FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
Congressional research reportFeb 10, 2022
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal
Pandemic Response
February 10, 2022
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R47048
SUMMARY
FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal
Pandemic Response
On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared a nationwide emergency under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288
as amended), authorizing assistance administered by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). Five days later, the President notified then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor
that the agency would assume leadership of the federal pandemic response effort—the first
known instance of FEMA serving in such a role for a public health incident.
The Stafford Act declarations and FEMA’s role in the pandemic response changed the scope of
the statute and the agency. Both President Donald J. Trump and President Joseph R. Biden Jr.
activated the Stafford Act and FEMA resources in unprecedented ways to respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Former President Trump issued the first unilateral, nationwide Stafford
Act emergency declaration. Soon after, President Trump issued the first Stafford Act major
disaster declaration for an infectious disease incident, and directed FEMA to lead the federal
response. Within weeks, President Trump declared concurrent major disasters in every state and
territory, marking the first time in history that the Stafford Act was activated to simultaneously
deliver assistance for major disasters across the entire country. After assuming office in January
of 2021, President Biden expanded the scope of assistance FEMA could provide for the
pandemic, including full federal reimbursement for a wide range of ongoing emergency response
measures undertaken by state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments and healthcare
providers.
FEMA, in turn, undertook unprecedented agency-level measures to respond. FEMA activated the
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) from which it coordinates federal response
efforts, for the longest duration in its history (ongoing as of the date of publication). FEMA also
established an interagency Unified Coordination Group (UCG) to lead the response—the first
time the agency reported using such a team to manage nationwide federal response planning,
logistics, and operations. To meet the extraordinary demands of a nationwide disaster, FEMA
adapted foundational elements of its regionalized response framework, including changes to the
deployment of federal assets, the prioritization and fulfillment of requests for emergency
supplies, and communication with SLTTs. FEMA additionally coordinated novel applications of
the Defense Production Act (DPA) for pandemic response, including contracting for and
allocating scarce medical supplies, identifying anti-price-gouging and hoarding actions, and
entering agreements to coordinate information-sharing with medical supply manufacturers and
distributors. These extraordinary strains and innovations have prompted FEMA to rethink how
the agency currently responds to disasters.
R47048
February 10, 2022
Erica A. Lee, Coordinator
Analyst in Emergency
Management and Disaster
Recovery
Diane P. Horn
Analyst in Flood Insurance
and Emergency
Management
Bruce R. Lindsay
Specialist in American
National Government
William L. Painter
Specialist in Homeland
Security and
Appropriations
Lauren R. Stienstra
Section Research Manager
Shawn Reese
Analyst in Emergency
Management and
Homeland Security Policy
Elizabeth M. Webster
Analyst in Emergency
Management and Disaster
Recovery
President Trump, President Biden, and FEMA also made significant pandemic-specific changes to its flagship response and
recovery grant programs, Public Assistance and Individual Assistance. These programs are generally activated in response to
sudden-onset hazards that strike a defined geographic area, such as hurricanes or fires. Their pandemic adaptations enabled
the programs to finance assistance across the country over an extended period of time for pandemic-related lost wages, new
sheltering options, emergency food distribution, COVID-19 diagnostic testing, vaccination programs, and facility reopening
costs. The expansions of these grant programs well exceeded previous demands on the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) that funds
Stafford Act assistance. As of the end of the first quarter of FY2022, FEMA reports spending approximately $90 billion from
the DRF on the pandemic response.
FEMA’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic has raised basic questions about the purpose and capacity of the agency and the
Stafford Act. Policy issues facing Congress in the wake of these events include whether, and how, FEMA and the Stafford
Act should be activated for long-term public health incidents, the consequences of pandemic-specific activations of Stafford
Act authorities for the Disaster Relief Fund, and to what extent FEMA operational innovations should revert or continue.
Congress additionally faces questions about the nature of FEMA’s role in coordinating and implementing DPA activities for
ongoing supply-chain issues and future public health incidents.
Congressional Research Service
FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Federal Response Doctrine: FEMA’s Planned Role in Infectious Disease Incidents ..................... 3
FEMA’s Role in COVID-19 Pandemic Response .......................................................................... 6
FEMA’s Role Prior to March 13, 2020 ..................................................................................... 6
FEMA’s Role Following Stafford Act Declarations for the Pandemic ..................................... 9
Response Organizational Structure after FEMA’s Assumption of Leadership................. 12
Stakeholder Commentary on Leadership Transition ......................................................... 13
FEMA’s Pandemic Response: Key Lines of Effort ................................................................ 16
Lead Federal Agency (LFA) of the Federal Pandemic Response ..................................... 16
SLTT Emergency Management Operational Support ....................................................... 16
Public Assistance (PA) for SLTT and Nonprofit Response Efforts................................... 16
Individual Assistance (IA) for Funeral Costs, Lost Wages, and Crisis Counseling .......... 17
Supply Chain Stabilization ............................................................................................... 19
Critical Medical Supply Distribution ................................................................................ 20
National Guard Mobilization ............................................................................................ 20
Vaccination Assistance ...................................................................................................... 21
Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 23
Stafford Act Legislative Considerations.................................................................................. 23
Applicability of Stafford Act to Public Health Incidents .................................................. 23
Clarification of Roles and Leadership for Public Health Incidents .................................. 24
Adaptation of Stafford Act Public Assistance for the Pandemic ....................................... 27
Adaptation of Stafford Act Individual Assistance for the Pandemic ................................ 29
Hazard Mitigation Funding for Pandemic Stafford Act Declarations ............................... 31
FEMA Preparedness and Response Operations ...................................................................... 33
FEMA’s Public Health Preparedness Coordination.......................................................... 33
FEMA’s Preparedness Grants for Public Health Incidents ............................................... 35
Validating National Readiness: Exercises ......................................................................... 36
Pandemic Response and the Limits of FEMA’s Capacity and Expertise ......................... 37
Adapting FEMA’s Regionalized Response Structure to a Nationwide Disaster .............. 41
FEMA-Led Critical Supply Distribution .......................................................................... 42
Equity and FEMA’s Pandemic Response ......................................................................... 44
FEMA and the Defense Production Act .................................................................................. 46
Defense Production Act Coordination Issues.................................................................... 47
FEMA, the Defense Production Act, and Supply Distribution ......................................... 49
COVID-19 Spending Patterns from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) ..................................... 51
The COVID-19 Pandemic Disaster Declarations and Tapping into the DRF ................... 51
Lost Wages Assistance and Boosting FEMA’s Pandemic Involvement ........................... 54
A Catastrophic Disaster Like No Other ............................................................................ 56
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 61
Figures
Figure 1. Agency Leadership Designations in Domestic Incident Response .................................. 5
Figure 2. Authorization of Stafford Act Assistance for Pandemic-Related Costs .......................... 11
Figure 3. Organization of the Federal Coordinated Pandemic Response ...................................... 15
Congressional Research Service
FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
Figure 4. Duration of Select FEMA Lines of Effort in Federal Pandemic Response .................... 22
Figure 5. HMGP Funding for COVID-19 Disaster Declarations .................................................. 33
Figure 6. DRF Unobligated Balances and Projections, December 2019-June 2021 ..................... 52
Figure 7. Monthly Obligations for COVID-19 Disaster Declarations .......................................... 54
Figure 8. Cumulative Allocations, Obligations, and Expenditures from the DRF for
COVID-19 .................................................................................................................................. 57
Figure 9. COVID-19 DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter.................................................. 57
Figure 10. Hurricane Sandy DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter ....................................... 59
Figure 11. Hurricane Harvey DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter ..................................... 59
Figure 12. Hurricane Irma DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter ......................................... 60
Figure 13. Hurricane Maria DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter ....................................... 60
Tables
Table 1. Key Leadership Designations for Federal COVID-19 Pandemic Response ..................... 7
Table 2. Major Disaster Program Obligation Ratios ..................................................................... 55
Table A-1. Select FEMA Authorities Relevant to Federal Pandemic Response ............................ 62
Appendixes
Appendix A. Key FEMA Authorities for Pandemic Response ...................................................... 62
Appendix B. Bibliography—Selected Resources.......................................................................... 65
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 67
Congressional Research Service
FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
Introduction
On January 20, 2020, the United States documented its first known case of the disease caused by
the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2.1 In the weeks and months following, federal officials
activated multiple emergency powers, established interrelated response task forces and decisionmaking bodies, and enacted a series of relief bills that together constituted what is referred to as
the coordinated federal response, or whole-of-government response, to the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) outbreak and eventual pandemic.2 These actions included historic declarations
of emergency and major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended).3 The pandemic marked the first
instance in the history of the United States in which the President activated the Stafford Act to
provide nationwide assistance for the same incident; it also generated the first major disaster
declarations for a public health incident. Contrary to historical precedent, existing federal incident
response doctrine, and the primary scenarios outlined in federal pandemic response plans, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumed leadership of this coordinated
response at the direction of President Donald J. Trump on March 19, 2020.4
President Trump, and later President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., deployed FEMA and the Stafford Act in
unprecedented ways to provide nationwide assistance during the pandemic, ranging from the
distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE), to the development of a new unemployment
assistance program, to the establishment of federal vaccination sites. As lead agency for
government-wide DPA planning and coordination, FEMA Administrators also helped to
implement selected presidential invocations of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA, P.L.
81-774, as amended)5 to respond to pandemic-related supply constraints. The use of DPA during
the pandemic—including by FEMA—at times underwhelmed expectations and raised concerns
among policy experts, Members of Congress, and governors.6
1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), PanCAP Adapted: U.S. Government COVID-19 Response
Plan, Mar. 13, 2020, p. 1, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6819-covid-19-response-plan/
d367f758bec47cad361f/optimized/full.pdf (hereinafter HHS, PanCap-Adapted).
2 For an explanation of the sequence of federal emergency declarations, see CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency
and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister. A
compilation of hundreds of CRS products on various federal relief measures is available at
https://crsreports.congress.gov/resources/covid19/; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) references are
available at https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus. For an agency description of the initial federal response, see Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Pandemic Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Initial
Assessment Report, Jan. 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_covid-19-initial-assessmentreport_2021.pdf (hereinafter FEMA, Initial Assessment Report); for a perspective from nonfederal stakeholders, see
National Homeland Security Consortium (NHSC), COVID-19 Pandemic: After-Action Report, June 2021,
https://www.astho.org/COVID-19/NHSC-COVID-19-Pandemic-After-Action-Report/ (hereinafter NHSC, Pandemic
After-Action Report).
3 The Stafford Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.
4 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 4, 7, 24.
5 The Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.) confers on the President authorities to mobilize
domestic industry in service of national defense, broadly defined, including emergency preparedness and response to
natural hazards like the pandemic. For recent information on the use of the DPA for the pandemic, see FEMA, The
Defense Production Act Committee Report to Congress, Sept. 20, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/fema_DPAC-report-Defense-production-act-committee_2020.pdf. See also CRS In Focus IF11767, The
Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC): A Primer, by Michael H. Cecire.
6 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 4 and 7. See also testimony by then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor in U.S.
Congress, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Evaluating the Federal Government’s
Procurement and Distribution Strategies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, hearings, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
As noted in the following report, the pandemic compelled FEMA to rapidly adapt longstanding
components of its response operations, flagship response and recovery programs, and
coordination with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. In the words of then-FEMA
Administrator Peter Gaynor, who led FEMA in its first year of pandemic response, these
innovations reflected “tremendous creativity, ... [and] also laid bare gaps and shortcomings in [the
agency’s] plans, procedures, and policies.”7 To identify areas to improve, FEMA assessed its
initial response to the pandemic in a January 2021 report.8 Additionally, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector
General have published multiple reports examining aspects of FEMA’s pandemic response (a list
of resources may be found in Appendix B).
The 117th Congress faces questions regarding the scope and purpose of the Stafford Act, FEMA,
and the agency’s use of the DPA as all three continue to shape the coordinated federal pandemic
response. Should the Stafford Act and FEMA play central roles in future U.S. responses to
infectious disease events? How should the Stafford Act and FEMA operate in conjunction with
other emergency authorities and public health agencies in the future? How should FEMA deploy
or coordinate the DPA to manage future supply chain constraints posed by biological incidents?
