Possible U.S.-Saudi Agreements and Normalization with Israel: Considerations for Congress
Congressional research reportAug 27, 2024
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Possible U.S.-Saudi Agreements and
Normalization with Israel: Considerations for
Congress
Updated August 27, 2024
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48162
SUMMARY
Possible U.S.-Saudi Agreements and
Normalization with Israel: Considerations for
Congress
R48162
August 27, 2024
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
The Biden Administration has stated that it considers normalization of the kingdom of Saudi
Arabia’s relationship with Israel as a U.S. national security interest. The Administration also
intends for the United States to remain the kingdom’s preferred security partner as the kingdom
considers its relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. Press reports
since early 2023 have suggested the Saudi government is seeking formal security commitments from the United States in
exchange for normalization of relations with Israel, Saudi commitments to forgo certain cooperation with U.S. strategic
competitors, or both. The kingdom also reportedly seeks accommodations in U.S. policy on the kingdom’s nuclear energy
program, and, in connection with potential Saudi-Israeli normalization, U.S.-facilitated changes to Israel’s policies toward the
Palestinians. Since April 2024, Biden Administration officials have publicly stated that U.S. and Saudi negotiators are close
to completing a series of agreements that could create incentives for Saudi-Israeli normalization and deepen U.S.-Saudi
partnership in a number of areas including defense, nuclear energy, and economic cooperation. In June 2024, unnamed U.S.
and Saudi officials said the two countries are drafting a defense treaty akin to the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security and an executive defense cooperation agreement to enhance military ties.
For decades, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has maintained a conditional approach to possible normalization with Israel, based
on Saudi support for the advancement of Palestinian interests and the establishment of a Palestinian state. In the context of
the Israel-Hamas conflict and Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip since October 2023, the kingdom said in February
2024 that “there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized on the 1967
borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, and that the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip stops and all Israeli occupation
forces withdraw from the Gaza Strip.” Israel’s current government has stated its intent to eliminate threats to Israel emanating
from the Gaza Strip, opposed Palestinian statehood, and rejected other parties’ recognition of such statehood. Israeli and
Saudi stated positions and ongoing fighting in Gaza suggest that prompt normalization may not be likely. Future
opportunities may remain contingent on developments in the conflict and the posture and policies of the Israeli, Saudi, and
U.S. governments concerning the conflict, Palestinian statehood, and the feasibility of other security understandings.
Biden Administration officials have described the negotiations as part of a unified vision for regional security and have
described Saudi-Israeli normalization and potential U.S.-Saudi agreements as linked. To the extent that regional security
conditions and policy developments present obstacles to Saudi-Israeli normalization, progress on U.S.-Saudi defense, energy,
technology, or other agreements could proceed or may be delayed.
Congress may debate how to respond to the Administration’s initiatives toward Saudi Arabia, including efforts to create
incentives for Saudi-Israeli normalization. Depending on the content, format, timing, and structure of any prospective U.S.Saudi agreements, Congress may have different constitutional roles in reviewing, ratifying, or otherwise considering them.
While media commentary has focused on the prospect of a grand bargain or single “megadeal” linking normalization and a
range of possible U.S.-Saudi understandings, U.S. officials have stated that U.S.-Saudi talks have focused on a number of
discrete elements that may each invite unique consideration by Congress. U.S., Saudi, and Israeli views on possible
agreements, their merits, and the extent to which they should remain linked may vary and could change based on new
developments.
Elements proposed as treaties, legislatively endorsed bilateral agreements, civil nuclear cooperation agreements, trade or
investment agreements, and/or executive agreements each may present distinct legislative considerations and implicate
different congressional processes, entities, and tools. In evaluating executive branch proposals, Congress may review current
U.S.-Saudi cooperative initiatives and examine selected policy and procedural considerations. For more information about
U.S.-Saudi relations, see CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M.
Blanchard.
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Possible U.S.-Saudi Agreements and Normalization with Israel
Contents
Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1
Background: U.S.-Saudi Cooperation and Saudi Policy Priorities.................................................. 2
U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and Commitments ................................................................ 3
What is the nature of U.S.-Saudi security cooperation? ..................................................... 3
What security commitments has the United States made to Saudi Arabia? ........................ 6
What type of mutual security commitment is under consideration? ................................... 6
Saudi Arabia’s Policy Toward Israel and the Palestinians......................................................... 7
What is the nature of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Israel? ........................................... 7
What has Saudi Arabia said about the Palestinian issue in relation to
normalization? ................................................................................................................. 7
What might Israel and Saudi Arabia negotiate and what factors might shape
Saudi-Israeli agreements? ................................................................................................ 9
U.S.-Saudi Civilian Nuclear Cooperation ............................................................................... 10
What are Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear energy plans? ................................................... 10
What nonproliferation commitments has Saudi Arabia made? .......................................... 11
What is the status of U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation and what might be
considered? .................................................................................................................... 12
Saudi Transformation Initiatives and U.S. Partnership ........................................................... 13
What are Saudi Arabia’s domestic economic goals and what progress has the
kingdom made toward them? ......................................................................................... 13
What is the status of U.S.-Saudi economic and technology cooperation? ........................ 14
Potential Policy Considerations for Congress ............................................................................... 15
Potential Merits and Risks of Proposed Agreements Individually or in Combination ............ 15
Potential Implications for U.S. Global Strategy and for U.S. Foreign and Defense
Policy Programs ................................................................................................................... 16
Threats to Saudi Arabia and Saudi Defense Capabilities ........................................................ 16
Possible Reactions from Adversaries, Rivals, and Partners .................................................... 17
Israeli and Palestinian Politics ................................................................................................ 18
Saudi Influence on Normalization Beyond the Middle East Region ...................................... 19
U.S. Regional and Global Nonproliferation Policy................................................................. 19
Public Opinion and Saudi Arabia’s Political Future................................................................ 20
Technology Transfer................................................................................................................ 21
Human Rights Issues ............................................................................................................... 22
Potential Process Considerations for Congress ............................................................................. 22
What form might security commitments and defense agreements take? How might
Congress shape their content and oversee implementation? ................................................ 23
What elements might a mutual defense commitment agreement contain? ............................. 25
How has Congress considered other mutual defense commitment agreements and
other bilateral agreements? .................................................................................................. 26
How could Congress conduct oversight of U.S.-Saudi negotiations and agreements
and shape their implementation?.......................................................................................... 27
How might Congress review security cooperation with Saudi Arabia under
existing and potentially new agreements? ..................................................................... 27
How might Congress shape and review a possible nuclear cooperation agreement
with Saudi Arabia? ......................................................................................................... 28
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How adequate is the information available to Congress when reviewing any proposed
agreements?.......................................................................................................................... 29
How sufficient is the timeline for legislative review and consideration of proposed
agreements?.......................................................................................................................... 29
Appendixes
Appendix A. Additional CRS Resources ....................................................................................... 30
Appendix B. Selected Examples of U.S.-Saudi Security Commitments and
Considerations ............................................................................................................................ 31
Appendix C. Saudi Arabia and Israel: From Rejection to Conditional Normalization ................. 34
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 36
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Possible U.S.-Saudi Agreements and Normalization with Israel
Introduction and Issues for Congress
This report provides background information and analyzes issues for Congress regarding possible
U.S.-Saudi agreements and the potential normalization of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Israel.
Issues for Congress include the potential advantages and disadvantages of proposed treaties or
agreements, and potential implications for the processes by which Congress may review and
assess them. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues in turn could have implications for
U.S. foreign and defense policy, relations among Middle East countries, and Congress’s powers
and prerogatives relating to the review and assessment of proposed treaties and agreements.
The Biden Administration and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia reportedly are considering a
proposed mutual security commitment and executive defense cooperation agreement that could
provide a basis for enduring U.S.-Saudi strategic ties, possibly in conjunction with the
normalization of the kingdom’s relationship with Israel.1 Civil nuclear cooperation and economic
relations also could expand pursuant to new bilateral agreements. U.S.-Saudi agreements or
treaties may present legislative considerations for Congress and implicate different congressional
processes, entities, and tools. In determining how to respond to the Administration’s initiatives
with Saudi Arabia, Congress may review current U.S.-Saudi cooperative initiatives and examine
certain policy and procedural considerations.
Regarding the potential advantages and disadvantages of proposed agreements, Congress may
consider issues including but not necessarily limited to the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The potential merits or risks of proposed agreements, whether individually or in
combination.
The potential effects of any security agreements on U.S. global strategy and
interests, including contributions to U.S. security, implications for the credibility
and sustainability of U.S. commitments and partnerships around the world, and
the potential implications for U.S. defense and foreign assistance policy,
programs, and spending.
Potential threats to Saudi security, Saudi self-defense capabilities, and their
implications for any proposed security commitments.
The potential responses from global competitors such as Russia and the People’s
Republic of China, and the views of other states in the Middle East region
including antagonists such as Iran and U.S. partners such as the United Arab
Emirates.
The relationship between proposed agreements and Israeli and Palestinian
politics.
The potential for Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization to affect normalization
decisions by other states.
Potential implications for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy.
The Saudi government’s domestic stability and security concerns, its policies,
Saudi public opinion, and their implications for any proposed U.S. commitments
and technology transfers.
Potential implications for U.S. human rights policy.
1 See, for example, Stephen Kalin and Michael R. Gordon. “U.S. to Offer Landmark Defense Treaty to Saudi Arabia in
Effort to Spur Israel Normalization Deal,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2024.
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Regarding Congress’s powers and prerogatives relating to the review and assessment of proposed
treaties and agreements, potential issues for Congress include but are not necessarily limited to
the following:
•
•
•
The institutional roles of Congress and the President in overseeing and
implementing agreements involving U.S. commitments abroad and the
constitutional role of the Senate in providing advice and consent to treaties.
The adequacy of information available to Congress for reviewing and assessing
proposed agreement(s) and their possible implementation.
Whether the administration’s proposed schedule for reviewing and assessing the
proposed agreements provides Congress with sufficient time to carry out its
duties and functions fully.
For other CRS products on Saudi Arabia, Israel and the Palestinians, and congressional
procedures for the consideration of treaties and other international agreements, including
agreements involving nuclear cooperation, see Appendix A. For selected examples of past U.S.
security assurances and statements regarding Saudi Arabia, see Appendix B. For information
about past Saudi policy toward Israel and the Palestinians, see Appendix C.
Background: U.S.-Saudi Cooperation and Saudi
Policy Priorities
U.S.-Saudi discussions about deepening defense, energy, and economic ties, including potentially
binding mutual security commitments, reflect a reinvigoration of decades-long trends that have
drawn the kingdom and the United States closer together in pursuit of shared interests. Reported
progress in U.S.-Saudi negotiations suggests that the Biden Administration is pivoting back
toward a regional partnership approach with U.S.-Saudi relations as an anchor, after reevaluating
U.S. partnership with the kingdom over Saudi military operations in Yemen and human rights in
the kingdom during the President’s first year in office. Since 2022, the Administration has
reengaged Saudi leaders amid U.S. concerns about Russia’s war against Ukraine, security in East
Asia, and the People’s Republic of China’s inroads in the Gulf region; global oil prices, climate
change, and energy transition issues; and conflicts in the Middle East and East Africa. The
changing diplomatic approach reflects the Administration’s apparent intention for the United
States to remain the kingdom’s preferred security partner as the kingdom considers its
relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia.2
The Administration also has sought Saudi leaders’ support for long-standing U.S. goals for
normalization between Arab states and Israel. Having long taken a conditional approach to
possible Arab-Israeli normalization, Saudi officials have restated the country’s criteria for future
diplomatic recognition of Israel in the context of the Israel-Hamas war, emphasizing the need for
an end to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and a defined path toward Palestinian
statehood. Specifically, they have stipulated that the kingdom will not normalize its relations with
Israel while the Israeli military remains in Gaza and until additional steps toward Palestinian
statehood or its greater international recognition takes place.3
2 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), “USMTM Mission, Vision, and Commander’s Intent,” at
https://www.centcom.mil/OPERATIONS-AND-EXERCISES/USMTM/.
3 The kingdom said in February 2024 that “there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent
Palestinian state is recognized on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, and that the Israeli aggression on
(continued...)
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In June 2024, press reports suggested that U.S.-Saudi talks may yield a security agreement akin to
the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. A similar bilateral agreement
between the United States and Saudi Arabia could see the kingdom agree to grant U.S. forces
conditional-but-enduring military access in exchange for a U.S. commitment to view attacks on
the kingdom as dangerous to U.S. security and to act in response in accordance with U.S.
constitutional provisions and practices. U.S. and Saudi officials also may reach an agreement
concerning civil nuclear energy cooperation, including provisions related to the cooperative
production of nuclear fuel using Saudi uranium resources. Other defense and technology
cooperation or economic agreements could accompany Administration proposals in these areas.
