Qatar: Issues for the 119th Congress
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Qatar: Issues for the 119th Congress
Updated March 13, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R47467
SUMMARY
Qatar: Issues for the 119th Congress
The State of Qatar is a small, energy-rich emirate strategically located near the center of the
Persian Gulf. Defense and diplomatic cooperation have anchored close U.S.-Qatari relations:
Qatar hosts thousands of U.S. troops, allows U.S. military use of Qatari facilities, and consults
with U.S. officials on engagements with third parties in the Middle East region and beyond. In
2022, President Joseph Biden and Emir Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani reaffirmed the
multifaceted partnership between the United States and Qatar, and the Biden Administration
designated Qatar as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally.
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March 13, 2025
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG):
LNG revenues have fueled economic and social change in Qatar and enabled Qatar’s active foreign policies. Qatar’s fewer
than 300,000 citizens enjoy one of the world’s highest per capita income levels, and, as in other Gulf states, a large expatriate
population is critical to Qatar’s domestic economy. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari leaders have overseen rapid, expansive
economic growth; transformed the global media environment through the founding of the Al Jazeera satellite networks;
engaged in complex and at times controversial diplomacy with U.S. partners and adversaries; and pursued a course of limited
domestic political liberalization.
While Qatar supports many U.S. priorities, its leaders’ pursuit of Qatar’s sovereign interests and initiatives have presented
both opportunities and challenges. Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to expand military, security, diplomatic, and
economic cooperation with Qatar. Issues of immediate priority for the United States include coordinating with Qatar on
negotiations to sustain a ceasefire and continue hostage-prisoner exchanges in the Israel-Hamas war, maintaining U.S.-Qatari
defense cooperation, encouraging stability in Qatar’s relationships with fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) and other Arab states, and leveraging Qatar’s diplomatic engagement with the Taliban government in Afghanistan,
new leaders in Syria, and with neighboring Iran. Prior to the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Qatar had not joined the
Abraham Accords between some Arab states and Israel but had instead conditioned normalization of relations with Israel on
substantial progress toward resolving Israel-Palestinian disputes.
Qatar voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations; stated its “respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity”; and called for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the conflict in accordance with
international law. Emir Tamim met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Qatar in June 2024. The Emir met Russian
President Vladimir Putin in July 2024 in conjunction with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in
Kazakhstan; Qatar joined the SCO as a Dialogue Partner in 2023. Emir Tamim and People’s Republic of China (PRC) leader
Xi Jinping met in Saudi Arabia in December 2022 in conjunction with the Arab States-China Summit and the GCC-China
Summit. PRC state-owned firms have provided infrastructure and construction services for some major projects in Qatar.
Qatar exports oil products and LNG to China.
Since 2012, successive Administrations have proposed several major U.S. arms sales to Qatar, including items for air defense
and missile defense. Qatar is investing in its military facilities to meet current and potential future needs, with planned Qatarfunded development projects at Al Udeid Air Base valued at $8.4 billion through 2033.
Qatar’s constitution had provided for elections to a consultative Shura Council, but in November 2024, Qataris adopted
amendments proposed by the Emir to end legislative elections and return to an appointed national consultative body. The
government limits freedom of assembly, expression, religion, the press, and association. Labor and migrants’ rights concerns
have long drawn public and official attention as Qatar builds out physical infrastructure. The U.S. State Department notes
reports of human rights violations in Qatar and credits Qatar with taking some steps to improve human rights and labor
conditions.
In Congress, foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence committees monitor Qatar’s foreign and domestic policies, while
Qatar’s resources, sovereign wealth, and associated geo-economic clout fuel congressional interest in Qatar’s energy and
investment policies and in U.S.-Qatari trade and investment ties. In the 119th Congress, a Congressional Caucus on QatariAmerican Strategic Relationships is active. Various Members of Congress and congressional staff frequently visit Qatar to
attend conferences, consult with U.S. civilian and military personnel, and conduct oversight of U.S. regional policy and U.S.
military operations.
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Contents
Overview and Bilateral Relations .................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Relations .............................................................................. 3
Arms Sales .......................................................................................................................... 5
Al Udeid Air Base and Military Construction .................................................................... 5
Qatari Facilities and U.S. Relocation of Evacuees from Afghanistan ................................ 6
Counterterrorism Issues ...................................................................................................... 6
U.S. Security Assistance ..................................................................................................... 7
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations ................................................................................................ 8
Congress and Qatar ................................................................................................................... 9
Qatar and Hamas-related Legislation in the 118th Congress ............................................... 9
Qatar and Iranian Funds-related Legislation in the 118th Congress .................................. 10
Qatari Politics and Government .....................................................................................................11
Human Rights.......................................................................................................................... 12
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 12
Labor Issues and Trafficking in Persons ........................................................................... 13
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 14
Qatar’s Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................... 14
Qatar and Russia’s War Against Ukraine ................................................................................ 15
Qatar and China....................................................................................................................... 16
Qatar and Afghanistan ............................................................................................................. 17
Qatar and Its Neighbors .......................................................................................................... 17
Gulf Cooperation Council and Other Arab States ............................................................. 17
Syria .................................................................................................................................. 18
Iran .................................................................................................................................... 18
Israel and the Palestinians ................................................................................................. 20
Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues ............................................................................................ 22
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 25
Figures
Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance ............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure, 2015 ................................. 23
Tables
Table A-1. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2022 .................................................... 26
Appendixes
Appendix. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2022 .................................................... 26
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Qatar: Issues for the 119th Congress
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 27
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Qatar: Issues for the 119th Congress
Overview and Bilateral Relations
The State of Qatar is a small, energy-rich monarchy, strategically located near the center of the
Persian Gulf (see Figure 1); its natural resources and active foreign policy give it global
influence. Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is a major
exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG).1 From 2000 to 2021, Qatar’s gross domestic product
(GDP) increased tenfold from $17 billion to an estimated $179 billion.
The country’s population, including expatriates, more than quadrupled between 2000 and 2023,
growing to over 2.9 million in 2023.2 One-tenth of those are citizens. Qatar’s fewer-than-300,000
citizens enjoy one of the world’s highest per capita income levels, and, as in other Gulf states, a
large expatriate population is critical to Qatar’s domestic economy. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari
leaders have overseen rapid, expansive economic growth; transformed the global media
environment through the founding of the Al Jazeera satellite networks; engaged in complex and at
times controversial diplomacy with U.S. partners and adversaries; and introduced constitutional
changes to formalize succession and limited consultative governance. International attention
focuses on Qatar’s roles as an energy exporter and diplomatic catalyst.
U.S. officials recognized Qatar’s independence in September 1971 and established diplomatic
relations in 1972. Since the 1990s, successive U.S. Administrations have sought to expand
military, security, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with Qatar. Qatari leaders’ pursuit of
Qatar’s sovereign interests and initiatives have presented both opportunities and challenges over
time. Past U.S. Administrations have scrutinized Qatari policy with regard to some armed
conflicts and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa region and some Qataris’
relationships with Islamist groups: at present Qatar supports many U.S. priorities and U.S.
officials have welcomed Qatar’s partnership (see below).
Biden Administration officials thanked Qatar in 2023 and 2024 for its role as an intermediary to
Hamas in the wake of the group’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks and taking of hostages in
Israel. U.S. officials engaged with Qatari, Egyptian, and Israeli counterparts in efforts to achieve a
ceasefire and free remaining hostages held in Gaza, leading to the ceasefire reached in January
2025. President Donald Trump’s Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff travelled to
Qatar and met with Qatari leaders in support of U.S. negotiations prior to the President’s
inauguration. In January 2025, he called Qatar “enormously helpful” and said that Qatari Prime
Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani’s “communication skills with Hamas
were indispensable.”3 In February 2025, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called Qatar’s Deputy
Prime Minister and “thanked Qatar for hosting U.S. and coalition forces at Al Udeid Air Base and
urged continued support for Trump Administration efforts to secure the release of the hostages
from Gaza.”4
The U.S. government continues to engage with Qatar on negotiations to sustain a ceasefire and
continue hostage-prisoner exchanges in the Israel-Hamas war. U.S. officials also have sought to
1 In 2015, Qatar National Bank estimated that at then-prevailing production rates, Qatar’s gas reserves could last 138
years. Sergio Chapa, “U.S. Holds World’s Top LNG Exporter Spot on European Energy Crisis,” Bloomberg, February
1, 2022; and Agence France-Presse, “Qatar Vast Gas Reserves ‘to Last 138 Years’: Report,” June 21, 2015.
2 Based on figures available from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, “World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision,” accessed March 2025.
3 “FNC Interview with Steve Witkoff, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East,” Bloomberg News, January 22, 2025.
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Readout of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s Call With Qatar Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of State for Defense Affairs, His Excellency Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman bin Hassan bin Ali Al Thani,
February 15, 2025.
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leverage Qatar’s diplomatic engagement with neighboring Iran and actors in Lebanon and Syria.
Prior to the October 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel, Qatar had not joined the Abraham Accords
that some other Arab states had signed with Israel beginning in 2020, but has instead conditioned
normalization of relations with Israel on substantial progress toward resolving Israel-Palestinian
disputes.
Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance
Area
11,586 sq. km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)
People
Population: ~2.9 million, of which nearly ~90% are expatriates
Religions: Muslim 65.2%; Christian 13.7%; Hindu 15.9%; 3.8% Buddhist; and 1% other. Figures
include expatriates. (2020 est.)
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $249 billion on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis (2021 est.)
GDP per capita: $92,900 on PPP basis
Inflation: 2.3% (2021)
GDP Growth Rate: 1.59% (2021)
Oil and Gas
Oil Exports: ~900,000 barrels per day (2022)
Gas (LNG) Exports: 127.9 billion cubic meters per year (2021)
Sources: Graphic created by CRS using data from U.S. State Department and Esri. At-a-glance information from
CIA, World Factbook (March 2023), UN Population Division (March 2023), International Monetary Fund, and Gas
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) Annual Statistics Bulletin (October 2022).
