The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional research reportMar 26, 2026
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The Philippines:
Background and U.S. Relations
Updated March 26, 2026
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
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SUMMARY
The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines have a deep relationship that includes a
bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties, and many
shared strategic and economic interests. The Philippines, a diverse and democratic island nation
situated east of the South China Sea and south of Taiwan, has long played an important role in
U.S. Asia policy as a willing security and counterterrorism partner. Popular support in the
Philippines for the U.S.-Philippines bilateral relationship and alliance has remained strong over
the past several decades, but historically has fluctuated in response to domestic concerns and
international events.
R47055
March 26, 2026
William Piekos
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Current Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. assumed office in 2022. Marcos is the son of Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who
ruled the country from 1965 until he was ousted in 1986. Sara Duterte-Carpio, daughter of former President Rodrigo Duterte
(2016–2022), is vice president. Both the president and vice president, who are elected on separate tickets, are constitutionally
limited to one six-year term. Observers maintain political groupings in the Philippines tend to be fluid, driven more by
personalities and interests than by ideologies and policy platforms.
Though Marcos and Sara Duterte allied their tickets for the election, they have disagreed on policy and personal issues. In
February 2025, the Philippines’ House of Representatives impeached Vice President Duterte on corruption charges and for
voicing threats against the president. In July 2025, the Supreme Court unanimously declared the impeachment proceedings to
be unconstitutional for a lack of due process; new proceedings were initiated in February 2026. The extradition of former
President Duterte to The Hague in March 2025, where he faces charges before the International Criminal Court for “crimes
against humanity” during his self-declared “war on drugs,” has further riled Philippine politics. The Marcos administration
faces popular pressure over corruption allegations related to substandard or nonexistent flood control projects, which came to
light following a series of typhoons in 2025.
The Philippines is one of the United States’ five treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific going back to the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty. In 2023, the two countries increased the number of AFP sites at which U.S. forces are permitted to operate on a
rotational basis under the 2014 U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and signed Bilateral Defense
Guidelines to clarify the conditions under which the 1951 treaty is operational. U.S. military personnel and the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) hold regular bilateral military exercises and maritime patrols, collaborate on counterterrorism
efforts, and conduct joint humanitarian activities. The Philippines is one of the largest recipients of U.S. military assistance in
the East Asia-Pacific region, which includes foreign military financing (FMF) and assistance under the Department of
Defense (DOD) Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative. DOD is “using a secondary Department of War designation,”
under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025. During his tenure, President Marcos has supported deeper U.S.Philippine security ties. The Trump Administration has affirmed an “ironclad” commitment to the Philippines, continued
providing FMF funds to the country, and approved some new U.S. assistance programs, including related to economic
development and public health.
The Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) have long-standing disputes over waters and land
features in the South China Sea. In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded that China’s “dashed line” territorial claims have no legal basis. PRC naval, coast guard, and
maritime militia vessels repeatedly have contested the Philippines’ ability to operate in the South China Sea. The Philippine
government has sought to shift the AFP’s defense posture away from internal security issues and toward external threats—
including PRC harassment and interference in the South China Sea. Marcos has continued the government’s focus on
external threats through an updated military modernization program and a more visible presence in the Philippines’ exclusive
economic zone.
Though the Philippines has been one of the region’s most vibrant democracies, the State Department has emphasized
continuing and significant human rights issues, including arbitrary or unlawful killings, police impunity, restrictions on
freedom of expression and the media, and threats and violence against labor activists. From 2016 to 2022, former President
Duterte’s “war on drugs” resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings, with estimated deaths related to the campaign
ranging from 6,252, according to the Philippine government, to 30,000, as reported by human rights organizations. Since the
campaign launched in 2016, the U.S. government has suspended some counternarcotics assistance to the Philippine National
Police. Under the Marcos administration, Philippine officials have stated that the government will continue the drug war,
though it will target large illegal drug operators rather than petty offenders and focus on drug rehabilitation.
Congressional Research Service
The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Congressional Interests.................................................................................................................... 2
Philippine Politics............................................................................................................................ 4
U.S.-Philippine Relations .......................................................................................................... 5
U.S. Foreign Assistance ............................................................................................................ 7
The Philippines’ Defense Posture .................................................................................................... 9
U.S.-Philippines Defense Ties.................................................................................................. 11
Defense Agreements .......................................................................................................... 11
U.S. Security Cooperation ................................................................................................ 14
Military Exercises ............................................................................................................. 15
Counterterrorism Operations ............................................................................................ 16
U.S. Arms Transfers .......................................................................................................... 17
The Philippine Economy ............................................................................................................... 18
U.S.-Philippines Economic Relations ..................................................................................... 18
Philippines-China Relations .......................................................................................................... 19
Tensions in the South China Sea ............................................................................................. 20
The Philippines and Taiwan .......................................................................................................... 22
Human Rights Concerns in the Philippines ................................................................................... 23
Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 24
Strategic Interests .............................................................................................................. 24
The South China Sea Disputes and Maritime Domain Awareness ................................... 24
Human Rights Concerns ................................................................................................... 25
Counterterrorism Efforts ................................................................................................... 25
U.S.-Philippines Economic Relations ............................................................................... 25
Selected Legislation in the 118th and 119th Congresses ................................................................. 26
Figures
Figure 1. Philippines at a Glance ..................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. South China Sea, Disputed Features, and EDCA Sites .................................................. 21
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance Obligation to the Philippines, FY2018-FY2024 ........................ 7
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 27
Congressional Research Service
The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations
Overview
The Republic of the Philippines has been an important part of U.S. strategy in East Asia for
decades. The country’s strategic location, its security alliance and people-to-people ties with the
United States, and its democratic and economic development have shaped close bilateral ties.1
The U.S. administration of the Philippines as a colonial territory (1898-1946) also has shaped the
relationship, with the sometimes-contradictory effects of forging bonds and instilling a wariness
of drawing too close to the United States. Filipino-Americans constitute the third-largest Asian
origin population living in the United States, with an estimated 4.6 million people in the United
States identifying as Filipino in 2023, and comprised the second largest group of foreign-born
veterans in the United States in 2022.2
Colonial History
The Philippines, situated east of the South China Sea and
The archipelago now known as the
south of Taiwan, has long played an important role in U.S.
Philippines was colonized by Spain
Asia policy and is one of five treaty allies in the Indostarting in 1565. In 1896, the
Philippine Revolution sought
Pacific. The Philippines has been a treaty ally since 1951
independence from Spain; the United
3
and a major non-NATO ally since 2003. It is one of the
States purchased the territory from
largest recipients of U.S. military assistance, equipment, and
Spain in the 1898 Treaty of Paris
training in the region. The country holds strategic
following the Spanish-American War,
but did not recognize the Philippines’
importance as a part of what some experts refer to as the
independence. U.S. forces battled
“first island chain” in the Pacific, and its maritime territorial
Filipino resistance fighters in the
disputes with People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China)
Philippine-American War (1899-1902)
4
are a potential flashpoint in the South China Sea. The
until the Philippines was subdued in
Philippines also serves as an important U.S.
1902. The Philippines gained
independence in 1946.
counterterrorism partner in Southeast Asia.
Since the 1986 People Power Revolution that deposed
former authoritarian President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the Philippines has experienced peaceful
transitions of power and has a dynamic political landscape, although corruption and human rights
issues persist.5 Ties between the United States and the Philippines were strained under former
President Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022). Current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., also known by
1 This report does not cover congressional issues related to WWII Filipino veterans who fought under U.S. military
command during World War II.
2 Carolyne Im, “Facts About Filipinos in the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, May 1, 2025; Jeanne Batalova, “Immigrant
Veterans in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, May 9, 2024.
3 Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, Presidential Determination No. 2004-02 of October 6,
2003, 68 Federal Register 59855. For further information, see Department of State, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,”
fact sheet, January 20, 2025.
4 The so-called first island chain extends from southern Japan, down past Taiwan and the Philippines, and to Indonesia,
enclosing the sea areas closest to China. The second island chain also starts in Japan, but extends further out into the
Pacific, enclosing the Philippine Sea that separates the Philippines from Guam. In discussions of China’s military
capabilities and foreign policy goals for the Western Pacific, some security and foreign policy experts assert that China
seeks to influence or eventually dominate the first and second island chains, and conversely perceive the areas as
locations for the United States, its allies, and partners to counter or contain PRC military ambitions. See, for examples,
Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the Pacific
‘Island Chains,’” The National Interest, February 6, 2016; Thomas Mahnken et al., “Tightening the Chain:
Implementing a Strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Western Pacific,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis,
2019; Andrew Yeo and Michael O’Hanlon, “Geostrategic Competition and Overseas Basing in East Asia and the First
Island Chain,” Brookings Institution, February 2023.
5 “Freedom in the World 2025: Philippines,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/philippines/freedomworld/2025; Department of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, August 12, 2025.
For more, see “Philippine Politics.”
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his nickname “Bongbong,” has been a proponent of deepening U.S.-Philippine security and
economic ties.6
Figure 1. Philippines at a Glance
Geography
Land area—298,000 square kilometers (slightly larger
than Arizona); over 7,000 islands
People
Population: 118.3 million (2024 est.)
Ethnic Groups: Tagalog (26%); Bisaya/Binisaya (14.3%);
Ilocano (8%); Cebuano (8%); Illonggo (7.9%); Bikol/Bicol
(6.5%); Waray (3.8%); Kapampangan (3%); Maguindanao
(1.9%); Pangasinan (1.9%); other local ethnicities (18.5%);
foreign ethnicities (0.2%) (2020 est.)
Religious Affiliations: Roman Catholic (78.8%); Muslim
(6.4%); other Christian (6.5%); other (8.2%) (2020 est.)
Economy
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $1.138 trillion
(purchasing power parity, 2023 est.; in 2021 dollars)
Per Capita GDP: $9,900 (2023 est.; in 2021 dollars); global
ranking: 148
GDP Composition by Sector: Services (62.4%); industry
(28.2%); agriculture (9.4%) (2023 est.)
Source: Map created by CRS using data from the Department of State, Global Admin, and ESRI. Information
from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2025.
Congressional Interests
Members of Congress have shown interest in the Philippines in several policy areas over which
Congress has provided oversight, policy direction, and funding. For a longer discussion of these
interests and Congressional action, see “Considerations for Congress” near the end of this report.
•
Strategic Interests. The Philippines has held strategic importance for the United
States for decades.7 Trump Administration officials have expressed support for an
“ironclad” U.S. commitment to the Philippines, and Secretary of Defense Pete
Hegseth has pledged to “work relentlessly to reestablish deterrence in the South
China Sea and advance the [U.S.-Philippine] alliance.”8 Some experts contend
that the Philippines could play a key role in a contingency with China in the
region, though Philippine officials and commentators have expressed mixed
6 Richard Javad Heydarian, “US Outlasts Duterte’s Failing Dalliance with China,” Asia Times, May 19, 2021; Ruth
Abbey Gita-Carlos, “PBBM: PH-US Relations Reach New Height, Remain a ‘Beacon of Stability,’” Philippine News
Agency, September 10, 2025.
7 Lee Gim Siong, “In Focus: What Is the Second Island Chain and How Does It Shape US-China’s ‘Geostrategic Wei
Qi’?” Channel News Asia, June 4, 2025.
8 Department of State, “Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Philippine President Marcos, Jr.,” July 21, 2025; Secretary of
Defense Pete Hegseth (@SecWar), “We will work relentlessly to reestablish deterrence in the South China Sea and
advance our alliance,” X post, October 31, 2025, https://x.com/SecWar/status/1984160977789841699. The Secretary of
Defense is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025. See
Executive Order 14347 of September 5, 2025, “Restoring the United States Department of War,” 90 Federal Register
43893, https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-order/14347.
