, 2007.

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4/24/05 — In remarks carried by KCNA marking the 73rd anniversary of North Korea’s army,

Vice Marshal Kim Yong Chun, a member of the North Korean National Defense

Commission, says North Korea “... will steadily bolster its nuclear deterrent for selfdefense to cope with the enemies’ reckless moves for military aggression.”70

5/1/05 — The BBC reports that North Korea has test-fired a short-range missile into the Sea of

Japan. The missile was believed to have traveled about 100 kilometers, or 60 miles,

into the sea between the two countries.71

5/11/05 — “The DPRK has successfully finished the unloading of 8,000 spent fuel rods from the

5 MW pilot nuclear plant in the shortest period,” North Korea’s Foreign Ministry said

in a statement, according to the Korean Central News Agency.72

6/5/05 — The San Jose Mercury News reports that Stanford University Professor John Lewis,

returning from his 11th trip to North Korea, says that senior North Korean officials

told him that the United States is trying to goad them into a nuclear test to sour their

ties with China and South Korea, that they have restarted construction of the 50megawatt and 200-megawatt reactors that had been suspended under the 1994 Agreed

Framework. The North Koreans also reportedly told Lewis that North Korea had

been on the verge of agreeing in mid-May to resume the Six-Party Talks until this

move was dashed by comments by senior U.S. officials threatening to take North

Korea to the UN Security Council. The officials also reportedly reiterated North

Korea’s March 31 demand that the talks be expanded in scope to take up peninsular

disarmament.73

6/30/05 — The Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports that North Korea has

resumed construction of a 50,000-kilowatt reactor in Yongbyon and a 200,000kilowatt one in Thaechon, violating a 1994 agreement with the United States to halt

construction on these facilities. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda

told a press conference that he was unsure whether Pyongyang is considering using

the facilities reportedly under construction “for power generation or production of

nuclear weapons.”74

8/29/05 — North Korea announces that it will delay the return to the Six-Party Talks for two

weeks. As reasons for the delay, it blamed U.S. joint military exercises with South

Korea and the appointment of Jay Lefkowitz as a Special Envoy on human rights in

North Korea. Lefkowitz, a former adviser to President Bush, was to shine a human

Text of a statement by the Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army, Kim Yong Chun. KCNA, “DPRK to Steadily

Bolster Its Nuclear Deterrent for Self-Defence,” Pyongyang, April 24, 2005, at http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

BBC, “North Korea ‘tests new missile,’” May 1, 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4503531.stm.

Text of Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on the unloading of spent fuel rods from a power plant. KCNA, “Spent

Fuel Rods Unloaded from Pilot Nuclear Plant,” Pyongyang, May 12, 2005, at http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

Daniel Sneider, “There’s thread of hope that N. Korea will return to talks,” San Jose Mercury News, June 6, 2005.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japanese newspaper), “‘Sources’ Say North Korea Resumes Nuclear Reactor Construction,”

June 30, 2005. (Translation by OpenSource.gov)

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rights spotlight in international settings on what the administration has called “the

long-suffering North Korean people.”

9/15/05 — The U.S. Treasury Department designated Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank, as

a “primary money laundering concern,” charging it with being a “willing pawn” of

North Korean counterfeiting and drug trafficking activities.75

9/20/05 — A day after the joint statement from all six nations closing the fourth round of sixparty talks, North Korea demanded that a light water reactor be fully constructed

before it begins dismantling its nuclear program. Washington reiterated its rejection

of the reactor demand and joined China in urging North Korea to stick to the

agreement announced Monday in which it pledged to abandon all its nuclear

programs in exchange for economic aid and security assurances.

11/23/05 — KEDO announced plans to terminate a moth-balled project to build a light-water

reactor in North Korea. The program had been frozen since 2002. A day later, Japan

demands its money back for the outlay of cash it spent on the light-water reactor.