In response to a press briefing question about whether U.S.-Saudi agreements could possibly
move forward without Saudi-Israeli normalization and a pathway to a two-state solution, a
Department of State spokesperson said on May 2, 2024, that the United States and Saudi Arabia
have been “very clear that this is a package deal that would include a bilateral component and
also include a path to two states.”4 It is unclear whether U.S.-Saudi bilateral agreements might or
might not explicitly include provisions or references to normalization or future Palestinian
statehood.
In August 2024, the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia told a Saudi-owned news outlet that
it’s more than just a single agreement. It’s really a package of agreements that need to be
agreed upon, negotiated and signed together. Part of that is a strengthened U.S.-Saudi
strategic partnership and military agreement. The second piece is normalization of relations
between Saudi Arabia and Israel. There’s an economic component. And of course, an
important piece of this relates to the Palestinians. It includes a credible pathway with
benefits toward statehood for the Palestinian people. All of these are part of a package, and
you really can’t disentangle one from another. So while we came very close and are very
close on very important elements of this agreement, it’s important that we finalize all of it
together.5
As a baseline for engagement with executive branch counterparts and foreign officials in
evaluating possible agreements and diplomacy, Congress may review ongoing U.S.-Saudi
security cooperation, existing security commitments, the evolution of the kingdom’s approach to
normalization, and its civil nuclear energy plans.
U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and Commitments
What is the nature of U.S.-Saudi security cooperation?
The United States has played a central role in the development of Saudi Arabia’s military forces
and defense infrastructure since the 1960s and remains the principal provider of defense articles
and services to the kingdom. From 1950 to 2022, U.S. foreign military sales to the kingdom
totaled more than $164 billion, making Saudi Arabia by far the largest U.S. defense customer by
value worldwide.6 As of June 2024, approximately 2,300 U.S. military personnel were deployed
the Gaza Strip stops and all Israeli occupation forces withdraw from the Gaza Strip.” The kingdom has not publicly
specified precise criteria related to some of these conditions. Saudi officials may or may not accept as sufficient the
conclusion and maintenance of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas and/or the de jure recognition of the
principle of Palestinian statehood by Israel, the United States or others.
4 Department of State Press Briefing, May 2, 2024.
5 U.S. Ambassador Michael Ratney, Interview with Al Sharq Al Awsat, August 25, 2024.
6 U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Historical Sales Book Fiscal Years 1950 to 2022, FY2022
Edition. The next highest totals are for Israel ($53.4 billion) and Japan ($52.9 billion).
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in the kingdom “to protect U.S. forces and interests in the region against hostile action by Iran
and Iran-backed groups.”7 U.S. forces deployed to the kingdom in 1990 to deter Iraqi forces
following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and remained in the kingdom until 2003. U.S. forces
redeployed to the kingdom in October 2019 following attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure
attributed to Iran and Iran-backed groups. U.S. forces in the kingdom include U.S. personnel
operating and maintaining U.S. fighter aircraft, and are in addition to hundreds of U.S. personnel
supporting long-running U.S.-Saudi security cooperation programs for Saudi military, national
guard, and internal security forces.
As of 2024, U.S.-Saudi security cooperation initiatives include
•
•
•
the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) has operated in the kingdom
since U.S. military assistance began in the 1950s.8 USMTM oversees U.S.
cooperation with the kingdom’s conventional military forces pursuant to bilateral
executive agreements.9
the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPMSANG), which has operated in the kingdom since the 1970s and supports the
SANG’s development and mission implementation pursuant to a bilateral
executive agreement.10
the U.S. Army Military Advisory Group (USA-MAG)/Program of Technical
Cooperation (PTC), which under a 2008 agreement focused on critical
infrastructure protection forces under the Ministry of Interior (MOI), realigned
and rebranded to support the State Security Presidency (SSP), MOI forces, and
other non-military security forces pursuant to a 2023 bilateral executive
Agreement for Technical Cooperation on infrastructure protection,
counterterrorism, emergency management, related foreign military sales, training,
and other security support.11 The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
administers the USA-MAG program. The U.S. State Department Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs leads other interagency partners in supporting PTC
implementation.
7 The White House, “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the Senate—
War Powers Report,” June 7, 2024.
8 In 1951, the United States and Saudi Arabia reached a bilateral executive agreement providing for U.S. military
assistance to the kingdom at cost pursuant to the Mutual Defense Act of 1949 (P.L.81-329), as amended. In 1953, the
United States and the kingdom reached an agreement for the presence of a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group.
See Agreements on U.S.-Saudi Arabia Mutual Defense Assistance, TIAS 2289, 2 U.S.T. 1460, June 18. 1951; and,
United States Military Assistance Advisory Group to Saudi Arabia, TIAS 2812, 4 U.S.T. 1482, June 27, 1953.
9 Under a 1977 agreement, the U.S. advisory group evolved into USMTM. See Military Training Mission, TIAS 8558,
28 U.S.T. 2409, February 27, 1977. See also, DSCA, “Saudi Arabia – Security Assistance Office (SAO) Support
Services, U.S. Training Mission to Saudi Arabia (USMTM),” Case 20-58, December 1, 2020; and, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), “USMTM Mission, Vision, and Commander’s Intent,” at https://www.centcom.mil/
OPERATIONS-AND-EXERCISES/USMTM/.
10 In 1973, the United States and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement providing for U.S. Department of Defense support
for the modernization of the Saudi National Guard. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of Saudi Arabia Concerning the Saudi Arabian National Guard
Modernization Program, TIAS 7634, 24 U.S.T. 1106, March 19, 1973.
11 The Saudi government created the SSP in 2017 to serve as the kingdom’s “principal domestic intelligence and
counterterrorism authority.” U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2017 – Saudi Arabia. Elements that
have received U.S. assistance under USA-MAG include the SSP, MOI, Border Guard, Facilities Security Forces, and
MOI Special Security Force. See Technical Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, TIAS 08-516, May 16, 2008, extended January 16, 2013; and, Agreement for Technical
Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, TIAS 23-508, May 8, 2023.
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•
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has implemented Saudi-funded military
engineering and construction projects in the kingdom since the 1950s, pursuant to
bilateral executive agreements.12
Saudi Arabia pays for U.S. government-facilitated training, advising, equipment, and construction
for its military and internal security forces with its national funds through the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program and pursuant to authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended.13 Saudi Arabia also makes substantial defense article and services purchases pursuant to
the FMS and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs. In support of Saudi Arabia’s defense
sector transformation initiatives, Saudi Arabia has sought U.S. advice for its Defense Ministry
and national security leaders on institutional reorganization and changes to training, force
management, and acquisition processes.14
In August 2024, an unnamed senior State Department official cited unspecified “positive steps
that the Saudi Ministry of Defense have taken over the past three years to substantially improve
their civilian harm mitigation processes” in describing the Administration’s decision to resume
sales of air-to-ground munitions to the kingdom.15 Saudi Arabia reportedly seeks to replenish its
supplies of these munitions in light of regional tensions after expending ordnance in strikes in
Yemen from 2015 to 2022.16
Congress may exercise oversight of the implementation of U.S.-Saudi bilateral executive
agreements and may review the authorities that provide for the sale of defense articles and
services to the kingdom, and funding and authorities for related activities by U.S. military and
civilian personnel. Congress has not required regular reporting on the activities, goals, and
effectiveness of U.S. security cooperation organizations and initiatives in the kingdom.
Congress has periodically challenged executive branch preferences with regard to proposed arms
sales to Saudi Arabia and, on occasion, has voted to disapprove or enact conditions on the sale
and transfer of defense articles and services to Saudi Arabia. For example Congress enacted
annual prohibitions on the availability of International Military Education and Training (IMET)
assistance for the kingdom from FY2019 through FY2023.17 Congress directed that no IMET
funds “should” be made available for assistance to the kingdom in the Further Consolidated
12 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) assistance activities in the kingdom date back to the 1950s and expanded
under a bilateral agreement in 1965. See Defense: Construction of Military Facilities, TIAS 5380, May 24, 1965. See
also, USACE, “Historical Vignette 065 - Middle East Division’s Extensive Construction Program,” November 2009;
and, Catherine Carroll, USACE, “USACE Transatlantic Division: Setting Extraordinary Standards as ‘Partner of
Choice’ in CENTCOM AOR,” February 7, 2024.
13 FMS sales provide for training under USMTM and PM-SANG. The USA-MAG/PTC programs are administered
pursuant to authorities in 22 U.S.C. § 2357 (furnishing of services and commodities on an advance-of-funds or
reimbursement basis to friendly countries); 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-2 (anti-terrorism assistance); and 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751, et
seq. (the Arms Export Control Act, as amended).
14 Bilal Y. Saab, “The Other Saudi Transformation,” Middle East Policy, Volume 29, Issue 2, May 2022.
15 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. restarts offensive weapons sales to Saudi Arabia after lengthy ban,” Washington Post, August
9, 2024.
16 Ibid.
17 IMET funds the attendance of mid-to-senior level foreign military personnel, as well as select civilian personnel, in
U.S. professional military courses at Department of Defense (DOD) institutions. From 2002 through 2018, Saudi
Arabia received roughly $10,000 - $25,000 per year in IMET assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961. This nominal amount made the kingdom eligible for a discount on other training that it purchased through the
Foreign Military Sales program for training initiatives overseen by the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) and
other U.S. entities. Successive administrations waived congressionally enacted restrictions on the provision of this
assistance from 2004 to 2009 and argued that the aid and related discount supported continued Saudi participation in
U.S. training programs, which in turn supported the maintenance of important military-to-military relationships and
improved Saudi capabilities.
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Appropriations Act, 2024 (Division F, Section 7041(h) of P.L. 118-47). The House and Senate
versions of the FY2025 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 8771 and S. 4797)
contains the same provision.
What security commitments has the United States made to Saudi Arabia?
Saudi leaders have long sought assurances about the nature and extent of U.S. security
commitments to the kingdom, and U.S. officials for decades have communicated varying types
and degrees of U.S. commitment through private correspondence and public statements. In May
2022, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan “reaffirmed President Joe Biden’s commitment to
help Saudi Arabia defend its territory” in a meeting with a senior Saudi defense official.18 This
formulation—under which President Biden committed the United States to assisting Saudi
Arabia’s own efforts to defend Saudi territory—reflects previous U.S. public statements. At times,
past U.S. administrations have offered similarly limited security assurances to Saudi Arabia in
private correspondence, but the United States has, with the exception of the 1990-1991 Gulf War,
generally refrained from making public commitments to directly defend Saudi Arabia using U.S.
military forces. The formulation has in various iterations communicated U.S. respect for Saudi
Arabia’s sovereignty, emphasized the kingdom’s responsibility for its own defense, and defined
U.S. commitments as aid in the defense of Saudi territory rather than the Saudi government. At
times U.S. officials have noted the geo-economic importance of Saudi Arabia’s oil exports in
implying that the United States would respond to critical threats to the availability of the
kingdom’s oil reserves to global markets.19
For a historical account of select U.S. security assurances, commitments, and statements of
national interests regarding Saudi Arabia see Appendix B.
What type of mutual security commitment is under consideration?
According to the U.S. ambassador, Saudi leaders desire congressional endorsement of any U.S.Saudi strategic agreements to increase their political durability, whether through the Senate’s
advice and consent to a treaty or through bicameral endorsement of authorizing legislation.20
Press reporting in June 2024 cited unnamed U.S. and Saudi officials as indicating that a possible
U.S.-Saudi mutual security agreement could be modeled on the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security.21 A similar bilateral agreement between the United States and Saudi
Arabia could see the kingdom agree to grant U.S. forces conditional-but-enduring military access
in exchange for a U.S. commitment to view attacks on the kingdom as dangerous to U.S. security
and to act in response in accordance with U.S. constitutional provisions and practices. Such an
agreement would not appear to require the United States to use military force against entities
responsible for attacks on the kingdom or to preempt, deter, or counter such attacks, but could
create expectations that the United States would do so. U.S. actions thus could affect perceptions
The White House, “Readout from NSC Spokesperson Adrienne Watson on National Security Advisor Jake
Sullivan’s Meeting with Saudi Vice Minister of Defense Khalid bin Salman,” May 17, 2022.
19 In 1981, President Ronald Reagan said “Saudi Arabia, we will not permit to be an Iran.... There is no way, as long as
Saudi Arabia and the OPEC nations there in the East—and Saudi Arabia’s the most important—provide the bulk of the
energy that is needed to turn the wheels of industry in the Western World, there’s no way that we could stand by and
see that taken over by anyone that would shut off that oil.” President Ronald Reagan, The President’s News
Conference, October 1, 1981, in U.S. Government Printing Office, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Ronald Reagan, January 20 to December 31, 1981.
20 U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney interview with Frankly Speaking, Arab News, June 2, 2024.
21 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,11 UST 4509, January 19, 1960, at https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/
service/ll/lltreaties//lltreaties-11-2/lltreaties-11-2.pdf#page=340.
18
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of other U.S. security commitments, including commitments to allies and partners in Europe, East
Asia, and the Middle East.