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•
•
•
views of the country’s willingness and ability to participate in a regional conflict,
particularly one related to Taiwan.9
South China Sea Disputes. The United States has aimed to partner with the
Philippines in countering PRC gray-zone tactics in the South China Sea and to
“reestablish deterrence” in the region.10 Multiple Asian governments—including
that of the Philippines—assert sovereignty over rocks, reefs, and other
geographic features in the heavily trafficked South China Sea (SCS), with the
government of China arguably making the most assertive claims. Among the
claimants, only the Philippines has challenged China’s maritime territorial claims
and behavior under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), including by filing a complaint in 2013 against the PRC under the
UNCLOS arbitration process.11
Human Rights Concerns. Congress has long-demonstrated concerns regarding
human rights violations in the Philippines, including extra-judicial killings. Most
prominently, former President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs” resulted in as
many as 30,000 deaths. At various times during the past decade and a half,
Congress has restricted U.S. security assistance to the Philippines in order to
encourage improvements in human rights practices of the Philippine military,
police, and government.
Counterterrorism Efforts. Since the 1970s, Philippine governments have
battled Muslim armed separatist and terrorist movements on the southern island
of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.12 The Philippines has been a close
counterterrorism partner with the United States, particularly following the attacks
of September 11, 2001, and has “continued to dedicate significant resources to
countering threats from terrorist groups,” according to the Department of State’s
2023 report on terrorism.13 The AFP has restricted terrorist groups’ ability to
operate, though various groups remain an ongoing, if diminished, threat.14
9 Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies,” December 3, 2020; Edcel John A. Ibarra, “Entangled Fronts: The Philippines’ Anxiety Over a
Taiwan Crisis,” National Bureau of Asian Research, June 23, 2025.
10 Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s Meeting with Philippine Secretary of National
Defense,” October 31, 2025. For more on the PRC’s maritime gray-zone operations, see Todd C. Helmus et al.,
“Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” RAND Corporation, November 2024.
11 See “Tensions in the South China Sea” for details on the UNCLOS arbitral ruling.
12 Successive Philippine governments, as well as Spanish and American colonial administrators, have struggled to
govern—and were perceived as neglecting—the southern provinces of the Philippines, where Muslim populations
retained political and demographic advantages until the 20th century. Thomas M. McKenna, “The Origins of the
Muslim Separatist Movement in the Philippines,” Asia Society, accessed on February 19, 2026; Amina Rasul,
“Radicalization of Muslims in Mindanao: The Philippines in Southeast Asian Context,” in Islam and Politics: Renewal
and Resistance in the Muslim World, eds. Amit Pandya and Ellen Laipson (Stimson Center, January 1, 2009). In 2014,
the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed a peace agreement that has precipitated an
ongoing and delicate transition of political power to a new entity, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (BARMM), in some parts of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. For more on the peace process and
BARMM, see Haironesah Domado, “Election Delays and the Crisis of Confidence in the Bangsamoro Peace Process,”
The Diplomat, October 16, 2025; International Crisis Group, “The Philippines: Keeping the Bangsamoro Peace Process
on Track,” January 30, 2024.
13 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2023: Philippines, December 12, 2024.
14 Julie Chernov Hwang, “Demobilization and Disengagement: Lessons from the Philippines,” Soufan Center, May 30,
2025.
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Philippine Politics
Since former President Marcos Sr. was ousted in 1986, the Philippines has experienced peaceful
transitions of power and hosts a dynamic and contentious political landscape, although
corruption, political intimidation, and human rights issues present ongoing challenges to
Philippine democracy.15 Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son of the former president, won the 2022
presidential election, receiving more than 31 million out of 55 million votes cast.16 Sara Duterte,
daughter of former President Rodrigo Duterte (in office 2016–2022), won the election for vice
president. The Philippine constitution limits both the president and vice president, who are
elected on separate tickets, to one six-year term. Though Marcos and Sara Duterte allied their
tickets for the election, they have disagreed on policy and personal issues. In February 2025, the
Philippines’ House of Representatives impeached the vice president on corruption charges and for
voicing threats against the president.17 In July 2025, the Supreme Court unanimously declared the
impeachment proceedings—which had been the subject of delays in the Senate—to be
unconstitutional for a lack of due process; according to the court’s judgement, an impeachment
complaint could be refiled one year after February 6, 2025, when the original complaint was
submitted.18 In February 2026, several members of the House filed a new impeachment
complaint, restarting the process.19 Conviction in the Senate would preclude Sara Duterte from
running for public office; she is seen as a strong contender in 2028 presidential elections.20
The extradition of former President Duterte to The Hague in March 2025 generated additional
controversy ahead of the midterm elections.21 Rodrigo Duterte faces charges before the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for “crimes against humanity” during his “war on drugs”
while in office (see “Human Rights Concerns in the Philippines,” below). The Duterte family
commands significant political support in the Philippines, particularly in their home island of
Mindanao; in 2025, former President Duterte won his race for the mayorship of Mindanao’s
Davao City while in detention. As of February 2026, the Trump Administration has not
commented on Duterte’s extradition and ICC trial.
The Marcos administration faces popular pressure over corruption allegations and accusations of
misappropriated funds related to substandard or nonexistent flood control projects, which came to
light following a series of typhoons in 2025. Several Marcos-aligned policymakers, including
Cabinet members and the speaker of the House, have resigned as a result of the scandal.22
15 “Freedom in the World 2025: Philippines,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/philippines/freedom-
world/2025.
16 Jim Gomez, “Marcos Jr. Proclaimed Next Philippine President with Huge Win,” Associated Press, May 25, 2022;
Republic of the Philippines Commission on Elections, “Report to the President and the Congress on the May 9, 2022,
National and Local Elections,” May 15, 2024.
17 James Patrick Cruz, “Timeline: Sara Duterte Impeachment,” Rappler, February 10, 2025. The “Verified Complaint
for Impeachment can be viewed at https://www.congress.gov.ph/impeachment/.
18 Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines, “SC: House Impeachment Complaint vs VP Duterte Barred by 1year Rule, Due Process or Fairness Applies During All Stages of Impeachment Process,” July 25, 2025; Jairo Bolledo
and Lian Buan, “Supreme Court Bars Sara Impeachment, Can Be Refiled Next Year,” Rappler, July 25, 2025.
19 Dwight De Leon, “VP Sara Duterte Slapped with 4th Impeachment Complaint,” Rappler, February 18, 2026.
20 Mong Palatino, “Why Did Philippine VP Sara Duterte Declare Her Presidential Candidacy?” The Diplomat,
February 19, 2026.
21 International Criminal Court, “Situation in the Philippines: Rodrigo Roa Duterte in ICC Custody,” March 12, 2025.
22 Mong Palatino, “Corruption Allegations and Family Drama Hound Philippine President Marcos,” The Diplomat,
December 3, 2025; Raissa Robles, “2 Top Philippine Officials in Marcos’ Cabinet Quit Amid Flood Control Scandal,”
South China Morning Post, November 17, 2025.
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The Department of State reported that the 2013 and 2019 midterm elections and the 2016 and
2022 national elections were “generally free and fair,” although there were reports of vote-buying
and some incidents of violence.23 During the democratic era, which began in 1986, the legislative
branch and Supreme Court have not served as strong checks on presidential power.24 Observers
note political parties and groupings have tended to be fluid and shifting, driven more by
individual personalities, interests, and loyalties than by unifying ideologies, policy platforms, and
goals.25
Philippine citizens generally can exercise political and civil rights with few restrictions, openly
criticize national leaders, and enjoy academic freedom and religious liberties, though criminal
complaints and libel laws have been used to attempt to silence government critics, particularly
during the Duterte administration.26 Some aspects of Philippine politics have undermined
democratic institutions and government effectiveness and led to human rights abuses. These
include corruption; concentrations of power among socioeconomic elites and local clans;
persistent concerns about the suppression of opposition figures and the media; and a weak judicial
system and culture of impunity.27 According to Freedom House, the practice of “red-tagging”—
defined as “a form of harassment whereby targets are accused of having links with local
communist groups”—physical assaults, and politicized lawsuits have continued to impact media
workers and activists.28
U.S.-Philippine Relations
During the administrations of current President Marcos and one of his predecessors, Benigno
Aquino III (2010–2016), the Philippines has deepened security relations with the United States,
including by expanding U.S. access to Philippine military facilities and agreeing to new Bilateral
Defense Guidelines (BDG) in 2023. Both the Biden and Trump Administrations have supported
the Philippines through military support and cooperation, economic assistance and agreements,
and inclusion in regional initiatives. The Philippines remains an important component of U.S.
strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
In contrast to the U.S.-Philippines relationship under Marcos Jr. and Aquino, relations under
former President Duterte were strained. Duterte, who hails from the southern island of Mindanao
23 Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, March 30, 2021; Department of
State, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, May 3, 2017; Department of State, 2022 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, March 20, 2023. International election observers were critical of the
2022 national elections, asserting there were instances of vote-buying, intimidation, disinformation, and violence.
Sebastian Strangio, “Philippine Election Marred by Violence, Vote-Buying: Monitoring Mission,” The Diplomat, May
20, 2022; International Observers Mission, “Interim Report of the Philippine Elections 2022,” May 19, 2022.
24 Mark R. Thompson, “The Philippine Presidency in Southeast Asian Perspective: Imperiled and Imperious Presidents
but not Perilous Presidentialism,” Contemporary Politics, vol. 24 (December 11, 2017).
25 Paul D. Kenny, “Why Is There No Political Polarization in the Philippines?” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, August 18, 2020; Paul Hutchcroft, Strong Patronage, Weak Parties: The Case for Electoral System Redesign in
the Philippines (World Scientific, 2020).
26 Prominent examples include the several cases against Maria Ressa, a journalist and Nobel Peace Prize winner, and
her media site Rappler, and Leila de Lima, a former senator and vocal critic of Duterte who was detained for over six
years on charges widely viewed as politically motivated. Jairo Bolledo, “Rappler Again Wins Shutdown Case at Court
of Appeals,” Rappler, August 8, 2025; Tetch Torres-Tupas, “Leila de Lima Case: 2024 Brings Justice, Freedom,”
Philippine Inquirer, December 27, 2024.
27 Nicole Curato, “Democratic Expressions Amidst Fragile Institutions: Possibilities for Reform in Duterte’s
Philippines,” Brookings Institution, January 22, 2021; Christia Marie Ramos, “‘Culture of Impunity’ Made Filipinos
Afraid of Voicing Criticism vs. Admin—Pangilinan,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 19, 2021.
