Kuwait: Issues for the 119th Congress
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Kuwait: Issues for the 119th Congress
Updated January 14, 2026
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R47390
SUMMARY
Kuwait: Issues for the 119th Congress
The Persian Gulf emirate of Kuwait derives its global influence from its large oil and natural gas
reserves, its sizeable sovereign financial resources, its strategic location, and its diplomatic
outreach and posture in international and regional organizations. Kuwait’s oil reserves amount to
more than 7% of global proven reserves, and at current production rates, its reserves would last
through this century. Kuwait’s 1.5 million citizens are mostly Sunni Muslim, and its Shia Muslim
minority (~30%) has participated peacefully in politics. The country’s 3.3 million expatriates
play an important role in its economy. Kuwait’s politics have been fraught for years, amid
differences between the executive and legislative branches of government, within the ruling
family, and among different constituencies.
R47390
January 14, 2026
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
The Al Sabah family has exercised authority in Kuwait since the 18th century. Kuwait’s Emir (Head of State), Shaykh
Mishaal al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah (born 1940), succeeded his late half-brother in December 2023. In June 2024, the Emir
appointed his cousin, Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al Sabah, as Crown Prince and heir apparent. A previous succession in 2006
rebalanced power in the Al Sabah family, and succession arrangements may remain privately rivalrous.
In May 2024, the Emir issued a decree dissolving the elected National Assembly and suspending several articles of the 1962
constitution for a period of up to four years, citing perceived challenges to his authority and long-standing executivelegislative impasses. By suspending specific constitutional articles, the decree effectively enables the government to rule by
decree, amend or issue laws, and implement executive decisions without future legislative review. Kuwait’s National
Assembly has long been the most constitutionally empowered and influential legislative body among the Arab Gulf states,
and Kuwaiti citizens have been more politically engaged and active relative to their Gulf counterparts. Kuwaiti leaders and
citizens may debate the merits of structural reforms undertaken pursuant to the decree relative to the maintenance of rights
and responsibilities of Kuwaiti citizens under the country’s unique consultative system. Since issuing the decree, Kuwait’s
executive branch has issued and amended several laws intended to bolster the country’s economic and administrative reform
goals. As of 2026, the National Assembly and constitutional article suspensions remain in place.
U.S. relations with the State of Kuwait have been close since the United States led a multinational coalition that liberated
Kuwait from Iraqi forces in 1991. Defense cooperation serves as the centerpiece of U.S.-Kuwaiti partnership. The United
States has U.S. military personnel deployed in Kuwait on a lasting and rotational basis, along with forward operational
commands and U.S. military equipment pursuant to a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement and an Acquisition and
Cross-Servicing Agreement. Germany, Japan, and South Korea are the only countries that host more U.S. forces than Kuwait,
if rotational forces are included. The Kuwaiti government pays some of the cost of the U.S. military presence in Kuwait. In
October 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Kuwait’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior and
reaffirmed the U.S.-Kuwait partnership.
U.S. foreign and defense assistance to Kuwait has been limited, and since the 1990s, Congress has considered legislation
addressing bilateral relations relatively infrequently. President George W. Bush designated Kuwait as a Major Non-NATO
Ally in 2004, making Kuwait eligible to purchase certain U.S. arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in
defense research cooperation with the United States. Proposed U.S. foreign military sales to Kuwait since 2020 have included
U.S. construction services for the Ministry of Defense headquarters, Patriot missile system upgrades, Apache AH-64
helicopters, land and air force munitions, and M1A2 Abrams tank sustainment. The Trump Administration has notified the
119th Congress of more than $2.9 billion in proposed foreign military sales to Kuwait.
Kuwait responded to the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and ensuing Israel-Hamas war by reiterating its solidarity
with Palestinians, criticizing Israeli military actions, calling for an immediate ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian access.
Kuwait has joined other Arab League states in restating support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
Members of Congress may review developments in Kuwait and U.S.-Kuwait relations in the context of overseeing U.S.
diplomacy and defense policy, including efforts to ensure security of the global energy supply, deter aggression, promote
accountable governance and human rights, respond to humanitarian crises, and deescalate conflicts in the Middle East region.
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Kuwait: Issues for the 119th Congress
Contents
Overview and Bilateral Relations .................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Kuwaiti Defense Relations ............................................................................................... 3
U.S.-Kuwait Economic Relations ............................................................................................. 3
Consular and Legal Issues ......................................................................................................... 3
Congress and Kuwait ................................................................................................................ 4
Kuwait’s History and Politics .......................................................................................................... 4
Political System......................................................................................................................... 5
Human Rights............................................................................................................................ 7
Women’s Rights .................................................................................................................. 8
Trafficking in Persons ......................................................................................................... 8
Religious Freedom and Tolerance....................................................................................... 8
Kuwait’s Foreign Policy .................................................................................................................. 9
Kuwait and China...................................................................................................................... 9
Kuwait and its Neighbors ........................................................................................................ 10
Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues ............................................................................................ 12
Resources and Climate Change ............................................................................................... 13
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 14
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Kuwait ................................................................................................................. 1
Figure 2. Kuwait: Basic Facts ......................................................................................................... 5
Appendixes
Appendix. Political Developments 2006-2024.............................................................................. 15
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 18
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Kuwait: Issues for the 119th Congress
Overview and Bilateral Relations
The U.S. Department of State has described the U.S.-Kuwait relationship as warm and
multifaceted.1 Bilateral ties have remained close since the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait in the
1991 Gulf War (see text box below). The United States and Kuwait hosted the sixth U.S.-Kuwait
Strategic Dialogue virtually in December 2024.2 Deputy Chief of Mission Steven Butler serves as
the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires, ad interim. In October 2025, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
held a hearing to consider President Donald Trump’s nominee as ambassador-designate to
Kuwait, Amer Ghalib of Michigan. As of early 2026, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
not a held a vote on his nomination.3 As of 2026, thousands of U.S. military personnel are in
Kuwait at the invitation of the Kuwaiti government, which pays some of the cost of the U.S.
military presence.4 Kuwaiti-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation has deepened since the early
2000s. According to the Institute of International Education, approximately 5,000 Kuwaiti
students enrolled in U.S. higher education institutions during the 2024/2025 academic year, a
roughly 44% decline since the 2014/2015 period.5
Figure 1. Map of Kuwait
Source: CRS, using State Department and ESRI data.
Note: Energy fields and boundaries approximate.
1 U.S. State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “U.S. Relations With Kuwait,” January 5, 2021.
2 U.S. State Department, Joint Statement on the Sixth Round of the U.S.-Kuwait Strategic Dialogue, December 13,
2024.
3 CQ Congressional Transcripts, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Pending Nominations, October
23, 2025; Ramsey Touchberry and David Sivak, “Senate GOP to sink Trump ambassador pick for Kuwait over
antisemitism,” Washington Examiner, October 28, 2025; and, U.S. State Department, “Ghalib, Amer– State of Kuwait
– May 2025, Certificate of Competency, May 30, 2025.
4 Current U.S. law provides for acceptance of burden sharing contributions by designated countries and regional
organizations (see 10 U.S.C. 2609 and 10 U.S.C. 2350j).