Executive branch responses to congressional concerns during consideration of treaties with
security commitment language in the 1950s emphasized that the U.S. government reserves the
right to use its own judgment about what constitutes actions requiring a treaty response and that
determinations of aid and assistance in response are “wholly within the determination of the
United States.”22 Declarations of war would require congressional action, though the President
could take a range of actions pursuant to constitutional authorities that may implicate the War
Powers Resolution.
Saudi Arabia’s Policy Toward Israel and the Palestinians
What is the nature of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Israel?
Since the 1970s, the Saudi government has developed an approach to Israel in which it has stated
that recognition and formal engagement will only come if Israel makes peace with the
Palestinians and its Arab state neighbors under certain terms. While maintaining this approach,
the kingdom has tacitly agreed not to undermine other Arab states’ burgeoning ties to Israel in
line with U.S. goals,23 leaving the Palestinian question as the main unresolved issue. Saudi Arabia
led other Arab states in developing a consensus position on conditional normalization with Israel
in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (see Appendix C).24 Saudi Arabia publicly supports key
Palestinian demands, while Saudi leaders reportedly at times have engaged quietly with Israel
based on shared security concerns about Iran.25 After the 2020 Abraham Accords between Israel
and various Arab states, Saudi Arabia granted Israel flyover rights within its airspace to facilitate
direct Israeli airline travel to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, and in July 2022,
Saudi Arabia opened its airspace to all civilian air traffic bound to or departing from Israel. The
Biden Administration in July 2022 announced changes to the U.S. military observer presence on
the Red Sea island of Tiran in conjunction with the island’s transfer to Saudi control under a
Saudi-Egyptian agreement endorsed by Israel.26 Israel’s Minister for Tourism visited the kingdom
in September 2023, marking the first public visit by an Israel cabinet minister to the kingdom.
What has Saudi Arabia said about the Palestinian issue in relation to
normalization?
Prior to the October 2023 onset of the Israel-Hamas conflict, Saudi officials appeared to uphold
the kingdom’s commitment to the Saudi-sponsored 2002 Arab Peace Initiative as a reference
point for the kingdom’s conditions on normalization with Israel. Saudi leaders acknowledged the
22 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Hearing on Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea, Jan 13-14, 1954, p. 18.
23
Saudi officials privately discussed the possibility of normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations with the Carter
Administration in the context of diplomatic talks concerning Israeli-Arab peace and U.S.-supported negotiations
between Egypt and Israel.
24 Prior to the October 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel and the Israel-Hamas war, King Salman had reiterated the
kingdom’s commitment to the terms of the peace initiative put forward by his predecessor King Abdullah under the
auspices of the Arab League in 2002. This initiative calls for normalization of Arab relations with Israel following the
conclusion of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace accord, the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in
East Jerusalem, and a “just solution” for Palestinian refugees. Saudi Arabia has joined multilateral statements with
other Arab states calling for steps in accordance with the initiative. See for example
25 Reuters, “Covert Israeli-Saudi meeting sends Biden a strong message on Iran,” November 27, 2020.
26 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021.
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potential regional benefits of Saudi-Israel normalization, but called variously for giving the
Palestinians “hope,” “dignity,” “a state,” and/or “a pathway” toward “peace,” “a two-state
solution” and/or “justice” as a prerequisite for normalization.27
In August 2023, the kingdom named its Ambassador to Jordan as nonresident Ambassador to “the
State of Palestine and consul general in the city of Jerusalem.”28 In a September 2023 interview,
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman declined to specify what Palestinian-related terms Saudi
Arabia would insist on as part of a potential normalization agreement, saying that he did not want
to affect ongoing negotiations with the Biden Administration. The Crown Prince called the
Palestinian issue “very important” and said, “We need to solve that path. ... we hope that it will
reach a place that will ease the life of the Palestinians.”29 Days later in a speech to the UN
General Assembly, the Saudi Foreign Minister said, “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia emphasizes
that the security of the Middle East region requires swiftly finding a just, comprehensive solution
to the Palestinian issue; this solution must be based on legitimate international resolutions and the
Arab Peace Initiative in a way that guarantees the right of the Palestinian people to establish their
independent state on the 1967 borders with its capital in East Jerusalem.”30
The Hamas-led attacks on Israel of October 7, 2023, and the ensuing Israel-Hamas war prompted
a halt to U.S.-Saudi discussions that had been taking place regarding potential bilateral
agreements in concert with possible Saudi-Israeli normalization. Since January 2024, both U.S.
executive branch officials and Members of Congress have resumed engagement with Saudi
counterparts on these issues.31
On February 7, 2024, the Saudi government said:
the kingdom has communicated its firm position to the U.S. administration that there will
be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized
on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, and that the Israeli aggression on
the Gaza Strip stops and all Israeli occupation forces withdraw from the Gaza Strip. The
Kingdom reiterates its call to the permanent members of the UN Security Council that have
not yet recognized the Palestinian state to expedite the recognition of a Palestinian state on
the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital ... 32
In May 2024, Saudi Arabia joined other Arab League members in issuing a joint declaration in
Manama, Bahrain to reiterate the League’s
firm position and call for a just and comprehensive peaceful settlement of the Palestinian
issue, and we support the call of His Excellency President Mahmoud Abbas, President of
the State of Palestine, to convene an international peace conference and to take irreversible
steps to implement the two-state solution in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative and
27 Saudi Foreign Minister comments in Davos, Switzerland, reported in Abeer Abu Omar and Manus Cranny, “Saudi
Arabia Says a Palestinian State Is Key to Ties with Israel,” January 19, 2023. U.S. Department of State, “Secretary
Antony J. Blinken and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at a Joint Press Availability,” June 8,
2023.
28 Saudi Press Agency, “Ambassador Al-Sudairi delivers a copy of his credentials as Non-Resident Ambassador
Extraordinary to the State of Palestine and Consul General in the city of Jerusalem to the Advisor to the Palestinian
President,” August 12, 2023.
29 “Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman,” interview by Bret Baier, Special Report, Fox News, September 20, 2023.
30 Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, Remarks before the UN General Assembly, at UN News, “Saudi Foreign
Minister outlines plans for better, greener Middle East,” September 23, 2023.
31 Sam Dagher and Jennifer Jacobs, “Saudis Resume US Defense Talks After Pause From Israel-Hamas War,”
Bloomberg, January 31, 2024.
32 Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, X post, February 7, 2024 at: https://x.com/ksamofaen/status/
1755020860836962666.
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resolutions of international legitimacy to establish an independent and sovereign
Palestinian state on the lines of 4 June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital, and to accept
its membership in the United Nations as an independent and fully sovereign state in
common with other countries in the world, and to ensure the restoration of all legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people, in particular, the right to return and self-determination,
empowerment and support.33
Some Saudi statements have criticized Israeli officials’ actions at Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem
and the conduct of Israeli military operations in stark terms, calling for an end to what the Saudi
Foreign Ministry described in July 2024 as “continued genocidal massacres against the
Palestinian people at the hands of the Israeli war machine.”34 After the killing of Hamas leader
Ismail Haniyeh in Iran, a Saudi official said the kingdom rejects “any violation of the sovereignty
of states or interference in the internal affairs of any country.”35 At an August 2024 cabinet
meeting, Saudi officials stated their “support for efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza,
emphasizing the need to end the occupation to achieve peace and restore the legitimate rights of
the Palestinian people.”36
Saudi leaders have not clarified publicly to what extent the Arab Peace Initiative remains a
specific reference point for their policy, or what they might or might not accept in lieu of a fully
executed and implemented Israeli-Palestinian agreement leading to the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state. Saudi officials have spoken of the need to “chart a clear and
irreversible path towards the two-state solution,” but have not publicly elaborated on what
specific elements or timelines they believe such a course would require.37 Saudi officials also
have not clarified whether the kingdom would view the diplomatic recognition of Palestinian
statehood by the United States or certain other permanent members of the UN Security Council
prior to the establishment of a Palestinian state and exercise of Palestinian statehood as meeting
Saudi requirements to pursue normalization or proceed with agreements with the United States.
What might Israel and Saudi Arabia negotiate and what factors might shape
Saudi-Israeli agreements?
Saudi and Israeli officials could negotiate security, technology, and/or economic agreements in
conjunction with any understandings reached on normalization. Israel historically has sought to
maintain a Qualitative Military Edge (QME) over the kingdom and other Arab states both
individually and in combination.38 This has led successive Israeli governments to monitor and at
times oppose the U.S. transfer of certain defense systems to the kingdom and argue that certain
U.S.-origin weapons systems should not be deployed in areas of Saudi Arabia within range of
Israeli territory. U.S. law requires the executive branch to certify that U.S. arms transfers to the
Middle East region will not erode Israel’s QME.39
33 Bahrain News Agency, “Bahrain Declaration of 33rd Arab Summit issued,” May 17, 2024.
34 Arab News, “Saudi foreign ministry condemns continued genocide against Palestinian people,” July 14, 2024; and,
Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, X post, August 12, 2024 at https://x.com/ksamofaen/status/
1823394531779428704.
35 Reuters, “Saudi Arabia says Hamas leader’s killing was ‘blatant violation’ of Iran’s sovereignty,” August 7, 2024.
36 Arab News, “HRH the Crown Prince Chairs Cabinet Session,” August 13, 2024.
37 Saudi FM Emphasizes Need for Immediate Ceasefire in Gaza, Al Sharq Al Awsat, May 30, 2024 and CSPAN
Washington Journal, Saudi Embassy Spokesperson Fahad Nazer on Saudi Arabia and Israel-Hamas War, May 8, 2024.
38 See “Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME)” in CRS Report R44984, Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and
Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy, coordinated by Clayton Thomas.
39 Lawmakers codified U.S. support for Israel’s QME as U.S. policy in 2008 (P.L. 110-429, §201, 22 U.S.C. §2776
note).
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If normalization were achieved, Israel and the kingdom’s bilateral relations could resemble
Israeli-Emirati ties established after the September 2020 “Abraham Accords” diplomatic
normalization agreements. Though Saudi ties with Israel may develop more slowly than EmiratiIsrael ties did due to Saudi domestic concerns, Israel and the kingdom could engage in defense
trade and cooperation. Israel and the kingdom also could cooperate in responding to shared Iranrelated security concerns, including Iran-backed armed groups in the Middle East. On the
economic and social fronts, Saudi and Israeli officials could attempt to negotiate agreements
similar to the free trade agreement and multisector understandings reached between Israel and the
United Arab Emirates in the course of their normalization in 2020.40
The State Department has supported the Negev Forum platform established under the auspices of
Israel’s normalization agreements with other Arab states.41 The Administration has promoted the
development of an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor based on railway, port,
infrastructure, and information technology linkages that could one day include Israel and Saudi
Arabia.42
Congress has acted to require additional reporting on the Administration’s strategy to promote
Arab-Israeli normalization and on anti-normalization laws and actions in Arab states through
March 2027 [Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (Div Z, P.L. 117-103)]. Congress has
also included provisions in national defense authorization acts for FY2023 and FY2024 that
impose requirements for the Administration to develop and submit to Congress strategies
regarding integration of the aerial and maritime security capabilities of countries in the U.S.
CENTCOM area of responsibility, which includes Israel (see Section 1658 of P.L. 117-263 and
Section 1261 of P.L. 118-31).
U.S.-Saudi Civilian Nuclear Cooperation
What are Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear energy plans?
In July 2017, Saudi Arabia approved a National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to
build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity production and water desalination. The
project is part of a broader Saudi government effort to diversify the kingdom’s economy and
expand the use of non-fossil-fuel-based energy.
In 2017, the Saudi government solicited marketing information from foreign companies for
reactor construction, but did not meet its original timeline for initiating a formal bidding process.
From 2017 to 2019, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) granted seven “Part 810”
authorizations (per 10 C.F.R. §810) for U.S. companies to engage in civil nuclear discussions,
including marketing, with Saudi Arabia in response to the kingdom’s 2017 request for marketing
information. In May 2022, Saudi officials invited technical bids from companies in Russia,
China, France, and South Korea related to the planned construction of two 1.4 giga-watt electric
(GWe) reactors at Khor Duweihin, a coastal area on the Persian Gulf between the kingdom’s
borders with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
40 The Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State
of Israel states the intent of the parties to conclude agreements covering finance and investment, civil aviation, visas
and consular services, innovation, trade and economic relations, health care, science, technology and peaceful uses of
outer-space, tourism, culture and sport, energy, environment, education, maritime arrangements, telecommunications
and post, agriculture and food security, water, and legal cooperation.
41 See https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-framework/.
42 The White House, “FACT SHEET: World Leaders Launch a Landmark India-Middle East-Europe Economic
Corridor,” September 9, 2023.
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Saudi authorities have worked to develop required legal and regulatory frameworks with the
support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA officials completed a nuclear
infrastructure review in Saudi Arabia in 2018 and issued a final report in January 2019. The
kingdom established a Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Commission in March 2018, and, in
March 2022, created the Saudi Nuclear Energy Holding Company (SNEHC) to develop and
operate planned nuclear facilities.
