Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportMay 21, 2025
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Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight
Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress
Updated May 21, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48050
SUMMARY
Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight
Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress
Commercial human spaceflight is a nascent but growing industry, and that is reflected in how the
safety of the industry is regulated. Customers for commercial human spaceflight include national
space agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as well as
private citizens. As the industry and its safety evolves, Congress continues to consider how to
approach safety regulations for commercial human spaceflight and the responsibilities of the
federal agencies involved.
R48050
May 21, 2025
Rachel Lindbergh
Analyst in Science and
Technology Policy
Safety Record
In recent years, the frequency of commercial human spaceflight missions has increased. As of May 2025, no commercial
human spaceflight mission has resulted in the death of a government astronaut, a spaceflight participant (a private citizen on a
commercial flight who is not part of the crew), or a member of the general public. An accident during a 2014 test flight of
Virgin Galactic’s SpaceShipTwo caused the death of a crew member and injury to another employed by the company.
Learning Period and Informed Consent Regime
Since the enactment of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (P.L. 98-575), the Department of
Transportation (DOT) has had regulatory authority for commercial human spaceflight safety during launch and reentry. The
DOT delegates its authority to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Pursuant to statute (51 U.S.C. §50905(c)),
starting on January 1, 2028, the agency may propose regulations for the safety of human occupants. The period before
January 1, 2028, is referred to as a “learning period.” During the learning period, the FAA cannot propose regulations
specific to the safety of humans on spacecraft except under specified circumstances. The learning period allows commercial
companies to mature their capabilities without regulatory oversight, which could be burdensome to the development of this
market. Currently, the FAA and industry operate under an informed consent regime, in which customers are informed that
human spaceflight involves potential risk and that the U.S. government has not certified the spacecraft.
The learning period, originally set to expire in 2012, has been extended several times. In 2023, the FAA indicated that, absent
an extension of the learning period, it would have been able to publish a final rule approximately five years later (i.e., 2028).
At the time, major industry groups disagreed and advocated for an extension until the industry matured, had a base of shared
safety knowledge, and had made more progress toward voluntary consensus standards. In December 2024, Congress changed
the expiration of the leaning period from January 1, 2025, to January 1, 2028, in the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159, §5702). Before this extension to
2028, the potential end to the learning period spurred discussion on the timing for possible development of regulations and
the status of industry standards that would inform regulations. The FAA maintained that the learning period did not need to
be extended and that both the agency and industry were ready to transition to a new safety framework, eventually including
regulations.
Issues for Congress
Congress may consider whether to extend the learning period for a fixed time or indefinitely, to shorten the period, or to
allow it to expire and let the FAA begin developing regulations. Congress’s interest may be driven by concern for the safety
of government astronauts, who are potential customers of the commercial human spaceflight industry.
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the FAA’s dual mandate to both promote the commercial space
industry and regulate its activities in the interest of public safety, asking whether the agency can appropriately manage a dual
mandate. Congress may also consider whether to address overlaps and gaps in federal agency oversight of commercial space
activities, such as the lack of regulatory oversight for commercial activity in space or on orbit. The Biden Administration, in
December 2023, released a legislative proposal that would have, if enacted, expanded the FAA’s authorities for human
spaceflight to commercial activities beyond Earth orbit. As of May 2025, the Trump Administration has not indicated its
position on potential overlaps or gaps in federal agency oversight of commercial human spaceflight.
Congressional Research Service
Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of the Commercial Human Spaceflight Industry ............................................................ 1
Types of Commercial Human Spaceflight ................................................................................ 2
Customers for Commercial Human Spaceflight ....................................................................... 2
Safety of U.S. Commercial Human Spaceflight ....................................................................... 3
Current and Proposed Federal Role in Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety ............................. 4
Existing Regulatory Authorities ................................................................................................ 4
Informed Consent and Other Existing Requirements ......................................................... 5
The Learning Period ........................................................................................................... 6
The FAA’s Proposed Approach to Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety ............................. 8
Regulating Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety ................................................................. 9
Assessments of Government and Industry Readiness for Commercial Human
Spaceflight Safety Regulation ....................................................................................... 10
Discussions on the Possible End of the Learning Period ...................................................11
Developing Industry Standards ......................................................................................... 13
Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 14
Extension or Expiration of the Learning Period ...................................................................... 14
Regulation and Industry Standards ......................................................................................... 15
The FAA’s Dual Mandate ........................................................................................................ 15
Potential Overlap and Gaps in Existing Regulatory Authorities ............................................. 17
Proposals for On-Orbit Human Safety on Commercial Spacecraft .................................. 17
Tables
Table A-1. The FAA’s Readiness Sets, Areas, and Indicators ........................................................ 19
Table B-1. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90 ................................................................................. 21
Appendixes
Appendix A. The FAA’s Readiness Sets, Areas, and Indicators .................................................... 19
Appendix B. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90 ............................................................................. 21
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 22
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Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress
Introduction
Commercial human spaceflight is a nascent industry. Congress shapes commercial spaceflight
through its actions on the development of safety regulations and its direction to the agencies
involved in regulation and the scope of regulatory authorities.
As of May 2025, 51 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-licensed or FAA-permitted
commercial human spaceflight missions have occurred.1 FAA-licensed or FAA-permitted
commercial human spaceflights have increased recently, with more launches occurring since 2021
than in the 17 years prior.2
The FAA, within the Department of Transportation (DOT), is responsible for regulating the safety
of commercial space launch and reentry, including the safety of humans onboard.3 Since 2004,
statute (51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9)) established a “learning period,” during which the FAA is
prohibited from proposing regulations addressing the safety of humans on commercial spacecraft
during launch and reentry, with a few exceptions. This learning period is set to expire on January
1, 2028.
After providing an overview of the commercial human spaceflight industry in the United States,
the report discusses the existing status of safety regulations and authorities and other potential
safety considerations for Congress. Specific topics addressed include the term of the learning
period for regulating the safety of human occupants, the roles and responsibilities of federal
agencies (in particular the FAA), and regulatory oversight of commercial human spaceflight after
launch and before reentry (i.e., on orbit).
Human spaceflight missions conducted solely by the U.S. government are not addressed in this
report, as the responsible federal agency has authority for the safety of such missions.
Overview of the Commercial Human Spaceflight
Industry
Until the 2004 launch of SpaceShipOne by U.S. aerospace company Scaled Composites,4 human
spaceflight was limited to government missions, and few countries were able to launch humans
into space. Currently, three companies—Blue Origin, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic—are able to
launch humans into space, with additional companies developing the capability to transport
humans to space or host them on private orbital platforms, commonly referred to as “space
stations.” In the coming years, commercial space companies hope to develop the human
spaceflight industry, in which private citizens and government astronauts can travel to or stay in
space on privately owned spacecraft or space stations.
1 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues experimental permits for commercial launch or reentry of reusable
suborbital rockets for research and development, demonstrating compliance with licensing conditions, or crew training,
as described in 14 C.F.R. §437.5. The FAA issues licenses for all other types of commercial space launch or reentry.
2 Number of missions determined from FAA, “Commercial Space Data,” August 31, 2023, https://www.faa.gov/
data_research/commercial_space_data.