Qatar continues to host a political office of the Palestinian Islamist armed group Hamas (a U.S.designated Foreign Terrorist Organization [FTO]), though Hamas representatives have at times
left Qatar for extended periods, possibly as a means of avoiding Qatari-facilitated engagement on
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issues of dispute with Israel and other countries.5 On October 13, 2023, then-Secretary of State
Antony Blinken said while in Qatar that “there can be no more business as usual with Hamas,”
and press reports citing unidentified diplomats suggested that month that the United States and
Qatar “agreed to revisit the Persian Gulf state’s association with Hamas” following the resolution
of the Hamas hostage crisis.6 More than 100 Members of Congress wrote to President Biden in
October 2023 urging him to “put significant pressure on Qatar and Türkiye to cease their support
for Hamas and expel Hamas leadership that they host.”7 Qatar condemned the July 2024 killing in
Iran of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh.8 Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar reportedly contacted
officials in Qatar shortly before being killed by Israeli forces in Gaza in October 2024.9
In September 2024, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and Prime
Minister met with President Donald Trump in Florida during their visit to the United States for
the United Nations General Assembly. President Trump praised the Emir as “someone also who
strongly wants peace in the Middle East, and all over the world,” writing in a social media post,
“We had a great relationship during my years in the White House, and it will be even stronger this
time around!”10
Through 2024, U.S. priorities in the bilateral relationship have included sustaining and
strengthening U.S.-Qatari defense cooperation, sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Qatari defense
cooperation, and encouraging stability in Qatar’s relationships with fellow members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) and other Arab states.
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Relations
Qatar hosts U.S. military forces under the terms of a defense cooperation agreement, including
the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S.-Qatar security ties
deepened from the mid-1990s onward, and, in 2022, the Biden Administration designated Qatar
as a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally.
In the late 1980s, the United States and Qatar engaged in a years-long diplomatic dispute
regarding Qatar’s black market procurement of U.S.-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.11 The
dispute froze then-planned economic and military cooperation, and Congress approved a ban on
5 Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Hamas leader speaks in Iran of Israel’s ‘political isolation,’” March 26, 2024; AFP and
Times of Israel, “Hamas Leader Haniyeh Said to Meet Turkish FM to Discuss Hostages, Ceasefire,” January 21, 2024;
and Parisa Hafezi, “Iranian State Media Confirm Meeting Between Khamenei, Hamas’ Haniyeh in Tehran,” Reuters,
November 5, 2023.
6 John Hudson, “U.S., Qatar to Revisit Doha’s Ties to Hamas After Gaza Hostage Crisis,” Washington Post, October
26, 2023; and Humeyra Pamuk, “Qatar Open to Reconsidering Hamas Presence in Qatar, US Official Says,” Reuters,
October 27, 2023.
7 Marc Rod, “Lawmakers Reject De-escalation, Urge Strong Action Against Iran, Qatar, Turkey,” Jewish Insider,
October 17, 2023.
8 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The State of Qatar Condemns Assassination of Head of the Political Bureau of
Hamas,” July 31, 2024, at https://mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/the-state-of-qatar-condemns-assassination-of-head-of-thepolitical-bureau-of-hamas.
9 Times of Israel, “After speculation he was killed, Sinwar said to renew contact with Qatar,” October 7, 2024; and,
Ellie Grant, “Sinwar said to have contacted Qatar mediators to seek deal for his safety,” The Jewish Chronicle, October
9, 2024.
10 President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social post, September 22, 2024, 11:23 AM, at https://truthsocial.com/
@realDonaldTrump/posts/113181892397857719.
11 Qatar defended its procurement of the missiles in protest of the sale of similar missiles by the United States to
Bahrain, with which Qatar had an unresolved border dispute until 2001. Elaine Sciolino, “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand
for Return of Illicit Stingers,” New York Times, June 28, 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Drawn into Gulf Dispute—Stray
Stingers Tied to Qatar-Bahrain Tiff,” Washington Post, October 6, 1988.
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arms sales to Qatar (§566(d), P.L. 100-461) that lasted until the months leading up to the 1991
Persian Gulf War, when Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from Qatari territory and agreed
to destroy the missiles in question.12 In January 1991, Qatari armored forces helped coalition
troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi Arabian town of Kafji, on the coastal road leading south
from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province.13
Deep U.S. defense and security relations with Qatar did not begin until after the 1991 war. In
1992, Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a period of
close coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present. In 1995, Shaykh Hamad
bin Khalifa deposed his father and became Emir. The United States promptly recognized Shaykh
Hamad’s assumption of power, and welcomed his decision to subsequently expand U.S.-Qatar
defense cooperation. Shaykh Hamad faced a counter-coup attempt in 1996.
With its small territory and narrow citizen population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on
external cooperation and support for its security. With 16,500 personnel, Qatar’s armed forces are
the second smallest in the Middle East.14 Since 2013, the government has imposed mandatory
short-term (3-4 month) military training and service for Qatari males.
Qatari-U.S. defense relations have expanded since 2001 to include cooperative defense exercises,
equipment pre-positioning, and base access agreements. Qatar hosts the forward headquarters for
U.S. Central Command. In 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Doha, met with
Emir Tamim, and signed a 10-year bilateral defense cooperation agreement. The text of the
agreement is classified.15 Unnamed U.S. defense officials told CNN in January 2024 that Qatar
and the United States have renewed the agreement for a further 10 years.16 Qatar is a member of
the Combined Maritime Forces coalition, which operates Combined Task Forces (CTF) 150
(maritime security and counterterrorism), CTF 151 (counter piracy), CTF 152 (Gulf security and
cooperation), and CTF 153 (Red Sea security). The Qatari military and the West Virginia National
Guard cooperate under the U.S. National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program.
Qatar’s 2022 designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally qualifies Qatar to purchase certain U.S.
arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research cooperation with the
United States, for which it would not otherwise be eligible.
12 The ban was formally repealed by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1991 (§568(b), P.L. 101-513). The conference report on H.R. 5114, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (H.Rept. 101-968) inserted Senate language (Amendment No. 144) that
repealed the ban based on information provided by the Secretary of Defense “that it is in the national interest to
reestablish United States-Qatari security relations because of their support for United States troops in the Middle East.”
13 Thomas Ferraro, “Allies Retake Saudi City,” United Press International, January 31, 1991; and Joseph Albright,
“Marines Take Credit for Khafji Victory,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, February 3, 1991.
14 Bahrain’s armed forces are the smallest. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
2022.
15 U.S. State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2021. In addition to this
agreement, as of 2021, the United States and Qatar had the following agreements for defense cooperation: 2012
General Security of Military Information Agreement, 2013 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, 2013 Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence, 2016 Communications Interoperability and Security
Memorandum of Agreement, and 2020 Maritime Implementing Agreement.
16 Alex Marquardt and Natasha Bertrand, “US Quietly Reaches Agreement with Qatar to Keep Operating Largest
Military Base in Middle East,” CNN, January 2, 2024.
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Over the past several years, the number of U.S. military personnel who are deployed at the
various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid Air Base (see below), has ranged from about 6,500
to more than 10,000.17
Arms Sales
Since 2012, successive Administrations have proposed several major U.S. arms sales to Qatar,
marking a shift in Qatar’s defense planning toward the use of advanced U.S. attack and transport
helicopters and other weapons systems, including items for air defense and missile defense (see
Table A-1 in the Appendix). France previously had provided approximately 80% of Qatar’s arms
inventory. Qatar collaborates with Italy and Turkey in support of its naval development efforts.18
Qatar’s purchase of U.S. weapons systems, including U.S. air and missile defense systems,
corresponds to increased interest in such systems from some other governments in the region,
ostensibly to defend against and respond to potential attacks from Iran. In 2022, the State
Department reported
Qatar has over $26 billion in active government-to-government cases under the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) system making Qatar the United States’ third largest FMS partner in
the world. Recent and significant FMS sales focused on integrated air and missile defense
and include the PATRIOT long-range air missile system, the National Advanced Surface
to Air Missile System, and the AN/FPS-132 Early Warning Radar; F-15QA fighter
aircraft—the most advanced F-15 in production; and AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.
Each of these programs includes facility construction and extended munitions, logistics,
and training support.19
Al Udeid Air Base and Military Construction
Qatar invested over $1 billion to construct the Al Udeid Air Base southwest of Doha during the
1990s. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also awarded over $100 million in Military
Construction Air Force contracts for the initial construction of U.S. storage, housing, service,
command, and communication facilities. Qatar’s financing and construction of the runways and
most of the facilities at Al Udeid and its granting of permission for the construction of U.S.funded facilities underpinned gradually deeper cooperation with U.S. military forces.
In 2003, the U.S. military moved its Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East from
Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid. Al Udeid then served as a logistics, command,
and basing hub for U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the U.S. CENTCOM
area of responsibility.20
Qatar has invested more than $8 billion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since
2003, expanding and enhancing the facility in conjunction with U.S. military construction
17 U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Qatar,” December 12, 2024, available at
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2023/qatar; U.S. State Department, “Coordinator for
Counterterrorism Ambassador Nathan A. Sales Travels to Qatar,” August 12, 2020; and Department of Defense, “U.S.
and Qatar Sign MOU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military Activities at Al Udeid Air Base,”
January 14, 2019.
18 Agnes Helou, “Qatari Navy’s New Amphibious Ship to Help Fulfil Nation’s ‘Unique’ Needs,” Breaking Defense,
February 2, 2023.
19 U.S. State Department, Qatar Integrated Country Strategy, July 2022.
20 Rebecca Grant, “The Short, Strange Life of PSAB,” Air and Space Forces, July 1, 2012.
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funding.21 From FY2003 to FY2011, Congress appropriated and authorized more than $457
million for U.S. military construction activities in Qatar.22
Qatar plans further investment in its military facilities to meet current and potential future needs.
Planned development projects under the Qatar Development of Al Udeid program are valued at
$8.4 billion with construction plans through 2033 set to adapt base facilities from an
expeditionary to an enduring nature and to enable them to house more than 15,000 personnel and
support additional fighter, transport, and helicopter aircraft.23 Nearby Camp As Sayliyah housed
significant U.S. military equipment pre-positioning and command facilities for the CENTCOM
area of operations prior to its closure and a repositioning of U.S. equipment in mid-2021.24
Qatari Facilities and U.S. Relocation of Evacuees from Afghanistan
U.S.-Qatar bilateral agreements have provided terms for the hosting in Qatar of evacuees from
Afghanistan under U.S. auspices.25 In April 2023, the Administration stated that facilities at Camp
As Sayliyah then-served as the main processing center for U.S. resettlement efforts for evacuees
from Afghanistan.26 In 2024, initiatives at the site continued under the auspices of the Office of
the Coordinator of Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE).27 In February 2025, a press report cited an
unnamed U.S. official as saying the Trump Administration has directed CARE to plan for its
closure by April 2025.28 According to press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials and advocates
for U.S.-associated Afghans, U.S. relocation operations were “essentially paused” as of March
2025.29 See “Qatar and Afghanistan” below for information on the status of U.S. evacuation and
Afghan nationals in Qatar.
