Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict:
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Updated October 20, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R47754
SUMMARY
Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict:
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated
foreign terrorist organization, or FTO) led surprise attacks against Israel from the Gaza
Strip by land, sea, and air. The assault came on a Jewish holiday, 50 years after the
Egypt-Syria surprise attack that sparked the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The attacks’ scope
and lethality against Israel have no precedent in the 16 years Hamas has controlled
Gaza, and the nature of the violence stunned Israelis. The apparent intelligence and
operational failures in preventing the assault will be a subject of analysis for Israeli and
U.S. officials. Iran reportedly provides material support to Hamas, and according to U.S.
officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but President Biden has said “there is no
evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack.
R47754
October 20, 2023
Jim Zanotti, Coordinator
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
Jeremy M. Sharp,
Coordinator
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard,
Coordinator
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
In response to the attacks, Israel’s cabinet formally declared war on Hamas. Israel has
initiated efforts to recover hostages, begun an aerial bombardment campaign against
militants in Gaza, mobilized hundreds of thousands of reserve troops, and repositioned
ground forces close to Gaza. Israel’s government almost completely halted the supply of
electricity, food, water, and fuel to Gaza, which before the conflict had already faced crisis-level economic and
humanitarian conditions.
Israeli officials have said that they aim to change the status quo in Gaza, and are contemplating a major ground
invasion that may seek to end Hamas’s rule there. The Israel Defense Forces has said it “calls for” all civilians
residing in northern Gaza to evacuate southward. Hamas called on people to remain in place. United Nations
Secretary-General António Guterres has expressed concern for the effects Israeli actions regarding Gaza may have
on civilian well-being. An estimated 1 million Gazans (nearly half the territory’s population) have been displaced
from their homes.
On October 16, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the United States and Israel have agreed to
develop a plan that will enable international humanitarian aid to reach civilians in Gaza. On October 18 during a
visit to Israel, President Biden confirmed this plan and announced $100 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance
for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
Reportedly, more than 1,400 Israelis (and at least 32 American civilians) and about 3,785 Palestinians in Gaza
have been killed as of October 19. Additionally, Israel has reported that the bodies of around 1,500 dead attackers
have been found in southern Israeli areas recaptured by its military. Militants are also reportedly holding some
200-250 persons hostage in Gaza (including some Americans). Hundreds of American citizens are estimated to be
in Gaza, and the U.S. government is discussing safe passage for them with Egypt and Israel.
Hamas’s attack preparations may have extended over several years. Possible motivating factors for the attacks’
timing include the potential to disrupt Arab-Israeli normalization efforts, bolster Hamas’s domestic and regional
position, capitalize on Israeli political turmoil, and use hostages as leverage for prisoner releases or other
concessions from Israel. The West Bank-based Palestinian Authority appears to be in a difficult position:
unwilling to embrace Hamas and its attack on Israel, but unable to denounce them for fear of alienating West
Bank Palestinians.
Exchanges of fire after October 7 between Israel and the Iran-backed Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah
(another FTO) have fueled speculation that Hezbollah could create a second front at the Israel-Lebanon border.
U.S. statements and actions, including expedited arms deliveries to Israel and the reported movement of major
U.S. military assets, have conveyed warnings to Hezbollah not to get involved. President Biden is reportedly
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
requesting that Congress appropriate up to an additional $14 billion in U.S. security assistance for Israel. U.S.
officials have stated that they do not intend the use of U.S. ground forces, but are reportedly deliberating about
what might or might not “trigger U.S. military involvement.”
Congress may consider whether or not to provide additional military assistance to Israel. Congress also may
weigh whether or not to increase scrutiny of the use of U.S. defense articles, provide humanitarian assistance for
Palestinians, enact sanctions on Hamas or other parties, or otherwise legislate or conduct oversight.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Contents
Conflict overview ............................................................................................................................ 1
State of play............................................................................................................................... 5
Main parties and other key actors ....................................................................................... 5
Major U.S. policy statements and actions ........................................................................... 5
What are some important questions that remain unanswered? ................................................. 7
Report methodology ........................................................................................................................ 8
What is Hamas and who supports it? .............................................................................................. 8
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 8
Foreign terrorist organization designation and consequences .................................................. 11
Hamas’s relationship with Iran................................................................................................ 12
Hamas attacks: Why and why now? .............................................................................................. 14
What is Palestine Islamic Jihad and who supports it? ................................................................... 15
Is there evidence that Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad are using cryptocurrency to
finance their activities?............................................................................................................... 15
How did Hamas achieve the element of surprise? ......................................................................... 16
Did Iran play a role in planning, directing, or otherwise enabling the Hamas attacks? ................ 18
What is the role of the Palestinian Authority in this crisis?........................................................... 20
How has Israel’s military responded to the attacks?...................................................................... 24
Counterattacks in Gaza via air and artillery strikes ................................................................. 24
Iron Dome ............................................................................................................................... 25
Siege of Gaza .......................................................................................................................... 25
“IDF’s call” for evacuation from northern Gaza ..................................................................... 26
What role do humanitarian considerations have in the conflict? ................................................... 28
What international humanitarian law responsibilities do the conflict parties have? ............... 28
What is the status of hostages taken from Israel? ................................................................... 29
What is the humanitarian situation in Gaza? ........................................................................... 30
What is Egypt’s role regarding humanitarian developments in Gaza?.................................... 31
What are other relevant humanitarian considerations? ........................................................... 32
U.S. policy ........................................................................................................................ 32
In Israel ............................................................................................................................. 33
Is an Israeli ground invasion likely, and what are the probable implications? .............................. 33
Objectives and operational considerations .............................................................................. 33
Hamas tunnel system............................................................................................................... 34
Who or what could replace Hamas control in Gaza? .............................................................. 36
Could the conflict widen to include other actors against Israel? ................................................... 37
Lebanese Hezbollah ................................................................................................................ 37
West Bank militants ................................................................................................................ 39
Groups in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen ........................................................................................... 39
Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 40
How have international actors responded? .................................................................................... 40
Arab states ............................................................................................................................... 40
Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 43
China and Russia ..................................................................................................................... 43
United Nations ........................................................................................................................ 44
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What are the considerations for Congress and U.S. policy? ......................................................... 46
What are some consular, diplomatic, and security issues involving U.S. citizens in
Israel and Gaza? ................................................................................................................... 46
What roles might (or might not) the U.S. military play? ........................................................ 48
How has the Biden Administration acted to support Israel? ................................................... 50
Expedited arms deliveries ................................................................................................. 50
What support does the United States provide to the Palestinians?.......................................... 51
What are some possible options for Congress? ....................................................................... 52
Presidential Drawdown Authority..................................................................................... 53
Additional foreign military financing for Israel ................................................................ 53
Use of U.S. stockpile in Israel .......................................................................................... 53
Emergency arms sales ....................................................................................................... 54
Monitoring conditions on the use of U.S. defense articles ............................................... 54
Humanitarian assistance.................................................................................................... 55
Calls for a cease-fire and respect for international law ..................................................... 55
Iran: Transfer of $6 billion ................................................................................................ 56
Sanctions or aid restrictions related to Hamas and PIJ ..................................................... 57
Efforts to prevent Hamas and PIJ from accessing cryptocurrency resources ................... 58
Additional oversight.......................................................................................................... 59
How might the conflict affect Israel’s government and domestic politics? ............................ 59
What are key long-term considerations for U.S. regional priorities? ...................................... 60
Figures
Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map ......................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Hamas Organization and Personnel ............................................................................... 10
Figure 3. Map of West Bank .......................................................................................................... 21
Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2014-FY2024 Request.................................. 22
Figure 5. Tunnels in Gaza.............................................................................................................. 35
Figure 6. View Inside a Gaza Tunnel ............................................................................................ 36
Figure 7. Regional Map of Selected Iran-Allied Groups............................................................... 38
Figure A-1. Old City of Jerusalem ................................................................................................ 65
Appendixes
Appendix A. What were prevailing conditions (with Gaza, Jerusalem, West Bank, Israel,
and regional diplomacy) before the attacks? .............................................................................. 62
Appendix B. Previous major Israel-Hamas conflicts .................................................................... 70
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 71
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Congressional Research Service
Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Conflict overview
On October 7, 2023, Gaza Strip-based militants led by the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group
Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO) engaged in a series of surprise
attacks by land, sea, and air against Israel (see Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map).
Palestine Islamic Jihad (or PIJ, another FTO) claimed that its forces also participated in the
attacks, and others outside of Hamas and PIJ may also have joined. The assault targeted Israeli
military bases and civilian areas during the final Jewish high holiday, just over 50 years after the
Egypt-Syria surprise attack that sparked the 1973 Yom Kippur War, known in the Arab world as
the October War. The attacks’ scope and
lethality against Israel have no precedent in
Possible Iranian role in Hamas attacks
the 16 years Hamas has controlled Gaza. The
The possible role of Iran in the planning, support, or
nature of the violence stunned Israelis and
execution of the Hamas attacks is a question of keen
many others.3 The apparent intelligence and
interest to many Members of Congress. National
operational failures in preventing the assault
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has described Iran as
“complicit in this attack in a broad sense,” given the
or limiting its impact have become a subject of
level of support it has provided Hamas for years.1
analysis for Israeli and U.S. officials.4
President Joe Biden said on October 15, “did they
[Iran] have foreknowledge; did they help plan the attack
…there’s no evidence of that at this point.”2
For more detail, see “Did Iran play a role in planning,
directing, or otherwise enabling the Hamas attacks?”
below.
In response to the attacks, Israel’s cabinet
formally declared war on Hamas, with Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserting that
Israel will win a long and difficult campaign.
On October 7, the Permanent Representative
of Israel to the United Nations, Gilad Erdan,
sent a letter to the Security Council that stated, “this is an initiated attack by terrorist
organizations led by Hamas.”5 That same day, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield reaffirmed to Israeli officials “our ironclad support for Israel’s
security and right to self-defense.”6
During the following week, Israel took steps to halt the supply of electricity, food, water, and fuel
to Gaza, mobilized troops, and initiated an aerial bombardment campaign targeting Gaza-based
militants. In a letter to the Security Council, Ambassador of the Permanent Observer Mission of
the “State of Palestine” to the United Nations Riyad Mansour alleged that Israel’s actions through
October 10 “constitute war crimes.”7
1 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,”
October 10, 2023.
2 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript,” CBS News, October 15, 2023.
3 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “President Herzog reveals Hamas ‘Captive Taking Handbook’ in CNN interview,”
October 15, 2023.
4 For information on prevailing conditions in the region before the outbreak of conflict, see What were prevailing
conditions (with Gaza, Jerusalem, West Bank, Israel, and regional diplomacy) before the attacks?. For information on
the four previous major Israel-Hamas conflicts since Hamas seized Gaza in 2007, see Previous major Israel-Hamas
conflicts.
5 X, Pamela Falk CBS News Correspondent United Nations, October 7, 2023, https://twitter.com/PamelaFalk/status/
1710717063939936336.
6 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Attacks on
Israel,” October 7, 2023.
7 Michelle Nichols, “Palestinian UN envoy accuses Israel of ‘genocidal’ campaign against Gaza,” Reuters, October 10,
2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Observers debate how to apportion blame between the militants and Israel for the worsening of
humanitarian conditions that were already dire. While Israeli actions mentioned above have
inflicted casualties and limited life-sustaining supplies, Hamas personnel in Gaza and other
militants reportedly contribute to making civilian areas and facilities targets by operating in or
near them.
The situation faced by civilians in Gaza, including some American citizens, appears to be
growing increasingly desperate. There are reportedly hundreds of U.S. citizens in Gaza, many of
whom are seeking to leave; the White House has stated that it has sought to work with Israel and
Egypt to arrange safe passage for them. The State Department has advised Americans who can
safely do so to transit toward the Egyptian border near Gaza, though conditions may not permit
that move for some.8
As of October 16, Egypt has stated its readiness to use its Rafah crossing with Gaza to open a
humanitarian corridor for aid into the territory, and to allow U.S. citizens and other foreigners
safe passage out. However, Egyptian officials claim that Israeli air strikes have made the crossing
inoperable to date, with details difficult to verify.9
On October 13, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it “calls for” the evacuation of all
civilians in Gaza City “from their homes southwards for their own safety and protection.”10
Hamas reportedly called on people in these areas to remain in place.11 U.N. officials have
expressed concern about potentially grave humanitarian consequences,12 with an estimated 1
million Gazans (nearly half the territory’s population) currently displaced from their homes.
Reportedly, some of those who have evacuated or have been evacuating may have been killed by
Israeli airstrikes.13 U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres has called for a ceasefire, the
immediate release of hostages, and unimpeded humanitarian aid.14 Under reported U.S. pressure,
Israel announced the resumption of water supply to southern Gaza on October 15.15
On October 16, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the United States and Israel
have agreed to develop a plan that will enable international humanitarian aid to reach civilians in
Gaza. On October 18, during a visit to Israel, President Biden confirmed this plan to facilitate
international aid to Gaza through Egypt, and announced $100 million in U.S. humanitarian
assistance for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.16
8 U.S. Department of State, “Information for U.S. Citizens in Gaza,” October 18, 2023.
9 “Gaza aid stuck as Egypt says Israel not cooperating,” Reuters, October 16, 2023.
10 Israel Defense Forces, “IDF Announcement Sent to the Civilians of Gaza City,” October 13, 2023. Passages from the
announcement include, “The IDF calls for the evacuation of all civilians of Gaza City from their homes southwards for
their own safety and protection and move to the area south of the Wadi Gaza,” and “Civilians of Gaza City, evacuate
south for your own safety and the safety of your families and distance yourself from Hamas terrorists who are using
you as human shields.”
11 “Hamas tells Gaza residents to stay home as Israel ground offensive looms,” Reuters, October 13, 2023.
12 “UN says Israel wants 1.1 million Gazans moved south,” Reuters, October 12, 2023.
13 Yahya Abou-Ghazala, “They followed evacuation orders. An Israeli airstrike killed them the next day,” CNN,
October 17, 2023; “70 killed after convoys of evacuees in Gaza hit by Israeli airstrikes,” NBC News, October 14, 2023.
14 “Middle East on ‘verge of the abyss’ UN warns, as Israel-Hamas conflict deepens Gaza crisis,” UN News, October
15, 2023.
15 Barak Ravid, “Israel resumes water supply to southern Gaza after U.S. pressure,” Axios, October 15, 2023.
16 White House, “U.S. Announcement of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People,” October 18, 2023; Brett
Samuels, “Biden announces humanitarian aid deal for Gaza,” The Hill, October 18, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Reportedly, more than 1,400 Israelis (and at least 32 American citizens) and about 3,785
Palestinians in Gaza had been killed as of October 19,17 with a single explosion at a Gaza City
hospital on October 17 apparently killing many civilians. Hamas-run authorities in Gaza claimed
that Israel carried out a strike on the location, but Israel attributed the explosion to a misfired
rocket launched by PIJ.18 President Biden has expressed outrage and sadness at the explosion and
loss of life. While in Israel on October 18, he said that “based on what I’ve seen it appears it was
done by the other team, not – not you [Israel]. But there’s a lot of people out there who are not
sure.”19 He said later that day that his public statement to Netanyahu was based on data shown to
him by the Defense Department.20
As a result of their attacks, Hamas and other militants aligned with them could be holding some
200 to 250 persons hostage in Gaza.21 A Hamas spokesperson threatened on October 9 to kill
hostages in the event of unannounced Israeli strikes on civilian homes in Gaza;22 a Hamas
spokesman later said that the group “is prepared to release non-Israeli hostages once conditions
allow movement in Gaza.”23 Rescuing the hostages would be highly challenging, and the goal of
doing so may affect Israeli military planning.24
17 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash
Update #13,” October 19, 2023; White House “Remarks by President Biden on the United States’ Response to Hamas’s
Terrorist Attacks Against Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine,” released October 20, 2023.