3 The FAA’s authorities are limited to commercial missions, and, therefore, the agency does not oversee missions
conducted by other government agencies.
4 The company Scaled Composites conducted the first commercial spaceflight on June 21, 2004, with the launch of
SpaceShipOne. Tim Sharp, “SpaceShipOne: The First Private Spacecraft,” Space.com, March 5, 2019,
https://www.space.com/16769-spaceshipone-first-private-spacecraft.html.
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Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress
Types of Commercial Human Spaceflight
The commercial human spaceflight industry is composed of companies providing suborbital and
orbital spaceflight,5 as well as companies developing commercial orbital platforms to host
customers. SpaceX, for example, has launched both National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) astronauts and commercial customers into orbit. Virgin Galactic is
currently offering suborbital flights.6 Blue Origin currently offers suborbital flights and intends to
offer orbital flights in the future.7
Orbital platforms, or “space stations,” are crewed spacecraft that operate in Earth orbit for an
extended period of time. The International Space Station (ISS) is an example of a crewed,
government-owned orbital platform. Several companies, such as Axiom Space and NanoRacks,
intend to operate commercial orbital platforms in low Earth orbit (LEO).8
Customers for Commercial Human Spaceflight
Customers for commercial human spaceflight include both governments and private citizens.
Governments can contract with space companies to launch government astronauts and researchers
or to host them on commercial orbital platforms.
NASA relies on commercial human spaceflight services for three of its programs: the
Commercial Crew program, which transports NASA astronauts to the ISS; the Artemis program
through its Human Landing System, which NASA plans to use to transport its astronauts to the
Moon’s surface; and the Commercial LEO Destinations program, which NASA has indicated that
it hopes will support commercial platforms to host its astronauts in Earth orbit. For all of these
programs, NASA does not plan to develop its own capabilities; the agency plans on using
commercial human spaceflight services instead. The commercial providers offer transportation or
orbital hosting as a service, retaining ownership of their spacecraft.
Private citizens may also pay to travel to space for recreation, tourism, privately funded research,
or other purposes. So far, relatively few private citizens have traveled to space on either orbital or
suborbital flights. The first crewed private spaceflight occurred in 2004, with the flight of
SpaceShipOne. Between 2001 and 2009, seven private citizens traveled to the ISS on Russiangovernment-owned Soyuz spacecraft.9 No additional commercial human spaceflight missions
occurred until 2018. In the years since, Blue Origin, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic have each
transported private citizens to space on multiple missions.10
5 Although both suborbital and orbital spacecraft reach space, only orbital spacecraft reach sufficient speed (known as
orbital velocity) to complete at least one orbit—or more commonly, several orbits—around the Earth. In contrast, a
suborbital flight reaches space and then returns without making a full orbit around the Earth, usually after a few
minutes.
6 Doug Messier, “U.S. Commercial Human Spaceflight Set to Accelerate as Regulatory Battle Looms,” Parabolic Arc,
April 10, 2023, https://parabolicarc.com/2023/04/10/current-state-future-commercial-spaceflight/.
7 Eric Berger, “Blue Origin Just Validated the New Space Movement,” ArsTechnica, October 6, 2016,
https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/10/blue-origin-just-validated-the-new-space-movement/.
8 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “NASA Selects Companies to Develop Commercial
Destinations in Space,” press release, NASA, December 2, 2021, https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-selectscompanies-to-develop-commercial-destinations-in-space/.
9 Mike Wall, “An Interview with the First Space Tourist,” SpaceNews, May 2, 2011, https://spacenews.com/interviewfirst-space-tourist/.
10 Sissi Cao, “Every Person Launched into Space by Blue Origin, So Far,” Observer, June 22, 2023,
https://observer.com/2023/06/blue-origin-passenger-list/; William Harwood, “Virgin Galactic Launches Third
(continued...)
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The number of private citizens who have visited space, while still relatively small, is anticipated
to grow, given expectations that these companies may increase the frequency of their missions
and that more companies may enter the commercial human spaceflight market. The industry has
grown and increased the frequency of its spaceflights in recent years. More FAA-licensed or
FAA-permitted commercial human spaceflights occurred since 2021 than in the 17 years prior.11
Safety of U.S. Commercial Human Spaceflight
As of May 2025, no U.S. commercial human spaceflight mission has resulted in the death of a
government astronaut, a spaceflight participant,12 or a member of the general public. An accident
during a 2014 test flight of Virgin Galactic’s SpaceShipTwo caused the death of a crew member
and injury to another employed by the company.13
The FAA, which regulates and licenses commercial space launch and reentry, tracks U.S. human
spaceflight data—from both government and commercial missions—including the numbers of
persons launched, casualties, and catastrophic failures. The FAA defines a “catastrophic failure”
as an accident that caused death or serious injury to the people onboard.14 CRS analysis of FAA
data shows a catastrophic failure rate of 2.78% for commercial suborbital missions and 0% for
commercial orbital missions.15 Out of the 36 suborbital commercial human launches licensed or
permitted in the United States, the 2014 SpaceShipTwo test flight is the only catastrophic failure
recorded.
Comparisons may provide useful, yet limited, points of reference, as commercial human
spaceflight is a developing activity with relatively little flight history. In 2023, U.S. commercial
air carriers had an accident rate16 of less than 0.15 per 100,000 scheduled flights, or less than
0.00015%.17
Suborbital ‘Space Tourist’ Flight,” CBSNews, September 8, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/virgin-galacticlaunches-third-suborbital-space-tourist-flight/; Will Gendron, “Virgin Galactic’s First Space Tourism Flight Took Off
This Week. Here Are the Players Taking Civilians to Space,” Business Insider, August 12, 2023,
https://www.businessinsider.com/virgin-galactic-blue-origin-spacex-commercial-space-flights-tourism-cost-2023-7.
11 Between January 2021 and June 2024, 27 FAA-licensed or FAA-permitted commercial human spaceflights occurred.
From 2004 through 2020, 15 such spaceflights occurred. FAA, “Commercial Space Data,” August 31, 2023,
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/commercial_space_data.
12 The FAA considers a spaceflight participant “[a]n individual, who is not crew, carried aboard a launch vehicle or
reentry vehicle.” FAA, “Human Space Flight,” February 1, 2024, https://www.faa.gov/space/human_spaceflight.
13 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites
SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake, California, October 31, 2014, NTSB/AAR-15/02, 2015, p. 1,
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1502.pdf.
14 FAA, “U.S. Human Space Flight Safety Record (as of April 14, 2025),” April 14, 2025, https://www.faa.gov/media/
77636; FAA, “Commercial Space Data,” August 31, 2023, https://www.faa.gov/data_research/commercial_space_data.
15 FAA, “U.S. Human Space Flight Safety Record (as of April 14, 2025),” April 14, 2025, https://www.faa.gov/media/
77636. The FAA’s Human Space Flight Safety record lists SpaceShipTwo as having conducted 20 spaceflights, while
the agency’s Commercial Space Data dashboard lists only 19 licensed or permitted SpaceShipTwo launches as human
spaceflight missions. The FAA’s U.S. Human Space Flight Safety Record does not include orbital missions until the
reentry is complete.