Counterterrorism Issues
U.S. policymakers have considered alleged material support for terrorist groups by some Qataris,
including reported past support by members of the ruling family, alongside Qatar’s
counterterrorism efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military
forces.30 U.S. officials have described Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation since 2001 as
21 U.S. State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Qatar,” Fact Sheet, July 30, 2021.
22 Specific legislative text available to congressional offices from CRS.
23 U.S. CENTCOM response to CRS Inquiry, January 2023.
24 Staff Sgt. Neil W. McCabe, “Curtain Falls on ASG-Qatar After Three Decades Supporting Readiness, Resilience,”
U.S. Army 310th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, June 24, 2021.
25 U.S. State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs, Qatar (22-919)—Protocol Amending the Temporary Relocation
Transit Agreement of November 12, 2021, September 19, 2022; and Qatar (21-1112)—Temporary Relocation Transit
Agreement, November 12, 2021.
26 Akmal Dawi, “US Continues Relocating Afghans Even Under Taliban Rule,” Voice of America, April 4, 2023.
27 See U.S. State Department, Office of the Inspector General, Relocation and Resettlement Outcomes of Afghan
Special Immigrant Visa Holders, AUD-MERO-23-21, June 2023; and, Alexanderia Haidara, “Office of the Coordinator
for Afghan Relocation Efforts,” State Magazine, August 2024.
28 Jonathan Landay, “Exclusive: Office overseeing Afghan resettlement in US told to start planning closure, sources
say,” Reuters, February 18, 2025.
29 Priscilla Alvarez, Haley Britzky and Jennifer Hansler, “Thousands of Afghans who helped the US lose access to
critical resources following Trump directives,” CNN, January 27, 2025; and “US-bound Afghans left ‘without options’
as Trump travel ban looms,” AFP, March 11, 2025.
30 In 2022, media reports described a lawsuit involving allegations of terrorist financing by Qatar Charity and Qatar
National Bank, and a reported investigation of similar allegations concerning the Emir’s half-brother. See Alan
Suderman, “Qatar, Key US Ally, Faces New Accusations of Terror Funding,” May 13, 2022; and Sotloff et al. v. Qatar
Charity et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, May 12, 2022. According to the 9/11
(continued...)
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significant, and the State Department report on terrorism for 2023 states that “Qatar has made
strides in addressing state-sourced internal support for educational and religious content
espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence.”31 The report notes that a
mutual evaluation on terrorist financing “identified major inconsistencies between the type and
extent of terrorist financing (TF) activity prosecuted and convicted with its TF risk profile” and
identified domestic and international challenges “which lead to many TF cases being acquitted or
overturned on appeal.”
Qatar and Hamas
Qatar hosts a political office of the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated
FTO). The U.S. government and government of Israel have engaged Qatari officials as
interlocutors of Hamas prior to and in the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led terrorist
attacks in Israel. (See “Israel and the Palestinians” below.) In October 2023, the U.S. Department
of the Treasury named Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abd Al-Dayim Nasrallah as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224, describing Nasrallah as “a longtime Hamas
operative based in Qatar with close ties to Iranian elements,” who “in recent years ... was
involved in the transfer of tens of millions of dollars to Hamas, including Hamas’s military wing,
the Izz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades.”
U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance
Qatar uses its own funds to pay for participation of Qatari personnel in the State Department’s
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training program, including training that was pertinent to
Qatar’s preparations to host the 2022 International Federation of Association Football (FIFA)
soccer World Cup. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reached cooperative security
agreements with Qatar related to the World Cup, and in July 2022 signed memoranda on border
and cybersecurity cooperation.32
U.S. Security Assistance
The George W. Bush Administration requested $10,000 in International Military Education and
Training (IMET) assistance funds for Qatar in FY2010, and requested an additional $10,000 for
FY2011 but did not allocate funds for Qatar during that fiscal year. The nominal IMET assistance
had the administrative effect of making Qatar eligible to purchase other U.S. military training at
the reduced cost level available only to IMET recipients.33 The Obama, first Trump, and Biden
Commission Report and former U.S. government officials, Qatari royal family member and later Interior Minister
Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani provided support to Al Qaeda figures, including the suspected mastermind of the
September 11 attacks, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report), pp. 73, 147-8, 488-9. See also, James Risen and David Johnston,
“Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before September 11 Attack,” New York Times, March 8, 2003; Josh Meyer and
John Goetz, “Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003.
31 U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Qatar,” December 12, 2024, available at
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2023/qatar.
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS to Expand Security Cooperation with Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates,” July 12, 2022.
33 The Senate version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2467, 112th Cong.) would have amended
existing law to make Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia eligible for such reduced cost
purchases without having to receive IMET. §1204 of S. 2467 would have amended Section 546(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2347e(b)).
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Administrations did not request IMET assistance for Qatar, though Qatari personnel continued to
participate in IMET and other U.S. training programs.
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations
Qatar and the United States have not negotiated a Free Trade Agreement, but Qatar has used a
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to undertake large investments in the United
States. The joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” the Qatar
Investment Authority’s (Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund) commitment of $45 billion in future
investments in U.S. companies and real estate. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aerospace
equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products. Total bilateral trade in
goods for 2023 was valued at $6.69 billion.34 Qatar Petroleum has jointly developed LNG export
infrastructure at the Golden Pass facility in Texas with ExxonMobil.35
Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways, has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft and in January
2022 announced that it would purchase up to 50 cargo aircraft and up to 50 737 Max passenger
aircraft from Boeing.36 Qatar Airways and Airbus in 2023 announced they had reached a
settlement of their dispute over paint on Qatar Airways-purchased Airbus aircraft.37 In the past,
some U.S. airlines challenged Qatar Airways’ benefits under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement
based on the Qatari government’s support for Qatar Airways aircraft purchases.38 The United
States and Qatar reached a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018,
committing Qatar Airways to financial transparency and containing some limitations on the
airline’s ability to pick up passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. European officials
reached an open skies agreement with Qatar in 2021, but not all European Union member states
have ratified it.39
In August 2024, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority, announced a
$180 million investment in the U.S. Development Finance Corporation-backed mining
investment vehicle Techmet. A QIA official said: “We are delighted to partner with TechMet to
invest in the responsible sourcing of critical minerals, which are crucial to the global green
transition. This investment builds on QIA’s theme of diversified energy transition and critical
minerals investments.”40
Several U.S. universities have established satellite faculty campuses in Doha at Qatar’s Education
City, where Qatari, American, and other students pursue undergraduate and graduate coursework
across a broad range of subjects: Carnegie Mellon University, Virginia Commonwealth
University, Georgetown University, Weill Cornell Medicine, and Northwestern University. In
February 2024, Texas A&M University announced plans to close its branch in Qatar by 2028
34 U.S. Census Bureau data, August 2024, at https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5180.html.
35 ExxonMobil, “QatarEnergy and ExxonMobil to Independently Market Golden Pass LNG,” October 27, 2022, and at
https://www.goldenpasslng.com/about/about-golden-pass.
36 “Boeing Lands Huge Airplane Order from Qatar Airways,” Associated Press, January 31, 2022.
37 Airbus, “Qatar Airways and Airbus Reach Amicable Settlement in Legal Dispute,” February 1, 2023.
38
Frank Kane, “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates,” The National, January 30, 2016.
39 European Commission, “Aviation: EU and Qatar Sign Landmark Aviation Agreement,” October 18, 2021.
40 Financial Times, “Qatar invests in US-backed fund to loosen China dominance of critical minerals,” August 7, 2024.
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citing regional instability.41 The Qatar Foundation (QF) criticized the decision saying it was
“influenced by a disinformation campaign aimed at harming the interests of QF.”42
Congress and Qatar
In Congress, legislative action related to Qatar has been relatively limited with the exception of
appropriations and authorization legislation that affects U.S. defense programs and congressional
review of proposed foreign military sales to the Qatari military. Congressional foreign affairs,
defense, and intelligence committees monitor Qatar’s foreign and domestic policies, while
Qatar’s resources, sovereign wealth, and associated geo-economic clout fuel congressional
interest in Qatar’s energy and investment policies and in U.S.-Qatari trade and investment ties.
Congress has acknowledged Qatar’s support for U.S. military operations, including efforts to
evacuate U.S. personnel and third country nationals from Afghanistan. The Senate in 2022
adopted S.Res. 390, expressing appreciation for Qatar’s “pivotal role and support of Operation
Allies Refuge; and ... support to temporarily house thousands of evacuees [from Afghanistan]
until they are cleared for follow-on movement.” In 2022, Congress designated U.S. veterans who
served on active duty in Qatar and several other countries on or after August 2, 1990, as “covered
veterans” under the Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022
(P.L. 117-168), which expands health care eligibility for veterans subject to toxic exposure. In the
118th Congress, S. 302 would have provided for related cancer screening.
The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 118-31) directed the Administration to report
to Congress on the legal protections afforded to U.S. service personnel in Qatar and other
countries. The act also directed the Administration to report on efforts by the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) to increase its influence in the Middle East, including in Qatar.
In the 119th Congress, a Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Strategic Relationships is
active.
Since October 2023, some in Congress have increased their scrutiny and/or criticism of Qatar for
its relationships with Hamas and Iran, including scrutiny of Iranian funds transferred to Qatar
pursuant to U.S. sanctions waivers.
Qatar and Hamas-related Legislation in the 118th Congress
In April 2024, Congress enacted the Hamas and Other Palestinian Terrorist Groups International
Financing Prevention Act (Division M of P.L. 118-50), which requires the executive branch to
impose sanctions on foreign states or persons that the President determines provide certain types
of support to Hamas, PIJ, some other groups, or their affiliates. The act provides for a waiver that
the executive branch could use if the President were to determine that the continued operation in
Qatar of Hamas figures constituted activity targeted by the act.
Other bills, such as H.R. 6431, H.R. 8190, and S. 4093, would have suspended or directed the
review of Qatar’s major Non-NATO Ally designation absent presidential certifications related to
Qatar’s relationships and interactions with foreign terrorist organizations.
41 Susannah George and Mohamad El Chamaa, “Texas A&M to Close Qatar Campus, Citing Regional Instability,”
Washington Post, February 9, 2024.