Additionally, Israel reported that the bodies of around 1,500 dead militants had been found as of October 10 in southern
Israeli areas recaptured by its military.
18 “Israel denies involvement in Gaza hospital blast, says explosion caused by Palestinian rocket,” Associated Press,
October 17, 2023; Neri Zilber, “Gaza hospital explosion caused by misfired Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket, says
IDF,” Financial Times, October 18, 2023.
19 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting,”
October 18, 2023.
20 Kathryn Watson, “Biden tells Israel, ‘You’re not alone’; says military data show Gaza militants to blame for hospital
explosion,” CBS News, October 18, 2023.
21 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF says hostages in Gaza include around 30 children, 10-20 elderly people,” Times of Israel,
October 19, 2023; Hamas spokesman Abu Ubaida quoted in Harriet Sherwood, “Hamas says 250 people held hostage
in Gaza,” The Guardian, October 16, 2023.
22 An individual identified as Abu Ubaydah of the Al Qassam Brigades said, “Going forward, we announce that each
time our peaceful people are targeted in their houses without a prior notice, we will respond by executing one of the
civilian hostages. We will video the execution and broadcast it. We hold the enemy accountable for this decision before
the world. The ball is in its court.” Al Jazeera Satellite Television, October 9, 2023, 1700 GMT.
23 “Hamas says it is preparing to release non-Israeli hostages,” NBC News, October 16, 2023.
24 Danielle Gilbert, “Why the Gaza Hostage Crisis Is Different,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October
17, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
State of play
Main parties and other key actors
Israel has formed an emergency unity government and “war management cabinet” with key
opposition figures (see “How might the conflict affect Israel’s government and domestic
politics?”), and Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Israel’s military intends to “demolish
Hamas” as it prepares for a likely ground assault of Gaza.25 In an invasion, Hamas and other
Palestinian militants may rely on their knowledge of Gaza’s terrain, a vast network of tunnels,
and urban warfare tactics to counter Israel’s conventional military superiority.
Since the October 7 attacks, Israel also has exchanged some fire with the Iran-backed Shia
Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (an FTO) and Palestinian militants across Israel’s northern
border with Lebanon. Israel has ordered the evacuation of 28 communities in northern Israel. If
these clashes escalate, Hezbollah’s arsenal of more than 100,000 missiles and rockets could pose
a grave threat to Israeli strategic sites and population centers.26
Officials from the Palestinian Authority/Palestine Liberation Organization (PA/PLO), based
in the West Bank, appear to be in a difficult position, unwilling to embrace their Hamas rivals but
also unable to denounce them for fear of alienating the sizable population of Palestinians who
support confronting Israel.27 Amid rising tensions and violence between Palestinians and Israeli
soldiers and settlers in the West Bank. PA President and PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas has
criticized Israel’s actions, but also has said that no organization other than the PLO represents the
Palestinian people.28
The United States; the European Union; Arab governments including Egypt, Jordan, and
Qatar; and various international organizations, among other parties, may seek to play roles in
efforts at mediation or humanitarian assistance. Some have started making such overtures. After
Qatari mediation, Hamas released two American hostages on October 20.
As U.S. officials travelled to Israel and around the region, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein
Amir-Abdollahian made a regional tour of his own, meeting with Iran-allied or -friendly actors in
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar, including top Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.29
Major U.S. policy statements and actions
President Biden and senior members of his Administration have condemned the attacks on
Israel. They have pledged unwavering U.S. support for Israel, directed the provision of U.S.
military and security assistance to Israel, engaged diplomatically with Middle East and global
interlocutors, encouraged Israeli decision makers to implement Israel’s response in accordance
with international humanitarian law, underscored the importance of civilian protection for all
25 “Israel vows to demolish Hamas as troops prepare to move on shattered Gaza,” Reuters, October 15, 2023.
26 Adi Hashmonai, “Israel Plans to Evacuate Communities Close to Border with Lebanon, Many Refuse to Leave,”
Haaretz, October 17, 2023.
27 Mohammad al-Kassim, “PA President Mahmoud Abbas MIA as Hamas wages war against Israel,” Ynetnews,
September 10, 2023.
28 “President Abbas discusses difficult developments in Palestine with Venezuelan counterpart,” WAFA News Agency,
October 16, 2023.
29 Peter Baker and Farnaz Fassihi, “Fearing Escalation, Biden Seeks to Deter Iran and Hezbollah,” New York Times,
October 15, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
conflict actors, sought to assist American citizens in Israel and Gaza, and negotiated with Israel to
enable humanitarian aid to reach civilians in Gaza.
In an interview aired on the program 60 Minutes on October 15, President Biden expressed
support for Israeli efforts to eliminate Hamas—calling it a “group of people who have engaged in
barbarism that is as consequential as the Holocaust”—while also appealing for the protection of
civilians and a pathway to a Palestinian state, and responded to a question about whether he
would “support Israeli occupation of Gaza” with a warning that it would be “a big mistake.”30 On
October 18, President Biden traveled to Israel and voiced additional support for its efforts against
Hamas and its allies. Also on October 18, the United States vetoed a draft United Nations
Security Council resolution on the conflict (see “United Nations”).
In an October 19 Oval Office speech, President Biden announced that he is sending Congress an
urgent budget request to support critical partners, including Israel and Ukraine, and address other
domestic and global issues. The Administration is reportedly requesting that Congress provide
$14 billion for security assistance to Israel and $10 billion in general humanitarian assistance
(some of which could potentially fund humanitarian needs in Gaza).31 Biden also referred to the
protection of civilians and U.S. efforts to work with Israel and Egypt to provide humanitarian
assistance to Palestinians in Gaza. In the speech, he said:
In Israel, we must make sure that they have what they need to protect their people today
and always. The security package I’m sending to Congress and asking Congress to do is
an unprecedented commitment to Israel’s security that will sharpen Israel’s qualitative
military edge, which we’ve committed to – the qualitative military edge. We’re going make
sure Iron Dome continues to guard the skies over Israel. We’re going to make sure other
hostile actors in the region know that Israel’s stronger than ever and prevent this conflict
from spreading.
Look, at the same time, [Prime Minister] Netanyahu and I discussed again yesterday the
critical need for Israel to operate by the laws of war. That means protecting civilians in
combat as best as they can. The people of Gaza urgently need food, water and medicine.
Yesterday, in discussions with the leaders of Israel and Egypt, I secured an agreement for
the first shipment of humanitarian assistance from the United Nations to Palestinian
civilians in Gaza. If Hamas does not divert or steal this shipment—these shipments, we’re
going to provide an opening for sustained delivery of lifesaving humanitarian assistance
for the Palestinians.32
From October 11 to 16, Secretary of State Blinken conducted a circuit of high-level diplomacy
and consulted leaders and officials in Israel, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt before returning to Israel to consult with Israel’s emergency war cabinet. The
Administration said the visits had “four key objectives: to make clear that the United States
stands with Israel; to prevent the conflict from spreading to other places; to work on securing the
release of hostages, including American citizens; and to address the humanitarian crisis that exists
in Gaza.”33 In media remarks, Secretary Blinken expressed U.S. opposition to the relocation of
civilians from Gaza to the Sinai Peninsula. He also criticized Hamas for its operational practices,
describing the group as using the civilian population of Gaza as human shields.34 U.S. diplomats
30 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript.”
31 “Biden declares Israel and Ukraine support is vital for US security, will ask Congress for billions,” Associated Press,
October 19, 2023.
32 White House “Remarks by President Biden on the United States’ Response to Hamas’s Terrorist Attacks Against
Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine,” released October 20, 2023.
33 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press,” Cairo, Egypt, October 15, 2023.
34 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Randa Abul Azm of Al-Arabiya,” October 15, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
are facilitating the evacuation of U.S. citizens in Israel to Cyprus via ship, and remain engaged
with authorities in Israel and Egypt regarding U.S. nationals in Gaza.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin travelled to Israel on October 13 and met with Israeli leaders
to discuss “expediting security assistance to Israel, including precision guided munitions and air
defense ammunition.”35 The President has directed the Department of Defense to position two
U.S. carrier strike groups in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and has bolstered U.S. air assets in the
region in an apparent bid to reassure Israel and other U.S. partners, and to warn Iran and
Hezbollah not to widen the conflict. U.S. 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit forces reportedly were
in transit to the eastern Mediterranean from the Persian Gulf as of October 17. U.S. officials have
stated that they do not plan to involve U.S. troops in armed action, and National Security Council
spokesman John Kirby has stated that “the Israelis have made it very clear that they don’t want
foreign troops on their soil—that they want to prosecute these operations on their own.”36
President Biden and other U.S. officials have implied U.S. willingness to use force, without
specifying potential triggers or red lines.37
President Biden has appointed former Ambassador David Satterfield as the Special Envoy for
Middle East Humanitarian Issues.
What are some important questions that remain unanswered?
As the Israel-Hamas conflict approaches its two-week mark, how the following issues unfold may
be particularly important for the parties and U.S. interests.
•
•
•
Recovering the hostages. Can Israel do it? How? With the help of the United
States? Will Hamas follow through on threats to kill some hostages in response to
Israeli strikes affecting civilians in Gaza? Will Hamas release non-Israeli
hostages when movement and access conditions in Gaza permit? Would Israel or
the United States exchange prisoners for hostages?
An Israeli ground assault on Gaza. If it happens, as statements from Israeli
officials suggest, how long and extensive will it be, and with what results and
human costs? What would an invasion mean for Hamas’s rule over Gaza, and if
Hamas were to be defeated, who would assume responsibility for the territory
and its over two million people? Would such a defeat effectively remove threats
that Israelis have historically faced from people in Gaza with whom Israel has a
long, complicated history of violence and uneasy coexistence? What might
reconstruction costs be, and who would pay them?
Potential escalation between Israel and Hezbollah or other Iran-backed
actors. Could a major second front materialize? What might trigger escalation?
35 U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Visit to Israel,” October 13,
2023.
36 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic
Communications John Kirby,” October 12, 2023.
37 On October 17, John Kirby, National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications said, “There are
no plans or intentions to put U.S. boots on the group in combat in Israel. But as we’ve also said, we have significant
national security interests in the region. Those national security interests have not changed. As a matter of fact, they are
more important perhaps now than they have been in the recent past. And those forces will be there to demonstrate a
sincere capability of protecting and defending those national interests if need be…. We never talk about future military
operations, and I simply wouldn’t do that. They are there to send a deterrence signal. There is more than enough
capability to de-—protect and defend our national security interests if it comes to that.” White House, “Press Gaggle by
Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby En Route Tel Aviv,
Israel,” October 17, 2023.
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•
•
An Israeli operation that endangers Hamas’s position in Gaza? Miscalculations at
the Lebanese border? Strikes involving groups in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or attacks
elsewhere? Could the situation escalate into more direct conflict between Israel
and Iran?
Impact of major civilian casualties. How might incidents causing major civilian
casualties, such as the October 17 explosion (whose cause is disputed) that
reportedly killed many Palestinians at and around a Gaza City hospital, or the
cumulative effect of casualties over time, affect global public sentiment and
various actors’ stances on the conflict?
Longer-term outcomes. What might be the longer-term ramifications for U.S.
priorities such as regional stability, security for Israel, countering the reach of
Iran and its allies, and quality of life for all affected people? How will U.S.
support for Israel in the current conflict affect its standing in the region? Can
U.S.-Israel-Saudi diplomacy resume, and will efforts toward an IsraeliPalestinian two-state solution be viable? Does this conflict have implications for
U.S. efforts to influence outcomes in places of significant global contention such
as Ukraine and Taiwan, or for the U.S. role in influencing the overall world
geopolitical order?
Report methodology
This report provides information and analysis on complex and fluid developments in an ongoing
conflict. Information in this report is drawn from official statements, media reporting, and other
publicly available information as of October 19, 2023. CRS cannot independently verify the
details of reported conflict and diplomatic developments, and information presented herein is
subject to revision as additional information becomes available. Levels of documentation and the
specificity of publicly available information may vary, and the facts of individual incidents or
developments may remain subject to dispute.
CRS is unable to investigate, confirm, or refute allegations of war or atrocity crimes and
violations of international humanitarian law. CRS cannot make definitive assessments of whether
reported incidents might arguably constitute war or atrocity crimes pursuant to international law,
or whether evidence collected would necessarily lead to prosecutions for such crimes. Statements
of attribution by U.S. or other international officials are not determinative for the purposes of
legal accountability.
What is Hamas and who supports it?
Overview
Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Islamist military and sociopolitical
movement that grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious and political organization
founded in Egypt in 1928 that has branches throughout the world.38 Hamas emerged in Gaza in
the late 1980s, and established itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah movement in the 1990s
by violently attacking Israeli targets after Fatah had entered into a peace process with Israel. Over
time, Hamas has attacked or repressed Palestinian political and factional opponents.
38 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2021, released February 2023.
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After Israel withdrew military forces from Gaza in 2005, Hamas forcibly seized the territory from
the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2007.39 Hamas has both political and military
components, and exercises de facto government authority and manages service provision in Gaza.
Hamas controls Gaza through its security forces and obtains resources from smuggling, informal
“taxes,” and reported external assistance. According to the U.S. State Department, “Hamas has
received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries. The
group receives donations from some Palestinians and other expatriates as well as from its own
charity organizations.”40 Media reports have suggested that during this decade, Hamas has
received some of its funding in cryptocurrency.41
Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader for Gaza, came from Hamas’s military wing (see Figure 2). Aside
from those living in Gaza and the West Bank, some Hamas leaders and personnel reportedly live
in Arab countries and Turkey. Qatar allows Hamas’s political bureau leader, Ismail Haniyeh, to
operate an office in Doha.
Hamas and other Gaza-based militants have engaged in occasional conflict with Israel since
Hamas seized Gaza by force in 2007. During major conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and
2021, Hamas and other militants launched rockets toward Israel, and Israeli military strikes
decimated much of Gaza’s infrastructure.
Since 2007, Gaza has faced crisis-level economic and humanitarian conditions, partly owing to
broad restrictions that Israel and Egypt—citing security concerns—have imposed on the transit of
people and goods. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of electricity and safe
drinking water.42 Because Gaza does not have a self-sufficient economy, external assistance
largely sustains humanitarian welfare. Egypt and Qatar helped mediate conflict and provided
basic resources in the wake of four past major Israel-Hamas clashes, but Gaza has not
experienced broader economic recovery or reconstruction (see “Hamas-controlled Gaza” below).
39 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, updated October 27, 2022.
40 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2021, released February 2023.
41 E.g., Angus Berwick and Ian Talley, “Hamas Militants Behind Israel Attack Raised Millions in Crypto,” Wall Street
Journal, October 10, 2023.
42 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian
territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip-criticalhumanitarian-indicators.