Where should Congress locate responsibility for the challenges faced in the federal COVID-19
pandemic response, and how should those challenges be redressed? What, if any, authorities
should Congress provide or revise given the course of the federal response?
This report first examines FEMA’s planned and actual role in the federal COVID-19 pandemic
response. It then presents considerations for Congress focused on the Stafford Act and its public
health adaptations, FEMA’s public health preparedness and response operations, the Disaster
Relief Fund that finances Stafford Act assistance, and FEMA’s use of the DPA during the
pandemic. A comprehensive account of FEMA’s many individual lines of effort and challenges
faced during the COVID-19 pandemic exceeds the scope of this report; however, Appendix B
includes relevant resources.
Terms
Within this report, the term “state” refers to states and territories. For purposes of the Stafford Act, “‘State’
means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands” (42 U.S.C. §5122(4)).
The term “tribe” refers to Indian tribal governments. Per the Stafford Act, “[t]he term ‘Indian tribal government’
means the governing body of any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that
the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe under the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe
List Act of 1994” (42 U.S.C. §5122(6)).
6, 2020, p. 3, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Gaynor%20&%20Polowczyk-2020-06-09.pdf
(hereinafter, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution). See Shayan Karbassi, “Understanding Biden’s
Invocation of the Defense Production Act,” Mar. 4, 2021, Law Fare Blog, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
understanding-bidens-invocation-defense-production-act; H.Res. 906, Calling on the President to invoke the Defense
Production Act to respond to COVID-19, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.; and Ariel Cohen, “Pharmacies, Governors Say Biden
Test Program Is Depleting Supply,” CQ News, Jan. 27, 2022, https://plus.cq.com/doc/news-6440599?0. For
background, see GAO, Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency and Identify Future
Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues, GAO-21-108, Nov. 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21108.pdf, and CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for
Congress, by Heidi M. Peters.
7 Then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor, Introductory Letter, Initial Assessment Report, p. i.
8 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report.
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
Generally, Stafford Act assistance is requested by the “governor” (i.e., “the chief executive of any State” (42 U.S.C.
§5122(5)), or the “chief executive” (i.e., “the person who is the Chief, Chairman, Governor, President, or similar
executive official of an Indian tribal government” (42 U.S.C. §5122(12)).
The term “Recipient” in this report refers to “[a] non-Federal entity that receives a Federal award directly from a
Federal awarding agency to carry out an activity under a Federal program”; and the term “Applicant” or “PA
Applicant” refers to “the responsible entity for a [Public Assistance] project,” per FEMA, Public Assistance Program
and Policy Guide (PAPPG), FP 104-009-2, June 1, 2020, pp. 21-22, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_pappg-v4-updated-links_policy_6-1-2020.pdf (hereinafter FEMA, PAPPG 2020).
The term “COVID-19 pandemic” refers to the public health disaster caused by the COVID-19 virus in the U.S.,
including the domestic outbreak that predated the World Health Organization’s designation of pandemic on
March 11, 2020. World Health Organization, “WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on
COVID-19,” March 11, 2020, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-sopening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—11-march-2020.
Federal Response Doctrine: FEMA’s Planned Role in
Infectious Disease Incidents
This section summarizes federal plans for FEMA’s involvement in infectious disease incidents
prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in the United States to contextualize the actual role
of the agency in the COVID-19 pandemic response.
Multiple overlapping and interrelated authorities govern U.S. federal responses to domestic
hazards, including public health incidents. This report focuses on those that activate or involve
FEMA, including those tailored to biological incidents and specifically infectious disease
incidents (see Appendix A for a select list of relevant authorities).
Under these authorities, U.S. domestic incident response is organized according to a federalist
“bottom-up” framework. Federal policy envisions a “whole-of-community” approach to domestic
incident response, involving the authorities of individuals, SLTTs, private partners, and, when
warranted, federal agencies. Federal authorities provide for federal involvement only if an
incident exceeds state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) response capacity,9 and generally only
after one or more state, tribal, or territorial authorities request such involvement or assistance.10
FEMA articulates these principals in its assertion that incident preparedness, mitigation, response
and recovery are ideally “locally executed, state, tribe, and territory-managed, and federally
supported.”11
The Department of Homeland Security identifies relevant roles and responsibilities of SLTTs,
federal agencies, and private sector partners in the National Response Framework (NRF), a
strategic guide to intergovernmental incident response.12 The NRF recognizes that incidents—
9 See, for example, the President’s authority to authorize major disaster assistance under the Stafford Act following a
request from a governor or tribal chief executive “based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude
that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal
assistance is necessary” (the Stafford Act, Section 401(a); 42 U.S.C. §5170(a)).
10 One exception, invoked for COVID-19, is the power of the President to declare an emergency under the Stafford Act
Section 501(b) absent a request for assistance. Previously, this authority had been invoked for incidents involving
federal property. See CRS Insight IN11251, The Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19, by Erica A. Lee,
Bruce R. Lindsay, and Elizabeth M. Webster.
11 See, for example, FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 9.
12 The NRF was developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2005 (PKEMRA, as amended, P.L. 109-295); PKEMRA amended the Homeland Security
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
particularly nationally significant, severe incidents, such as the COVID-19 pandemic—transcend
the authorities of a single federal statute, response framework, or agency.13
Under the NRF and related domestic response plans, federal disaster response activities generally
fall under the leadership of one agency—what is referred to as the lead federal agency.14
According to the Public Health Service Act15 and federal response operations plans,16 the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is to lead federal public health response efforts
for public health incidents. Meanwhile, the Homeland Security Act and the Stafford Act identify
leadership and coordination roles for FEMA in domestic incidents that warrant federal assistance,
particularly those with Stafford Act declarations.17 FEMA interpretations of these authorities and
related presidential policy appear in Figure 1.18
Federal guidance detailing pandemic response activities, including the Pandemic Crisis Action
Plan (PanCAP; updated by FEMA in 2018) and its adaptation for the COVID-19 pandemic,
PanCAP-Adapted (released by HHS on March 13, 2020), envisioned HHS leading the federal
response.19 In its initial self-assessment, FEMA underscored
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) in order to enhance domestic incident response. Section 509 of Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act, P.L. 109-295 (6 U.S.C. §319); U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National
Response Framework, Fourth Edition, Oct. 28, 2019, pp. 22, 45, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/
NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf, (hereinafter DHS, NRF 2019); FEMA, “National Response Framework,”
https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/frameworks/response. For more information, see
CRS Report R46696, National Preparedness: A Summary and Select Issues, by Shawn Reese and Lauren R. Stienstra.
13 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen
Preparedness, GAO-21-513, Aug. 2021, p. 9, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-513, (hereinafter GAO,
Biodefense: After-Action Findings).
14 DHS, NRF 2019, p. 22.
15 The Public Health Service Act (PHSA, P.L. 78-409) provides emergency authorities the HHS Secretary may activate
in response to threat of disease or disorder. Under the PHSA, the HHS Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health
and medical response to public health emergencies and incidents covered by the National Response Plan” [succeeded
by the NRF]. Public Health Service Act §2801; 42. U.S.C. §300hh. For more information, see CRS Report R46809,
Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and
Sarah A. Lister.
16 DHS defines a biological incident as one which has “the potential to overwhelm state and local resources and for
which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to lead all federal public health and medical efforts,
deems that, in consultation with other relevant agencies, interagency support is or will be required” in interagency
guidance detailing a federal response plan for biological incidents. DHS, Biological Incident Annex to the Response
and Recovery Federal Interagency Operations Plans, Final—January 2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
2020-07/fema_incident-annex_biological.pdf, p. vii. Additionally, according to FEMA, Presidential Policy Directive 44
(PPD-44) outlines agency leadership of domestic incidents in the absence of Stafford Act declarations; under this
directive, HHS served as lead federal agency and FEMA lent support through late March, 2020. FEMA, Initial
Assessment Report, p. 23. CRS has not reviewed PPD-44, as it is not publicly available.
17 Notably, FEMA has not served as the lead federal agency in incidents with Stafford Act declarations, particularly
those relevant to the expertise of other federal agencies. For example, the President declared emergencies in New York
and New Jersey under the Stafford Act for the West Nile Virus, but the CDC served as the lead federal agency. U.S.
Congress, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
“Responding to the West Nile Virus: Public Health Implications and Federal Response,” hearing, 107th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Oct. 3, 2002, no. 107-233.
18 See, for example, Sections 402 and 502 of the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §§5170a and 5192), which authorize the
President to “direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its authorities and the resources
granted to it under Federal law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and
advisory services)” to support state and local response and recovery efforts following a Stafford Act major disaster or
an emergency, respectively. These authorities were delegated to FEMA in Executive Order 12148 and subsequent
amendments. Executive Order 12148, “Federal Emergency Management,” 44 Federal Register 43239, July 24, 1979.
19 The PanCAP and PanCAP-Adapted are not publicly available. CRS may share the documents with Members of
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
[t]he 2018 Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (PanCAP) did not envision FEMA as the agency
leading federal response for a whole-of-government response under the Stafford Act, or its
role in managing health and medical supplies and equipment for SLTT partners nationally.
FEMA regional pandemic plans either did not exist or did not account for jurisdictionspecific capabilities or deficiencies.20
However, federal pandemic plans did allow for the possibility that a situation could evolve to
warrant a different leadership structure, including one co-led by HHS and FEMA. In particular,
the PanCAP-Adapted stipulated that HHS may “request FEMA coordination support to the
overall federal response while HHS continues to lead the public health and medical response.”21
Further, the PanCAP-Adapted noted that widespread domestic transmission of the COVID-19
virus or a Stafford Act declaration might require the activation of an interagency Unified
Coordination Group (UCG) at FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center (NRCC).22
FEMA and HHS implemented variations of these proposed leadership structures in March 2020.
Figure 1. Agency Leadership Designations in Domestic Incident Response
According to FEMA’s Interpretation of Presidential Policy
Source: FEMA’s interpretation of Presidential Policy Directive 44 (PPD-44), FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p.
32. See also DHS, National Response Framework, Fourth Edition, October 28, 2019, p. 43.
Congress and congressional staff upon request.
20 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 11.
21 HHS, PanCAP-Adapted, p. 7.
22 Ibid., p. 10.
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NRF and Supporting Interagency Operations Plans
The NRF organizes federal response capabilities responsibilities under “Emergency Support Functions” (ESFs),
each of which pertains to a particular response function and designates a lead agency and supporting agencies. 23
For example, ESF-8—Public Health and Medical Services “[c]oordinates the mechanisms for assistance in response
to an actual or potential public health and medical disaster or incident.”24 The agency designated as ESF-8
Coordinator is HHS. Additional federal interagency plans and systems translate the doctrine of the NRF into
operational structures and procedures. These include:
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which outlines a flexible response management structure
and vocabulary that may be used at local, state, regional, or national levels.25 NIMS reflects the Incident
Command System (ICS), which standardizes chains of command, organizational hierarchies, resource
management and communication processes, and functional areas for field-level incident management
operations;26
the Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) align federal response tasks to specific agency roles and
responsibilities;27 FIOP “annexes,” like the Biological Incident Annex, tailor FIOPs to outline federal responses
to specific types of hazards; and
the Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (PanCAP), authored by FEMA in 2018, which adapts existing authorities and
interagency response plans to specifically address a pandemic, including the PanCAP-Adapted, which HHS
adapted specifically to guide response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
FEMA’s Role in COVID-19 Pandemic Response
FEMA’s Role Prior to March 13, 2020
To coordinate the response, President Trump first established the White House Coronavirus Task
Force, led by then-HHS Secretary Alex Azar.28 Two days later, on January 31, 2020, then-HHS
Secretary Alex Azar declared a Public Health Emergency under the Public Health Service Act
(PHSA), under which the Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health and medical response to
public health emergencies.”29 Thereafter, leadership of the expanding federal response evolved,30
as summarized in Table 1. During this time, FEMA reported that it was lending support to HHS
in its role as lead federal agency for public health response.31 According to FEMA, this support
23 DHS, NRF 2019, pp. 21-22.
24 Ibid., p. 40.
25 FEMA, National Incident Management System, Third Edition, Oct. 2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
2020-07/fema_nims_doctrine-2017.pdf.