42 Qatar Foundation (@QF), X post, February 9, 2024, at https://twitter.com/qf/status/1755827488364564599.
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Required Report on Al Udeid Air Base
In the Senate, Section 1287 of the Senate Armed Services Committee-reported version of the
NDAA for FY2025 (S. 4638) would have required the Department of Defense to provide a
briefing to congressional defense committees on “the operational value of the Al-Udeid Air Base
in Qatar, taking into consideration the relationship of the Government of Qatar with Hamas and
other terrorist organizations.”43 The provision was not included in the final bill, but the joint
explanatory statement on the FY2025 NDAA (House Committee Print 119-2 on P.L. 118-159)
directs the Secretary of Defense
to submit a report and provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later
than June 1, 2025, on the operational value of the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, taking into
consideration the presence of Hamas and other United States-designated terrorist
organizations in Qatar. The report and briefing shall include:
(1) Whether the presence of Hamas and other United States-designated terrorist
organizations in Qatar undermines the national security interests of the United States;
(2) The operational value of the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar;
(3) The effect on United States Air Force operations in the Middle East if the United States
were to redeploy members of the United States Air Force from Al-Udeid Air Base; and
(4) The resources that would be required to redeploy members of the United States Air
Force from Al-Udeid Air Base.
Qatar and Iranian Funds-related Legislation in the 118th Congress
In December 2023, the House adopted H.R. 5961, the “No Funds for Iranian Terrorism Act,”
which would have imposed U.S. sanctions on financial institutions that transact in Iranian funds
that were transferred in September 2023 from South Korea via Europe to a restricted Qatari
account for potential humanitarian use by Iran in conjunction with Iran’s release of U.S. detainees
(see “Iran” below). The act as adopted in the House would state the “sense of Congress that the
Government of Qatar should publicly condemn Hamas, turn Hamas leadership over [to]44 the
United States or Israeli control, and pledge never to facilitate the transfer of any covered Iranian
funds to Iran or any agency or instrumentality of Iran.”
In April 2024, the House adopted H.R. 5826, the “No Paydays for Hostage-Takers Act,” which
would have required reporting and certification on the Iranian funds transferred to Qatar, and
H.R. 5947, which would have rescinded the September 2023 waiver.
Other bills introduced in the House and Senate (H.R. 6000 and S. 3049) would have directed the
Secretary of the Treasury to act to remove exemptions on transactions involving Iranian funds via
Qatar or rescinded the related September 2023 waiver.
43 The committee report (S.Rept. 118-188) noted “that the State of Qatar, a major non-NATO ally of the United States,
continues to host Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization responsible for the deaths of more than 33
Americans and the kidnapping of 12 Americans on October 7, 2023. The committee notes that the hosting of Hamas
was originally undertaken in full coordination by multiple, sequential U.S. administrations. The committee further
notes that 8 months into this crisis, Hamas has not changed its negotiating position, despite reasonable offers from
Israel that would result in the release of all the hostages, including all eight Americans, increase humanitarian
assistance to the people of Gaza, and provide a pathway for a sustainable end to the conflict. Therefore, if Hamas
refuses reasonable negotiations, the committee directs that the Secretary of Defense urge his Qatari counterparts to
expel senior Hamas officials.”
44 H.R. 5961 may contain a drafting error.
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Other proposed bills would have directed the President to confiscate any of the Iranian funds
subject to U.S. jurisdiction (S. 3081) or to reimpose the threat of U.S. sanctions on transactions
involving the funds (S. 3041).
Similar bills have not, to date, been introduced in the 119th Congress.
Qatari Politics and Government
Qatar declared its independence from the United Kingdom on September 3, 1971.45 It is a
constitutional monarchy governed by the Al Thani family; in an April 2003 referendum, Qatari
voters approved a new constitution that outlined plans to elect some members of the consultative
National Assembly (Majlis al Shura) and recognized women’s right to vote and run for national
office. The Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (age 42), began his rule in
June 2013 when his father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, abdicated, marking the first voluntary and
planned transition of power in Qatar since its independence.46 Al Thani family members lead
several government ministries and hold board seats on important state and private companies; the
ruling family retains ultimate political authority but its relationships with other leading families
appear cooperative. In March 2023, Emir Tamim bin Hamad announced a cabinet reshuffle and
named Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani as Prime Minister: Sheikh Mohammed has
served as Qatar’s Foreign Minister since 2016.47
Qatari authorities delayed the holding of national elections envisioned in the 2003 constitution
until October 2021, when Qatari voters selected 30 members for the 45-seat National Assembly.
The onset of political unrest in other regional countries from 2011 onward, the 2013 transition
from former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to his son Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and
the 2017-2021 confrontation between Qatar and some neighboring states may have contributed to
Qatari decisions to delay the election. Turnout in the 2021 election exceeded 63% of eligible
voters. Citizens categorized as naturalized, including members of the numerous Al Murra tribe,
were ineligible to stand as candidates or vote, leading to some protests and arrests in the run up to
the election.48 Qatari officials argued that procedural remedies were available to challenge
election-related complaints and that the new Shura Council could review “any amendments to the
laws governing the elections process.”49 None of the female candidates who stood for office were
elected, but the Emir appointed two women among the 15 additional members whose
appointments he controls in accordance with the constitution. Qatar last held Central Municipal
45 Treaties signed in 1868 and 1916 between the Al Thani family and the United Kingdom recognized the Al Thani
family’s authority in Qatar but placed mutually agreed restrictions on Qatari sovereignty from 1868 through 1971.
46 The former Emir, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, raised Qatar’s global profile and influence after replacing his own
father in a palace coup in 1995. Qatar’s constitution reflects the previously contested principle that successors to the
throne will follow the hereditary line of Shaykh Hamad’s male offspring (Article 8).
47 Andrew Mills, “Qatar’s Emir Names Top Diplomat as Premier, Reappoints Energy and Finance Ministers,” Reuters,
March 7, 2023.
48 Some members of the Al Murra tribe have contested the leadership of Emir Tamim bin Hamad and his father, and
Qatari authorities have stripped some members of the tribe of their Qatari nationality in related disputes. In 2017, some
Al Murra tribal figures supported Saudi efforts to isolate Qatar. Human Rights Watch, “The Shura Council Elections,”
September 9, 2021; and Reuters, “Qatar’s New Electoral Law Stirs Up Tribal Sensitivities,” August 12, 2021. For more
background see Jill Crystal, “Tribes and Patronage Networks in Qatar” in Uzi Rabi (ed.), Tribes and States in a
Changing Middle East, Oxford University Press, June 2016, pp. 37-56.
49 Qatar Government Communications Office statement in response to HRW report regarding “The Shura Council
Elections,” September 9, 2021.
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Council elections in 2019. Qatar convicted four elections protestors on related charges in May
2022, sentencing two individuals to life terms.50
In 2024, Qatar’s Emir proposed a series of constitutional amendments to end the country’s
experiment with a partially elected National Assembly, citing concerns that the holding of the
2021 election had undesirably amplified social tensions.51 In November 2024, Qatari voters
approved amendments in a referendum, reverting the Assembly to fully appointed status.52
Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the Emir appoints all judges.
Human Rights
The 2023 State Department Country Report on Human Rights in Qatar cites
credible reports of: enforced disappearance; arbitrary arrest; political prisoners; serious
restrictions on free expression, including the existence of criminal libel laws; substantial
interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including
overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental
organizations and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement;
inability of citizens to change their government peacefully in free and fair elections; serious
and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; extensive gender-based violence;
existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct, which were not
systematically enforced; and the prohibition of independent trade unions and significant or
systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association.53
A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) investigates allegations of human rights abuses
and appears to operate independently. It is funded largely by the QF that is run by the Emir’s
mother, Shaykha Moza bint Nasser Al Missned. The nongovernmental organization Freedom
House classifies Qatar as “not free.”54
The European Parliament (EP) in December 2022 suspended consideration of Qatar-related
legislation pending resolution of allegations of corruption involving Qatari nationals, the NHRC,
and some EP Members.55
Women’s Rights
Women in Qatar drive and own property, and work in the government and private sector. Qatar’s
constitution recognizes the right of women to vote and hold office. According to the State
Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues, despite the constitutional
assertion of equality.56 The application of Islamic law, which is not gender-neutral on marriage,
divorce, child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, contributes to this gender inequality, as
50 Reuters, “Qatar Jails Four Election Protesters, Including Three for Life,” May 13, 2022.
51 Andrew Mills, “Qatar to hold referendum on measure to abandon legislative elections, Emir says,” Reuters, October
15, 2024.
52 “Qatar votes overwhelmingly to scrap legislative polls,” AFP, November 6, 2024.
53 U.S. State Department, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, April 22, 2024.
54 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2024, at https://freedomhouse.org/country/qatar/freedom-world/2024.
55 Joshua Posaner, Mari Eccles, and Hanne Cokelaere, “EU Parliament to Stop Work on Qatar Airline, Visa Laws,”
Politico, December 15, 2022; and Eddy Wax and Ana Fota, “How Qatar Used a Secret Deal to Bind Itself to the EU
Parliament,” Politico, February 17, 2023.
56 U.S. State Department, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, April 22, 2024.
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does a lack of laws against domestic violence.57 Guardianship laws require young women to
obtain permission from their male guardians to travel alone, as well as “to marry, obtain a
government scholarship to pursue higher education, work in government, and obtain some
reproductive health care.”58 As of 2023, 64% of women (citizens and expatriates) in Qatar
participated in the workforce.59 The World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report
ranked Qatar 130 out of 146 countries assessed and seventh among assessed countries in the
Middle East and North Africa. The report ranked Qatar among countries that have made the most
progress in closing the gender wage gap and in women’s educational attainment, but also found
that health and survival outcomes in Qatar demonstrate a 3% or more gap between men and
women based on Qatari men’s longer life expectancy.60 Qatar is a member of the executive board
of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)
through 2025.