In June 2023, the Saudi Foreign Minister said the kingdom would “very much prefer to be able to
have the U.S. as one of the bidders” for its program, noting “there are others that are bidding, and
obviously we would like to build our program with the best technology in the world, and that will
require a certain agreement [with the United States] to be in place.”43 The kingdom extended its
deadline for final bid offers to July 1, 2024.44 As of July 2024, China National Nuclear
Corporation, EDF of France, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), and Rosatom of
Russia were approved bidders.
What nonproliferation commitments has Saudi Arabia made?
Saudi state policy maintains that Saudi nuclear energy pursuits are limited to peaceful purposes.45
Saudi Arabia is a state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires the
government to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities. Comprehensive safeguards
agreements (CSA) impede the development of nuclear weapons.46 Saudi Arabia has not
concluded an additional protocol to its 2009 safeguards agreement with the IAEA.47 Such
protocols increase the agency’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by
increasing the IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand
information from member states. Saudi Arabia’s safeguards agreement does include a small
quantities protocol (SQP) which, according to the IAEA, “holds in abeyance” most
comprehensive safeguards agreement procedures if the government neither possesses more than a
specified amount of nuclear material nor has introduced nuclear material into a facility. In
September 2023, Saudi officials told the IAEA they intend to rescind the SQP and “implement the
full” CSA.48 In August 2024, the IAEA said Saudi Arabia had deposited an Instrument of
Acceptance for the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA, “providing
protection” to IAEA staff in the kingdom.49
43 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud
at a Joint Press Availability,” June 8, 2023.
44 Jennifer Aguinaldo, “Saudi Arabia sets July nuclear plant bid deadline,” Middle East Economic Digest, June 3, 2024.
45 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Commission, “National Policy for the Atomic
Energy Program of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” March 3, 2018. See also, National Report of Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, Convention on Nuclear Safety Joint 8th and 9th Review Meeting, November 2023.
46 Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153, which states that such
agreements “should provide for the Agency’s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied” to all
nuclear material of potential proliferation concern “in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State,
under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material
is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
47 IAEA, Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/746,
February 16, 2009.
48 Statement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the 67th Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna,
Austria, September 25-29, 2023, at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/09/saudi-arabia-gc67_en.pdf.
49 IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi (@rafaelmgrossi), X Post, August 7, 2024, at: https://x.com/
rafaelmgrossi/status/1821125110478053855.
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Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abd al Aziz bin Salman Al Saud said in January 2023 that Saudi
Arabia intends to use its domestic uranium resources for producing low enriched uranium, which
is not used as fissile material in nuclear weapons, as fuel for its nuclear energy program.50
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in September 2023 that if Iran were to obtain a
nuclear weapon, the kingdom “will have to” follow suit.51
Nuclear Fuel and Nonproliferation Concerns
Both highly enriched uranium and plutonium can be used as fuel in some types of nuclear reactors but also are
used as fissile material in nuclear weapons. Consequently, ostensibly peaceful enrichment and reprocessing
facilities frequently generate concern that a government’s facilities may aid nuclear weapons programs. Conversely,
a nuclear program without such facilities generally poses little proliferation risk, but may pose security and/or
environmental risks.
What is the status of U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation and what might be
considered?
In 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
stating bilateral intent to cooperate on nuclear activities in the fields of medicine, industry, and
electricity production. The nonbinding MOU stated Saudi Arabia’s intent “to rely on existing
international markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and
reprocessing.”52 In 2022, U.S. and Saudi officials signed an MOU on the exchange of technical
information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters.53
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA, 42 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq.),
requires nuclear cooperation agreements for significant nuclear cooperation with foreign
governments.54 The Obama and Trump Administrations engaged the kingdom on the prospects for
reaching a bilateral civil nuclear energy agreement, including through formal negotiations over
the text of a proposed “123 agreement” (see below) in 2012 and 2018. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2020 that the governments had “not made significant
progress toward a nuclear cooperation agreement because of persistent differences ... over
nonproliferation conditions, including U.S. insistence that Saudi Arabia conclude an Additional
50 According to Reuters, the Minister said, “The kingdom intends to utilise its national uranium resources, including in
joint ventures with willing partners in accordance with international commitments and transparency standards,” adding
that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program would include “the production of yellowcake, low enriched uranium and the
manufacturing of nuclear fuel both for our national use and of course for export.” Reuters, “Saudi Arabia plans to use
domestic uranium for nuclear fuel,” January 11, 2023.
51
Regarding Iran, the Crown Prince said, “If they get one, we will have to get one too.” Interview with Brett Baier, Fox
News Channel, September 20, 2023.
52 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning Cooperation in Nuclear Energy and other Energy Fields, May 16, 2008.
53 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters,
TIAS 22-926, September 26, 2022.
54 Such cooperation includes the transfer of certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing for commercial,
medical, and industrial purposes; the export of reactors and critical reactor components; and other commodities under
Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority. Foreign entities’ nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia
containing U.S.-origin technology might require U.S. consent.
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Protocol with the IAEA and that Saudi Arabia agree to restrictions on enrichment and
reprocessing.”55
In April 2023, U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Jill Hruby told the
Senate Armed Services Committee that she and Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm had
talked to Saudi leaders about the government’s nuclear program and said that the Administration
was then “asking the Saudis to be consistent with nonproliferation standards that we have for
every other country that we work with.”56
In May 2024, Secretary of State Blinken said, “Any nuclear cooperation agreement that we reach
will have to address all of our nonproliferation goals and we want to make sure that of course we
have gold standard agreements with whomever we reach these agreements.”57 The term “gold
standard” is used in the nonproliferation and nuclear energy cooperation policy community to
refer to agreements in which a partner country forgoes the development of its own capacity to
produce nuclear fuel using uranium enrichment or fuel reprocessing.58 (See “What
nonproliferation commitments has Saudi Arabia made?” above.)
According to unnamed U.S. and Israeli officials cited in a September 2023 press report, the
United States was then considering a U.S.-run uranium enrichment operation in partnership with
Saudi Arabia in conjunction with proposals to encourage Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with
Israel.59 In July 2024, President Biden said that he had discussed with Saudi leaders the
establishment of a U.S.-run civilian nuclear facility in Saudi Arabia, possibly with U.S. military
security support.60
Saudi Transformation Initiatives and U.S. Partnership
What are Saudi Arabia’s domestic economic goals and what progress has the
kingdom made toward them?
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 initiatives set ambitious targets for transformation of the kingdom’s
economy, government operations, energy sector, and society. Central to the Vision 2030 plans are
goals for increasing private sector economic activity and boosting non-oil-dependent sources of
growth, employment, and state revenue.61 The U.S. government has said “Vision 2030 has the
55 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation: Progress Is Stalled over Nonproliferation
Conditions and Agency Management of Negotiations Is Unclear, GAO-20-343, April 3, 2020.
56 National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Jill Hruby testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, CQ Congressional Transcripts, “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Fiscal Year
2024 Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration Atomic Energy Defense Activities Defense
Authorization Request,” April 26, 2023.
57 Secretary of State Antony Blinken testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, CQ Congressional
Transcripts, “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on the State of American Diplomacy,” May 22, 2024.
58 See Appendix B in CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr
and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
59 Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “Saudi Uranium Enrichment Floated Under Possible Israel Deal,” Wall Street
Journal, September 21, 2023.
60 360 With Speedy, “The President Biden Interview,” Complex Magazine, July 12, 2024, at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=XJP2zlH2nt8.
61 For an overview of Vision 2030, see https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/vision-2030/overview/ and, Karen E. Young,
“The MBS Economy,” Foreign Affairs, January 27, 2022.
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potential to exponentially expand the U.S.-Saudi Arabia bilateral trade and investment
relationship.”62
As of 2024, the kingdom has achieved some of its Vision 2030 targets and made progress toward
others. Notably, non-oil sector growth has increased, as has the contribution of non-oil sources to
state revenue. Saudi women’s participation in the labor force has exceeded Vision 2030 targets,
and unemployment has declined. The kingdom’s fiscal balance has improved, but oil proceeds
remain essential to the state budget and the stimulus provided by the state-owned Public
Investment Fund (PIF) is a critical engine of the non-oil economy. Press reports in 2024 have
highlighted Saudi decisions to reduce the scope or delay some proposed Vision 2030 projects, sell
U.S. stocks, and sell additional shares in state-owned oil company Aramco in a bid to rein in costs
and raise funds.63 In July 2024, the International Monetary Fund revised its projections for Saudi
Arabia’s annual economic growth down nearly a full percentage point, citing oil production
cuts.64 The kingdom’s transformation programs seek to attract foreign partnership and investment
and could benefit from agreements that facilitate new U.S. and/or Israeli engagement in the Saudi
economy.
What is the status of U.S.-Saudi economic and technology cooperation?
Saudi Arabia and the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)
in 2003, and held their latest TIFA consultations in March 2023. The countries signed a bilateral
agreement on science and cooperation in 2008 and renewed the agreement in 2019.65 In July
2024, U.S. and Saudi officials signed a framework agreement on aeronautics cooperation and
space exploration.
U.S.-Saudi trade has evolved since the early 2000s as increased U.S. production of domestic oil
resources has replaced imports, including Saudi crude oil. Overall, U.S. exports to the kingdom
have declined, as the kingdom has increased its imports of goods from Asia, especially from the
People’s Republic of China. After Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia was the
third-largest U.S. trading partner for goods in the Middle East by overall value in 2023.66
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, in 2023,
U.S. goods imports from Saudi Arabia were valued at nearly $15.9 billion (down from more than
$18.8 billion in 2017), and U.S. goods exports to Saudi Arabia were valued at more than $13.8
billion (down from more than $16.4 billion in 2017).67 To a considerable extent, U.S. exports of
commercially sold weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia and fluctuations in the
volume and value U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from the kingdom have dictated the annual value
of U.S.-Saudi trade.
62 U.S. Department of Commerce Commercial Service, “The United States of America and Saudi Arabia – 75 Years of
Partnership,” 2020.
63 Ahmed al Omran, “Saudi Arabia scales back flagship projects,” Financial Times, May 14, 2024; and, Eliot Brown,
“Saudi Arabia’s $54 Billion Haul Still Leaves It Craving Cash,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2024.
64 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update: The Global Economy in a Sticky Spot, July 2024.
65 U.S. State Department Office of Treaty Affairs, Saudi Arabia (09-1020) – Agreement on Science and Technology
Cooperation, October 20, 2009; and Saudi Arabia (22-414) – Protocol Amending and Extending Agreement on Science
and Technology Cooperation, April 14, 2022.
66 U.S. Census Bureau data at https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5170.html.
67 U.S. Census Bureau data at https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5170.html.
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Since Saudi Arabia launched its Vision 2030 initiatives in 2016, U.S. direct investment in Saudi
Arabia has increased from $10.16 billion to $11.31 billion.68 Saudi investments in U.S. domestic
industries and infrastructure create business opportunities for some U.S. firms. In March 2023,
the Biden Administration welcomed Saudi Arabia’s decision to purchase up to 121 Boeing 787
Dreamliner aircraft for its new Riyadh Air and legacy Saudia Airlines in an agreement estimated
to be worth nearly $37 billion.69 Saudia Airlines placed an order for 105 aircraft from Airbus in
May 2024. Riyadh Air, Saudia Airlines, and the Saudi government-owned airline Flyadeal are
expected to place additional large orders to complete their fleets.70 Certain Saudi investment
transactions in the United States, including Saudi investments implicating water rights in the U.S.
southwest and Saudi involvement in the PGA Tour/LIV Golf merger, for example, have raised
U.S. national security or other concerns (e.g., human rights) expressed by some Members of
Congress and other stakeholders.71
Potential Policy Considerations for Congress
In considering possible U.S.-Saudi agreements and Saudi-Israeli normalization, Members of
Congress may debate the national and global implications of proposals for a number of U.S.
policy concerns including competition with China and Russia; the utility and viability of U.S.
security commitments; the security and use of U.S.-origin defense equipment and technology;
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; maintenance of Israel’s security and qualitative military
edge; the security of other U.S. partners in the Middle East and North Africa and beyond; the
potential for peace and normalization in the Middle East region to create economic opportunity
and contribute to growth; and the image of the United States as an advocate for accountable
governance and human rights.
Congress may consider the policy issues below when determining how to respond to executive
branch proposals and whether to endorse, reject, expand, or impose limits on any emergent U.S.Saudi-Israeli agreements.
Potential Merits and Risks of Proposed Agreements Individually or
in Combination
Members of Congress may assess the relative merits and risks involved with proposed defense,
diplomatic, civil nuclear cooperation, and other agreements differently if considering them
individually or in combination and in light of progress or a lack thereof regarding Saudi-Israeli
normalization. In response to a press briefing question about whether U.S.-Saudi agreements
could possibly move forward without Saudi-Israeli normalization and a pathway to a two-state
solution, a Department of State spokesperson said on May 2, 2024, that the United States and
Saudi Arabia have been “very clear that this is a package deal that would include a bilateral
68 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Saudi Arabia - International Trade and Investment Country Facts, Direct
Investment at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#511.