16 The NTSB uses the definition of “aircraft accident” provided by 49 C.F.R. §830.2, which is substantively similar to
the definition for “catastrophic failure” used by the FAA in determining human spaceflight safety records. The FAA
defines a catastrophic failure as “causing death or serious injury to the people on board. Launch or reentry aborts,
regardless of the cause, are not counted as a catastrophic failure unless death or serious injury occurs.” FAA, “U.S.
Human Space Flight Safety Record (as of April 14, 2025),” April 14, 2025, https://www.faa.gov/media/77636.
17 NTSB, “2004-2023 Accident Statistics,” spreadsheet, 2024, https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/data/Documents/
AviationAccidentStatistics_2004-2023_20241217.xlsx.
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Companies that wish to participate in NASA’s Commercial Crew program must demonstrate their
ability to meet the agency’s safety standards. For these companies to meet NASA’s safety
standards, their proposed spacecraft design must meet a “loss of crew” threshold of 1 in 270, or
0.37%. This threshold is for a probabilistic risk assessment of the proposed spacecraft designs, as
there is not yet sufficient flight experience to determine a number based on actual accidents.18
A 2023 RAND Corporation report, Assessing the Readiness for Human Commercial Spaceflight
Safety Regulations: Charting a Trajectory from Revolutionary to Routine Travel, conducted in
response to congressional direction to the Secretary of Transportation, noted that the commercial
human spaceflight industry has a strong incentive to ensure that missions are safe and that no
accidents occur.19 Accidents—particularly those that are high profile—could discourage potential
customers, negatively impacting the economic prospects of either single companies or even the
industry more broadly. In addition, the RAND report posited that Congress or regulating agencies
might be motivated to impose additional oversight or regulation in response to an accident.20
The RAND report noted several factors that may negatively impact the safety of the industry.21
Some companies—particularly new entrants to the industry—may not have sufficient knowledge
of and expertise in various safety measures. Implementation costs could also discourage
companies from adopting some safety measures or processes. Companies may also be reluctant to
share lessons learned or mishap data, as they may fear sharing proprietary data may hurt their
competitiveness. The report noted that this concern may, in turn, inhibit the creation of voluntary
industry standards or voluntary safety reporting systems, both of which could improve safety.
Current and Proposed Federal Role in Commercial
Human Spaceflight Safety
This section discusses the FAA’s regulatory oversight of commercial human spaceflight during
launch and reentry by U.S. citizens or launching from areas within U.S. jurisdiction, including the
learning period; the FAA’s proposal for future regulatory action for commercial spaceflight safety
for launch and reentry; and stakeholder positions on the federal role in commercial human
spaceflight safety.
Existing Regulatory Authorities
The Commercial Space Launch Act (P.L. 98-575) gave the DOT the authority to regulate the
launch and reentry of commercial spacecraft, as codified in Title 51, Chapter 509, of the U.S.
Code. The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-492) extended the
scope of the DOT’s regulatory authority to address the health and safety of humans onboard
launch and reentry vehicles.22 These authorities are implemented by the FAA Office of
18 Government Accountability Office (GAO), NASA Commercial Crew Program: Plan Needed to Ensure
Uninterrupted Access to the International Space Station, GAO-18-476, July 2018, pp. 22-24, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-18-476.pdf; NASA Office of the Inspector General, NASA’s Management of Crew Transportation to the
International Space Station, IG-20-005-, November 14, 2019, p. 14, https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-20-005.pdf.
19 Doug C. Ligor et al., Assessing the Readiness for Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety Regulations: Charting a
Trajectory from Revolutionary to Routine Travel, RAND Corporation, October 2023, p. 34, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RRA2466-1.html. Hereinafter RAND 2023.
20 RAND 2023, p. 34.
21 RAND 2023, p. 36.
22 See various subsections in 51 U.S.C. §§50903-50905. The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004
(continued...)
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Commercial Space Transportation (AST), which oversees a licensing process for commercial
space launch and reentry.23 Its regulatory focus is public health and safety.24 It does not have the
authority to regulate mission assurance (i.e., the design or operations of vehicles), as the FAA
does for the commercial aviation industry.25
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 directed the FAA to implement an
“informed consent” regime and medical and training requirements for commercial human
spaceflight, as well as to develop and implement regulations on liability insurance and financial
responsibility (referred to as indemnification). The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act
of 2004 also created the learning period, during which the FAA cannot propose regulations
specific to the safety of humans on spacecraft except under specific circumstances. The FAA may
propose regulations in response to instances in which a design feature or an operating practice has
resulted in serious or fatal injury to crew, government astronauts, or spaceflight participants or
has contributed to an unplanned event or series of events during a licensed or permitted flight that
posed a high risk to crew, government astronauts, or spaceflight participants. When issuing such
regulations, the FAA must describe the instance or instances when the design feature or operating
practice in question contributed to a qualifying injury, unplanned event, or unplanned series of
events.26
Informed Consent and Other Existing Requirements
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 directed the FAA to develop and
implement informed consent requirements for commercial human spaceflight companies. The
companies must inform spaceflight participants in writing of the safety records of their intended
launch vehicle and of the risks of launch and reentry more broadly.27 Both crew and spaceflight
participants must be informed that the U.S. government has not certified their intended launch
vehicle.28 These requirements are often referred to as the informed consent regime.29
Spaceflight participants were also included in the existing regime for liability and indemnification
by the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. The FAA must require licensees to
sign reciprocal waivers of claims with their spaceflight participants, its contractors, and the U.S.
(P.L. 108-492; 51 U.S.C. §50902) defines three types of human occupants on commercial spaceflight missions:
government astronauts, crew, and spaceflight participants. Per §50902, government astronaut is a designation either
assigned by NASA under 51 U.S.C. §20113(n) or referring to an employee of the U.S. government or its international
partners. Crew is defined as an employee of a launch provider who is involved in operating a launch or reentry vehicle.
The term spaceflight participant refers to an individual being transported on a human spaceflight mission who is
neither crew nor a government astronaut.
23 51 U.S.C. §50904(d).
24 George C. Nield et al., “Recommended Practices for Commercial Human Space Flight,” International Astronautical
Congress, Toronto, Canada, 2014, p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/space/additional_information/
international_affairs/recommended_practices_human_space_flight_iac_toronto_nield_october_2014_508.pdf.
25 George C. Nield et al., “Recommended Practices for Commercial Human Space Flight,” International Astronautical
Congress, Toronto, Canada, 2014, p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/space/additional_information/
international_affairs/recommended_practices_human_space_flight_iac_toronto_nield_october_2014_508.pdf.
26 51 U.S.C. §50905(c).
27 51 U.S.C. §50905(b)(4); 14 C.F.R. §460.45.
28 51 U.S.C. §50905(b)(4); 14 C.F.R. §§460.9 and 460.45.
29 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, September 29, 2023, p. 11, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/
2023_10_06%20PL_114-90_Sec_111_7_Commercial_Human_Spaceflight_Activities.pdf. Hereinafter FAA, U.S.
Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New
Safety Framework.
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government.30 These waivers ensure that each party releases claims against the others and
assumes financial responsibility for any property damage or bodily injury. The FAA established
the regulations for these requirements in Title 14, Part 440, of the Code of Federal Regulations.