Labor Issues and Trafficking in Persons
Domestic and international observers and officials have raised labor and migrants’ rights concerns
for decades as Qatar has implemented large-scale infrastructure projects, including works that
were completed in preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA soccer World Cup. Press analysis citing
government data from labor source countries reported in 2021 that thousands of foreign workers
had died while employed in Qatar since 2011, but cited statistics that were not categorized “by
occupation or place of work.”61 Amnesty International has said some labor conditions have
amounted to the equivalent of “forced labor”; Qatari officials have highlighted labor law changes,
acknowledged some shortcomings, and rejected some foreign criticism.62 Qatari officials
emphasize their commitment to ending abusive and exploitative labor practices and have
established minimum wage rules and banned some components of the kafala (migrant labor
sponsorship) system. Official enforcement reportedly has remained uneven and some reports
suggest continuing abuses by private employers, including firms that supported World Cuprelated projects.63
According to the State Department’s 2023 human rights report, “Some elements of the kafala
employer-based sponsorship system—such as the exit requirement and legal requirement for the
no objection certificate—were removed in 2020, but the sponsorship system gave employers
broad control over foreign workers, and the government did not consistently implement reforms
and ensure access to justice.” The State Department’s 2024 Trafficking in Persons report
classifies Qatar as a Tier 2 country and describes increased investigations, the establishment of a
specialized court, and improved victim assistance measures. The report states that “Courts
convicted all traffickers under the anti-trafficking law and the penal code and sentenced the
57 For more information and sources, see CRS Report R46423, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for
Congress, by Zoe Danon and Shannon L. Smith.
58 Human Rights Watch, Women and Qatar’s Male Guardianship Rules, March 29, 2021.
59 World Bank, Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled International Labor
Organization estimate)—Qatar, August 2024.
60 World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2024, Tables 1.1 and 1.3 and page 303, June 2024.
61 “Revealed: 6,500 Migrant Workers Have Died in Qatar Since World Cup Awarded,” The Guardian, February 23,
2021.
62 Amnesty International, “Qatar: Security Guards Subjected to Forced Labour,” April 7, 2022; Reuters, “Qatar
Minister Slams Hypocrisy of People Calling for World Cup Boycott,” November 4, 2022.
63 Migrant Rights, “Job Mobility in Qatar Is Still a Mirage Despite Reforms; Domestic Workers Most Affected,”
October 5, 2021; and Pramod Acharya, “Months Before World Cup, Workers Forced to Return Home Early and with
Pending Dues,” Migrant Rights, September 4, 2022.
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traffickers to imprisonment ranging from one to five years.” It noted, however, that “the
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas,” and said, “officials did
not consistently consider labor complaints or violations where trafficking indicators were present
as potential trafficking crimes.”64
In November 2022, the International Labour Organization (ILO) issued a report describing
“significant progress” in Qatar’s efforts to reform its labor system and noting “universal
recognition that the work is not complete.”65 In March 2023, the ILO rejected allegations that
“lobbying” and financial support from the government of Qatar had altered its reporting on
conditions in the country.66
Religious Freedom
Qatar’s constitution guarantees the freedom to practice religious rites in accordance with “the
maintenance of public order and morality.” Islam is the state religion and sharia is “a main
source” of legislation. Most citizens are Sunni Muslims, and some citizens are Shia Muslims.
Non-Muslims comprise most of Qatar’s non-citizen expatriate population, including Hindus,
Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Copts, Orthodox Christians, Baha’i, and others. Expatriate nonMuslim religious groups must register with the government. The law prohibits public worship or
proselytization by non-Muslims. The State Department’s report on religious freedom conditions
in Qatar during 2023 reported that Qatar
continued to host the headquarters of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS),
a group widely viewed in the press and academia as being affiliated with the Muslim
Brotherhood, a Sunni transnational organization that promotes political Islam. Although
the IUMS stated it was an independent association of scholars, observers said its close
relationship with the government helped it to serve as an instrument of the country’s soft
power. .67
The 2023 State Department human rights report states that “under sharia, homosexuality was
punishable by death; there were no reports of executions for this reason.”68
Qatar’s Foreign Policy
Qatar’s multidirectional foreign policy, financial resources, and unique international relationships
have raised its global diplomatic profile since the early 2000s, and appears to lead other
governments to view Qatari initiatives variously as useful or vexing depending on their discrete
perspectives and interests. Qatar’s 2011 deployment of military aircraft to support NATO-led
operations in Libya signaled a new assertiveness, as did reported Qatari support for armed
elements of the Syrian opposition during the height of Syria’s civil war. Some of Qatar’s positions
have drawn U.S. attention and have been scrutinized by some of Qatar’s Arab neighbors,
including its contacts with the government of Iran and groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the
Palestinian group Hamas, various other Islamist groups (including members of the Muslim
Brotherhood movement), and Afghanistan’s now-ruling Taliban.
64 U.S. State Department, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Qatar, June 2024.
65 ILO, Labour Reforms in the State of Qatar: Coming Together Around a Shared Vision, November 3, 2022.
66 ILO, “Statement Following the New York Times Story on the ILO’s Work in Qatar,” March 11, 2023; and Rebecca
R. Ruiz and Sarah Hurtes, “In World Cup Run-Up, Qatar Pressed U.N. Agency Not to Investigate Abuses, New York
Times,” March 11, 2023.
67 U.S. State Department, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Qatar, June 24, 2024.
68 U.S. State Department, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights: Qatar, April 22, 2024.
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Qatar and Russia’s War Against Ukraine
In response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Qatar has stated its “respect for Ukraine’s
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders”
and called for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the conflict in accordance with international
law.69 Qatar has voted in favor of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, but abstained, along with other GCC members, in the April 2022 vote on
expelling Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.
Qatar has provided $5 million to support humanitarian aid to Ukrainian refugees and displaced
persons and in July 2023 pledged $100 million in humanitarian support to Ukraine.70 Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also has acknowledged a Qatari donation of $20 million to
Ukraine’s “Grain from Ukraine” initiative.
Qatar’s diplomatic statements on the Russia-Ukraine war and related humanitarian crises outline
the Qatari government’s “full readiness to contribute to any international and regional effort
aimed at alleviating the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and is in line with its position supporting
peaceful solutions through dialogue and mediation.”71 Qatar has had close energy related ties to
fellow natural gas exporter Russia, and has reportedly considered closer security cooperation with
Russia at times in the past.72
Qatar’s Emir and Prime Minister have offered mediation to Ukraine and Russia, and continue to
engage with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and Russian President Vladimir Putin in related
talks.73 Russia has released several Ukrainian children through mediation by Qatari officials at the
request of the government of Ukraine.74 Presidents Zelenskyy and Putin have thanked the Emir
for Qatar’s engagement in mediation, humanitarian issues related to the war, and the return of
children.75
Qatar has committed to maintaining (and expanding as possible) its supplies of natural gas to
Europe during the crisis. However, Qatari officials have said they will not divert to Europe gas
already contracted for delivery to Asia, emphasizing that, “Qatar is absolutely committed to the
sanctity of contracts.”76 Entities purchasing Qatari gas may have discretion to divert gas to
Europe, which Qatari officials have not said they oppose. Qatari energy officials have stressed
that no combination of major gas exporters can supply enough natural gas to Europe, on short
69 Qatar “calls for a ceasefire and the start of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, based on its keenness on the
Charter of the United Nations and the well-established principles of the international law, its obligations stipulated in
the Charter to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and its commitment to the sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity of states.” Qatar Foreign Ministry, “Qatar Participates in Humanitarian Meeting of Senior
Officials on Ukraine,” September 27, 2022.
70 Qatar Information Office, “Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Affirms Qatar’s Support for
UNHRC in Facing Global Challenges,” February 28, 2022; and Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Pledges USD
100 Million for Humanitarian Assistance to Ukraine,” July 28, 2023.
71 Qatar Foreign Ministry, “Qatar Participates in ‘Solidarity with Ukrainian People’ Conference in Paris,” December
13, 2022.
72 Al Jazeera, “Qatar FM: Doha Buying S-400s ‘Not Anyone’s Business,’” March 4, 2019.
73 “Foreign Minister Meets Russian Foreign Minister.” The Peninsula, March 14, 2022.
74 Siobhán O’Grady, “Russia Releases Four Ukrainian Children After Mediation by Qatar,” Washington Post, October
16, 2023; and O’Grady, “Russia to Release Six More Ukrainian Children After Qatar Mediation,” Washington Post,
December 5, 2023.
75 Office of the President of Ukraine, “The President Met with the Amir of Qatar,” June 5, 2024; Office of the President
of Russia, “Meeting with Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani,” July 4, 2024.
76 QatarEnergy CEO Saad Al Kaabi quoted in Andrew Mills, “QatarEnergy Expanding in LNG, Won’t Divert Supplies
to Europe,” Reuters, October 18, 2022.
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notice, to completely compensate for a shutoff of gas supplies from Russia. In December 2024,
Qatar’s Energy Minister threatened to suspend gas exports to the European Union if EU countries
impose fines on QatarEnergy in conjunction with the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due
Diligence Directive on human rights and environmental effects.77
Qatar has announced plans to expand its gas output and exports in coming years and has
discussed new long-term purchase agreements with European customers.78 In October 2023,
Qatar announced 27-year natural gas sale and purchase agreements with TotalEnergies of France
and Shell of the Netherlands beginning in 2026.79 (See “Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues”
below.) In January 2023, Qatar announced it would replace a Russian firm in a joint natural gas
exploration venture in Lebanese waters in partnership with ENI of Italy and TotalEnergies.80
Delivery delays to Europe may result from shipping disruptions in the Red Sea associated with
maritime attacks by the Yemen-based Houthi movement.81
Qatari officials at times have observed that multilateral financial sanctions could motivate some
energy producers to develop alternative, non-U.S. dollar-based means of marketing oil and gas
exports.82
Qatar and China
Emir Tamim and PRC leader Xi Jinping met in Saudi Arabia in December 2022 in conjunction
with the Arab States-China Summit and the GCC-China Summit and again in July 2024 during
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Council of Heads of State meeting in Astana,
Kazakhstan. PRC firm China Railway Construction Corporation partnered with Qatari firms to
build the Lusail stadium that hosted the 2022 World Cup final. China Harbour Engineering
Company (CHEC) played a central role in Qatar’s Hamad Port and Emiri Naval Base
construction projects.83 In 2015, Qatar launched the first renminbi clearing hub in the Middle
East/North Africa (MENA) region, primarily to settle payments in China’s currency for exports of
oil and gas.84 Oil, natural gas, and petroleum products comprise most of Qatar’s exports to China.
In November 2022, China’s Sinopec and QatarEnergy agreed to a 27-year LNG supply deal.
China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and Qatar-Energy signed a similar 27-year deal in June
2023.85 In April 2024, QatarEnergy and China State Shipbuilding Corporation signed an
agreement for a Qatari order of 18 LNG shipping carriers valued at $6 billion.86
77 Giedrė Peseckytė, “Qatar warns it will halt gas supplies to Europe if fined under EU due diligence law,” Politico,
December 22, 2024.