28 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2024: Key Developments, June 1, 2023–May 31, 2024,”
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and has long-held distrust of the United States, sought to strengthen ties with China, which he
viewed as a potentially large source of foreign investment.29 Duterte also challenged aspects of
the U.S.-Philippines alliance, including by calling for the reassessment of 2014 U.S.-Philippines
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), reducing the number of combined military
exercises in the Philippines, and threatening to terminate the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA).30 As tensions between the Philippines and China over disputes in the South
China Sea continued to fester, however, the Duterte government sought closer security
cooperation with the United States.31
Trump Administration officials, including Secretary Hegseth and Secretary of State and Acting
National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, have reaffirmed the United States’ “ironclad alliance”
with the Philippines.32 The United States has continued some existing assistance and promised
new funding for FMF and other security programs in support of the Philippines’ military
modernization, and the Trump Administration has announced several new foreign assistance
projects for the Philippines.33 Several high-level engagements—including visits by Secretary of
Defense Pete Hegseth to the Philippines in March 2025 and by President Marcos to Washington
in July 2025—have reinforced bilateral ties.34 Marcos’ visit to Washington, DC, included
meetings with President Donald Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and Secretary Rubio. These meetings
yielded a trade framework agreement that reduced tariffs on some U.S. imports from the
Philippines to 19% (from 20%) and the announcement of $60 million in U.S. foreign assistance.35
In return, the Philippines agreed to zero tariffs on some U.S. exports to the Philippines.36
Among Filipinos, popular support for the U.S.-Philippines relationship is strong. According to
“The State of Southeast Asia 2025 Survey Report” conducting by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak
Institute, a majority of Filipino respondents (66.5%) were “confident” or “very confident” that the
United States “will ‘do the right thing’ to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and
governance.” By contrast, only 16% of respondents expressed confidence in the PRC.37 Still,
specific aspects of the relationship—particularly related to U.S. military access to the country—
29 Derek Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance with China Is Over,” The RAND Blog, November 2, 2021; Prashanth
Parameswaran, “Why the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte Hates America,” The Diplomat, November 1, 2016.
30 John Schaus, “What Is the Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement, and Why Does It Matter?” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, February 12, 2020.
31 “US-Philippines Alliance Back on Track as Duterte’s China Charm Offensive Crumbles,” South China Morning
Post, October 23, 2021.
32 Department of State, “Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Philippine President Marcos, Jr.,” July 21, 2025; Department
of Defense, “Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Hold
Joint Media Availability,” March 28, 2025.
33 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Announces PHP3 Billion in Foreign Assistance for the Philippines,” July 23,
2025; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Announces PHP13.8 Billion in Health Assistance to the Philippines,”
September 12, 2025.
34 Jim Gomez, “Hegseth Tells Philippines the Trump Administration Will Ramp Up Deterrence Against China Threat,”
Associated Press, March 28, 2025; Department of Defense, “United States–Philippines Joint Statement on Secretary
Hegseth’s Inaugural Visit to the Philippines,” March 28, 2025; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Announces
PHP3 Billion in Foreign Assistance for the Philippines,” July 23, 2025.
35 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Announces PHP3 Billion in Foreign Assistance for the Philippines,” July 23,
2025.
36 “President Trump Sets 19% Tariff on Philippines in New Trade Deal,” Reuters, July 22, 2025. The status of this
agreement is uncertain following the February 2026 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that the President does not have the
authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). See CRS Legal Sidebar
LSB11398, Supreme Court Rules Against Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli.
37 Sharon Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia 2025 Survey Report,” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2025.
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have been and remain sensitive. In 1992—in the face of nationalist Philippine opposition to U.S.
military bases and during a period of relative peace and stability following the fall of the Soviet
Union—the U.S. military withdrew from Naval Base Subic Bay and Clark Air Base after the
Philippine Senate rejected the renewal of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement.38 More recently,
several high-profile incidents in 2005 and 2014—in which U.S. servicemembers have been
accused of serious crimes—have rekindled concerns about the U.S. military presence in the
Philippines.39
U.S. Foreign Assistance
According to foreignassistance.gov, the United States provided nearly $720 million in foreign
assistance to the Philippines in FY2024, including Development Assistance (DA), Global Health
Programs (GHP), and FMF. The majority of this funding—$500 million—took the form of FMF,
allocated through emergency supplemental appropriation in 2024 (P.L. 118-50).40 In recent years,
FMF and development and global health assistance administered by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) have comprised the largest share of U.S assistance to the
country (see Table 1). Aid programs supported by these accounts aimed at promoting economic
development, the rule of law, human rights, health, education, and environmental management, as
well as military assistance administered by the Departments of State and Defense in support of
the Philippines’ military modernization.41 Comprehensive FY2025 aid data by country are not yet
available. The Trump Administration’s review and restructuring of foreign assistance in 2025—
which resulted in the reported cancellation of 83% of U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID)-managed foreign aid programs, and the transfer of remaining programs to the State
Department—may have affected 95% of U.S. assistance to the Philippines managed by USAID,
according to a March 2025 analysis by the Center for Global Development.42
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance Obligation to the Philippines, FY2018-FY2024
Current $ in millions
Account
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
FY2023
FY2024
Foreign Military Financing
(FMF)
40.00
65.82
129.16
176.50
120.00
40.00
540.00
Development Assistance
(DA)
40.66
68.77
93.09
63.55
79.61
111.57
68.15
Global Health Programs
(GHP)
36.15
35.16
21.22
47.31
42.44
47.60
37.37
38 Shawn D. Harding, “There and Back and There Again: U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines,” Proceedings, vol.
150, no. 5 (May 2024).
39 Reynaldo Santos Jr., “LOOKING BACK: Daniel Smith and the Subic Rape Case,” Rappler, December 1, 2015; Julie
McCarthy, “Philippines Pardons U.S. Marine in Killing of Transgender Woman,” NPR, September 7, 2020.
40 Department of Defense, “Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” July 30,
2024.
41 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY2025.
42 Justin Sandefur and Charles Kenny, “USAID Cuts: New Estimates at the Country Level,” Center for Global
Development, March 26, 2025. For more on the Trump Administration’s approach to foreign aid and USAID, see
Executive Order 14169 of January 20, 2025, “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid,” 90 Federal
Register 8619, https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-order/14169; CRS In Focus IF10261, U.S. Agency for
International Development: An Overview, by Emily M. McCabe.
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Account
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
FY2023
FY2024
International Disaster
Assistance
14.73
10.61
15.62
7.52
34.39
9.39
17.57
Agency for International
Development, Operating
Expenses
10.34
10.63
11.72
11.34
12.02
15.21
17.12
Nonproliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining and
Related Programs
32.98
20.80
18.11
9.00
16.41
7.89
16.51
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
12.29
22.12
33.34
33.14
16.57
8.97
8.33
Peace Corps
3.60
3.39
2.36
2.22
2.44
3.67
3.80
Trade and Development
Agency
—
1.44
1.00
0.53
3.09
1.54
3.62
International Military
Education and Training
(IMET)
2.07
2.06
2.12
1.74
1.90
2.37
2.40
International Narcotics
Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE)
6.96
7.26
6.97
9.75
8.83
7.96
2.38
Other
143.15
166.07
36.80
23.156
3.60
9.66
2.63
TOTAL
342.93
414.14
371.52
385.75
341.31
265.83
719.86
Source: ForeignAssistance.Gov, accessed January 23, 2026.
Notes: The relatively high amounts under “Other” in FY2018 and FY2019 reflect Department of Defense
Operation and Maintenance obligations in those years. The DA, GHP, and ESF accounts have historically been
implemented primarily by USAID. FMF and IMET are implemented by the Defense Department through the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
Despite these changes, the Trump Administration has continued some foreign assistance,
including FMF, and announced new programs for the Philippines. In July 2025, for example, the
Administration announced foreign assistance funding pledges totaling at least $60 million to
support energy, maritime, and economic growth programs in the Philippines, including $15
million for private sector development in the Luzon Economic Corridor; according to the U.S.
Embassy in the Philippines, this was the “first announcement of new foreign assistance for any
country” since the pause in foreign assistance began.43 In August 2025, the State Department
announced $500,000 in foreign assistance to the Philippines in response to flooding.44 In
September 2025, Secretary Rubio announced $250 million in assistance to address public health
challenges.45
In the past decade, some appropriations legislation has restricted U.S. assistance to the
Philippines due to human rights concerns. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115141) allowed International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to PNP
units only if the Secretary of State certified that the Philippine government “has adopted and is
implementing a counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with international human rights
43 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Announces Php3 Billion in Foreign Assistance for the Philippines,” July 23,
2025; Tammy Bruce, “Department Press Briefing—July 22, 2025,” Department of State, July 22, 2025.
44 Department of State, “Update on U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Philippines in Response to Recent Flooding,” media
note, August 12, 2025.
45 Department of State, “U.S. Announces New Health Sector Assistance for the Philippines,” press statement,
September 11, 2025.
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standards.”46 Similar language was included in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (P.L.
115-409), which expired in 2023. Appropriations legislation for FY2022 mandated reporting on
Philippine security forces related to human rights violations.47 The Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2026 (Division F of P.L. 119-75, §7043(h)) prohibits funding for “counternarcotics
assistance for the Philippines, except for drug demand reduction, maritime law enforcement, or
transnational interdiction.”
The Philippines’ Defense Posture
The AFP traditionally focused on internal security and counterinsurgency. Since the early 2010s,
however, the AFP has increased its orientation toward external threats, including through a
planned 15-year, $40 billion military modernization plan started in 2012. The three-phase plan
encountered funding and procurement difficulties throughout its implementation, and dozens of
projects that were to be conducted in the first two five-year phases (called “horizons”) remain
incomplete.48 In January 2024, the Marcos administration announced a revamped third phase,
rebranded as “Re-Horizon 3,” which committed $35 billion over 10 years to a procurement
program aimed at territorial defense.49 Marcos initiated a 2024 “Comprehensive Archipelagic
Defense Concept,” which seeks to project AFP capabilities throughout the Philippines’ EEZ and
expand the AFP’s ability to defend the entire archipelago.50 His administration also has pursued a
“transparency initiative” in the South China Sea, seeking to expose and publicize China’s “illegal,
coercive, aggressive, and deceptive” actions to garner domestic and international support for the
Philippines.51
Since 2012, the PRC has used military, paramilitary, and civilian vessels to assert its claims over
disputed maritime territory near the Philippines, creating a potential flashpoint in the South China
Sea that could trigger U.S. security commitments. Some experts have raised concerns about
whether and how the Philippines might play a role in a potential U.S. response to a conflict in the
Taiwan Strait.52 China has responded to the Philippines’ efforts to acquire more advanced
46 INCLE assistance is provided through the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL).
47 Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2022 (P.L. 117-103).
48 Alan Robles and Raissa Robles, “The China Threat Is Finally Prompting the Philippines to Step Up Military
Modernisation. Will It Succeed?” South China Morning Post, May 12, 2024; Renato Cruz De Castro, “Exploring the
Philippines’ Evolving Grand Strategy in the Face of China’s Maritime Expansion: From the Aquino Administration to
the Marcos Administration,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 43(1), 2024; Haena Jo, “Philippines Military
Modernization: Revamped but Not Resolved,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, June 23, 2026.
49 Frances Mangosing, “Marcos OKs Military’s P2-Trillion Wish List for Weapons, Equipment,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 29, 2024; Jo, “Philippines Military Modernization”; Presidential Communications Office, “Keynote
Speech by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. at the Lowy Institute Peace and Resilience Amidst Great Power Rivalries:
The Philippine Perspective,” March 4, 2024.
50 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Supporting the Philippines in Kickstarting the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense
Concept (CADC): The Role of the US-Australian Alliance,” Asia Pacific Bulletin 691, September 30, 2024.
51 Richard Javad Heydarian, “South China Sea: The ‘Transparency Initiative’ Success Is Plain to See,” The Interpreter
(Lowy Institute), September 9, 2024; Priam Nepomuceno, “PH to Continue Using Transparency Policy vs. China’s
Gray-zone Tactics,” Philippine News Agency, March 2, 2026.
52 Edcel John A. Ibarra, “Entangled Fronts: The Philippines’ Anxiety over a Taiwan Crisis,” National Bureau of Asian
Research, June 23, 2025; Derek Grossman, “The Philippines Is Ever More Focused on Taiwan,” Foreign Policy,
January 29, 2025.