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Figure 2. Hamas Organization and Personnel
Source: Council on Foreign Relations using noted sources, October 2023.
Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades,43 has killed hundreds of Israelis44 and
more than two dozen U.S. citizens (including some dual U.S.-Israeli citizens)45 in attacks since
1993. As the Qassam Brigades developed from a small band of guerrillas into a more
sophisticated organization with access to greater resources and territorial control, its methods of
43 Izz al Din al Qassam was a Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anti-colonialist
resistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He was killed by British forces in 1935.
44 Figures sourced from Jewish Virtual Library website at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/
TerrorAttacks.html and https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/comprehensive-listing-of-terrorism-victims-in-israel. In
the aggregate, other Palestinian militant groups (such as Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Fatah-affiliated Al Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) also have killed scores, if not hundreds, of Israelis since
1993.
45 Figures sourced from Jewish Virtual Library website at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/
usvictims.html.
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attack evolved from small-scale kidnappings and killings of Israeli military personnel to suicide
bombings and rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. The planning, preparation, and
implementation of the October 7, 2023, attacks in Israel apparently demonstrate a further
evolution in the Qassam Brigades’ capabilities, including the use of drone munitions, personnelcapable gliders, and complex infantry operations featuring thousands of personnel attacking
across Israeli-controlled lines along multiple axes.
Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s
founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an
Islamic state in all of historic Palestine.46 A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding principles.
It stated that Hamas sees its conflict as being with the “Zionist project,” rather than Jews in
general, and expressed willingness to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice
lines (the provisional borders of the West Bank and Gaza) if it results from “national consensus,”
while rejecting Zionism completely and stating Hamas’s preference for the establishment of an
Islamist Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and from the southern
Israeli city of Eilat to the Lebanese border.47 (For background on the history of Arab-Israeli and
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Appendix B and CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.)
Having consolidated control over Gaza, and pursuing popular support through armed attacks on
Israel, Hamas has appeared to seek to compete politically with other Palestinian movements and
establish its indispensability to a future negotiated Israeli-Palestinian political arrangement.
Hamas’s 2017 document states that the group remains open to democratic political competition
with Palestinian rivals, but underscores goals incompatible with recent Arab-Israeli normalization
diplomacy. Elections have not occurred in Gaza since 2007, and Hamas appears to maintain strict
control over political activity in areas under its control. Human rights organizations, including
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented Hamas human rights
violations against Palestinian civilians and violence against Israelis.
Foreign terrorist organization designation and consequences48
The U.S. government designated Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) on October 8,
1997. (PIJ and Lebanese Hezbollah (or Hizballah) were designated as FTOs on the same date.)
The State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) is responsible for identifying entities
for designation as an FTO. Prior to doing so, the Department is obligated to demonstrate that the
entity in question engages in “terrorist activity” or retains the capability and intent to engage in
terrorist activity or terrorism.49 When assessing entities for possible designation, the CT Bureau
looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the
group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the
capability and intent to carry out such acts.
Entities placed on the FTO list are suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. By
designating an entity as an FTO, the United States seeks to limit the group’s financial, property,
46 For an English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
47 “Hamas in 2017: The document in full,” Middle East Eye, May 1, 2017. This document, unlike the 1988 charter,
does not identify Hamas with the Muslim Brotherhood.
48 Prepared by John W. Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security. For more information, see CRS In Focus
IF10613, Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), by John W. Rollins.
49 As defined in Section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)), or
“terrorism,” as defined in Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA), Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989 (FRAA) (22 U.S.C. §2656f(d)(2)).
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and travel interests. Per Section 219 of the INA, as amended by Section 302 of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), the Secretary of State must demonstrate
that the entity of concern has met the three criteria to allow the Department to designate it as an
FTO. The suspected terrorist group must:
•
•
•
be a foreign organization,
engage in or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorism, and
threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national defense, foreign
relations, or the economic interests of the United States.
In general, the designation of an entity, such as Hamas, as an FTO leads or may lead to the
following consequences:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States to knowingly provide “material support or resources” to a
designated FTO.
Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are
inadmissible to, and in certain circumstances removable from, the United
States.
The Secretary of the Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions
possessing or controlling any assets of a designated FTO to block all
transactions involving those assets.
May motivate efforts by the U.S. government and other nations to curb
terrorism financing.
May stigmatize and isolate the FTO outside of its established support base.
May deter donations or contributions to and economic transactions with the FTO.
May heighten public awareness and knowledge of the FTO and terrorist
organizations more generally.
May signal to other governments U.S. concern about designated
organizations.
Hamas’s relationship with Iran
The Iranian government has supported Hamas for decades, going back nearly to the group’s
inception.50 Iranian officials met with Hamas leaders and expressed public backing for the group
and its goals beginning in the early 1990s, as Hamas sought to take up the mantle of Palestinian
resistance to Israel against the backdrop of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-Israel
negotiations that culminated in the 1993 Oslo Accord.51 Hamas opened an external office in Iran
in 1992.
50 The Iranian government has backed terrorist groups since the early 1980s, focused initially on supporting the Shia
Islamist group Hezbollah in Lebanon and pressuring Persian Gulf monarchies to cease their support for Iraq in its war
against Iran. After the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising) broke out in 1987 (the same year Hamas was founded),
Iran began to focus more on supporting Palestinian groups. See U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism:
1986, January 1988 and Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, April 1990.
51 “Iran pledges to aid Hamas in fight for ‘free Palestine,’” Independent (London), November 17, 1992; Christopher
Walker, “PLO fears rise of fundamentalists,” Times (London), December 18, 1992; “Iran tells Hamas it is firmly
against PLO peace deal,” Reuters, November 30, 1993. For background on the Oslo Accord, see CRS Report RL34074,
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
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It is less clear how much material support the Iranian government provided to Hamas in the first
years of the relationship. In 1998, Hamas’s spiritual leader Ahmad Yassin (later killed in a 2004
Israeli strike) reportedly obtained from Iran a pledge of $15 million a month.52
During the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) of 2000-2005, Iran reportedly continued to
provide support to Hamas, including via the Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (also an
FTO).53 Some experts have contrasted Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah (a “full Iranian proxy,”
in the words of one observer) with its relationship with Hamas (“a pragmatic partner to Iran’s
anti-Israel axis”).54
Since Hamas took over de facto control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it has engaged in several
rounds of conflict with Israel, with continued reported material and financial support from Iran.
Iranian aid has been especially important to Hamas in light of Israeli-Egyptian restrictions in
place for Gaza since 2007 on the transit of people and goods, and with regard to Hamas’s arsenal
of rockets, which have featured prominently in Hamas attacks against Israel for years. Iran
reportedly initially smuggled rockets into Gaza by sea and via illicit tunnels under the Egyptian
border. After Egypt began cracking down on those tunnels in 2013, and as ties between Iran and
Sudan (a key arms transit point) began to deteriorate in 2014, Iran apparently focused more on
teaching Palestinian militants how to use Iranian systems and locally manufacture their own
variants.55
Iran-Hamas relations deteriorated after the outbreak of violence in Syria in 2011, with Iran and
Hezbollah backing the government of Bashar al Asad, and Hamas siding with the mostly Sunni
opposition. In 2012, Hamas’s political leadership left Damascus; Qatar has since then allowed it
to operate an office in Doha. In 2017, with Hamas more isolated regionally and with the Iranbacked Asad government ascendant, the two sides began to repair ties and have since appeared
closely aligned. Hamas’s top political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly visited Tehran at least
three times between 2019 and the October 7 attacks.56
The level of Iranian material support for Hamas has reportedly remained high in recent years. In a
September 2020 publication, the State Department reported that “Iran historically provided up to
$100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas,
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command.”57 Haniyeh reportedly said in a January 2022 interview that Iran was the “main
funder” of a $70 million “plan of defense for Gaza” after 2009.58 According to an October 2023
media report, “An Israeli security source said that Iran had significantly increased funding for
Hamas’ military wing in the past year from $100 million to about $350 million a year.”59
Some analysts have asserted that certain weapons—particularly rocket-propelled grenades—that
Gazan militants are observably using (based on open source images) are likely of North Korean
52 Laura King, “Hamas leader gaining Arab support,” Associated Press, May 27, 1998.
53 Aaron Mannes, “Iran binds Hizballah to Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, March 30, 2004.
54 Ido Levy, “How Iran fuels Hamas terrorism,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1, 2021.
55 Fabian Hinz, “Iran transfers rockets to Palestinian groups,” Wilson Center, May 19, 2021; Adnan Abu Amer,
“Report outlines how Iran smuggles arms to Hamas,” Al-Monitor, April 9, 2021.
56 Maren Koss, “Flexible resistance: How Hezbollah and Hamas are mending ties,” Carnegie Middle East Center, July
11, 2018. Haniyeh reportedly visited Tehran in June 2019, January 2020 (for the funeral of assassinated Iranian military
leader Qassem Soleimani), and August 2021 (for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s inauguration). Iran and Sudan
announced the resumption of diplomatic relations on October 9, 2023.
57 U.S. State Department, Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive Activities, September 2020.
58 Mai Abu Hasaneen, “Hamas holds memorial tribute for Soleimani in Gaza,” Al-Monitor, January 7, 2022.
59 Samia Nakhoul, “How Hamas secretly built a ‘mini-army’ to fight Israel,” Reuters, October 16, 2023.
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origin. One U.S.-based scholar said, “This could be new supplies or from previous shipments
going back as far as 2009,” and that any North Korean weapons likely took an indirect route via
Iran or Syria to Hamas. North Korea’s official news agency denied that any of its weapons were
being used in the ongoing conflict.60
Hamas attacks: Why and why now?
Hamas leaders have said that their planning and preparation for the October 2023 attacks took
place over several years, suggesting that the group made a strategic decision to prepare itself to be
able to carry out attacks and operations that might change the status quo and prevailing
assumptions in the group’s long confrontation with Israel.61 The decision to launch the attacks in
October 2023 may reflect various Hamas motivating factors, including the following:
•
•
•
•
Disrupting Arab-Israeli normalization efforts – The October 7 attacks
may have been intended to disrupt existing and potential future normalization
agreements between Israel and Arab states, including U.S.-backed efforts to
promote Saudi-Israeli normalization. Hamas may have assessed that Arab
governments’ increased willingness to normalize relations with Israel before
the establishment of a Palestinian state—and potential PA acquiescence to
this trend—provided an opening for Hamas to portray itself as uniquely
committed to the Palestinian national cause.
Seeking to strengthen its domestic and regional position – Hamas may
have launched the attacks in a bid to bolster its domestic political position
vis-à-vis the struggling PA and its president Mahmoud Abbas. Difficult and
deteriorating living conditions in Gaza may have increased local political
pressure on Hamas, and Hamas leaders may have perceived political
opportunity arising from alleged Israeli encroachments on Muslim holy sites
in Jerusalem and a pattern of confrontations in 2022 and 2023 between
Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank. A former senior U.S. official has
speculated, “Hamas’s intention is to get Israel to retaliate massively and have
the conflict escalate: a West Bank uprising, Hezbollah attacks, a revolt in
Jerusalem.”62
Capitalizing on Israeli domestic turmoil – Political tensions have risen in
2023 among Israelis, stemming from disputes over proposed judicial reform
and other issues. Hamas and its allies may have perceived an opportunity to
strike at a time of internal division and distraction within Israel, and perhaps
amplify discord among Israelis, by launching the attacks and successfully
targeting Israeli military and civilian targets.
Using hostages for prisoner releases or other concessions – Hamas leaders
have long highlighted the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel as a
priority for the group, and may have launched the attacks to use hostages to
obtain prisoner releases or other Israeli concessions.
60 “North Korea denies its weapons used by Hamas against Israel,” Reuters, October 12, 2023.
61 Hamas official Ali Baraka quoted in Samia Nakhoul and Laila Bassam, “Who is Mohammed Deif, the Hamas
commander behind the attack on Israel?” Reuters, October 11, 2023.
62 Martin Indyk, “Why Hamas Attacked—and Why Israel Was Taken by Surprise,” Foreign Affairs, October 7, 2023.
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What is Palestine Islamic Jihad and who supports it?
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is another FTO that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim
Brotherhood and receives support from Iran, including possibly cryptocurrency.63 PIJ emerged in
the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas. Since 2000, PIJ has conducted several attacks
against Israeli targets (including suicide bombings), killing scores of Israelis. PIJ militants in
Gaza sometimes take the lead in firing rockets into Israel—perhaps to pressure Hamas into
matching its hardline tactics or to demonstrate its credentials as a resistance movement to
domestic audiences and external supporters.
PIJ’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and Shiite
revolutionary thought (inspired by the Iranian Revolution). PIJ seeks liberation of all of historic
Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has
not established a social services network, formed a political movement, or participated in
elections. PIJ has not received as much support from Palestinians as Hamas has. Some PIJ leaders
reside in Syria, Lebanon, or other Arab states.
For three days in August 2022, Israel and PIJ militants in Gaza exchanged fire. Hamas stayed out
of the violence. A similar round of violence between Israel and PIJ (with Hamas abstaining) took
place in November 2019. PIJ personnel reportedly hold some of the hostages from the October 7
attacks and claimed operations at Israel’s northern border with Lebanon in the days following the
attacks.64
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2021 (most recent),
“estimates of PIJ’s membership range from about 1,000 to several thousand.”
Is there evidence that Hamas and Palestine Islamic
Jihad are using cryptocurrency to finance their
activities?65
According to reporting by the Wall Street Journal and CNN, citing a cryptocurrency analytics
firm, digital currency wallets linked to Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) received as much as $93
million in cryptocurrency between August 2021 and June 2023. Digital currency wallets linked to
Hamas allegedly received about $41 million over a similar time frame (a figure attributed to a
different analytics firm), but Israeli authorities may have been able to interdict some or all of that
amount.66
On October 10, the Israel government issued a press release stating that, in collaboration with
Binance (the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange), it had frozen cryptocurrency accounts
63 Berwick and Talley, “Hamas Militants Behind Israel Attack Raised Millions in Crypto.”
64 “Islamic jihad faction holding over 30 Israelis captive, its chief says,” Reuters, October 8, 2023; “Palestinian Al
Quds Brigades claim responsibility for attack at Lebanon-Israel border,” Reuters, October 9, 2023.
65 Prepared by Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance; and Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in
International Crime and Narcotics.
66 Angus Berwick and Ian Talley, “Hamas Militants Behind Israel Attack Raised Millions in Crypto,” Wall Street
Journal, October 10, 2023; Scott Glover et al., “‘They’re opportunistic and adaptive’: How Hamas is using
cryptocurrency to raise funds,” CNN, October 12, 2023.