5 Institute of International Education, Open Doors—International Students Data, November 2024.
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The 1990-1991 Invasion of Kuwait and its Aftermath
In August 1990, Iraq’s then-dictator Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi military to invade neighboring Kuwait.6 The
subsequent Iraqi occupation of Kuwait led to the displacement of Kuwait’s government; the death, disappearance,
and injury of thousands of Kuwaitis; and extensive damage to Kuwait’s natural resources and environment.
President George H.W. Bush quickly dispatched U.S. military forces to Saudi Arabia to deter further advances by
Iraqi forces. The 101st Congress condemned the Iraqi invasion immediately (S.Res. 318 and H.R. 5431) and
authorized and appropriated supplemental funds for Operation Desert Shield (P.L. 101-403, P.L. 101-510, and P.L.
101-511).
In January 1991, the 102nd Congress authorized the President to use military force (P.L. 102-1) pursuant to United
Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), which called on UN Member States to use “all necessary means
to uphold and implement” related Security Council resolutions and restore international peace and security in the
area. A U.S.-led multinational military campaign (Operation Desert Storm) to evict Iraqi forces began on January
17, 1991. Coalition forces liberated Kuwait by the end of February. Saddam Hussein’s regime was weakened, and
U.S. and partner forces established and maintained no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq over the next
decade, amid UN-backed sanctions and global scrutiny of Iraq’s suspected weapons of mass destruction programs.
The U.S. military and U.S. national security decisionmakers continue to study the 1990-1991 crisis and U.S.
decisions for lessons to inform current policy and future planning.7 The 119th Congress repealed the 1991 and
2002 Iraq authorizations for use of military force (AUMF, P.L. 102-1 and P.L. 107-243) in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60).
The after-effects of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and
Kuwait’s liberation have influenced the Middle East and
U.S. foreign policy for more than three decades. U.S.
confrontation with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq culminated
in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The
disorder and violence that followed destabilized Iraq
and arguably altered the regional balance of power in
Iran’s favor. More than 30 years after U.S. forces first
fought alongside partners to free Kuwait from Iraqi
forces, U.S. and partner militaries remain in both
countries, maintaining pre-positioned equipment,
conducting training and supporting deterrence
operations in Kuwait while providing security advice
and assistance to Iraq’s post-2003 government.
The military presence that the United States established and maintained in the Gulf in the wake of the 1991 war
cemented a role for the United States as a de facto guarantor of the Gulf’s security that has endured. The global
economy’s reliance on the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf similarly has evolved since the
1990s but persists. U.S. and host country decisions about the future presence and role of U.S. forces in the region
thus remain a question of significant regional and global interest.
In 2022, the UN Compensation Commission that processed and paid compensation claims related to Iraq’s
invasion and occupation of Kuwait announced the completion of the 31-year compensation process.8 Under a
series of UN Security Council resolutions, a portion of proceeds from Iraq’s oil sales were allocated to fund the
$52.4 billion in compensation claims paid over the life of the program. Congress may consider how the
development and implementation of this claims-compensation process might inform arrangements to secure and
administer compensation for claims arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or other cases of state aggression.
Photo Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Kuwait 1991.
6 On Iraq’s motives and considerations, see F. Gregory Gause, III, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990,”
Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter, 2002), pp. 47-70.
7 Richard A. Lacquement Jr., “The Gulf War 30 Years Later: Successes, Failures, and Blind Spots,” War on the Rocks,
September 9, 2020.
8 United Nations, “Iraq makes final reparation payment to Kuwait for 1990 invasion,” February 9, 2022.
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U.S.-Kuwaiti Defense Relations
On January 20, 2025, the U.S. State Department reported that “approximately 13,500 U.S. forces”
were then based in Kuwait, “primarily at Camp Arifjan and Ali al-Salem Air Base.”9 Kuwait hosts
the forward headquarters of U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT) and the Combined Joint
Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), which supports Iraqi and Syrian partner
forces in operations against the remnants of the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) organization.
When rotational forces are included in the count, only Germany, Japan, and South Korea host
more U.S. forces than Kuwait. A bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement is in place. The U.S.Kuwait Joint Military Committee met in Kuwait in May 2024, and a bilateral defense Joint
Implementation Committee met in February 2025. A joint exercise in December 2025 tested
counter-drone and air defense capabilities in Kuwait.
U.S. forces affiliated with Task Force Spartan/Operation Spartan Shield also operate in Kuwait,
for deterrence purposes and to build regional partner capacity. The 401st Army Field Support
Battalion–Kuwait manages pre-positioned U.S. Army stocks in Kuwait, and Kuwait-based
stockpiles have been used to support Ukraine under drawdown authorities. Proposed U.S. foreign
military sales to Kuwait since 2020 have included U.S. construction services for the Ministry of
Defense headquarters, various Patriot missile system upgrades, Apache AH-64 helicopters, M1A2
Abrams tank sustainment, and land and air force munitions, follow-on support, and services.
U.S.-Kuwait Economic Relations
The United States and Kuwait signed a Trade Investment Framework Agreement in 2004. In
2024, U.S. exports to Kuwait were valued at $2.41 billion and U.S. imports from Kuwait were
valued at $1.64 billion.10 The overall value of bilateral trade has declined since 2015, reflecting
lower prices and volumes of Kuwaiti oil exports to the United States and fewer U.S. exports to
Kuwait. Pursuant to Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, a 10% ad valorem duty has been
placed on articles imported from Kuwait.11
Consular and Legal Issues
During 2025, Kuwait tightened its already stringent laws against drug use and drug trafficking.
These laws had been cited in several cases of convictions of U.S. citizens in Kuwait, including
some that the U.S. government regarded as resulting in unlawful detention. In March 2025,
Kuwait released 10 U.S. nationals who had been imprisoned, including some former U.S. defense
contractors convicted on drug related charges. The State Department welcomed the release and
said, “Kuwait is a vital ally in the region, and we look forward to continuing to work with Kuwait
and other partners in these efforts across the world.”12 State Department travel advice notes
Kuwait’s strict anti-drug laws and advises U.S. citizen travelers to avoid travel to Kuwait if they
have used or handled illegal drugs or if they are using certain prescription medications.13
9 U.S. State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Kuwait,” January 20,
2025.
10 U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration using U.S. Census Bureau data, March 2025.
11 Executive Order 14257, April 2, 2025, 90 Federal Register 15041, April 7, 2025.
12 Eric Tucker and Jon Gambrell, “Kuwait frees 10 jailed Americans, including contractors held on drug charges,”
Associated Press (AP), March 13, 2025.
13 U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, Security Alert: Kuwait, Prescription Drug Restrictions and Security Alert: Criminal
Penalties for Drugs, December 22, 2025.
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Congress and Kuwait
Congress has considered legislation addressing U.S. relations with Kuwait relatively infrequently
since the 1990s, but Members of Congress frequently visit U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait. In
2022, Congress designated U.S. veterans who served on active duty in Kuwait on or after August
2, 1990, as “covered veterans” under the Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive
Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-168), which expands health care eligibility for veterans
subject to toxic exposure.
The FY2024 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 8108 of Division A, P.L. 118-47)
authorizes the Department of Defense to incur obligations not to exceed $350 million during the
fiscal year “in anticipation of receipt of contributions, only from the Government of Kuwait.”