The current indemnification regime for spaceflight participants is set to expire on September 30,
2028.31
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 also directed the FAA to establish basic
medical and training requirements for spaceflight participants and crew.32 Among these
requirements, human spaceflight companies must give their pilots vehicle and mission-specific
training and train spaceflight participants on how to respond to emergency situations.
Per Title 51, Section 50905(c)(10), of the U.S. Code, the FAA may implement these and other
regulations and requirements in support of its mission to protect the public. For instance, the FAA
has imposed regulations and requirements for spacecraft crew, as the crew is considered by the
agency to be part of the flight safety system. The FAA has requirements for crew qualifications,
medical screening, life support, and similar basic safety elements (14 C.F.R. Part 460) and has
implemented basic security requirements for spaceflight participants to protect the crew and
public (14 C.F.R. §460.53).
The Learning Period
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 originally set a period of eight years in
which the FAA cannot propose regulations specifically addressing the safety of persons on
commercial space vehicles—absent specified exceptions and aside from the informed consent,
liability and indemnification, medical, and training requirements—codified at Title 51, Section
50905(c), of the U.S. Code. The learning period provides commercial companies with the
opportunity to mature their capabilities without regulatory oversight, which could be burdensome
to the development of this market. The length of the learning period has been extended multiple
times since it was first set to expire on October 1, 2012.33 Most recently, the learning period was
extended to January 1, 2028, by the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159, §5702).
During the learning period, the FAA may issue human occupant safety regulations only in
response to a serious or fatal injury to an in-flight event or events with a high risk of such
casualties.34 Should such an incident occur, the FAA may develop and implement regulations in
response, but the agency is not obligated to do so. For instance, the FAA did not issue new
regulations after the only event that met these criteria—the 2014 SpaceShipTwo accident, in
which a Virgin Galactic suborbital spacecraft crashed.35 Notably, the National Transportation
30 51 U.S.C. §50914.
31 51 U.S.C. §50914; Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159, §5702).
32 P.L. 108-492, §2(c)(13); 51 U.S.C. §50905(b); 14 C.F.R. Part 460.
33 Prior to the most recent extension in P.L. 118-59, the learning period had been extended to October 1, 2015, by the
FAA Modernization and Reform of 2012 (P.L. 112-95); to October 1, 2023, by the Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act (CSLCA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-90); to January 1, 2024, by the Continuing Appropriations and Other
Extensions Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-22); to March 9, 2024, by the Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2023, Part II (P.L.
118-34); and to May 11, 2024, by the Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-41).
34 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(2).
35 RAND 2023, pp. 3-4.
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Safety Board (NTSB)—which was the lead investigator of that accident—did not recommend
additional regulations in its report.36
The Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-90) required the
FAA to produce several reports to inform a transition from the learning period to a safety
framework that may include safety regulations.37 The CSLCA directed the FAA to consult and
coordinate with the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC)38 to
develop these reports for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and
the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. The required reports were to address
•
•
•
the commercial space transportation industry’s progress in developing voluntary
consensus standards and best practices, by December 2016 and every 30 months
thereafter;39
key industry metrics that could be used to indicate the industry’s readiness to
transition to a safety framework that may include regulations, by August 2016;40
and
the activities most appropriate for a new safety framework, which could include
regulatory action and a possible transition plan, by March 2018 with an update by
March 2022.41
Similarly, the CSLCA required the FAA to contract for an independent report, due by December
2022, assessing the readiness of the federal government and commercial industry to transition to a
safety framework that may include regulations.42 The FAA contracted with the RAND
Corporation, which published the congressionally mandated independent assessment in April
2023.43
The FAA has delivered several reports following these reporting requirements. A list of these
reports can be found in Appendix B.
In 2023, the FAA detailed its proposed approach for a safety framework inclusive of regulations.
The proposed approach is described in the following section.
36
NTSB, In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake,
California, October 31, 2014, NTSB/AAR-15/02, 2015, pp. 70-71, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1502.pdf.
37 P.L. 114-90, §111; 51 U.S.C. §50905.
38 For more information on COMSTAC, see FAA, “Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee
(COMSTAC),” https://www.faa.gov/space/additional_information/comstac.
39 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(5); FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards Development, December
20, 2022, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_114-90_Sec111-5-Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.
40 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6); FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key
Industry Indicators, 2017, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/CSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
Hereinafter FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry
Indicators.
41 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(7); FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight
Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework.
42 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(8).
43 RAND 2023.
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The FAA’s Proposed Approach to Commercial Human Spaceflight
Safety
The CSLCA required the FAA to submit a proposed transition plan before the expiration of the
learning period (which at the time was January 1, 2025); the agency delivered the report to
Congress, titled U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space
Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, in September 2023.44
The FAA outlined a phased approach to develop a safety framework that includes regulation. The
FAA intends to develop regulations “only to the extent necessary” and as one element of a
broader safety framework.45 Elements of such a safety framework may also include industry
consensus standards, best practices, inspections, compliance monitoring, safety management
systems, and accident investigations.46 Using an incremental approach, the FAA hopes to create a
safety framework that can evolve as industry develops.47
As the first step in creating its safety framework, the FAA updated its Recommended Practices for
Human Space Flight Occupant Safety, which is a nonbinding set of practices developed by the
FAA to aid human spaceflight companies.48 The FAA intends the updated document to be used by
standards development organizations as the basis for human spaceflight standards.49
In 2023, the FAA indicated that it planned to increase its efforts to solicit industry input to
potential regulations. In April 2023, the FAA chartered the Human Space Flight Occupant Safety
(HSFOS) Aerospace Rulemaking Committee (SpARC), an advisory group formed of industry
representatives and subject matter experts.50 The FAA has directed the HSFOS SpARC to submit
its recommendations within 18 months of its establishment. As of May 2025, this report has not
been publicly released.
Before the most recent extension of the learning period, the FAA intended to draft a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to solicit public comment on draft regulations after receiving the
SpARC recommendations.51 The FAA had planned to develop a phased transition plan using the
HSFOS SpARC recommendations, as well as drawing on case studies from other transportation
44 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework.
45 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3.
46 Josef S. Koller et al., Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety Regulatory Framework, Aerospace Corporation,
Aerospace Report No. ATR-2002-02101, September 28, 2022, p. 1, https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/
ATR-2022-02101.pdf.
47 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 11.
48 FAA, Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant Safety: Version 2.0, September 2023,
https://www.faa.gov/media/71481.
49 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 11. For information on the standards development organizations involved in
commercial human spaceflight, see FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus Standards Development,
December 20, 2022, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_114-90_Sec111-5Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.
50 FAA, “Human Space Flight Occupant Safety Aerospace Rulemaking Committee Charter,” April 21, 2023,
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/
documentID/5883.
51 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, pp. 11-12.