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weaponry by accusing the Philippines of provoking a regional “arms race” and “fuel[ing] tensions
in the region.”53
In addition to deepening defense ties with the United States, Marcos also has pursued
“minilateral” and bilateral security relationships with other partners in the region, including Japan
and Australia. Under Marcos, the Philippine government has expressed an interest in playing a
greater role in regional security as part of its strategy to defend Philippine interests in the South
China Sea. Some analysts warn that the Philippines’ small military expenditure—estimated by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at 1.3% of GDP, or $6.1 billion, in 2024—and
volatile political environment could restrict the country’s ability to play such a role.54 Following a
U.S.-Japan-Philippines summit in 2024, the three countries deepened cooperation between their
coast guards and announced a trilateral maritime exercise that took place in 2025, among
numerous other joint initiatives on a range of economic, defense, and climate issues.55 The
Philippines has visiting forces agreements—which, among other possible outcomes, allow the
countries’ armed forces to train and operate on each other’s territory—with Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, and Canada, and is negotiating similar agreements with France and the United
Kingdom.56 In August 2025, Marcos made a state visit to India, during which the two sides agreed
to elevated their ties to a “strategic partnership,” and after which the Philippine and Indian navies
conducted a joint exercise in the South China Sea.57 In November 2025, the Philippines deployed
the first of three India-made BrahMos anti-ship missile batteries.58
53 Raissa Robles, “Philippines Offered 20 US F-16 Fighter Jets in Major Defense Upgrade, Amid China Tensions,”
South China Morning Post, April 4, 2025; Congyi Lin, “Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of National Defense
on December 26, 2024,” PRC Ministry of National Defense, December 31, 2024. On April 1, the State Department
approved the possible sale of 20 F-16 fighter aircraft to the Philippines, at an estimated cost of $5.58 billion; Philippine
officials have indicated they have yet to receive a formal offer and are uncertain if the Philippines can afford such an
expensive acquisition. Maya Carlin, “Philippines Considers Nixing Its Purchase of F-16 Fighters,” The National
Interest, June 3, 2025.
54 International Crisis Group, “Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort,” International
Crisis Group, August 12, 2025; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure
Database,” accessed on January 19, 2026, https://milex.sipri.org/sipri.
55 White House, “Joint Visions Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States,” April 11,
2024; Sebatian Strangio, “Philippines, Japan, US Hold Second Round of Joint Coast Guard Exercises,” The Diplomat,
June 18, 2025.
56 Mikhail Flores and Karen Lema, “Philippines Says Pact with Japan Takes Defence Ties to Unprecedented High,”
Reuters, July 8, 2024; Euan Graham, “Allies Entwined: Australia’s Strategic Convergence with the Philippines,”
Australia Strategic Policy Institute, November 2025; Richard Javad Heydarian, “Philippines Hopeful but Openly
Hedging on Trump,” Asia Times, February 26, 2025. While the details vary, broadly these agreements provide the legal
basis to allow for mutual military rights and access in each other’s country and facilitate interoperability, military
exchanges, and exercises, among other things. The Philippine Senate has yet to ratify the agreements with New Zealand
and Canada. Jim Gomez, “Philippines Signs Military Pact with New Zealand to Widen Alliances While Facing an
Assertive China,” Associated Press, April 30, 2025; Job Manahan, “Philippines, Canada Ink Landmark Visiting Forces
Deal,” ABS-CBN News, November 2, 2025.
57 Rahul Mishra, “India-Philippines Ties Now Strategic Partnership on Upward Trajectory,” The Diplomat, August 12,
2025; Presidential Communications Office, “Fruitful Week: President Marcos Wraps Up Landmark India Visit with
Strategic Partnership, $5.8B Investment Pledges,” August 9, 2025.
58 Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Philippine Marine Corps Unveils First BrahMos Anti-Ship Missile Battery,” USNI News,
November 7, 2025.
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U.S.-Philippines Defense Ties59
The U.S.-Philippines defense relationship is rooted in a history of shared security interests and
priorities. During World War II, during which the Philippines was a commonwealth of the United
States, over 250,000 Filipino soldiers fought under the American flag.60 The military alliance
dates back to the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and has continuously evolved to address new and
developing threats. Between FY2015 to FY2022, the Philippines received over $1 billion in U.S.
military assistance, making it the largest recipient of such assistance in the Indo-Pacific during
that period.61 Security cooperation has expanded since 2012 from a longstanding emphasis on
counterterrorism to a broader focus on maritime security, territorial defense, and combined
deterrence, alongside continued humanitarian assistance and disaster response preparedness. Both
governments have taken steps to operationalize and deepen cooperation though expanded access
for U.S. forces, high-level engagements, increasingly large and complex exercises, and the
exploration of defense industrial base cooperation.62 The United States also transfers U.S. defense
articles to the Philippines through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales
(DCS), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programs.63
Defense Agreements
The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) commits the United States and the Philippines to help
defend each other against external armed attack.64 Article IV of the Treaty states: “Each Party
recognizes an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance
with its constitutional processes.” Article V defines an “armed attack” as one on the “metropolitan
territory of either of the Parties,” the “island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific
Ocean,” or its “armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.”
The 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement governs the legal status of U.S. military forces operating in
the Philippines.65 The VFA creates rules by which U.S. troops, vessels, and aircraft may enter the
country and establishes criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel.66 In 1991, the
59 This section was coauthored with Christina L. Arabia, Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the
Global Arms Trade.
60 Ron Sagudan and D’Andrea Jacobs, “The Congressional Gold Medal Tribute to Filipino WWII Veterans,” VA News,
October 4, 2024.
61 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Advanced Unmanned Aerial System to Philippine Air
Force,” press release, October 14, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Delivers Php48.5 Million in Weapons
and Munitions to AFP,” press release, July 8, 2021.
62 Defense industrial cooperation was one of the new joint initiatives announced during Secretary Hegseth’s March
2025 visit to the Philippines. Department of Defense, “United States–Philippines Joint Statement on Secretary
Hegseth’s Inaugural Visit to the Philippines,” March 28, 2025; Department of Defense, “Joint Vision Statement on
U.S.-Philippine Defense Industrial Cooperation,” March 28, 2025.
63 The Philippines was designated a major non-NATO ally in 2003, which allows the country certain defense trade and
security cooperation privileges. Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally, Presidential Determination
No. 2004-02 of October 6, 2003, 68 Federal Register 59855; Department of State, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status,”
fact sheet, January 20, 2025.
64 The MDT can be found at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.
65 For the text of the Visiting Forces Agreement, see Department of State, “Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Treatment of United
States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines,” Treaties and Other International Acts Series 12931, October 9, 1998,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/12931-Philippines-Defense-Status-of-Forces-10.9.1998.pdf.
66 John Schaus, “What Is the Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement, and Why Does It Matter?” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, February 12, 2020.
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Philippines rejected the renewal of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, which would have
extended the U.S. lease of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, resulting in the withdrawal
of all U.S. troops from the Philippines.67 Though former President Duterte submitted a “notice of
termination” to the U.S. Embassy in Manila in February 2020, his administration eventually
recommitted to the VFA in July 2021, citing U.S. donations of over 3 million doses of the
COVID-19 vaccine.68
In 2014, the U.S. and Philippine governments signed the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement.69 Under the EDCA, U.S. military personnel may be deployed on a
rotational or non-permanent basis to Philippine military bases, including U.S.-built and -improved
facilities, which are to be utilized rent-free by the U.S. military but owned by the Philippines. The
agreement aims to “facilitate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines and the
region; improve opportunities for bilateral training; and support the long-term modernization of
the [AFP] as it works to establish a minimum credible defense.”70 In 2023, the United States and
the Philippines agreed to increase the number of Philippine bases open to U.S. forces from five to
nine.71 The United States also has invested in Philippine facilities outside the EDCA sites,
including two boat repair and maintenance facilities in Palawan Province and a warehouse in
Subic Bay for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief equipment.72 In July 2025, the two
countries announced they would construct a U.S.-funded ammunitions manufacturing facility in
Subic Bay for joint use.73
Some observers suggest the northern EDCA bases could be used as staging grounds for U.S.
forces in a potential conflict with the PRC over Taiwan—the northernmost site is 500 kilometers
(310 miles) from the city of Kaohsiung in Taiwan’s south—or as a “rear access area” for U.S.
67 The Military Bases Agreement also established the legal status of U.S. forces in the Philippines. The original
agreement established 99-year usage rights for various military bases, which was amended in 1966 to 25 years. The
Philippine Senate narrowly voted against renewing the treaty in 1991. Katerina Francisco, “LOOK BACK: When the
Senate Said ‘No’ to US Bases Renewal,” Rappler, September 16, 2016; Department of State, “Agreement Concerning
Military Bases, Manila, 14 March 1947.”
68 On February 10, 2020, the Government of the Philippines submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Manila a “notice of
termination” of the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement. The Philippine government suspended the termination
three times (for six months each), in June 2020, November 2020, and June 2021. Richard Javad Heydarian, “US
Outlasts Duterte’s Failing Dalliance with China,” Asia Times, May 19, 2021; Andrea Chloe Wong, “Duterte’s BackDown on US Forces in Philippines,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, August 24, 2021; Grossman, “Duterte’s Dalliance
with China Is Over.”
69 For the text of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, see Department of State, “Defense Cooperation
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Philippines,” Treaties and Other International Acts Series
14-625, April 28, 2014, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/14-625-Philippines-DefenseCooperation.pdf.
70 White House, “FACT SHEET: United States-Philippines Bilateral Relations,” April 28, 2014.
71 Department of Defense, “Philippines, U.S. Announce Locations of Four New EDCA Sites,” April 3, 2023. In the
announcement, the Department of Defense publicized it had invested $82 million in infrastructure for the original five
EDCA sites. In July 2024, the Department of Defense stated that the Philippines had invested an estimated $88.6
million at EDCA locations. Department of Defense, “Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Fourth 2+2
Ministerial Dialogue,” July 30, 2024.
72 “US Will Build Repair Facilities for the Philippine Navy Near the Disputed South China Sea,” AP, July 16, 2025;
Joanna Rose Aglibot, “US Marine Corps Opens Warehouse for Aid, Relief in Subic Freeport,” Philippine Inquirer,
February 6, 2025.
73 Christina Chi, “US Ammo Facility in Subic Bay Could Build World’s Largest Stockpile, Says Trump,” Philippine
Star, July 23, 2025; CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, “President Trump Participates in a Bilateral Meeting with the
President of the Republic of the Philippines,” July 22, 2025.