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linked to Hamas.67 On October 18, the United States applied sanctions to a Gaza-based
cryptocurrency exchange with links to Hamas.68
U.S. financial regulators have previously raised concerns about Hamas-linked activity in
cryptocurrencies. For example, In March 2023, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trade Commission
filed a civil enforcement action against Binance.69 Among other items, the CFTC alleges that
Binance received and dismissed information regarding Hamas transactions in February 2019.70
Additionally, in August 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a series of terrorismrelated cryptocurrency actions. One of them involved the Qassam Brigades, described as Hamas’s
military wing.71 According to an industry report from early 2020, Qassam Brigades
cryptocurrency fundraising efforts had generated “tens of thousands of dollars of Bitcoin” and
was among “the largest and most sophisticated cryptocurrency-based terrorism financing
campaigns ever seen.”72 As part of the actions reported in August 2020, U.S. law enforcement
seized the infrastructure of the Qassam Brigades websites and subsequently covertly operated
alqassam.net. U.S. law enforcement also reportedly tracked and seized 150 cryptocurrency
accounts through which funds were laundered to and from Qassam Brigades accounts. The
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia also unsealed criminal charges
against individuals who allegedly acted as related money launderers while operating an
unlicensed money transmitting business. Cryptocurrency donations reportedly continued to flow
to the Qassam Brigades following the August 2020 actions; the campaign for such donations
appears to have ended in April 2023.73
How did Hamas achieve the element of surprise?
The nature and timing of the attacks from Gaza have prompted questions about whether or not the
Israeli or U.S. governments had prior information to suggest such attacks were possible or
imminent or, if not, why they might have missed signs or misinterpreted indications. IDF Major
General Aharon Haliva, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, has stated that his
command failed to warn of the attack and that he bears “full responsibility for the failure.”74
Ronen Bar, head of the Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shin Bet or Shabak), also has
taken personal responsibility for the intelligence failure. An unnamed U.S. official in a White
House-organized press briefing declined to address the question of U.S. intelligence prior to the
67 Camomile Shumba and Sandali Handagama, “Hamas-Linked Crypto Accounts Frozen by Israeli Police, with
Binance’s Help: Report,” Coin Desk, October 10, 2023.
68 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Following Terrorist Attack on Israel, Treasury Sanctions Hamas Operatives and
Financial Facilitators,” October 18, 2023.
69 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “CFTC Charges Binance and Its Founder, Changpeng Zhao, with Willful
Evasion of Federal Law and Operating an Illegal Digital Asset Derivatives Exchange,” press release, March 27, 2023.
70 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Changpeng Zhao, Binance Holdings Limited, Binance Holdings (IE)
Limited, Binance (Services) Holdings Limited, and Samuel Lim, 33 (United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois 2023).
71 U.S. Department of Justice, “Global Disruption of Three Terror Finance Cyber-Enabled Campaigns,” August 13,
2020.
72 Chainalysis, “Terrorism Financing in Early Stages with Cryptocurrency but Advancing Quickly,” January 17, 2020,
https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/terrorism-financing-cryptocurrency-2019/. See also Elliptic, “Cracking the Code:
Tracing the Bitcoins from a Hamas Terrorist Fundraising Campaign,” April 26, 2019.
73 David Carlisle, “How Hamas Has Utilized Crypto, and What May be Coming,” Elliptic, October 11, 2023; Nidal AlMughrabi, “Hamas Armed Wing Announces Suspension of Bitcoin Fundraising,” Reuters, April 28, 2023.
74 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF intel chief says he ‘bears full responsibility’ for not warning of Hamas attack,” Times of
Israel, October 17, 2023.
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attack, and said that the United States “will continue to provide Israel with support during this
critical time, including close—close, deep intelligence sharing.”75
Israel’s reportedly advanced intelligence capabilities appear to have failed to detect planning and
preparation for the October 7 attacks, including Palestinian groups’ acquisition or development of
munition-carrying drones, personnel-carrying gliders, and thousands of missiles and rockets.
Some former Israeli security officials have speculated that Palestinian armed groups have adapted
their operations and methods following repeated rounds of conflict with Israel.76 Periodic attacks
in Syria—attributed to Israel—against reported shipments of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah and
other armed groups on Israel’s northern borders suggest that Israel’s intelligence and defense
establishment remain actively focused on transregional and cross-border security threats.
Domestic political tensions and confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank
and in and around Jerusalem also may consume Israeli intelligence and domestic security
resources. There is insufficient publicly available information at this time to determine whether or
how these factors may have affected Israel’s ability to detect, prevent, and respond to the October
7 attacks.
Some Members of Congress or others may raise questions about U.S. intelligence detection or
interpretation of data prior to the attacks. U.S. intelligence officials have not indicated that the
United States had specific information to suggest the October 7 attacks were imminent. In April
2023, U.S. Director for Central Intelligence William Burns said, “Despite the promise of the
Abraham Accords and progress to a normalization between Israel and more Arab states, tensions
in the region, including between Palestinians and Israelis, threaten to bubble over again.”77 The
U.S. military and its naval partners periodically intercept weapons shipments in the Arabian SeaRed Sea corridor that have been presumed to be destined for the Iran-backed Houthi movement in
Yemen. It is possible that Hamas and other Gaza-based armed groups use similar sources,
methods, and routes to acquire and smuggle weaponry.
Hamas figures have suggested that their planning and preparations for the attacks spanned several
years, and included a “subterfuge campaign” in which it sought to convey the impression that it
was unprepared for or unwilling to engage in a new round of conflict.78 As one apparent element
of this effort, Hamas encouraged Israel to believe that economic incentives it was providing to
Gazans were decreasing Hamas’s motivation to engage in conflict.79 Hamas figures also have told
the media that they compartmentalized information about their plans and limited dissemination to
exclude even senior political leaders.80 The groups responsible also may have taken other
operational security measures to conceal their activities and preparations. Footage released by the
attackers indicates that initial attacks were made against Israeli technical observation
infrastructure along the Gaza-Israel line of control; the disabling of these sites may have
contributed to the attackers’ apparent achievement of operational surprise.
75 White House, “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official Regarding Hamas Terrorist Attacks in
Israel,” October 7, 2023.
76 Tia Goldenberg, “What went wrong? Questions emerge over Israel’s intelligence prowess after Hamas attack,”
Associated Press, October 9, 2023.
77 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “DCIA @ Rice University,” April 11, 2023.
78 Samia Nakhoul and Laila Bassam, “Who is Mohammed Deif, the Hamas commander behind the attack on Israel?”
Reuters, October 11, 2023; Samia Nakhoul and Jonathan Saul, “How Hamas duped Israel as it planned devastating
attack,” Reuters, October 10, 2023.
79 Nakhoul and Saul, “How Hamas duped Israel as it planned devastating attack.”
80 Hamza Hendawi, “Hamas political leaders were unaware of Israel incursion plan, Egypt officials say,” The National,
October 9, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
There is insufficient public information available at this time to determine whether or how the
deployment locations of IDF personnel in Israel and the West Bank at the time of the attacks may
have shaped events or the initial Israeli response. The attacks’ occurrence during Jewish Israelis’
observation of the Sabbath and the holiday of Simchat Torah also may have benefitted the
attackers and increased the likelihood that the public spread of information and mobilization of a
response would be slower.
Did Iran play a role in planning, directing, or
otherwise enabling the Hamas attacks?
It remains unclear to what extent, if at all, the government of Iran was directly involved in the
October 2023 Hamas assault. U.S. and Israeli officials have stated publicly that despite the
Iranian government’s longstanding support for Hamas and its enthusiastic praise for the October
2023 assault, they do not have evidence at this time that the government of Iran played a direct
role in planning it or carrying it out. Media accounts, citing a variety of unnamed U.S. and
foreign officials, have varied in their assessments of Iranian involvement.
As of October 17, 2023, one early media account has indicated that Iran had a direct role in the
October 7 attacks. On October 8, 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing unnamed Hamas
and Hezbollah sources, that senior Iranian officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) met with Hamas counterparts (along with Hezbollah and PIJ leaders) in Beirut regularly
since August to plan the attacks and, on October 2, 2023, “gave the green light for the assault.”81
The publishing of that account reportedly caused some controversy among Wall Street Journal
reporters.82 A subsequent October 11 report in the Wall Street Journal indicated that U.S.
intelligence agencies assessed that Iran “likely knew Hamas was planning operations against
Israel but didn’t know the precise timing or scope.”83
Most other media reports align with that latter account from October 11. On October 9, 2023, the
Washington Post reported that planning for the assault began “as early as mid-2022” with “key
support” from Iran (including training for Hamas militants in camps in Lebanon), but that “U.S.
and Israeli officials said they have no firm evidence so far that Iran authorized or directly
coordinated the attack.” That article said further that the “rockets and missiles launched by Hamas
may have been locally produced, but they possess a clear Iranian pedigree.”84 Multiple outside
experts have expressed skepticism that Hamas could plan such a complex and resource-intensive
assault without the awareness, if not active support, of Iran.85 However, CNN reported on October
11 that the United States had collected intelligence indicating senior Iranian officials were
“caught by surprise” by the assault, perhaps as a result of Hamas’s “operational independence
from Iran.”86 The New York Times similarly reported the U.S. collection of intelligence showing
81 Summer Said et al., “Iran helped plot attack on Israel over several weeks,” Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2023.
82 Max Tani, “Wall Street Journal reporters split over Iran story,” Semafor, October 16, 2023.
83 Warren Strobel, “Iran knew Hamas was planning attacks, but not timing of scale, U.S. says,” Wall Street Journal,
October 11, 2023.
84 Joby Warrick et al., “Hamas received weapons and training from Iran, officials say,” Washington Post, October 9,
2023.
85 Said et al., op. cit.; Dan De Luce et al., “Hamas attack bears hallmarks of Iranian involvement, former U.S. officials
say,” NBC News, October 8, 2023.
86 Zachary Cohen et al., “Initial US intelligence suggests Iran was surprised by the Hamas attack on Israel,” CNN,
October 11, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
that unnamed Iranian officials “who typically would be aware of operations involving the Quds
Force” were surprised by the assault.87
As of October 17, U.S. officials in public statements maintained that firm evidence tying Iran
directly to the assault did not exist, though they also asserted that “Hamas wouldn’t be around in
the way that it is without the support that it’s received from Iran over the years,” as Secretary of
State Blinken said on October 8.88 Blinken stated the same day, “In this moment, we don’t have
anything that shows us that Iran was directly involved in this attack, in planning it or carrying it
out, but that’s something we’re looking at very carefully, and we’ve got to see where the facts
lead.”89 On October 9, Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer said that “Iran is broadly
complicit in these attacks,” given that Iran has been Hamas’s “primary backer for decades,” but
that there were no signs of “direct involvement” by Iran as of yet.90 Finer also said “we do not
have the ability to corroborate [the Wall Street Journal report] at this time.”91 A State Department
spokesperson said on October 10, “we do not have information to suggest that Iran either directed
or orchestrated these attacks by Hamas. Iran likely knew Hamas was planning operations against
Israel, but without the precise timing or scope of what occurred.”92
An IDF spokesperson reportedly said something similar, saying, “Iran is a major player but we
can’t yet say if it was involved in the planning or training.”93 Another IDF spokesperson said,
“We have no evidence or proof” of Iranian involvement but, “We are 100 percent sure that the
Iranians were not surprised.”94 For their part, Iranian officials, as noted above, have denied direct
involvement; one Hamas official said on October 9, 2023, that Iran was unaware of the operation
in advance.95
Some observers (including some Members of Congress) have tied the October 2023 Hamas
assault to funds from the September 2023 U.S.-Iran agreement that involved the freeing of several
U.S. hostages in exchange for the transfer of $6 billion in Iranian funds from South Korea to
Qatar.96 For more on these topics and congressional action, see “Iran: Transfer of $6 billion.”
87 Adam Entous et al., “Early intelligence shows Hamas attack surprised Iranian leaders, U.S. says,” New York Times,
October 11, 2023.
88 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Dana Bash of CNN’s State of the Union,” October 8,
2023.
89 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Kristen Welker of NBC’s Meet the Press,” October 8,
2023.
90 “U.S. to offer ‘every kind of support’ to Israel on hostages, White House advisor says,” CBS News, October 9, 2023.
91 Andrew Zhang et al., “‘No evidence or proof’: Israel and U.S. uncertain of Iran link to Hamas attack,” Politico,
October 9, 2023.
92 U.S. State Department, Press Briefing, October 10, 2023.
93 “No evidence yet of Iran link to Hamas attack, says Israeli military,” Guardian, October 9, 2023.
94 Andrew Zhang et al., op. cit.
95 Bassem Mroue and Sarah el Deeb, “Hamas official says Iran and Hezbollah had no role in Israeli incursion but
they’ll help if needed,” Associated Press, October 9, 2023.
96 See, for example, Representative French Hill, “Release: Rep. Hill condemns Hamas attack on Israel,” October 7,
2023; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member’s Press, “Risch statement on terrorist attacks against
Israel,” October 7, 2023. For background on the prisoner exchange/fund transfer agreement, see CRS Report R47321,
Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is the role of the Palestinian Authority in this
crisis?
After Hamas’s attacks on October 7, despite the considerable animus between the Palestinian
Authority and Hamas, PA President Mahmoud Abbas said that Palestinians have the right “to
defend themselves against the terrorism of settlers and the occupation forces.”97 In a statement
released the same day, the PA Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed Israel for “the destruction of the
peace process” and said that “the continuation of the injustice and oppression to which the
Palestinian people are exposed is the reason behind this explosive situation.”98 Per some analysts,
the Hamas attack has put Abbas in a difficult position, unwilling to embrace his Hamas rivals and
their attack on Israel, but also unable to denounce them for fear of alienating West Bank
Palestinians.99 Abbas has continued to engage with other world leaders (including an October 9
call with U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, in which Abbas asked the United Nations to
“immediately intervene to stop the ongoing Israeli aggression”), but has not made any public
appearances.100
The PA was created in the 1990s to provide Palestinians with temporary, limited self-rule in Gaza
and specific urban areas of the West Bank (see Figure 3)—under overarching Israeli control—
pending a final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. It is dominated by Fatah, a secular
Palestinian political party whose chairman Mahmoud Abbas has served as PA president since his
election by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in 2005 after the death of Yasser Arafat.
When his four-year term expired in 2009, the PA extended his term indefinitely until new
elections could take place; no elections have occurred to date. The PA has exercised little or no
effective control in Gaza since Hamas forcibly seized control there in 2007. Having different
Palestinian leaders in the two territories has complicated the question of who speaks for the
Palestinians at home and abroad.
97 Gianluca Pacchiani, “Abbas stressed Palestinian right to self defense, as int’l community condemns Hamas,” Times
of Israel, October 7, 2023.
98 X post, State of Palestine - MFA (@pmofa), October 7, 2023, https://twitter.com/pmofa/status/
1710630801379922370.
99 Mohammad al-Kassim, “PA President Mahmoud Abbas MIA as Hamas wages war against Israel,” Ynetnews,
September 10, 2023.
100 “President Abbas calls on UN to promptly intervene to stop Israeli aggression against Palestinians,” WAFA News
Agency, October 9, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Figure 3. Map of West Bank
Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, 2018,
adapted by CRS.
Note: All boundaries and depictions are approximate.
Successive U.S. presidential Administrations and Israeli governments appear to have viewed the
Abbas-led PA as a traditional counterweight to Hamas. Under Abbas, the PA does not appear to
have actively organized or directed violent campaigns targeting Israel or Israelis. The PA and its
security forces generally engage in some discreet coordination efforts with Israel to counter
shared threats from Hamas and other militants. This coordination has reportedly waned at least to
some extent in connection with increased West Bank violence in 2023.
The United States has invested in boosting PA governance and security capacities. The U.S.
Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), established in 2005, is a
U.S.-led multilateral mission of more than 75 security specialists from nine NATO countries
based in Jerusalem, with a forward post in the West Bank city of Ramallah, where the PA is
headquartered.101 The USSC is headed by a three-star U.S. flag officer who leads U.S. efforts to
101 Information provided by the USSC to CRS, October 20, 2022. The core of the USSC is made up of U.S. military
officers hosted by the Department of State. Supporting contingents of security specialists from the United Kingdom and
(continued...)
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
help develop and reform the PA security sector, and facilitate coordination and communication
between Israeli and PA security units. For more information about the USSC and U.S. non-lethal
security assistance to PA security forces, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. See Figure 4 for information on overall bilateral
U.S. aid to the Palestinians.
Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2014-FY2024 Request
appropriations
Sources: U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), adapted by CRS.
Notes: All amounts are approximate and reflect appropriations for each fiscal year. Some amounts have been
appropriated but not obligated. Amounts for FY2024 have been requested but not appropriated. NADR =
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations.
Despite the potential for the PA to act as a counterweight to Hamas, some factors now constrain
the United States from supporting the PA as it had in Abbas’s early years of rule. The PA is facing
a major ongoing financial crisis that could lead to bankruptcy, amid Palestinian domestic turmoil,
internal corruption allegations, and grievances the PA has with current Israeli government policies
in the West Bank—including on settlements and security.102 In a July 2023 CNN interview,
President Biden said that the PA has “lost its credibility” and created a “vacuum for extremism
among the Palestinians.” He also said at the time that some Israeli cabinet members are “part of
the problem,”103 referring to Israeli-Palestinian tensions stemming from Israeli actions in the West
Bank and Jerusalem.
Speculation surrounds who might lead the PA once President Abbas (born in 1935) leaves
office—whether via elections or otherwise104—perhaps further contributing to West Bank
instability as various actors anticipate a contest for succession.
The Taylor Force Act (TFA, enacted in March 2018 as Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141), prohibits
most U.S. economic aid that “directly benefits” the PA, because of certain PA payments “for acts
Canada work with the U.S. core team, as do smaller contingents from the Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, Poland, Greece,
and Bulgaria.
102 Alex Lederman, “The Palestinian Authority Is in Danger, and So Is Israel,” Israel Policy Forum, June 29, 2023.
103 Transcript: “Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden,” CNN, July 9, 2023.
104 Udi Dekel and Noa Shusterman, “The Day after Abbas”: Strategic Implications for Israel, Institute for National
Security Studies, December 2022; International Crisis Group, Managing Palestine’s Looming Leadership Transition,
February 1, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
of terrorism.”105 U.S. officials have encouraged other parties in the region to support the PA,106
encountering some public criticism because language in the TFA calls on all countries to cease
budgetary support to the PA until it “stops all payments incentivizing terror.”107
Palestinian Payments for “Martyrs” and Prisoners
The Palestinian practice of compensating families who lost a member (militant or civilian) in connection with
Israeli-Palestinian violence reportedly dates back to the 1960s.108 Palestinian payments on behalf of prisoners or
decedents in their current form apparently “became standardized during the second intifada [uprising] of 2000 to
2005.”109 Various PA laws and decrees since 2004 have established parameters for payments.110 U.S. lawmakers
and executive branch officials have condemned the practice, arguing that it may incentivize violence, and focusing
particular criticism on an apparent tiered structure that provides higher levels of compensation for prisoners who
receive longer sentences.111
Beyond these issues, PA security forces have faced a number of challenges in seeking to counter
Hamas and other militants. When the forces have cautiously avoided confrontation, they have
been vulnerable to criticism from Israeli and U.S. officials that they are weak or incapable of
maintaining order, or even sympathetic to the militants’ causes. When they have undertaken
operations to arrest militants—which in some cases may have been for the purpose of minimizing
Israeli incursions—some domestic critics have labeled them as collaborators with Israel,
especially when such operations and the resulting prosecution and imprisonment of suspects
appeared to be related to Israeli raids, information sharing, or objectives.112
105 During the legislative process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA payments—made
to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of terrorism by Israel—provide incentives for
Palestinians to commit terrorist acts. For more information see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background
and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
106 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” May 24, 2023.
107 Sander Gerber, “Opinion: Biden & Co. Keep Funding Palestinian Terror—in Defiance of Congress,” New York
Post, June 20, 2023.
108 Neri Zilber, “An Israel ‘Conspiracy Theory’ That Proved True—but Also More Complicated,” The Atlantic, April
27, 2018.
109 Eli Lake, “The Palestinian incentive program for killing Jews,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2016.
110 Yossi Kuperwasser, “Incentivizing Terrorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to Terrorists and their Families,”
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terrorists-contradicts-palestinian-vows-peacefulintentions/.
111 See, for example, Opening Statement of Senator Bob Corker, in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Consideration of the Taylor Force Act, hearings, 115th Cong., 1st sess., July 12, 2017,
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/corker-opening-statement-at-hearing-on-taylor-force-act; Joel Gehrke,
“House passes bill that could cut off Palestinian Authority funding due to aid of terrorists’ families,” Washington
Examiner, December 5, 2017. For an analysis arguing that these PLO/PA payments are not the primary drivers of
violence against Israel, see Shibley Telhami, “Why the discourse about Palestinian payments to prisoners’ families is
distorted and misleading,” Brookings Institution, December 7, 2020.
112 Jack Mukand, “A year on, Nizar Banat’s killing sheds light on PA corruption, but justice is on hold,” Times of
Israel, October 3, 2022; Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian Authority steps up arrests in Nablus,” Al-Monitor, September
28, 2022.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
How has Israel’s military responded to the attacks?
Counterattacks in Gaza via air and artillery strikes
Having formally declared war on Hamas, the Israeli government has mobilized around 360,000
reservists, or between 3% and 4% of Israel’s total population. Netanyahu has stated that Israelis
should expect prolonged conflict. With operations against attackers inside Israel reportedly
concluded as of October 11, thousands of Israeli air and artillery strikes have occurred in the Gaza
Strip, and Israeli ground forces are reported to be building a base and massing in adjacent areas.
Israeli strikes in Gaza present a dilemma because several military targets are located in close
proximity to civilian residential areas and other facilities like schools and hospitals. President
Biden said in a 60 Minutes interview that Hamas hides “behind the civilians” and puts “their
headquarters where civilians are.”113
Israeli officials have stated that the IDF tries to avoid civilian casualties and provides warnings to
civilians before some strikes.114 In such efforts, the IDF may be limited by incomplete or
imperfect information, Israeli perceptions regarding operational urgency, and constraints on how
precisely the IDF can deliver warnings. An unnamed senior Israeli government source has said:
the “roof knocking” policy, whereby the IDF has previously used text messages, phone
calls, or an initial strike on the roof to warn residents of a building that it is about to be
struck, is not the system currently applying. In certain circumstances, it will be used, the
source says, but today Israel is already evacuating masses of the [Gaza] populace from
central terrorist areas and attacking there.115
The effectiveness of Israel’s strikes in Gaza in destroying or damaging military positions,
personnel, and infrastructure is unclear. Israel claims to have killed a number of militant leaders,
including some from Hamas’s elite Nukhba forces who reportedly helped spearhead the October
7 attacks.116 Despite Israeli efforts to target rocket launching infrastructure, Hamas and other
militants continue to fire rockets into Israel, though these salvos reportedly have not matched the
volume and intensity of the initial barrage on October 7.117 It is unclear to what extent this may be
due to damage from Israeli strikes, Hamas operational decisions, or other factors.
113 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript.”
114 Jack Detsch and Anusha Rathi, “Israel Prepares for Block-by-Block Warfare in Gaza,” Foreign Policy, October 13,
2023.
115 “Senior Israeli source: Gaza will not be Hamastan; ‘roof knocking’ policy no longer norm,” Times of Israel, October
9, 2023.
116 According to the IDF, the IDF and Israel Security Agency (ISA, Shin Bet, or Shabak) have killed Ali Qadi,
Commander of Hamas’s Nukhba Jabalya Assault Company; Muetaz Eid, Commander of the Hamas Southern District
of National Security; Zachariah Abu Ma’amar, Head of the International Relations office in Hamas’s Politburo; Joad
Abu Shmalah, Hamas Minister of Economy in Gaza; Belal Alqadra (or Bilal al Kedra), Commander of the Nukhba
Southern Khan Yunis Assault Company; Merad abu Merad, Head of the Hamas Aerial Array in Gaza City; and Osama
Mazini, the head of the Shura Council of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Information retrieved from
https://idfanc.activetrail.biz/anc16102023.12345 and https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/updates-articles-videos-and-more/
real-time-updates/, October 17, 2023. See also “Nukhba Force: All you need to know about Hamas’ lethal military unit
in target of Israel Army,” CNBC, October 13, 2023.
117 The initial barrage apparently included some 2,500-3,000 rockets. Samia Nakhoul and Jonathan Saul, “How Hamas
duped Israel as it planned devastating attack,” Reuters, October 10, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Iron Dome
According to figures from the IDF, from October 7 through October 16, Hamas, other Gaza-based
Palestinian militants, and Hezbollah fired an estimated 6,000 rockets at Israel.118 Of that amount,
roughly 2,000-3,000 were fired within the initial hours of Hamas’s surprise attack against Israel in
the early morning of October 7.119 Iron Dome’s targeting system and radar are designed to fire its
Tamir interceptors only at incoming projectiles that pose threats to the area being protected, and,
in previous rounds of Israel-Hamas confrontations, Iron Dome’s interception rate has exceeded
90%.120 Nevertheless, when facing a rocket barrage, even with success rates exceeding 90%,
some rockets reach populated areas. There is insufficient public information available at this time
to authoritatively assess Iron Dome’s interception rate in the current conflict.121 According to one
analysis by the Modern War Institute at West Point, “If Hamas fires ten rockets and misses with
nine, Iron Dome can most likely intercept the one threatening round…. But extrapolate this
dynamic—by firing a thousand, two thousand, or even more rockets—and, eventually, the
advantage shifts in favor of the attacker.”122 In the ongoing war, Israel has deployed Iron Dome
batteries nationwide to defend both against rocket attacks emanating from Gaza and mortar and
rocket attacks emanating from Syria and Lebanon.
Though Iron Dome apparently continues to successfully intercept incoming rockets at a high rate,
some Israelis and some others have questioned whether Israel has become over-reliant on
technological solutions both to deter their adversaries and prolong difficult policy dilemmas visà-vis the Palestinians.123 According to one Israeli critic, though Iron Dome undoubtedly has
provided Israelis a certain sense of security, it also has led many Israelis to “not feel the urgency,
or sufficient enough optimism, to press their leaders to solve the underlying problems causing the
long-term crisis facing Gaza.”124
Siege of Gaza
Since Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, Israel has maintained air, land, and sea restrictions on
access to and from Gaza for people and goods, in concert with similarly tight parameters that
Egypt enforces at its land border with Gaza. A security fence separates Gaza from Israel, though
militants reportedly penetrated it in at least 28 areas during the October 7 attacks. A maritime
exclusion zone remains in place off the Gaza coast. The Erez crossing between Gaza and Israel
was damaged in the attacks and is closed. Israel has declared a military exclusion zone
118 Government of Israel, Israel Defense Forces, https://www.idf.il/en/.
119 Samia Nakhoul and Jonathan Saul, “How Hamas duped Israel as it planned devastating attack,” Reuters, October
10, 2023.
120 “Israel says Iron Dome shoots down 97% of Gaza rockets,” Reuters, August 7, 2022.
121
One analyst has said, “Iron Dome’s interception rate may have remained constant compared to previous conflicts,
with the successful strikes due to the high number of rockets fired. It also seems possible, however, that the high
number of rockets fired and their launch frequency overwhelmed the system and degraded its interception rate.” Fabian
Hinz, “The Hamas attack and Israeli military options: Rocket use by Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” International Institute
for Strategic Studies, October 10, 2023.
122 Patrick Sullivan and John Amble, “What Happened to Iron Dome? A Lesson on the Limits of Technology at War,”
Modern War Institute at West Point, October 10, 2023.
123 Seth J. Frantzman and Aaron Mehta, “In wake of Hamas attack, Israel may have to change intel, tech strategy,”
Breaking Defense, October 9, 2023. See also Michael Koplow, “The Great Shattering,” Israel Policy Forum, October 9,
2023.
124 Anshel Pfeffer, “The Costly Success of Israel’s Iron Dome,” The Atlantic, May 24, 2021.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
surrounding Gaza in areas of southern Israel, having evacuated Israeli residents of the region to
areas farther north in Israel.
On October 9, Israel announced a “complete siege” in Gaza that would apparently cut Gaza’s
residents off from the flow of food, water, fuel, and electricity.125 On October 12, Israel’s energy
minister said that Israel-imposed restrictions on the flow of goods, including fuel, and the
cessation of the provision of water and electricity services from Israel to Gaza would remain in
place until the release of Israeli hostages from Gaza.126
The siege has generated fierce debate between
•
those who argue the siege is a necessary element of Israel’s efforts to deprive its
adversaries of important supplies and sustenance, and demoralize and confuse them in
connection with a likely Israeli ground invasion; and
•
those who criticize Israeli measures as potentially severely harmful to civilians—
including vulnerable populations in hospitals, the elderly, and young children—and assert
that the measures breach international law.
“IDF’s call” for evacuation from northern Gaza
On October 13, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it “calls for” for the evacuation of
all civilians in Gaza City in northern Gaza “from their homes southwards for their own safety and
protection”127 (see Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map). Hamas called on people in these
areas to remain in place.128 U.N. officials expressed concern about potentially grave humanitarian
consequences,129 with an estimated 1 million Gazans (nearly half the territory’s population)
displaced from their homes. Reportedly, some of those who have evacuated or have been
evacuating may have been killed by Israeli airstrikes.130
There are reportedly hundreds of American citizens in Gaza, many of whom are seeking to leave.
The White House has stated that it has sought to work with Israel and Egypt to arrange safe
passage for them, but—according to one media report as of October 17—“diplomatic efforts to
ensure this have continued to stall.”131
The possibility of large numbers of refugees raises complex issues for neighboring Egypt (see
“What is Egypt’s role regarding humanitarian developments in Gaza?”). On October 13, Egyptian
President Abdel Fattah al Sisi said that Gazans must “stay steadfast and remain on their land.” He
committed to ensuring the delivery into Gaza of international humanitarian assistance arriving in
Egypt,132 but Egyptian officials have claimed that Israeli strikes in Gaza at or near the Rafah
crossing at the Egypt-Gaza border have prevented efforts to reopen the crossing (discussed
further below).
Ruby Mellen et al., “Israel ordered a ‘complete siege’ of Gaza. Here’s what that looks like,” Washington Post,
October 11, 2023.
126 Israel Katz (@Israel_katz), post on X, 2:34 AM EST, October 12, 2023.
127 Israel Defense Forces (@IDF), post on X (formerly Twitter), 1:50 AM EST, October 13, 2023.
128 “Hamas tells Gaza residents to stay home as Israel ground offensive looms,” Reuters, October 13, 2023.
129 “UN says Israel wants 1.1 million Gazans moved south,” Reuters, October 12, 2023.
130 Yahya Abou-Ghazala, “They followed evacuation orders. An Israeli airstrike killed them the next day,” CNN,
October 17, 2023; “70 killed after convoys of evacuees in Gaza hit by Israeli airstrikes,” NBC News, October 14, 2023.
