Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportSep 16, 2024
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background
and Issues for Congress
September 16, 2024
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48182
SUMMARY
Defense Production for Ukraine: Background
and Issues for Congress
Since the commencement of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S.
government has engaged in efforts to organize and expand the production of defense equipment
for Ukraine-related purposes. To date, such purposes have included the direct provision of
security assistance to Ukraine, the replacement of U.S. equipment already provided to Ukraine
from existing stocks, and the expansion of U.S. and global defense industrial capacity.
Congress has played a role in these efforts, including by enacting annual and supplemental
defense appropriations to fund Ukraine-related acquisition and industrial base investment
programs; establishing or modifying authorities and policies relating to security assistance,
defense procurement, and related activities; and overseeing the executive branch’s use of these
funds and authorities.
The Biden Administration contends that these attempts to mobilize the defense industrial base are
critical to the effective battlefield performance of the Ukrainian military, as well as the
realization of broader U.S. strategic interests. Partly as a result of these actions, since 2022, U.S.
suppliers—which include both privately-owned defense contractors as well as government
facilities and organizations—have increased the production of certain defense articles relevant to
the conflict in Ukraine (e.g., artillery shells, precision-guided munitions, and air defense
systems). Some policymakers and analysts argue that production challenges remain.
R48182
September 16, 2024
Luke A. Nicastro,
Coordinator
Analyst in U.S. Defense
Infrastructure Policy
Andrew S. Bowen
Analyst in Russian and
European Affairs
Brendan W. McGarry
Specialist in U.S. Defense
Budget
Daniel M. Gettinger
Analyst in U.S. Defense
Policy
Jennifer DiMascio
Analyst in U.S. Defense
Policy
Potential questions facing Congress include:
•
Do U.S. and global suppliers possess adequate industrial capacity to achieve
congressional objectives regarding Ukraine?
•
Is the executive branch’s use of Ukraine-related production authorities and
appropriations meeting congressional intent?
•
What has been the impact of U.S.-produced defense equipment on the conflict? Are U.S.
suppliers providing the right kinds of capabilities to achieve congressional objectives
regarding Ukraine?
Congressional Research Service
Christina L. Arabia
Analyst in Security
Assistance, Security
Cooperation and the
Global Arms Trade
Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Funding, Authorities, and Programs for Ukraine-Related Production ...................................... 2
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 2
Producing Items for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative ......................................... 4
Replacing Items Transferred Under Presidential Drawdown Authority ............................. 5
Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales ..................................................... 6
Investing in the U.S. Industrial Base................................................................................... 7
Producing Key Weapon Systems and Munitions ...................................................................... 8
155 mm Artillery Round ..................................................................................................... 9
Javelin ................................................................................................................................11
Stinger ............................................................................................................................... 12
M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) .............................................. 13
Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target (PATRIOT) ..................................... 14
Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (Drones) ............................................................................... 15
F-16 Fighting Falcon ........................................................................................................ 16
Production Diplomacy ............................................................................................................ 18
Coordinating National Production with Foreign Governments ........................................ 18
International Co-Production.............................................................................................. 20
Issues Facing Congress ................................................................................................................. 23
Industrial Capacity .................................................................................................................. 23
Assessing Capacity Needs ................................................................................................ 23
Legislative Options ........................................................................................................... 24
Exercising Oversight ............................................................................................................... 25
Existing Oversight Efforts ................................................................................................ 25
Possible Oversight Questions for Congress ...................................................................... 27
Impact on the Conflict ............................................................................................................. 28
Relationship to Battlefield Performance ........................................................................... 28
Figures
Figure 1. Ukraine-related Funding and Authorities ......................................................................... 4
Tables
Table 1. Production Output for Selected Weapons and Munitions, 2022-2024............................... 8
Table A2. Defense Articles and Services Provided to Ukraine, 2022-2024 .................................. 32
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine ............................................................................ 32
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 35
Congressional Research Service
Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since then, the
government of Ukraine has fought to defend and retake Ukrainian territory, assisted in various
ways by the governments of the United States and other countries.
At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) was equipped
mainly with upgraded Soviet or early post-Soviet era systems, and Ukraine’s domestic defense
industry—which was largely inherited from the Soviet Union—possessed only a limited ability to
produce advanced equipment at scale.1 As a result, the UAF faced a persistent shortage of
materiel, a problem exacerbated by equipment losses sustained in previous fighting as well as by
Russian strikes on Ukrainian production facilities.2 This made Ukraine dependent on outside
security assistance, the largest amount of which has come from the United States (other countries
in Europe and elsewhere have also provided significant security assistance, but not on the scale of
U.S. commitments).3 The U.S. government refers to the coordination of security assistance to
Ukraine as Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR).
To provide this assistance, the United States has sought to leverage its defense industrial base
(DIB)—the network of organizations, facilities, and resources that supply the U.S. government
with defense articles and services.4 Broadly speaking, the U.S. DIB supports Ukraine’s war effort
in two major ways: 1) by producing weapons, munitions, and other military hardware to provide
directly to the UAF, and 2) by manufacturing items to replace those that the United States has
already provided to the UAF from its existing stocks.
In addition to using its own DIB, the U.S. government has also sought to encourage and
coordinate the global production of materiel for Ukraine (efforts sometimes referred to as
production diplomacy).5 As part of these efforts, U.S. officials have negotiated and coordinated
production investments and procurement actions with other governments, as well as assisted in
the creation or expansion of international co-production arrangements and related industrial
partnerships.
The mobilization of the U.S. DIB to produce weapons for Ukraine has been the subject of
considerable debate, both within Congress and more broadly. The Biden Administration has
1 Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine inherited roughly 30% of Soviet defense industrial
capacity. Despite efforts to bring Ukrainian defense production in line with NATO standards prior to 2022, years of
underinvestment, corruption, and mismanagement have impacted the country’s defense industry. See Kateryna Bondar,
“Arsenal of Democracy: Integrating Ukraine into the West’s Defense Industrial Base,” Carnegie Endowment,
December 4, 2023; and Tor Bukkvoll, “Failures in Ukrainian Arms Procurement 2014-2023: The Negative Effects of
Limited Access Orders on National Security,” Problems of Post Communism (2024), pp. 1-23.
2 For more information on Ukraine’s military performance in the conflict, see CRS In Focus IF12150, Ukrainian
Military Performance and Outlook, by Andrew S. Bowen.
3 This preeminent role has been recognized by other governments—for example, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated
in February 2024 that “support from the United States is indispensable for the question of whether Ukraine will be able
to defend its own country.” A. Hernandez-Morales, “U.S. Aid ‘Indispensable’, Scholz Says,” Politico, February 10,
2024. For a breakdown of security assistance by country, see the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, “Ukraine
Support Tracker,” https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/.
4 For an overview of the U.S. defense industrial base, see CRS Report R47751, The U.S. Defense Industrial Base:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Luke A. Nicastro.
5 In the contemporary context, the term production diplomacy appears to have been coined by Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Dr. William LaPlante, and has since been used by other government officials
and some think tanks. See remarks in “Strengthening the U.S. Industrial Base (Transcript),” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, September 26, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/strengthening-us-industrial-base-hon-drwilliam-laplante.
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
maintained that 1) Ukrainian victory is in the United States’ national interest; 2) U.S. suppliers
are capable of meeting the requirements of arming Ukraine’s military (given the proper
government support); and 3) the resultant capacity expansion also improves U.S. military
readiness and the health of the domestic economy.6 Some officials also have claimed that the size
of the U.S. DIB means that its production efforts are uniquely important to Ukrainian success,
and that no other country or group of countries could replace its contributions.7 Other
stakeholders have argued that Ukraine-related production consumes limited resources that would
better be applied to other national security problems, such as strategic competition with China.8
Still others have posited that, even with Western assistance, Ukrainian victory is impossible, or
that U.S. support for Ukraine is itself unwise (making Ukraine-related production wasteful at best
and dangerous at worst).9
Background
Funding, Authorities, and Programs for Ukraine-Related
Production
Overview
Since 2022, Congress has appropriated $174.2 billion in emergency supplemental funding for
Ukraine-related purposes, with the majority of funds going to Department of Defense (DOD) and
defense-related accounts—which received $110.7 billion, or 64% of the total—and Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) accounts—which received $58.4
billion, or 34% of the total.10
Ukraine-related appropriations to DOD and defense-related accounts have been used for a variety
of purposes, including the provision of defense articles and services (i.e., security assistance) to
6 For example, in his address of October 19, 2023, President Joe Biden stated: “On Ukraine, I’m asking Congress to
make sure we can continue to send Ukraine the weapons they need to defend themselves and their country without
interruption, so Ukraine can stop Putin’s brutality in Ukraine… We send Ukraine equipment sitting in our stockpiles.
And when we use the money allocated by Congress, we use it to replenish our own stores, our own stockpiles, with
new equipment. Equipment that defends America and is made in America. Patriot missiles for air defense batteries,
made in Arizona. Artillery shells manufactured in 12 states across the country, in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas… Just as
in World War II, today patriotic American workers are building the arsenal of democracy and serving the cause of
freedom.” See also similar remarks in the State of the Union address of March 7, 2024, and the address of July 9, 2024.
7 As an example of this view, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has claimed that “at the end of the day,
there is no alternative to the United States stepping up to the plate and providing a level of resources that allow Ukraine
to have the artillery, the air defense systems and the other capabilities they need.” NATO, “Joint Press Conference,”
February 7, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_222506.htm. See also comments by German Prime
Minister Olaf Scholz in Footnote 3.
8 See, for example, Senator J.D. Vance, “J.D. Vance: The Math on Ukraine Doesn’t Add Up,” The New York Times,
April 12, 2024.
9 See, for example, Anatol Lieven, “Ukraine Can’t Win the War,” Time, February 24, 2024.
10 Congress has provided emergency funding for Ukraine in five supplemental appropriations acts: Ukraine
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N); Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128); Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-180, Division B); Additional
Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328, Division M); and Ukraine Security Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-50, Division B). Although defense and SFOPS accounts together received 98% of
this emergency funding, Ukraine-related appropriations were also made to Agriculture; Commerce, Justice, Science;
Energy and Water; and Financial Services, General Government; and Labor, Health and Human Services, Education
accounts. Congress has also provided certain funding for Ukraine-related activities in regular appropriations acts.
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Ukraine, the replacement of items already transferred to Ukraine from DOD stocks, the
deployment of U.S. military personnel and assets to Europe, and related activities.11 Funding with
direct production requirements or implications has included:
•
•
$31.8 billion to procure newly manufactured weapons and equipment for
provision to Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI;12
and
$45.8 billion to replace defense articles and services already provided to Ukraine,
as well as to reimburse the department for services, military education, and
training provided to Ukraine or foreign countries that have supported Ukraine.13
Funding related to defense production for Ukraine but provided to non-defense accounts has
included $6.33 billion for the SFOPS foreign military financing (FMF) account, to be made
available to Ukraine and countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.14 This assistance may be
used by its recipients to, inter alia, procure defense articles and services from U.S. suppliers via
the foreign military sales (FMS) system.15
Outside of the appropriations described above, Congress has also increased the total dollaramount limit for Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA; a statutory authority by which the
President may transfer materiel from existing stocks and provide services to foreign countries) to
permit more transfers to Ukraine than statute would have otherwise allowed.16 Since 2022,
Congress has raised this cap to a combined maximum of $33.3 billion.17
Figure 1 below provides a notional illustration of how such funding and authorities have been
used to supply Ukraine with weapons and equipment, as well as replenish U.S. defense stocks.
11 For more information, see CRS Insight IN12107, Department of Defense Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A
Summary, by Brendan W. McGarry.
12 In addition to the $31.8 billion provided for USAI via supplemental appropriations acts, Congress has also provided
$900 million via regular appropriations acts during this period (P.L. 117-103, §8139; P.L. 117-328, §8110; and P.L.
118-47, §8148). See also DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” infographic, August 8, 2024,
https://www.acq.osd.mil/news/spotlight/ukraine-infographic_08aug2024.pdf.
13 This total includes both $39.34 billion in operation and maintenance (O&M) funding for transfer between certain
accounts and $6.436 billion in multiple procurement accounts for replacement of DOD stocks. According to
information provided to CRS by DOD, the procurement funds were appropriated by P.L. 118-50, Division B and
include $3.103 billion in Procurement of Ammunition, Army; $1.897 billion in Missile Procurement, Army; $549.0
million in Weapons Procurement, Navy; $366.0 million in Missile Procurement, Air Force; $309.0 million in Other
Procurement, Army; and $212.4 million in Procurement, Marine Corps. For more information, see CRS Insight
IN12107, Department of Defense Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A Summary, by Brendan W. McGarry.
14 CRS Report R47275, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Supplemental
Funding for Ukraine: In Brief, by Emily M. McCabe, p. 10.
15 For more information on FMF, see Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Foreign Military Financing
(FMF),” https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-military-financing-fmf.
16 22 U.S.C. §2318. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by
Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.
17 Congress increased the annual PDA cap from $100 million to $11 billion for FY2022, $14.5 billion for FY2023, and
$7.8 billion for FY2024; for more information, see CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by
Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Figure 1. Ukraine-related Funding and Authorities
Selected Funding and Authorities Used to Aid Ukraine and Replenish U.S. Stocks
Source: CRS graphic.
Notes: FMF assistance may be used by Ukraine and other recipient countries to, inter alia, procure materiel
from U.S. defense suppliers.