69 The White House, “Statement from White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre on Saudi Arabia’s Historic
Purchase of Boeing Aircraft,” March 14, 2023.
70 Shivansh Tiwary and Aditi Shah, “Saudia turns to Airbus, Boeing wide-body jets amid single-aisle shortage,”
Reuters, June 6, 2024.
71 See PBS, “In drought-stricken Arizona, fresh scrutiny of Saudi Arabia-owned farm’s water use,” April 28, 2023; and,
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “Waters, Brown Ask CFIUS to Evaluate National
Security Risks of PGA Tour Merger with Saudi-Backed LIV,” June 16, 2023.
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component and also include a path to two states.”72 It is unclear whether U.S.-Saudi bilateral
agreements might or might not explicitly include provisions or references to normalization or
future Palestinian statehood.
Potential Implications for U.S. Global Strategy and for U.S. Foreign
and Defense Policy Programs
Members of Congress may consider what implications, if any, proposed agreement(s) might have
for the future scale of the U.S. role and depth of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East
region, and consequently for resources that might be available for meeting U.S. commitments in
other parts of the world. Successive U.S. administrations since the 2010s have signaled their
desire to rebalance U.S. national security policy to meet challenges posed by China in the IndoPacific region (and by Russia and China globally). They have found that developments in the
Middle East and Europe continue to demand U.S. attention and resources. Patterns of energy
trade between the Middle East region and East Asia and greater PRC economic and diplomatic
involvement in the Middle East region since 2020 also suggest strategic linkages between these
regions that may affect future U.S. calculations.
The degree to which any proposed U.S.-Saudi agreements may require or alleviate demands on
U.S. resources may vary according to their content and terms. Resource demands could be
alleviated to the degree that security commitments would be bolstered by other arrangements to
promote burden sharing. Possible elements could include agreements to implement new regional
partnerships for domain awareness and monitoring, more robust intra-regional security
cooperation, and arms sales to ensure interoperability. To date, efforts of these types have faced
hurdles related to regional politics, including apparent reluctance among some U.S. Gulf Arab
partners to integrate their defense systems and planning. Greater reliance on U.S.-backed partners
to provide security in the Middle East region may entail greater U.S. association with the policies
and actions of regional security partners, with attendant diplomatic, security, and political effects.
In examining burden-sharing options and commitments, Congress may review existing authorities
and programs that provide for burden-sharing investments in the Middle East region, Europe, and
Asia.
Threats to Saudi Arabia and Saudi Defense Capabilities
Since the 1940s, Saudi leaders have sought and, in some cases, have received U.S. assistance in
defending the kingdom from external attack, and bilateral cooperation continues to contribute to
the success of Saudi counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection efforts. Congress may
consider present and future threats to the kingdom when evaluating the possible extension of a
U.S. security commitment.
The principal risks to the kingdom’s security since the 1991 Gulf War have come from
transnational terrorist groups and from state and non-state actors’ long-range attacks on critical
infrastructure or populated areas using rockets, missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles. With some
exceptions, the military capacity of neighboring states to conduct lasting conventional air, naval,
or ground operations that might threaten Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity or political
independence appears limited. Threats to the kingdom from non-state actors, including the
Houthis and armed groups in Iraq, have been demonstrated by attacks since 2016.
72 Department of State Press Briefing, May 2, 2024.
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The lasting disruption or closure of air or sea access and lines of communication in or around the
kingdom could pose serious economic risks to Saudi Arabia. Global security effects would vary
based on the extent to which such disruptions jeopardized Saudi oil exports or limited trade and
civilian travel to and from the kingdom or in the airspace above and seas around the Arabian
Peninsula. The security and administration of the central holy sites of Islam in Mecca and Medina
also have global implications for the world’s Muslim population.
Saudi Arabia has a well-equipped air force and well-resourced military and internal security
forces, though actual Saudi warfighting abilities may be more limited. The Saudi military and
Saudi defense leaders demonstrated their capabilities and limits in the war in Yemen from 2015 to
2022, conducting a campaign of targeted air strikes, providing assistance to Yemeni partner
forces, preventing major Houthi incursions into southwestern Saudi Arabia, and imposing access
constraints on Yemen’s airspace and waters. Preventing civilian harm in Yemen and defending
against Houthi long-range counterattacks on Saudi critical infrastructure and populated areas
proved more challenging, and the Saudi-led campaign failed to dislodge the Houthis from most
areas they seized. International criticism of the Saudi-led coalition’s military conduct grew in
connection with civilian casualties and deteriorating humanitarian conditions during the war.
Saudi counterterrorism operations appear to have contained and eliminated most networks
associated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State group in the country after 2003, but according to
the State Department, “terrorism continues to be a concern in Saudi Arabia” and “attacks can
occur with little or no warning.”73 The State Department reports that missile, drone, or rocket
attacks may reoccur and that militant groups have threatened to conduct attacks in Saudi Arabia.74
Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks and Israel’s military response in Gaza, the Houthi
movement has targeted Israeli territory and commercial and naval vessels near the Bab al Mandeb
Strait, a key maritime choke point. Saudi naval forces are not among those identified by the
Operation Prosperity Guardian coalition as participating in multinational efforts to escort ships
transiting the southern Red Sea amid Houthi maritime threats since late 2023. Saudi Arabia
commands Combined Maritime Forces Task Force 152, which operates in the Persian Gulf to
protect critical infrastructure and counter threats from illicit non-state actors. Additional maritime
security support and participation from Saudi Arabia could lower requirements for U.S. and other
extra-regional deployments, but also could contribute to intra-regional tensions or conflict. In July
2024, the Houthis threatened to resume attacks on Saudi Arabia if the kingdom provided support
to efforts to limit Houthi finances or restrict use of Houthi-controlled infrastructure.
Possible Reactions from Adversaries, Rivals, and Partners
U.S. adversaries, rivals, and partners may reconsider their interests and policies based on the
nature, timing, and terms of any U.S.-Saudi or Saudi-Israeli agreements.
• Iran. It seems likely that Iran’s government would regard Saudi-Israeli
normalization and U.S.-Saudi mutual defense commitments negatively and could
act to undermine them, whether through pressure, closer relations with
Palestinian groups that may support violence against Israel, or increased
assistance to armed groups in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and/or Lebanon.75 Iran also
73 U.S. State Department, Saudi Arabia Travel Advisory, January 24, 2024.
74 U.S. State Department, Saudi Arabia Travel Advisory, January 24, 2024.
75 In September 2023 interviews, Iran’s late president Ibrahim Raisi said “We are against any bilateral relations
between our regional countries and the Zionist regime,” and that Arab government normalization with Israel “doesn't
equal the acceptance of those nations, of those people. People in those countries, in those Persian Gulf Arab countries
(continued...)
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•
•
•
could argue that any civil nuclear cooperation arrangements that provide for
nuclear fuel production in Saudi Arabia justify Iran’s continued operation of
nuclear fuel production infrastructure.
Terrorist Groups. Transnational extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State could attempt to exploit any popular rejection of closer Saudi ties to
the United States or Israel to recruit and incite violence.
Russia and China. U.S. strategic competitors could react to any provisions in
U.S.-Saudi agreements that preclude closer cooperation between them and the
kingdom by making their own overtures for closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia
that could undermine U.S.-Saudi ties, or to bolster closer ties to other regional
countries such as Iran, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, or Iraq.
U.S. Partners. Other close U.S. partners such as Israel, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar,
and Egypt could seek comparable security assurances or commitments or seek to
revise existing bilateral agreements with the United States to reach more
favorable terms.
As part of a U.S.-Saudi agreement to support Saudi-Israeli normalization, the United States could
propose the sale of advanced U.S. defense systems not yet made available to Saudi Arabia such as
the F-35 fighter aircraft, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, or longer-range missiles and rockets.76
Members may consider assessing the regional security implications of such transfers, including
their effect on the regional military balance of power, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, other
countries’ desire for comparable systems, the security of U.S. technology, and the likelihood of
partners’ responsible use of such systems in conflict.
Israeli and Palestinian Politics
Israel’s domestic politics have resulted in several changes of government since 2020, and Israelis
have vigorously debated proposed changes to domestic and foreign policy. The participation of
parties opposed to concessions to the Palestinians in the current Israeli government led by Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has led some analysts to assess that changes to Israel’s ruling
coalition or the emergence of a new coalition would be needed before any policy changes toward
the Palestinians that might encourage Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel could be
expected. In a September 2023 interview, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said that the
kingdom is not seeking to alter or interfere in Israeli politics and said that, in the context of a
U.S.-backed agreement with Israel, Saudi Arabia would work with any Israeli counterparts
committed to the agreement.77
Saudi leaders have not made specific comments about the prospect for changes in Palestinian
leadership or governance or how such changes might affect Saudi-Palestinian relations.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has sought and received political support from
the kingdom, despite reported periodic Saudi frustrations with Abbas, the Fatah movement, and
have a great deal of hate for the Israeli actions.” CNN, “Interview With Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi,” Fareed
Zakaria GPS, September 24, 2023.
76 For discussion of arms sale proposals in the context of the UAE’s normalization with Israel, see CRS Report
R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by
Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
77 “Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman,” interview by Bret Baier, Special Report, Fox News, September 20, 2023.
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Palestinian politics in general.78 President Abbas visited Saudi Arabia in August 2024 and met
with the Crown Prince, who reemphasized the kingdom’s support for the Palestinian people.
Historically, Hamas raised funds from private donors in Saudi Arabia, but Saudi arrests and trials
of individuals with reported links to Hamas since 2020 suggest that Hamas has faced restrictions
on its ability to operate in the kingdom. Both Fatah and Hamas leaders have visited the kingdom
since 2023 for religious pilgrimages and consultations with Saudi officials.79
Saudi Arabia negotiated a 2007 power sharing agreement between Hamas and Fatah but has not
publicly indicated that it seeks to be an arbiter of a new Palestinian political arrangement in the
wake of the Israel-Hamas war.
Saudi Influence on Normalization Beyond the Middle East Region
The Saudi monarchy’s role as custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, the Saudi government’s
leadership in multilateral Islamic organizations, and the historic role Saudis have played in
supporting Sunni Islamic proselytization around the world lead some analysts to argue that a
Saudi government decision to normalize relations with Israel could encourage governments in
other Sunni-majority countries to follow suit and lead to greater global endorsement of
normalization among Sunni Muslims.80 There is little evidence that Sunni Muslims around the
world view the Al Saud monarchy with any particular reverence or base their personal views of
Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Saudi government policy. Nevertheless, it is possible
that the kingdom’s traditional image as a global exponent of Sunni Islam, reinforced by its
stewardship of Islamic holy sites, could lead other governments to calculate that a potential Saudi
decision to normalize relations with Israel would provide a symbolic opening for them to do
likewise. Other governments’ decisions to embrace normalization have not resulted in major
changes in public views of the desirability or benefits of normalization. Saudi diplomatic and
financial influence with other governments could prove more decisive in related official
decisions.
U.S. Regional and Global Nonproliferation Policy
Congress and successive presidential administrations have sought the kingdom’s commitment to
forgo the most proliferation-sensitive nuclear facilities—those for enriching uranium or
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to obtain plutonium—and Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of enhanced
international safeguards on its nuclear program.81 Previous administrations linked prospects for a
U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement to these conditions, and Congress has limited the use
of certain funds to support possible U.S. nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia unless the kingdom
makes such commitments.82 The U.S. government has not insisted all U.S. partners forgo
enrichment or reprocessing, so the negotiation and conclusion of a Saudi-U.S. nuclear
78 See for example, Mohammed Assadi and Ali Sawafta, “Squabbling Palestinian movement gets Saudi scolding,”
Reuters, August 6, 2009.
79 Barak Ravid, “Hamas and Abbas make separate trips to Saudi Arabia,” Axios, April 19, 2023.
80 See, for example, Marc Schneier, “Opinion: The religious promise of Saudi-Israel normalization,” The Hill, July 23,
2024; and Dennis Ross, “Saudi-Israel normalization would transform Middle East – opinion,” The Jerusalem Post,
October 5, 2023.
81 See CRS In Focus IF10799, Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard
and Paul K. Kerr.
82 See discussion in CRS In Focus IF10799, Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, by Christopher M.
Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
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cooperation agreement that allows for or rejects those processes may minimally affect global
expectations about future U.S. civil nuclear cooperation and nuclear nonproliferation policies.
As noted above, Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA, 42 U.S.C.
§§2011 et seq.), requires nuclear cooperation agreements for significant nuclear cooperation with
foreign governments.83 So-called “123 agreements” must include the terms, conditions, duration,
nature, and scope of cooperation, as well as meet several nonproliferation criteria. The President
must make a written determination “that the performance of the proposed agreement will
promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
Section 123 agreements do not require recipient governments to forgo enrichment or
reprocessing. The AEA does mandate that U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements require U.S.
consent for any “alteration in form or content” (to include enrichment or reprocessing) of U.S.origin material or any material processed in a plant containing transferred U.S. nuclear
technology. Such agreements also require U.S. consent for any retransfer of material or
technology.