26 Emergency Management Institute, ICS Review Document, Mar. 2018, https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/
icsresource/assets/ics%20review%20document.pdf.
27 See, for example, DHS, Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, Second Edition, Aug. 2016,
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_response-fiop.pdf; and DHS, Recovery Federal Response
Federal Interagency Operational Plan, Second Edition, Aug. 2016, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/
Recovery_FIOP_2nd_aug2016.pdf.
28 Stefanie Grisham, “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Coronavirus Task Force,” Jan. 29,
2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidentscoronavirus-task-force/.
29 PHSA, P.L. 78-410, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§201-300mm–61; HHS, “Public Health Emergency Declarations,”
2020: Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists Nationwide as the Result of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus,
January 31, 2020, https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx. The declaration was
made retroactive to January 27, 2020, and has been renewed several times.
30 For more information, see FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 23-25.
31 FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4, 2020. Provided to CRS from FEMA Office of
Congressional Research Service
6
FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
included “crisis action planning, situational awareness reporting, interagency coordination, course
of action development and logistics supply chain analysis.”32 Additionally, FEMA and HHS
collaborated to “quickly adapt” the federal government’s general pandemic response plan to
COVID-19.33 However, FEMA’s overall role appeared relatively narrow. When invited to testify
at a hearing on the federal response efforts before the Subcommittee on National Security of the
U.S. House Oversight and Reform Committee FEMA declined, responding “the Agency does not
feel as if there is much that we would be able to testify to.”34
In February, FEMA began to identify personnel to deploy for pandemic incident management,
and on March 4, 2020, FEMA reported that it was readying more than 50 teams to support
SLTTs.35 However, the agency reported that it was not preparing for a Stafford Act declaration
and reasserted that HHS was the lead federal agency for the federal government’s public health
response to the pandemic.36 Additionally, FEMA indicated to Congress that it was not a part of
the White House Coronavirus Task Force at this time.37
Table 1. Key Leadership Designations for Federal COVID-19 Pandemic Response
Relevant to FEMA’s Role
Date
Authority
Jan. 29,
2020
Various, including
explicitly the
National
Biodefense
Strategy, National
Security
Presidential
Memorandum
(NSPM) 14.38
Leadership
Designation
Secretary of HHS to lead
federal response as chair
of White House
Coronavirus Task Force.
Summary
President Trump announced the formation of the
White House Coronavirus Task Force, which was
“charged ... with leading the United States
Government response,” and was to be “led by
Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar,
and ... coordinated through the National Security
Council.”39 The announcement referenced the
National Biodefense Strategy, which along with NSPM14 established a leadership structure chaired by the
HHS Secretary for implementing the Strategy.40
Congressional and Legislative Affairs.
32 Ibid.
33 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 23.
34 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, “FEMA Briefs Oversight Committee on
Administration’s Coronavirus Response,” Mar. 20, 2020, https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/fema-briefsoversight-committee-on-administration-s-coronavirus-response.
35 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 83; FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4,
2020.
36 FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4, 2020.
37 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, “FEMA Briefs Oversight Committee on
Administration’s Coronavirus Response,” Mar. 20, 2020, https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/fema-briefsoversight-committee-on-administration-s-coronavirus-response.
38 HHS, “Posting of the National Security Presidential Memorandum 14, ‘Support for National Biodefense,’” notice, 83
Federal Register 52841-52843, Oct. 18, 2018.
39 Stefanie Grisham, “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Coronavirus Task Force,” Jan. 29,
2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidentscoronavirus-task-force/.
40 HHS, National Biodefense Strategy, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/biodefense-strategy/Pages/goals-andobjectives.aspx; Multiple Agencies, National Biodefense Strategy, Sept. 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf; HHS, “National Security Presidential Memorandum
14, ‘Support for National Biodefense,’” notice, 83 Federal Register 52841-52843, Oct. 18, 2018.
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
Date
Authority
Leadership
Designation
Summary
The establishment of the White House Coronavirus
Task Force modified the incident response
structures established in federal pandemic response
plans.41
Jan. 31,
2020
The Public Health
Service Act.42
Secretary of HHS to lead
federal public health and
medical response to
COVID-19 public health
emergency.
Then-Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Alex Azar declared a Public Health Emergency under
the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) for the
COVID-19 pandemic, which provides that the HHS
Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health and
medical response to public health emergencies and
incidents covered by the National Response Plan”
[succeeded by the NRF].43
Feb. 26,
2020
Various, including
NRF.44
Vice President to lead
whole-of-government
response.
President Trump announced that Vice President
Michael Pence would lead the coordinated federal
response and ESF-8.45 Secretary Azar confirmed in
the same remarks that he would continue to serve as
Chairman of the White House Coronavirus Task
Force.46
March
13,
2020
The Stafford Act;
Public Health
Service Act,
PanCap-Adapted:
Biological Incident
Annex to NRF.
FEMA to lead provision
of Stafford Act
assistance; HHS to lead
overall federal pandemic
response.
President Trump declared a Stafford Act emergency
nationwide, specifying that “Administrator Gaynor
shall coordinate and direct other Federal agencies in
providing needed assistance under the Stafford Act,
subject to the Department of Health and Human
Services’ role as the lead Federal agency for the
Federal Government’s response to COVID-19.”47
March
18-20,
2020
The Stafford Act.
FEMA to serve as lead
federal agency of the
whole-of-government
pandemic response.
President Trump and Vice President Pence notified
then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor that the
agency would assume the role of LFA of the
coordinated federal response. HHS would continue
to lead the public health response.48
41 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings, p. 26; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 34.
42 PPD-44 is not a public document and was not available for CRS review for the writing of this report. However,
FEMA reported that “PPD-44 enhances the ability of the federal government to respond to domestic incidents by
providing for the timely identification of a lead federal agency (LFA) to oversee the federal response prior to a national
disaster declaration and by ensuring that an appropriate incident management capability is available. Under this
authority, FEMA supported HHS with incident management capability for the COVID-19 response,” prior to the
Stafford Act declarations. FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 23.
43 Public Health Service Act §2801; 42. U.S.C. §300hh.
44 The National Response Framework specifies that “[r]egardless of the type of incident, the President leads the Federal
Government response effort to ensure that the necessary resources are applied quickly and efficiently to large-scale and
catastrophic incidents.” (DHS, NRF 2019, p. 34).
45 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task
Force in Press Conference,” Feb. 27, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-conference/.
46 Ibid.
47 Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, to then-Acting Secretary Chad Wolf, then-Secretary
Steven Mnuchin, Secretary Azar, and then-Administrator Peter Gaynor, Mar. 13, 2020,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-emergency-determinationstafford-act/ (hereinafter President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19”).
48 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 7.
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
Date
Authority
Leadership
Designation
March
20,
2020
National Response
Framework;
PanCap-Adapted;
Biological Incident
Annex to NRF.
Unified Coordination
Group (UCG) to serve
as interagency decisionmaking body for federal
pandemic response.
Following FEMA’s assumption of the role of LFA,
FEMA and HHS established the UCG “for decisionmaking.” Principals included the FEMA Administrator,
the HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response (ASPR), the HHS Assistant Secretary for
Health, and Director of the Influenza Division in the
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory
Diseases at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC).49
January
20,
2021
Various, including
NRF.50
President Joseph R.
Biden establishes the
White House COVID19 Response Team.
President Biden established the White House
COVID-19 Response Team, coordinated by
appointee Jeffrey Zients.51
Summary
Source: CRS Analysis of Federal Pandemic Response structure leadership designations, and relevant authorities
identified in Table A-1.
FEMA’s Role Following Stafford Act Declarations for the Pandemic
On March 13, 2020, President Trump unilaterally declared an emergency pursuant to Stafford Act
Section 501(b), authorizing assistance for COVID-19 response efforts for all U.S. states,
territories, and the District of Columbia.52 This emergency declaration for the pandemic
authorized a single form of FEMA assistance: Public Assistance (PA) for emergency protective
measures.53 Subsequently, governors and tribal chief executives submitted requests for major
disaster declarations pursuant to Stafford Act Section 401 for the COVID-19 pandemic, and
President Trump declared major disasters for all 50 states, five territories, the District of
Columbia, and the Seminole Tribe of Florida. President Biden later approved the major disaster
declaration requests of the Navajo Nation and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians for the COVID19 pandemic.54
49 Ibid., pp. 24-25, 32.
50 The National Response Framework specifies that “[r]egardless of the type of incident, the President leads the Federal
Government response effort to ensure that the necessary resources are applied quickly and efficiently to large-scale and
catastrophic incidents.” (DHS, NRF 2019, p. 34).
51 President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Executive Order on Organizing and Mobilizing the United States Government to
Provide a Unified and Effective Response to Combat COVID-19 and to Provide United States Leadership on Global
Health and Security,” Executive Order 13987, Jan. 20, 2021, 86 Federal Register 7019-7021.
52 President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.”
53 PA provides supplemental grants or direct assistance (e.g., personnel, materials, operations) on a cost-share basis to
subfederal governments and eligible nonprofits for costs incurred for specific activities, in this case, eligible emergency
response measures. FEMA developed multiple iterations of guidance outlining eligible costs and measures. Current
guidance is available at FEMA. Eligible measures are available in pandemic-specific guidance at FEMA, “Public
Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance,” https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specificguidance-covid-19-declarations. PA for emergency assistance is authorized pursuant to Section 502 of the Stafford Act
(P.L. 93-288); 42 U.S.C. §5192. President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.”
54 Specific presidential declarations of major disaster for COVID-19 are listed at FEMA, “COVID-19 Disaster
Declarations,” https://www.fema.gov/coronavirus/disaster-declarations, and the FEMA “Disasters” webpage, available
at https://www.fema.gov/disasters. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public
Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R. Lindsay; and CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major
Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister.
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
All major disaster declarations reauthorized PA for emergency protective measures, and most
major disaster declarations authorized Individual Assistance (IA)—Crisis Counseling Assistance
and Training Program (CCP) in the President’s initial declaration.55 Subsequently, President
Trump authorized the FEMA Administrator to approve CCP requests, and through the program,
46 states, Washington, DC, and four territories applied for and received CCP awards.56 Later, on
August 8, 2020, President Trump invoked IA statutory authorities to authorize FEMA to expend
up to $44 billion from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) for the Lost Wages Assistance (LWA)
program to provide supplemental lost wages payments to individuals receiving unemployment
insurance.57 Congress also later authorized Funeral Assistance for the pandemic under the
Stafford Act declarations.58 Upon assumption of office in January 2021, President Biden
increased the federal cost share for PA-eligible activities from 75% to 100% and expanded the
range of work eligible for reimbursement. Figure 2 provides a chronology of the activation of
Stafford Act authorities for the pandemic.
55 The Crisis Counseling Program (CCP) provides community-based outreach and psycho-educational services to
support individuals and communities recovering from disasters. FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Authority to Approve
Crisis Counseling During Coronavirus,” press release, Apr. 28, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/femaadministrator-authority-approve-crisis-counseling-during-coronavirus; FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Approves 30
States for Crisis Counseling,” Release HQ-20-129, May 2, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200726/femaadministrator-approves-30-states-crisis-counseling.
56 According to the GAO, FEMA awarded “about $467 million to 46 states, Washington, DC, and four U.S. territories
[Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands] via the Crisis
Counseling Assistance and Training Program.” The states of Alaska, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Wyoming did not
apply for CCP assistance (Alaska also withdrew its application for the CCP Regular Service Program). The Navajo
Nation’s CCP Regular Services Program application is under review (as of December 2021), and the Poarch Band
Creek Indians did not apply for CCP assistance (GAO, Behavioral Health and COVID-19: Higher-Risk Populations
and Related Federal Relief Funding, GAO-22-104437, December 2021, pp. 74-76 (Appendix V), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-22-104437.pdf).