Using these funds, authorities, and programs, the executive branch has reported that it has
provided more than $55.7 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since February 2022, including
$26.2 billion committed for USAI contracting actions, $25.6 billion in announced PDA transfers,
and $4 billion committed for FMF uses.18
In addition, the executive branch has used other funding sources to make investments that it has
framed as supportive of security assistance to Ukraine, including Defense Production Act (DPA)
Title III projects and other industrial base expansion programs and authorities.19
Producing Items for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
USAI is an initiative to fund security assistance to Ukraine, which may include the provision of
defense equipment, training, logistics support, intelligence support and other defense articles and
services to the military and security forces of Ukraine. Although USAI was initially established
by Section 1250 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 114-92), the
majority of USAI assistance has been provided since February 2022.20 The provision of USAI
assistance typically has involved new contracting actions with U.S. defense suppliers. As of
August 8, 2024, DOD has awarded $15.8 billion of USAI funding to various contractors for 155
millimeter (mm) artillery rounds, air defense systems and munitions, mobile rocket artillery
systems, and other defense equipment.21
18 The term provide in this context refers to 1) appropriated funds that have been obligated or committed (i.e., their use
has been notified to Congress); and 2) PDA transfers that have been publicly announced. DOS, “U.S. Security
Cooperation with Ukraine,” September 6, 2024, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/; and
DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” August 8, 2024.
19 See discussion in “Investing in the U.S. Industrial Base” section below.
20 CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory
Welt.
21 DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” infographic, August 8, 2024.
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
To address what it has described as urgent Ukrainian shortfalls, the executive branch has also
taken actions to redirect the production and delivery of certain defense articles—initially intended
to be sold to other countries—to Ukraine via USAI. On June 20, 2024, for instance, National
Security Council spokesman John Kirby announced that “the United States government has made
the difficult but necessary decision to reprioritize near term planned deliveries of foreign military
sales to other countries, particularly of Patriot and [National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile
System] missiles to go to Ukraine instead.”22 One media report has suggested that the costs of this
reprioritization could exceed $1 billion and would be drawn from USAI funds.23
Replacing Items Transferred Under Presidential Drawdown Authority
To replace the capabilities provided to Ukraine through PDA, DOD has contracted with suppliers
to produce new items for U.S. use. As of this writing, President Biden has invoked PDA to
transfer approximately $25.6 billion in defense equipment to Ukraine since August 2021; as of
August 8, 2024, DOD has obligated $21.0 billion for contracting actions to replace the equipment
so provided.24
Although PDA replacement funding is intended primarily to backfill PDA-provided equipment,
contracting actions are not necessarily being taken on a ‘one-to-one’ basis (that is, DOD may not
be procuring a replacement for every single item sent to Ukraine). Rather, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that DOD may use PDA replacement funds for four
distinct purposes:
•
•
•
•
To “buy exact replacements of weapons delivered to Ukraine;”
To “buy newer, modern variants of weapons delivered to Ukraine;”
To “invest in the defense industrial base to accelerate the production of
weapons;” and
To “reimburse service costs, including logistics costs associated with PDA
transfers to Ukraine (e.g., operation and maintenance fuel costs to ship equipment
overseas).”25
As of December 2023, the largest amount of PDA replacement funds had been obligated for
actions related to ammunition production ($6.0 billion), followed by actions related to missiles
($5.4 billion) and combat vehicles ($2.7 billion).26
PDA Valuation Errors
On June 20, 2023, DOD reported overestimating the value of equipment transferred to Ukraine under PDA by
$6.2 billion, including $2.6 billion in FY2022 and $3.6 billion in FY2023. Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said
department officials discovered inconsistencies in how financial managers in the military services calculated such
estimates. In a “significant” number of cases, Singh said, the services used replacement cost (i.e., the cost to
purchase a new item to replace a transferred item) rather than net book value (i.e., the depreciated value of a
22 The White House, “On-the-Record Press Gaggle by White House National Security Communications Advisor John
Kirby,” June 20, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/06/20/on-the-record-pressgaggle-by-white-house-national-security-communications-advisor-john-kirby-15/.
23 Tony Bertuca, “U.S. to Redirect Foreign Sales of Air Defense Missiles,” Inside Defense, June 20, 2024.
24 CRS analysis of Ukraine appropriations acts; DOS, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” September 6, 2024;
and DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” August 8, 2024. See also CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to
Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.
25 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Ukraine: Status and Challenges of DOD Weapon Replacement Efforts,
GAO-24-106649, April 30, 2024, p. 2.
26 Ibid., p. 4.
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transferred item). After correcting for the “valuation errors,” Singh said, DOD identified $6.2 billion in previously
announced PDA still available for use.27
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern these errors may have affected the pace and mix of
equipment transferred to Ukraine. In May 2023, for instance, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael
McCaul and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers issued a joint statement claiming that
“these funds could have been used for extra supplies and weapons for the upcoming counteroffensive, instead of
rationing funds to last for the remainder of the fiscal year.”28
In July 2024, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report examining the valuation of
PDA transfers, and documented additional valuation errors totaling over $2.1 billion. GAO found that some DOD
components did not consistently follow department accounting policy when valuing defense articles for PDA, and
recommended that Congress clarify the definition of PDA-related “value” in the Foreign Assistance Act, and that
DOD update its Financial Management Regulation to include a PDA-specific valuation section, among other
recommendations. Without these or similar changes, GAO states that “DOD cannot have assurance that the
articles will be valued accurately, which may result in a miscalculation of the remaining presidential determination
authorization amount.”29 In addition, if Congress were to base the amounts appropriated for PDA replacement
actions on misvalued PDA transfers, one result could be too much or too little funding to procure new weapons
and munitions for U.S. stocks.
Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales
As noted above, both FMF and FMS have been used to provide security assistance to Ukraine.
According to the Department of State (DOS), as of September 6, 2024, $4 billion of the $6.33
billion in Ukraine-related FMF had been notified to Congress.30 In addition, DOS has reported
that the United States has $595.9 million in active FMS cases with Ukraine (it is unclear how
much of this total is financed by FMF).31 Recently approved FMS sales include “Blanket Order
Sustainment of U.S. Army Supplied Systems” (May 2024; $100 million estimated cost),
HIMARS and “related elements of logistics and program support” (May 2024; $30 million
estimated cost), and “HAWK Phase III Missile System Sustainment and related elements of
logistics and program support” (April 2024).32 In addition, at least $2 billion of Ukraine-related
FMF is intended to fund a “defense enterprise fund,” which U.S. Secretary of State Antony
Blinken described as having three elements:
One is to provide weapons today, so this will assist Ukraine in acquiring those weapons.
Two is to focus [on] investing in Ukraine’s defense industrial base, helping to strengthen
even more its capacity to produce what it needs for itself but also to produce for others.
27 DOD, “Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh Holds a Press Briefing,” transcript, June 20, 2023.
28 House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Chairmen McCaul and Rogers on Pentagon Multi-Billion-Dollar ‘Accounting
Error’,” press release, May 18, 2023.
29 GAO, Ukraine Assistance: Actions Needed to Properly Value Defense Articles Provided under Presidential
Drawdown Authority, GAO-24-10634, July 2024.
30 DOS, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” September 6, 2024, https://www.state.gov/u-s-securitycooperation-with-ukraine/.
31 Ibid.
32 DSCA, “Ukraine – Blanket Order Sustainment of U.S. Army Supplied Systems,” May 16, 2024,
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-blanket-order-sustainment-us-army-supplied-systems;
DSCA, “Ukraine – HIMARS,” May 10, 2024, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-highmobility-artillery-rocket-systems; and DSCA, “HAWK Phase III Missile System Sustainment,” April 9, 2024,
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-hawk-phase-iii-missile-system-sustainment.
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And finally, using this fund to help Ukraine purchase military equipment from other
countries, not just the United States, for Ukraine’s use.33
More generally, the executive branch has reported an uptick in FMS since 2022, and some DOD
officials have attributed much of this increase to European reactions to the war in Ukraine.34
Depending on the particular systems and components involved in these sales, they could have an
impact on the production of Ukraine-related defense equipment. For example, increased demand
for systems relevant to the war in Ukraine (e.g., HIMARS or PATRIOT) could lead to production
or sustainment delays for Ukraine or other FMS customers (or both).
Investing in the U.S. Industrial Base
The U.S. government has also made a number of Ukraine-related investments in the DIB. Since
February 2022, Congress has appropriated at least $600 million for Ukraine-related uses of Title
III of the DPA, which allows the President to provide loan guarantees, loans, purchases and
purchase commitments, grants, and other financial assistance directly to suppliers for the purpose
of expanding production.35 According to DOD, these appropriations—along with other DPA Title
III funds—have been used to bolster and expand the production of numerous systems and
components relevant to Ukraine assistance, including missiles, other munitions, and strategic and
critical materials.36 As an example, Aerojet Rocketdyne (a subsidiary of L3 Harris Technologies
Inc.) is using Ukraine-related DPA Title III funds in Camden, AR, and Orange, VA to expand and
modernize production facilities for solid rocket motors.37
Beyond DPA appropriations, DOD has also reported using nearly $5.6 billion for other industrial
base expansion efforts related to Ukraine, including $4.9 billion associated with the production of
155 mm artillery shells, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) munitions, Javelin
anti-tank systems/munitions, Stinger anti-air systems/munitions, and other related equipment.38
Ukraine-related industrial base investments may utilize funds from a number of different
appropriations accounts. These may include the Industrial Facilities line item within the
Procurement of Ammunition, Army (PAA) appropriation, which funds “modernization,
construction and rehabilitation efforts at [government-owned] plants and commercial facilities as
well as preservation of inactive production lines”);39 as well as the Operational Systems
Development budget activity of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E),
33 DOS, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba at a Joint Press Availability,”
May 15, 2024, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-ukrainian-foreign-minister-dmytro-kuleba-at-ajoint-press-availability-5/.
34 C. Todd Lopez, “DOD Has Seen 'Huge' Increase in Military Sales Since Ukraine Invasion,” DOD press release,
April 9, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3736017/dod-has-seen-huge-increase-inmilitary-sales-since-ukraine-invasion/.
35 Congress appropriated $600 million for this purpose through the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-128). For more information on the DPA, see CRS Testimony TE10092, Mission Critical:
Restoring National Security as the Focus of Defense Production Act Reauthorization, by Luke A. Nicastro. Note that
DOD reports a total of $746 million in Ukraine-related DPA Title III funding (see DOD, “Ukraine Security
Assistance,” infographic, August 8, 2024).
36 DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” August 8, 2024.
37 Investments in Aerojet Rocketdyne facilities were funded by appropriations made via the Additional Ukraine
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). For more information on this project, see Aerojet Rocketdyne,
“Factories of the Future,” press release, May 9, 2024, https://www.l3harris.com/newsroom/editorial/2024/05.
38 DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” August 8, 2024.
39 A recent project funded by this line item that may be relevant to Ukraine may be the construction of a “future
artillery complex” at Iowa Army Ammunition Plant ($280.65 million total cost). See Department of the Army,
Department of Defense FY2025 Budget Estimates: Procurement of Ammunition, Army, March 2024, pp. 782-830.
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Defense-wide appropriation, which funds “investment in prime and sub-tier suppliers to mitigate
supply chain risks and eliminate production capacity bottlenecks” under the aegis of the Industrial
Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program.40 As an example of broader industrial base
expansion efforts that may have relevance for Ukraine-related production, in May 2024 the Army
opened a new Universal Artillery Projectile Lines facility to produce metal parts for large caliber
ammunition in Mesquite, TX (see “155 mm Artillery Round” section of this report for more
information).41
Producing Key Weapon Systems and Munitions
Through the authorities, funding, and other activities described above, the United States has
provided and produced a wide array of defense equipment for purposes related to Ukraine. The
ability of U.S. suppliers to make this hardware can be understood as a function of the DIB’s
industrial capacity—that is, the total amount of resources available for the manufacture of
defense-related goods. Such resources may include facilities and equipment, labor, and raw
materials, as well as less tangible assets such as intellectual property.42
According to DOD, contract awards and grants related to defense production for Ukraine have
been made to suppliers in at least 38 U.S. states since February 2022.43 Some media reports and
company statements suggest these awards constitute a significant and growing source of revenue
for some defense contractors, particularly manufacturers of ammunition, precision-guided
munitions, and air/missile defense systems.44 Some suppliers have reported increases in
production output for certain Ukraine-related defense items, including 155 mm artillery shells,
precision-guided munitions, and related systems and components (see Table 1). DOD and some
defense suppliers have also sought to increase relevant industrial capacity both by making
investments in existing sites and by establishing new sites.
Table 1. Production Output for Selected Weapons and Munitions, 2022-2024
Total output figures for producers of selected U.S.-origin defense articles
Monthly output,
2022
Monthly output,
2024
155 mm projectile
14,400
40,000
+178%
155 mm propelling charge
14,494
18,000
+24%
GMLRS
833
1,167
+40%
Javelin
175
200
+14%
PAC-3 MSE (PATRIOT Interceptor)
21
42
+100%
HIMARS
5
8
+60%
Item
Percentage change
40 The IBAS program is authorized by 10 U.S.C. §4817 as the Industrial Base Fund. See Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Department of Defense FY2025 Budget Estimates: Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation, DefenseWide, March 2024, pp. 1179-1201.