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logistics and military operations.74 Philippine officials have expressed caution related to possible
crisis-related commitments under EDCA, emphasizing the agreement aims to boost Philippine
military modernization, and, in a possible cross-Strait conflict, may help facilitate the evacuation
of overseas Filipino workers in Taiwan, who number over 150,000.75
In 2023, the Biden and Marcos administrations signed new Bilateral Defense Guidelines aimed
at modernizing Philippine defense capabilities, deepening interoperability with the United States,
enhancing bilateral planning and information-sharing, and combating transnational and
nonconventional threats.76 The guidelines clarify the conditions under which the MDT can be
triggered and state that “an armed attack in the Pacific, to include anywhere in the South China
Sea, on either Philippine or U.S. armed forces—which includes both nations’ coast guards—
aircraft, or public vessels, would invoke mutual defense commitments under Article IV and
Article V of the MDT.”77
The BDG laid out several core lines of efforts, and subsequent bilateral meetings tied them to
concrete implementation steps and resourcing, which included a commitment by the United
States to allocate $500 million in FMF to support the AFP and an agreement by both parties to
jointly fund the Philippines-Security Sector Assistance Roadmap (P-SSAR), which will guide
shared modernization planning, investments, and priority equipment delivery over the next 5 to
10 years. According to U.S. documents, the P-SSAR was finalized on July 29, 2024.78 The two
governments also announced the establishment of a Roles, Missions, and Capabilities (RMC)
Working Group to provide policy guidance for joint operations, activities, and investments as well
as plans to operationalize the newly agreed on EDCA locations. The United States and the
Philippines further tied BDG information-sharing priorities to “concluding” key agreements: the
Philippines-U.S. Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement
(CISMOA), extended in June 2024, and a General Security of Military Information Agreement
(GSOMIA).79 In the same meetings, the two governments tied the BDG cyber priorities to the
U.S. providing on-demand cyber training to support a new AFP Cyber Command.80
74 Derek Grossman, “The Philippines Is Ever More Focused on Taiwan,” RAND Corporation, February 1, 2025; Rupert
Wingfield-Hayes, “US Secures Deal on Philippines Bases to Complete Arc Around China,” BBC, February 2, 2023;
David Brunnstrom and Karen Lema, “Explainer: Why U.S. Seeks Closer Security Cooperation with the Philippines,”
Reuters, February 2, 2023; Brad Lendon, “US Gains Military Access to Philippine Bases Close to Taiwan and South
China Sea,” CNN, April 4, 2023.
75 Michael Martina, Don Durfee, and David Brunnstrom, “Marcos Says Philippines Bases Could Be ‘Useful’ If Taiwan
Attacked,” Reuters, May 5, 2023; Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Philippines’ Evolving View on Taiwan: From Passivity
to Active Involvement,” Brookings Institution, March 9, 2023; Grossman, “The Philippines Is Ever More Focused on
Taiwan”; Priam Nepomuceno, “DND Chief Welcomes Cagayan Mayors Support for EDCA” Philippine News Agency,
April 21, 2023.
76 Department of Defense, “The United States and the Republic of the Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines,” May
3, 2023.
77 Department of Defense, “The United States and the Republic of the Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines.”
78 Department of Defense, “Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” July 30,
2024; DOD, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” July 30, 2024.
79 CISMOA document available at Department of State, Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Philippines Concerning Communications Interoperability and Security, entered into force June 7, 2024. For details on
the GSOMIA, see Sebastian Strangio, “Philippines, US Sign Military Intelligence Sharing Agreement,” The Diplomat,
November 19, 2024.
80 Department of Defense, “Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” July 30,
2024; DOD, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue,” July 30, 2024.
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In 2025, Secretary Hegseth publicly described these priorities as ongoing—announcing a new
Task Force-Philippines and completion of a two-year action plan to accelerate progress on “major
priorities,” while also pointing to advances in defense industrial cooperation.81
U.S. Security Cooperation
U.S. security cooperation with the Philippines combines State Department-funded assistance with
Department of Defense (DOD)-funded capacity building to support Philippine deterrence,
maritime domain awareness and security, and defense professionalization capabilities. State
Department programs include FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET).82
In July 2024, the United States announced $500 million in FMF in FY2024 supplemental funds
intended to help the Philippines modernize its military and coast guard for external defense;
following the Trump Administration’s pause in foreign assistance, Secretary Hegseth announced
the release of some of these funds in March 2025.83 DOD’s capacity-building efforts have focused
on the development and enhancement of AFP capabilities including intelligence, maritime and
border security operations, counterterrorism, and counter-proliferation initiatives. These efforts
have occurred under DOD security cooperation authorities, including Section 333 Building
Partner Capacity, Section 332 Institutional Capacity Building, and the Indo-Pacific Maritime
Security Initiative.84
The NDAA for FY2026 (P.L. 119-60) requires annual reports on the U.S. government’s efforts to
enhance the U.S. defense relationship with the Philippines, annual U.S. spending on security
assistance to the Philippines, specific capabilities needed to modernize the defense capabilities of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the AFP’s absorptive capacity for additional
security assistance. The FY2026 NDAA also authorized direct loans of up to $1 billion through
the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) loan program and annual grant assistance of not more than
$500 million each year through FY2030 for the Philippines through the Foreign Military
81 Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s Meeting with Philippine Secretary of National
Defense,” October 31, 2025; Seth Robson, “US Military Task Force at Work in the Philippines,” Stars and Stripes,
November 28, 2025; DOD, “United States–Philippines Joint Statement on Secretary Hegseth's Inaugural Visit to the
Philippines,” March 28, 2025; DOD, “Joint Vision Statement on U.S.-Philippine Defense Industrial Cooperation,”
March 28, 2025. In his March 2025 visit to Manila, Secretary Hegseth announced the deployment of an anti-ship
missile launcher and unmanned surface vessels during the Balikatan exercises, as well as several new joint initiatives
including plans to deploy more advanced U.S. military assets to the Philippines, conduct advanced Special Operations
Forces training, improve defense industrial cooperation, and launch a cybersecurity campaign. Jim Gomez, “Hegseth
Tells Philippines the Trump Administration Will Ramp Up Deterrence Against China Threat,” Associated Press, March
28, 2025; Department of Defense, “Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Philippine Secretary of National Defense
Gilberto Teodoro Hold Joint Media Availability,” March 28, 2025.
82 The Department of Defense is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347
dated September 5, 2025.
83 Department of Defense, “Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto
Teodoro Hold Joint Media Availability,” transcript, March 28, 2025; Ramon Rayondoyan, “U.S. Unfreezes Military
Aid to Philippines to Bolster China Deterrence,” Nikkei Asia, March 28, 2025. According to Philippine officials, at
least a portion of the $500 million in FMF was exempted in February 2025; Hegseth’s announcement was the first
public confirmation from a U.S. official that the FMF funding would continue. See Sam Beltran, “Philippines’
Exemption from US Foreign Aid Freeze Reaffirms ‘First-in-Line’ Status: Analysts,” South China Morning Post, March
2, 2025.
84 Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Cooperation with the Philippines,” January 20, 2025; U.S. Embassy
in the Philippines, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Philippines Defense and Security Partnership,” February 11, 2022. Section 333
Building Partner Capacity is authorized under 10 U.S.C. §333. The Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) was
authorized by Section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92; last amended and
extended in the FY2022 NDAA, P.L. 117-81). Note: DOD security cooperation program details are not made publicly
available in a consistent or comprehensive manner; such activities provided in this report are not meant to be an
exhaustive list.
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Financing (FMF) security assistance program.85 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L.
119-75) appropriated not less than $100 million for FMF grant assistance to Philippines in
FY2026.
The Philippines participates in the State Partnership Program (SPP) through partnerships with the
Hawaii National Guard and Guam National Guard, both of which were established in 2000.86
Over the past 25 years, hundreds of SPP engagements have been carried out, spanning air
defense, cyber defense, medical readiness, and disaster response, among other areas.87 In recent
years, SPP engagements have aligned with broader U.S.-Philippines defense planning cycles,
including a year-long agenda of over 500 joint planning and training initiatives linked to the
Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board processes.88 Recent examples of SPP
activities include recurring aviation engagements, casualty training exercises, and U.S.
participation in a Philippine reservist convention.89
Military Exercises
Military exercises are a central feature of U.S.-Philippine security cooperation, with recent
iterations increasingly oriented toward multi-domain operations and more demanding, combatrelevant scenarios. Balikatan (“shoulder-to-shoulder” in Tagalog) is an annual large-scale
combined exercise, typically integrating U.S. and Philippine Army, Marine, Navy, and Air Force
elements (often alongside other partners) to rehearse combined operations across land, sea, and
air. Balikatan 2024 included military personnel from France and Australia and focused on
complex training and coordination in air and maritime domain awareness, cyber operations, and
territorial defense activities, among other activities.90 Balikatan 2025, the 40th iteration of the
annual exercise, featured a “full battle test,” which included the deployment of the U.S. NavyMarine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS); the exercise also included live-fire
85 National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60, §1269 and §1270). Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) is implemented by the Defense Department through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA). See 22 U.S.C. §2763.
86 For more information, see State Partnership Program, U.S. National Guard, at https://www.nationalguard.mil/
Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/.
87 Mysti Bicoy, “25 Years Strong: Hawai‘i Guard and Philippines Celebrate Enduring Partnership,” Hawaii National
Guard, September 30, 2025.
88 John Linzmeier, “Hawaii, Guam National Guard Strengthen U.S.-Philippines Ties,” Hawaii Air National Guard,
March 31, 2025; U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Philippines and U.S. Hold Annual Mutual Defense and Security
Engagement Boards,” September 16, 2023. According to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “The Mutual Defense Board
was established in 1958, and the Security Engagement Board was established in 2006. Together, the two boards form
the framework that directs and enables defense and security cooperation between the U.S. and Philippine militaries.”
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “USINDOPACOM Hosts Philippines for Mutual Defense Board and Security
Engagement Board,” August 18, 2025.
89 Josen Christian Munoz Pascual, “Guam and Hawaii Guards Strengthen Ties at Philippine Reservist Convention,”
Guam National Guard, December 17, 2025; Roann Gatdula, “Hawaii Guard, Filipino Military Conduct Expert
Exchange,” Hawaii Air National Guard, September 30, 2024.
90 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Philippines and U.S. Conclude Balikatan Exercises, Shoulder-to-Shoulder,” May 10,
2024; U.S. Naval Institute, “Balikatan 2024,” June 2024.
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drills with the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).91 Smaller contingents of
Japanese and Australian troops also participated.92
Other notable annual exercises include Sama Sama (“Together”), which primarily involves U.S.
and Philippine naval forces, often with supporting maritime aviation forces; Kamandag
(“Cooperation of Warriors of the Sea”), which involves the U.S. Marine Corps and Philippine
Marine Corps and other AFP elements; and Salaknib (“Resist”), which primarily involves U.S.
and Philippine Army units.93
In April 2024, U.S. forces deployed a mid-range Typhon missile system to the northern
Philippines as part of Salaknib 2024.94 The system’s range encompasses the South China Sea and
the Taiwan Strait, and the PRC has criticized the system’s presence in the Philippines. The AFP
has since announced that it was in negotiations to purchase the system.95 The U.S. and Philippines
also routinely conduct Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCAs), which are typically short, at-sea
events often aimed at enhancing interoperability and combined maritime capabilities outside the
large annual exercises.96
Counterterrorism Operations
U.S-Philippine counterterrorism cooperation expanded markedly after 9/11 through Operation
Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF–P), a roughly 14-year effort in which a Joint Special
Operations Task Force maintained a continuous presence of approximately 500 to 600 troops to
advise and assist Philippine forces against the Abu Sayyaf Group and other transnational terrorist
threats in the southern Philippines.97 U.S. activities during this period centered on operational
advice and support to Philippine counterterrorism operations, training and equipping Philippine
units, and combined U.S.-Philippine civil-military and information activities to reduce extremist
safe havens and improve government legitimacy.98
U.S.-Philippine counterterrorism cooperation deepened after the 2017 siege of Marawi by a
coalition of Filipino Islamist extremist groups that had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS,
91 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Philippines, U.S. Conclude Exercise Balikatan 25,” May 9, 2025; Mikhail Flores,
“Philippines, US Launch Joint Combat Drills in ‘Full Battle Test,’” Reuters, April 21, 2025; U.S. Marine Corps,
“Philippine, U.S. Troops Kick Off Exercise Balikatan,” April 10, 2025; Jeoffrey Maitem, “US, Philippines Flex
Military Muscle with Himars Live-Fire Drills Near South China Sea,” South China Morning Post, April 30, 2025.