Section 1229 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (P.L. 118-31)
directed the Secretary of Defense to review and report on “the legal protections afforded by
bilateral agreements” between the United States and Kuwait and “how the rights and privileges
afforded under such agreements may differ from United States law.” The act also authorized
$18.85 million for an Energy Resilience and Conservation Investment Program (ECRIP) power
generation and microgrid project at Camp Buehring and $8.2 million to complete a previously
authorized ECRIP project at Camp Arifjan. The FY2025 NDAA (P.L. 118-159) and FY2026
NDAA (P.L. 119-60) did not contain provisions addressing Kuwait.
The FY2026 National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs appropriations bill
text released on January 11, 2026 by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees includes a
provision requiring reporting on steps to be taken for the timely resolution of commercial disputes
between U.S. entities and foreign governments. The joint explanatory statement released by the
committees states that “Of particular concern are withheld payments by Kuwait’s state-owned
entities to United States firms for completed projects.”14
Kuwait’s History and Politics
Coastal Kuwait grew gradually as a trading center in the northern Gulf region as the Al Sabah
family and others gained influence there after migrating to the area in the late 17th and early 18th
centuries. Kuwait’s interior was home to then-nomadic tribal groups, and urban-rural differences
and tribal identities and relations have remained influential in Kuwaiti society and politics.15 The
Al Sabah family’s leadership and administrative roles in Kuwait deepened during the 18th century.
At the end of the 19th century, the Al Sabah family sought British protection from the Ottoman
Empire, trading Kuwait’s sovereignty by treaty for security guarantees. Kuwait’s citizenry
includes Sunni and Shia Muslims and descendants of settled and nomadic communities, all of
which have experienced considerable social and economic change since the discovery of oil in
1938. Kuwait regained independence from the United Kingdom in 1961, developing rapidly with
an influx of oil revenue and foreign labor. Under a constitution adopted in 1962 and renewed
following the 1991 U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait from occupation by neighboring Iraq, the Al
Sabah family has shared some power with Kuwait’s diverse citizenry. Together they have forged a
global profile for their small, energy-rich emirate (Figure 2).
14 Senate Appropriations Committee, Joint Explanatory Statement for “National Security, Department of State, and
Related Programs, January 11, 2026.
15 See Alanoud al-Sharekh and Courtney Freer, Tribalism and Political Power in the Gulf: State-Building and National
Identity in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, (I.B. Tauris-Bloomsbury), September 2021.
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Kuwait’s political environment has been strained for years with questions about leadership
succession and debates over public finances, services, social issues, and alleged corruption.
Disagreements between successive governments and members of the elected National Assembly
created legislative deadlock and fueled political confrontation, leading to the election and
dismissal of several Assemblies and resignations of several cabinets (see Chronology in
Appendix).16 Some observers have described tensions in Kuwaiti politics over the last two
decades as reflecting “conflict over policy with disputes over the rules of the game,” and, at
times, “an overzealous utilization of oversight tools, such as the repeated questioning of ministers
followed by votes of no confidence.”17 The Emir’s May 2024 dissolution of the National
Assembly and suspension of constitutional articles appears to have left Kuwaitis weighing
options for preserving their system’s relative openness and consultative nature, pursuing efficient
governance and change, and ending paralysis and confrontation.
Political System
Kuwait’s 1962 constitution recognizes the
Emir as head of state and ruler, with
power as commander-in-chief of the
military and authority to appoint all
judges and to dismiss or suspend
Kuwait’s unicameral legislature. The
Emir appoints a prime minister as head of
government, who in turn selects the
cabinet. The prime minister has always
been a member of the Al Sabah family,
and Al Sabah family members have often
held key cabinet portfolios such as
defense, interior, foreign affairs, and
finance.
Figure 2. Kuwait: Basic Facts
Source: CRS, using data from the U.S. State Department,
Esri, the Central Intelligence Agency, International
Monetary Fund, and Government of Kuwait.
Plans for succession within the ruling Al Sabah family historically have been opaque, and the
National Assembly would under normal circumstances be required to confirm the Emir’s
designee for the position of crown prince.18 Until 2006, the main branches of the family (Al Jaber
and Al Salem) generally had alternated in holding the positions of Emir and Crown Prince.19 In
2006, Assembly members and other leading figures questioned the suitability of the successor
from the Al Salem branch on health grounds and recommended his replacement through a
16 For a chronology of these developments, congressional readers may contact the author.
17 See Luai Allarakia and Hamad H. Albloshi, “The Politics of Permanent Deadlock in Kuwait,” Arab Gulf States
Institute in Washington, March 11, 2021.
18 During the period of the Assembly’s first suspension, a leadership transition occurred and the Emir and Crown
Prince were sworn in before the sitting government. The requirement for legislative approval reportedly had
contributed to controversial entanglements between rival royal family members and some members of the National
Assembly following the 2006 leadership transition. See Kristin Smith Diwan, “Kuwait’s constitutional showdown,”
Foreign Policy, November 17, 2011; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Kuwait: Political crisis at critical juncture,” BBC
News, October 23, 2012; and, Rivka Azoulay and Claire Beaugrand, “Limits of political clientelism: elites’ struggles in
Kuwait’s fragmenting politics,” International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula,
Vol. 4, 2015.
19 In addition to the Al Jaber, members of the Al Salem, Hamad, and Abdullah lines of the family—all named for
descendants of sons of Emir Mubarak Al Sabah (ruled 1896-1915)—remain eligible to lead under the constitution.
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negotiated transition. From that time until 2024, several members of the Al Jaber branch of the Al
Sabah family served as Emir and Crown Prince.20
On June 1, 2024, Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al Sabah was named as the new Crown Prince and heir
apparent. He previously served as Prime Minister from 2019 to 2022 and before that as Foreign
Minister from 2011 to 2019.21 Sheikh Sabah’s appointment marked a shift from post-1991
leadership decisions that had chosen the Crown Prince and Emir from the main branches of the
ruling family (the Al Jaber and Al Salem lines). The State Department congratulated the new
Crown Prince on his appointment and said, the United States government “values our strategic
partnership with the State of Kuwait.”22
Kuwait’s now suspended National Assembly has been the longest-established elected body
among the Gulf Arab states and, under the 1962 constitution, the Assembly has had a greater
scope of authority than any other Gulf Arab legislature or consultative body. Under normal
circumstances, eligible voters elect 50 Assembly members, with up to 15 members of the cabinet
eligible to serve and vote in the Assembly ex-officio.23 The Assembly’s members have been
empowered to draft legislation and act on legislation proposed by the government. The Assembly
has not voted to confirm cabinet nominees, but its members have frequently questioned ministers
(a process known as interpellation or colloquially as “grilling”), and the Assembly has had the
power to remove ministers by a vote of no confidence. The Assembly has had the power to
remove the prime minister by voting to declare the Assembly’s inability to cooperate with the
prime minister. Prior to its May 2024 suspension, the Assembly had been suspended twice before:
from 1976 to 1981 and from 1986 to 1992.
The Assembly’s membership has reflected Kuwait’s political and social diversity over time,
including Sunni and Shia Muslims, social liberals and conservatives, younger and older Kuwaitis,
urban and more rural citizens, and supporters and critics of the prevailing constitutional order.
The country’s majority expatriate population, which remains critical to its economy and includes
individuals holding public sector positions, has not had political representation. Authorities
announced plans to carry out “unprecedented” measures in 2024 against expatriates living
illegally in Kuwait, and said they had deported more than 90,000 expatriates in 2024 and 2025.24
By August 2025, authorities announced that the Kuwaiti citizenship of nearly 50,000 dual
nationals had been revoked since August 2024.25
Some religious and social conservatives have opposed women’s rights as candidates and members
of the Assembly since the state recognized those rights in 2005 (see Women’s Rights, below).