57 The Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program includes a 25% nonfederal cost sharing requirement funded by states
and territories. It was authorized as a form of Other Needs Assistance under Stafford Act Section 408(e)(2) (42 U.S.C.
§5174(e)(2)). President Donald J. Trump, “Memorandum on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program for
Major Disaster Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019,” Aug. 8, 2020,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-authorizing-needs-assistance-program-majordisaster-declarations-related-coronavirus-disease-2019/. For additional information on LWA, see CRS Insight
IN11492, COVID-19: Supplementing Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Federal Pandemic Unemployment
Compensation vs. Lost Wages Assistance), by Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker.
58 Congress authorized Funeral Assistance first through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 and then in the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA); on the date of ARPA’s enactment, the President amended the declarations
for the COVID-19 pandemic to add Funeral Assistance for the declared states, territories, and District of Columbia. For
additional information on COVID-19 Funeral Assistance, see CRS Insight IN11582, FEMA Funeral Assistance for
COVID-19, by Elizabeth M. Webster.
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
Figure 2. Authorization of Stafford Act Assistance for Pandemic-Related Costs
Sources: CRS interpretation of pandemic-specific PA and IA guidance, Stafford Act declarations, and relevant
presidential memoranda.
Notes:
a. The President granted multiple extensions of the 100% federal cost share for PA and may issue additional
extensions. FEMA announced that PA will be available for eligible pandemic-related measures indefinitely; the
agency will provide at least thirty days’ notice prior to the program’s conclusion. According to current policy,
FEMA will cover 100% of eligible costs through July 1, 2022, after which it will cover 90% of eligible costs.
b. Congress authorized Funeral Assistance first through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 and then in
the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA); on the date of ARPA’s enactment, the President amended the
declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic to add Funeral Assistance for the declared states, territories, and
District of Columbia.
The emergency and major disaster declarations for the pandemic were unprecedented in several
respects. The emergency declaration marked the first time that a President had declared a Stafford
Act emergency for all jurisdictions nationwide. Additionally, the COVID-19 nationwide
emergency declaration marked the first time the president issued such an expansive declaration
absent a governor or tribal chief executive’s request, as is generally required for Stafford Act
declarations except for very rare incidents determined to be of “primary Federal responsibility.”59
Additionally, while Presidents have occasionally declared emergencies under Stafford Act for
public health incidents, the major disaster declarations for the pandemic were the first to be issued
for any public health incident under current law.60
Initially, in the March 13, 2020 Stafford Act declaration of emergency, President Trump explained
that:
[FEMA] Administrator Gaynor shall coordinate and direct other Federal agencies in
providing needed assistance under the Stafford Act, subject to the Department of Health
59 Stafford Act Section 501(b); 42 U.S.C. §5170. For discussion, see Elizabeth Goiteen, “Emergency Powers, Real and
Imagined: How President Trump Used and Failed to Use Presidential Authority in the COVID-19 Crisis,” Journal of
National Security Law and Policy, vol. 11, no. 27 (2020), pp. 51-53; for background, see CRS Insight IN11229,
Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R. Lindsay; and CRS Report R46809,
Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and
Sarah A. Lister.
60 Ibid.
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
and Human Services’ role as the lead Federal agency for the Federal Government’s
response to COVID-19.61
However, on March 18, 2020, President Trump and Vice President Pence then directed FEMA to
assume leadership of the coordinated federal response. FEMA assumed this role on March 19,
2020.62 The following description of FEMA’s planned and observed role in the federal pandemic
response draws upon a number of interrelated authorities in statute, regulations, and interagency
guidance, as summarized in Appendix A.
Response Organizational Structure after FEMA’s Assumption of Leadership
On March 20, 2020, FEMA and HHS established the Unified Coordination Group, consisting of
four principals (representing FEMA and HHS) whose responsibility included “operational
command, leadership, and decision making for the coordinated federal response,” according to
the GAO.63 FEMA reported that, as lead federal agency for the coordinated federal response, the
agency also led the UCG.64 The FEMA Administrator and HHS Secretary additionally served on
the White House Coronavirus Task Force, which oversaw the coordinated federal response.
Following FEMA’s assumption of leadership, HHS transferred eight operational task forces it had
established to support the federal response from the HHS Secretary’s Operations Center to the
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) at FEMA headquarters.65 The task forces
represented interagency efforts dedicated to:
Community Based Testing;
Data Management;
Laboratory Diagnostics;
Healthcare System Resilience;
Medical Countermeasures;
Supply Chain Stabilization;
Community Mitigation Measures;
and Continuity of Operations.66
Each task force was responsible for securing resources to support the federal pandemic response
and to coordinate specific lines of effort. For example, the Community Based Testing Task Force,
led by HHS with support from FEMA, was responsible for the creation of federally-supported
community-based testing sites to increase COVID-19 testing nationwide.67 According to FEMA,
these task forces were initially led by HHS and Department of Defense (DOD) subject matter
experts. The task forces did not correspond to the existing structure and functions of the NRCC,
61 President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.”
62 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 7.
63 Note that the GAO identified three principals in its June 2020 report on the federal pandemic response; FEMA later
identified four principals in its Initial Assessment Report. GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities to Improve Federal
Response and Recovery Efforts, pp. 12-13 (hereinafter GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities); FEMA, Initial Assessment
Report, p. 25.
64 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 35.
65 Ibid., p. 37.
66 For a thorough description of the responsibilities and key tasks of each task force, see GAO, COVID-19:
Opportunities, pp. 91-92.
67 GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, p. 91; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 38-39.
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
which is modeled off of the NRF and NIMS (National Incident Management System) guidance
(see textbox on p. 6 for more information). As a result, existing NRCC response functions and the
pandemic-specific task forces operated in parallel.68 See Figure 3 for a visualization of the
federal pandemic response organization according to FEMA.69
As FEMA describes, “[f]or any given incident, FEMA disaster response begins and ends with the
affected [FEMA] Region in the lead.”70 In line with this posture, FEMA’s ten Regional Response
Coordination Centers (RRCCs) all activated to support the federal pandemic response, led by
FEMA Regional Administrators. FEMA regional staff coordinated with SLTT representatives,
relayed information from the NRCC to SLTT partners, and deployed regional FEMA personnel to
directly assist SLTT emergency management and public health offices.71 However, FEMA found
that certain functions typically coordinated out of regional offices required adaptation. For
example, FEMA designed national Mission Assignments (or “work orders” for federal personnel)
to reduce the burdens on FEMA regions and provide the NRCC better situational awareness
nationwide.72
In May and June, 2020, FEMA’s role in the federal pandemic response changed to enable FEMA
to “prepare and support the upcoming hurricane season and other potential disasters Americans
may face.”73 The remaining response task forces were converted into working groups, over which
HHS reassumed oversight.74 HHS and the Defense Logistics Agency assumed responsibility for
certain FEMA lines of effort related to medical supply chain management and procurement,
respectively.75 However, FEMA retains an active and leading role in the federal pandemic
response as of the date of publication of this report.
Stakeholder Commentary on Leadership Transition
Perceived delays in FEMA’s assumption of a leadership role in the federal response prompted
concern among some Members of Congress, news media, and academic sources.76 For example,
Representative Xochitl Torres Small noted in a July 2020 hearing that a congressional evaluation
of lessons learned should
68 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 32-40.
69 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
70 FEMA, Incident Management and Support Keystone, Jan. 2011, p. 47, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
2020-07/fema_incident_management_and_support_keystone-Jan2011.pdf.
71 Ibid., pp. 25-26, 33-34, 80-85.
72 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 57-59.
73 Submitted testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Gaynor and Real Admiral Polowcyzk, HSGAC, Federal
Procurement and Distribution, p. 7.
74 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 5.
75 GAO has noted that the scope and nature of the transition of FEMA supply chain management responsibilities to
HHS lacked clarity. See GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts, pp. 19-20; See also submitted testimony of then-FEMA
Administrator Gaynor and Real Admiral Polowcyzk, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution, p. 7.
76 See, for example, Daniel Kaniewski, “Coronavirus Is a Disaster. Why Hasn’t FEMA Been Brought In?” Politico,
Mar. 10, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/03/10/coronavirus-crisis-fema-125076; Eric Lipton, Zolan
Kanno-Youngs, and Helene Cooper, “Trump Slowly Enlisting More Agencies in ‘Whole of Government’ Response to
Virus,” New York Times, Mar. 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/coronavirus-governmentarmy-corps.html; and William Shields, “The COVID-19 Pandemic: Early Lessons for Public Governance: The United
States Experience,” in Good Public Governance in a Global Pandemic, Paul Joyce, Fabienne Maron and Purshottama
Sivanarain Reddy, eds., IIAS public Governance Series, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 429-442.
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
includ[e] revisiting the appointment of FEMA as the lead of the federal response effort in
mid-March, more than six weeks after the White House Coronavirus Task Force was
formed; a delay that unquestionably put the agency at a disadvantage of executing such a
formidable task.77
Despite these concerns, FEMA’s response also garnered praise from some subfederal
stakeholders. In July 2020, the Director of California’s Office of Emergency Services testified
that
[g]iven the complexity of the situation and how late into the response they took over federal
responsibility, FEMA was both challenged and worked to be incredibly responsive. FEMA
did the best they could to organize information and operations to assist our state. FEMA
Region IX is still embedded in the SOC and has played a critical role in the state’s Logistics
and Commodity Movement Task Force and in communicating across the entire federal
family. Particularly, the FEMA Region IX Administrator and liaison officers have been
highly communicative and supportive.”78
77 Testimony of Rep. Xochitl Torres Small, Chairman of House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management and Accountability, in U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittees on Oversight,
Management and Accountability and Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery, House Committee on
Homeland Security, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
July 14, 2020 (hereinafter House Homeland Security Committee, Federal And State Pandemic Supply Preparedness
and Response).
78 Submitted testimony of Director, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and Governor’s Homeland
Security Advisor Mark Ghilarducci, in House Homeland Security Committee, Federal and State Pandemic Supply
Preparedness and Response, p. 4.
Congressional Research Service
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Figure 3. Organization of the Federal Coordinated Pandemic Response
According to FEMA
Source: CRS adaptation of FEMA, “Revised UCG Structure in COVID-19 Response,” Initial Assessment Report, p. 36.
Notes: Not all task forces are pictured. Color codes indicate agency leadership of different functions. ASPR = Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response; OASH
= Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health and Response; CDC = U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; SOC = HHS Secretary’s Operations Center, the
primary emergency operations center for HHS; ESF = Emergency Support Functions as described in the National Response Framework; JIC = Joint Information Center.
CRS-15
FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
FEMA’s Pandemic Response: Key Lines of Effort
This section identifies FEMA’s key lines of effort during its expanded role in the pandemic
response following the Stafford Act declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 4).
This overview is not intended to offer an exhaustive catalogue of FEMA’s actions during the
pandemic (see Appendix B for resources that comprehensively detail FEMA’s pandemic
response efforts).