41 U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Army Inaugurates Universal Artillery Projectile Lines Facility,” May 29, 2024,
https://www.army.mil/article/276727/army_inaugurates_universal_artillery_projectile_lines_facility.
42 For more information, see discussion in CRS Report R47751, The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Luke A. Nicastro, pp. 24-25.
43 DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” infographic, August 8, 2024.
44 See, for example, Doug Cameron, “Ukraine Aid Lifts Defense Industry as Debate Over Profits Reignites,” The Wall
Street Journal, April 28, 2024.
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Item
M777 Tubes
Monthly output,
2022
Monthly output,
2024
11
18
Percentage change
+64%
Source: DOD, “Fact Sheet on Efforts of Ukraine Defense Contact Group – National Armaments Directors,”
September 6, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-efforts-ofukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
Notes: For more information on individual items, refer to relevant subsections below. Not all of the output
documented above may be intended for direct provision to Ukraine.
The production process varies considerably across different categories of defense equipment. The
subsections below describe the manufacture and transfer of seven key U.S.-made weapons or
munitions (155 mm artillery rounds, the Javelin anti-tank weapon, the Stinger anti-air weapon,
the HIMARS rocket artillery system, the PATRIOT air defense system, select unmanned aerial
systems, and the F-16 fighter aircraft).
155 mm Artillery Round
The 155 mm munition is a large caliber field artillery round. The United States produces several
varieties of 155 mm ammunition with different warheads and functions, including some with
precision guidance (e.g., the Excalibur munition).45 The U.S. Army’s general purpose 155 mm
round is the M795 High Explosive (HE), first introduced in 1999.46
The United States has provided 155 mm ammunition to Ukraine since 2022. In July 2023, the
Biden Administration announced that it would transfer 155 mm Dual Purpose Improved
Conventional Munitions, a type of cluster munition, to Ukraine.47 As of early September 2024,
the United States had provided Ukraine more than 3,000,000 155 mm artillery rounds.48
Media reporting suggests that Ukraine’s expenditure of artillery ammunition has exceeded the
ability of its partners, including the United States, to supply it in quantities sufficient to meet its
stated goals.49 The UAF relies on artillery to compensate for Russia’s quantitative advantage in
personnel and its strategy of massed infantry assaults.50 Ukrainian officials have called for as
many as 594,000 artillery rounds a month to sustain combat operations.51 According to one study,
“Ukraine will need around 75,000–90,000 artillery shells per month to sustain the war
defensively, and more than double that — 200,000–250,000 — for a major offensive.”52
Shortages of artillery ammunition have reportedly caused the UAF to ration fire during Russian
45
According to DOD, the M982 Excalibur is a precision-guided, extended-range 155-millimeter munition that uses a
guidance system comprised of both GPS and an inertial navigation system (INS).
46 United States Army, PEO Ammunition Systems Portfolio Book 2017, Washington, DC, p. 40,
https://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/Migrated/CopDocuments/PEO%20Ammo%20Portfolio%20Book%202017.pdf.
47 See CRS Report RS22907, Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr and Andrew
Feickert.
48 DOD, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” September 6, 2024. See also Appendix A to this report.
49 Andrew E. Kramer, “Dwindling Ammunition Stocks Pose Grave Threat to Ukraine,” The New York Times, April 5,
2024; Antti Ruokonen, “Ukraine’s Artillery Shell Shortfall,” Lawfare, April 3, 2024,
https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/ukraine-s-artillery-shell-shortfall; Isobel Koshiw, “We’re Almost Out of
Ammunition and Relying on Western Arms, says Ukraine,” The Guardian, June 10, 2024.
50 Jack Detsch, “Ukraine Is Still Outgunned by Russia,” Foreign Policy, April 23, 2024; Gordon Corera, “Ukraine Calls
Them Meat Assaults: Russia’s Brutal Plan to Take Ground,” BBC, July 3, 2024.
51 Andy Bounds, “Ukraine Asks EU for 250,000 Artillery Shells a Month,” Financial Times, March 3, 2023.
52 Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, “Making Attrition Work: A Viable Theory of Victory for Ukraine,”
Survival 66, no. 1 (February-March 2024), p. 19.
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offensives and were described by Ukrainian officials as a key factor in the UAF’s retreat from the
strategically-located town of Avdiivka in February 2024.53
At the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States
produced an estimated 14,400 155 mm rounds per month.54 Since then, the U.S. Army has made
efforts to produce greater quantities of 155 mm ammunition than it has in recent years. Colonel
Leon L. Rogers II, the project manager for Combat Ammunition Systems, the Army office
responsible for managing mortars and artillery ammunition, described these efforts as the “most
significant U.S. ramp-up of 155 mm artillery ammunition production since the Korean War.”55 In
September 2023, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Doug Bush said that the Army had set a target of producing 100,000 155 mm rounds per month
by the end of 2025.56 In September 2024, DOD reported producing 40,000 rounds per month.57
Army initiatives to expand production capacity have included scaling production of the steel alloy
casing for the 155 mm artillery round. The 78-pound metal body of an M795 155-millimeter
round is made of high fragmentation steel, or HF-1. Production of the metal casing has in recent
years occurred largely at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant (SCAAP) in Scranton,
Pennsylvania, after which the munition is assembled at other facilities.58 As part of the 15-year
Army Organic Industrial Base Modernization Plan, the Army committed to investing $243
million in updating the Scranton facility.59 In November 2023, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Doug Bush said upgrades to the facilities that produce 155 mm ammunition had “helped double
the Army’s artillery production rate.”60 In addition to increasing capacity at its pre-existing
facility, in May 2024 the Army opened a new site known as the Universal Artillery Project Lines
(UAPL) facility (located in Mesquite, Texas), to produce metal parts for 155 mm ammunition.61
Henry Foy, Felicia Schwartz, and Christopher Miller, “Ukraine Faces ‘Gap in the Hose’ as Western Ammunition
Dries Up,” Financial Times, February 9, 2024; Mike Eckel, “Ukraine's New War Strategy: Dig In, Hold On, Find More
Soldiers, Hope For U.S. Weaponry,” RFE/RL, March 13, 2024; Special Inspector General Report to the United States
Congress, Operation Atlantic Resolve: Including U.S. Government Activities Related to Ukraine, April 1, 2024-June
30, 2024, p. 26.
54 Abraam Dawoud, “US Army and Industry Partners Mobilize to Boost US Artillery Production,” U.S. Army press
release, February 8, 2024, https://www.army.mil/article/273152/us_army_and_industry_partners. DOD, “Fact Sheet on
Efforts of Ukraine Defense Contact Group – National Armaments Directors,” September 6, 2024,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defense-contactgroup-national-armaments-direc/.
55 Defence iQ, “Mobilizing Artillery Interview with Colonel Leon L. Rogers II,” March 2024,
https://www.defenceiq.com/events-futureartillery/downloads/mobilizing-artillery-interview-with-colonel-leon-l-rogers.
56 Audrey Decker, “Pentagon set to make 100K artillery shells a month in 2025 ,” Defense One, September 15, 2023,
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/09/pentagon-set-make-100k-artillery-shells-year-2025/390338/.
57 DOD, “Fact Sheet on Efforts of Ukraine Defense Contact Group – National Armaments Directors,” September 6,
2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defensecontact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
58 Richard P. Hanson, “Scranton Army Ammunition Plant Manufactures and Ships Large-Caliber Ammunition Metal
Parts,” U.S. Army, August 19, 2020,
https://www.army.mil/article/238269/scranton_army_ammunition_plant_manufactures_and_ships_large_caliber_amm
unition_metal_parts.
59 Matthew Wheaton, “Secretary of the Army discusses modernization efforts during SCAAP visit,” U.S. Army,
February 7, 2023,
https://www.army.mil/article/263789/secretary_of_the_army_discusses_modernization_efforts_during_scaap_visit.
60 Christopher Hurd, “Strengthened Army industrial base doubles artillery production,” U.S. Army, November 14,
2023, https://www.army.mil/article/271572/strengthened_army_industrial_base_doubles_artillery_production.
61 Matthew Olay, “Army Opens New Munitions Factory,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 30, 2024,
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3791962/army-opens-new-munitions-facility/.
53
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Like the SCAAP, the UAPL is a government-owned facility operated by General Dynamics
Ordnance and Tactical Systems.62
Additional projects to accelerate production of artillery ammunition include work at other GOCO
facilities involved in the production of 155 mm ammunition such as Holston Army Ammunition
Plant and Radford Army Ammunition Plant, where the Army produces explosives and propellant
charges, respectively, for the 155 mm munition, as well as at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant,
where the Army assembles 155 mm munitions.63 In September 2024, DOD reported having
increased production of propellant charges for the 155 mm from 14,494 per month in 2022 to
18,000 per month.64 In all, according to one estimate by the Project Director Joint Services, the
DOD office in the Joint Program Executive Office Armaments & Ammunition that is responsible
for production base activities, the Army has invested $2.7 billion into the production of 155 mm
ammunition as of March 2024.65
Javelin
The Javelin is a shoulder-mounted, fire-and-forget anti-tank guided missile system.66 The 48pound Javelin system consists of the FGM-148 Javelin missile, a disposable launch tube
assembly, and the command launch unit, a reusable system used to acquire, identify, and track
targets. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Army
began developing the Javelin in the early 1980s; low-rate initial production of the system began
in 1994.67 The primary contractor for the Javelin is the Javelin Joint Venture, a collaboration
between Raytheon, an RTX company, and Lockheed Martin.
Some observers have credited the Javelin system with helping Ukraine repel Russia’s full-scale
invasion in February 2022. For example, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg has stated that the
Ukrainians “were able to push back the Russian invaders, not least because they had the Javelins
and they played a critical role in those opening weeks of the war.”68 As of September 2024, the
United States had provided Ukraine with more than 10,000 Javelin missiles.69
62 Steff Chávez, “US defence industry faces uncertainty despite production ‘boomlet’,” Financial Times, June 25, 2024,
https://www.ft.com/content/dc127392-2d98-4571-8ec9-2ed82b510b46.
63 Roxana Tiron and Tony Capaccio, “US Puts $2 Billion Into Plants Making Ammo Vital to Ukraine (1),” Bloomberg
Government, January 25, 2023.
64 DOD, “ Fact Sheet on Efforts of Ukraine Defense Contact Group – National Armaments Directors ,” press release,
September 6, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukrainedefense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
65 Joshua Headley and Melissa Markos, “Project Director Joint Services,” presentation at NDIA's 2024 Munitions
Executive Summit, Parsippany, NJ, March 20, 2024, https://ndia.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/2024/mes/Headley.pdf.
66 “Fire-and-forget” munitions are a type of guided munition that, once launched, do not require additional inputs from
the operator to guide the munition to its target. After an operator of the Javelin system designates a target and launches
the missile, the missile’s onboard infrared seeker, autopilot, and tracking system are designed to maintain the missile’s
course towards the target even if the target moves to avoid the missile.
67 Amael Kotlarski and Thomas Ford, Janes Infantry Weapons 2021-2022, (Coulsdon: Jane's Group UK, 2021), pp.
998.
68 Jens Stoltenberg, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Lockheed Martin Facility in Troy,
Alabama,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 31, 2024,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_222260.htm.
69 DOD, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” September 6, 2024. See also Appendix A to this report.
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The length of time required to manufacture Javelin missiles is among the highest of the U.S.
military’s portfolio of precision munitions, some analysts have found.70 The Army and the Javelin
Joint Venture are seeking to reduce manufacturing lead-times by growing the production capacity
of the Javelin to 3,960 missiles per year by the end of 2026.71 As of February 2024, Lockheed
Martin reported that production of the Javelin had risen to 2,400 missiles per year from 2,100
missiles annually in 2022 (a 14% increase).72
Stinger
The Stinger is a fire-and-forget man-portable air defense (MANPAD) surface-to-air missile
system. Produced by RTX’s Raytheon, the 34.5-pound Stinger system consists of a reusable
launch tube assembly and an FIM-92 Stinger missile round. The U.S. Army began developing the
Stinger in the late 1960s, before fielding the weapon in 1981.73 Originally designed to defend
against fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, the Army has adapted the Stinger for use against other
low-altitude aerial threats such as cruise missiles and uncrewed aircraft.74 In addition to the manportable version, vehicle-mounted short-range air defense systems like the U.S. Army’s Avenger
and Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense systems are also equipped with the Stinger.
The Stinger was among the first weapons provided by the United States to Ukraine following
Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.75 “With Russia's unrelenting and
brutal air attacks on Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure, additional air defense
capabilities are critical,” said DOD Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh in
announcing a November 2022 aid package that included additional Avenger and Stinger
systems.76 As of September 2024, the United States had provided more than 2,000 Stinger
missiles to Ukraine.77
In May 2022, the U.S. Army announced that it had awarded Raytheon a $625-million contract for
an estimated 1,300 missiles to replenish its inventory of Stinger missiles.78 The contract
represented the first such award by the Army for new Stinger missiles in approximately two
70 Seth G. Jones, Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,
D.C., January 23, 2023, p. 14, https://www.csis.org/analysis/empty-bins-wartime-environment-challenge-us-defenseindustrial-base.
71 Lockhed Martin, “Ramping Up: Lockheed Martin Steadily Increasing Production of High-Demand Systems,” press
release, February 15, 2024, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2024/ramping-up--lockheed-martinsteadily-increasing-production-o.html.