131 Astha Rajvanshi, “Why Egypt’s Border with Gaza Is Sealed,” Time, October 17, 2023
132 “Gazans must ‘remain on their land’: Egypt’s al-Sisi,” Agence France Presse, October 13, 2023.
125
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
For residents in the northern Gaza region who faced endemically poor living and working
conditions at the outset of conflict, followed by days of active bombardment, the “IDF’s call” for
them to abruptly leave their homes and most of their possessions may present enormous stresses.
Many humanitarian experts argue that implementing an evacuation may not be feasible,
especially under present conditions. Medically compromised, elderly, and disabled individuals,
their families, or families with young children may face particular challenges finding safety.
Individuals and families confront the question of whether to remain in a zone that may likely
experience more intense conflict in the coming days and weeks, or to migrate to southern Gaza
areas where residential and health care infrastructure is reportedly inferior in capacity to that in
the north, while risking potential hazards during the journey and upon arrival. For example,
Hamas may discourage or block movement. Some Gazans’ reaction to the “IDF’s call” to
evacuate could be affected by personal and collective memories of the mass expulsion or
displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians during the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli
wars.133 Thus, some Gazans might interpret the “IDF’s call” as part of a larger pattern of Israeli
efforts to weaken or destroy the Palestinian national cause.
Under pressure reportedly exerted by the United States, among other governments and
organizations, to ensure that those who live in or evacuate to southern Gaza do not face lifethreatening privation, Israel announced the resumption of water supply there (but apparently not
other items) on October 15.134 Then, on October 16, Secretary of State Blinken announced:
the United States and Israel have agreed to develop a plan that will enable humanitarian
aid from donor nations and multilateral organizations to reach civilians in Gaza – and them
alone – including the possibility of creating areas to help keep civilians out of harm’s way.
It is critical that aid begin flowing into Gaza as soon as possible.
We share Israel’s concern that Hamas may seize or destroy aid entering Gaza or otherwise
preventing it from reaching the people who need it. If Hamas in any way blocks
humanitarian assistance from reaching civilians, including by seizing the aid itself, we’ll
be the first to condemn it and we will work to prevent it from happening again. 135
On October 18 during a visit to Israel, President Biden confirmed this plan to facilitate
international aid to Gaza through Egypt, and announced $100 million in U.S. humanitarian
assistance for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.136
It is unclear whether or how the movement of a large portion of northern Gaza’s population to
southern Gaza might affect Israeli future military operations or improve humanitarian outcomes.
If large numbers of civilians leave the areas of Gaza City and its vicinity, where Israel claims that
most Hamas and other militant infrastructure is located, Israel might be able to more precisely
target adversaries with less collateral damage. However, it is possible that militants could seek to
embed themselves with evacuating civilians, while also using Hamas’s vast internal network of
tunnels to impede Israeli military efforts (see “Hamas tunnel system”). Israel has reportedly
conducted several air strikes in southern Gaza since October 7, particularly in Khan Yunis, where
Hamas reportedly maintains operational infrastructure.
133 See, for example, “Israeli evacuation call in Gaza hikes Egypt’s fears of a mass exodus of refugees into its
territory,” Associated Press, October 13, 2023.
134 Barak Ravid, “Israel resumes water supply to southern Gaza after U.S. pressure,” Axios, October 15, 2023.
135 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press on President Biden’s Upcoming Trip to
Israel and Agreement with Israel to Develop a Humanitarian Aid Plan for Gaza,” October 16, 2023.
136 White House, “U.S. Announcement of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People,” October 18, 2023; Brett
Samuels, “Biden announces humanitarian aid deal for Gaza,” The Hill, October 18, 2023.
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What role do humanitarian considerations have in
the conflict?
What international humanitarian law responsibilities do the
conflict parties have?137
All parties to the current conflict, including Hamas and Israeli forces, as well as any other state
militaries or non-state armed groups who join the fighting, are prohibited by international
humanitarian law (IHL) from causing undue suffering amongst civilians and combatants during
the conflict. IHL, also known as jus in bello, is intended to limit harm and suffering caused by
parties to an armed conflict. These prohibitions adhere in all instances of the use of military force
or other military operations in armed conflict, including actions taken in self-defense against
armed attack. The basic principles of IHL include (1) the distinction between civilians and
combatants; (2) the prohibition of attack on those not participating in armed conflict (hors de
combat), including combatants who have surrendered or been wounded; (3) the prohibition
against infliction of unnecessary suffering; (4) the principle of necessity, which permits military
action only when necessary to weaken the military capacity of an enemy; and (5) the principle of
proportionality, which prohibits military action that will cause injury or death to civilians or
damage to civilian objects that is excessive in relation to the military advantage gained.138 IHL
violations might have already occurred, be ongoing, or continue to take place as this conflict
unfolds, as indicated by
•
•
•
the attacks of October 7 on civilians and the taking of civilian hostages;
reports of intentional or indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian areas
and destruction of civilian and cultural buildings—including places of
worship, hospitals, and schools; and
statements by officials on both sides of the conflict explaining plans to
attack, starve, or deny humanitarian assistance to a civilian population, or
destroy objects indispensable to a civilian population’s survival, and reports
of such plans and actions being carried out.
Both Israel and the “State of Palestine” are required to prevent and punish criminal violations of
IHL (“war crimes”), systematic widespread attacks on civilian populations (“crimes against
humanity”), and the intentional destruction of any group in whole or in part (“genocide”).139 In
addition, the International Criminal Court (ICC) possesses the authority to investigate and
prosecute alleged instances of these crimes during the current conflict. In December 2014,
Palestinian leaders accepted ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed by Palestinian nationals or
“in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014,” and in
January 2015 the “State of Palestine” became party to the Rome Statute, the treaty that
137 Prepared by Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation.
138 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Fundamentals of IHL, https://casebook.icrc.org/law/fundamentals-
ihl#d_iii.
139 To the extent that Hamas is considered the governing authority for Gaza, which for purposes of the Geneva
Conventions appears to be considered part of the “State of Palestine,” Hamas holds responsibility for adherence to the
Geneva Conventions in Gaza. As a party to armed conflict, Hamas, whether considered as a state or non-state actor, is
bound by the obligations of IHL and its officials and personnel are subject to criminal prosecution for atrocity crimes.
See generally Jelena Pejic, “The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye,” International
Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 881 (March 2011).
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established the ICC.140 After a preliminary examination, the ICC Prosecutor announced in March
2021 that the Prosecutor had opened a formal investigation into the “situation in Palestine.”141 On
October 10, 2023, the Office of the ICC Prosecutor stated that the Prosecutor’s investigation
extends to the current conflict, and that the Office is continuously gathering information and
evidence related to all alleged atrocity crimes.142 Israel rejects the ICC’s jurisdiction over its
nationals.143
What is the status of hostages taken from Israel?
On October 16, a spokesman for Hamas said the group was holding 200 hostages, said 50 others
were being held by other “resistance factions and in other places,” and claimed that Israeli strikes
since October 7 had killed 22 hostages.144 A Hamas spokesman also said that the group “is
prepared to release non-Israeli hostages once conditions allow movement in Gaza.”145 An earlier
Hamas statement claimed to have dispersed hostages, including in tunnels reported to span areas
of the Gaza Strip.146 On October 19, an Israeli media account cited IDF data stating that “among
the 203 hostages that the military believes with high confidence are being held by terrorists in the
Gaza Strip, some 30 are children and youths, and another 10-20 are elderly.”147
On October 9, President Biden said, “We believe it is likely that American citizens may be among
those being held by Hamas,” and he said “I have directed my team to work with their Israeli
counterparts on every aspect of the hostage crisis, including sharing intelligence and deploying
experts from across the United States government to consult with and advise Israeli counterparts
on hostage recovery efforts.”148 On October 11, John Kirby, National Security Council
Coordinator for Strategic Communications, said, “We know that a—a number of those Americans
are being held hostage right now by Hamas.”149
The presence of hostages complicates Israeli military considerations and planning, along with
U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence considerations. Past cases of Hamas hostage taking
suggest that related concerns could persist for years.
In prior conflicts with Israel, Palestinian armed groups, including Hamas, have taken hostages
and used them to extract concessions from Israel, including the release of prisoners. In 2011,
Hamas secured the release of more than a thousand prisoners in exchange for a single Israeli
soldier held hostage. On October 9, Al Jazeera aired a statement attributed to Hamas’s Qassam
Brigades threatening that Hamas would broadcast the execution of civilian hostages in response
140 International Criminal Court, Situation in the State of Palestine, ICC-01/18, https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine.
141 International Criminal Court, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, Respecting an Investigation of the
Situation in Palestine, March 3, 2021, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-fatou-bensoudarespecting-investigation-situation-palestine.
142 “ICC Prosecutor Says Mandate Applies to Current Israel-Palestinian Conflict,” Reuters, October 10, 2023.
143 “Israel Rejects ICC Probe, Saying It Lacks Jurisdiction,” Associated Press, April 8, 2021.
144 Hamas spokesman Abu Ubaida quoted in Harriet Sherwood, “Hamas says 250 people held hostage in Gaza,” The
Guardian, October 16, 2023.
145 “Hamas says it is preparing to release non-Israeli hostages,” NBC News, October 16, 2023.
146 Hamas statement on Telegram social media, as reported in Cassandra Vinograd and Isabel Kershner, “Hamas Took
Scores of Hostages from Israel. Here’s What We Know About Them.” New York Times, October 10, 2023.
147 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF says hostages in Gaza include around 30 children, 10-20 elderly people,” Times of Israel,
October 19, 2023.
148 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on American Citizens Impacted in Israel,” October 9, 2023.
149 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic
Communications John Kirby,” October 11, 2023.
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to any subsequent Israeli strikes on civilian homes that occur without prior warning.150 Qatar,
which allows Hamas to operate an office in Doha, reportedly has engaged Hamas figures in
discussions on a potential swap of female Hamas-held hostages for female Palestinian prisoners
held by Israel.151 In an October 10 interview, one prominent Palestinian politician from the West
Bank rejected Hamas’s kidnapping of children, and said that messages had been delivered to
Hamas to dissuade it from executing any hostages.152 He indicated that Hamas was considering
possible prisoner exchange proposals. On October 10, top Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh
said that Hamas will not engage in negotiations on the status of hostages until the conflict
concludes and that the group would only release hostages for agreeable concessions.153 Hamas
released a video showing an Israeli hostage on October 17.154
What is the humanitarian situation in Gaza?155
The Gaza Strip is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. More than two million
people, the majority of whom are registered Palestinian refugees, live in the territory and most
rely on humanitarian assistance. In Gaza, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provides humanitarian services to 1.4 million
Palestinian refugees;156 the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
(UNOCHA) coordinates humanitarian assistance for other vulnerable populations. UNRWA has
13,000 national and international staff in Gaza, most of them refugees themselves.157 Before the
Hamas attack on Israel, the humanitarian situation in Gaza was already protracted and living
conditions were dire.158 UNRWA’s persistent funding shortfalls limited its capacity to respond.159
The World Food Program (WFP) cut assistance for 60 percent of its food aid recipients in Gaza in
June 2023, despite deepening food insecurity, also due to underfunding.160
Hostilities and airstrikes in Gaza continue to destroy infrastructure and humanitarian facilities
and, as of October 19, 2023, had reportedly displaced more than about 1 million people, including
about 527,500 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) taking spontaneous shelter in UNRWA’s
schools, which are temporarily closed.161 The sharp increase in displacement was partly due to
150 An individual identified as Abu Ubaydah of the Al Qassam Brigades said, “Going forward, we announce that each
time our peaceful people are targeted in their houses without a prior notice, we will respond by executing one of the
civilian hostages. We will video the execution and broadcast it. We hold the enemy accountable for this decision before
the world. The ball is in its court.” Al Jazeera Satellite Television, October 9, 2023, 1700 GMT.
151 Reuters, “Qatar leading talks to swap Hamas-held hostages for Palestinians in Israeli jails,” October 9, 2023.
152 Sarah Ferguson and Marina Freri, “Palestinian politician claims Hamas ready to swap hostages,” ABC News
Australia, October 10, 2023.
153 Regional media reports on Hamas statement, October 10, 2023.
154 Ivana Kottasová, “Hamas releases first video of a hostage taken to Gaza,” CNN, October 17, 2023.
155 Prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
156 For information on UNRWA, U.S. contributions to it, and congressional oversight, see CRS Report RL34074, The
Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
157 U.N. News, “Explainer: UN on the ground amid Israel-Palestine crisis,” October 10, 2023.
158 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan:
Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), January 2023; U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA), Annual Operational Report 2022, July 27, 2023.
159 International Crisis Group, “UNRWA’s Reckoning: Preserving the UN Agency Serving Palestinian Refugees.”
Report 242, September 15, 2023.
160 WFP, “WFP sounds alarm on food security amid conflict in Israel and Palestine, urges immediate humanitarian
access,” October 8, 2023.
161 UNOCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel, Flash Update #13, October 19, 2023; UNRWA, “Situation
Report #7 on the situation in the Gaza Strip,” October 17, 2023.
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civilians in northern Gaza attempting to relocate to southern Gaza following the October 13 “IDF
call” for evacuation. An unknown number of civilians remain in the north. Although the numbers
are fluid, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry, in Gaza as of October 19, an estimated
3,785 civilians had been killed and more than 12,500 injured.162 These figures do not include
fatalities from a reported October 17 strike on an UNRWA school in Al Maghazi refugee camp in
central Gaza, which is sheltering an estimated 4,000 IDPs, or the estimated many patient and IDP
fatalities from the October 17 explosion mentioned above at Al Ahly hospital in Gaza City.
Israel’s imposed “complete siege” and cutoffs of food, water, fuel and electricity to Gaza have
had an impact on emergency services and health facilities amid high demand for lifesaving
care.163 Overcrowding and lack of basic relief supplies, shelter facilities, water, and sanitation
services have created severe hardship for civilians.164 On October 15, Israel announced a
resumption of water supply to southern Gaza. As of October 19, humanitarian assistance on the
Egyptian side awaiting delivery to Gaza in response to needs—including food, water and
medicines—has reportedly not moved past the Rafah crossing at the Gaza-Egypt border. On
October 18, the Biden Administration announced that Israel had agreed to allow humanitarian
assistance to flow between Egypt and Gaza, with the understanding that it would be subject to
inspections, and that it should go to civilians and not Hamas militants. The timeline on when
assistance might start to move is not known.165 UNRWA and WFP are coordinating limited food
distribution in shelters. WFP has prepositioned food and is aiming to reach 1.3 million
beneficiaries with critical assistance over the next two weeks.166 The intensity of the hostilities
constrains the ability of humanitarian staff to deliver assistance and supplies into the territory. At
least 14 U.N. employees had been killed in air strikes in Gaza as of October 17.167
Protection of and access to civilians remain key concerns. The World Health Organization and
other U.N. agencies and partners proposed establishing a humanitarian corridor for safe,
unimpeded humanitarian access to reach people in Gaza with critical supplies.168 The
International Committee of the Red Cross, which is working closely with the Magen David Adom
and the Palestine Red Crescent Society “to assist those who are wounded or sick and in need, has
called for all parties to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law and to take
every possible step to prevent civilians from further harm.”169 The U.N. officials have argued for
a suspension of hostilities that might enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the
release of hostages held by Hamas.