Some 123 agreements contain provisions designed to discourage enrichment and reprocessing
programs in the Middle East. For example, the 2009 U.S.-UAE 123 agreement provides the
United States the right to terminate nuclear cooperation with that country if the UAE “possesses
sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engages in activities within its territory
relating to enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.”84 An agreed minute to that
agreement states that its terms “shall be no less favorable in scope and effect than those which
may be accorded” to other countries in the Middle East. The minute also explains that, if the U.S.
government concludes a more-favorable 123 agreement with another regional government, the
United States will, at the UAE’s request, consult with the government “regarding the possibility
of amending” the 123 agreement with equally favorable terms.
Public Opinion and Saudi Arabia’s Political Future
The U.S. Senate has considered the domestic politics of defense treaty partners in the past and has
reflected on conditions and trends in its advice and consent to such treaties. In considering the
1960 U.S.-Japan treaty for example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the Japanese
public’s views of the previous and revised treaties, the Japanese legislature’s endorsement of the
new agreement, and prevailing trends in public opinion.85 The Committee described the deletion
of a provision allowing for the use of U.S. forces to put down domestic disturbances in Japan as a
“concession to Japanese opinion.”
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia appears stable, having weathered internal security challenges posed
in the 1990s and 2000s by terrorist groups. The opaque nature of the kingdom’s elite politics and
its security sector, however, provide limited data on which to base conclusions about its potential
fragility. Diplomatic reopening appears to have ended a period of overt antagonism in SaudiIranian relations that prevailed from 2016 to 2023, though Iran and Iran-backed armed groups
83 42 U.S.C. §2153. Such cooperation includes the transfer of certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing
for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes; the export of reactors and critical reactor components; and other
commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority. Foreign entities’ nuclear exports to
Saudi Arabia containing U.S.-origin technology might require U.S. consent.
84 See archived CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear
Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr. House Document 111-43, Agreement for Cooperation
Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Arab Emirates, May 21, 2009, p. 36.
85 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan,
Executive Report No. 8 to Accompany Ex. E, 86th Cong., 2d sess., June 14, 1960.
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still pose risks to Saudi security. Since 2017, the kingdom’s ambitious economic transformation
and social reform programs have recast long established patterns and relationships among many
Saudis, inviting some endorsement and some objections. Formerly empowered religious
conservatives have been stripped of their authority and capability to enforce religious norms in
public and the government has taken some steps to codify the kingdom’s laws and introduce
regularity to a legal system long dominated by relatively independent religious judges.
Those disempowered or disgruntled by these changes have not mounted observable challenges to
state authority, nor have broad popular movements emerged seeking to fundamentally challenge
or change the structure of the kingdom’s governance. While relations between some members of
the ruling Al Saud family have appeared strained since 2017, there are few public indications that
intra-royal family difference might disrupt or delay the expected succession from King Salman to
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Uncertainty remains over how the Al Saud family will
provide for future succession and identify a future heir apparent. The Crown Prince reportedly
has informed some Members of Congress that he feels that normalization of the kingdom’s
relationship with Israel could prompt personal security threats to him.86
Several Saudi religious scholars who had large transnational followings have seen their influence
and freedom of expression curtailed since 2017. During this period, Saudi Arabia has
disempowered or detained some religious scholars who were especially critical of Israel, though
officials did not cite this as a motivating factor. Existing constraints on freedom of expression
suggest that if Saudi leaders choose to normalize relations with Israel, the government could
continue to limit public criticism of its decisions. Saudi government statements since 2023
suggest that even after any normalization of relations with Israel, the Saudi government and Saudi
nationals are likely to remain vigilant about and critical of perceived violations of Islamic
religious interests, especially in Jerusalem.
The views of the Saudi population about domestic politics, social change, the role of religion in
public life, relations with Israel, and cooperation with the United States remain difficult to
authoritatively measure. Saudi Arabia remains a politically closed monarchy with little tolerance
for public dissent and significant limits on expression, complicating efforts to measure public
opinion. Anecdotal reporting suggests that younger Saudis and Saudis in some urban areas have
embraced many changes introduced under the kingdom’s current leadership, while older Saudis,
social and religious conservatives, and those in more rural areas may have differing views.
Polling studies released in December 2023 and January 2024 suggested that Saudi public
solidarity with Palestinians had increased since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war, support for
economic ties with Israel had declined, and many Saudis agreed with the premise that Arab states
should break political, economic, and diplomatic ties with Israel “in protest of its military action
in Gaza.”87 Broad Saudi popular opposition to normalization could complicate U.S.-Saudi-Israeli
trilateral cooperation and/or affect the kingdom’s domestic politics.
Technology Transfer
In considering technology transfers, U.S. officials have long sought to deny U.S. adversaries
access to sensitive U.S. technologies, including defense articles and other items, and to prevent
the misuse of U.S. technology transferred to U.S. partners globally. There is no present public
indication that dramatic political change is imminent or likely in Saudi Arabia (see “Public
86 Nahal Toosi, “The Saudi Crown Prince Is Talking About an Assassination. His Own.” Politico, August 14, 2024.
87 Catherine Cleveland and David Pollock, “New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, December 21, 2023; and Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “Arab Public
Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza,” January 10, 2024.
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Opinion and Saudi Arabia’s Political Future” below). Nevertheless, technology and knowledge
transferred to Saudi Arabia pursuant to U.S. agreements presumably could prove difficult or
impossible to control or retrieve in the event the kingdom’s leadership abruptly changes in
makeup or orientation. One House Member has cited the rapid political change that unfolded in
Iran in the 1970s in raising questions about the potential future implications of nuclear technology
transfers under U.S.-Saudi agreements.88 Requirements for maintenance, spare parts, and service
may degrade the utility of transferred technologies over time and provide the United States
opportunities to influence their future use.
Human Rights Issues
The potential exchange of mutual defense commitments between the United States and Saudi
Arabia may raise questions among some Members of Congress regarding the kingdom’s human
rights record, including issues of women’s rights, free expression, and religious freedom. Some
Members of Congress have questioned U.S.-Saudi partnership based on human rights concerns,
including in relation to the treatment of U.S. citizens and residents. In the 118th Congress, for
example, H.R. 5833, the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2023, would restrict transfers of
defense articles and services to Saudi Arabia until the President certifies that Saudi Arabia has not
engaged in specific human rights violations and submits other reports and certifications with
regard to transnational repression against Saudi dissidents.89
State Department reports describe “significant human rights issues” in the kingdom, and the U.S.
government has designated the kingdom as a Country of Particular Concern pursuant to the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292; 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401 et seq.) “for
having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”90 State
Department reporting describes changes that have created new social and economic opportunities
for women in the kingdom under reforms introduced since 2017, but notes substantial remaining
limits on women’s rights, autonomy, and equality under the law. The Saudi government rejects
international scrutiny and criticism of its human rights practices as interference in Saudi domestic
affairs.
Potential Process Considerations for Congress
The Biden Administration and Members of Congress may consider proposed U.S.-Saudi
agreements and possible Saudi-Israeli normalization with Congress’s institutional interests and
processes in mind. The President, executive branch agencies, and Members of Congress may
view their constitutional roles and responsibilities in relation to proposed agreements differently
and may consider different precedents and preferences as any agreements are discussed.
88 See Representative Sherman remarks in CQ Congressional Transcripts, “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds
Hearing on the State of American Diplomacy” May 22, 2024; and “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle
East, North Africa, and Central Asia Holds Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2025 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Budget
Request,” May 23, 2024.
89 Resolutions introduced in the House and Senate would commemorate the anniversary of the 2018 killing of Saudi
journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi and call for greater accountability. See H.Res. 753 and S.J.Res. 46.
90 U.S. State Department, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia, April 2024; 2023 Report
on International Religious Freedom: Saudi Arabia, June 2024; and, Religious Freedom Designations, January 4, 2024.
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What form might security commitments and defense agreements
take? How might Congress shape their content and oversee
implementation?
International agreements involving mutual defense commitments are relatively few and mostly
have been entered into through treaties negotiated by the executive branch and then considered
for advice and consent purposes in the U.S. Senate, as the Constitution requires. If the Biden
Administration were to conclude a mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, then the Senate
would consider whether to provide advice and/or consent to ratification. This could include
review of a treaty and accompanying agreed minutes, exchanges of notes, and executive
agreements intended to implement or provide guidance for articles of a treaty. The Senate could
seek to limit or clarify U.S. obligations under a treaty through reservations, understandings, and
declarations.
Alternately, Congress and the Administration could enact regular legislation defining authorities
for a bilateral agreement or the amendment or development of legislation extending defense
benefits to Saudi Arabia, including but not limited to the following two approaches.
The first approach could be a congressional-executive agreement with Saudi Arabia through
which Congress would authorize a particular agreement (or type of agreement) and provide
tailored implementing authorities to executive agencies. Congress also might or might not act to
extend certain privileges to Saudi Arabia beyond those that it already has. Additional privileges
could include the preferential arms export terms and other benefits enjoyed by the so-called
NATO+ group under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751 et
seq.) and Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA). The AECA provides for shorter military sales
review periods and higher value thresholds for congressional notification for certain U.S.
partners.91 MNNA status would allow the kingdom to purchase certain U.S. arms, receive excess
defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research cooperation with the United States, for
which it would not otherwise be eligible.
The second approach could be for Congress to define a tailored partnership arrangement with
Saudi Arabia and direct the executive branch to facilitate or restrict defense trade, advanced
technology transfer, military planning and exercises, refined end-use monitoring arrangements, or
other elements. Since 2016, Congress has provided authority and direction for this type of
cooperation with India92 and Singapore.93 In the 118th Congress, the Senate version of the FY2024
National Defense Authorization Act would have identified Saudi Arabia and some other regional
partners as “major security partners” and would have enhanced related priority and allocation
ratings for the processing of foreign military sales.94 Congressionally defined authorities for a
bilateral agreement or the amendment or development of legislation extending defense benefits to
91 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. After any review periods set
forth under the AECA, Congress retains authority to regulate or restrict any arms transfers to a foreign country before
delivery via the regular legislative process.
92 Congress designated India a Major Defense Partner of the United States and directed the executive branch to take a
range of actions to promote and enhance defense cooperation. Congress terminated related reporting requirements in
2021. See P.L. 114-328, div. A, title XII, §1292, December 23, 2016, as amended by P.L. 115-91, div. A, title XII,
§1258(a), (c)(2), December 12, 2017; and, P.L. 115-232, div. A, title XII, §1266, August 13, 2018.
93 Congress has recognized Singapore as a “major security cooperation partner” and stated its view that the executive
branch should “continue to enhance defense and security cooperation,” “explore additional steps to better facilitate
interoperability,” and, including through “combined exercises and training.” See P.L. 116-92, §1260G, December 20,
2019, and P.L. 117-81, §1252, December 27, 2021.
94 See §1399K of H.R. 2670EAS, July 27, 2023.
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Saudi Arabia would require the passage of legislation by both houses of Congress and the
President’s approval (or a successful veto override) to become law.
Another possible avenue for the executive branch would be a sole executive agreement with
Saudi Arabia addressing matters of mutual defense. The parties might or might not define all or
part of such an agreement as binding and thus it follows that other international actors’ views of
such an agreement’s strategic and diplomatic implications and its moral and political weight
might vary. In 2023, the United States and Bahrain signed a “Comprehensive Security Integration
and Prosperity Agreement” addressing defense, trade, and scientific-technical cooperation. The
agreement commits the United States and Bahrain (a MNNA) to regard external aggression or
threats of external aggression against either of them as a matter of grave concern and “to develop
and implement appropriate defense and deterrent responses” consistent with their respective
constitutions and laws.
Current law provides for executive branch submission and congressional review of sole executive
agreements, including on mutual defense matters. Legislation seeking to outline new procedures
or additional requirements for congressional review of an executive agreement [for example, as
provided for in the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-17)] would require the
passage of legislation by both houses of Congress and the President’s approval (or a successful
veto override) to become law.
The executive branch also could prefer to continue bilateral cooperation under existing executive
agreements and foreign assistance and defense authorities rather than developing new ones. Press
reporting suggests that Saudi officials desire a substantive upgrade in the nature and extent of
U.S. cooperation and the U.S. Ambassador to the kingdom has said Saudi leaders specifically
seek congressional endorsement as a means of insulating bilateral arrangements from future
political changes in the United States.95
In case of a Senate-endorsed treaty or other bilateral agreement, past examples indicate that future
legislators would have opportunity and legislative prerogatives under the U.S. Constitution to
monitor, expand, or reduce U.S. cooperation with Saudi Arabia.
CRS Resources: International Agreements,Treaties, and Congress
•
For more information on Senate consideration of treaties, see CRS Report 98-384, Senate Consideration
of Treaties, by Valerie Heitshusen.