Opposition activism in Kuwait over the last two decades has featured critiques of alleged
government corruption, advocacy for stronger legislative authority and greater checks on
executive power, rejection of electoral system changes, and, in some instances, demands that the
20 See appendix. Also, for background on Kuwaiti succession, see Kristian Ulrichsen and Simon Henderson (eds.),
Kuwait: A Changing System Under Stress, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Note 69, October 2019.
21 Reuters, “Kuwait’s Emir makes Sheikh Sabah al-Khalid crown prince,” June 1, 2024.
22 U.S. State Department, “Congratulations for the Appointment of His Highness Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al-Sabah as the
Crown Prince of Kuwait,” June 2, 2024.
23 Kuwaiti male and female citizens over the age of 21 may vote, excluding citizens naturalized within 20 years of the
election date and members of the armed forces and police services.
24 Khitam Al Amir, “Kuwait deported 35,000 expatriates last year as part of crackdown on residency law violators,”
January 7, 2025; Kelsey Warner, “Kuwait deports thousands of foreign workers in nationality crackdown,” Semafor,
January 7, 2026.
25 Kuwait Times, “MoI: ‘Unprecedented’ crackdown on residency violators after amnesty,” May 23, 2024; Khitam Al
Amir, “More than 42,000 lose Kuwaiti citizenship in six months,” March 16, 2025; and, The National, “Kuwait’s mass
citizenship revocations explained – and why they matter,” August 12, 2025.
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state implement more religiously and socially conservative policies.26 The legacy of disputes
since 2006 over Kuwait’s electoral system has continued to shape Kuwaiti politics and appeared
to contribute to the impasses that preceded the Emir’s 2024 decision to suspend the National
Assembly and articles of Kuwait’s constitution (see Chronology in Appendix).
Human Rights
Kuwait’s government, like those of some other Gulf countries, publicly rejects foreign criticism
of human rights practices, dismissing such critiques as interference in Kuwait’s internal affairs.27
The 2024 U.S. State Department report on human rights conditions in Kuwait described the
suspension of the National Assembly and some articles of the constitution as “a significant
change in the human rights situation in Kuwait.” According to the report,
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious restrictions on free
expression and media freedom, including censorship; and trafficking in persons, including
forced labor. The government took credible steps in some cases to prosecute and punish
officials who committed human rights abuses.28
According to the report, activists representing stateless persons of Arab heritage—known as
Bidoon—"reported mistreatment at the hands of authorities while in detention.”29 The Bidoon
community consists of approximately 100,000 residents of Kuwait who lack or have been denied
registration as Kuwaiti citizens, which limits their access to employment, social benefits, and
political rights. Kuwait’s government historically has declined to recognize claims from members
of the Bidoon community to citizenship based on questions about the timing, circumstances, and
purpose of individuals’ migration to Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities separately are pursuing
initiatives to reduce the expatriate population and create more public and private sector
employment opportunities for Kuwaiti nationals.
Kuwait’s government limits freedom of speech and association.30 The state has not outlawed
political parties, but authorities effectively ban them. The government has outlawed informal
primaries among tribal groups, though one study released in 2021 found “electoral returns offer
evidence of growing tribal coordination intended to ensure representation within the National
26 For background on Kuwait’s electoral system and opposition politics since 2011, see Yuree Noh, “The Rise of the
Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait,” Project on Middle East Political Science, February 2014; Shafeeq
Ghabra, “Kuwait: At the Crossroads of Change or Political Stagnation,” Middle East Institute, May 20, 2014; Daniel L.
Tavana, “The Evolution of the Kuwaiti ‘Opposition’: Electoral Politics After the Arab Spring,” Baker Institute for
Public Policy, August 7, 2018; Courtney Freer and Andrew Leber, “The ‘tribal advantage’ in Kuwaiti politics and the
future of the opposition,” Brookings Institution, April 19, 2021; and, Luai Allarakia and Hamad H. Albloshi, “The
Politics of Permanent Deadlock in Kuwait,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), March 11, 2021.
27 For example, amid foreign and domestic attention to the execution of seven individuals convicted of murder and
other offenses in November 2022, Kuwait’s Foreign Minister said, “The decisions of our judicial apparatus are
independent without any interference from inside or outside Kuwait.” Reuters, “Kuwait executes seven convicted of
murder,” November 17, 2022.
28 U.S. State Department, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait, July 2025.
29 U.S. State Department, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait, July 2025. The Arabic term for
such persons is bidoon jinsiya (without nationality) or, colloquially, Bidoon [(those) without].
30 U.S. State Department, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait, April 22, 2024 and 2024 report,
July 2025. According to the 2024 report, “The law banned certain issues from publication and public discussion,
including insulting religion, in particular Islam; criticizing the amir; endangering relations between Kuwait and friendly
countries; insulting members of the judiciary or displaying disdain for the constitution; sorcery; and information that
could lead to a devaluation of the currency or create false economic worries.”
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Assembly, albeit one disrupted by changes in electoral laws.”31 In March 2024, Kuwait’s security
officials reaffirmed a ban on all unauthorized public gatherings or the advertising of such
gatherings in rallies amid calls on social media for demonstrations in solidarity with
Palestinians.32
Women’s Rights
The Emir recognized women’s political rights in 2005 after the National Assembly blocked an
earlier initiative to do so. According to a 2024 State Department assessment, women in Kuwait
face “cultural, social, and financial barriers to full political participation.”33 No women won seats
in the National Assembly election of 2020, but an appointed woman cabinet member had the right
to vote on Assembly decisions during its tenure. Two women won Assembly seats in the
September 2022 election and one woman won a seat in the June 2023 election. The cabinet
appointed in January 2024 has one woman member.
The State Department reported in 2023 that Kuwaiti law did “not provide women the same legal
status, rights, and inheritance provisions as men,” and found that “women experienced
discrimination in most aspects of family law, including divorce and child custody, as well as in
the basic rights of citizenship, the workplace, and in certain circumstances the value of their
testimony in court.”34 The Department’s 2024 report does not address these issues. Some Kuwaiti
social and religious conservatives oppose changes in gender relations and women’s participation
in politics and the work force introduced since the late 1990s.
In March 2025, a decree abolished Article 153 of Kuwait’s penal code: that article had provided
leniency for so-called honor killings of women by men in some circumstances.35 Authorities also
announced the amendment of Article 26 of Kuwait’s family law to prohibit marriage under the
age of 18.36
Trafficking in Persons
The 2025 State Department report on trafficking in persons found Kuwait’s visa sponsorship
system “continued to render migrant workers vulnerable to trafficking.”37 Kuwait was upgraded
to a Tier 2 country, meaning that the State Department judges that Kuwait does “not fully meet
the [Trafficking Victim Protection Act]’s minimum standards but are making significant efforts to
bring themselves into compliance with those standards.”
Religious Freedom and Tolerance
According to the State Department, the Kuwaiti government has official initiatives to promote
religious tolerance and provides for limited freedom of religious practice.38 Shia Muslims and
31 Courtney Freer and Andrew Leber, “Defining the ‘Tribal Advantage’ in Kuwaiti Politics,” Middle East Law and
Governance, 2021, pp. 1-30.