72 Lockhed Martin, “Ramping Up: Lockheed Martin Steadily Increasing Production of High-Demand Systems,” press
release, February 15, 2024, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2024/ramping-up--lockheed-martinsteadily-increasing-production-o.html.
73 Karl E. Cocke, Detmar H. Finke, and James E. Hewes, Jr., et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal
Year 1981, ed. Christine O. Hardyman (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1988), p. 30.
74 Gary Sheftick, “Army prioritizes mobile system to counter drones,” United States Army, March 5, 2018,
https://www.army.mil/article/201365/army_prioritizes_mobile_system_to_counter_drones; Kevin Jackson, “Stinger
maintenance work to increase service life, reliability,” United States Army, May 25, 2017,
https://www.army.mil/article/188420/stinger_maintenance_work_to_increase_service_life_reliability.
75 Joe Gould and Howard Altman, “Amid fears of Russian air dominance, US to send anti-aircraft Stingers to Ukraine,”
Defense News, February 28, 2022.
76 Sabrina Singh, “Sabrina Singh, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary, Holds a Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of
Defense, November 10, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3216785/sabrina-singhdeputy-pentagon-press-secretary-holds-a-press-briefing/.
77 DOD, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” September 6, 2024. See also Appendix A to this report.
78 U.S. Department of Defense, “Contracts For May 27, 2022,” press release, May 27, 2022,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract/Article/3046664/.
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decades; the Army last accepted new Stingers in 2005.79 The Stinger missiles ordered by the
Army in 2022 are expected to be delivered in 2026, according to the Army’s award notice.80
Raytheon officials have cited obsolete parts and the lack of trained personnel as among the
challenges to re-starting production of the Cold War-era missile.81
M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
A self-propelled, wheeled weapon system, the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) comprises a multiple rocket launcher mounted on an M1140 truck chassis. The U.S.
Army introduced the HIMARS in the late 1990s as an alternative to the tracked M270 Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS).82 The HIMARS is compatible with several families of
munitions, including the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS), and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). Both the GMLRS and
ATACMS families of munitions encompass multiple types of warheads and capabilities, with
maximum ranges of up to 150 kilometers and 300 kilometers, respectively.83
The U.S. Department of Defense announced in June 2022 that it would provide the HIMARS and
GMLRS ammunition to Ukraine.84 President Biden pledged in September 2023 to provide
ATACMS ammunition to Ukraine.85 As of September 2024, the United States has provided at
least 40 HIMARS systems and an unspecified amount of HIMARS ammunition to Ukraine.86
Ukrainian officials have credited the HIMARS and, in particular, the long-range capabilities of
the ATACMS munitions, for allowing Ukrainian forces to strike targets within Russian-held
territory.87
DOD and Lockheed Martin, the primary contractor for HIMARS and GMLRS, has sought to
accelerate its production of both systems. In September 2024, DOD reported having achieved a
production rate of eight HIMARS per month, or 96 per year, a 60% increase over production rates
in 2022.88 Production of GMLRS munitions, according to DOD, had reached 1,167 per month —
the equivalent of 14,000 annually — a 40% increase over 2022.89 Production may also be
79 Darrell Ames, “PEO Missiles and Space teams up with McAlester Army Depot to revive Stinger inventory,” Defense
Visual Information Distribution Service, January 23, 2024, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/462282/peo-missiles-andspace-teams-up-with-mcalester-army-depot-revive-stinger-inventory.
80 U.S. Department of Defense, “Contracts For May 27, 2022,” press release, May 27, 2022,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract/Article/3046664/.
81 Marcus Weisgerber, “Raytheon Calls in Retirees to Help Restart Stinger Missile Production,” Defense One, June 28,
2023.
82
Kinsey Lindstrom, “Army celebrates production of 500th HIMARS,” Defense Visual Information Distribution
Service, November 6, 2020, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/382526/army-celebrates-production-500th-himars.
83 Mary Kate Aylward, “Then & Now: Long-range for the modern age,” U.S. Army, April 16, 2018,
https://www.army.mil/article/203705/then_now_long_range_for_the_modern_age.
84 C. Todd Lopez, “Advanced Rocket Launcher System Heads to Ukraine,” DOD press release, June 1, 2022,
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3050010/advanced-rocket-launcher-system-heads-toukraine/.
85 Michael R. Gordon, Nancy A. Youssef, and Gordon Lubold, “Biden Told Zelensky U.S. Is Willing to Provide LongRange ATACMS Missiles,” The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2023.
86 DOD, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” September 6, 2024. See also Appendix A to this report.
87 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Siobhán O'Grady, and Dan Lamothe, “Ukraine fires long-range ATACMS to strike Russian
depot and aircraft,” The Washington Post, October 17, 2023.
88 DOD, “ Fact Sheet on Efforts of Ukraine Defense Contact Group – National Armaments Directors ,” press release,
September 6, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukrainedefense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
89 Ibid.
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influenced by Section 8010 of P.L. 118-47, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024,
which provided the Army with the authority to award multi-year procurement contracts for
critical munitions, including GMLRS. According to the accompanying explanatory statement, this
authority is intended to help “stabilize the defense supply base with predictable production
opportunities.”90
Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target (PATRIOT)
The Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target (PATRIOT) is a long-range air and
missile defense (AMD) system. The system consists of a radar set, engagement control station,
one or more launcher stations, an antenna mast group, and interceptor missiles.91 The most recent
version of the interceptor missile is the PATRIOT Advanced Capability 3 Missile Segment
Enhancement, or PAC-3 MSE, although earlier versions of the PAC-3 and its predecessor, the
PAC-2, are still in production and use. The U.S. Army, the primary U.S. military operator of the
system, introduced the PATRIOT in the early 1980s and the PAC-3 MSE in 2015. The militaries
of at least 19 other countries reportedly operate the PATRIOT system.92
Ukrainian officials have described the PATRIOT as essential to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself
from Russia’s aerial attacks, particularly those that involve ballistic missiles.93 DOD first
announced in December 2022 that the United States would provide Ukraine with a PATRIOT
battery.94 The United States has provided a total of two PATRIOT batteries and associated
munitions to Ukraine, according to the U.S. Department of State. In June 2024, Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine urgently needed another seven PATRIOT
systems to defend Ukrainian cities from attacks.95 On July 10, 2024, the United States, Germany,
and Romania pledged to send additional PATRIOT systems to Ukraine.96
In response to growing demand for PATRIOT interceptors, Lockheed Martin, the primary
contractor for PAC-3 MSE, and RTX’s Raytheon, the primary contractor for the PAC-2 GEM-T,
have each taken steps to expand production of the missiles. In October 2022, Lockheed opened a
new facility, All-Up Round III, in Camden, Arkansas, to support the production of the PAC-3
MSE.97 As of early 2024, Lockheed Martin had increased its output of PAC-3 MSE missiles from
a pre-2022 level of 300 per year to 500 per year, and had set a target of 650 PAC-3 MSE missiles
90 Rep. Kay Granger, “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. Granger, Chair of The House Committee on
Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2882, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024,” Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 170 (March 22, 2024), p. 2.
91 See CRS In Focus IF12297, PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense System for Ukraine, by Andrew Feickert
92 RTX, “RTX's Raytheon awarded $1.2 billion contract to provide Patriot air and missile defense systems to
Germany,” press release, March 21, 2024, https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/2024/03/21/rtxs-raytheon-awarded1-2-billion-contract-to-provide-patriot-air-and-missile-d.
93 James Marson, Doug Cameron, and Ievgeniia Sivorka, “How the U.S. Patriot Missile Became a Hero of Ukraine
War,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2023.
94 David Vergun, “Ukraine Getting Patriot Battery, Other Defense Weapons,” DOD press release, December 21, 2022,
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3253206/ukraine-getting-patriot-battery-other-defenseweapons/.
95 The White House, “ Remarks by President Biden and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine in Joint Press
Conference | Fasano, Italy,” press release, June 13, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2024/06/13/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-in-joint-pressconference-fasano-italy/.
96 France 24, “NATO members pledge dozens of air defense systems to Ukraine,” France 24, July 10, 2024.
97 Lockheed Martin, “New Lockheed Martin Facility to Support Increased PAC-3 Production,” press release, October
4, 2022, https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2022-10-04-new-lockheed-martin-facility-to-support-increased-pac-3production
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annually by 2027.98 As of April 2024, Raytheon produced 20 PAC-2 GEM-T missiles each
month—the equivalent of 240 per year—and planned on expanding production to 35 missiles per
month by the end of 2027.99
In addition to meeting the current demand from Ukraine and other U.S. allies and partners, U.S.
Army officials have cited a need to raise the production of PATRIOT missiles to prepare for
future conflicts.100 In Section 8010 of P.L. 118-47 the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2024, Congress authorized the Army to award multi-year procurement contracts for PAC-3 MSE
interceptors and other critical munitions.101 On June 28, 2024, the Army awarded Lockheed
Martin a $4.5 billion multiyear contract for 870 PAC-3 MSE missiles.102
Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (Drones)
Ukrainian officials have described uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), or drones, as playing a
critical role in the UAF’s efforts to resist Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country.103 Ukraine
has acquired drones from several of its international partners, including the United States. As of
July 2024, the United States had provided nine different UAS models to Ukraine.104 The list of
U.S.-provided UAS includes some systems, like the Boeing Insitu ScanEagle, that the U.S.
military has used over the past two decades, as well as more recently-developed drones like the
CyberLux K8 that are not typically used by the U.S. military. The United States has provided
unarmed drones that are used primarily for gathering intelligence, such as the AeroVironment
Jump-20, and one-way attack drones—expendable armed drones that are designed to explode
upon impact with a target—like the Aevex Aerospace Phoenix Ghost family of systems and the
AeroVironment Switchblade 300 and 600.
Aevex Aerospace and AeroVironment appear to be the foremost recipients of DOD contracts for
Ukrainian security assistance, according to figures published in August 2024 by Office of the
Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment.105 As of August 2024, DOD had awarded Aevex
98 Lockheed Martin, “New Lockheed Martin Facility to Support Increased PAC-3 Production,” press release, October
4, 2022, https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2022-10-04-new-lockheed-martin-facility-to-support-increased-pac-3production; Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “Lockheed Martin eyes Patriot interceptor parts production in Spain,” Defense
News, April 22, 2024; Lockheed Martin, “Ramping Up: Lockheed Martin Steadily Increasing Production of HighDemand Systems,” press release, February 15, 2024, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/enus/news/features/2024/ramping-up--lockheed-martin-steadily-increasing-production-o.html.
99 Jen Judson, “How companies plan to ramp up production of Patriot missiles,” Defense News, April 9, 2024,
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/04/09/how-companies-plan-to-ramp-up-production-of-patriot-missiles/.
100 Jen Judson, “How companies plan to ramp up production of Patriot missiles,” Defense News, April 9, 2024.
101 Rep. Kay Granger, “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. Granger, Chair of The House Committee on
Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2882, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024,” Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 170 (March 22, 2024), p. 2.
102 U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Army awards $4.5 billion Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement
missile multiyear contract,” press release, June 28, 2024,
https://www.army.mil/article/277680/army_awards_4_5_billion_patriot_advanced_capability_3_missile_segment_enh
ancement_missile_multiyear_contract.
103 In February 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that drones had “proven their effectiveness in
battles on land, in the sky and at sea.” In an interview in July 2024, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the UAF’s
commander-in-chief, said that drones played “as big a role as artillery” in the UAF’s combat operations. See: David
Ingram, “Ukraine creates a branch of its armed forces specific to drone warfare,” NBC News, February 6, 2024; and
Luke Harding, “‘I know we will win – and how’: Ukraine’s top general on turning the tables against Russia,” The
Guardian, July 24, 2024.
104 DOD, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” July 29, 2024. See also Appendix A to this report.
105 DOD, “Ukrainian Security Assistance.”
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Aerospace and AeroVironment $576 million and $90 million, respectively, in USAI contracts.106
Aevex Aerospace has supplied approximately 5,000 one-way attack drones to Ukraine since
Russia’s renewed invasion of the country.107 Both companies have said that they are working to
increase production of one-way attack drones. In March 2024, AeroVironment CEO said that the
company had “significantly increased our Switchblade production capacity.”108 Aevex Aerospace
said in July 2024 that its expanded production facility in Tampa, Florida, could produce up to
1,000 Phoenix Ghost aircraft per month when operating at maximum capacity.109
F-16 Fighting Falcon
The F-16 is a fourth-generation, multi-role fighter aircraft capable of conducting air-to-air and
air-to-ground operations.110 The first F-16s were delivered to the U.S. Air Force in 1979;
approximately 3,100 are in operation today across 25 countries, according to manufacturer
Lockheed Martin.111 F-16s are used for a variety of missions, including suppression of enemy air
defenses, offensive counter-air, defensive counter-air, close-air support, and forward air control.112
Prior to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukraine operated mostly Soviet-era, Russianbuilt planes, although the government had plans to modernize its fighter fleet by acquiring
Western jets.113 Following that invasion, Ukrainian officials began lobbying Western governments
to transfer F-16s, arguing that the aircraft could boost air defenses and help intercept Russian
combat aircraft using glide bombs in Ukraine.114 Although the U.S. government—citing concerns
about the risk of escalation, high costs, and Ukraine’s ability to effectively employ F-16s—
initially declined these requests, in May 2023 President Biden announced that “the United States,
together with our allies and partners, is going to begin training Ukrainian pilots in fourthgeneration fighter aircraft, including F-16s.”115 Later that summer, 11 NATO governments agreed
to provide training for Ukrainian pilots, and the Department of State announced U.S. support for
the planned transfer of F-16s to Ukraine by the governments of Denmark and the Netherlands.116
106 DOD, “Ukrainian Security Assistance,” infographic, August 8, 2024.
107 E-mail from Aevex Aerospace to CRS, July 30, 2024.
108 AeroVironment Inc, “AVAV.OQ - Q3 2024 AeroVironment Inc Earnings Call,” press release, March 4, 2024,
https://investor.avinc.com/static-files/27fa3b4e-8968-4ec0-b1b3-85a2d75b68ef.