North Korea responded through a foreign ministry spokesman by blaming the U.S.

for having overturned a 1994 bilateral agreement that included the project, and

demanding that Washington “compensate [North Korea] for the political and

economic losses it has caused.”76

12/12/05 — Pyongyang tells the KEDO Office in Kumho, North Korea, to withdraw all its

workers at the nuclear power reactor construction site in the North by early January.

After construction work at the site was suspended, the North had blocked KEDO

from removing about 20 million dollars’ worth of cars, trucks, cranes and other

construction equipment, much of it owned by South Korean contractors.77

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03/10/06 — North Korea test-fires two short-range missiles from a coastal site on the Sea of

Japan. According to a South Korea government official, the missiles probably

dropped into the sea about 100km away. The direction of the launch could not be

confirmed.78

07/4/06 — Defying broad international pressure, North Korea test-fires six missiles into the Sea

of Japan, including a long-range Taepodong-2 with the theoretical capacity to reach

United States Treasury Department press release, “Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money

Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act,” September 15, 2005, at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/

js2720.htm.

Text of Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on halt to light-water reactor construction. KCN, “DPRK FM

Spokesman Demands U.S. Compensate for Political and Economic Losses,” Pyongyang, November 28, 2005, at

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

Text of report by So’ Myo-cha, originally published in English by South Korean newspaper Chungang Ilbo website

on December 12. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 12, 2005.

Anna Fifield, “North Koreans test short-range missiles,” Financial Times (London), March 10, 2006, p.3. In a White

House press briefing on March 8, 2006, Scott McClellan stated, “We have consistently pointed out that North Korea’s

missile program is a concern that poses a threat to the region and the larger international community.” Press briefing

transcript at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060308-5.html.

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the continental U.S. However, the Taepodong-2 failed 40 seconds into its flight. In a

press briefing about the launches, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan

stated, “In doing this, the North Koreans have once again isolated themselves. They

have defied their neighbors who urged them not to have a launch. The South

Koreans, the Japanese and the Chinese all have asked them not to do it. The United

States now will work with the other parties in the six-party talks to figure out the

appropriate way to move forward. But I think it’s fair to say that this is a further

indication of isolation on the part of the North Koreans. And it also reminds

everybody about the nature of the regime.”79

07/5/06 — North Korea launches a seventh missile, despite broad international condemnation of

the earlier launches.

09/25/06 — Selig S. Harrison, a scholar and a longtime Korea specialist based in Washington, said

top North Korean officials whom he met with last week told him they intended to

unload fuel rods at the Yongbyon reactor by this fall. The fuel rods can be processed

to extract plutonium for nuclear bombs.

10/3/06 — North Korean media carry a DPRK Foreign Ministry statement saying that the DPRK

will take “new measures” to strengthen its self-defense capabilities, which includes

conducting a “nuclear test.”80

10/9/06 — North Korea announces that it has carried out an underground nuclear test. It calls the

test a “historic event” and says that “It will contribute to defending the peace and

stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the area around it.”81

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3/23/07 — Negotiations on halting North Korea’s nuclear program during the latest of the sixparty talks broke down abruptly Thursday, with the country’s chief envoy to the talks,

Kim Kye Gwan, flying home after a dispute over money frozen in a Macau bank

could not be resolved. China issued a statement saying the talks would take a recess

but did not give a restart date. The breakdown raises doubts over meeting a deadline

in the February 13 agreement that calls for UN inspectors to verify the closure of

North Korea’s main nuclear reactor at Yongbyon by April 14.

Scott McClellan, “Press Briefing on North Korea Missile Launch,” July 4, 2006, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2006/07/print/20060704-1.html.

North Korea—OSC Report in Korean, Pyongyang, “FYI: DPRK Media Carry ‘Foreign Ministry Statement’ Pledging

‘Nuclear Test’,” October 3, 2006. Translated by OpenSource.gov.

KCNA report, “DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,” Pyongyang, October 9, 2006, at

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm.

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(name redacted)

Information Research Specialist

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

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