32 Arab Times, “No shows for pro-Palestinian rally in Kuwait,” and “Unauthorized Gatherings or Marches Prohibited in
Kuwait,” March 2, 2024.
33 U.S. State Department, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait, April 22, 2024.
34 U.S. State Department, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait, April 22, 2024.
35 Nadda Osman, “Kuwait abolishes child marriage and ends leniency for ‘honour killings,’” The New Arab, March 18,
2025.
36 Osman, “Kuwait abolishes child marriage and ends leniency for ‘honour killings,’” The New Arab, March 18, 2025.
37 U.S. State Department, 2025 Report on Trafficking in Persons: Kuwait, September 29, 2025.
38 U.S. State Department, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kuwait, May 15, 2023.
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religious minorities report some discrimination. The state regulates and directs the content
presented by Sunni religious leaders.39 Under a National Plan to Reinforce Moderation, Kuwait’s
Ministry of Information and Ministry of Religious Endowments have supported programs to
combat religious radicalization and promote religious tolerance.40 In 2015, the Islamic State (IS,
aka ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) group claimed a major terrorist attack against a Kuwaiti Shia mosque.
Kuwait is a member of the Global Coalition against the Islamic State and periodically announces
security actions against suspected IS-supporters in the country.
Kuwait’s Foreign Policy
Kuwait’s experiences of military occupation and liberation in 1990 and 1991 shape its foreign
policy, which generally promotes neutrality, balanced relations with major powers, respect for
international law, and diplomatic resolution of conflicts. Kuwait is a member of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League. As a major oil producer, Kuwait is a member
of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and coordinates with OPEC
and non-OPEC oil producers by agreement under the auspices of the OPEC+ group.
Kuwait and China
Kuwait’s economic and political relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or
China) have been limited, though China is a leading importer of Kuwaiti oil and a series of
announcements since 2024 suggest closer ties are developing. Under the banner of China’s Belt
and Road Initiative, PRC-based entities have engaged with Kuwaiti partners on Kuwait’s planned
Silk City, Five Islands, and Mubarak Al Kabeer port megaprojects, which may develop areas of
northern Kuwait into a logistics hub.41 Kuwaiti telecom providers Zain and VIVA have partnered
with PRC-firm Huawei in developing their fifth generation (5G) mobile communications
networks.42 PRC Vice President Han Zheng met with Kuwait’s Emir in November 2025 in
Kuwait. During the Emir’s September 2023 visit to China, the countries signed memoranda of
understanding on the completion of the Mubarak al Kabeer port, housing projects, and renewable
energy cooperation.43
In 2025, Kuwait has signed agreements with the PRC Ministry of Transport affiliate China State
Construction and Communications Corporation Limited to implement, manage, and operate the
Mubarak al Kabeer port.44 A related engineering, supply, and construction contract was signed in
December 2025.45 Also in March 2025, China and Kuwait reached an agreement for China to
39 U.S. State Department, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kuwait, May 15, 2023.
40 U.S. State Department, 2020 Country Report on Terrorism: Kuwait, December 16, 2021.
41 See CRS In Focus IF11735, China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Economic Issues, by Karen M. Sutter, Andres
B. Schwarzenberg, and Michael D. Sutherland. See also, Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), “Kuwait, China sign Silk
City, 5 islands MoU,” November 18, 2018; Fiona MacDonald, “’Silk City’ Dream Stifled in Only Gulf State Where
Voters Matter,” Bloomberg, November 6, 2019; and, Sylvia Westall and Ahmed Hagagy, “Kuwait plan for northern
mega city faces political hurdles,” Reuters, May 1, 2019.
42 For background, see CRS In Focus IF11251, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile
Technologies, by Kelley M. Sayler.
43 KUNA, “Kuwait Crown Prince concludes productive China’s (sic) visit,” September 24, 2023.
44 “Kuwait to directly contract Chinese firm for Mubarak Port,” Kuwait Times, January 22, 2025; and, “Kuwait, China
Sign Contract for Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port Study and Design,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, February 17, 2025.
45 KUNA, “Kuwait- China sign contract to execute Mina Abdullah Port enterprise,” December 22, 2025.
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expand the capacity of Kuwait’s solar energy production facilities at Al Shagaya and Al
Abdiliya.46
Kuwait and its Neighbors
Kuwait’s preference for multilateralism and diplomatic outreach has been evident in its officials’
mediation efforts in the Middle East region and beyond since 2015.
Gulf Cooperation Council and Yemen. Kuwaiti leaders contributed to rapprochement between
Qatar and its critics in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from 2017 to 2021, when those
counties ended their isolation of Qatar. In 2016, Kuwait hosted peace talks between Yemeni
government officials and representatives of the Ansar Allah (aka Houthi) movement.47 Kuwait
also has sent military forces to support the Yemeni government as part of the military coalition
led by neighboring Saudi Arabia.
Iran. Kuwaiti officials have engaged with counterparts from neighboring Iran on a range of
issues and generally support dialogue between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Unresolved maritime
boundaries between Kuwait and Iran may have implications for the development of maritime
energy resources and for commercial and military navigation in the northern Persian Gulf. In July
2023, Kuwait’s Oil Minister asserted exclusive Kuwaiti/Saudi rights to develop the offshore
Dorra/Arash gas field after an Iranian official preliminary consideration of development had
begun.48 After Iranian and Kuwaiti officials indicated they would each pursue their own rival
development projects, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reasserted their position that they have an
exclusive right to do so.49 An Iranian official said in March 2024 that Iran views the Dorra/Arash
field as shared.50 In September 2025, the Khafji Joint Operations Company, a joint company of
Saudi Aramco Gulf Operations Company and Kuwait Gulf Oil Company, issued tenders related to
project management for the development of the Dorra Gas field.51
Kuwait condemned Israel’s June 2025 strikes on Iran as violations of Iran’s sovereignty and
expressed concern about U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear program. Kuwait briefly closed its airspace
following Iran’s attack on U.S. forces based in Qatar.
Israel and the Palestinians. Kuwait’s leaders have chosen not to recognize or engage with Israel
to date, though some other Arab states’ recognition of Israel under the Abraham Accords
prompted Kuwaiti press discussion of normalization with Israel. Some Kuwaitis remain vocally
opposed to recognition of Israel, and Kuwait’s National Assembly and government have endorsed
some anti-normalization measures since 2020. Kuwait’s government participates in the Arab
boycott of Israel and supported the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.
Kuwait’s government responded to the Israel-Hamas war by condemning and denouncing Israel’s
military actions, calling for accountability for alleged violations of international humanitarian
law, and demanding an immediate ceasefire and unimpeded provision of humanitarian aid.52
46 “China Tightens Ties to Kuwait with Deal to Expand Solar Power,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, March 18, 2025.
47 For background, see CRS Insight IN11917, Political Transition in Yemen, by Carla E. Humud.
48 Reuters, “Kuwait, Saudi Arabia have ‘exclusive rights’ in Durra gas field, Kuwait oil minister says,” July 10, 2023.
49 Reuters, “Iran will pursue rights over Durra gas field if other parties shun cooperation, oil minister says,” July 30,
2023; and Reuters, “Saudi Arabia, Kuwait reaffirm rights to natural resources in Durra gas field, Saudi ministry says,”
August 2, 2023.