What is Egypt’s role regarding humanitarian developments
in Gaza?
Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, making it the only non-Israeli-controlled
passenger entryway into Gaza. As war continues in Gaza and the humanitarian situation there
162
UNOCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel, Flash Update #13, October 19, 2023.
163 UNRWA, “Situation Report #7 on the situation in the Gaza Strip,” October 17, 2023.
164 Ibid.
165 AP News, “Israel will let Egypt deliver some badly needed aid to Gaza, as it reels from hospital blast,” October 18,
2023.
166 WFP, “WFP Palestine Emergency Response External Situation Report #3,” October 18, 2023.
167 UNRWA, “Situation Report #7 on the situation in the Gaza Strip,” October 17, 2023.
168 U.N. News, “Explainer: UN on the ground amid Israel-Palestine crisis,” October 10, 2023.
169 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Israel and the Occupied Territories: Targeting civilians leads to further
spirals of violence and hatred,” October 10, 2023.
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worsens, Egypt’s government may not welcome large numbers of refugees pouring into the
northern Sinai Peninsula, an area which has witnessed a decade of insurgency between the
Egyptian military and various terrorist groups, including an affiliate of the Islamic State (Sinai
Province).170 Additionally, Egypt faces an ongoing economic crisis at home and a civil war in
Sudan on its southern border. Perhaps most importantly, the Egyptian government may consider
the possibility that temporary resettlement of Palestinians in Egypt could extend over a long term
or become permanent, akin to the situation of some Palestinians living in refugee camps
elsewhere in the region.171
Egypt may play a central role in humanitarian aid delivery. On October 12, Egypt directed that
international aid shipments should arrive via air to Arish in the northern Sinai, about 30 miles
from Gaza. On October 16, Secretary Blinken said that the United States and Israel agreed “to
develop a plan” to deliver the aid into Gaza.172 As of October 17, 2023, approximately 160 trucks
carrying humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip have left Arish airport for the Rafah border
crossing.173
The Egyptian government, which has claimed (during the week of October 16) that the Rafah
border crossing is technically open but inoperable due to Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza side of the
crossing, may be using its sovereign control over Rafah as leverage to negotiate understandings
with Israel, Hamas, and/or the United States over the passage of people and/or humanitarian aid.
Such understandings could relate to a number of issues, ranging from reassurances that
Palestinians won’t be permanently settled in Egypt, to financial inducements for Egyptian
cooperation.174 On October 15, Secretary Blinken may have attempted to reassure Egypt by
saying that the United States does not support the mass relocation of Gazans into Egypt, but
added “we also want to make sure that they’re out of harm’s way and that they’re getting the
assistance they need.”175
What are other relevant humanitarian considerations?
U.S. policy
A senior U.S. defense official acknowledged the relevance of civilian protection concerns in an
October 9 briefing, saying, “engagement on mitigating collateral damage and civilian casualties is
always part of the conversation with all of our allies and partners. It’s no different with Israel.”176
On October 10 and October 11, President Biden stated that he had discussed the importance of
observation of the laws of war with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.177 An October 14 Pentagon
statement on Secretary of Defense Austin’s call with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said
the Secretary “discussed the importance of adhering to the law of war, including civilian
170 “Egypt discusses Gaza aid, rejects corridors for civilians, say sources,” Reuters, October 11, 2023.
171 Heba Saleh, Henry Foy, and Guy Chazan, “Fear of Gaza exodus looms over Egypt,” Financial Times, October 17,
2023.
172 “Gaza aid arrives at border crossing but no plan for delivery yet,” Reuters, October 17, 2023.
173 “Trucks carrying aid for Gaza Strip arrive at Rafah crossing,” Reuters, October 17, 2023.
174 For example, see Steven T. Dennis, “US Aid to Egypt in Limbo Amid Conflict,” Bloomberg, October 16, 2023 and
“Can Egypt be persuaded to accept Gazan refugees?” The Economist, October 14, 2023.
175 Jacob Magid, “Blinken says efforts to relocate Palestinians from Gaza to Sinai a ‘non-starter,’” Times of Israel,
October 15, 2023.
176 U.S. Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing on U.S. Force Posture Changes
in the Middle East,” October 9, 2023.
177 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Terrorist Attacks in Israel,” October 10, 2023.
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protection obligations, and addressing the worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza while Israel
continues its operations to restore security.”178 Following the October 17 explosion at the Al Ahly
hospital in Gaza, President Biden said, “The United States stands unequivocally for the protection
of civilian life during conflict.”179 He subsequently stated that evidence pointed toward a
Palestinian source of the explosion.180 U.S. laws and regulations regarding arms sales and security
assistance restrict certain sales of defense articles to foreign recipients found to have committed
human rights violations.181
In Israel
After the attacks, Israeli authorities evacuated tens of thousands of people from towns and cities
in southern Israel. Thousands of people injured in the attacks on Israel have received medical
support. Ongoing indiscriminate indirect rocket and mortar fire from the Gaza Strip poses
security threats across southern and central Israel, and additional mass evacuations are possible,
which could create humanitarian needs.
Is an Israeli ground invasion likely, and what are
the probable implications?
Objectives and operational considerations
Israel has initiated air strikes and reportedly localized raids, but the questions of whether it will
launch a ground assault, and, if it does, how extensive such a ground assault might be, loom large.
The IDF has said it plans a wide-ranging offensive against Hamas, including coordinated attacks
by land, air, and sea. Cyber and electronic warfare operations also would appear likely. Some
observers, including former U.S. military commanders and defense officials, have speculated on
the nature of a potential Israeli ground invasion. While entry into Gaza from the far north at the
Erez crossing may be favorable for the movement of large tanks and armored personnel carriers,
the IDF could try to enter at other points in central or southern Gaza to surround or surprise
Hamas or to cut its lines of communication. Observers have anticipated the following possible
developments, among others:
•
•
Urban warfare settings. Gaza-based militants may be able to limit Israeli
armored vehicles’ maneuverability, with “anti-tank mines and obstacles intended
to channelize them into concentrated fires,” and surface-to-air missiles targeting
planes and helicopters.182
Block-by-block close quarters fighting. Israel may be aided to some extent by
advanced robotics technology, the urban warfare capabilities of its Merkava
178 U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Call with Israeli Minister of
Defense Yoav Gallant,” October 14, 2023.
179 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the Hospital Explosion in Gaza,” October 17, 2023.
180 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the Hospital Explosion in Gaza,” October 17, 2023.
181 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and
Frequently Asked Questions, by Paul K. Kerr and Michael A. Weber.
182 Luis Martinez, “‘Extremely difficult’: What would be Israel’s objectives in an offensive into Gaza?” ABC News,
October 13, 2023; Mehul Srivastava and John Paul Rathbone, “‘Everything you can imagine and worse’ awaits Israeli
army in Gaza,” Financial Times, October 12, 2023.
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tanks, techniques honed by advanced training for clearing areas and avoiding
ambushes, and the layered use of drones and aircraft.183
Retired General Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, former U.S. Central Command commander, has
stated, “Fighting in a built-up area is the most difficult of all combat operations and Gaza is
uniquely dense, uniquely packed, high-rise buildings ... plus Hamas has had years to put an
elaborate tunnel system into place, which would make it even more difficult.”184 Former Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has said that militants could surprise Israeli troops with new types of
weaponry.185 In light of these challenges, the IDF could potentially opt for tactics in Gaza that
differ from traditional military ground operations. Some observers question whether any attempt
to remove Hamas’s leadership from Gaza would be viable without a major ground invasion.
Hamas tunnel system
Hamas reportedly began using tunnels in Gaza for military purposes in 2006, when Hamas
members used the tunnel system in battle and to capture an Israeli soldier who was later
exchanged for more than 1,000 prisoners in Israeli jails. Hamas claimed in 2021 to have built 311
miles worth of tunnels under Gaza (a little less than half the length of the New York City subway
system).186 Israel’s intelligence community contends that resources provided by international
donors for Gaza relief, recovery, or reconstruction from past conflicts have been diverted by
Hamas to build and fortify its tunnels and bunkers.187
Israel has reportedly spent billions of dollars on “sensors to detect underground movements and
building a barrier to block tunnels from reaching into Israel.”188 From FY2016 to FY2023, after
Hamas’s extensive use of cross-border tunnels in the 2014 Israel-Hamas conflict, Congress has
appropriated $320 million in Department of Defense funding for U.S.-Israel collaboration on
detecting, mapping, and neutralizing underground tunnels that threaten either country.189
183 Ibid.
184 Martinez, “‘Extremely difficult’: What would be Israel’s objectives in an offensive into Gaza?”
185 Srivastava and Rathbone, “‘Everything you can imagine and worse’ awaits Israeli army in Gaza.”
186 Joshua Berlinger, “The ‘Gaza metro’: The mysterious subterranean tunnel network used by Hamas,” CNN, October
17, 2023.
187 Jason Gewirtz, “‘We know they’re waiting for us’: Gaza’s tunnels pose deadly challenge for Israeli troops,” CNBC,
October 12, 2023.
188 Srivastava and Rathbone, “‘Everything you can imagine and worse’ awaits Israeli army in Gaza.”
189 CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
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Figure 5. Tunnels in Gaza
Source: Financial Times, citing other sources.
Note: CRS cannot independently the information herein.
According to various media reports,190 some features of the tunnel system (see Figure 5. Tunnels
in Gaza and Figure 6. View Inside a Gaza Tunnel), include the following:
•
A reported rail system that allows militants to transport rockets underground to different
launch sites within the territory, frustrating Israeli efforts to destroy Hamas’s rocket
capacity from the air.
•
Storage of weapons and ammunition, food, electricity generators, and other supplies to
allow militants refuge and opportunities for tactical surprise against Israeli forces in Gaza
for an extended period of time.
•
Opportunities for militants to disperse themselves and the hostages they hold,
complicating any potential Israeli operation to enter, clear, or destroy tunnels.
Some observers say that the IDF may opt to find ways to “smoke out” militants from the tunnels
rather than storm them.191 Bombing the underground passages is reportedly the most efficient way
to destroy tunnels.192 However, any method that could cause death or severe injury could also
affect hostages possibly held inside or Gazan civilians located above or nearby.
190 Gewirtz, “‘We know they’re waiting for us’: Gaza’s tunnels pose deadly challenge for Israeli troops”; Srivastava
and Rathbone, “‘Everything you can imagine and worse’ awaits Israeli army in Gaza”; Detsch and Rathi, “Israel
Prepares for Block-by-Block Warfare in Gaza”; Martinez, “‘Extremely difficult’: What would be Israel’s objectives in
an offensive into Gaza?”; Neri Zilber and Mehul Srivastava, “Military briefing: the shape of a Gaza invasion,”
Financial Times, October 13, 2023.
191 Gewirtz, “‘We know they’re waiting for us’: Gaza’s tunnels pose deadly challenge for Israeli troops.”
192 Berlinger, “The ‘Gaza metro’: The mysterious subterranean tunnel network used by Hamas.”
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Figure 6. View Inside a Gaza Tunnel
Source: CNN, based on a February 2018 photo.
Who or what could replace Hamas control in Gaza?
It is unclear whether the removal of Hamas from power is within Israel’s capabilities or at what
price it might be possible. It is unclear who would govern in Hamas’s place and whether such a
change would result in a lasting peace.
If Israel were to reassume responsibility for Gaza, whether for a temporary duration or
indefinitely, it would return to the role its military had from 1967 (when it captured the territory,
which had been under Egyptian administration) until the then-new PA assumed limited self-rule
in Gaza in 1994. From 1994 until the full withdrawal of Israel’s military and settlers in 2005, PA
administration of Gaza remained subject to overarching Israeli control. Some Israelis and other
observers might wonder why Israel would seek to return to a role of direct administrative
responsibility that it discarded in stages after the outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada in 1987.
In the wake of the October 7 attacks and ensuing conflict, Israeli leaders and citizens may be
reassessing the costs and benefits of devoting manpower and resources to the administration of
Gaza, with its very complicated political, economic, security, and humanitarian situation.
When asked in his 60 Minutes interview if he would “support Israeli occupation of Gaza at this
point,” President Biden said, “I think it’d be a big mistake.” He then said that he believes that
Hamas must be “eliminated entirely,” but that “there needs to be a Palestinian authority. There
needs to be a path to a Palestinian state.”193 In the event Palestinian control were established, it is
unclear whether or how Israel, Palestinian leaders, or third parties could prevent the political
participation in Gaza of groups and individuals that share or sympathize with Hamas’s views.
The PA (discussed above) faces a number of challenges in connection with its limited self-rule
over parts of the West Bank. Similar factors could complicate efforts aimed at having the PA
193 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript.”
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regain control over Gaza, especially considering it lost control to Hamas in 2007. Additionally, if
the PA were to be placed in charge of Gaza by Israel, the Palestinian public could have great
difficulty accepting its legitimacy.
President Biden said that “Hamas and the extreme elements of Hamas don’t represent all the
Palestinian people.”194 It is unclear whether the removal of much or all of Hamas’s leadership and
organizational structure, if it occurs, would effectively quash all individuals and groups who may
have an interest in or engage in efforts to organize violence against Israel. Hamas and other
Islamist or secular militant groups with sizable bases of support in Gaza may respond to popular
sentiment. Hamas leaders and operatives who survive the conflict in Gaza or are in exile
elsewhere, or other Palestinian figures, could conceivably organize rear-guard efforts,
insurgencies, or other movements to oppose or hinder the rule of whatever controlling authority
might succeed Hamas.
Whether Hamas somehow maintains its control in Gaza, or some other governing structure
eventually takes over—be it Israel, the PA, or an entity approved by some combination of Israelis,
Palestinians, and international actors, a major international effort to fund relief, recovery, and
reconstruction, and to restructure patterns of life in Gaza, could take place. For any would-be
governing state or body, such an effort could help mitigate some initial difficulties of resourcing
Gaza’s administration and caring for its vast humanitarian needs.
Could the conflict widen to include other actors
against Israel?
Lebanese Hezbollah
Beyond Hamas, Israel faces hostile actors on a variety of fronts, many backed by Iran. The most
acute of these threats arguably comes from Hezbollah, which some consider Iran’s closest and
most capable proxy. Hezbollah last fought a war with Israel in 2006, when it launched thousands
of rockets into northern Israel and conducted cross-border raids into Israeli territory—killing
more than 40 civilians. Its militia has since periodically launched rockets into Israel (and has
reportedly acquiesced at times to Hamas or PIJ rocket strikes on Israeli-held territory from
Lebanon, an apparent indication of deepening Hamas-Hezbollah ties) as Hezbollah has
accumulated an arsenal of over 100,000 rockets and missiles.195
194 Ibid.
195 Patrick Kingsley et al., “Rockets from Lebanon point to growing Hamas cooperation with Hezbollah,” New York
Times, April 8, 2023; Hanna Davis, “Lebanon: Inside Hezbollah’s arsenal,” Middle East Eye, June 2, 2023.
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Figure 7. Regional Map of Selected Iran-Allied Groups
Source: CRS, based on various open sources.