109 Aevex Aerospace, “Aevex Aerospace Ramps Up Production at Unmanned Systems Tampa Facility,” press release,
July 10, 2024, https://aevex.com/aevex-aerospace-ramps-up-production-at-unmanned-systems-tampa-facility/; Brad
Graves, “AEVEX Delivers Phoenix Ghosts, Grows Revenue to $500M,” San Diego Business Journal, June 19, 2024,
https://www.sdbj.com/defense/aevex-delivers-phoenix-ghosts-grows-revenue-to-500m/; E-mail from Aevex Aerospace
to CRS, July 30, 2024.
110 Air Combat Command Public Affairs Office, “F-16 Fighting Falcon,” U.S. Air Force, September 2021,
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104505/f-16-fighting-falcon.
111 Lockheed Martin, “F-16 Fighting Falcon Fast Facts,” July 2024,
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/24-19622.
112 Air Combat Command Public Affairs Office, “F-16 Fighting Falcon.”
113 Steve Trimble, “How Ukraine’s Two-Year Campaign for Fighters Finally Succeeded,” Aviation Week Intelligence
Network, June 15, 2023.
114 Tony Osborne, “European Coalition Forming Around Supply of F-16s to Ukraine,” Aviation Week Intelligence
Network, May 18, 2023.
115 Remarks by President Biden in a Press Conference, May 21, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/speeches-remarks/2023/05/21/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-press-conference/. For information on the
Administration’s previous stance, see Dan DeLuce and Mosheh Gains, “Biden admin rules out transfer of Polish fighter
jets to Ukraine,” NBC News, March 9, 2022.
116 Government of the Netherlands, “Statement on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force,”, July 11, 2023,
https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-statements/2023/07/12/statement-joint-coalition; and Joseph Clark,
(continued...)
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Since then, Belgium and Norway have also pledged to provide additional aircraft.117 On July 10,
2024, President Biden, Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof, and Danish Prime Minister Mette
Frederiksen said in a joint statement that “the transfer process for these [Dutch and Danish] F-16s
is now underway, and Ukraine will be flying operational F-16s this summer.”118 Media reports
suggest that Ukraine will eventually receive about 80 F-16s, although the majority may not be
provided until 2025.119 On July 31, a U.S. official confirmed to the Associated Press that Ukraine
had received the first of these aircraft.120 By late August, Ukraine was reportedly using transferred
F-16s to shoot down Russian missile strikes (one such jet was lost in a crash that killed its
Ukrainian Air Force pilot).121
Although the United States has not announced plans to provide F-16s directly, it is committing
related security assistance with implications for U.S. defense production. According to press
reports, the United States has agreed to provide Ukraine with several air-to-ground and air-to-air
munitions that can be employed by F-16 aircraft. Air-to-ground munitions will reportedly include
the AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (which targets enemy radar emissions), Joint
Direct Attack Munition kits (which guide bombs to targets), and small diameter bombs (used to
strike stationary targets).122 Air-to-air munitions will reportedly include AIM-120 Advanced
Medium-range Air-to-Air Missiles and AIM-9X short-range air-to-air missiles.123 A U.S.
electronic warfare squadron is also collaborating with Denmark and the Netherlands to help
Ukrainian F-16s withstand Russian jamming attacks.124 DOD officials have also stated that U.S.
suppliers will need to provide spare parts and other logistical and sustainment support for
Ukrainian F-16s, and the Department is currently training Ukrainian pilots and ground crews on
the aircraft.125 It is also possible that the U.S. government may seek to provide F-16s directly to
Ukraine in the future.
“U.S. Will Train Ukrainian F-16 Pilots, Ground Crews,” DOD press release, August 24, 2023,
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3504621/us-will-train-ukrainian-f-16-pilots. Because the
F-16s in question were originally obtained from the United States, their transfer required congressional notification.
See DOS, “Third Party Transfer,” https://www.state.gov/third-party-transfer-process-and-documentation/.
117 Alex Horton, “Ukraine’s First F-16s Will See Combat this Summer, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, July 10,
2024.
118 Joint Statement on F-16s for Ukraine from U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof, and
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, July 10, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2024/07/10/joint-statement-on-f-16s-for-ukraine-from-u-s-president-joseph-r-biden-dutch-prime-ministerdick-schoof-and-danish-prime-minister-mette-frederiksen/.
119 Lara Seligman, “First F-16 Jet Fighters on Their Way to Ukraine, U.S. and Allies Say,” The Wall Street Journal,
July 10; and Courtney McBride and Andrea Palasciano, “Ukraine’s F-16 Ambitions Snarled,” Bloomberg, July 12,
2024.
120 Tara Copp, “Ukraine Receives First F-16 Fighter Jets to Bolster Defenses Against Russia, Officials tell AP,”
Associated Press, July 31, 2024.
121 Lara Seligman, “U.S.-Made F-16 Crashed in Ukraine, Killing Pilot,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 30, 2024.
122 Lara Seligman and Allistair MacDonald, “U.S. to Arm Ukraine’s F-16 Jets with Advanced Weapons,” The Wall
Street Journal, July 30, 2024.
123 Ibid.
124 Captain Benjamin Aronson, “Dominate the Spectrum: 350th SWW Enables EW Capabilities for Ukrainian F-16s,”
350th Spectrum Warfare Wing, August 26, 2024, https://www.350sww.af.mil/News/Display/Article/3884560/dominatethe-spectrum-350th-sww-enables-ew-capabilities-for-ukrainian-f-16s/.
125 C. Todd Lopez, “DOD Aims to Ensure Availability of Spare Parts to Sustain Ukraine-Bound F-16s,” DOD press
release, November 16, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3591267/dod-aims-toensure-availability-of-spare-parts-to-sustain-ukraine-bound-f-16s/; and Carla Babb, “First Ukrainian Pilots Graduate
From F-16 Training in US,” Voice of America, May 29, 2024. These efforts have been criticized by some Members of
Congress for the allegedly insufficient number of personnel trained thus far. See, for example, Representative Michael
(continued...)
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Production Diplomacy
In addition to leveraging suppliers based in the United States, the U.S. government has also
sought to encourage and coordinate Ukraine-related defense production by foreign manufacturers.
Coordinating National Production with Foreign Governments
To meet its objectives regarding the provision of materiel to Ukraine, the U.S. government has
engaged directly with allied and partner governments. Broadly speaking, the aim of these efforts
has been to encourage and align international commitments to defense investment, production,
and procurement actions.
One major multilateral forum for this coordination has been the Ukraine Defense Contact Group
(UDCG), a group of around 50 nations that first met in April 2022.126 As part of the UDCG
structure, the National Armaments Directors (NADs) of member nations also agreed to regularly
meet to conduct high-level synchronization of national efforts. According to DOD, major lines of
effort for UDCG NAD meetings include mapping global production capacity, identifying
production constraints and associated mitigation strategies, supporting the sustainment of
Ukrainian materiel and manpower, and improving standardization, interchangeability, and ease of
integration for equipment produced by UDCG nations.127
The UDCG conducts its work, in part, through eight “capability coalitions” (which are each
organized around a particular technical or functional defense areas) and four NAD working
groups (each aligned to a different functional areas). The current capability coalitions cover air
forces, air defense, artillery, maritime security, armor, information technology, de-mining, and
drones, and the working groups cover innovation, production, sustainment, and Ukraine’s
industrial base.128 DOD describes these two organizational schemas as “complementary, not
duplicative.”129
In June 2024, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced that the UDCG had
collectively committed more than $98 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including “most of
the counter-UAS systems provided to Ukraine and most of the 155 mm artillery systems, most of
the tanks, most of the armored personnel carriers, most of the infantry fighting vehicles and
more.”130 Secretary Austin has also stated that the group’s members “remain determined to keep
Turner, “Letter from Representative Michael Turner Secretary Lloyd Austin,” May 20, 2024,
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/5.20.24_joint_letter_to_dod_for_urgent_ukraine_aid.pdf.
126 As of this writing, the UDCG has convened at least 23 times. C. Todd Lopez, “2-Year Anniversary of Ukraine
Defense Contact Group Comes with Billions in New Aid,” DOD press release, April 26, 2024,
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3758274/2-year-anniversary-of-ukraine-defense-contactgroup-comes-with-billions-in-new/.
127 DOD, “Fact Sheet on Efforts of Ukraine Defense Contact Group – National Armaments Directors,” September 6,
2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defensecontact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
128 Senior Defense Official, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing on the Outcomes of the 19th
Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 16, 2024,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3680149/. DOD, “UDCG Fact Sheet,”
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defense-contactgroup-national-armaments-direc/.
129 DOD, “UDCG Fact Sheet,” https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-effortsof-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
130 Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III, “Opening Remarks at the 23rd Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered),” U.S.
Department of Defense, June 13, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3805429/opening(continued...)
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supporting Ukraine while ensuring [their] own military readiness” and are therefore exploring
“ways to expand the production of critical munitions and systems and to deepen [their]
coordination through the capability coalitions.”131 According to DOD, as of September 2024
UDCG members have also committed to a range of Ukraine-related production efforts, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Doubling production capacity for ammunition and explosives loading by 2025,
doubling capacity of modular charges by 2026, and increasing powder production
capacity ten-fold by 2026 (France and Sweden);
Constructing a new gunpowder factor (Romania/European Commission);
Constructing a new artillery ammunition facility (Germany);
Co-producing up to 1,000 PARTRIOT GEM-T missiles (Germany, the
Netherlands, Romania, and Spain);
Acquiring 500,000 artillery rounds for provision to Ukraine from various sources
(Czech-led consortium of 15 countries); and
Investing approximately $92 million to expand artillery production (Norway).132
Other multilateral fora that the U.S. government has sought to leverage for Ukraine-related
defense production include the U.S.-European Union (EU) Security and Defense Dialogue and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; see the shaded text box below for more
information).133
NATO and Defense Production for Ukraine
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, some U.S. policymakers have seen NATO as a key
forum for the coordination of defense industrial support for Ukraine. NATO’s national armaments directors (i.e.,
the officials responsible for weapons procurement and development in each member government) have regularly
met to discuss national and alliance-wide efforts to arm Ukraine. In addition, the NATO-Ukraine Council serves as
a joint body for NATO and Ukrainian representatives to manage security, economic, and political aid and
cooperation, including security assistance and defense production.
During the July 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., NATO announced several new efforts and
commitments related to defense production and security assistance for Ukraine, including:
•
Establishment of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (SATU) organization
to coordinate NATO members’ provision of defense equipment, training, and logistical support;134
•
Additional weapons transfers (notably, F-16s and air defense systems/munitions);135
•
A pledge of €40 billion ($43 billion) in security assistance in 2025;136 and
•
A commitment to “accelerate the growth of defense industrial capacity and production across
the alliance,” through measures such as expanded investments, improved coordination among NATO
remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-at-the-23rd-ukraine/; and C. Todd Lopez, “2-Year Anniversary of
Ukraine Defense Contact Group,” DOD press release, April 26, 2024.
131 Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III, “Outcomes of Ukraine Defense Contact Group Presented to the Media,” U.S. Mission
to NATO, June 13, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U9hHfbbbEH8. Quoted remarks start at 4:28.
132 DOD, “UDCG Fact Sheet,” https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-effortsof-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
133 For information on the U.S.-EU Security and Defense Dialogue, see U.S. Department of State, “2nd U.S.-EU
Security and Defense Dialogue,” December 1, 2023, https://www.state.gov/2nd-u-s-eu-security-and-defense-dialogue/.
134
NATO, Washington Summit Declaration, July 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid. Note that the declaration text specifies the figure in euros.
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governments and industry, greater use of large-scale multinational procurement arrangements, and an
increased focus on NATO-wide standardization.137
For more information on the 2024 NATO Summit, see CRS Report R48121, NATO’s July 2024 Washington, DC
Summit: In Brief, by Paul Belkin.
In addition to this multilateral coordination, the U.S. government has also sought to encourage
Ukraine-related defense production in its bilateral engagements with foreign governments. For
example, in June 2024, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel called for Japanese assistance
in producing Ukraine-related systems and munitions, and in October 2023, the U.S. and
Australian governments announced a series of “continuing, coordinated actions to assist
Ukraine,” including through defense industrial assistance.138 On some occasions, the U.S.
government has sought to make arrangements with foreign suppliers to meet immediate Ukrainerelated needs. In November 2022, for instance, DOD reportedly concluded a deal to purchase
100,000 155 mm artillery shells from South Korean suppliers.139
International Co-Production
To provide materiel for Ukraine, some American defense suppliers have also established
industrial partnerships directly with foreign suppliers to collaboratively develop, produce, and
sustain various weapons and munitions. These partnerships have involved companies and
government organizations in Ukraine itself, as well as in other countries that are providing
security assistance.