50 Iranian Vice President for Legal Affairs Mohammed Dehghan quoted in E’temad, March 8, 2024.
51 Indrajit Sen, “Firms prepare project management bids for Dorra gas scheme,” MEED, October 31, 2025.
52 KUNA, “Kuwait strongly denounces Israeli occupation aggression on Gaza,” December 2, 2023; KUNA, “Kuwait
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Kuwait’s initial response to the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel said the attack came
as a result of Israeli violations and attacks on Palestinians.53 Kuwait has joined other Arab states
in calling for “a comprehensive and just solution for the Palestinian cause that includes an
independent state on the 1967 border with East Jerusalem being its capital.”54 Kuwait Specialized
Hospital has operated with Kuwaiti state support in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, and had its
operations disrupted by Israeli military operations in May 2024.
Kuwait joined other Arab states in rejecting President Donald Trump’s statements in 2025 calling
for the relocation of Gaza’s population and the territory’s redevelopment under U.S. auspices, and
said “any efforts to encourage the transfer or uprooting of Palestinians from their land … threaten
the region’s stability, risk expanding the conflict, and undermine prospects for peace and
coexistence among its peoples.”55 Kuwait joined other Arab League states in endorsing an
Egyptian counterproposal in March 2025.56 Kuwait continued to provide humanitarian relief
support for Gaza during 2025 and welcomed the October 2025 ceasefire agreement.57
In May 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Kuwait-based Jordanian national
Abdallah Yusuf Faisal Sabri for sanctions, stating that Sabri had “managed Hamas’s operational
expenses” since 2018.58 Press reports citing former U.S. officials have focused on allegations that
Kuwait-based entities since October 2023 have used crowdfunding mechanisms to solicit funding
that benefits Hamas.59 Kuwaiti officials have revoked the fundraising licenses of some charitable
entities since December 2023 and have underscored requirements for fundraising to abide by
Kuwaiti law.60 In 2025, Kuwaiti authorities strengthened oversight and accountability provisions
in Kuwaiti anti-money laundering laws related to illicit financing.61
Iraq. Kuwait’s land border with Iraq was delineated by a United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary
Demarcation Commission following the 1990-1991 Gulf War and endorsed by the UN Security
Council in Resolution 833 (1993). The delineation of maritime boundaries remains a subject of
Kuwaiti-Iraqi discussion—both Kuwait and Iraq are developing large capacity ports on the Khor
Abdullah waterway (see Figure 1).62 In September 2023, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court
invalidated the Iraqi parliament’s 2013 endorsement of a 2012 agreement on the partial
condemns Israeli bombing of Palestinians waiting for humanitarian aid,” February 29, 2023; “Kuwait submits pleading
to ICJ for legal opinion on services to Palestinians,” KUNA, February 28, 2025; “Egypt, Kuwait leaders warn
continued Israeli attacks on Gaza threaten regional stability,” Ahram Online, March 18, 2025; “Kuwait urges protection
of Palestinians from Israeli occupation’s crimes,” KUNA, March 19, 2025.
53 Cleary Waldo, Gabriel Epstein, Sydney Hilbush, Aaron Y. Zelin, “International Reactions to the Hamas Attack on
Israel,” October 11, 2023. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs October 7, 2023 statement linked in this report is no
longer active, but several Kuwaiti and regional news outlets contemporaneously carried the text cited in this report.
54 KUNA, “Kuwait strongly denounces Israeli occupation aggression on Gaza,” December 2, 2023.
55 Egypt State information Service, Joint statement of the Arab Ministerial Meeting in Cairo, February 1, 2025.
56 Samy Magdy and Mohammad Jahjouh, “Arab leaders endorse Egypt’s plan to rebuild Gaza as an alternative to
Trump’s proposal,” AP, March 4, 2025.
57 KUNA, “Kuwait dispatches 12th planeload of relief supplies to Gaza,” Date: 23/09/2025
58 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Covert Hamas Investment Network and Finance Official,” May
24, 2022.
59 Joby Warrick and Souad Mekhennet, “Seeking cash, Hamas turns to allies experienced in ‘financial jihad,’”
Washington Post, January 12, 2024.
60 Arab Times, “Ten charities blocked for good from collecting donations,” March 19, 2024.
61 Ahmed Hagagy, “Kuwait strengthens anti-money laundering legislation,” Reuters, July 1, 2025.
62 See Middle East Monitor, “Kuwait calls on Iraq to complete maritime border demarcation,” December 21, 2022; Al
Sharqiya (Iraq), “Kuwait calls on Iraq to withdraw naval vessels that exceeded its territorial waters,” December 2,
2022; and, Bader Al Saif, “Think Big: Why Broadening Negotiations Could Help Resolve the Kuwaiti-Iraqi Maritime
Dispute,” Carnegie Middle East Center, March 19, 2021.
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delineation of the Iraq-Kuwait maritime border, citing lack of two-thirds majority support for the
implementing law. In December 2024, the United States and Kuwait “called for the complete
demarcation of the maritime border between Kuwait and Iraq beyond Boundary Marker 162, in
line with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)” and
said, “Iraq was called upon to ensure the 2012 Kuwait-Iraq Agreement to regulate maritime
navigation in Khor Abdullah remains in force.”63 Rejection or reopening of the 2012 agreement
could affect both countries’ ability to use the waterway and affect their relative rights regarding
maritime boundary and resource claims in northern Persian Gulf waters adjacent to Iran and
Saudi Arabia.
Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials reportedly resumed talks on outstanding border issues in December
2024, and their joint technical committee met during 2025 to review outstanding issues.64 Kuwait
and Iraq have agreed on managing oil fields that transcend the Iraq-Kuwaiti border.
Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues
Kuwait’s state finances remain almost completely dependent on oil revenue and investment
income, but authorities are engaged in efforts to expand non-oil revenue sources and promote
private sector economic activity under the national New Kuwait/Vision 2040 initiative.65 Relative
to other GCC members pursuing similar economic transformation initiatives, Kuwait’s efforts are
nascent and the country’s political stalemates arguably constrained them. In 2025, Kuwait’s
cabinet endorsed a law providing for government borrowing and unlocked new sources of
funding for long-planned programs. In considering the state budget for 2025-2026, a Kuwaiti
official estimated that wages and subsidies account for more than 79% of public spending, with
more than 9% allocated to capital investments.66 The U.S. Investment Climate Statement for
Kuwait notes that “More than 80 percent of all Kuwaitis work in the public sector, receiving
extremely generous salaries and benefits, as well as typically working short workdays.” Oil
export revenue provides more than 90% of state revenue, and the 2025-2026 budget assumed a
break-even oil price of $90.50 per barrel.67
A National Bank of Kuwait analysis released in November 2025 observed that “The debt law has
expanded the authorities’ financing options and alleviated liquidity pressures” and reported that
new public debt issued in 2025 “is more than sufficient to fully finance two years’ worth” of the
bank’s estimates for Kuwait’s deficits.68 NBK expects that “The fiscal deficit will likely widen in
FY26/27 amid softer oil prices and despite ongoing projected restraint in government spending.”
According to NBK, “Public debt has risen from 2.9% of GDP to about 14%, but is still very low
by international standards.” In December, International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff linked deficit
reduction gains under the current government to “rationalization of the public sector wage bill
from retirements, moderation of energy subsidies alongside international fuel prices, and
63 U.S. State Department, “Joint Statement on the Sixth Round of the U.S.-Kuwait Strategic Dialogue,” December 13,
2024.