Lead Federal Agency (LFA) of the Federal Pandemic Response
In this role, FEMA coordinated resources across the federal government and helped to establish
and served on the Unified Coordination Group (UCG), an interagency decision-making body. On
March 19, 2020, as FEMA assumed leadership of the coordinated response, federal pandemic
response operations moved to the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), an
interagency response operations room inside FEMA headquarters.79 The NRCC activated to Level
1, its highest activation level, for 426 days—an activation of unprecedented duration.80 FEMA’s
10 Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) also all activated and coordinated SLTT
support and communications.81
SLTT Emergency Management Operational Support
FEMA’s national and regional offices provided technical assistance and communications support
and deployed federal personnel to SLTT emergency management offices. For example, according
to FEMA, over 100 FEMA Integration Team (FIT) members—already embedded in state
emergency management offices prior to the pandemic—supported pandemic response
communication and planning across all levels of government. FEMA regional offices also
deployed Incident Management Assessment Teams-Advance (IMAT-As) and liaison officers to
support state, territorial, and tribal requests for direct and financial assistance.82
Public Assistance (PA) for SLTT and Nonprofit Response Efforts
Since March 13, 2020, FEMA has provided reimbursement through the PA program for the
eligible costs of specific emergency protective measures incurred by eligible PA Applicants (e.g.,
SLTTs and eligible nonprofits) responding to the pandemic. The wide range of costs eligible for
reimbursement includes pandemic-related purchase and distribution of food; the provision of
emergency medical care and diagnostic and screening testing; non-congregate sheltering for
eligible individuals; the purchase of medical supplies; the construction and operation of
alternative care facilities; the reopening of eligible public and nonprofit facilities; and
compensation of overtime and surge staff needed to execute the above measures.83
79 Ibid., pp. 25, 32.
80 Initial activation to Level 1 reported in FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 32. FEMA reported that the NRCC
reduced activation to Level III on May 19, 2021. FEMA, “FEMA Daily Ops Briefing,” May 19, 2021.
81 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 158-159.
82 Ibid., pp. 10, 25-26, 77, 81-85.
83 See FEMA, “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance—COVID-19 Declarations,” https://www.fema.gov/
media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations, for a collection of guidance
delineating eligible work, particularly FEMA, “Eligible Emergency Protective Measures,” August 27, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/eligible-emergency-protective-measures.
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Additionally, FEMA provided direct federal assistance (e.g., federal personnel, materials, space,
operations) when PA Applicants were found unable to execute eligible response activities. FEMA
mission assignments—or “work orders”—for FEMA and other agencies reflect provision of
direct assistance ranging from the provision of temporary medical facilities to the deployment of
federal personnel to perform vaccination to the establishment of quarantine housing. 84 Most
recently, in January 2022, FEMA released guidance stipulating how the agency would support the
expansion of healthcare facilities, including with direct federal assistance.85
Under the emergency and major disaster declarations issued by President Trump, Applicants
could receive reimbursement for 75% of the eligible costs of specific response measures.
Subsequently, President Biden increased the federal cost share to 100%.86 Under current
presidential directive, FEMA shall reimburse 100% of costs incurred from January 20, 2020,
through July 1, 2021.87 Thereafter, FEMA has announced that PA may be available to cover at
least 90% of eligible costs incurred.88 The agency will provide at least thirty days’ notice prior to
the conclusion of the program for the pandemic.89 As of December 2021, FEMA has obligated
more than $34 billion through the PA program for pandemic-related expenses, an unprecedented
sum for a single incident.90
Individual Assistance (IA) for Funeral Costs, Lost Wages, and Crisis
Counseling
The President and Congress authorized FEMA to provide select forms of IA to support recovery
from the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, President Trump authorized FEMA to provide
assistance through the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) and the Lost
Wages Assistance (LWA) program. Subsequently, Congress authorized FEMA to provide
COVID-19 Funeral Assistance.
CCP is a type of IA that can be authorized pursuant to a major disaster declaration under the
Stafford Act.91 It provides grants to state, local, territorial, or tribal government agencies that
allow them to deliver—or contract with local mental health services to deliver—communitybased outreach and psycho-educational services to support individuals and communities
84 OpenEFMA, “OpenFEMA Dataset: Mission Assignments,” reflecting obligations made through January 7, 2022,
https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/mission-assignments.
85 FEMA and Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), Healthcare Facility Expansion Assistance
Playbook, Dec. 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_healthcare-facility-expansionassistance-playbook.pdf.
86 President Joseph R. Biden, “Memorandum to Extend Federal Support to Governors’ Use of the National Guard to
Respond to COVID-19 and to Increase Reimbursement and Other Assistance Provided to States,” Jan. 21, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/21/extend-federal-support-to-governors-useof-national-guard-to-respond-to-covid-19-and-to-increase-reimbursement-and-other-assistance-provided-to-states/.
87 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19,” Mar. 1, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistanceto-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022.
88 FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022.
89 See, “Time Limitations for the Completion of Work,” in FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Work
Eligible for Public Assistance (Interim),” FEMA Policy FP 104-009-19, Sept. 1, 2021, p. 6, https://www.fema.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-09/fema_public-assistance-eligibility-for-covid_policy_9-1-2020.pdf.
90 CRS Analysis of FEMA, “Public Assistance Funded Projects—Details,” as of Dec. 5, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/
openfema-data-page/public-assistance-funded-projects-details-v1.
91 42 U.S.C. §5183; 44 C.F.R. §206.171.
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recovering from disasters.92 The majority of the jurisdictions that received major disaster
declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic were authorized to receive assistance through the
CCP.93 President Trump authorized some CCP requests, and on April 28, 2020, the FEMA
Administrator was authorized to approve COVID-19-related requests for CCP to expedite
assistance.94
Invoking ONA’s general statutory authority, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum
that authorized the LWA program and allowed FEMA to provide grants to states, territories, and
the District of Columbia for supplemental lost wages payments to individuals receiving
unemployment insurance.95 ONA typically provides financial assistance for uninsured disasterrelated necessary expenses and serious needs (e.g., assistance to replace disaster-damaged
personal property and vehicles, and funeral assistance); LWA was a novel use of ONA.96
Funeral Assistance is another form of ONA that helps with eligible funeral expenses and is
typically available when the President authorizes the Individuals and Households Program
(IHP)—a type of Individual Assistance—pursuant to a declaration of emergency or major disaster
under the Stafford Act.97 In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Congress authorized
FEMA to provide COVID-19 Funeral Assistance.98 Specifically, Section 201 of the Coronavirus
Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (Division M of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, P.L. 116-260), and Section 4006 of the American Rescue Plan Act of
92 42 U.S.C. §5183; 44 C.F.R. §206.171.
93 The Crisis Counseling Program requests submitted by American Samoa and the Seminole Tribe of Florida had not
been approved as of Aug. 24, 2021 (email to CRS from FEMA Office of External Affairs, Aug. 24, 2021, noting
“American Samoa and Seminole Tribe of Florida have not been declared for IA with CCP”).
94 FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Authority to Approve Crisis Counseling During Coronavirus,” release, Apr. 28, 2020,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-administrator-authority-approve-crisis-counseling-during-coronavirus; and
FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Approves 30 States for Crisis Counseling,” Release HQ-20-129, May 2, 2020,
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200726/fema-administrator-approves-30-states-crisis-counseling. According to
the GAO, FEMA awarded “about $467 million to 46 states, Washington, DC, and four U.S. territories [Guam, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands] via the Crisis Counseling
Assistance and Training Program.” The states of Alaska, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Wyoming did not apply for CCP
assistance (Alaska also withdrew its application for the CCP Regular Service Program). The Navajo Nation’s CCP
Regular Services Program application is under review (as of December 2021), and the Poarch Band Creek Indians did
not apply for CCP assistance (GAO, Behavioral Health and COVID-19: Higher-Risk Populations and Related Federal
Relief Funding, GAO-22-104437, December 2021, pp. 74-76 (Appendix V), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22104437.pdf).
95 President Donald J. Trump, “Memorandum on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program for Major Disaster
Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019,” Aug. 8, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidentialactions/memorandum-authorizing-needs-assistance-program-major-disaster-declarations-related-coronavirus-disease2019/. See also, FEMA, “Lost Wages Supplemental Payment Assistance Guidelines,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/
coronavirus/governments/supplemental-payments-lost-wages-guidelines. LWA was subject to a 25% nonfederal cost
sharing requirement.
96 Section 262(b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) authorized states to waive the
requirement that individuals repay Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) that they were not entitled to receive if the state
determines: “(1) the payment of such covered assistance [LWA] was without fault on the part of the individual; and (2)
such repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience.” Additionally, pursuant to Section 262(c), a state’s
debt waiver issued under Section 262(b) also waives a debt owed to the United States.
97 42 U.S.C. §5174(e)(1); 44 C.F.R. §206.119(b)(1).
98 Only Funeral Assistance, and not all forms of Individuals and Households Program (IHP) assistance, has been
authorized for the COVID-19 pandemic Stafford Act declarations.
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2021 (P.L. 117-2) authorized FEMA to provide financial assistance for COVID-19-related funeral
expenses at 100% federal cost share.99
Supply Chain Stabilization
In coordination with DOD and HHS, FEMA led efforts to stabilize critical domestic supply
chains, particularly medical supply chains, upon assuming the role of LFA in March 2020.100
FEMA initiated several efforts in this capacity. First, FEMA began working with HHS and DOD
to assess and stabilize the PPE supply chain after forming the Supply Chain Task Force.101 The
Supply Chain Task Force supported PPE distribution efforts, analyzed supply chain
vulnerabilities, and transported privately purchased PPE from manufacturers abroad to domestic
airports through Project Air Bridge.102
Second, as designated lead of the federal government’s Joint DPA Office, FEMA coordinated and
vetted invocations of the statute in support of the federal pandemic response.103 In this role,
FEMA released guidance in coordination with Customs and Border Protection on the use of DPA
to allocate and federal prioritize orders for scarce medical supplies.104 FEMA’s DPA actions
included procuring critical medical supplies through priority-rated contracts, seizing and
distributing PPE under anti-hoarding and price-gouging authorities, restricting exports of certain
critical medical supplies, and establishing a voluntary agreement with private medical distributors
to share price, cost, supply, distribution, and capacity utilization information, among other data,
on certain critical health supplies.105
99 On the date of the enactment of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), the declarations for the COVID-
19 pandemic for the declared states, territories, and District of Columbia (but not the three tribes) were amended to
authorize Funeral Assistance under Other Needs Assistance (ONA) (the amendments limit IHP-ONA to Funeral
Assistance).
100 See CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options,
coordinated by Michael H. Cecire, pp. 12-17; GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and
Concerted Actions, Sept. 2020, pp. 10-24, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-701.pdf (hereinafter GAO, Federal
Efforts); FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 24-25.
101 Submitted testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, HSGAC,
Federal Procurement and Distribution, pp. 4-5.
102 Ibid.; GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 10-12; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 45-76; CRS Report R46628, COVID19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by Michael H. Cecire, pp.
7-16.
103 FEMA, “Defense Production Act Authority and Functions of the FEMA Administrator,” https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/defense-production-act/dpa-authority-and-functions. For detailed discussion of pandemic-specific organization
of DPA authorities across the government, see GAO, Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist to Increase
Transparency and Identify Future Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues, GAO-21-2018, November 2020,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-108.pdf; for a brief overview of DPA leadership and FEMA’s role see CRS In
Focus IF11767, The Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC): A Primer, by Michael H. Cecire.
104 Executive Office of the President, Executive Order 13911, “Delegating Additional Authority Under the Defense
Production Act With Respect to Health and Medical Resources to Respond to the Spread of COVID-19,” Mar. 27,
2020, 85 Federal Register 18403. Subsequent notices report that authorities delegated to the DHS Secretary have “in
turn been delegated to the FEMA Administrator in DHS Delegation 09052, Rev. 00.1 (Apr. 1, 2020).” See, for
example, FEMA, “Prioritization and Allocation of Certain Scarce or Threatened Health and Medical Resources for
Domestic Use,” temporary final rule, Apr. 10, 2020, 85 Federal Register 20195.
105 See CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options,
coordinated by Michael H. Cecire; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 69-73; GAO, Defense Production Act:
Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency and Identify Future Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues,
GAO-21-108, November 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-108.pdf; CRS Insight IN11470, Defense Production
Act (DPA): Recent Developments in Response to COVID-19, by Heidi M. Peters and Erica A. Lee; FEMA, “Pandemic
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FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response
FEMA transferred certain medical supply chain responsibilities back to HHS and ASPR
beginning in June 2020, including management of the Supply Chain Task Force, which became
the Supply Chain Advisory Group under HHS’s management on June 15, 2020.106
Critical Medical Supply Distribution
Following its assumption of the role of lead federal agency, FEMA coordinated and often
executed federal efforts to distribute critical medical supplies, including PPE, testing supplies,
ventilators, and oxygen. As part of this effort, FEMA collaborated with ASPR and DOD to
provide and receive contracting support, including entering into an agreement with ASPR that
enabled FEMA to acquire and distribute critical medical supplies, including PPE, from the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).107 At the time of publication, FEMA continues to distribute
scarce medical supplies to states, tribes, and territories through its authorities to provide direct
assistance under the PA program. States, tribes, and territories may then distribute these resources
to localities and eligible nonprofits within their jurisdictions, including healthcare facilities.