Production Partnerships with Ukrainian Suppliers
American suppliers have pursued (and the U.S. government has encouraged) production
partnerships with Ukraine with an eye toward a number of potential advantages. Locating
production within Ukrainian territory may shorten the time to transport equipment to the
battlefield, for instance, and the associated influx of American capital, technology, and expertise
may increase the capacity of Ukraine’s domestic defense industry, allowing it to produce more
and better weapons. In addition, direct coordination with Ukrainian industry and government
officials—whether in support of production at facilities in Ukraine itself or elsewhere—may also
lead to production efforts that are more responsive to Ukraine’s military needs.
In December 2023, the U.S. government convened the U.S.-Ukraine Defense Industrial Base
Conference, a gathering of U.S., Ukrainian, and European industry and government officials
intended to “focus on significantly increasing weapons production to support Ukraine’s fight for
freedom against Russian aggression, and strengthen Ukraine’s long-term self-defense.”140
137 NATO, Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge, July 10, 2024,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227504.
138 Mari Yamaguchi, “U.S. Envoy Calls for Japan’s Help to Quickly Replenish US Missile Inventory, Repair
Warships,” Associated Press, June 11, 2024; and The White House, “United States-Australia Joint Leaders’
Statement,” October 25, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/25/fact-sheet.
139 Lolita Baldor and Tara Copp, “U.S. to Buy South Korean Howitzer Rounds to Send to Ukraine,” Associated Press,
November 11, 2022.
140 The White House, “The White House Announces New Actions to Strengthen Cooperation and Co-Production
between U.S. and Ukraine’s Defense Industrial Bases,” December 6, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2023/12/06/fact-sheet-the-white-house-announces-new-actions-to-strengthen-cooperationand-co-production-between-u-s-and-ukraines-defense-industrial-bases.
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Following this conference, the White House announced that it would undertake the following
steps to strengthen and expand defense industrial cooperation with Ukraine:
1. Embedding a U.S. advisor in Ukraine’s Ministry of Strategic Industries to
“support and accelerate Ukraine’s transition to an interoperable military force,
combat corruption, and attract foreign investment in critical industries;”
2. Establishing an interagency team to “support industry, Ukrainian, and other
partners who seek guidance on potential deals, and export requirements for
Ukraine’s defense industry;”
3. Signing a Statement of Intent on Co-production and Technical Data Exchange
that would facilitate cooperative work “in the areas of air defense systems, repair
and sustainment, and production of critical munitions;” and
4. Providing Ukraine with technical data to allow for the Ukrainian production and
integration of air defense systems and components.141
In June 2024, the U.S. and Ukrainian governments signed the U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security
Agreement, which committed both parties to “increased defense industrial cooperation” and the
pursuit of “private industry partnerships in key priority areas of defense production… [including]
air defense systems and supporting munitions, artillery ammunition of multiple calibers,
supporting barrels and other components, and manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles.”142
Media reports in December 2023 suggested that two unnamed U.S. defense contractors had
agreed to produce artillery ammunition inside Ukraine by 2025.143 In June 2024, Northrop
Grumman announced plans to produce medium caliber ammunition at a facility inside Ukraine, in
what appears to be the first publicly-acknowledged instance of a major U.S. defense contractor
manufacturing equipment in Ukraine itself.144 The following month, Boeing signed a
memorandum of understanding to collaborate with Antonov—a Ukrainian aerospace firm—on
“training, logistical support and overhaul services for tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems utilized
by the [UAF], which includes the ScanEagle,” and company statements and media reports
suggest some of this work will be conducted inside Ukraine.145 Other instances of cooperation
between U.S. and Ukrainian companies include a partnership between Amentum and Ukrainian
Defense Industry to restore and maintain U.S.-provided armored vehicles (announced in June
2024) and the construction of an ammunition factory inside Ukraine by D&M Holding
Company.146
In addition to these U.S.-Ukrainian partnerships, several European companies have also
established defense industrial cooperation with Ukraine. Rheinmetall—a German defense firm—
141 Ibid.
142 White House, Bilateral Security Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine, June 13, 2024.
143 Reuters, “Ukraine to Make Shells With US Firms As It Seeks to Develop Defence Sector,” December 7, 2023.
144 The move was announced at the Eurosatory 2024 defense trade show and confirmed during the July 2024 NATO
Summit. See Valerie Insinna, “Northrop Planning to Build Munitions Inside Ukraine,” Breaking Defense, June 18,
2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/northrop-planning-to-build-munitions-inside-ukraine/; and Lee Hudson,
“Northrop Grumman Becomes First US Company to Build Weapons Inside Ukraine,” Politico, July 11, 2024.
145 Boeing, “Boeing, Antonov to Collaborate on Defense Projects,” July 22, 2024, https://boeing.mediaroom.com/newsreleases-statements?item=131463; and Paul Mcleary, “Boeing Looks to Start Drone Work Inside Ukraine,” Politico,
July 22, 2024.
146 This effort may have predated the Northrop Grumman partnership, as DOD in a September 2024 press release gave
October 2023 as the date of the partnership, but it does not appear to have been publicly acknowledged until September
2024. DOD, “UDCG Fact Sheet,” https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-onefforts-of-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
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has announced plans to co-produce a variety of weapons and munitions inside Ukraine, and as of
July 2024 has confirmed the opening of an armor plant in western Ukraine.147 The Norwegian
defense firm Nammo has announced the licensing of 155 mm round production in Ukraine, and
the joint-Franco-German venture KNDS will establish a subsidiary in Ukraine to produce 155
mm rounds and spare parts.148
Ukraine has also sought to establish production-related liaison missions abroad. In July 2024,
Ukraine’s state-owned arms manufacturer, Ukroboronprom, opened its first overseas office in
Washington, D.C. According to a Ukrainian official, the aim is to “promote joint US-Ukrainian
defense projects and enhance our integration into NATO's defense industrial base.”149
Production Partnerships with Other Countries
U.S. defense suppliers have also established partnerships with suppliers in other countries
supporting the Ukrainian war effort. As DOD’s senior procurement official put it in a Senate
hearing in May 2024:
One of the lessons of Ukraine is co-production of munitions. So, right now, we're working
a lot across Europe around co-production of 155 [mm ammunition]. Co-production of
Patriot in Australia, separate from AUKUS, we're going to be doing co-production, the
Army is, of GMLRS and eventually Prism.
And I mentioned earlier about Japan with the Glide [Phase Intercept missile defense
system], I think you're going to see much more co-production and co-sustainment with our
allies and partners.150
In addition to the Glide Phase Intercept system, Japanese suppliers are also involved in
supporting other Ukraine-related capabilities—Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, for instance,
produces PAC-3 interceptor missiles for the PATRIOT air defense system, and is reportedly
seeking to increase output to meet heightened demand.151
Other DOD officials have singled out Poland as an example of a country with which U.S.
industry is initiating co-production efforts. In April 2024, the then-director of the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency stated that the U.S. government had “recently undertaken some new
cooperation with Poland in the joint co-production of some defense systems” and was “looking at
how to do that with other allies and partners, as well.”152
147 Rheinmetall, “Ammunition Factory to be Built in the Ukraine [sic],” press release, July 23, 2024,
https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2024/07/2024-07-24-rheinmetall-supplies-equipment-forammunition-factory-in-ukraine.
148 DOD, “UDCG Fact Sheet,” https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3897721/fact-sheet-on-effortsof-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/.
149 Reuters, “Ukraine’s State Arms Producer Opens Office in Washington,” July 9, 2024.
150 Remarks of Dr. William LaPlante, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in U.S. Congress,
Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, A Review of Select Department of Defense Acquisition
Programs, Hearings to Examine Selected Acquisition Programs, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., May 15, 2024.
151 According to Reuters, however, these efforts have faced challenges due to a component shortage. See Nobuhiro
Kubo and Tim Kelly, “Exclusive: US-Japan Patriot Missile Production Plan Hits Boeing Component Roadblock,”
Reuters, July 21, 2024.
152 C. Todd Lopez, “DOD Has Seen 'Huge' Increase in Military Sales Since Ukraine Invasion,” DOD press release,
April 9, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3736017/dod-has-seen-huge-increase-inmilitary-sales-since-ukraine-invasion/.
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The production of a wide array of Ukraine-related weapon systems and munitions made by U.S.
suppliers involve international partnerships, including artillery munitions (various), PATRIOT air
defense systems and munitions (various), F-16s (Poland), HIMARS (Germany), and others.153
Issues Facing Congress
Congress faces a range of potential issues relating to defense production for Ukraine, including
three broad sets of questions:
1. Do U.S. and global suppliers possess adequate industrial capacity to achieve
congressional objectives regarding Ukraine?
2. Is the executive branch’s use of Ukraine-related production authorities and
appropriations meeting congressional intent?
3. What has been the impact of U.S.-produced defense equipment on the conflict?
Are U.S. suppliers providing the right kinds of capabilities to achieve
congressional objectives regarding Ukraine?
Industrial Capacity
Assessing Capacity Needs
Because of the diversity of defense equipment being produced for Ukraine, the issues and
dynamics associated with industrial capacity will necessarily vary (for a system-specific
discussion of production, refer to the “Producing Key Weapon Systems and Munitions” section of
this report).154 Nevertheless, some policymakers and commentators have contended that the DIB,
considered holistically, lacks sufficient capacity to accomplish the U.S. government’s Ukrainerelated objectives.155
In part, this may be due to expanded demand. Compared to the pre-2022 baseline, the U.S.
government has increased its requirements for Ukraine-related weapons and munitions,
establishing higher output goals that producers may not be able to immediately meet. Some
observers have also attributed capacity shortfalls to broader economic and strategic developments
over the past 30-40 years. Commonly cited factors include consolidation among major defense
contractors, changes in logistics and manufacturing practices, the divestment of governmentowned production assets, and a strategic focus on counter-terrorism and low-intensity conflicts at
the expense of planning for high-intensity conflict.156 Some stakeholders have also highlighted
153 Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “European Nations Team Up to Buy Patriot Missiles,” Defense News, January 3, 2024;
Kubo and Kelly, “US-Japan Patriot Missile Production Plan,” Reuters, July 21, 2024; PZL Mielec, “PZL Mielec
Celebrates Completion of First F-16 Block 70/72 Aft Fuselage,” press release, August 29, 2023; Christina MacKenzie,
“Rheinmetall, Lockheed unveil GMARS, in talks with European customers,” Breaking Defense, June 17, 2024; and
Vivienne Machi, “Lockheed, Rheinmetall Pair Up,” Defense News, June 23, 2023.
154 In the context of this report, industrial capacity refers to the total amount of resources available for the manufacture
of defense-related goods.
155 For examples of this perspective, see U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “NATO Governments on Industrial Cooperation
& Challenges,” July 10, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XU7tAoIV8t8; and PBS News, “Arms
Manufacturers Struggle to Supply Ukraine With Enough Ammunition,” March 10, 2023,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/arms-manufacturers-struggle-to-supply-ukraine-with-enough-ammunition;
Stephen Grey, John Shiffman, and Allison Martell, “Years of Miscalculations by U.S., NATO Led to Dire Shell
Shortage in Ukraine,” Reuters, July 19, 2024.
156 See Mike Lofgren, “Why Can’t America Build Enough Weapons?” Washington Monthly, June 23, 2024; Noah
(continued...)
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the ongoing policies and actions of particular actors, including the U.S. government—whose
allegedly slow and inefficient acquisition process has been characterized by some as a barrier to
capacity expansion—and some private defense firms—which some critics argue have prioritized
share buybacks and widening profit margins over investing in new production.157 In addition,
GAO has identified capacity issues specific to the replacement of equipment provided to Ukraine
via PDA, including “long lead times associated with the delivery of supplier parts and raw
materials,” the difficulty of replacing some necessary components or manufacturing tools that
have become obsolete, and quality issues.158
Whether Congress assesses that defense suppliers possess sufficient industrial capacity will
ultimately depend on the nature of congressional priorities, goals, and expectations. Congress
may determine and communicate these in a number of ways. One approach could be to develop
specific output targets for capabilities it deems to be particularly important (e.g., the monthly
production of a certain number of 155 mm rounds) and then assess industrial capacity against
those metrics.
If Congress were to develop production goals for Ukraine-related systems, several factors may
warrant its consideration. Congress may consider what kinds of analysis, projections, and
advocacy should inform any metrics it may adopt, and how much importance to attach to these
various inputs. Possible sources of information may include executive branch assessments of
production requirements and battlefield impact (particularly by DOD, DOS, and the intelligence
community), requests for weapons and munitions by Ukrainian government and military officials,
and perspectives from U.S. and global defense suppliers. Congress may also consider the degree
and pace of potential changes relating to defense production for Ukraine—battlefield
developments, technological or industrial advancements, and other unforeseeable developments
could rapidly change congressional objectives in this area.
In addition, Congress may consider the interaction of Ukraine-related production with other
potential defense requirements. For example, if Congress considers it likely that future
geopolitical developments may require new or expanded security assistance to other countries
(e.g., Israel, Taiwan), or that the United States may itself become involved in a protracted or
intensive conflict, it may factor those possibilities into whatever approach to capacity assessment
it chooses to adopt.