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modes.52 The agency projected that it would have taken approximately five years to publish a
final rule from the start of the SpARC (April 2023), with an effective date to be set sometime
after publication.53 The FAA is directed in statute to “take into consideration the evolving
standards” of the commercial human spaceflight industry.54 The agency plans to create
performance-based regulations.55 According to the FAA,
Performance-based regulatory regimes can be positive guardrails allowing innovation and
development within established bounds for safety. These requirements also allow
voluntary consensus standards to be developed to provide a means of compliance and can
be the basis for updating or establishing new performance requirements for the industry to
increase the safety of participants.56
Should the FAA promulgate safety regulations, it must use a structured process that would
provide opportunities for public comment and possibly benefit-cost analysis on the potential
impact of proposed regulations. This rulemaking would be subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) (P.L. 79-404, as amended). The APA sets forth a structured process by
which regulations can be promulgated, with opportunities for public comment. Depending on the
economic effects of the regulations, the FAA could also be required to conduct a benefit-cost
analysis of any proposed regulation of human spaceflight, per Executive Order 12866 and
consistent with guidance provided in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4.57
Regulating Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety
The expiration date of the learning period was most recently extended from January 2025 to
January 2028. Before the most recent extension, the possible end of the learning period and the
FAA’s 2023 proposed safety framework spurred discussions between government and industry
about whether the learning period should be extended and the status of the development of
industry standards.
Many government officials, commercial stakeholders, industry group representatives, and
standards development organizations agree that commercial human spaceflight regulations are
“inevitable.”58 Disagreement generally stems from differing views on when such regulations
would be appropriate and how to assess when that point is reached.
This section briefly summarizes the major approaches to assessing whether the industry is ready
for the end of the learning period; perspectives on whether the learning period should be
extended; and progress on and challenges to developing industry standards.
52 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 12.
53 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 12.
54 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9).
55 Performance-based regulations focus on performance and desired outcomes, giving companies flexibility in how to
meet the mandated standard. Conversely, prescriptive regulations specify the processes, design, or technology
standards that companies must use.
56 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 11.
57 Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis, Circular A-4, September 17, 2003, pp. 10-12,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf; Executive Order 12866 of
September 30, 1993, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” 58 Federal Register 51735, October 4, 1993,
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf.
58 RAND 2023, p. 48.
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Assessments of Government and Industry Readiness for Commercial Human
Spaceflight Safety Regulation
While statute does not define or describe regulatory readiness in the context of commercial
human spaceflight, statute (as codified at 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6)) directed the Secretary of
Transportation to deliver to Congress “a report specifying key industry metrics that might indicate
readiness of the commercial space sector and the Department of Transportation to transition to a
safety framework that may include regulations.” Additionally, Congress directed the Secretary of
Transportation to contract with “an independent systems engineering and technical assistance
organization or standards development organization” to report on “the readiness of the
commercial space industry and the Federal Government to transition to a safety framework that
may include regulations,” using the key industry metrics for readiness submitted by the Secretary
of Transportation.59
Pursuant to Title 51, Section 50905(c), of the U.S. Code, in its 2017 report to Congress, FAA
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators,
the FAA developed three sets of readiness areas and associated indicators to assess whether
industry and government are prepared to transition to a new safety framework.60
•
•
•
For the “industry readiness” indicator, the readiness areas are the “purpose of
people flying in space,” the “size and complexity of the industry,” and the “safety
of the industry.”61
For the “industry’s progress in developing a safety framework” indicator, the
readiness areas are “a voluntary safety reporting system,” “voluntary consensus
standards,” and compliance with safety standards.62
For the “Department of Transportation readiness” indicator, the readiness areas
are the DOT’s and FAA’s “authority to transition to a safety framework” and their
“expertise in human spaceflight safety.”63
The FAA notes that, rather than being pass/fail criteria, the readiness indicators were designed to
provide “maximum flexibility for Congress in assessing readiness to transition to a safety
framework that may include regulations.”64 Each of these areas has specific readiness indicators,
which are described in Appendix A.
In its 2017 report, the FAA noted that “proactive” industry participation in a safety framework
(e.g., through the development of consensus standards, systems for data sharing) may “influence
the timing and extent of government regulatory involvement, and successful implementation of
an industry-led framework could minimize the need for government involvement.”65
Some groups are skeptical of the FAA’s readiness indicators. RAND, in its 2023 report on
assessing the readiness for regulation of the human commercial spaceflight industry, noted that
59 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(8).
60 FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators.
61 FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, pp. 16-
18.
62 FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, pp. 1921.
63 FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, pp. 2224.
64 FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, p. 2.
65 FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, p. 3.
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the FAA’s indicators do not allow for “an appropriate and scientifically valid assessment” of
progress, as the metrics are not sufficiently defined or specific.66 How data would be collected is
also undefined, and RAND notes that the FAA did not provide targets to signify readiness.67
COMSTAC, in response to a draft version of the FAA’s 2023 report to Congress, expressed
skepticism of the FAA’s assessment that industry and the agency were ready for the transition to
regulation and requested clarification on how the FAA used its metrics to verify the agency’s
conclusions.68 Although it did not address each individual indicator, COMSTAC did specifically
note that industry continued to work toward consensus standards, that missions are still
infrequent, and that there are few operational providers.69 It stated that regulatory readiness will
not be reached until commercial human spaceflight missions are “routine and the flight rates
substantial, which could take decades.”70
More broadly, some industry stakeholders maintain that regulation will be appropriate when the
industry is more mature, has a base of shared safety knowledge, and has made more progress
toward voluntary consensus standards.71 Some industry stakeholders maintain that as the industry
matures, it will develop a shared base of safety knowledge, which will in turn enable industry to
develop, reach consensus on, and individually adopt voluntary consensus standards.72 While
developing shared safety expertise may be aided by a larger number of providers with frequent
missions, the diversity of industry vehicle designs and operating conditions may be a limiting
factor.73
Discussions on the Possible End of the Learning Period
Before the most recent extension of the learning period in 2024, the FAA maintained that both the
agency and industry were ready to transition to a new safety framework that would eventually
include regulations and that the learning period did not need to be extended. In its 2023 report,
the FAA stated, “The human space flight industry is moving at the pace of innovation, and the
66 RAND 2023, p. 25.
67 RAND 2023, p. 25.
68 COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, July 11, 2023,
p. 2, https://www.faa.gov/media/68011. Hereinafter COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to
Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework.
69 COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 2.
70 COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 2.
71 Michael Lopez-Alegria, “The Future of Human Spaceflight Safety Is in the Hands of Congress,” SpaceNews,
September 8, 2023, https://spacenews.com/the-future-of-human-spaceflight-safety-is-in-the-hands-of-congress/.
Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and Competitiveness in U.S.
Commercial Human Space Activities, hearings, 118th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 11,
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/ADC08FC1-E28D-4178-8D39-16E02BB803CE. Hereinafter
Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier.
72 Testimony of Sirisha Bandla, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and Competitiveness in U.S. Commercial Human
Space Activities, hearings, 118th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 5, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/
files/07881B07-FCFF-4B7C-8857-432BF66216C6.
73 Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 11.