National Guard Mobilization
The President has authorized FEMA to fund 100% of eligible costs of mobilizing the National
Guard under Title 32 of the U.S. Code to execute certain pandemic response measures, including
work related to vaccination, hospital and medical staffing (including “wraparound” hospital
support services like cleaning, security, and food preparation), testing, and food distribution,
among others.108 Under Title 32, FEMA issues fully-funded mission assignments to DOD for
National Guard mobilization; troops operate at the direction of governors. Funding covers troops’
salaries, allowances, travel expenses, and per diem.109 Barring any changes, FEMA’s 100%
Response Voluntary Agreement Under Section 708 of the Defense Production Act; Plans of Action To Respond to
COVID-19,” 86 Federal Register 28851-28884, May 28, 2021.
106 GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 10-11.
107 Submitted testimony of Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, HSGAC, Federal
Procurement and Distribution, p. 7; FEMA and HHS, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness Response,” executed Apr. 5, 2020, provided to CRS by FEMA Office of Congressional and Legislative
Affairs. Available to congressional members and staff upon request.
108 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19,” Mar. 1, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistanceto-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022; White House,
“Memorandum for the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19,” Nov. 9, 2021 (hereinafter White House, “Maximizing
Assistance,” Nov. 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/11/09/memorandumfor-the-secretary-of-homeland-security-and-the-administrator-of-the-federal-emergency-management-agency-onmaximizing-assistance-to-respond-to-covid-19/; FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Gives Remarks to Ongoing COVID-19
Response,” Jan. 14, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20220114/icymi-fema-administrator-gives-remarksongoing-covid-19-response; FEMA, “Federal Support for Wraparound Medical Care and Services During COVID-19
Response,” Jan. 14, 2022.
109 FEMA will also reimburse states and territories for the costs of mobilizing the National Guard for eligible work
under Title 10 of the U.S. Code (State Active Duty), but mission assignments may help relieve economic and
administrative burdens associated with Title 10 mobilizations. FEMA, “National Guard Deployment Extended to
Support COVID-19 Response,” updated Jan. 14, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/national-guard-deploymentextended-support-covid-19-response.
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funding for the eligible costs of National Guard mobilization is scheduled to expire on July 1,
2022, after which FEMA will cover 90% of eligible costs.110
Vaccination Assistance
FEMA provides 100% reimbursement and direct assistance through the PA program for
Applicants’ eligible vaccination work, currently available through July 1, 2022.111 Since January
2021, FEMA has provided enhanced vaccination assistance, including extensive direct assistance
(e.g., federal personnel, supplies, contract assistance, facilities) and the establishment of several
dozen federally-run mass vaccination sites that provided vaccine allocations in excess of those
distributed to individual states and territories.112 FEMA PA is available for a range of costs related
to vaccine administration and distribution, including operations and surge personnel costs, PPE,
facility support costs, vaccine storage and transportation, equipment, security, and transport for
individuals under certain circumstances.113 Applicants may also receive reimbursement and direct
assistance for vaccination community outreach (e.g., communications, personnel), booster
vaccination campaigns, and vaccination of children ages 5 through 11 years.114
110 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19,” Mar. 1, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistanceto-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022.
111 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19,” Mar. 1, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistanceto-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022; FEMA, “Vaccine
Support,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support; and CRS Report R46715, FEMA Assistance for
Vaccine Administration and Distribution: In Brief, by Erica A. Lee and Kavya Sekar.
112 FEMA, “Vaccine Support,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support; CRS Report R46715,
FEMA Assistance for Vaccine Administration and Distribution: In Brief, by Erica A. Lee and Kavya Sekar; FEMA,
“Federally Supported Community Vaccination Centers,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support/
vaccine-center; and FEMA, “Community Vaccination Centers Playbook,” Final version, https://www.fema.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/fema_community-vaccination-centers_playbook_04-23-2021.pdf.
113 FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Medical Care Eligible for Public Assistance (Interim) (Version 2),”
FEMA Policy #104-21-0004, pp. 6-9, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_public-assistancecovid-19-medical-care-v2-with-equity-job-aid_policy_3-15-2021.pdf.
114 FEMA, “FEMA Funds Community Engagement for COVID-19 Vaccinations,” May 12, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-funds-community-engagement-covid-19-vaccinations; FEMA, “FEMA Public
Assistance Supports COVID-19 Vaccine Administration to Children,” provided by FEMA Congressional and
Legislative Affairs, Nov. 3, 2021; and FEMA, “FEMA Support for COVID-19 Vaccination Efforts Continues,” Sept.
20, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FEMA_Advisory_FEMA_Support_for_COVID19_Vaccination_Efforts_Continues_09202021.pdf.
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Figure 4. Duration of Select FEMA Lines of Effort in Federal Pandemic Response
Source: CRS Analysis of FEMA Pandemic-Specific Guidance and Documentation of Response Efforts.
Notes:
a. At any time, FEMA may announce an end to the “incident period” that marks the period during which the pandemic occurred. Separately, FEMA policy notes that
Public Assistance for pandemic-related costs will be available on an ongoing basis; FEMA will provide at least 30 days’ notice prior to its conclusion. For further discussion
on the duration of Stafford Act declarations and Public Assistance, see CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic,
coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister.
b. The Community Based Testing Sites initiative involved multiple phases; this graph reflects phases in which FEMA was directly involved. The White House announced
the establishment of new federal surge testing sites in December 2021, supported in part by FEMA. The White House, “President Biden Announces New Actions to
Protect Americans and Help Communities and Hospitals Battle Omicron,” Dec. 21, 2021; FEMA, “FEMA Funding for the Safe Opening and Operating of Schools,
Including Testing,” Jan. 18, 2022.
c. FEMA began accepting applications for Funeral Assistance on Apr.12, 2021 for deaths attributed to COVID-19 since Jan. 20, 2020.
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Considerations for Congress
The following section identifies considerations and policy options for Congress in four areas
critical to FEMA’s role in the federal pandemic response: the Stafford Act, FEMA’s operations
and organization, the Defense Production Act (DPA), and the Disaster Relief Fund.
Stafford Act Legislative Considerations
The following section identifies policy considerations specific to FEMA’s authorities under the
Stafford Act and their relevance to the federal COVID-19 pandemic response.
Applicability of Stafford Act to Public Health Incidents
The design of the Stafford Act might complicate activations for public health incidents. Presidents
generally activate the Stafford Act to respond to rapid-onset events that cause measurable losses
in a specific geographic area (e.g., tornadoes), in contrast to ongoing infectious disease incidents
that spread across whole regions.115 As noted above, the federal government mobilized and
adapted the Stafford Act in unprecedented ways to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Under the Stafford Act, governors or tribal chief executives may request an emergency or major
disaster declaration only when an incident is “of such severity and magnitude” that state, local,
tribal, or territorial governments are unable to effectively respond without supplemental federal
assistance.116 FEMA defines the time interval during which the disaster-causing incident occurs as
the “incident period.”117 Per FEMA regulations, Stafford Act assistance shall only alleviate “the
damage or hardship ... which took place during the incident period or was in anticipation of that
incident.”118 FEMA weighs the monetary value of structural damages incurred during the incident
period when evaluating a state’s capacity to respond to an incident, and then makes a
recommendation to the President regarding the state’s request for a declaration.119
Infectious disease incidents are diffuse and develop over a significant period of time without
damaging infrastructure; they do not conform to the temporal and geographic limits built into
FEMA’s declaration process. The lack of measurable physical damage might make it difficult to
determine whether the infectious disease outbreak is beyond the state’s response capacity under
the current assessment framework. Similarly, it may be difficult for FEMA to determine the
geographic areas eligible for federal assistance and establish incident periods for pandemics.
Additionally, policymakers may be concerned that definitions within the Stafford Act limit
declarations for future infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics. Under the Stafford Act,
emergencies are defined broadly as follows:
any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance
is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect
115 For more information, see CRS Report R42702, Stafford Act Declarations 1953-2016: Trends, Analyses, and
Implications for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay.
116 Stafford Act Sections 401 and 501; 42 U.S.C. §§5170, 5191.
117 44 C.F.R. §206.32(f).
118 Ibid.
119 For information on the damage assessment process, see CRS Report R44977, Preliminary Damage Assessments for
Major Disasters: Overview, Analysis, and Policy Observations, by Bruce R. Lindsay.
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property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any
part of the United States.120
The broad definition of an emergency arguably provides the President with the discretion to
declare emergencies for a range of incidents, including infectious disease outbreaks and
pandemics. However, the scope of emergency assistance is fairly limited. By contrast, the
Stafford Act authorizes a wider range of federal assistance for major disasters, defined as:
any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm,
or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United
States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity
and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the
efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief
organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.121
While President Trump and President Biden determined that pandemics could be included within
the definition of major disaster (which does not explicitly list infectious disease outbreaks or
pandemics), future administrations could view the list to more narrowly constrain the meaning of
“any natural catastrophe.” If so, requests for disease outbreaks and pandemics could be denied in
the future on the basis that they do not meet the legal definition of a major disaster.122
If Congress wants to broaden the applicability of the Stafford Act to include future infectious
disease incidents, it could require FEMA to update its regulations accordingly. The effort may
require identification of metrics that may accurately measure a state’s response capacity with
respect to infectious disease outbreaks. Towards this end, Congress might consider directing
FEMA to clearly measure hazard losses beyond structural damages. Congress could alternatively
consider amending the Stafford Act to include infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics.
Others may disagree and argue that such incidents should not be eligible for major disaster
assistance, and propose to amend the definition of major disasters to specifically exclude them.
Clarification of Roles and Leadership for Public Health Incidents
Federal planning, including a pandemic response plan adapted for COVID-19, envisioned HHS—
not FEMA—as the lead federal agency for pandemic response (for more detail, see “Federal
Response Doctrine: FEMA’s Planned Role in Infectious Disease Incidents”).123 When warranted,
these plans also allowed for parallel leadership, whereby HHS would lead federal public health
and medical response, and FEMA would coordinate intergovernmental consequence
management. The Public Health Service Act specifies that the HHS Secretary shall lead federal
public health response efforts for declared Public Health Emergencies.124 Separately, the
Homeland Security Act and the Stafford Act (by delegated authority) direct the FEMA
120 Stafford Act Section 102(1); 42 U.S.C. §5122(1).
121 Stafford Act Section 102(2); 42 U.S.C. §5122(2).
122 For example, FEMA explained that Governor Rick Snyder’s (Michigan) request for a major disaster declaration for
the Flint water contamination incident was denied based on the grounds that it did not meet the definition of a major
disaster. Letter from W. Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator, to Rick Snyder, Governor of Michigan, Jan. 16, 2016;
reprinted in CRS Report R46665, Stafford Act and Selected Federal Recovery Programs for Civil Unrest: Historical
Perspectives and Policy Observations, coordinated by Bruce R. Lindsay.