78 Patrick Wintour, “Germany Agrees Gas Deal with Qatar to Help End Dependency on Russia,” The Guardian, March
20, 2022.
79 “QatarEnergy, TotalEnergies Sign 27-year LNG Supply Agreement,” Reuters, October 11, 2023; and Yousef Saba,
“Qatar Supplies Gas to Europe, Vying with US to Replace Russia Supply,” Reuters, October 18, 2023.
80 Bassem Mroue, “Qatar Boosts Influence in Lebanon amid Multiple Crises,” Associated Press, February 4, 2023.
81 Maha El Dahan, Emily Chow, and Andrew Mills, “QatarEnergy Halts Red Sea LNG Shipping amid Attacks, Seeking
Security Advice,” Reuters, January 15, 2024.
82 “Ukraine-Russia Crisis Is Driving Countries to Explore New Ways of Pricing Oil, Qatar Says,” CNC, March 26,
2022.
83 Qatar New Port Project at http://www.npp.com.qa/Construction.html.
84 SWIFT, “The United Arab Emirates and Qatar Drive RMB Adoption in the Middle East,” press release, January 28,
2016.
85 Andrew Mills and Maha El Dahan, “Qatar Strikes Second Big LNG Supply Deal with China,” Reuters, June 20,
2023.
86 Bloomberg, “Qatar Places $6 Billion Order for LNG Carriers From China,” April 29, 2024.
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Qatar and Afghanistan
Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, Qatari diplomats in Kabul helped
U.S. evacuation efforts, including by escorting small groups of Americans into the Kabul
airport.87 Since the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, 2021, Qatar Airways charter
flights have evacuated additional U.S. and other nationals. President Biden and senior U.S.
officials thanked Qatar for its help in U.S. relocation efforts and for Qatar’s engagement in talks
with the Taliban on issues of mutual concern to Qatar and the United States. U.S. Embassy Kabul
closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, and its diplomats
transferred to Embassy Doha, where they operate an Afghan Affairs Unit. The Biden
Administration sought $41.9 million in FY2023 State Department funding to support the
Protecting Power Arrangement (PPA) between Qatar and the United States to protect certain U.S.
interests in Afghanistan.
Qatar has maintained contact with Taliban officials and in May 2023, in his capacity as Prime
Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani travelled to Kandahar, Afghanistan for a
direct meeting with Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. UN-led talks on Afghanistan in Doha
in July 2024 were the first to include Taliban participants since the U.S. withdrawal.88
As noted above, Qatar and the United States have bilateral agreements regarding Qatar’s hosting
of Afghan nationals for a limited period to complete their vetting and processing for onward
migration.89 Qatar’s CARE Doha, formerly known as the Camp As Sayliyah pre-positioning site
for U.S. military equipment, has served as the primary overseas platform for processing
applications for U.S. resettlement for individuals from Afghanistan. In February 2025, a press
report cited an unnamed U.S. official as saying the Trump Administration has directed CARE to
plan for its closure by April 2025.90 According to press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials and
advocates for U.S.-associated Afghans, U.S. relocation operations were “essentially paused” as of
March 2025 and there were approximately 2-3,000 Afghan nationals in Qatar awaiting transit to
the United States whose onward travel has been delayed by announced Trump Administration
policy changes.91 The Administration does not publicly report how many Afghans remain in Qatar
awaiting onward travel.
Qatar and Its Neighbors
Gulf Cooperation Council and Other Arab States
The United States has encouraged intra-Arab rapprochement following a period from 2017
through 2020 in which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt
worked to isolate Qatar diplomatically and economically in the hopes of changing Qatari
87 “Biden Says Safe Zone Around Kabul Airport to Expand, as Pentagon Enlists Commercial Airlines to Aid
Evacuations,” Washington Post, August 22, 2021.
88 Associated Press, “UN-led meeting in Qatar with Afghan Taliban is not a recognition of their government, official
says,” July 1, 2024.
89 U.S. State Department, Office of Treaty Affairs, Qatar (22-919)—Protocol Amending the Temporary Relocation
Transit Agreement of November 12, 2021, September 19, 2022; and Qatar (21-1112)—Temporary Relocation Transit
Agreement, November 12, 2021.
90 Jonathan Landay, “Exclusive: Office overseeing Afghan resettlement in US told to start planning closure, sources
say,” Reuters, February 18, 2025.
91 Priscilla Alvarez, Haley Britzky and Jennifer Hansler, “Thousands of Afghans who helped the US lose access to
critical resources following Trump directives,” CNN, January 27, 2025; and “US-bound Afghans left ‘without options’
as Trump travel ban looms,” AFP, March 11, 2025.
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officials’ policies toward sensitive regional political issues.92 By 2019, having realized few
benefits from the blockade, Saudi Arabia and the UAE apparently began to look for a
resolution—an outcome urged by the first Trump Administration.93 At the 41st GCC summit in Al
Ula, Saudi Arabia, on January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced
that they would restore diplomatic relations with Qatar, though Qatar did not commit to meeting
any of their demands.
Following the Al Ula summit, Qatar reengaged with its former antagonists, and Emir Tamim
visited Egypt in June 2022 and participated in the GCC+3 Summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
where he met with President Biden. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi visited Doha in
September 2022. Qatari authorities reportedly requested that several Egyptian nationals affiliated
with Islamist groups relocate from Qatar in June 2023. Qatar joined other Gulf states in
announcing billions of dollars of planned investments in Egypt in 2022, as the Egyptian
government sought Gulf-state financial support in exchange for Egyptian state assets, including
Egyptian government-held stakes in several companies. In February 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted
officials from Qatar and Bahrain to launch talks to resolve a series of outstanding issues between
Qatar and Bahrain. Qatar’s Prime Minister visited Saudi Arabia in February 2024 for
consultations with other Arab ministers on the Israel-Hamas war and conditions in Gaza (see
below). The Emir attended the May 2024 Arab Summit in Bahrain.
Syria
Qatar opposed the Asad regime’s crackdown and use of military force against Syrians and
declined to reestablish ties with the Asad government prior to Asad’s ouster. Emir Tamim visited
Saudi Arabia for the April 2023 Arab League summit, but reportedly departed before Syrian
President Bashar al Asad spoke following his government’s reinstatement by the League. The
Emir was the first Arab head of state to travel to Syria following Asad’s ouster, visiting with
interim president Sharaa in February 2025. Qatar has pledged financial and energy support to
Syria’s interim government, and a March press report citing an unnamed U.S. official said that
Qatar has U.S. approval to begin supplying or financing the supply of natural gas to Syria via
pipelines from Jordan.94
Iran
Qatar and Iran share the large North Field natural gas reserve in the Persian Gulf.
Qatari leaders have pursued dialogue with Iran, while cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter
Iran strategically. Emir Tamim visited Iran in February 2025 after hosting Iranian President
Masoud Pezeshkian in October 2024. Qatar previously hosted Iran’s then-President Ibrahim Raisi
in February 2022, and the two sides signed several agreements.95 Qatar turned to Iran to help it
cope with the GCC rift, including by importing Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying Iranian
92 In June 2017, those countries cut diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari
nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The group initially demanded that, as a condition for
ending the boycott, Qatar close the Al Jazeera satellite network, sever relations with Muslim Brotherhood
organizations, downgrade relations with Iran, and end the deployment of Turkish military personnel in Qatar. See “List
of Demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Other Arab Nations,” Associated Press, June 23, 2017.
93 “US Secretary of State in Qatar Urges End to Gulf Diplomatic Rift,” Deutsche Welle, January 13, 2019.
94 Timour Azhari and Andrew Mills, “Exclusive: Qatar to supply gas to Syria via Jordan with a US nod, sources say,”
Reuters, March 13, 2025.
95 Anna L. Jacobs, Qatar and Iran Expand Ties amid Broader Gulf De-escalation, Arab Gulf States Institute in
Washington, March 11, 2022.
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airspace, a privilege for which Qatar Airways paid Iran over $130 million per year in overflight
fees.96 Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran
nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, instead stating that efforts to “denuclearize” the region should not
lead to “escalation.”97 Qatar and Iran exchanged mutual visits of high-ranking officials in 2019 in
an initiative reported as seeking to de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions,98 and Qatar has encouraged
dialogue between the GCC countries and Iran to lower Gulf tensions.99
Qatar supported Biden Administration efforts to restore full Iranian and U.S. adherence to the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).100 In September 2023, the United States and Iran
conducted a mutual prisoner exchange and the U.S. government waived the potential imposition
of sanctions to facilitate the transfer of $6 billion in Iranian assets, accrued from petroleum sales
to South Korea, to a financial institution in Qatar. The actions by the governments of Iran and the
United States occurred in the context of broader diplomatic engagement to de-escalate tensions.101
A Treasury FAQ published September 18, 2023, read
In partnership with the Government of Qatar and financial institutions operating the HC
[humanitarian channel]—all of which have committed to stringent due diligence
measures—the United States will closely monitor the HC and will take appropriate action
should Iran attempt to use these funds for purposes other than permitted humanitarian
purchases.102
An October 2023 press report said that then-Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo told
legislators that, in the wake of Hamas’s assault on Israel, U.S. and Qatari officials had agreed to
prevent the use of the funds to finance the purchase of humanitarian goods for export to Iran for
an unspecified period of time.103 Going forward, the United States could impose sanctions on any
foreign financial institution or entity involved in a transaction involving the funds, including
restricting access to the U.S. financial system. As noted above (“Congress and Qatar”), the House
in 2023 and 2024 adopted bills that would have rescinded U.S. waivers related to the transferred
funds and would have directed the President to impose sanctions on foreign financial institutions
determined to transact in the funds.
The Qatari Prime Minister said in October 2023 that Qatar was “always committed to any
agreement” that Qatar has entered into, a likely reference to the Qatari government’s position that
it has made commitments both to the United States and Iran in relation to the transfer and
potential future use of the funds. Later that month, Secretary of State Blinken said in Senate
testimony
The money in that South Korean account that accrued from the sale of these proceeds, for
technical reasons related to Korean banks, was unable to be used even though it lawfully
could be. So, it was moved to an account in Qatar where it could be used for humanitarian
purposes, just as the previous administration established another account in another country
for these very purposes. The money never goes and would never go to Iran. It can only be
96 “UN Aviation Ruling Could Deny Iran Hundreds of Millions of Dollars,” Fox News, July 14, 2020.