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FAA believes that as the leader in transportation safety, the United States is ready for the sunset of
the moratorium.”74
The FAA report states that, given the recent growth of the commercial human spaceflight
industry, the expiration of the learning period would allow for the implementation of a new safety
framework.75 RAND, in its 2023 report, recommends that the learning period be allowed to expire
and that Congress take steps “to concurrently resource the FAA appropriately to engage in
additional actions and activities to meet its statutory responsibilities.”76
The FAA anticipated that a final rule could be published approximately five years after “the start
of a SpARC,” absent an extension of the learning period.77 The HSFOS SpARC was chartered in
April 2023. Both RAND and the FAA note that industry standards may be developed
concurrently with regulations. Doing so, they note, may allow for industry standards to inform
regulations, while also giving direction and motivation for the development of industry
standards.78 The FAA argues that regulations provide performance requirements that establish
boundaries and direction for standards development, that the “development of robust voluntary
consensus standards is ... not as advanced as expected,” and that the lack of regulations to date
may have contributed to the “less-than robust number of published standards.”79 The RAND 2023
report did not “find that the moratorium has supported, per se, the development of voluntary
consensus standards, key metrics, or regulation readiness.”80
The commercial human spaceflight operators serving on COMSTAC, which includes all such
companies operating in the United States, “unanimously agree that the learning period is crucial
to supporting a robust and safe” human spaceflight industry.81 A senior SpaceX executive argued
that ending the learning period and implementing “premature occupant safety regulations” could
“risk freezing the industry at an early stage, slowing or inhibiting the development of
technologies that would materially improve safety.”82 According to RAND’s 2023 report, some
commercial operators are concerned that regulations may compel them to divulge sensitive and
proprietary information, which they view as hindering their competitiveness. RAND, however,
found no quantifiable evidence to support these concerns.83
Some industry representatives have expressed concern that the FAA may not have sufficient
resources to develop human spaceflight safety regulations should the learning period end.84 In
74 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 4.
75 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3.
76 RAND 2023, p. 74.
77 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 12.
78 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 7; RAND 2023, p. 61.
79 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 7.
80 RAND 2023, p. 74.
81 COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, pp. 1-3.
82 Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 11.
83 RAND 2023, p. 50.
84 Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 12; COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to
Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
(continued...)
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2023, a senior SpaceX official claimed that the agency is “overwhelmed in executing its core
launch and reentry mission” and that diverting resources would cause further delays and “would
not improve safety.”85 A 2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the FAA’s role
in commercial human spaceflight safety discussed similar concerns relating to staffing. The GAO
noted that FAA AST has faced challenges in filling open positions across its office and has
regularly had fewer staff than positions authorized.86
It is unknown how the Trump Administration’s ongoing restructuring of the federal workforce
might impact the office’s staffing, if at all, and how staffing changes may or may not affect the
efficiency and efficacy of its commercial spaceflight activities. For example, in April 2025, public
reporting indicated that the head of FAA AST, Kelvin Coleman, was anticipated to be “leaving the
agency through a deferred resignation program.”87 Reportedly, the FAA has indicated that safetycritical employees are not eligible for the deferred resignation program. Industry officials in early
2025 have reportedly “expressed concerns about the departure of Coleman and, potentially, other
key people at AST. They worry that the loss of senior leadership would exacerbate workforce
challenges in the office.”88
Developing Industry Standards
The FAA must consider industry standards when developing regulations. Following the expiration
of the learning period, the FAA has a statutory mandate (51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(9)) to “take into
consideration the evolving standards of the commercial space flight industry” when proposing
regulations, specifically those identified in the three reports mandated by the CSLCA (P.L. 11490). Additionally, Title 51, Section 50901(a)(15), of the U.S. Code, stipulates that “regulatory
standards governing human space flight must evolve as the industry matures so that regulations
neither stifle technology development nor expose crew, government astronauts, or space flight
participants to avoidable risks.” More broadly, federal agencies are directed by statute and
executive branch policy to use voluntary consensus standards in their regulatory and procurement
activities, when feasible, by the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(P.L. 104-113) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119, respectively.89
RAND noted that individual commercial human spaceflight companies’ compliance with
standards is “not quantified or well characterized.”90 COMSTAC has described the commercial
human spaceflight industry’s use of published safety standards as “minimal,” but urged the FAA
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3; testimony of Sirisha Bandla, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Space and Science, Promoting Safety, Innovation, and
Competitiveness in U.S. Commercial Human Space Activities, hearings, 118th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 2023, p. 4,
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/07881B07-FCFF-4B7C-8857-432BF66216C6.
85 Testimony of William H. Gerstenmaier, p. 10.
86 GAO, Commercial Space Transportation: FAA’s Oversight of Human Spaceflight, GAO-24-106184, February 2024,
pp. 27-29 https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24106184.pdf.
87 Jeff Foust, “Head of FAA’s Commercial Space Office Takes Buyout,” SpaceNews, April 28, 2025,
https://spacenews.com/head-of-faas-commercial-space-office-takes-buyout/.
88 Jeff Foust, “Head of FAA’s Commercial Space Office Takes Buyout,” SpaceNews, April 28, 2025,
https://spacenews.com/head-of-faas-commercial-space-office-takes-buyout/.
89 P.L. 104-113; Office of Management and Budget, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary
Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, Circular No. A-119 Revised, February 10, 1998,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Circular-119-1.pdf.
90 RAND 2023, p. 39.
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to conduct an assessment of industry compliance once a set of “high-priority” standards are
developed.91
COMSTAC recommended that the FAA “consider incentives for operators to participate in
industry voluntary standards [development] and ensure that the agency devotes sufficient
resources to enable such activities.”92 COMSTAC did not specify in its recommendation what
form that the proposed incentives should take.
Data Protections
The FAA and RAND have identified the potential reluctance among private-sector companies to
share data due to proprietary concerns as a barrier to the development of voluntary consensus
standards and sharing safety data.93 Unlike for voluntarily provided aviation industry safety data,
there are currently no statutory data protection safeguards specific to the commercial space
industry safety information shared with the U.S. government.94 Aside from industry-specific
provisions, information constituting trade secrets or commercial information shared with the U.S.
government may be withheld from public disclosure under certain Freedom of Information Act
exemptions.95 The 2023 RAND report recommended that “the FAA and industry explore a means
to identify, collect, report, and analyze these data in a manner that prevents public release of
sensitive or otherwise proprietary data and information,” while recognizing the potential role for
legislation and FAA rulemaking to enable this.96
Considerations for Congress
Per statute, the learning period for the commercial human spaceflight industry is set to expire on
January 1, 2028. Congress may consider whether to extend the learning period for a fixed period
of time or indefinitely, to shorten it, or to let it expire and have the FAA begin developing
regulations. Some Members of Congress have also raised concerns over the FAA’s dual mandate
to promote the commercial space industry and protect the general public and its potential impact
on commercial human spaceflight. Congress may also consider whether to address overlaps and
gaps in federal agency oversight of commercial space activities.
Extension or Expiration of the Learning Period
Congress may consider whether to extend the learning period before its scheduled expiration in
2028, for a fixed amount of time or indefinitely, or to allow the learning period to lapse. The FAA
and some other stakeholders have suggested that, given the growth of the commercial human
91 COMSTAC Safety Working Group, “COMSTAC Safety WG Report—DRAFT,” FAA, September 14, 2020, p. 2,
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/space/additional_information/comstac/presentations/
COMSTAC_Safety_WG_white_paper_14_Sept_2020.pdf; COMSTAC Safety Working Group, “COMSTAC Safety
Working Group Report, May 2023,” FAA, May 2023, https://www.faa.gov/media/31151.