123 HHS, PanCAP-Adapted.
124 Public Health Service Act Section 2801; 42 U.S.C. §300hh.
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Administrator to coordinate federal disaster response efforts.125 Officials issued declarations for
the pandemic under both statutes, introducing multiple leadership roles.126
In practice, the presence of multiple leadership roles generated confusion. GAO reported
confusion among nonfederal governments and healthcare providers; one local public health
official called the early federal response “incoherent, confusing, and uncoordinated.”127
Subsequently, FEMA reported that headquarters staff did not clearly understand the
responsibilities of the Unified Coordination Group directing the whole-of-government response
or interagency operational working groups that transitioned from HHS to FEMA.128 The National
Homeland Security Consortium (NHSC), a body comprising SLTT associations, emergency
management associations, and private-sector stakeholders, among others, identified an initial
problem of the federal response as follows:
The federal government’s messaging was neither unified nor consistent. The failure to
implement a national strategy or plan led to states, localities, tribes, and territories (SLTTs)
issuing guidance that was inconsistent with federal guidance. The guidance changed
constantly, which further confused the public and led to lost credibility.... This event tested
the limits of the national response doctrine—in particular NIMS/ICS—and agencies’
understanding of how to implement it, for prolonged, nontraditional, complex incidents. 129
These findings echoed those of pre-pandemic GAO and HHS assessments that unclear,
conflicting authorities persist in federal public health response plans, presidential directives, and
statutes.130 FEMA has acknowledged that HHS’s and FEMA’s “parallel and overlapping
authorities” in federal response doctrine challenged pandemic response planning and
operations.131
Additional challenges emerged following the establishment of the White House Coronavirus Task
Force led by the Vice President, which was not envisioned by pre-pandemic plans and
authorities.132 FEMA reported that the Task Force, which included the FEMA Administrator and
the HHS Secretary, effectively worked with FEMA senior officials.133 However, FEMA also
125 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act amended the Homeland Security Act to specify that the
FEMA Administrator “shall ... lead the Nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and
mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other manmade disasters, including catastrophic
incidents.” (Section 503(2)(A) of the Homeland Security Act, as amended); 6 U.S.C. §313(2)(A). Stafford Act Sections
402(1)-(2), 403(a), and 502(a)(1)-(2); 42 U.S.C. §§5170a(a)-(2), 5170b(a), and 5192(a)(1)-(2), provide the President
authority to direct and coordinate federal disaster and emergency response authorities. These authorities have been
delegated to FEMA as well as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, who has then delegated them to
the FEMA Administrator. FEMA, Disaster Operations Legal Reference, V 4.0, Sept. 25, 2020, pp. xxv-xxxii, available
at https://oregondisasterlegalservices.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/DOLR_4_09252020.pdf.
126 While previous incidents received declarations under both statutes, the scale of the pandemic and involvement of
every federal agency exacerbated confusion regarding agency roles and hierarchies.
127 See, for example, GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 93-94.
128 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 8; 25, 32-33; 36-37; 39; 80.
129 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 8.
130 GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Gaps in Pandemic Planning and Preparedness Need to Be Addressed, GAO-09-909T,
July 29, 2009, p. 8; GAO, Defense Civil Support: DOD, HHS, and DHS Should Use Existing Coordination
Mechanisms to Improve Their Pandemic Preparedness, GAO-17-150, Feb. 10, 2017, pp. 18-22; https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-17-150; HHS, Crimson Contagion 2019 Functional Exercise After-Action Report 2020, Jan. 2020, pp. 17,
19, 24-25, 29-31, 34-35.
131 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 31.
132 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 34; GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings, p. 26.
133 Ibid.
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reported that daily engagement with the White House caused the agency to undertake additional
efforts to ensure communication was consistent across the agency and subfederal partners. The
GAO found that conflicting messaging from the White House Coronavirus Task Force and federal
agencies may have contributed to confusion among subfederal stakeholders.134
Members of Congress, oversight bodies, the news media, stakeholders from the healthcare
industry and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments have repeatedly called upon the
government to clarify agency roles and clearly identify responsibility and decision-making
authority for specific lines of effort and the federal response on the whole.135 In its initial selfassessment on the agency’s COVID-19 response efforts, FEMA also recommended that the
federal government clarify agency authorities, roles, and financial responsibilities for public
health incidents.136 The NHSC recommended that the federal government update and promulgate
a national strategy, framework, and plan for pandemics.137
Congress may consider clarifying statutory authorities and roles in large-scale public health
incidents declared under both the Public Health Service Act and the Stafford Act. Neither the
Stafford Act nor FEMA regulations currently specify how FEMA shall coordinate with HHS in
public health incidents declared under the Stafford Act; Congress could amend the statute or
direct the agencies to issue relevant rulemaking following analysis of agency after-action reports.
Notably, in September 2020, GAO recommended that HHS, in consultation with FEMA, clarify
roles and responsibilities with respect to pandemic supply chain management and supply gaps—
recommendations that remained open as of September 2021.138
Emergency managers, experts, and SLTT stakeholders have proposed possible leadership
structures.139 The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) recommended that
President Biden, upon assuming office “formally designate FEMA as THE lead agency for all
hazards Incident Coordination across the federal government enterprise to include Stafford Act
and non-Stafford Act events” and reinstate the FEMA Administrator’s membership in the
134 GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 76, 94.
135 See, for example, GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, pp. 65-66; GAO, Federal Efforts, p. 94; GAO, “Priority Open
Recommendations: Department of Homeland Security,” Aug. 13, 2021, p. 4, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21377pr.pdf; NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, pp. ii, 6; Testimonies of Rep. Payne and Rep. Thompson, in House
Homeland Security Committee, Federal And State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response; Priscilla Alvarez et
al., “Confusion and Frustration Still Reign a Week After FEMA Takes over Coronavirus Response,” CNN, Mar. 27,
2020; Testimony of Heather Krause, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Assessing the Federal Government’s COVID-19 Relief and Response
Efforts and Its Impact,” hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 29, 2021 (hereinafter House T&I, Federal Response
Efforts); IAEM, “IAEM Recommendations for Action During the First 100 Days of the Administration of PresidentElect Biden,” Dec. 2020, https://www.iaem.org/Portals/25/documents/IAEM-Recommendations-to-the-BidenTransition-Team.pdf (hereinafter IAEM, “Recommendations for Action”).
136 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 22-23, 31-33.
137 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 8.
138 These GAO recommendations were most recently reviewed in September 2021. GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 1-2.
These recommendations build on pre-pandemic GAO recommendations to clarify roles and responsibilities in national
biodefense strategy. See GAO, National Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would Enhance Likelihood of
Effective Implementation, GAO-20-273, Feb. 2020.
139 For scholarly analysis of these and other alternatives, see, for example, Daniel Gerstein, “Assessing the US
Government Response to the Coronavirus,” July 20, 2020, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pp. 166-174; David Carter
and Peter May, “Making Sense of the U.S. COVID-19 Pandemic Response: A Policy Regime Perspective,”
Administrative Theory and Praxis, May 5, 2020, pp. 265-277; Roy Guharoy and Edward Krenzelok, “Lessons from the
Mismanagement of the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Blueprint to Reform CDC,” American Journal of Health-System
Pharmacy, vol. 78, iss. 18, Sept. 15, 2021, pp. 1739-1741.
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President’s cabinet.140 The National Homeland Security Consortium issued a similar
recommendation while noting that “[c]onsensus was not achieved ... on this recommendation. At
least one association maintained that as a public health disaster, public health at the state and
national level should be the lead coordinating agency.”141 Alternatively, prior to the COVID-19
pandemic, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense (a private organization assessing U.S.
biodefense efforts) identified deficiencies in historical iterations of agency leadership and
recommended that the Vice President lead federal biodefense efforts under the auspices of a
White House Biodefense Coordination Council.142
Adaptation of Stafford Act Public Assistance for the Pandemic
The President’s Stafford declarations for the pandemic authorized FEMA Public Assistance (PA)
for emergency protective measures for jurisdictions nationwide. Prior to the pandemic, no
President had ever mobilized the PA program, FEMA’s largest federal grant program, as a
primary instrument to respond to an infectious disease event.143
The PA program generally operates following incidents clearly delimited in time and space (e.g.,
hurricanes); the pandemic compelled FEMA to make rapid pandemic-specific adaptations for
long-term response efforts across the country.144 For example, federal regulations provide that
emergency response activities funded through PA be completed within six months of a
declaration, though extensions may be granted.145 For the pandemic, the President directed that
the PA program provide reimbursement and direct assistance for eligible measures from January
20, 2020 to beyond July 2022—more than two and a half years.146 The PA program may
additionally provide assistance beyond that time frame, subject to presidential and agency
discretion.147
The President and FEMA have also deployed PA to provide financial reimbursement and direct
assistance for novel uses. For the pandemic, FEMA will reimburse Applicants for eligible costs
incurred for work required to safely reopen and operate designated facilities (e.g., the purchase of
140 IAEM, “Recommendations for Action.” The FEMA Administrator was a member of the President’s Cabinet from
1996-2001. For more information, see DHS Office of Inspector General, FEMA: In or Out? OIG-09-25, Feb. 2009,
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-25_Feb09.pdf.
141 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 19.
142 Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense (now Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense), A
National Blueprint for Biodefense, Oct. 2015, pp. 6-7, 9, 15, https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/10/NationalBluePrintNov2018-03.pdf.
143 See CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R.
Lindsay.
144 See FEMA’s website “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance—COVID-19 Declarations,”
https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations.
145 44 C.F.R. §206.205(c).
146 President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Memorandum for the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19,” Nov. 9, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/11/09/memorandum-for-the-secretary-ofhomeland-security-and-the-administrator-of-the-federal-emergency-management-agency-on-maximizing-assistance-torespond-to-covid-19/; President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to
COVID-19,” Mar. 1, 2022, Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19 | The White House;
FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022.
147 See, for example, “Time Limitations,” in FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Work Eligible for Public
Assistance (Interim),” FEMA Policy FP 104-009-19, Sept. 1, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/
fema_policy_104-009-19_PA-eligibility-policy-covid.pdf.
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PPE for schools, disinfection, surveillance testing), provide ongoing non-congregate sheltering
for at-risk and exposed individuals, and execute a wide range of work related to vaccination
assistance.148 These novel applications may modify interpretations of what assistance FEMA may
provide under the Stafford Act’s nonexclusive list of emergency response measures.149
Further, President Biden increased the federal cost share that FEMA will reimburse for PAeligible costs from the statutory floor of 75% to 100% for all jurisdictions nationwide. Prior to
that, SLTT governments and eligible healthcare organizations, including nonprofits, noted the
challenge of meeting the fiscal burdens of the 25% cost share, as well as providing the up-front
costs of eligible work before requesting reimbursement.150 FEMA has observed that the increased
federal cost share for pandemic response and the expansion of PA-eligible work (to include
reopening costs and enhanced vaccination assistance) significantly increased projected
obligations in FY2021.151
These pandemic-era changes to PA raise questions about future uses of, and expectations for, the
PA program.152 Congress might consider challenges related to the program’s adaptation when
considering how, if at all, PA should be mobilized for hazards with nationwide impacts, like
infectious disease events and climate change. Should Congress affirm the program’s relevance for
future public health incidents, Congress may consider whether existing PA authorities for
response are sufficient or should be expanded,153 and whether to clarify the eligibility of certain
activities, including vaccination-related assistance, the costs of reopening and operating facilities
during infectious disease incidents, and the ongoing costs of non-congregate sheltering for
eligible populations. Alternatively, Congress might prefer narrower interpretations of the Stafford
Act’s list of eligible expenses and further limit the statute’s authorities.
Novel projects funded by PA during the pandemic may be relevant to these discussions. The state
of California used the PA program to create Project Roomkey, which provided hotel and motel
rooms to individuals experiencing homelessness in an effort to mitigate the risk of COVID-19
transmission associated with congregate shelters, and thereby reducing the strain on the health
care system.154 Similarly, FEMA and the President made PA available to reimburse food banks
and restaurants for 100% of the costs of purchasing and distributing meals to eligible
individuals.155 Evaluating such innovative uses of PA might help agency heads and Congress as
148 See FEMA’s website “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance - COVID-19 Declarations,”
https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations.
149 Stafford Act Section 403(a); 42 U.S.C. §5170b(a).
150 See Testimony of J. Ryan McMahon II, County Executive, Onondaga County, New York, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Homeland Security, Confronting the Coronavirus: Perspectives on the COVID-19 Pandemic One Year
Later, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 24, 2021 (hereinafter House Homeland Security Committee, Confronting the
Pandemic).