•
For more information on the Senate’s options for conditioning advice and consent to treaties, see CRS
In Focus IF12208, Reservations, Understandings, Declarations, and Other Conditions to Treaties, by Steve P.
Mulligan.
•
For more information on U.S. international agreements and their effect on U.S. law, see CRS Report
RL32528, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law, by Steve P. Mulligan.
•
For more information on the agreement making process, tools for congressional influence, and
transparency measures, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11048, International Agreements (Part I): Overview and
Agreement-Making Process; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11049, International Agreements (Part II): Examining Tools for
Congressional Influence Over International Instruments; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11050, International Agreements
(Part III): Transparency Measures, by Steve P. Mulligan.
•
For an example of enacted congressional procedures in relation to a specific executive
agreement, see CRS Report R44085, Procedures for Congressional Action in Relation to a Nuclear Agreement
with Iran: In Brief, by Valerie Heitshusen.
•
For information on war powers and the relationship between the War Powers Resolution and U.S.
security treaties and agreements see CRS In Focus IF10534, Defense Primer: President’s Constitutional Authority
with Regard to the Armed Forces, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS In Focus IF10535, Defense Primer: Congress’s
95 U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney interview with Frankly Speaking, Arab News, June 2, 2024.
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Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and archived CRS Report R42699,
The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice, by Matthew C. Weed.
What elements might a mutual defense commitment agreement
contain?
The content of other U.S. security treaties and agreements may suggest areas of interest or
questions that Congress could consider in relation to a proposed U.S.-Saudi security agreement.
Positions outlined and precedents set during executive-congressional consideration of other extant
agreements also may be informative.
U.S. agreements with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies and U.S. treaty allies in Asia
consider and suggest several topics that could be addressed in a U.S.-Saudi security agreement.
These include
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Circumstances that would require mutual U.S.-Saudi consultation and response,
to include armed attacks or the threat of armed attacks on the parties by state or
nonstate actors.
Application with regard to specific territories or areas that may be subject to
international dispute, to include maritime claims and shared transboundary
resources.
The extent to which mutual security commitments extend to internal security
matters.
Privileges of military access and use, to include the status of U.S. forces and the
process for adjudicating outstanding claims or new claims that may arise from
U.S. military operations.
The scope of independent military activity by the United States in Saudi territory,
requirements for prior consultation or assent, and any limits on Saudi partnership
with other foreign parties, including Russia and/or China.
The relationship of a treaty to other existing agreements and their provisions.
Cost sharing requirements and mechanisms.
The duration of the treaty and any means for its revision or termination.
Examples of U.S. Treaty Provisions on Mutual Defense
U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)96
Article III of the treaty states: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the
Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the
Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes.”
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security and Cooperation Treaty (1960)97
Article V of the treaty states: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act
to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”
96 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (TIAS): Volume 5, Part 3 (1954), U.S.-Republic of Korea
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, TIAS 3097.
97 TIAS Volume 11, Part 2 (1960), U.S.-Japan Mutual Security and Cooperation Treaty of 1960, TIAS 4509.
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North Atlantic Treaty (1949)98
Article IV of the treaty states: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”
Article V of the treaty states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
Article VI of the treaty states that: “For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is
deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America” and other
defined territories and areas.
How has Congress considered other mutual defense commitment
agreements and other bilateral agreements?
Past processes followed for U.S. security treaties and bilateral agreements relating to national
security matters may inform executive and legislative branch consideration of proposed
agreements with Saudi Arabia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken the principal
role in reviewing and making recommendations to the Senate for its advice and consent on
treaties. The executive branch also has engaged Members of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, along with defense committees, leadership, and Members in both chambers on
matters involving U.S. security commitments. Provisions of law direct the executive branch to
submit bilateral executive agreements to the Senate and the House for the information and review
of committees of jurisdiction.99
Congress could seek to review and consult on the drafting of agreements with Saudi Arabia prior
to their conclusion and formal presentation. Such steps may occur through private
correspondence or consultations, hearings in executive (closed) session, or public hearings and
may involve Members of the House and Senate.100 In the case of the 1952 U.S.-Japan peace and
security treaties, the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, and the security treaty with
Australia and New Zealand, then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson praised the principal U.S.
negotiator, Ambassador John Foster Dulles, for having kept “both houses of the Congress fully
informed as to each stage of the work.”101 Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
praised the ambassador for having kept them “informed of every single step that was taken” to
include briefings before, during, and after consultative visits abroad.102 Ambassador Dulles
remarked, “it can properly be said that you have helped write those treaties.”103
As part of any review and consultative process, Congress could seek the views of the U.S.
military or Department of Defense or both on proposed agreements with Saudi Arabia and
98 United States Treaty Series, Volume 4, Multilateral Treaties, 1946-1949, North Atlantic Treaty, TIAS 1964.
99 For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11050, International Agreements (Part III): Transparency
Measures, by Steve P. Mulligan.
100 For examples of House engagement on treaty consideration see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign
Relations, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-56; Volume XVII: U.S. Policy in the Far East.
Part 1: U.S. Policy and Japan, the Korean War and Peace Negotiations, South Asian and Related Problems, 1980.
101 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to
Security in the Pacific¸ hearing, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., January 21, 1952 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952).
102 Comments by Senator John Sparkman, Ibid.
103 Ibid.
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express the legislative branch’s views concerning the appropriate role for the U.S. military in
implementing agreement provisions. Such steps may occur through private correspondence or
consultation, hearings in executive (closed) session, or public hearings. In the case of the 1952
U.S.-Japan peace and security treaties, the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, and the
security treaty with Australia and New Zealand, Congress specifically sought and received the
input of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on provisions of the agreements.104 In the case of the 1960 U.S.Japan security treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs in its public hearing and executive session, and
Members of the Committee sought to clarify and express their views of the proper role for the
U.S. military under the treaty in executive session and in the committee report.105
How could Congress conduct oversight of U.S.-Saudi negotiations
and agreements and shape their implementation?
How might Congress review security cooperation with Saudi Arabia under
existing and potentially new agreements?
Several extant bilateral executive agreements provide for U.S.-Saudi security cooperation,
including agreements setting terms for decades-long training and advisory programs. Congress
could seek additional information about the implementation of those agreements and programs to
date and the effects of any new agreements on their terms and future. Congress could review how
U.S. deployments and operations in Saudi territory are funded and examine terms and
mechanisms for host nation contributions in countries with which the United States has treaties of
mutual defense and security cooperation. Congress also may consider how best to seek to ensure
that programs administered or established pursuant to bilateral security agreements reflect or
address issues of long-standing congressional interest such as human rights, civilian protection,
technology security, end-use monitoring, and international humanitarian law.
Law and established executive-legislative branch procedures provide for congressional
consultation, notification, and review of proposed arms sales under the Arms Export Control Act.
In addition to considering whether commitments to transfer specific defense systems and
capabilities to the kingdom should be made in relation to a possible U.S.-Saudi agreement on
Saudi-Israeli normalization, Congress may consider whether to alter Saudi Arabia’s treatment
under executive-legislative arms sale consideration processes.
CRS Resources: Arms Sales, Security Cooperation, and Burden Sharing
•
For information about congressional review of proposed arms sales, see CRS In Focus IF10392, Foreign
Military Sales Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
104 Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Omar Bradley testified alongside Secretary of State Dean Acheson
and U.S. Ambassador John Foster Dulles. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Japanese Peace
Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific¸ hearing, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., January 21, 1952
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1952).
105 The Committee report on the treaty states “It is the view of most members of the committee that representatives of
the armed services should participate in foreign policy decisions of the kind envisaged on a purely consultative basis
only.” See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with
Japan, Executive Report No. 8 to Accompany Ex. E, 86th Cong., 2d sess., June 14, 1960; and, U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, hearing, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
June 7, 1960 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960).
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•
For information about U.S. Department of Defense security cooperation authorities, see CRS In Focus
IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation, by Christina L. Arabia, Defense Primer: DOD
“Title 10” Security Cooperation, by Christina L. Arabia.
•
For information about burden-sharing issues in other U.S. partnerships, see CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S.
Relations: Issues for Congress, by Caitlin Campbell, Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, and Mark E. Manyin and CRS In
Focus IF11388, U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress, by Caitlin Campbell and Christina L. Arabia.
How might Congress shape and review a possible nuclear cooperation
agreement with Saudi Arabia?
Depending on its nature and extent, possible future U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may require
Department of Energy authorizations or congressional approval of U.S.-Saudi agreements, or
both. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq.) provides for
congressional review of an agreement pursuant to Section 123 of the act for two time periods
totaling 90 days of continuous session.106 If the President has not exempted the agreement from
any requirements of Section 123(a), it becomes effective at the end of the second period, unless,
during that time, Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the resolution
becomes law.
Congress could authorize civil nuclear cooperation on specific terms and exempt such
cooperation from certain provisions of the AEA. Such authorization and exemption would require
the passage of legislation by both houses of Congress and the President’s approval (or a
successful veto override) to become law.
Section 57(b)(2) of the AEA allows for limited cooperation related to the “development or
production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States.” A 123 agreement is not
necessary for such cooperation, which mostly involves transfers of unclassified nuclear
technology and services pursuant to “Part 810 authorizations” that are not subject to
congressional review.
CRS Resources: U.S. Nuclear Cooperation and Congressional Review
•
For more information on possible U.S.-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperation and Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy
policies, see CRS In Focus IF10799, Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, by Christopher M.
Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
•
For information about nuclear energy cooperation and congressional review procedures, see CRS Report
R41910, Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D.
Nikitin, and Mark Holt.
•
For information on limited nuclear cooperation not requiring congressional review, see CRS In Focus
IF11183, Nuclear Cooperation: Part 810 Authorizations, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
106
See CRS Report R41910, Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress, by Paul K.
Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Mark Holt, which states: “Under the AEA, Congress has the opportunity to review a
123 agreement for two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. The President must submit the text of the
proposed nuclear cooperation agreement, along with required supporting documents (including the unclassified
[Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement] NPAS) to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. The President is to consult with the committees “for a period of not less than 30 days of
continuous session.” After this period of consultation, the President is to submit the agreement to Congress, along with
the classified annex to the NPAS and a statement of his approval of the agreement as well as a determination that it will
not damage the national security interests of the United States. This action begins the second period, which lasts for 60
days of continuous session. In practice, the President has submitted the agreement to Congress, along with the
unclassified NPAS, its classified annex, and his approval and determination, at the beginning of the full 90-day period.
The 60-day period has been considered as following immediately upon the expiration of the 30-day period.”
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•
For an example of a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement that Congress made exempt from AEA
requirements and discussion of related executive and legislative branch actions, see CRS Report RL33016,
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr.
How adequate is the information available to Congress when
reviewing any proposed agreements?
The executive branch may or may not choose to provide Congress with updates on its diplomatic
consultations, plans, and concerns. Prevailing arrangements for U.S.-Saudi security cooperation
are financed through Saudi purchases and financial transfers authorized under U.S. law. Because
existing programs do not require specific appropriations and authorization, Congress typically has
not enacted provisions requesting or requiring additional information about U.S. security support
to the kingdom in annually considered legislation, with the exception of some appropriations
limits imposed on foreign operations and defense funding and certification and reporting
provisions related to the war in Yemen. In the 1980s, Congress required the President to certify
that certain conditions had been met prior to the transfer to Saudi Arabia of U.S. military
aircraft.107 U.S. law requires the executive branch to provide Congress with advance information
on some proposed arms sales and civil nuclear cooperation initiatives. The executive branch is
required to submit some executive agreements to Congress for review. For additional information
on related reporting requirements and transparency measures, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11050,
International Agreements (Part III): Transparency Measures.
How sufficient is the timeline for legislative review and
consideration of proposed agreements?
Congress may be asked to consider various proposed agreements or initiatives on different
timelines based on their content and degree of interconnection assumed by involved parties.
Diplomatic, national security, and political considerations also may affect the timing of
presentation and review of proposals, including conflict or negotiation developments and
decisions regarding the congressional calendar. Possible implied linkage of proposed security
agreements, Saudi-Israeli normalization, and civil nuclear cooperation may generate pressure on
Congress to quickly consider proposed initiatives, to consider them in total or not at all, or to
swiftly deliver expected outcomes and avoid disruption by events or the actions of opposed
parties. Members of Congress individually or acting through committees may or may not have
opportunities to consult with the executive branch to shape agreements while they are in
development and prior to the extension of U.S. commitments.
Senate consideration of treaties proceeds at the discretion of the Senate. U.S. law provides
timelines for the review and consideration of proposed civil nuclear cooperation agreements,
certain arms sales, and trade agreements that may or may not feature in future U.S.-Saudi-Israeli
diplomacy. In advance of formal presentation of initiatives, proposals, and agreements to
Congress, Members may consult directly with executive branch counterparts, conduct oversight
individually or through committee briefings or hearings, or through travel to Saudi Arabia, Israel,
or other parts of the Middle East for consultations on related issues.