64 KUNA, “Baghdad hosts Kuwait-Iraq legal, technical cmte on demarcating maritime borders,” September 16, 2025.
65 For a summary of New Kuwait 2040, see World Bank Group, State of Kuwait Country Engagement Framework,
2021–2025; and information from the Kuwaiti government available at http://www.newkuwait.gov.kw/home.aspx.
66 B Izzak, “Kuwait’s Cabinet passes 2025-2026 budget with KD 6.3 deficit” Kuwait Times, February 2, 2025.
67 B Izzak, “Kuwait’s Cabinet passes 2025-2026 budget with KD 6.3 deficit” Kuwait Times, February 2, 2025.
68 National Bank of Kuwait Economic Research Department, Economic Insight: Macroeconomic Outlook 2025-2026,
November 20, 2025.
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mobilization of non-oil revenue by raising government service fees.”69 The IMF expects “robust
non-oil growth” and a “surge in investment” as the government’s reform initiatives are enacted.
Kuwait’s oil reserves amount to more than 7% of global proven reserves, and at current
production rates, would last through this century. (For a map of Kuwaiti energy resources, see
Figure 1.) Kuwait plans to expand its oil production capacity, but has limited spare capacity at
present. Kuwait has considerable natural gas reserves, but its gas production infrastructure is less
developed. Kuwait imports natural gas for domestic consumption even as it continues to flare
associated gas from oil production.
As of 2026, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) reportedly manages $1 trillion in sovereign
wealth assets between the Future Generations Fund (FGF) and the General Reserve Fund
(GRF).70 Prior to the suspension of the National Assembly, the executive had been constrained
from issuing debt or accessing FGF assets without parliamentary approval, and had used GRF
funds and existing authority to transfer stakes in state entities to the KIA in exchange for funds to
cover successive budget deficits. Executive-legislative impasses over public spending, corruption
allegations, proposed reforms to public sector employment and benefits, service costs, and
financing for new economic initiatives contributed to political discord in the lead up to the 2024
suspension of the National Assembly.71
Resources and Climate Change
Kuwait is highly vulnerable to the projected effects of global climate change, including sea level
rise and increased average temperatures, which already are consistently among the highest in the
Gulf.72 Kuwait’s water resources are extremely limited, and the state burns fossil fuels to generate
power for water desalination, air conditioning, and other essential services. In 2023 and 2024,
summer power demand, driven by air conditioning needs, exceeded available supply, creating
some power outages.73 Outages recurred in spring 2025, but officials credited awareness
campaigns, industrial standdowns, and crackdowns on illegal use with preventing the need for
outages over the summer months.74
Kuwait is a major oil producer and exporter, and as such, the extent of global energy transition
away from fossil fuel consumption may affect Kuwait’s long-term fiscal outlook. In November
2022, Kuwait made what its then-Foreign Minister described as “a solid serious pledge” to
achieve carbon neutrality in oil and gas operations by 2050 and nationwide by 2060.75
Implementation efforts continued toward these goals in 2025.76
69 IMF, “Kuwait: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission,” December 18, 2025.
70 Global SWF, Rankings, January 2026, at https://globalswf.com/ranking; and, Matt Smith, “The KIA maintains its
low profile approach – for now,” Arabian Gulf Business Insight, June 9, 2025.
71 Fiona MacDonald, “This $600 Billion Wealth Fund Got Caught in a Power Struggle,” Bloomberg, June 20, 2021.
72 For a detailed study see, Deen Shariff Sharp, Abrar Alshammari, and Kanwal Hameed, The Quiet Emergency:
Experiences and Understandings of Climate Change in Kuwait, London School of Economics, October 13, 2021.
73 Yesar Al Maleki, “Kuwait’s Summer Electricity Crunch Set to Worsen,” Middle East Economic Survey, November
3, 2023; and, Nebal Snan, “Massive fuel shortage forces electricity cuts in Kuwait,” Kuwait Times, August 17, 2024.
74 Arab Times Kuwait, “No blackouts: Kuwait’s summer 2025 energy strategy a success, Ministry says,” October 2,
2025.
75 Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Salem Al Sabah quoted in Reuters, “Kuwait says to become carbon neutral in oil and gas
by 2050,” November 8, 2022.
76 Arab Times Kuwait, “Kuwait’s public and private sectors unite to combat carbon emissions and meet climate goals,”
February 24, 2025; and, The Times Kuwait, “Kuwait’s oil sector charts path to net zero with bold climate action plan,”
July 31, 2025;
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Outlook
Kuwaiti-U.S. security cooperation appears likely to continue to anchor the bilateral relationship,
while the pace of implementation of Kuwaiti plans for economic transformation may determine
opportunities for deeper bilateral economic partnership. Kuwait’s sovereign wealth fund is the
third largest among those of the Arab Gulf states and Kuwait remains an investor in U.S.
companies and markets. Congress may conduct oversight of the U.S. military’s presence and
programs in Kuwait and may monitor Kuwaiti government decision making on a range of foreign
and domestic policy topics. These may include Kuwait’s oil production, Kuwaiti engagement
with China, Kuwait’s policy toward Israel and the Palestinians (including Hamas), Kuwait’s
relations with its Arab and non-Arab neighbors, developments in Kuwaiti politics, alleged support
by Kuwaiti nationals or residents for terrorist groups, and the Kuwaiti government’s protection of
human rights, including women’s rights and religious freedom.
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Appendix. Political Developments 2006-2024
The legacy of disputes since 2006 over Kuwait’s electoral system, succession, fiscal matters, and
other issues shaped Kuwaiti politics and appeared to contribute to the impasses that preceded the
Emir’s 2024 decision to suspend the National Assembly and articles of Kuwait’s constitution.
Chronology of Selected Political Developments, 2006-2023
January 2006
Longtime Emir Shaykh Jaber al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah (aka Jaber III) dies on January 15,
2006. His designated successor, Shaykh Sa’ad al Abdullah al Salem Al Sabah, was infirm. A
brief succession dispute ensues, and the National Assembly endorses a transfer of power
to then-Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al Ahmad al Jaber Al Sabah (aka Sabah IV), the
younger brother of the late Emir. Shaykh Sabah becomes Emir on January 29, 2006.
June – July 2006
Following executive-legislative disputes over electoral system reform, the Emir dissolves
the National Assembly, and Kuwaitis hold a national election on June 26, 2006. Women
run as candidates for the first time. After the election, the National Assembly adopts a
new electoral law reducing the number of electoral districts from 25 to 5.
May 2008
Continuing executive-legislative differences over public sector wage reform led the Emir
to dissolve the National Assembly. Kuwaitis hold a national election on May 17, 2008, the
first under the new 5-district electoral system.
March – May 2009
After opposition parliamentarians demand to question the then-prime minister, the prime
minister and cabinet resign in March. The Emir dissolves the National Assembly and
Kuwaitis hold a national election on May 16, 2009. Women candidates win seats for the
first time. The Emir reappoints the prime minister.