92 U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Exercise Balikatan 2025 Kicks Off with Opening Ceremony Highlighting Ironclad Alliance,”
April 21, 2025.
93 Joshua Brandenburg, “Salaknib 2025: Combined Joint Force Executes Logistics Over-the-Shore Operation in the
Philippines,” May 4, 2025; Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Philippine, Allied Warships Hold Combat Drills in the South
China Sea,” USNI News, October 16, 2025; John Fischer, “Multinational Forces Set to Launch KAMANDAG 9 in the
Philippines,” INDOPACOM, May 5, 2025.
94 See CRS In Focus IF12135, The U.S. Army’s Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) System, by Andrew Feickert.
95 Ryan Chan, “US Missiles Stationed in Philippines Can Reach China: Official,” Newsweek, October 28, 2025;
Sebastian Strangio, “Philippines Defends Plan to Acquire Typhon Missile System from US,” Diplomat, December 30,
2024.
96 See, for example, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Philippines, U.S. Conduct Bilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity,”
January 27, 2026; Priam Nepomuceno, “PH, US Forces Hold 10th Bilateral Exercise in WPS,” Philippine News Agency,
December 16, 2025; U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S., Philippine Coast Guards Conduct Maritime Cooperative
Activity,” May 21, 2025; U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Australia, Japan, Philippines, and United States Conduct
Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity,” February 5, 2025.
97 The United States designated the Abu Sayyaf Group as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997.
98 Linda Robinson et al., “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001-2014,” RAND, April 6, 2016.
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alt. ISIS/ISIL) and the emergence of ISIS-linked elements in the Philippines.99 In September
2017, the Secretary of Defense designated Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines (OPE–P) as an
overseas contingency operation (OCO) to support Philippine efforts to “isolate, degrade, and
defeat” ISIS affiliates and other terrorist organizations in the Philippines.100 Through OPE, U.S.
forces combined field advising and enabling support, such as logistical support, intelligence
sharing, operational planning, and the integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities overcome counterterrorism capability gaps in the AFP.101 The DOD rescinded the
OCO designation in 2019, and the Lead Inspector General’s (IG) special quarterly reporting
sunset at the end of FY2020. The final IG report noted that DOD had committed $85.4 million for
OPE-P, in which approximately 200 U.S. military personnel served in advisory roles.102 The final
report also noted that the United States’ broader counterterrorism mission and related security
assistance would continue under existing authorities.103
U.S.-Philippine counterterrorism cooperation today appears to persist through U.S. training and
advising as well as bilateral counterterrorism crisis-response activities.104 In February 2023, DOD
described U.S. forces as working closely with Philippine forces through training, advising, and
assisting while the Philippines leads and conducts the counterterrorism operations.105
U.S. Arms Transfers
In addition to receiving military equipment through the U.S. FMF program, the Philippines is
eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles at discounted rates through the EDA grant program.106
The Philippines is among a group of countries that receives priority EDA grant transfers.107 In
some cases, the Philippines supplements U.S. grant assistance with its national funds. Between
2020 and 2024, the Philippines was among the top recipients of EDA in the INDOPACOM area
of responsibility.108 In 2025, the State Department notified Congress of two potential FMS cases
for the Philippines: a proposed F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft package (with an estimated cost of
99 The conflict in Marawi—a city in the southern province of Mindanao—resulted in the deaths of over 900 militants,
over 165 AFP troops, and roughly 50 civilians, as well as the destruction of much of the city. With U.S. noncombat and
other foreign military assistance, the AFP retook the city in October 2017.
100 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve and
Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2017–December 31,
2017.”
101 Ibid.
102 By comparison, funding for OPE-P was $108 million in 2019 and $100 million in 2018. Lead Inspector General
reporting responsibilities terminated at the end of FY2020 since none of the appropriated funding for OPE-P was
associated with an Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO). See the 12 th and final quarterly IG report for OPE-P:
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines: Lead Inspector General
Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020–September 30, 2020.”
103 Ibid.
104 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Philippines, U.S. Complete Tempest Wind 2024,” September 7, 2024; U.S. IndoPacific Command, “USINDOPACOM Commander Travels to the Philippines, Commemorates 80 th Anniversary of the
Liberation of Manila,” February 23, 2025.
105 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Austin Visit to Philippine Base Highlights Benefits of U.S-Philippine Alliance,”
February 2, 2023.
106 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Military Delivers Php183 Million in New Weapons and Equipment to AFP,”
press release, June 22, 2021. See also U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Advanced Unmanned
Aerial System to Philippine Air Force”; U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Delivers Php48.5 Million in Weapons
and Munitions to AFP.”
107 22 U.S.C. §2321j(c)(2).
108 Government Accountability Office, Excess Defense Articles: DOD Needs to Better Assess the Program, GAO-26107627, December 2025.
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$5.58 billion) and a proposed TH-73A training helicopter package (estimated cost of $120
million).109 (In September 2025, the Philippine ambassador to the United States indicated that the
approved purchase of 20 F-16s had been suspended due to budgetary limitations.110) The
Philippines also purchases U.S. defense articles and services through the DCS program.111
The Philippine Economy
The Philippines is a lower middle-income country with one of the fastest growing economies in
Southeast Asia. Poor infrastructure, high energy and logistics costs, regulatory inconsistencies, a
cumbersome bureaucracy, and corruption have hampered efforts to attract foreign investment,
according to the Department of State.112 The Philippines is home to the second-largest business
process outsourcing sector in the world, generating over $32.5 billion in revenue in 2022, and is a
major exporter of electronic components.113 Many Filipino workers emigrate for better-paying
jobs abroad, and the Central Bank of the Philippines reported remittances from overseas Filipinos
in 2024 reached $38.3 billion (estimated at 8.7% of GDP by the World Bank); official statistics do
not include funds sent through informal channels.114
U.S.-Philippines Economic Relations
The United States is the Philippines’ third-largest trading partner (after China and Japan) and
largest export market. Total goods trade between the two countries came to $23.5 billion in 2024:
$14.2 billion in U.S. imports from the Philippines and $9.3 billion in U.S. exports to the
Philippines.115 During Marcos’ visit to the United States in late July, the two countries announced
a trade framework agreement in which the Trump Administration would impose a countryspecific tariff of 19% on some Philippine goods imported into the United States; the Philippines
would allow some U.S. exports to the country to face no tariffs.116 Philippine officials have
109 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Major Arms Sales: “Philippines—F-16 Aircraft,” April 1, 2025;
“Philippines—TH-73A Training Helicopters and Support,” April 15, 2025.
110 Reuters, “Philippines’ Potential Purchase of F-16 Jets on Hold Due to Budget Constraints, Envoy Says,” September
9, 2025.
111 Details about proposed DCS are confidential; however, the State Department mentions some DCS transfers in the
following fact sheet: Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Cooperation with the Philippines,” January 20,
2025.
112 Department of State, “2024 Investment Climate Statements: Philippines.”
113 Argyll Cyrus Geducos, “Investment in Education Was Able to Bolster PH Economy—Expert,” Manila Bulletin,
July 2, 2023; “Five-Year Forecast: Philippines,” Economist Intelligence Unit, February 24, 2025.
114 Central Bank of the Republic of the Philippines, “Personal Remittances Reach a Record High of US$3.7 Billion in
December 2024; Full-Year Level of US$38.3 Billion Highest to Date,” February 17, 2025; World Bank, “Personal
Remittances, Received (% of GDP)—Philippines.” The Department of Foreign Affairs estimated that 10.8 million
Filipinos lived overseas in 2024. According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, the number of Overseas Filipino
Workers was estimated at 2.19 million in 2024. Jiselle Anne C. Casucian, “DFA Records over 10.8 Million Overseas
Filipinos in 2024,” GMA Integrated News, August 27, 2025; Philippine Statistics Authority, “Results of the 2024
Overseas Filipino Workers: Number of Overseas Filipino Workers Grew,” December 16, 2025, accessed February 3,
2026, https://psa.gov.ph/statistics/survey/labor-and-employment/survey-overseas-filipinos.
115 For more information, see Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Philippines,” https://ustr.gov/
countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/philippines; Philippine Statistics Authority, “International Merchandise Trade
Statistics of the Philippines 2024,” March 26, 2025.
116 “Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates,” 90 Federal Register 37963, July 31, 2025. See CRS Report
R48549, Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status, by Keigh E. Hammond and William F. Burkhart.
Previous orders and statements from the Trump Administration indicated that products from the Philippines would be
(continued...)
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indicated that negotiations are ongoing, and the Philippines will maintain tariffs on some products
to protect Philippine industries, including agriculture.117 The status of this agreement is uncertain
following the February 2026 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that the President does not have the
authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).118
In April 2024, the United States, the Philippines, and Japan launched the Luzon Economic
Corridor (LEZ) at a trilateral summit in Washington, DC.119 Under the Group of 7’s 2022
Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment, the LEZ aims to drive connectivity and
development on Luzon island through investment in railways, airports, port modernization,
semiconductors, agribusiness, and other sectors.120 On July 21, 2025, Secretary Rubio met with
Marcos and announced that the Department of State intends to work with Congress to allocate
$15 million to support private sector development in the LEZ.121
Philippines-China Relations
Although tensions between the Philippines and China over disputed waters and land features in
the South China Sea have risen since 2012, the Philippines and China are linked through
geographical proximity, extensive economic relations, and complex people-to-people ties. A 2024
Pew Research Center survey indicates that 34% of Philippine respondents held a favorable view
of China (compared with a 74% favorability rating for the United States).122 Philippine authorities
have arrested PRC and Philippine citizens for spying on China’s behalf on military sites and
critical infrastructure.123 China has denied the accusations and reportedly arrested three Philippine
nationals in China on suspicion of espionage against the PRC.124 As it has done elsewhere in
Southeast Asia and globally, China has sought to influence ethnic Chinese populations in the
Philippines.125 Neither government has been willing to significantly disrupt economic ties, though
between 2012 and 2016, China placed formal and informal restrictions on certain food imports
assessed a 17% and 20% tariff rate if the United States and the Philippines did not come to an agreement. Executive
Order 14266, “Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates to Reflect Trading Partner Retaliation and Alignment,” 90 Federal
Register 15625, April 9, 2025; “Philippines to Face 20% US Tariff, Trump Says in Letter to Marcos,” Nikkei Asia, July
10, 2025.
117 Bea Cupin, “3 Months Later, US-Philippine Trade Negotiations Not Done Yet,” Rappler, October 27, 2025.
118 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11398, Supreme Court Rules Against Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by Christopher T. Zirpoli.
119 Department of State, “The United States, the Philippines, and Japan Launch the Partnership for Global Infrastructure
and Investment Luzon Economic Corridor,” media note, April 11, 2024.
120 Kevin Chen, “The Luzon Economic Corridor: A Badly-Needed Win for the US in Southeast Asia?” The Diplomat,
May 20, 2024; “US Finalizing Plans on Infra Project for Luzon Corridor,” Manila Standard, June 15, 2024.
121 U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Announces PHP3 Billion in Foreign Assistance for the Philippines,” July 23,
2025. CRS has not been able to independently verify the source of these funds.
122 Laura Silver, “More People View the U.S. Positively Than China Across 35 Surveyed Countries,” Pew Research
Center, July 9, 2024.
123 Republic of the Philippines National Bureau of Investigation, “NBI Arrests Five (5) for Espionage,” press release,
February 25, 2025; National Security Council of the Philippines, “Statement of the National Security Council,”
Facebook post and photo, March 4, 2026, https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=1377908564381238&set=
a.227251549446951; Don Mclain Gill, “Uncovering China’s Spying Game in the Philippines,” The Interpreter (Lowy
Institute), March 11, 2025.