107 See conditions on security of technology, third-country participation, operations and command, and regional peace
and security in Section 131 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, P.L. 99-83.
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Appendix A. Additional CRS Resources
For information on congressional powers and procedures for the consideration of treaties and
other international agreements, including agreements involving nuclear cooperation, see the
following CRS products:
•
•
CRS Report 98-384, Senate Consideration of Treaties, by Valerie Heitshusen
CRS In Focus IF12208, Reservations, Understandings, Declarations, and Other
Conditions to Treaties, by Steve P. Mulligan
• CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11048, International Agreements (Part I): Overview and
Agreement-Making Process, by Steve P. Mulligan
• CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11049, International Agreements (Part II): Examining
Tools for Congressional Influence Over International Instruments, by Steve P.
Mulligan
• CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11050, International Agreements (Part III):
Transparency Measures, by Steve P. Mulligan
• CRS Report R41910, Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries:
Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Mark Holt
For information on U.S.-Saudi relations, Israel, the Palestinians, and the Israel-Hamas
conflict, see
• CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Christopher M. Blanchard
• CRS In Focus IF10799, Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation,
by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr
• CRS Report R44245, Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti
• CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview, Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues,
by Jim Zanotti
• CRS Report R47828, Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy,
and Options for Congress, by Jim Zanotti and Jeremy M. Sharp
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Appendix B. Selected Examples of U.S.-Saudi
Security Commitments and Considerations
Past U.S. administrations at times have offered limited security assurances to Saudi Arabia in
private correspondence, but the United States has, with the exception of the 1990-1991 Gulf War,
generally refrained from making public commitments to directly defend Saudi Arabia using U.S.
military forces. U.S. officials at times have emphasized U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf
region or the sovereign independence and energy exports of Saudi Arabia, stating that the United
States would respond to critical threats to the region or the availability of the kingdom’s oil
reserves to global markets, or both. During the Cold War, U.S. military planners prepared
contingency plans for military support to and intervention in Saudi Arabia, to include
counterinsurgency and defense from external attack.
•
•
•
In 1949, the Truman Administration communicated a series of “assurances” to
then-King Abd al Aziz ibn Saud in the context of discussions about the potential
extension of U.S. access rights to a nascent military airfield at Dhahran in eastern
Saudi Arabia. In November and December 1949, the U.S. government privately
but formally expressed to the king its “concern for Saudi Arabia” and “desire to
insure [sic] its territorial integrity and political independence.”108 President Harry
Truman reaffirmed those assurances in a 1950 letter to King Abd al Aziz, writing
“the United States is interested in the preservation of the independence and
territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. No threat to your Kingdom could occur
which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States.”109
Following the Suez crisis of 1956 in which Israel, Great Britain, and France
attempted to seize the Suez Canal Zone, President Eisenhower in 1957 wrote to
then-King Saud bin Abd al Aziz and said that, “Should Israel attempt to conquer
any Arab state the United States would, as it did last October, take action to
prevent this.... The United States stands fully prepared to meet aggression against
the free states of the Middle East.”110
In March 1963, President John F. Kennedy reassured then-Crown Prince Faisal
bin Abd al Aziz, writing “we agree that Saudi Arabia’s integrity and stability
must be defended against external intrusions,” and “Like you, we are not a fickle
people who change their policies and loyalties overnight. The United States, and
I personally, have a great and undiminished concern for the security and integrity
of Saudi Arabia.”111 After deploying U.S. Air Force aircraft to the kingdom, the
President wrote again, saying “It is my hope that the presence of the unit will
108 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Editorial Note,” November 29-December 5, 1949 in Foreign
Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949, Saudi Arabia, Volume VI, p. 1624.
109 See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “President Truman to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi
Arabia,” October 31, 1950 in FRUS, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, 711.56386A/10–3050.
110 “Message From President Eisenhower to King Saud.,” September 12, 1957 in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII, 783.00/9–1157. In March 1957, Congress passed
legislation stating that “the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the
independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity
thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting
assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.” See P.L.85-7, §2. In
the 118th Congress, H.R. 4445 would repeal P.L.85-7, 90 days after enactment.
111 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, in “Letter from President Kennedy to Crown Prince Faisal,” in
FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963, Document 172, March 1, 1963.
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•
•
•
•
•
demonstrate to all concerned the undiminished interest of the United States in the
security and integrity of your country.”112
In 1978, Saudi leaders expressed concern about Soviet encirclement and
subversion and sought to clarify the degree to which the United States was
prepared to offer support.113 President Carter sent King Khalid a letter in April
1978 outlining U.S. concerns for Saudi Arabia’s security, pledging continued
security cooperation and U.S. assistance to the kingdom in providing for its own
defense, but stopping short of offering a commitment that the U.S. would respond
militarily. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the time, “the
commitment as set forth in the letter was as strong a commitment as the President
and the administration could make without some formal action by the
Congress.”114
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter said in his State of the Union Address, “An
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military
force.”115
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan said “Saudi Arabia, we will not permit to be an
Iran.... There is no way, as long as Saudi Arabia and the OPEC nations there in
the East—and Saudi Arabia’s the most important—provide the bulk of the energy
that is needed to turn the wheels of industry in the Western World, there’s no way
that we could stand by and see that taken over by anyone that would shut off that
oil.”116
In August 1990, President George H.W. Bush announced the deployment of U.S.
military personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia at the request of the Saudi
government following Iraq’s invasion of neighboring Kuwait. President Bush
said that “the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the
United States,” and defined the U.S. forces’ mission as “to assist the Saudi
Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland,” and “to preserve the
integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression.” President Bush
said U.S. forces would “defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and
other friends in the Persian Gulf.”117 U.S. forces remained in the kingdom at the
Saudi government’s invitation until 2003.
In October 2019, the United States deployed fighter aircraft and air and missile
defense systems to the kingdom to “assure and enhance the defense of Saudi
112 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Message from President Kennedy to Crown Prince Faisal,” in
FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963, Document 286, July 1, 1963.
113 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter
- Saudi Desire for Assurances of Our Support and Protection,” FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region;
Arabian Peninsula, Document 170, undated.
114 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department
of State” (Jidda 6452), FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 255,
September 9, 1978.
115 President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980.
116 President Ronald Reagan, The President’s News Conference, October 1, 1981, in U.S. Government Printing Office,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, January 20 to December 31, 1981.
117 President George H.W. Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces
to Saudi Arabia,” August 8, 1990.
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Arabia” following an Iran-linked attack on Saudi oil infrastructure.118 President
Donald Trump said, “You read where we’re sending some troops to Saudi Arabia.
That’s true. Because we want to help Saudi Arabia. They have been a very good
ally. They’ve agreed to pay for the cost of those troops. They’ve agreed to pay
fully for the cost of everything we’re doing over there.... Saudi Arabia is paying
for 100 percent of the cost, including the cost of our soldiers. And that
negotiation took a very short time—like, maybe, about 35 seconds.”119
118 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Statement on Deployment of Additional U.S. Forces and Equipment to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” October 11, 2019.
119 Glenn Kessler, “Trump’s claim the Saudis will pay ‘100 percent of the cost,’” Washington Post, October 21, 2019.
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Appendix C. Saudi Arabia and Israel: From
Rejection to Conditional Normalization
Saudi Arabia has a long history of formal opposition to Israel and its actions in the region. Saudi
Arabia joined other Arab states in contesting the UN partition plan for the British Mandate in
Palestine and refused to recognize Israel’s declaration of independence in May 1948. The
kingdom sent a small military force to participate in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war; a contingent of
Saudi forces remained in Egypt afterward. Israel and Saudi Arabia both opposed Egypt’s military
support to anti-royalist forces in Yemen during the 1960s. A small number of Saudi troops
deployed in Jordan following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and a small number of Saudi forces were
deployed to the Syrian-Israeli front during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Saudi Arabia imposed
temporary oil export embargoes on countries providing military support to Israel, including the
United States, in conjunction with the 1967 and 1973 wars. In the latter case, the Saudi-led oil
embargo led to fundamental changes in world energy markets and contributed to economic
disruptions in the United States and other oil consuming countries.
Following the 1973 war, the kingdom in 1974 recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as
the political representative of the Palestinian people. Amid U.S.-supported Arab-Israeli peace
initiatives in the 1970s, Saudi leaders engaged the United States and fellow Arab governments in
private, high-level discussions over possible terms for peace and normalization with Israel. Saudi
leaders expressed support for U.S.-led peace efforts and told U.S. officials they were encouraging
other Arab governments and Palestinian leaders to engage in similar talks and back U.S.
initiatives. Following the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, Saudi
Arabia joined other League of Arab States (LAS, Arab League) members in withdrawing its
ambassador from Egypt and publicly expressing opposition to the treaty. However, Saudi officials
had privately assured U.S. officials of their support and remained engaged in private talks with
the United States and other Arab states on regional peace.120
In 1981, Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud publicly stated eight
“guidelines toward a just settlement” of the Palestinian issue. Among those guidelines was an
“affirmation of the right of all states in the region to live in peace.”121 This provision’s implied
recognition of the state of Israel and its suggestion of conditional normalization proved
controversial among some other Arab governments who rejected the idea of future peace with
Israel. The provision was amended when the Arab League adopted a version of the Saudiproposed guidelines at its 1982 Fez summit to call for, “The establishment by the United Nations
Security Council of guarantees of peace between all States of the region, including the
independent Palestinian State.”122
Saudi officials remained vocal supporters of the Palestinian cause through the ensuing decades,
and recognized the Palestinian declaration of statehood in November 1988. Saudi Arabia
participated in the 1991 Madrid peace talks and remained engaged with U.S. officials in private
discussions about regional peace and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Saudi government
provided financial support to various Palestinian organizations and causes during this period and
encouraged and facilitated similar support by Saudi nationals through public and private
120 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Memorandum of Conversation, Riyadh,” March 17, 1979, in
FRUS, Arab-Israeli Dispute August 1978– December 1980, Volume IX.
121 U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS), LD072355, “Saudi Crown Prince Fahd on peace,” August 6,
1981.
122 UN Document A/37/696-S/15510, “Letter dated 3 December 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” December 15, 1982.
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channels. The U.S. government and Saudi officials have acknowledged some Saudi nationals’
past financial support to Hamas.123
During the heightened violence of the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) and resulting
Israeli military operations of the early 2000s (and in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the United States), Saudi Arabia revisited and restated its guidelines for peace and
normalization. In February 2002, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud
discussed possible terms for normalization with Israel in an interview with the New York Times.124
In March 2002, the Arab League adopted a version of the Saudi proposal as the Arab Peace
Initiative.125 The initiative called on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied after June 4,
1967, to support a “just and agreed” solution for Palestinian refugees, and to accept the
establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with
its capital in East Jerusalem in exchange for Arab states then considering the Arab-Israeli conflict
“at an end,” entering into “a peace agreement,” and establishing “normal relations with Israel in
the context of this comprehensive peace.”
Other Arab governments’ decisions to normalize relations with Israel in the context of the U.S.supported Abraham Accords during the Trump Administration reflected a departure from the 2002
Arab League consensus position, but Saudi Arabia did not publicly oppose or demonstrably seek
to undermine others’ engagement in the accords. In an interview published in March 2022, Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman said, “We look at Israel as a potential ally but before that it should
solve its problems with the Palestinians.”126
Following the Biden Administration’s reengagement with Saudi Arabia in mid-2022, public
speculation about possible Saudi-Israeli normalization grew in the context of reports that the
Biden Administration was engaging in talks with Saudi counterparts about bilateral agreements to
incentivize progress in that direction. President Biden has stated his view that the Hamas-led
terrorist attacks on Israel in October 2023 may have been intended to preempt or undermine
Saudi-Israeli normalization.127 The attacks and ensuing Israel-Hamas conflict have likely led
U.S., Israeli, and Saudi parties to reexamine their priorities with regard to normalization and what
may follow the conflict’s end.
123 In its annual report on terrorism for the year 2001 (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001), the State Department noted
that Hamas received funding from “private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states.” The 2002 and
2003 editions of the report did not mention Saudi Arabia as a specific source of funding for Hamas. The State
Department’s 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism (released in March 2006) indicated that “private benefactors in Saudi
Arabia and other Arab states” remained a primary source of funding for Hamas. In 2003, a Saudi spokesperson said he
considered it “very likely” that “some Saudi individuals” had provided financial support to Hamas. AFP, “Saudi
Official Condemns Terrorism, But Not Hamas,” June 12, 2003.
124 Thomas Friedman, “An Intriguing Signal from the Saudi Crown Prince,” New York Times, February 17, 2002.
125 UN Document A/56/1026-S/2002/932, “Letter dated 24 April 2002 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” August 15, 2002.
126 Al Arabiya, “Saudi Arabia open to full ties with Israel, on condition of Palestine state: Saudi FM,” December 5,
2020.
127 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden at a Campaign Reception,” October 20, 2023.
Congressional Research Service
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Possible U.S.-Saudi Agreements and Normalization with Israel
Author Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
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