Legislative Options
If Congress determines that U.S. defense suppliers possess insufficient industrial capacity, a
number of options are available. Congress could consider whether or not to appropriate more
funding for the acquisition of capabilities of concern, for instance, which may increase short-term
output as well as send a “demand signal” for private industry to invest their own resources into
expanding capacity. Another approach could be to change DOD contracting and acquisition
practices—as Congress did in 2022, for example, by authorizing multi-year procurement of
Robertson, “The Pentagon Wants Industry to Transform Again to Meet Demand,” Defense News, February 20, 2024;
and NPR, “The Military Industry… It’s Complex,” Planet Money broadcast, January 2024. See also discussion in CRS
Report R47751, The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Background and Issues for Congress, pp. 24-33.
157 For criticism of procurement timelines, see Eric Bazail-Emil, “NATO Members, Industry Execs Bemoan Production
Lags,” Politico, July 9, 2024. For discussion of potential corporate underinvestment, see Doug Cameron, “Ukraine Aid
Lifts Defense Industry as Debate Over Profits Reignites,” The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2024; see also Senator
Bernie Sanders, “Defense Contractors Are Bilking the American People,” The Atlantic, February 27, 2024.
158 GAO, Ukraine: Status and Challenges of DOD Weapon Replacement Efforts, GAO-24-106649, April 30, 2024, pp.
4-5.
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certain Ukraine-related munitions—or to establish or modify programs to incentivize investment
in defense firms or support workforce recruitment, retention, and job training programs.159
Congress could also consider whether or not to appropriate more funding for DIB-wide capacity
expansion programs, such as the Industrial Base Fund or DPA Title III, or expand governmentowned capacity more directly by establishing additional organic industrial facilities, like the
Army’s newly-opened Universal Artillery Projectile Lines facility. Additionally, Congress could
also consider whether or not to direct the executive branch to pursue more defense industrial
partnerships with foreign governments and industry.
Exercising Oversight
Amid the scale and strategic significance of Ukraine-related defense production and transfer
activities, some Members of Congress have called for thorough oversight and monitoring of U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine, including in congressional hearings and through proposed and
enacted legislation.160
Existing Oversight Efforts
Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group
The Biden Administration has implemented what it characterizes as a “whole of government”
approach to providing “comprehensive independent oversight” of U.S. security assistance.161 A
centerpiece of this approach has been interagency coordination between various oversight
officials and organizations, now consolidated as a partnership of 24 federal oversight agencies
under the auspices of the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group (UOIWG).162 Pursuant
to Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (FY2024
NDAA; P.L. 118-31), the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) leads this
partnership as the Special Inspector for Operation Atlantic Resolve (SIG-OAR), in which
capacity he or she—together with the Inspectors General for the Department of State and the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—must fulfill a number of
functions relating to Ukraine oversight. Statutorily-established requirements include the
submission of an annual Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for OAR to Congress, as well as quarterly
OAR Reports.163 These plans and reports, along with an array of other oversight projects
conducted by various federal agencies, are available on a publicly-accessible website
(www.ukraineoversight.gov). As of this writing, this website contained information on 175
159 Section 1244(c) of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) authorized multi-year procurement of 16 different munitions.
For more information, see discussion in CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, p. 13.
160 Andrew Desiderio, Lara Seligman, and Connor O’Brien, “Pentagon Vs. Congress Tension Builds Over Monitoring
Billions in Ukraine Aid,” Politico, June 6, 2022; U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Oversight,
Transparency, and Accountability of Ukraine Assistance, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2023.
161 “About Us,” http://www.ukraineoversight.gov/about-us/.
162 Coordination of Ukraine oversight was initially spearheaded by the DOD, DOS, and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) Inspectors General. The UOIWG was established in June 2022. See “Ukraine
Oversight Interagency Working Group,” https://www.ukraineoversight.gov/Oversight-Work/Ukraine-OversightInteragency-Group/. See also DOD, DOS, and USAID, “Joint Statement on Commitment to Ukraine Response
Oversight,” November 1, 2022. https://oig.usaid.gov/node/5630.
163 According to SIG-OAR and the other Inspectors General, the responsibility to develop an annual joint strategic
oversight plan is derived from 5 U.S.C. § 419. The requirement for quarterly OAR reports is established by Section
1250B of the FY2024 NDAA.
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oversight projects: of these, 60 were reported to be ongoing, while 115 were listed as completed
(this latter number included 7 projects from FY2022 and 45 from FY2023).164 A plurality of these
projects (66, or 38% of the total) were reported to be overseen by DOD.165
Some Members have called for the designation of a Special Inspector General separate from the
DOD IG (an approach similar to that taken for Afghanistan reconstruction), and a bill to that
effect was introduced in 2023 (S. 651, 118th Congress).166
End-Use Monitoring
In addition to oversight of U.S. government efforts, some provision has also been made for
oversight of Ukrainian use of U.S.-produced or provided arms (commonly referred to as end-use
monitoring). For example, the Annex to the 2024 U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement
reiterates the U.S. interest in “mitigat[ing] the risk of diversion of advanced conventional
weapons,” and commits Ukraine to “ensuring the security of United States-provided defense
articles and technology in accordance with DOD’s Golden Sentry enhanced end-use monitoring
(EEUM) requirements.”167 The Annex further commits Ukraine (security conditions permitting)
to:
•
•
•
“Conducting a comprehensive inventory of all remaining EEUM items in
Ukraine’s possession;”168
“Providing DOD with access to military installations across Ukraine at which
EEUM items are stored, to allow for the resumption of all in-person verification
activities;”169 and
“Supporting future EEUM requirements the United States may identify to
maintain reasonable assurances of the security of advanced conventional
weapons in a postwar environment.”170
A DOD IG report released on January 10, 2024, identified several issues with DOD monitoring of
Ukraine-transferred defense articles designated as requiring “enhanced end-use monitoring”
(EEUM), including an inability to conduct initial inventories of all EEUM-designated articles and
a lack of serial number inventories for 59% of the total value of EEUM-designated articles
164 SIG-OAR, “Ukraine Oversight Dashboard,” September 5, 2024, https://www.ukraineoversight.gov/Oversight-
Work/Oversight-Dashboard/.
165 Ibid.
166 See, for instance, Daniel F. Runde and Madeleine McLean, “Ensuring Oversight to U.S. Aid to Ukraine,” CSIS, July
21, 2023; and Patrick Sullivan, “It’s Time for a Special Inspector General for Ukraine Assistance,” Modern War
Institute, September 19, 2023.
167 The White House, “Bilateral Security Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine,” June 13,
2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/13/bilateral-security-agreementbetween-the-united-states-of-america-and-ukraine/.
168 Ibid.
169 The White House, “Bilateral Security Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine,” June 13,
2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/13/bilateral-security-agreementbetween-the-united-states-of-america-and-ukraine/.
170 Ibid.
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transferred to that point.171 Some Members have also expressed concerns about DOD’s ability to
effectively conduct end-use monitoring.172
Legislative Options
Congress may review the efficacy of existing oversight efforts and mechanisms, and consider
whether or not to modify existing requirements and mechanisms. If Congress determines it needs
more information to inform its oversight, it could consider whether or not to include additional
planning and reporting requirements through legislation such as the annual NDAA. It could also
consider whether or not to establish new positions or organizations to exercise oversight
responsibilities, or direct or request existing entities—both governmental and nongovernmental—to conduct reporting on particular issues of concern.173 If Congress determines
that existing oversight activities are unnecessary or unduly impede Ukraine assistance, it could
consider whether or not to reduce or eliminate requirements.
Possible Oversight Questions for Congress
Beyond reviewing the existing oversight efforts described above, Congress may assess how
effectively the Administration has implemented and executed production-related authorities and
appropriations provided by Congress, and how effective implementation and execution are likely
to be in the future. Congress could consider posing the following oversight questions:
Readiness Impacts
•
•
How has the transfer of weapons and equipment to Ukraine affected the size and
makeup of U.S. defense stocks?
Are certain items above, at, or below minimum levels viewed by military
commanders as necessary to conduct operations in various combatant
commands? If any are below minimum levels, does DOD assess the DIB is able
to produce enough to replace these in a timely fashion? What is the basis of
DOD’s assessment, and does it align with congressional objectives?
USAI Actions
•
As of August 8, 2024, DOD reported having obligated $15.8 billion, or 48%, of
the $32.7 billion it has available for USAI contracting actions.174 What factors
affect DOD’s rate of obligation?
PDA Replacement Actions
•
How have valuation issues with PDA transfers affected DOD’s planning for PDA
replacement activities?175 For example, has DOD’s undervaluing prior PDA
171 DOD IG, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine,”
January 10, 2024, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/11/2003374323/-1/-1/1/dodig-2024-043eemu_redacted%20secure.pdf.
172 Rep. James Comer et al., “Letter to Secretary Austin,” February 6, 2024, https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2024/02/Ukraine-DoD-End-Use-Monitoring-Letter_.pdf.
173
For example, Inspectors General, GAO, or federally funded research and development centers.
174 DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” infographic, August 8, 2024.
175 See discussion on p. 6 of this report.
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•
•
transfers meant that fewer funds than necessary have been requested or
appropriated for PDA replacement?
As of August 26, 2024, the Department of State reported that $6.176 billion of
the $7.8 billion in FY2024 PDA remained available, meaning that almost 80% of
the authority had not been used five weeks before the end of the fiscal year.176
What are the implications of this for Ukraine assistance broadly and PDA
replacement actions specifically? Is this rate of usage related to the pace or
efficacy of PDA replacement actions?
As of August 8, 2024, DOD reported having obligated $21.0 billion, or 46%, of
the $45.8 billion it has available to replace items already transferred to Ukraine
via PDA.177 What factors affect DOD’s rate of obligation?
Production Diplomacy
•
•
Media reports suggest that European countries have had difficulty meeting goals
for the production of Ukraine-related weapons and munitions (e.g., 155mm
rounds).178 To what extent are executive branch efforts to encourage the
expansion of international production working, what is that assessment based on,
what areas have been the most challenging, and why?
Are there statutory or regulatory barriers to executive branch efforts to encourage
U.S. defense firms to coordinate with international suppliers to expand Ukrainerelated production?
Impact on the Conflict
As noted above, the United States has been the single largest supplier of defense equipment to
Ukraine. When assessing the efficacy of U.S. security assistance and considering future defense
support Congress may consider the extent to which U.S. defense production and assistance has
contributed to Ukrainian battlefield performance and options for congressional oversight of
Ukraine’s use of U.S.-provided weapons.
Relationship to Battlefield Performance
Since the commencement of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the composition of the security
assistance that the United States has provided Ukraine has changed. Initially, U.S. security
assistance focused on weapons and munitions best adapted for defensive operations and urban
environments, such as man-portable anti-tank and anti-air systems (e.g., Javelins and Stingers)
and munitions compatible with Soviet/Russian artillery.179 As the conflict developed, U.S.
security assistance has come to include more sophisticated platforms and equipment, including
176 Office of Management and Budget, “FY2025 Continuing Resolution Appropriations Issues,” p. 25.
177 DOD, “Ukraine Security Assistance,” infographic, August 8, 2024.
178 See, for example, Anna Myroniuk and Valeria Yehoshyna, “EU Shell-Production Capacity, Supplies To Ukraine
Fall Far Short Of Promises,” Radio Free Europe, July 8, 2024. See also Patricia Cohen and Liz Alderman, “Europe
Wants to Build a Stronger Defense Industry, but Can’t Decide How,” The New York Times, May 20, 2024.
179 Karoun Demirjian and Alex Horton, “As War Loomed, U.S. Armed Ukraine to Hit Russian Aircraft, Tanks, and
Prep for Urban Combat, Declassified Shipment List Shows,” Washington Post, March 4, 2022.
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artillery and long-range precision strike capabilities (e.g., 155-mm howitzers, HIMARS, and
ATACMS), air defense, and ground maneuver systems (see Appendix for full list).180
Throughout the conflict, U.S. decisions on what to provide—and when to provide it—have been
informed by the Biden Administration’s assessments of the UAF’s capacity to operate and
integrate particular capabilities, as well as other considerations such as Ukrainian requests, the
potential for escalatory Russian responses, battlefield conditions, and industrial or logistical
constraints.181 Although the stated and assessed needs of the UAF have shifted over the course of
war, Ukrainian government officials have consistently requested artillery and artillery
ammunition, armored vehicles, and air defense systems.182 Beyond bolstering Ukrainian
performance in the short term, some U.S. aid also has been oriented toward longer-term security
objectives: according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, his department’s efforts have
proceeded “on two tracks: [1] rushing Ukraine the capabilities to meet its urgent battlefield needs
and [2] helping Ukraine to build the future force to stave off and deter Russian aggression over
the longer term.”183
Some analysts have argued that U.S. security assistance provides the UAF with a qualitative edge
against Russian quantitative advantages. According to SIG-OAR, “the UAF has demonstrated
superior proficiency and innovation in certain areas, such as the employment of small commercial
UAV’s for reconnaissance and attack.”184 The provision of U.S. precision strike munitions
(including long-range missiles as well as precision artillery rounds and various types of air
launched missiles), for example, has allowed the UAF to target Russian command-and-control
and logistics centers, while U.S.-produced air and missile defense systems may have blunted the
military effect of Russian offensive strike capabilities.185 These, and other advanced capabilities,
have been most effective, and have had the greatest impact, immediately after deployment, before
the Russian military has had time to adjust and adapt to the introduction of the new weapons.186
180 Andrew E. Kramer, “With Western Weapons, Ukraine Is Turning the Tables in an Artillery War,” New York Times,
October 29, 2022; Tim Lister, Fred Pleitgen, and Matthias Somm, “As a Russian Offensive Looms, Ukraine Races to
Train Military on New Western Weapons,” CNN, January 23, 2023.