124 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, “Statement of the Spokesperson of
the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines on the Philippines’ Announcement to Have Arrested a So-called ‘Chinese
Spy,’” January 25, 2025; “Philippines Alarmed Over China Arrest of Alleged Filipino Spies,” Reuters, April 5, 2025.
125 Teresita Ang See and Carmelea Ang See, “The Rise of China, New Immigrants and Changing Policies on Chinese
Overseas,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2019.
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from the Philippines, most notably bananas, and on some tourism; some observers suggest this is
an attempt by the PRC to coerce the Philippines into accepting China’s position in the South
China Sea dispute (see next section).126 China is the Philippines’ largest trading partner, its largest
supplier of goods, and an important source of investment.127
Tensions in the South China Sea
China has constructed and expanded military assets on several disputed features in the Spratly
Island chain, including on land features within the Philippines’ EEZ (Figure 2), and interfered
with Philippine commercial and military activity in the Philippines’ EEZ.128 Since 2019, PRC
vessels occasionally have massed around Philippine-occupied land features and harassed fishing
and coastguard vessels operating within the country’s EEZ.129
In 2013, after China gained de facto control of Scarborough Shoal following a confrontation
between PRC and Philippine ships, the Philippines sought arbitration over PRC actions under the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 2016, an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal ruled,
among other judgements, that China’s use of its “dashed-line” to assert maritime claims or
“historical rights” in the South China Sea had “no legal basis.” 130 The tribunal also ruled that
China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights by interfering with Philippine vessels, damaging
the maritime environment, and engaging in reclamation work on a feature in the Philippines’
EEZ. The United States has urged both sides to abide by the ruling, which under UNCLOS is
binding on both parties. China declared the ruling “null and void.”131
The Philippines is chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2026, and the
Marcos administration has indicated that one of its priorities will be the completion of a South
China Sea Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China. Some analysts are skeptical that the
126 Matthew Reynolds and Matthew P. Goodman, “Deny, Deflect, Deter: Countering China’s Economic Coercion,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 21, 2023; Gatra Prayandita, “Chinese Coercion in Southeast Asia:
Balancing Carrots and Sticks,” European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats Working Paper, October
26, 2023.
127 Philippine Statistics Authority, “International Merchandise Trade Statistics of the Philippines 2024,” March 26,
2025; Ji Siqi and Ralph Jennings, “China, Philippines Cautiously Flip Trade Dip as ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’
Define Relations,” South China Morning Post, August 9, 2023; William Alan Reinsch and Reena Samuel, “Rocking
the Boat: The Philippines Trade Strategy Amid Rising Geoeconomic Tensions,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, January 31, 2025.
128 The Philippines refers to the area of the South China Sea within its EEZ as the West Philippine Sea. Between 2013
and 2015, China undertook land reclamation in the Spratly Islands. According to DOD, the reclamation created around
five square miles of artificial landmasses on the seven disputed sites that China controls. Department of Defense,
Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,
May 15, 2017.
129 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12550, China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea. Department of Defense,
Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025,
December 23, 2025.
130 Permanent Court Arbitration Case No. 2013-19, “In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration Before an
Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Between
the Republic of the Philippines and The People’s Republic of China, Award of 12 July 2016.” Separately, in 2023,
China updated its “standard” map to include a 10-dash line, which has a dash off the eastern coast of Taiwan, to
demarcate its maritime claims. Council on Foreign Relations, “China’s Maritime Disputes: 1895-2024,”
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinas-maritime-disputes.
131 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of
the Republic of the Philippines,” July 12, 2016.
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PRC will be willing to limit its freedom of action through any binding agreement, which has been
on ASEAN’s agenda since 2002.132
Figure 2. South China Sea, Disputed Features, and EDCA Sites
Source: CRS. Boundaries from the Department of State.
Since 2023, the China Coast Guard (CCG) and PRC maritime militia vessels have escalated their
interference with Philippine boats attempting to conduct resupply missions to Second Thomas
Shoal in the Spratly Islands chain. The Philippines posts a small cadre of its marines on a nowderelict Philippine Navy ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, which it grounded on the shoal in 1999 as
part of its efforts to assert its maritime claims. In 2023 and 2024, PRC harassment resulted in at
least three collisions between PRC and Philippine vessels, including one in which CCG personnel
boarded a Philippine boat.133 In July 2024, the two sides agreed to de-escalate tensions and allow
the resupply of the Sierra Madre.134 The Philippines has successfully resupplied the ship since
then, and the two countries reaffirmed the agreement in January 2025.135
132 Bianka Venkataramani, “With the Philippines as ASEAN Chair, a South China Sea Agreement Is Unlikely to Be
Concluded in 2026,” Chatham House, December 9, 2025; Monica Sato, “Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Philippines,
ASEAN, and the South China Sea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 7, 2025.
133 Frances Mangosing, “China Ships Ram, Tow PH Vessels at Ayungin,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 18, 2024; “A
Timeline of Clashes Between China and the Philippines in South China Sea, Following Latest Ship Collision,”
Associated Press, June 17, 2024; Jim Gomez, “Philippines Says a Coast Guard Ship and Supply Boat Were Rammed
by Chinese Vessels at Disputed Shoal,” ABC News, October 21, 2023.
134 Carl Thayer, “The State of the South China Sea: Coercion at Sea, Slow Progress on a Code of Conduct,” The
Diplomat, January 27, 2025.
135 Carl Thayer, “The State of the South China Sea: Coercion at Sea, Slow Progress on a Code of Conduct,” The
Diplomat, January 27, 2025; Sam Beltran, “‘It’s a Win’: Philippines, China Uphold South China Sea Deal on Resupply
Missions,” South China Morning Post, January 21, 2025.
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In April 2024, the Philippines deployed its largest coast guard vessel, the BRP Teresa Magbanua,
to Sabina Shoal, an unoccupied feature in the Spratlys, responding to reports of crushed coral.136
China responded by sending CCG vessels, which later rammed Philippine Coast Guard boats and
prevented the resupply of the BRP Teresa Magbanua. The Philippine vessel withdrew in
September, citing bad weather, lack of supplies, and a sick crew.137
Since 2012, China has harassed and blocked Philippine fishing boats operating near Scarborough
Shoal, a traditional fishing area for both countries. On August 11, 2025, two PRC vessels—a navy
destroyer and a CCG cutter that was deploying a water cannon—collided while chasing a
Philippine Coast Guard ship. A U.S. Navy destroyer conducted a Freedom of Navigation
operation at the shoal two days later.138 In 2024, incidents near Scarborough Shoal included closeproximity aerial maneuvers by PRC fighter jets around Philippine military and civilian aircraft,
the deployment of China’s largest coast guard ship, and the use of a water cannon on Philippine
vessels delivering provisions to Philippine fishermen near the shoal.139
The Philippines and Taiwan
Concerns over the Philippines’ potential role in a Taiwan contingency—particularly given
geographic proximity—has driven the expansion of unofficial relations between the Philippines
and Taiwan under Marcos. The Philippines does not maintain official relations with Taiwan,
which formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC); the Philippines adopted a “one-China”
policy in 1975.140
While military ties remain sensitive due to the unofficial nature of the relationship, reporting
indicates that security cooperation between Taiwan and the Philippines is increasing, including
closed-door forums, combined coast guard patrols, and Taiwan military observers attending a
U.S.-Philippine exercise.141 During a trip to India in August 2025, Marcos stated that there was
“no way that the Philippines can stay out of” a possible conflict between the PRC and the United
States over Taiwan, noting Taiwan’s geographical proximity and the presence of Filipino workers
in Taiwan.142 PRC media responded by warning the Philippines to avoid “playing with fire” and
interfering with China’s “internal affairs.”143 In recent years, Marcos and other Philippine officials
136 Meredith Chen, “China Says Its Ships Didn’t Damage South China Sea Reef, but Philippine Coastguard Did,” South
China Morning Post, August 30, 2024.
137 John Eric Mendoza, “‘Surprise of 2024’: Escoda Shoal in West PH Sea Is New Flashpoint,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, December 27, 2024.
138 Jim Gomez, “US Briefly Deploys 2 Warships to a Disputed South China Sea Shoal After Chinese Collision,”
Associated Press, August 13, 2025.
139 Jennifer Jett, “U.S. Condemns ‘Dangerous’ Chinese Maneuvers After Close Encounter with Philippine Plane,” NBC
News, February 19, 2025; Jeoffrey Maitem, “China’s ‘Monster’ Coastguard Ship Tests Philippines’ South China Sea
Resolve,” South China Morning Post, January 7, 2025; Jim Gomez, “Philippines Says China’s Coast Guard Fired
Water Cannons and Sideswiped Its Patrol Vessel,” Associated Press, December 4, 2024.
140 In the 1975 Philippines-PRC Joint Communiqué, the Philippine government “recognizes the [PRC] as the sole legal
government of China” and “fully understands and respects the position of the Chinese Government that there is but one
China and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory.” The Marcos Administration reaffirmed the Philippines’
“one-China” policy in 2024. “Joint Communique of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (Peking, June 9, 1975),” November 15, 2000; Department of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, “Statement on the Philippines’ One China Policy,” January 14, 2024.
141 Rebecca Tan, Frances Mangosing, and Pei-Lin Wu, “The Philippines Is Quietly Working with Taiwan to Counter
China,” Washington Post, July 14, 2025; Franco Jose C. Baroña, “PH Eyes Military Ties with Taiwan,” Manila Times,
May 1, 2025.
142 Firstpost, “War Over Taiwan and the Philippines: Firstpost Interview Continues to Make Waves,” August 11, 2025.
143 Li Yang, “Absurd Logic of Manila’s Game of Flames Belies Its Assigned Role,” China Daily, August 11, 2025.
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have been more willing to discuss publicly the possibility and implications of conflict in the
Taiwan Strait.144
In April 2025, the Philippines eased restrictions on official travel between Taiwan and the
Philippines to encourage economic, trade, and investment ties, though it continues to prohibit
high-level interactions.145 In the past decade, Taiwan has sought to expand relations with IndoPacific partners, including the Philippines, and these efforts have yielded deepening trade and
commercial ties and increasing people-to-people exchanges, including expanded tourism.146
Human Rights Concerns in the Philippines
According to the Department of State, human rights concerns in the Philippines include arbitrary
or unlawful killings, police impunity, serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media
freedom, and threats and violence against labor activists.147 Former President Duterte’s anti-drug
campaign resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings between 2016 and 2022; estimates of
anti-drug campaign-related deaths during this period range from 6,252 (the official tally) to
30,000.148 While Marcos has touted his “bloodless war on dangerous drugs,” human rights groups
have documented continued abuses, including extrajudicial killings, and a lack of accountability
for former Duterte administration officials and police.149 In addition to the Duterte arrest, the ICC
is pursuing investigations against various officials from Duterte’s administration. Philippine
courts have convicted eight police officers for their actions in the drug war.150 In 2016, the State
Department shifted U.S. funding away from police drug control programs in response.151
Subsequent funds have been directed toward drug demand reduction, maritime law enforcement,
and transnational interdiction.152
144 Jing Bo-jiun, “Regional Economic Integration and Taiwan’s Unofficial Relations with the Philippines,” National
Bureau of Asian Research, June 23, 2025.
145 Office of the President of the Philippines, “Memorandum Circular No. 82,” April 15, 2025. For discussion of the
order, see Thomas Shattuck, “Signals from the South: An Opening for Stronger Philippines-Taiwan Ties,” Global
Taiwan Brief, vol. 10, no. 10 (May 2025).