92 COMSTAC Human Space Flight Working Group, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 3.
93 FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most
Appropriate for New Safety Framework, p. 7; RAND 2023, p. 19.
94 49 U.S.C. §40123 (for the protections of voluntarily provided aviation industry safety data); FAA, U.S. Department
of Transportation Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate for New Safety
Framework, p. 7.
95 For more information, see CRS Report R46238, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): A Legal Overview, by
Benjamin M. Barczewski.
96 RAND 2023, p. 76.
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spaceflight industry, the learning period should be allowed to lapse and the FAA should begin the
process of developing regulations.
Conversely, as 2028 approaches, Congress may determine that the industry is not yet ready for
regulation specific to the safety of human occupants and that the learning period should be
extended for a set duration. For example, legislation introduced during the 118th Congress would
have, if enacted, extended the learning period beyond 2028. The Space Transformation and
Reliability Act (H.R. 5617), as introduced, would have extended the learning period until October
1, 2031, and the Commercial Standards Paramount to Accelerating Cosmic Exploration (SPACE)
Leadership Act (S. 4064), as introduced, would have extended the learning period for five years
from date of enactment. Another option could be to extend the learning period indefinitely,
relying on the informed consent regime to inform potential customers of risks.
Regulation and Industry Standards
Congress may consider whether to provide specific direction to the FAA or industry on the
development of industry standards, the creation of potential regulations, or other matters relating
to commercial human spaceflight safety. For instance, Congress could direct the FAA to evaluate
or develop potential mechanisms to incentivize industry participation in standards development.
Another option could be to require additional input from the FAA and industry. For example, the
Commercial Space Act of 2023 (H.R. 6131), as ordered to be reported out of the House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, would have directed the FAA to continue
providing updates to relevant congressional committees on the status of voluntary industry
consensus standards until 2031.97 The most recent act extending the learning period neither
included additional reporting requirements nor requested updated versions of previously provided
reports.98
Congress may also consider data protection safeguards for the commercial spaceflight industry.
Such an approach could include directing the FAA to develop a method of collecting and
handling sensitive data to facilitate collaboration across industry or implementing statutory data
protections for voluntarily submitted information through legislation, similar to those of the
aviation industry (49 U.S.C. §40123). Addressing potential concerns over the protection of
proprietary or sensitive data could help facilitate industry’s development of voluntary consensus
standards.
The FAA’s Dual Mandate
The FAA’s statutory mission with respect to commercial spaceflight is both to “encourage,
facilitate, and promote” commercial space launch and reentry, as well as to regulate those
activities to protect the general public.99 As the commercial space industry grows, Congress and
other stakeholders have discussed the appropriateness of this dual role. The potential impact on
97 H.R. 6131 was ordered to be reported but was not reported. While official reported text of H.R. 6131 is not available,
the amendments adopted during the markup did not appear to change the introduced bill provisions related to the
FAA’s updates on the status of voluntary industry consensus standards. House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, “Full Committee Markup of H.R. 6213 & H.R. 6131,” November 29, 2023, https://science.house.gov/
2023/11/markup-h-r-6213-h-r-6131.
98 Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (P.L.
118-159, §5702).
99 51 U.S.C. §§50901, 50903.
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commercial human spaceflight, in particular, has driven many of these discussions, due to
concerns for the safety of humans onboard.100
Representative Babin of Texas stated in a 2021 hearing of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, on the role of the FAA in
spaceflight that the dual mandate creates “a tension that results in a balanced and measured
relationship between the public and private sector.”101 In the same hearing, then-FAA Associate
Administrator Wayne Monteith stated that safety is the foundation of the dual mandate, and that it
allows for “the right regulations or the right scope at the right time to ensure safety, while also
allowing these companies to innovate and grow and continue to lead on the global stage.” 102
At the 2021 hearing, GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Heather Krause noted that the dual
role “could give rise to a potential conflict of interest” and could hinder the FAA’s ability to
regulate the industry. Krause also pointed to the DOT’s 2008 statutorily required assessment of
the dual mandate, the last formal review to date, which recommended that the DOT “periodically
review its dual role specifically for safety and promotion of human space flight.”103
At the same 2021 hearing, Representative DeFazio—who was, at the time, chair of the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure—drew a comparison to commercial aviation,
pointing to Congress’s decision to remove the FAA’s similar dual mandate for aviation in the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264, §401) after a high-profile aviation
accident.104 Similarly, a 2006 GAO report on commercial space launch described this decision as
“evidence of the importance of maintaining FAA’s focus on safety oversight” and as a cautionary
tale for commercial spaceflight.105
In light of these varied perspectives, options for Congress could include evaluating the FAA’s
dual mandate, through congressional oversight or by directing the FAA or another organization to
conduct a review; amending the statute codified at Title 51, Section 50903, of the U.S. Code to
redefine the FAA’s statutory mission; or allowing the dual mandate to remain unaltered.
100 Prepared testimony of GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Heather Krause, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An
Examination of the FAA’s Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117th Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 14,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-105268.pdf.
101 Rep. Brian Babin, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on
Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA’s Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117th
Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 73, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG117hhrg46249.pdf.
102 Testimony of FAA Associate Administrator Wayne Monteith, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the
FAA’s Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117th Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 2021, pp. 30-31, 39-40,
https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-117hhrg46249.pdf.
103 Testimony of FAA Associate Administrator Wayne Monteith, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the
FAA’s Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117th Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 14,
https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG-117hhrg46249.pdf.
104 Rep. Peter DeFazio, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on
Aviation, Stars and Stripes Forever—An Examination of the FAA’s Role in the Future of Spaceflight, hearings, 117th
Cong., 1st sess., June 16, 2021, p. 14, https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg46249/CHRG117hhrg46249.pdf.
105 GAO, Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the
Emerging Space Tourism Industry, GAO-07-16, October 2006, p. 31, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-16.pdf.
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Potential Overlap and Gaps in Existing Regulatory Authorities
Multiple federal agencies have jurisdiction over aspects of commercial space operations.106 The
FAA has authority for commercial launch and reentry, including for spacecraft carrying
humans.107 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates commercial satellite
communications as part of its role in managing spectrum allocation for nonfederal U.S. entities.108
The Department of Commerce, through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), regulates private satellite remote sensing.109 These authorities do not address all current
or potential commercial space activities, particularly those on orbit or beyond Earth orbit,
including human safety on commercial spacecraft. For example, the FAA’s launch and reentry
authorities do not extend to operations in space. Authorities that would cover activities in space
are referred to interchangeably as “on-orbit authority” or “mission authorization.”