December 2011 –
February 2012
Amid region-wide political turbulence often referred to as the ‘Arab Spring,’ some
Kuwaitis challenge the government over corruption allegations, including through public
demonstrations and the storming of the Assembly building in November 2011. The Emir
dissolves the National Assembly in December 2011, and Kuwaitis hold a national election
on February 2, 2012. Opposition candidates win 34 of 50 seats.
June –
December 2012
In June, the Constitutional Court invalidates the Emir’s December 2011 decree dissolving
the previous National Assembly (the membership elected in May 2009). The decision
dissolves the Assembly elected in February 2012 and reinstates the Assembly’s May 2009
membership. Opposition members refuse to attend Assembly sessions, preventing a
quorum; the Emir again dissolves the Assembly in October. The cabinet unsuccessfully
appeals to have the 25-district electoral law reinstated, and the Emir issues a decree
reducing the number of candidates that voters can select from four to one. Many
opposition members reject the reduction because it has the effect of limiting the utility of
informal coordination among candidates and voters across communal differences such as
location, tribe, and class. Demonstrators protest the changes, some opposition members
clash with security forces, and the government imposes controls on public gatherings.
Many opposition candidates boycott the December 1, 2012 election. Turnout declines
from nearly 60% in February 2012 to just over 40% in December 2012.
June – July 2013
The Constitutional Court finds the December 2012 National Assembly election invalid on
procedural grounds, but upholds the Emir’s October 2012 decree reducing the number of
votes per voter from four to one. Fewer opposition members boycott the July 27, 2013
election, and turnout increases to above 51%.
October –
November 2016
The Emir dissolves the National Assembly and calls for an early election, as Kuwaitis
debate austerity measures proposed and adopted in response to fiscal strains resulting
from lower oil prices and high public sector spending. Turnout again increases,
approaching 70% in the November 26, 2016 election. Voters elect one female candidate.
September –
December 2020
Emir Shaykh Sabah al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah dies on September 29, 2020. His halfbrother Shaykh Nawwaf al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah becomes Emir. Their half-brother
Shaykh Mishaal al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah becomes Crown Prince. An October decree
calls for a national election as Kuwaitis face a fiscal crisis exacerbated by low global oil
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prices and the COVID-19 pandemic. Turnout exceeds 60% in the December 5, 2020
election. Voters do not elect any women candidates.
December 2020 –
April 2022
Political stalemate persists, and, in April 2022 then-prime minister Shaykh Sabah al Khaled
al Hamad Al Sabah resigns. The Emir and Crown Prince delay naming a replacement, and,
in June 2022, the Crown Prince announces the Assembly will be dismissed pursuant to the
constitution and calls for a new election. The dismissed Assembly had taken a pointed
approach to questioning government officials and refused to endorse government fiscal
proposals or approve authority for the government to borrow domestically or
internationally to finance long-debated projects.
July – December
2022
The Emir’s son, Shaykh Ahmed Nawaf al Ahmed Al Sabah, becomes prime minister. On
September 29, 2022, Kuwaiti voters elect a new Assembly, including 27 new members,
among them various opposition figures and members of the Islamic Constitutional
Movement—the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm. Women members, absent
from the previous Assembly, again win seats. Voters return Ahmed al Saadoun, who
served as Assembly speaker from 1985 to 1999, to parliament. In October, a newly
appointed cabinet resigns after some Assembly members protest that the cabinet’s
membership had not changed sufficiently. Consultations follow and a new cabinet is
seated. Consultation follows government pardons of some convicted government critics.
January – May 2023
Cabinet ministers boycott Assembly sessions forcing its adjournment, arguing that the
cabinet had not had sufficient opportunity to comment on proposed legislation that would
incur state costs. The cabinet resigns. In March, the Constitutional Court rules that the
October 2022 election is void and reinstates the parliamentarians elected in December
2020. Amid some public opposition to the court’s decision, including small
demonstrations, some members of the 2020 and 2022 Assemblies call for constitutional
reform.
In May 2023, the Crown Prince dismisses the reinstated 2020 Assembly.
June – December
2023
On June 6, 2023, voters elect a new Assembly, returning 38 of the members elected in
September 2022 to office. Following the election, the Emir and Crown Prince appoint a
new government again led by Shaykh Ahmed Nawaf al Ahmed Al Sabah as prime minister.
The cabinet resigns in December 2023 following the Emir’s death. Crown Prince Shaykh
Mishaal al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah (born 1940) becomes Emir.
January – June 2024
On February 15, 2024, Emir Mishaal issues an order dissolving the National Assembly
pursuant to the constitution after a legislator used language deemed offensive to the Emir
and the Assembly voted not to remove the statement from its record. An election, the
fourth since 2020, is held on April 10, 2024. Authorities disqualify some candidates for
participating in so-called tribal elections, which are informal primaries among tribal groups
to select a group-affiliated candidate. The April 2024 election returns 29 opposition
members to the legislature, largely mirroring the parliament elected in 2023. The Emir
designates his nephew Shaykh Ahmad Abdullah Al Ahmed Al Jaber Al Sabah as Prime
Minister. On May 10, the Emir issues a decree dissolving the Assembly and suspending
articles of the constitution, including Article 107, which calls for the election of a
replacement assembly within two months. The Emir suspends articles beyond those
suspended in previous suspension decrees in 1976 and 1981, which appear to enable the
executive branch to issue laws and amend the constitution during the Assembly’s
suspension without future legislative review.77 The U.S. government does not comment
77 Past instances of the suspension of constitution articles may be relevant to future developments in Kuwait and U.S.
policy considerations. In 1976 and 1986, Kuwait’s then-emir suspended Articles 56 (paragraph three), 107, 174, and
181. The 2024 decree suspends articles 51, 56 (paragraphs two and three), 71 (paragraph two), 79, 107, 174 and 181.
Article 71 (paragraph two) provides for legislative review of decrees issued during the Assembly’s dissolution. Article
181 states that constitutional provisions may not be suspended unless martial law has been declared. The Emir’s May
10 decree did not declare martial law. In 1976, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait reported in a now released cable that
“Under article 181 of the Kuwaiti constitution of 1962, the Amir was expressly barred from suspending any article of
that constitution, except after declaring martial law, which he did not declare. Thus, it seems that the Amir acted
unconstitutionally when he suspended several provisions of the constitution without declaring martial law. (The fact
that he suspended the article barring his own action (181) raises a legal paradox.)” See U.S. National Archives and
(continued...)
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on the Emir’s decree.78 In June, the Emir appoints Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al Sabah as the
new Crown Prince and heir apparent.
Sources: Compiled from international media and wire service reports, 2006-2024. Turnout data from
International Foundation for Electoral Systems.
Records Administration, Diplomatic Records Archival Database, Cable Record, U.S. Embassy Kuwait to SECSTATE
(KUWAIT 4265), “Rule by Decree in Kuwait: Nature, Duration and Then What?” September 7, 1976.
78 In August 1986, following the prior such decree, the State Department replied to a congressional question for the
record about the measures taken by stating “It would be inappropriate to discuss publicly diplomatic exchanges we
might have with the government of Kuwait about these measures.... We regret restrictions on the democratic process
but note that in his decree, the Emir of Kuwait reiterated his commitment to Kuwait’s parliamentary path.” U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Developments in the
Middle East, August 1986, hearing, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, August 14, 1986, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1986.
Congressional Research Service
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Kuwait: Issues for the 119th Congress
Author Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
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Congressional Research Service
R47390 · VERSION 18 · UPDATED
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