146 Jing “Regional Economic Integration and Taiwan’s Unofficial Relations with the Philippines”; Reymund B. Flores,
“Strengthening the Fabric, Tightening the Bonds: Taiwan’s Soft Power in the Philippines,” National Bureau of Asian
Research, June 23, 2025.
147 Department of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines, August 12, 2025; Freedom
House, “Freedom in the World 2024.”
148 Republic of the Philippines, Office of the President, Dangerous Drugs Board, “#RealNumbersPH Year 6,” at
https://ddb.gov.ph/realnumbersph/. The official tally of “persons who died during anti-drug operations” covers the time
period of July 1, 2016, to May 31, 2022. Ted Regencia, “Arrested on ICC Warrant: What Was Duterte’s ‘War on
Drugs’?” Al Jazeera, March 11, 2025.
149 Alexis Romero, “Marcos Touts ‘Bloodless’ Drug War, No Extermination,” The Philippine Star, July 23, 2024; Joel
F. Ariate Jr., Aidrielle Raymundo, and Vincent Halog, “The 2024 Dahas Report: More Reported Drug-Related Killings
in 2024 Than in 2023,” VERA Files, January 14, 2025; Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Marcos Rights Gains Fall
Short,” January 16, 2025.
150 Republic of the Philippines Department of Justice, “Remulla Hails Conviction of 4 Killer Cops in 2016 Drug Bust,”
June 19, 2024; “Philippine Court Convicts 4 Police Officers for Killings in Duterte Drug War,” BenarNews, June 18,
2024.
151 Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing—November 28, 2016,” November 28, 2016.
152 “Leahy Laws” prohibit provision of U.S. security assistance to foreign security forces when there is credible
information that a recipient has committed “a gross violation of human rights.” See CRS In Focus IF10743, The
Philippines: War on Drugs and Human Rights Concerns, by Thomas Lum, Liana W. Rosen, and Ben Dolven.
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Considerations for Congress
Strategic Interests
Members of Congress have demonstrated support for bolstering security ties between the United
States and countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines, by appropriating funds
for maritime domain awareness efforts and authorizing various initiatives in successive National
Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the IndoPacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI).153
Given ongoing interest in the Philippines as it relates to U.S. strategic interests in the region,
Congress may evaluate U.S.-Philippines defense cooperation, including how U.S. funds are used
to address AFP capability gaps and shortfalls. Congress may consider, in particular, how U.S.
security assistance is apportioned between the AFP’s areas of need, including maritime domain
awareness, land-based capabilities, and counterterrorism.
The South China Sea Disputes and Maritime Domain Awareness
Through the MSI, the United States has sought to improve the ability of the Philippines, Vietnam,
and other Southeast and South Asian countries to maintain maritime domain awareness and patrol
their exclusive economic zones (EEZs).154 Some Members of Congress have sought to ensure
continued U.S. financial and military support for the AFP, the Philippine Coast Guard, and their
ability to respond to and defend against PRC armed aggression in the South China Sea.155
As the United States and the Philippines have expressed common interests in maintaining a “free
and open Indo-Pacific,” Congress may analyze the U.S. approach to supporting Philippine efforts
to protect its sovereignty and interests in its maritime domain. Congress may debate whether to
develop or wield policy tools, such as official statements, indicating their views on the 2016
UNCLOS tribunal decision that China’s territorial claims have no legal basis; whether and, if so,
how to support multilateral diplomatic efforts to counter PRC assertiveness in the South China
Sea; increasing, decreasing, or otherwise adjusting security assistance to the Philippines; or
ratifying UNCLOS.156
153 For more on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), see CRS In Focus IF12303, The Pacific Deterrence Initiative,
by Luke A. Nicastro. The PDI was established in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2021 (H.R.
6395, §1251) and extended in the NDAA for FY2026 (S. 1071, §1251). The Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative
was redesignated as such (and expanded and extended) in the NDAA for FY2019 (H.R. 5515, §1252); previously, the
initiative was formerly the South China Sea Initiative in the NDAA for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92, §1263) and the Southeast
Asia Maritime Security Initiative in the NDAA for FY2017 (S. 2943, §1289). The NDAA for FY2022 (P.L. 117-81,
§1241) extended the MSI through 2027.
154 According to UNCLOS, an EEZ extends up to “200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.” A territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles. An EEZ does not confer sovereign rights. The
text of the treaty can be found at https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
155 See, for examples, S.Res. 834 and H.Res. 843 the 118th Congress and S.Res. 409 in the 119th Congress.
156 Some Members of Congress have sponsored legislation calling on the U.S. Senate to ratify UNLCOS, such as
S.Res. 331 in the 119th Congress and H.Res. 361 in the 117th Congress. Policymakers and experts have debated the
effectiveness of ratifying the agreement in furthering U.S. interests, including in the South China Sea. For various
perspectives on the value of U.S. ratification of UNCLOS, see James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, “Up for Debate:
Should the U.S. Ratify UNCLOS?” Center for Maritime Strategy, December 26, 2023; Robert Beckman, “On the
United States, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and US Freedom of Navigation Operations,” ISEAS
Perspective 2002/73, July 18, 2022.
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Human Rights Concerns
The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA, P.L. 115-409; expired in 2023) supported a
multipronged U.S. strategy for advancing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” including the
promotion of human rights in the Indo-Pacific region. Foreign assistance appropriations,
including legislation for FY2024 (P.L. 118-47), restricted counternarcotics assistance to the
Philippines “except for drug demand reduction, maritime law enforcement, or transnational
interdiction.”157 Pursuant to appropriations legislation, in November 2025 the State Department
submitted a report to the Committees on Appropriations assessing the extent to which the AFP
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) are respecting human rights and the rule of law.158
Congress may assess U.S. assistance for strengthening oversight of police and military forces and
enhancing the efficacy of the judicial system. Previous U.S. assistance, for example, have
included efforts to improve governance, strengthen the rule of law, and improve judicial
processes.159 Given past and ongoing congressional restrictions on U.S. security assistance to the
Philippines due to human rights concerns, Congress may consider the extent to which the
restrictions affected human rights conditions in the Philippines and on U.S.-Philippine relations,
and deliberate the merits of such restrictions.
Counterterrorism Efforts
Groups affiliated with the Islamic State (IS, alt. ISIS/ISIL), including ISIS-East Asia, remained
active in 2022, according to the U.S. Department of State, and in 2023, ISIS-affiliated militants
claimed responsibility for a bombing attack on a Catholic mass in Marawi.160 The blast, which
killed four worshippers, followed a series of Philippine military operations against ISIS-affiliated
groups in the region.161
Congress may assess the current status of terrorist threats to U.S. interests in the southern
Philippines and the appropriate type and extent of support for the AFP’s counterterrorism efforts,
the delicate political arrangement preserving some stability in Bangsamoro, conflict recovery
efforts, and/or long-term economic development in the region, if any.162
U.S.-Philippines Economic Relations
Given China’s economic engagement and influence in the region and Philippine interest in
strengthening economic ties with the United States, Congress may consider whether and to what
157 P.L. 118-47, §7043(h)(2), specifically limits counternarcotics assistance for the Philippines under the heading
“International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement.” This language was carried over in FY2025 legislation via
continuing resolution (P.L. 119-4) and repeated in FY2026 appropriations legislation (H.R. 7006).
158 Department of State, “Report to Congress on Steps Taken by the Government of the Philippines During the
Preceding 12 Months to Document and Prosecute Human Rights Abuses Committed by the Philippines Police and
Military,” November 2025. This report is mandated in S.Rept. 118-71 through the Further Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, §7019(e)) and the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2025 (P.L. 119-4).
159 See, for example, USAID’s Judicial Strengthening to Improve Court Effectiveness (JUSTICE) Project, at
https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/philippines/partnership-growth-pfg/justice.
160 In 2018, the U.S. State Department added ISIS-Philippines (renamed ISIS-East Asia in 2020) to its foreign terrorist
organization (FTO) list. Department of State, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, https://www.state.gov/
foreign-terrorist-organizations/.
161 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2023; Karen Lema and Neil Jerome Morales, “Islamic State
Claims Responsibility for Deadly Philippine Bombing,” Reuters, December 4, 2023.
162 For more on Bangsamoro and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, see footnote 12;
International Crisis Group, “Peace in the Philippines: The Bangsamoro’s Moment of Truth,” no. 355, March 10, 2026.
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extent to promote closer U.S.-Philippines economic ties and provide alternatives to PRC
infrastructure financing, including through bilateral trade arrangements, the U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation, initiatives to offset the effects of PRC economic coercion
attempts, or other programs and financial entities.
Selected Legislation in the 118th and 119th
Congresses
•
•
•
163
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60)
requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to
submit annual reports on enhancing the U.S. defense relationship with the
Philippines, U.S. spending on assistance to the Philippines, and specific
capabilities needed to modernize the defense capabilities of the AFP and the
AFP’s absorptive capacity. The NDAA also authorizes direct loans of up to $1
billion for FMF loan programs through FY2030 and annual grant assistance to
the Philippines not more than $500 million each year through FY2030.163 Aspects
of this language stem from the Philippines Enhanced Resilience Act (PERA) Act
(S. 4097), introduced in the Senate in the 118th Congress. The Joint Explanatory
Statement for the FY2026 NDAA further directs the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, “to develop and implement a
multiyear plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities
by the Philippines and to engage with the Philippines in a series of combined
training, exercises, and planning activities to enhance the United StatesPhilippines defense relationship.”164
The Consolidated Appropriations, 2026 (Division F of P.L. 119-75) would
make available for assistance for the Philippines not less than $100 million in
FMF and not less than $80.3 million under the heading National Security
Investment Programs. According to the House report (H.Rept. 119-217)
associated with the original State appropriations bill (H.R. 4779), these funds are
intended “to help modernize the alliance, strengthen deterrence, and continue to
support a prosperous, secure Philippines.” That report also states that “the
Committee notes the ongoing threat to the Philippines posed by the PRC’s
campaign of intimidation and maritime occupation in the South China Sea.”
The FY2026 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (Division A of P.L.
119-75) includes an increase of $40 million for the Philippines within the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s International Security Cooperation
Programs (ISCP) Account.165 The Joint Explanatory Statement further requires
the DOD to submit to Congress a spend plan, a report on PRC threats to the
security of the Philippines, and a plan for enhanced security cooperation.166
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60, §1269 and §1270).
164 The “Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026” can
be found at https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy26_ndaa_joint_explanatory_statement.pdf.
165 The ISCP account is used to fund activities under 10 U.S.C. §332, §333 and Section 1263 (the Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security Initiative) of P.L. 114-92.
166 The Joint Explanatory Statement for FY2026 Defense appropriations can be found at
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fy26_def_jes.pdf.
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•
•
The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2024 (P.L. 118-47,
§7043(h)(2)), restricted funding under the heading “International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement” to the Philippines “except for drug demand
reduction, maritime law enforcement, or transnational interdiction.”167 This
wording was carried over into the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and
Extensions Act, 2025 (P.L. 119-4) and is included in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division F of P.L. 119-75, §7043(h)).
Some Members of Congress have sought to express support for continued U.S.
financial and military assistance for the AFP, the Philippine Coast Guard, and
their ability to counter PRC vessels in the South China Sea. Examples include
S.Res. 834 and H.Res. 843 in the 118th Congress and S.Res. 409 in the 119th
Congress.
Author Information
William Piekos
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Disclaimer
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167 P.L. 118-47, §7043(h)(2), limits counternarcotics assistance for the Philippines under the heading “International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement.”
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