97 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018.
98 “The Latest: Qatar Trying to Defuse Tensions amid Iran Crisis,” Fox News, May 16, 2019.
99 Erin Cunningham, “Qatar Urges Dialogue Between Persian Gulf States,” Washington Post, January 19, 2021.
100 Amwaj Media, “Qatar Carries US ‘Message’ to Tehran as IAEA Chief Set to Visit Iran,” January 31, 2023.
101 See, for example, Karen DeYoung et al., “U.S. and Iran in Indirect Talks over Nuclear Program and Prisoners,”
Washington Post, June 20, 2023; and Chase Winter et al., “What’s Driving Biden’s Iran Sanctions Policy,” Energy
Intelligence, September 7, 2023.
102 Treasury FAQ 1134, at https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1134.
103 Jeff Stein and Jacob Bogage, “U.S., Qatar Agree to Stop Iran from Tapping $6 Billion Fund After Hamas Attack,”
Washington Post, October 12, 2023.
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used for authorized transactions overseen by our Treasury Department and only for things
like food, medicine, and other authorized humanitarian purposes. To date, not a single
dollar has been expended from that account. There are currently no plans to expend a single
dollar from that account. And in any event, that money never touches Iran directly.104
In October 2024, Iranian President Pezeshkian said Qatar and Iran had “reached a good
understanding” regarding Iranian funds held in Qatar during his visit to Doha.105
Some Members of Congress have urged or sought to compel the executive branch to act in a
demonstrable, transparent way to ensure the funds in Qatar are not used for Iran-related
transactions. If Qatar or the United States acts with regard to the funds in ways that the
government of Iran perceives as violating the understanding previously reached, Iran could
decide to no longer engage Qatar as an intermediary for the United States on issues such as Iran’s
nuclear program, U.S. or other foreign nationals unjustly detained in Iran, negotiations with
Hamas or other Iran-backed groups, and/or other regional security matters.106
Israel and the Palestinians
Qatar’s policies toward Israel and the Palestinians are receiving additional international attention
following the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks by the U.S.-designated FTO Hamas on Israel, the
seizure by Hamas and other armed groups of hostages from Israel, and Israel’s military campaign
in the Gaza Strip, which Hamas has controlled since 2007.
Qatar has had high-level contacts with Israel since the mid-1990s, and has allowed some smallscale direct Israel-Qatar trade and visits to Doha by Israeli security officials, athletes, doctors, and
other Israelis, despite abiding policy differences.107 Emir Tamim and other Qatari officials have
accused Israel of abuses against the Palestinians and express support for Palestinian efforts to
establish a state with East Jerusalem as its capital.108 Qatari officials say they have ruled out
joining other Arab states in normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords until
there is substantial progress toward resolving the Israel-Palestinian dispute.109
Following Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim
Al Thani’s February 9, 2024, meeting with Arab foreign minister counterparts in Saudi Arabia,
the Qatari government said the ministers “emphasized the importance of taking irreversible steps
to implement the two-state solution, recognizing the State of Palestine along the lines of June 4,
1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with relevant international resolutions.”110
104 “Senate Appropriations Committee Holds Hearing on National Security Supplemental Request,” CQ Congressional
Transcripts, October 31, 2023.
105 Press TV, “Iran, Qatar reach ‘good understanding’ on $6bn unfrozen funds, says Pezeshkian,” October 4, 2024.
106 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani at a Joint Press Availability,” October 13, 2023.
107 Uzi Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,” Middle East Journal, vol. 63, no. 3
(Summer, 2009), pp. 443-459; and Guy Azriel, “Qatar-Israel Talks Fail over Israeli Demand to Go Public,” i24 News,
August 31, 2022.
108 See, for example, “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir,” The Peninsula, September 29, 2015. In March 2023, Qatar’s
permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva stated Qatar’s position “supporting the Palestinian people
and their just cause until they reclaim all their legitimate rights, and establish full sovereignty as independent state
based on the borders of 1967 with East Jerusalem as the capital.” Qatar Foreign Ministry, “The State of Qatar
Reiterates Position of Supporting Palestine,” March 3, 2023.
109 “Interview: Qatar’s FM Rules Out Normalization with Israel, Syria.” Axios, February 2, 2022.
110 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Participates in Consultative
Meeting in Riyadh to Discuss Developments in Israeli War on Gaza,” February 9, 2024.
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The Emir joined other Arab leaders in May 2024 in issuing a joint declaration in Manama,
Bahrain to reiterate the League of Arab States’
firm position and call for a just and comprehensive peaceful settlement of the Palestinian
issue, and we support the call of His Excellency President Mahmoud Abbas, President of
the State of Palestine, to convene an international peace conference and to take irreversible
steps to implement the two-state solution in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative and
resolutions of international legitimacy to establish an independent and sovereign
Palestinian state on the lines of 4 June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital, and to accept
its membership in the United Nations as an independent and fully sovereign state in
common with other countries in the world, and to ensure the restoration of all legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people, in particular, the right to return and self-determination,
empowerment and support.111
Since October 7, the Qatari government has been vocal in its calls for an immediate and lasting
ceasefire,112 has criticized the Israeli military’s conduct,113 and has voiced opposition to attacks
against civilians.114 Qatar‘s government said on October 7, 2023, that it held “Israel solely
responsible for the ongoing escalation.”115 Later that month, the Qatari government rejected “the
attempts to forcibly displace the brotherly Palestinian people from Gaza Strip,” called for “lifting
the blockade on the Strip and providing full protection to civilians under international law and
international humanitarian law,” and affirmed the Palestinian right to statehood with East
Jerusalem as its capital.116 Qatari officials have repeated these views since October 2023.
Qatar joined other Arab states in rejecting President Trump’s statements in 2025 calling for the
relocation of Gaza’s population and the territory’s redevelopment under U.S. auspices, and said
“any efforts to encourage the transfer or uprooting of Palestinians from their land … threaten the
region’s stability, risk expanding the conflict, and undermine prospects for peace and coexistence
among its peoples.”117 Qatar joined other Arab League states in endorsing an Egyptian
counterproposal in March 2025.118
For years, Qatari officials have asserted that their engagement with Hamas can help foster IsraeliPalestinian peace and contribute to de-escalation of conflict, a view they have reiterated since
111 Bahrain News Agency, “Bahrain Declaration of 33rd Arab Summit issued,” May 17, 2024.
112 On October 8, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry called for “all parties to halt the escalation to attain calm and entirely halt
the armed confrontations on all fronts.” Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Reiterates Call for Halting Escalation
to Protect Region from Danger of Descending into a Wider Cycle of Violence,” October 8, 2023.
113 On October 31, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry decried an Israeli attack that killed Palestinians in Jabaliya refugee camp
in Gaza as a “new massacre against the defenseless Palestinian people, especially children and women,” Israeli officials
stated the strikes targeted Hamas facilities and personnel. See Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Strongly
Condemns the Massacre at Jabalia Refugee Camp in Gaza,” October 31, 2023.
114 Qatar joined other Arab League members states in endorsing an October 11 resolution that condemned the killing
and targeting of civilians “by both sides” and acts contrary to international law. See League of Arab States Resolution
8987, “On Ways to Take Political Action to Stop Israeli Aggression and Achieve Peace and Security,” October 11,
2023.
115 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Expresses Concern over the Developments in Gaza Strip and Calls for
Deescalation,” October 7, 2023.
116 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Qatar Announces Its Categorical Rejection of the Attempts to Forcibly Displace
the Palestinian People from Gaza Strip,” October 13, 2023; and Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Holds Phone Call with UN Secretary-General,” October 13, 2023.
117 Joint Statement by Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, the Palestinian Authority and the
Arab League, February 1, 2025.
118 Samy Magdy and Mohammad Jahjouh, “Arab leaders endorse Egypt’s plan to rebuild Gaza as an alternative to
Trump’s proposal,” AP, March 4, 2025.
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October 2023.119 In an October 2023 press conference with then-Secretary of State Blinken,
Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman said the Hamas office in Doha “was started to be used as a
way of communicating and bringing peace and calm into the region, not to instigate any war. And
this is the purpose of that office.”120 As of 2025, U.S. officials continue to travel to Doha to
engage in indirect meetings with Hamas officials based there, and apparently had engaged in
some direct talks that Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterized as “a one-off situation” that
to date had not “borne fruit.”121 Qatar-based Hamas official Khalil Al Hayya reportedly leads the
group’s negotiation team.122 The November 2023 and early 2025 pauses in the Israel-Hamas war
negotiated with Qatari, Egyptian, and U.S. support have reportedly included the exchange of a
large majority of the 250 hostages (including some deceased persons) that had been held in Gaza
since October 2023 for more than 2,000 Palestinian prisoners previously detained by Israel. Qatar
condemned the July 2024 killing in Iran of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh.123 Haniyeh
was buried in Lusail, Qatar.124
Qatar’s main engagement with the Palestinians prior to the October 7 attacks and ensuing conflict
appeared to come through the substantial financial aid it has provided to the people of Gaza,
which Israeli officials supported as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border.125 Aid
efforts have been provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official
Mohammad al Emadi, who serves informally as an envoy to Israel.
Qatar was a key mediator to end 11 days of clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021,
efforts that were reportedly facilitated, in part, by additional Qatari pledges of aid to Gaza.126
Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns
about the potential for its diversion, Qatar agreed to arrangements in late 2021 to provide money
transfers for needy families through the United Nations, and send fuel from Egypt into Gaza so it
can be sold to pay for civil servants’ salaries.127
Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues
Qatar’s active diplomacy is, at least in part, a result of its considerable financial resources and
economic influence. In February 2025, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised Qatar’s
resilience to external shocks, noted non-hydrocarbon growth in Qatar’s economy, and projected
119 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference of His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,” June
12, 2017.
120 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani at a Joint Press Availability,” October 13, 2023.
121 U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Remarks to the Press,” March 10, 2025.
122 Nidal Al Mughrabi, “Hamas’ Hayya seen in key role under new leader Sinwar, sources say,” Reuters, August 7,
2024; and Barak Ravid, “U.S.-Israel tensions over Hamas meetings simmer ahead of Gaza talks,” Axios, March 10,
2025.