On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah launched artillery and rocket attacks on Israeli targets, stating that
it did so “in solidarity” with the Hamas attack the day before, prompting Israeli retaliatory strikes
that reportedly killed Hezbollah fighters.196 A raid by PIJ (and possibly including Hamas
militants) across the Lebanese border on October 10 reportedly killed three Israeli soldiers and
prompted further Israeli attacks on Hezbollah sites in Lebanon.197
On October 16, the Israeli defense ministry ordered residents of 28 Israeli communities near the
border to evacuate to state-funded guesthouses.198 On October 17, additional projectile exchanges
led to reports of three Israelis injured and five Hezbollah fighters dead.199
U.S. officials have reportedly conveyed to Lebanese officials the message that “Hezbollah must
not get involved,” and some analysis suggests that the militia’s leadership reportedly seeks to
keep its operations “limited in scope, preventing a big spillover into Lebanon while keeping
Israeli forces occupied in northern Israel.”200 Hezbollah may increase attacks as a way to distract
Israeli forces or to seek a military advantage in northern Israel in the event of a large-scale Israeli
military ground operation into Gaza. According to a former head of Israel’s military intelligence:
Probably, Hezbollah thinks that they cannot sacrifice themselves for the Palestinians
because their whole reason for existence is Iran, not Gaza. So if they see more signs of
weaknesses, then surely they will see an opportunity. If they see signs of the opposite, of
strength and resolve, they will probably not get tempted.201
196 “Israel, Hezbollah exchange artillery, rocket fire,” Reuters, October 8, 2023.
197 “Lebanon’s Hezbollah on war footing but moves carefully as conflict widens,” Reuters, October 11, 2023.
198 Lauren Sforza, “Israel orders evacuations near Lebanon border,” The Hill, October 16, 2023.
199 “5 Hezbollah fighters are killed as tensions flare along the border between Lebanon and Israel,” Associated Press,
October 17, 2023.
200 “Lebanon’s Hezbollah on war footing but moves carefully as conflict widens,” Reuters.
201 Amy Mackinnon, “Can Israel Handle a War on 2 Fronts?” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
West Bank militants
Israel also faces threats from the West Bank, where tensions have increased dramatically in 2023
(see “What were prevailing conditions (with Gaza, Jerusalem, West Bank, Israel, and regional
diplomacy) before the attacks?”). Newer, youth-driven Palestinian militant groups like the Jenin
Brigades and Nablus-based Lion’s Den—which polls suggest enjoy high levels of Palestinian
domestic popularity—have emerged.202 According to some open sources, various factors may fuel
increased Palestinian militancy, including Israeli actions in the West Bank, PA weakness,
socioeconomic challenges, and the easy availability of weapons.203 One article suggests that much
of the funding comes from Iran, with weaponry improvised, stolen from Israel, or smuggled
across the Jordanian border.204
Hamas leaders have encouraged West Bank Palestinians to join their attack on Israel. Some
Palestinians have held marches to celebrate the attacks.205 Between October 7 and October 19, at
least 79 Palestinians have reportedly been killed by Israeli forces or settlers in West Bank clashes,
with some 700 others (mostly Hamas members) detained.206 The IDF has apparently used
checkpoints and barriers to limit Palestinian movement within the West Bank.207
Groups in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen
Further afield, a years-long campaign of strikes inside Syria attributed to (and sometimes claimed
by) Israel has targeted reported weapons shipments from Iran to Iran-backed armed groups. The
transfer of such weapons, the reported presence in Syria of Iranian personnel and Iran-backed
armed groups, and the consolidation of Syrian government control over areas of southern Syria
adjacent to Israel increases the risk that Israel could face attacks from Syria in the event of wider
conflict. Some media reports suggest that the United Arab Emirates warned the Syrian
government not to intervene or to allow strikes against Israel from its territory; Emirati officials
declined to confirm the reports.208 On October 10, Israeli forces returned fire after indirect fire
from southern Syria struck areas of northern Israel. On October 19, a Lebanese press outlet
reported that a drone attack had targeted the U.S. outpost near At Tanf in southeastern Syria and a
missile attack had targeted a U.S. facility in northeastern Syria near Deir ez Zour.209
Armed groups in Iraq and Yemen have expressed support for the Hamas attacks on Israel and
pledged support to Palestinians; some have threatened military action against U.S. interests if the
United States intervenes militarily in the Israel-Hamas war. In Iraq, the Iraqi government Popular
202 Ayman Oghanna, “Inside the Lions’ Den: the West Bank’s Gen Z fighters,” Economist (1843 Magazine), July 7,
2023; Udi Dekel, “The Lion’s Den: A Wake-Up Call for Imminent Challenges,” Institute for National Security Studies,
October 19, 2022; Hani al-Masri, “The Jenin Brigades and The Lions’ Den: Palestine’s new resistance,” Middle East
Eye, October 21, 2022.
203 Dekel, “The Lion’s Den”; al-Masri, “The Jenin Brigades and The Lions’ Den.”
204 Reuters, “Palestinian gunmen say they’re fighting for Jenin, not foreign backers,” August 14, 2023.
205 “Street rallies celebrate Hamas onslaught in West Bank and throughout the Middle East,” Times of Israel, October
8, 2023; “Hamas deputy chief anticipates hostages will be swapped for Palestinian prisoners,” Times of Israel, October
8, 2023.
206 UNOCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #13,” October 19, 2023; “West Bank gripped by
fear, anger as Gaza war rages,” Agence France Presse, October 17, 2023, quoting one Palestinian villager as saying,
“Soldiers and settlers are now quick to open fire in revenge for what’s happening in Gaza.”
207 Ali Sawafta and Henriette Chacar, “As Gaza war rages, Israeli forces kill 27 Palestinians in West Bank,” Reuters,
October 11, 2023.
208 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: UAE warns Syria’s Assad not to get involved in Hamas-Israel war,” Axios, October 9, 2023.
209 “Lebanese Iran-aligned Al-Mayadeen reports attacks on two U.S. bases in Syria,” Reuters, October 19, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Mobilization Forces praised the attacks, as have leaders of the Badr Organization and U.S.designated terrorist organizations Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah Al Nujaba, Asa’ib Ahl al
Haq, and Kata’ib Sayyid al Shuhada.210 Attacks by these groups on U.S. personnel in Iraq or a
renewed political initiative by these groups and their allies to expel U.S. forces from Iraq could,
among other things, jeopardize U.S. counter-Islamic State operations in Syria and Iraq. On
October 18, U.S. Central Command said U.S. forces in Iraq had foiled three attempted drone
attacks in Iraq—two on an Iraqi military base that hosts U.S. soldiers in western Iraq, one of
which resulted in injuries to Coalition forces, and a third drone attack in northern Iraq.211 A U.S.
civilian contractor reportedly suffered a cardiac event and died during the attack in western Iraq.
On October 10, the leader of Yemen’s Ansar Allah/Houthi movement Abdulmalik al Houthi gave
a speech praising the attacks on Israel, calling for support to Hamas and other armed Palestinian
groups, and threatening attacks if the United States intervenes militarily in Israel’s war in Gaza.212
As discussed below, on October 19 the Pentagon said that U.S. naval forces had intercepted
missiles and drones “launched from Yemen, heading north along the Red Sea, potentially towards
targets in Israel.”213
Iran
Iranian officials have threatened to become involved if Israel proceeds with a military ground
operation in Gaza, with the foreign minister reportedly stating that Iran “cannot remain a
spectator” to such an operation.214 National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on October 15,
“We have means of communicating privately with Iran” and that the United States had used those
means to convey the message that Iran should not become involved.215 Beyond supporting
proxies, Iran could also seek to disrupt global energy markets or strike Israel directly with its
long-range missiles; either would likely precipitate a much larger conflict.216
How have international actors responded?
Arab states
Most Arab governments have expressed support for an end to violence, with some expressing or
implying concern about the October 7 Hamas attacks, and some explicitly expressing support for
the Palestinian people. Several Arab governments, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE,
Egypt, and Qatar, condemned and attributed to Israel the October 17 explosion at the Al Ahly
hospital in Gaza. Collectively, the League of Arab States (Arab League) member states have
called for civilian protection and avoiding further escalation.
210 Statements released October 9 and 10 on social media, and Iraqi media reports.
211 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Forces Defend Against Drones in Iraq,” October 18, 2023.
212 Ansar Allah, “The Leader: We are in complete coordination with the axis of resistance, and if the Americans
intervene, we are ready to do so,” October 10, 2023, at https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/633132.
213 U.S. Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds an On-Camera Press
Briefing,” October 19, 2023.
214 “Iran warns it may not ‘remain a spectator in Israel-Hamas conflict – as U.S. urges Iran not to intervene,” Forbes,
October 15, 2023.
215 CBS News, “Transcript: National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on ‘Face the Nation,’” October 15, 2023.
216 “Iran threatens to join the Gaza war, fueling fears of an expanded conflict,” Stratfor, October 16, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
•
•
An October 7 statement from Saudi Arabia called for “an immediate halt to the
escalation between the two sides, the protection of civilians, and restraint” and
highlighted the kingdom’s past warnings that Israeli policies could provoke
confrontation.217 A Saudi statement following an October 15 meeting between
Secretary of State Blinken and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abd al
Aziz Al Saud said the kingdom calls “for lifting the siege on Gaza, to bring
justice, stability and peace and ensure that the Palestinian people attain their
legitimate rights. The Kingdom rejects the targeting of civilians, the destruction
of infrastructure and of vital services that affect everyday life.”218 A Saudi
government statement on Secretary Blinken’s earlier October 15 meeting with
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud stated the kingdom’s
“categorical rejection of calls for the forcible displacement of the Palestinian
people from Gaza,” called for “an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and its
surroundings” and called for “an end to all forms of military escalation against
civilians.”219 The statement called on the international community “to stop the
violence and advance the peace process” according to U.N. Security Council
Resolutions and the U.N. General assembly “and the Arab Peace Initiative” (API,
the Saudi-led, Arab League-endorsed peace plan from 2002). Separate Saudi
Foreign Ministry statements earlier that day reiterated calls for an independent
Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.220
Qatar, which allows Hamas to operate an office in Doha, said on October 7 that
it “holds Israel solely responsible for the ongoing escalation.”221 On October 8, it
called for “all parties to halt the escalation to attain calm and entirely halt the
armed confrontations on all fronts.”222 In an October 13 press conference with
Secretary Blinken, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani said the Hamas office in Doha
“was started to be used as a way of communicating and bringing peace and calm
into the region, not to instigate any war. And this is the purpose of that office.”223
On October 13, the Qatari government rejected “the attempts to forcibly displace
the brotherly Palestinian people from Gaza Strip,” called for “lifting the blockade
on the Strip and providing full protection to civilians under international law and
international humanitarian law,” and affirmed the Palestinian right to statehood
with East Jerusalem as its capital.224
217 Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement, October 7, 2023, https://x.com/KSAmofaEN/status/
1710629609757086172?s=20.
218 Saudi Press Agency, “HRH the Crown Prince, US Secretary of State Hold Talks,” October 15, 2023.
219 Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (@KSAmofaEN), Statement, X post, October 15, 2023, at
https://twitter.com/ksamofaen/status/1713259184291020841.
220 Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (@KSAmofaEN), Statement, X post, October 15, 2023, at
https://twitter.com/ksamofaen/status/1712947177935224837.
221 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Expresses Concern over the Developments in Gaza Strip and Calls for
Deescalation,” October 7, 2023.
222 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Reiterates Call for Halting Escalation to Protect Region from Danger of
Descending into a Wider Cycle of Violence,” October 8, 2023.
223 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani at a Joint Press Availability,” October 13, 2023.
224 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Announces Its Categorical Rejection of the Attempts to Forcibly Displace
the Palestinian People from Gaza Strip,” October 13, 2023; and, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Holds Phone Call with UN Secretary-General,” October 13, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
•
•
•
The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which normalized diplomatic relations with
Israel in 2020, called the Hamas attacks “a serious and grave escalation” and said
the UAE government “is appalled by reports that Israeli civilians have been
abducted as hostages from their homes. Civilians on both sides must always have
full protection under international humanitarian law and must never be a target of
conflict.”225 Following the October 17 explosion at the Al Ahly hospital in Gaza,
the UAE Foreign Ministry “stressed the need for an immediate cessation of
hostilities and to ensure that civilians and civilian institutions are not targeted.”226
Jordan’s Foreign Ministry called for a halt to escalation227 and its Royal Court
said that in a call with PA President Mahmoud Abbas, King Abdullah II stated
that “there can be no peace or stability without comprehensive resolution of the
Palestinian issue on [the] basis of the two-state solution, guaranteeing the
establishment of [an] independent sovereign Palestinian state on [the] 4 June
1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital.”228 On October 10, Jordan said it
would dispatch humanitarian relief supplies to Gaza through the Rafah crossing
in coordination with Egypt.229 On October 17, King Abdullah II said, “No
refugees in Jordan, no refugees in Egypt. This is a situation of humanitarian
dimension that has to be dealt [with] inside of Gaza and the West Bank and not to
try and push the Palestinian challenge in their future onto other people’s
shoulders.”230 Jordan offered to host a summit between President Biden, the
King, President Sisi of Egypt, and PA President Mahmoud Abbas, but cancelled
the summit in the wake of the October 17 explosion at the Al Ahly hospital in
Gaza.
League of Arab States (Arab League) Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit
said during a visit to Moscow, “We completely reject violence, but on both
sides,” and said, “The Palestinian problem cannot be postponed any longer, and
the U.N. decisions must be implemented.”231 The Arab League met at the
ministerial level on October 11 to discuss the crisis and issued a decision calling
for the cessation of Israel’s war and an end to further escalation.232 The statement
condemned the killing and targeting of civilians “by both sides” and acts contrary
to international law. The statement further called for the release of civilians,
prisoners, and detainees. Iraq and Libya asserted reservations to the statement’s
inclusion of the phrase “by both sides.”
225 UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “In a statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for the protection of
civilians and stressed that the immediate priority is to end the violence and protect the civilian population,” October 8,
2023, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2023/10/8/8-10-2023-uae-population.
226 UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The UAE condemns the Israeli attack on Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital in Gaza and
calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities,” October 18, 2023.
227 Jordan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, X post, October 7, 2023, https://twitter.com/ForeignMinistry/status/
1710624188925427893.
228 Jordanian Royal Court (@RHCJO), X post, October 8, 2023, https://twitter.com/rhcjo/status/
1711082875821441104.
229 Jordanian Royal Court, “King issues directives to dispatch aid to Palestinians in Gaza,” October 10, 2023.
230 Eyad Kourdi, “Jordanian king warns against forced migration of Palestinians to Jordan and Egypt,” CNN, October
17, 2023.
231 Guy Faulconbridge, “Russia accuses US of ‘destructive’ approach on Israeli–Palestinian war,” Reuters, October 9,
2023.
232 League of Arab States Resolution 8987, “On Ways to take political action to stop Israeli aggression and achieve
Peace and Security,” October 11, 2023.
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Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Iran
Iranian government officials have been united in expressing enthusiastic support for the assault,
including:
•
•
•
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who wrote, “God willing, the cancer of
the usurper Zionist regime will be eradicated at the hands of the Palestinian
people and the Resistance forces throughout the region,” while reposting a video
of civilians fleeing Hamas attackers on X (formerly Twitter).233 In an October 10,
2023, speech, Khamenei praised the Hamas attack but said that Iran was not
“behind this move.”234
President Ebrahim Raisi, who said, “Iran supports the legitimate defense of the
Palestinian nation.”235 In an October 16 call with Russian Presid
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.