Proposals for On-Orbit Human Safety on Commercial Spacecraft
Stakeholders have long discussed which federal agency should assume the responsibility of
mission authorization, including for on-orbit human safety on commercial spacecraft. Some
stakeholders propose granting broad mission authorization authority to either the FAA or the
Office of Space Commerce within NOAA.110 Others propose a framework that splits authorities,
granting authority over commercial human activities in space to the FAA, while commercial
missions without humans onboard would be overseen by another agency or agencies.111
In September 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris, then chair of the National Space Council,
directed the Council to develop a proposal for authorization and supervision of “commercial
novel space activities.” The National Space Council released its proposal on December 20,
2023.112 Among other provisions, the Biden Administration’s legislative proposal would have
extended the FAA’s authority for human spaceflight safety regulation to human activities in outer
space, such as commercial space stations or operations on the Moon, rather than only launch and
reentry as under current law.113
H.R. 6131 (Commercial Space Act of 2023) would have assigned mission authorization for all
“space objects” to the Department of Commerce. This legislation did not include provisions
specific to commercial human spaceflight, although orbital platforms with humans onboard
would appear to fall into the category of “space objects” and, therefore, may fall under the
proposed purview of the Department of Commerce.
106 For more information, see CRS Report R45416, Commercial Space: Federal Regulation, Oversight, and Utilization,
by Rachel Lindbergh.
107 P.L. 108-492; 51 U.S.C. Ch. 509.
108 47 U.S.C. §§151-614.
109 P.L. 102-555; 51 U.S.C. §§60101 et seq.
110 Jeff Foust, “An Extended Mission for Authorization,” The Space Review, December 18, 2023,
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4712/1.
111 Josef Koller and Carson Coursey, “Hazards Don’t Stop at the Kármán Line,” SpaceNews, December 26, 2022,
https://spacenews.com/op-ed-hazards-dont-stop-at-the-karman-line/.
112 White House [Biden Administration], “FACT SHEET: U.S. Novel Space Activities Authorization and Supervision
Framework,” December 20, 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/20/
fact-sheet-u-s-novel-space-activities-authorization-and-supervision-framework/.
113 White House [Biden Administration], “Draft Bill Text: ‘Authorization and Supervision of Novel Private Sector
Space Activities Act,’” December 20, 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/
Authorization-and-Supervision-of-Novel-Private-Sector-Space-Activities_Legislative-Text_final.pdf.
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As of May 2025, the Trump Administration has not indicated its position as to whether there is a
current or future gap in mission authorization authorities or, if there is a perceived gap, what a
potential framework for those authorities should look like.
Congress may consider whether existing regulatory authorities are sufficient to address nascent
commercial space activities, including commercial human spaceflight, and if it is determined that
additional authorities are needed, could consider legislation to assign mission authorization
authority, in whole or in part, to one or more federal agencies. Alternatively, Congress may judge
that existing regulatory authorities are sufficient, given the nascence of commercial activity on
orbit.
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Appendix A. The FAA’s Readiness Sets, Areas, and
Indicators
Table A-1. The FAA’s Readiness Sets, Areas, and Indicators
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) framework from 2017 to assess whether industry and the
federal government are ready to transition to a new safety framework that may include regulation in
response to 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)(6)
Readiness
Indicator Set
Readiness Area
Readiness Indicator
Industry
Readiness
Purpose of People
Flying in Space
The extent to which people are flying for adventure purposes; part of
their occupation; or as a mode of transportation
Size and
Complexity of the
Industry
The number of suppliers of orbital or suborbital spaceflight, as well as
of similar spaceflight types (e.g., vertical suborbital, horizontal
suborbital, and balloon)
The extent to which there is a broad supplier network
The extent to which operations occur internationally
Safety of the
Industry
The extent to which there is evidence of unsafe operations
The extent to which industry is having difficulty attracting new
customers
The extent to which insurance companies are willing to insure human
spaceflight operations
Industry’s
Progress in
Developing a
Safety
Framework
Voluntary Safety
Reporting
The extent to which individual companies have an internal voluntary
reporting system to identify and address potential precursors to
accidents
The extent to which industry members share safety data with each
other, with a common data format and taxonomy
Voluntary
Consensus
Standards
The extent to which industry has formed a consensus on top-level
performance standards
The extent to which industry has developed and maintains voluntary
consensus standards in high-priority areas
The extent to which industry has developed and maintains a robust set
of voluntary consensus standards
Compliance
The extent to which individual companies self-verify compliance with
voluntary consensus standards
The extent to which a third party verifies compliance with voluntary
consensus standards
Department of
Transportation
Readiness
(Particularly
that of the FAA)
FAA Authority to
Transition to a
Safety Framework
Status of the learning period
FAA Expertise in
Human Spaceflight
Safety
The extent to which the FAA has helped create elements of a space
safety framework
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The extent to which the FAA has engaged with industry regarding
standards development
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Regulation of Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety: Overview and Issues for Congress
Readiness
Indicator Set
Readiness Area
Readiness Indicator
The extent to which the FAA has published safety practices related to
commercial human spaceflight
The extent to which the FAA has experience participating in a space
safety framework
Source: CRS using FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Frameworks and Key Industry
Indicators, 2017, pp. 17-24, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/
CSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
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Appendix B. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90
Table B-1. Reports Required by P.L. 114-90
Human spaceflight reports submitted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to Congress in
fulfillment of requirements from the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015
(P.L. 114-90, §111), as codified in 51 U.S.C. §50905(c)
Report
Statutory Requirements Addressed in Report
FAA, U.S. Department of Transportation Evaluation of
Commercial Human Space Flight Activities Most Appropriate
for New Safety Framework, September 29, 2023,
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/
2023_10_06%20PL_11490_Sec_111_7_Commercial_Human_Spaceflight_Activit
ies.pdf.
Activities most appropriate for a new safety
framework that could include regulatory action and a
possible transition plan
Doug C. Ligor et al., Assessing the Readiness for Human
Commercial Spaceflight Safety Regulations: Charting a
Trajectory from Revolutionary to Routine Travel, RAND
Corporation, RR-A2466-1, 2023, https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RRA2466-1.html.
Readiness of the federal government and commercial
industry to transition to a safety framework that may
include regulations
FAA, Final Report on Voluntary Industry Consensus
Standards Development, December 20, 2022,
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/PL_11490_Sec111-5Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standards.pdf.
Industry’s progress in developing voluntary consensus
standards and best practices
FAA, Report to Congress: Interim Report on Voluntary
Industry Consensus Standards Development—January 2022,
January 14, 2022, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/
2022-04/PL_11490_Sec_111_5_Voluntary_Industry_Consensus_Standar
ds.pdf.
Industry’s progress in developing voluntary consensus
standards and best practices
FAA, Report to Congress: U.S. Department of Transportation
Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight Activities
Most Appropriate for New Safety Framework, February 26,
2019, https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/
New-Safety-Framework-for-Commercial-Human-SpaceFlight-Completed-report.pdf.
Activities most appropriate for a new safety
framework that could include regulatory action and a
possible transition plan
FAA, FAA Evaluation of Commercial Human Space Flight
Safety Frameworks and Key Industry Indicators, 2017,
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/
CSLCA_Sec111_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
Industry’s progress in developing voluntary consensus
standards and best practices
Key industry metrics to indicate industry’s readiness
to transition to a safety framework that may include
regulations
Activities most appropriate for a new safety
framework that could include regulatory action and a
possible transition plan
Source: Collected by CRS from several sources, as noted.
Note: The reports are listed in reverse chronological order.
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Author Information
Rachel Lindbergh
Analyst in Science and Technology Policy
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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Congressional Research Service
R48050 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED
22
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