123 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The State of Qatar Condemns Assassination of Head of the Political Bureau of
Hamas,” July 31, 2024, at https://mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/the-state-of-qatar-condemns-assassination-of-head-of-thepolitical-bureau-of-hamas.
124 Tala Ramadan, Jana Choukeir and Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Slain Hamas leader Haniyeh buried in Qatar amid vows of
revenge against Israel,” August 2, 2024.
125 Neville Teller, “What Do You Make of Qatar?” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2019.
126 Vivian Salama, Felicia Schwartz, and Jared Malsin, “Israel and Hamas Near Cease-Fire amid Mounting Pressure,”
Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2021.
127 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to Begin Dispensing Qatari Cash to Needy Gazan Families Monday Under New Deal,”
Times of Israel, September 12, 2021; Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar Agreement with Israel, Hamas Provides Boost
for Gaza Economy,” Al-Monitor, November 23, 2021.
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that the planned large-scale expansion of natural gas production and exports from Qatar’s North
Field in the Persian Gulf (Figure 2) would support state finances over the medium term.128 The
IMF estimated in 2024 that the “[North Field] expansion project is expected to increase Qatar’s
LNG production capacity by around 65 percent by 2028” and said in 2022 that it expects the
project to “further increase Qatar’s reliance on fossil fuel.”129 According to the IMF, oil and gas
revenues directly provide roughly 53% of the government’s revenue, and may contribute
indirectly to investment and tax revenue.130 Qatar does not have a value-added tax (VAT), but the
IMF reports that “the tax authority has readied the infrastructure for VAT introduction.”131
Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure, 2015
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar Country Analysis Brief, October 2015.
New challenges have accompanied Qatar’s economic success in areas such as social cohesion;
education; labor; preservation of local traditions; national infrastructure; and energy, water, and
food supplies. To respond to these challenges, Qatari authorities have pursued a series of national
development strategies based on a comprehensive national vision document that seeks balanced,
sustainable growth by the year 2030.132 Emir Tamim bin Hamad chaired the implementation
128 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Qatar Article IV Consultation and Staff Report, IMF Country Report No.
2025/47, February 2025.
129 IMF Country Report No. 2024/043 and Country Report No. 2022/175.
130 IMF Country Report No. 2025/47, Table 3a, February 2025.
131 IMF Country Report No. 2025/47, February 2025, p. 12.
132 According to Qatari authorities, Qatar’s National Vision 2030 initiative “aims at transforming Qatar into an
advanced country capable of sustaining its own development and ensuring high living standards for its people for
(continued...)
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oversight body for the Qatar National Vision 2030 project in his former role as heir apparent. The
national development strategy for 2024 through 2030 set targets for diversified economic growth,
fiscal sustainability, workforce development, social cohesion, quality of life, environmental
sustainability, and governance improvement informed by Qatar’s experiences in implementing its
first two national development strategies from 2011 to 2016 and from 2018 to 2022.133 Qatar’s
isolation by neighboring Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE from 2017 through 2020 may
contribute to Qatar’s pursuit of greater self-sufficiency in some areas, and of extra-regional
economic partnerships. Preparations for the 2022 World Cup and preservation of Qatari culture
were core elements of the 2018-2022 strategy.
With proven oil reserves of 25.2 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian Gulf
producers. Crude oil output estimates were 580,000 barrels per day as of 2024.134 Qatar withdrew
from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as of January 2019.135 Qatar
also withdrew from the 25-member OPEC+ group in 2019. Qatar has not coordinated its
production decisions with OPEC or OPEC+ since, as Qatari officials have prioritized LNG
development and criticized both OPEC and OPEC+ as primarily reflecting the influence of larger
producers.136 Leading importers of Qatari oil include Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.
Qatar has the third-largest natural gas reserves in the world, an estimated 23.86 trillion cubic
meters (tcm).137 Qatar borrowed internationally and invited foreign investment in order to expand
gas extraction and LNG production and export facilities in the late 1990s and early 2000s.138 The
Export-Import Bank of the United States provided more than $1 billion in loan guarantees to
support the early development of Qatar’s gas production facilities in cooperation with a range of
U.S., European, and Asian companies, banks, and export credit agencies.139 Qatar expanded
annual natural gas production from 29.6 billion cubic meters in 2002 to 167 billion cubic meters
in 2019, and since 2020 has been the world’s top exporter of LNG alongside the United States.140
generations to come by seeking to develop a diversified economy coupled with diminishing dependence on
hydrocarbons, where investment is moving towards a knowledge-based economy and the private sector is growing in
importance.... The QNV 2030 identifies five main challenges: modernization and preservation of traditions; balance
between the needs of this generation and those of future generations; managed growth and uncontrolled expansion; the
size and quality of the expatriate labor force and the selected path of development; and economic growth, social
development and environmental management.” For more information, see the Qatar Government Communications
Office at https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/, and Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority
website at https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/qnv1/Pages/default.aspx.
133 For Qatar’s National Development Strategy documents, see https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Pages/default.aspx.
134 Claudia Carpenter, “Qatar plans more drilling to expand oil production at its largest field,” S&P Global, January 31,
2024.
135 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Opinion: Why Is Qatar Leaving OPEC?” New York Times, December 10, 2018; and
Verity Ratcliffe and Simone Foxman, “Qatar Says Rejoining OPEC Would Not Fit with Its Strategy,” Bloomberg,
October 11, 2021.
136 In 2020, Qatari Minister of State for Energy Affairs Saad bin Sherida Al Kaabi said, “The big players make the
decisions in OPEC. We didn't see a place for us there because we are a gas producer, and we are really growing in gas.”
S&P Global, “INTERVIEW: Qatar Thrives Outside OPEC as Minister Warns over Market Flood Legacy,” April 20,
2020.
137 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2021 estimate. Qatar’s supply of natural gas doubled in 2002,
when surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar’s North Field.
138 See Kohei Hashirnoto, Jareer Elass, and Stacy Eller, “Liquefied Natural Gas from Qatar: The Qatargas Project,”
Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and Rice University James A. Baker III Institute
for Public Policy, December 2004.
139 See Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank $930 Million Guarantee Supports U.S. Exports to Build
LNG Plant in Qatar,” November 18, 2004; and Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank Finances
QatarGas 3 Liquid Natural Gas Complex,” December 15, 2005.
140 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2022.
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China, India, Pakistan, and Taiwan were the top importers of Qatari LNG by volume in 2023.141
Qatar is a member of Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) and hosts the GECF headquarters.
Following a pause in development of gas production and LNG export infrastructure in the 2010s,
Qatari authorities embarked in 2020 on a further expansion of North Field operations and LNG
facilities under a $30-$50 billion initiative that seeks to expand LNG export capacity by 60% to
126 million tons per year by 2027. Qatar in 2021 raised $12.5 billion for this expansion through a
series of international bonds.142 The North Field-East expansion project includes four LNG trains
and the North Field-South expansion project includes two LNG trains.143 U.S. companies,
particularly ExxonMobil, have long been partners in Qatar’s LNG operations: Qatari officials
chose ExxonMobil to participate in the North Field-East project along with ConocoPhillips. In
addition to its domestic expansion, QatarEnergy is increasing its presence globally, including
through marketing, liquefaction, regasification, and shipping.144
Outlook
Qatari-U.S. security cooperation appears likely to continue to anchor the bilateral relationship,
with U.S. officials paying close attention to Qatar’s energy exports and its multidirectional
foreign policy. Congress may continue to conduct oversight of the U.S. military’s presence and
programs in Qatar and may monitor Qatari foreign and domestic policies, especially concerning
China, Iran, Afghanistan, human rights, and Russia’s war on Ukraine. Qatari officials may
continue to seek defense, economic, and diplomatic coordination with the United States while
pursuing Qatar’s discrete interests and priorities.
Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led terrorist attacks in Israel and ensuing Israeli military
operations, developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Qatar’s role as a host to and
interlocutor with Hamas are playing a more prominent role in U.S.-Qatar relations. U.S. and
Qatari leaders may reevaluate each other’s approaches to Israel and the Palestinians when
considering future cooperation, in parallel with other interests and goals.
141 Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024, “Natural gas Trade movements 2023 as LNG.”
142 Yousef Saba, “Qatar Petroleum Grabs $12.5 bln in Emerging Market Bonds Record,” Reuters, June 30, 2021.
143 Andrew Mills and Maha El Dahan, “QatarEnergy Signs Deal with TotalEnergies for North Field South Expansion,”
Reuters, September 24, 2022.
144 Rafiq Latta, “QatarEnergy 2.0: The New LNG Industry Hegemon,” Energy Intelligence Group, February 28, 2023.
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Qatar: Issues for the 119th Congress
Appendix. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales
2012-2022
Table A-1. Proposed Major U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2022
Items
Estimated
Cost
($ million)
Notification Date
UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters
$1,112
June 13, 2012
MH-60R and MH-60S SEAHAWK Helicopters
$2,500
June 26, 2012
AH-64D APACHE Block III Longbow Helicopters; Related Missiles
$3,000
July 12, 2012
$137
July 12, 2012
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units
$6,500
November 5, 2012
PATRIOT Configuration-3 Missile Fire Units and Missiles
$9,900
November 7, 2012
HELLFIRE Missiles
M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS); M57 Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Rockets; M31A1
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Rockets
$406
Javelin Guided Missiles
$122
March 28, 2013
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems
$110
May 15, 2013
C-17 Globemaster III Equipment and Support
$35
June 27, 2013
A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar
$1,100
July 29, 2013
RIM-116C and RIM-116C-2 Rolling Airframe Missiles
$260
April 21, 2016
Javelin Guided Missiles
$20
May 24, 2016
Mk-V Fast Patrol Boats
$124
August 23, 2016
Logistics Support Services and Equipment Continuation
$700
December 8, 2016
Spare C-17 Engines
$81
December 8, 2016
$1,100
November 1, 2017
Upgrade of Qatar Air Operations Center
$197
March 7, 2018
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) II Guidance
Sections
$300
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) for National
Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS)
$215
F-15QA multirole fighter aircraft
AH-64E Apache Attack helicopters and related equipment
AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM)
systems for Head of State Aircraft
Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated
Defeat System (FS-LIDS)
December 24, 2012
$3,000
$86
$1,000
April 9, 2018
November 27, 2018
May 9, 2019
September 24, 2019
November 29, 2022
Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Does not reflect Direct Commercial Sales approved by
U.S. State Department.
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Qatar: Issues for the 119th Congress
Author Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
R47467 · VERSION 12 · UPDATED
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