181 Initial assistance, such as anti-tank and anti-air systems, could be operated by an individual after minimal training.
Subsequent assistance focused on providing advanced systems such as artillery, tank, armored vehicle, and advanced
air defense systems which require extensive training and maintenance support. Further complicating the task is the
ability of the recipient to integrate the new weapons into its command structure and doctrine to ensure proper
employment. Additionally, decisions to supply new systems are evaluated against the requirements of maintaining a
consistent supply of ammunition and steady quantities of already provided systems. As one study notes, “Innovation is
therefore an exercise in risk management, a balancing act between the promises of a new capability and the perils of
losing older ones.” Kendrick Kuo, “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,”
International Security 47, no. 2 (2022), p. 53; Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natalia Yermak, “Potent Weapons Reach
Ukraine Faster Than the Know-How to Use Them,” New York Times, June 6, 2022. CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S.
Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.
182 Author discussions with Ukrainian government officials.
183 Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Air Force General Charles Q. Brown Jr.,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hold A News Conference Following Virtual Meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact
Group,” press release, April 26, 2024.
184 Special Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, Operation Atlantic Resolve: Including U.S.
Government Activities Related to Ukraine, April 1, 2024-June 30, 2024, p. 31.
185 Siobhan O’Grady, Kostiantyn Khudov, and Serhiy Morgunov, “Ukrainian Attacks on Supply Lines Slowed
Russians in Kharkiv, Intercepts Show,” Washington Post, July 8, 2024.
186 The Russian military continues to demonstrate an ability to adapt and learn in response to new battlefield
developments. Russia has adapted its logistics and command and control structures in response to effective UAF strikes
and Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities reportedly are increasingly effective at mitigating some advanced U.S.
munitions. For more see, Paul Schwartz et al., Russian Military Logistics in the Ukraine War, CNA, September 2023;
(continued...)
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U.S.-provided equipment may also bolster the ability of the UAF to replace losses, reconstitute
forces, and equip new units, thus allowing for more extensive and successful combat
operations.187 In late 2022, for example, the United States contributed relatively large amounts of
new equipment to create new UAF units in preparation for a planned counteroffensive in summer
2023.188 The UAF continued to create new units but reportedly still faced equipment shortages,
especially of armored or protected mobility, resulting in some units lacking equipment or being
equipped piece-meal.189 This reportedly risked undermining the effectiveness of new units,
complicating logistics, and potentially forcing the UAF to combine portions of units to
compensate for the lack of equipment.
Other factors influencing the battlefield impact of U.S.-origin weapons and munitions have been
the ability of the UAF to fix or repair damaged equipment and the speed of U.S. delivery of
pledged security assistance. Due to high usage, the UAF reportedly has faced hurdles in quickly
repairing equipment.190 The UAF has received assistance to repair equipment close to the
frontlines, but repairs that are substantial or complex may require transportation to facilities in
western Ukraine or in Europe.191 Additionally, uncertainty about when pledged security assistance
may arrive in Ukraine may affect Ukrainian operational planning.192
Biden Administration officials have maintained that U.S. defense production and assistance has
played an important role in averting Ukrainian defeat and allowing the UAF to continue its
operations.193 In March 2024, for example, both Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines
and Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns highlighted the importance of U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine and the likelihood of Ukrainian losses in the absence of such aid; in
April 2024, U.S. European Command Commander General Christopher G. Cavoli stated that “if
we [United States] do not continue to support Ukraine, Ukraine will run out of artillery shells and
will run out of air defense interceptors in fairly short order.”194
Some observers have criticized the pace of U.S. production and assistance, arguing that delays
have hindered Ukrainian performance. More specifically, they have contended that delays in
approving particular systems, as well as delays in funding, have undermined UAF operations and
Sam Skove, “Another U.S. Precision Guided Weapon Falls Prey to Russian Electronic Warfare, U.S. Says,” Defense
One, April 28, 2024; Carlotta Gall and Vladyslav Golovin, “Some U.S. Weapons Stymied by Russian Jamming in
Ukraine,” New York Times, May 25, 2024; Yaroslav Trofimov, “High-Tech American Weapons Work Against
Russia—Until They Don’t,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2024.
187 Jack Watling, “The War in Ukraine is Not a Stalemate,” Foreign Affairs, January 3, 2024.
188 Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kamila Hrabchuk, “NATO-Trained Units Will Serve as Tip of Spear in Ukraine’s
Counteroffensive,” Washington Post, June 4, 2023; Cristian Segura, “Ukraine’s Star Brigade in Dire State Due to Lack
of Weapons and Its Own Mistakes,” El Pais, April 22, 2024
189 Economist, “Ukraine Will Hold if it Gets the Arms It Needs, Says a Top General,” May 10, 2024; Institute for the
Study of War, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2024.”
190 For example, Ukraine’s artillery tubes require frequent repair due to heavy usage. Alistair MacDonald, “Ukraine
Plunders Howitzer Graveyard to Keep Big Guns Firing,” Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2024.
191 Bojan Pancevski and Alistair MacDonald, “Many of Ukraine’s Western Weapons Await Repairs Far From the Front
Line,” Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2022; Lolita Baldor, “How to Fix a Howitzer: U.S. Offers Helpline to
Ukraine Troops,” Associated Press, January 28, 2023.
192 Constant Meheut, “Ukraine Retreats From Villages on Eastern Front as It Awaits U.S. Aid,” New York Times, April
29, 2024.
193 Special Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, Operation Atlantic Resolve: Including U.S.
Government Activities Related to Ukraine, April 1, 2024-June 30, 2024, p. 26.
194 U.S. Congress, Senate Intelligence (Select) Committee, Worldwide Threats, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., March 11,
2024; and Testimony of Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Military Posture and National Security Challenges in Europe, hearings, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., April 10, 2024.
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prevented it from capitalizing on successes on the battlefield.195 However, others have cautioned
that the character of U.S. assistance is not the only determinant of material availability: for
example, some U.S. officials have claimed that the UAF’s “reliance on artillery has contributed to
the UAF’s persistent shortage of munitions and overuse of weapon systems.”196
While acknowledging the importance of the aid already provided, some Ukrainian officials,
including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, have also criticized the scale and character of
Western assistance (for example, Zelensky stated in July 2024 that “the decision to transfer F-16s
to Ukraine was strategic, but their number was not strategic”).197 A related but distinct debate—
and one largely beyond the scope of this report—concerns the limitations placed by the U.S.
government on the use of U.S.-origin weapons and munitions, which have been the subject of
considerable disagreement among stakeholders in the United States, Ukraine, and elsewhere.198
Depending on the sense of Congress regarding the battlefield impact of U.S. aid, a number of
options are available. Congress could, for instance, consider whether or not to direct the executive
branch or another organization (e.g., the Government Accountability Office or a federally-funded
research and development center) to review the efficacy of U.S.-origin weapons and munitions,
either in toto or for specific capabilities. If Congress determines that certain capabilities or
recipients are more effective than others in producing desirable battlefield effects, it could
consider whether or not to direct DOD to focus on increasing relevant production and transfer
efforts. More broadly, Congress may consider assessing the extent to which U.S. production is
aligned with congressional priorities for U.S. strategic goals in Ukraine.
195 Eliot Cohen, “It’s Not Enough for Ukraine to Win. Russia Has to Lose,” Atlantic, May 19, 2023; Andrew Radin,
“How to Win in Ukraine: Pour It On, and Don’t Worry About Escalation,” Defense One, May 22, 2024. Some of this
criticism has focused on the debate to provide particular systems or technologies to Ukraine. However, some scholars
argue a single system or technology on its own is unlikely to prove decisive in a conflict. “Although technological
superiority can be very important in war, its effect is not equally great under all circumstances, and even where it is
very great, technology on its own will seldom decide a war.” Martin van Crevald, Technology and War: From 2000
B.C. to the Present (New York, NY: Free Press, 1989), p. 232.
196 U.S. Army Europe and Africa response to DOD IG request for information cited in Special Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, Operation Atlantic Resolve: Including U.S. Government Activities Related to
Ukraine, Jan 1, 2024-March 31, 2024, p. 30.
197 Isabel van Brugen, “Zelensky Issues Stark Warning Over F-16s,” Newsweek, July 15, 2024,
https://www.newsweek.com/zelensky-warning-ukraine-f16-fighter-jets-1925290. Earlier that month, Zelensky seemed
to suggest in a July 11 tweet that Ukraine would need twice the number of F-16s committed thus far.
https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1811532850497261967.
198 For more information on this debate, see, for example, Koen Verhelst, “US Pushes Back Against Ukraine Please to
Lift Weapon Restrictions,” Politico, September 7, 2024; and Idrees Ali and Steve Holland, “Complications Loom for
U.S. Arms Policy as Ukraine Moves Deeper Into Russia,” Reuters, August 15, 2024.
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix. U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine
Table A2. Defense Articles and Services Provided to Ukraine, 2022-2024
February 2022-September 2024
Quantity (if
known/applicable)
Article/Service
Air Defense
PATRIOT air defense batteries and munitions
2
National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions
12
HAWK air defense systems and munitions
-
AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense
-
Stinger anti-air missiles
At least 2,000
Avenger air defense system
-
VAMPIRE counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) and munitions
-
C-UAS gun trucks and ammunition/mobile c-UAS laser-guided rocket systems
-
Anti-aircraft guns and ammunition
-
Air surveillance radars
21
Fires
High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition
At least 40
Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb launchers and guided rockets
-
155mm Howitzers
At least 200
155mm artillery rounds
At least 3,000,000
Precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds
At least 7,000
Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) 155 mm rounds
At least 60,000
105mm Howitzers
72
105mm artillery rounds
At least 800,000
203mm artillery rounds
10,000
152mm artillery rounds
At least 400,000
130mm artillery rounds
Approximately 40,000
122mm artillery rounds
40,000
122mm GRAD rockets
60,000
Mortar systems
At least 200
Mortar rounds
At least 600,000
Counter-artillery/counter-mortar radars
At least 100
Multi-mission radars
50
Ground Maneuver
Abrams tanks
31
T-72B tanks
45
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Quantity (if
known/applicable)
Article/Service
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
At least 300
Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicles
4
Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers
189
M113 Armored Personnel Carriers
At least 800
M1117 Armored Security Vehicles
250
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
At least 1,000
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
At least 3,000
Light tactical vehicles
At least 200
Armored medical treatment vehicles
300
Trucks and trailers to transport heavy equipment
80 and at least 200, respectively
Tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment
At least 1,000
Tactical vehicles to recover equipment
153
Command post vehicles
10
Ammunition support vehicles
30
Armored bridging systems
18
Logistics support vehicles and equipment
20
Fuel tankers and fuel trailers
239 and 105, respectively
Water trailers
58
Armored utility trucks
6
125mm, 120mm, and 105mm tank ammunition
-
25mm ammunition
At least 1,800,000
Mine-clearing equipment
Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems
Switchblade, Phoenix Ghost, CyberLux K8, Altius-600, Jump-20, Hornet, Puma,
Scan Eagle, and Penguin unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
-
UAS radars
2
High-speed anti-radiation missiles
-
Zuni aircraft rockets
At least 6,000
Hydra-70 aircraft rockets
At least 20,000
UAS munitions
-
Precision aerial munitions
Anti-armor and small arms
Javelin anti-armor systems
At least 10,000
Non-Javelin anti-armor systems and munitions
At least 120,000
Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles
At least 9,000
Grenade launchers and small arms
At least 40,000
Small arms ammunition and grenades
At least 400,000,000
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Quantity (if
known/applicable)
Article/Service
Laser-guided rocket systems and munitions
-
Rocket launchers and ammunition
-
Anti-armor mines
Maritime
Harpoon coastal defense systems and anti-ship missiles
2
Coastal and riverine patrol boats
90a
Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels
-
Port and harbor security equipment
Other capabilities
M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions
-
C-4 explosives, demolition munitions, and demolition equipment for obstacle
clearing
-
Obstacle emplacement equipment
-
Counter air defense capability
-
Body armor and helmets
At least 100,000
Tactical secure communications systems and support equipment
-
Satellite communications (SATCOM) antennas
4
SATCOM terminals and services
-
Electronic warfare (EW) and counter-EW equipment
-
Commercial satellite imagery services
-
Night vision devices, surveillance and thermal imagery systems, optics, and
rangefinders
-
Explosive ordnance disposal equipment and protective gear
-
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment
-
Medical supplies, including first aid kits, bandages, monitors, and other
equipment
-
Field equipment, cold weather gear, generators, and spare parts
-
Support for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities
-
Source: Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” fact sheet, September 6, 2024,
https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/.
Notes:
a. Four of these boats were provided using the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, which allows the
President to transfer excess equipment to foreign governments. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
“EDA,” https://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-defense-articles-eda.
Congressional Research Service
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Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress
Author Information
Luke A. Nicastro, Coordinator
Analyst in U.S. Defense Infrastructure Policy
Daniel M. Gettinger
Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy
Andrew S. Bowen
Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
Jennifer DiMascio
Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy
Brendan W. McGarry
Specialist in U.S. Defense Budget
Christina L. Arabia
Analyst in Security Assistance, Security
Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade
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Congressional Research Service
R48182 · VERSION 1 · NEW
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