151 FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of April 30, 2021, May 11, 2021, Fiscal Year 2021 Report to
Congress, p. 24; Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of July 31, 2021, Aug. 10, 2021, p. 26; FEMA, Disaster
Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of September 30, 2021, Oct. 7, 2021, p. 27. Reports available at https://www.fema.gov/
about/reports-and-data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-reports.
152 For background about the PA program, its scope, and expense, see CRS Report R46749, FEMA’s Public Assistance
Program: A Primer and Considerations for Congress, by Erica A. Lee.
153 See, for example, an expanded list of eligible measures in S. 4627/H.R. 8266, “FEMA Assistance Relief Act of
2020,” 116th Cong., 2nd sess.
154 California Department of Social Services, “Project Roomkey/Housing and Homelessness COVID Response,”
https://www.cdss.ca.gov/inforesources/cdss-programs/housing-programs/project-roomkey.
155 FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Purchase and Distribution of Food Eligible for Public Assistance,”
FEMA Policy FP 104-010-03, Apr. 11, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_covid_purchase-
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they determine whether and how the program may be deployed for future unconventional or longduration incidents.156
Congress may also note the logistical challenges posed by the program’s nationwide use during
the pandemic that may have delayed assistance and hampered SLTT response efforts. For
instance, many stakeholders expressed confusion and frustration attributed to regional
inconsistencies in program delivery and eligibility determinations.157 In response, GAO
recommended in October 2021 that FEMA clarify PA eligibility requirements nationwide and
require additional training for the agency’s PA employees to promote consistent policy
interpretations within and across FEMA regions.158 How, if at all, the regionally-administered PA
program should change in the wake of these challenges remains an open question.
Adaptation of Stafford Act Individual Assistance for the Pandemic
FEMA’s IA program was adapted to support the pandemic response, providing an unprecedented
amount of assistance through Other Needs Assistance (ONA) for COVID-19 Funeral Assistance
and the Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program.159 In a July 19, 2021 press release, FEMA stated
that it “has provided over $710 million to more than 107,000 people to assist with COVID-19related funeral costs.”160 and, as of the publication of this report, there is no deadline to apply for
COVID-19 Funeral Assistance.161 Moreover, FEMA provided approximately $40 billion through
the LWA program to participating states, territories, and the District of Columbia.162 The agency’s
initial self-assessment lauded the speed with which it awarded LWA grants and the amount of
funding obligated through the program.163 FEMA also acknowledged that the CCP was authorized
and-distributions-of-food_policy.pdf; CRS Report R46432, Food Banks and Other Emergency Feeding Organizations:
Federal Aid and the Response to COVID-19, coordinated by Kara Clifford Billings.
156 See Karen Stabiner, “What If We Turned Restaurants into Government Contractors,” The Counter, Feb. 11, 2021,
https://thecounter.org/biden-fema-reimbursement-restaurants-food-aid/; FEMA, “COVID-19 Community Food
Distribution Community Innovations,” July 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_covid_fooddistribution_ci-story_june1.pdf; “New FEED Act to Address Food Insecurity with Help from Restaurants,” July 2020,
FoodTank, https://foodtank.com/news/2020/07/new-feed-act-to-address-food-insecurity-with-help-from-restaurants/.
157 GAO, COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Accountability and Program Effectiveness of Federal
Response, GAO-22-105051, October 2021, pp. 23-24, 353-366, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105051.pdf.
158 Ibid.
159 FEMA’s “Disaster Relief Fund Monthly Report” includes Individual Assistance program obligations for
catastrophic disasters. For the COVID-19 declarations, the estimated Individual Assistance total through FY2021 is
$41.8 billion (and financial assistance to individuals and households was only provided for ONA). By contrast, the
estimated total through FY2021 for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria combined is $6.0 billion (and, for these
disasters, financial assistance was provided for both housing assistance and ONA) (FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund:
Monthly Report as of June 30, 2021, July 12, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_july2021-disaster-relief-fund-report.pdf). See also Statement of Heather Krause, Director, Physical Infrastructure, and
Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, Testimony Before Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives, COVID-19 Pandemic: Actions Needed to Improve Federal Oversight of
Assistance to Individuals, Communities, and the Transportation Industry, GAO-21-105202, July 29, 2021, p. 3,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-105202.pdf.
160 FEMA, “FEMA COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Tops $700 Million,” press release HQ-21-138, July 19, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210719/fema-covid-19-funeral-assistance-tops-700-million.
161 FEMA, “Funeral Assistance FAQ,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/economic/funeral-assistance/faq.
162 FEMA, “By the Numbers: Coronavirus Pandemic Whole-of-America Response,” press release, Mar. 8, 2021. The
Lost Wages Assistance total of “[a]lmost $40 billion for those who were unemployed due to COVID-19 through Dec.
27, 2020” was provided as of the COVID-19 obligations as of Mar. 4, 2021. FEMA’s “By the Numbers: Lost Wages
Assistance Totals,” Feb. 9, 2021, lists the LWA total as $42.6 billion.
163 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 5.
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for all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
and that all tribal nation members were eligible for CCP services.164 Additional consideration of
the pandemic-caused needs of individuals and households is not addressed in FEMA’s selfassessment. Congress could consider requiring FEMA to evaluate whether the IA provided to
support COVID-19 pandemic recovery—which has been limited to ONA and CCP—has been
sufficient to meet the needs of affected individuals and households. Congress could also consider
whether FEMA may require additional authorities to meet the needs of disaster-affected
individuals and households following a future pandemic or infectious-disease incident.165
Disasters commonly create economic hardships for individuals and families, and the COVID-19
pandemic was no different. During the first few months of the pandemic response, Congress
considered the federal government’s options for providing housing assistance payments to
individuals experiencing financial hardship due to the pandemic. FEMA does not have the
statutory authority to provide temporary rental or mortgage payments when people experience
disaster-caused financial hardship. Currently, FEMA’s Rental Assistance program166 is premised
on an individual being displaced from their primary residence (e.g., because it is uninhabitable or
inaccessible).167 However, this has not always been the case. Prior to May 2002, the Stafford Act
authorized assistance to disaster survivors unable to make mortgage or rental payments. Section
206 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2K; P.L. 106-390) amended the Stafford Act to
remove temporary mortgage and rental payments, and added the language predicating assistance
on displacement.168 DMA2K was generally intended to control the federal cost of disaster
assistance.169 Congress may require FEMA to evaluate whether its housing assistance programs
are adequate and appropriate to meet the needs of survivors following disasters that result in
economic (rather than physical) damages—as this was a gap that was revealed by the economic
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.170
164 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 26, 87.
165 For example, Congress may wish to consider whether there is a need to clarify the LWA program’s authority.
FEMA stated that they were using the LWA authority, rather than the existing Stafford Act Section 410 authority to
provide Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), because “DUA is very limited and only available to individuals
who aren’t eligible for regular Unemployment Insurance (UI). The President’s authorization for a $300 lost wages
payment from FEMA is for a supplemental payment on top of UI paid by the state, territory and the District of
Columbia. Also, DUA is limited to what regular UI in the state, territory and the District of Columbia would pay out so
it can’t be used to supplement regular UI.” FEMA, “Frequently Asked Questions About Receiving Supplemental
Payments for Lost Wages,” Aug. 16, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/governments/supplementalpayments-lost-wages/frequently-asked-questions.
166 42 U.S.C. §5174(c)(1)(A).
167 42 U.S.C. §5174(b)(1); see also FEMA, IAPPG, pp. 80-81.
168 See the prior version of the Stafford Act’s provision of temporary rental or mortgage payments at 42 U.S.C.
§5174(b), (2001), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2001-title42/pdf/USCODE-2001-title42-chap68subchapIV-sec5174.pdf.
169 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Disaster Mitigation and Cost Reduction Act
of 1999, 106th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 3, 1999, H.Rept. 106-40, pp. 1, 12, 17, https://www.congress.gov/106/crpt/hrpt40/
CRPT-106hrpt40.pdf; see also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on
Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety, Review of the General Accounting Office Report on FEMA’s Activities
After the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 108th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 24, 2003, S.Hrg. 108-364, p. 253.
170 FEMA has evaluated its housing solutions following disasters, including following Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria in its 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report, July 12, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/
files/2020-08/fema_hurricane-season-after-action-report_2017.pdf. Additionally, in several of its reports on FEMA’s
housing assistance programs, the GAO has recommended FEMA evaluate its housing solutions (see, for examples,
GAO, Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data and Guidance Would Aid FEMA Activation Decisions, GAO-21-116,
Dec. 2020, p. 21, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-116.pdf; and GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional
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Hazard Mitigation Funding for Pandemic Stafford Act Declarations
FEMA’s role in responding to the pandemic may prompt stakeholders, including Congress and
the agency itself, to consider the timeline and scale of Hazard Mitigation Assistance funding
available nationwide through the Stafford Act declarations for the pandemic.
The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program is authorized by Stafford Act Section 404—Hazard
Mitigation171 and is funded through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). HMGP funding is available
to all areas of a state, territory, or tribal lands where it is requested by a governor or tribal chief
executive following a major disaster declaration (or the approval of a Fire Management
Assistance Grant). At the state, tribe, or territory’s request, HMGP may also be available
statewide.
HMGP funding is awarded as a formula grant to a state. The amount of the grant is based on the
estimated total federal assistance per major disaster declaration or Fire Management Assistance
Grant, subject to a sliding scale formula. For each declaration, a state receives a percentage of the
total amount of FEMA assistance awarded to the state for that disaster; in other words, the state
receives
up to 15% of the first $2 billion of aggregate amount of disaster assistance,
up to 10% for aggregate amounts of assistance between $2 billion and $10
billion, and
up to 7.5% for aggregate amounts of assistance between $10 billion and $35.333
billion.172
States that have an Enhanced State Hazard Mitigation Plan173 under section 322(e) of the Stafford
Act can receive 20% of the total amount.174
HMGP-funded projects must provide a long-term solution to a problem, rather than immediate
disaster response or recovery activities. The state, territory, or tribal government can use HMGP
funding for mitigation projects for any type of natural hazard and for any eligible activity that
reduces risk and builds resilience. HMGP funding does not have to be used for the particular
disaster for which it was allocated, nor for the particular type of disaster. For example, funding
allocated for wildfires in one county could be used for flood mitigation activities in a different
county, if the state chooses to do so and the activity is eligible.
All 50 states, five territories, the District of Columbia, and three tribes175 requested HMGP
funding for the pandemic disaster declarations. FEMA announced on August 5, 2021, that every
state, tribe, and territory that received a major disaster declaration for COVID-19 will be eligible
to receive 4% of their total pandemic-related Stafford Act assistance in HMGP funding.176 Four
Actions Could Strengthen FEMA’s Key Disaster Recovery Efforts, GAO-20-54, Nov. 2019, p. 44,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-54.pdf).
171 42 U.S.C. §5170c.
172 42 U.S.C. §5170c(a) and 44 C.F.R. §206.432(b).
173 44 C.F.R. §201.5.
174 As of June 31, 2021, 14 states have approved Enhanced State Hazard Mitigation Plans. See FEMA, Hazard
Mitigation Plan Status, https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/risk-management/hazard-mitigation-planning/
status.
175 The three tribes are the Navaho Nation, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, and the Seminole Tribe of Florida.
176 FEMA, “COVID-19 Disaster Declarations, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Allocations for COVID-19
Declarations,” Aug. 5, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/disaster-declarations.
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percent is a lower percentage than is usually awarded for HMPG, but the total funding of $3.46
billion represents the largest amount of HMGP funding in a single fiscal year.177 (The largest
amount previously was $2.29 billion in FY2005, following the extreme 2005 hurricane season.)178
As with all HMGP funding, the State determines where the funding can best be used and how to
allocate HMGP funds to sub-applicants, which means this funding does not have to be used for
pandemic-related mitigation activities. The largest amount of HMGP COVID-19 funding will go
to Texas, followed by California, New York, Florida, and New Jersey (see Figure 5).
The Stafford Act declarations for the pandemic also made more funding available for the FEMAadministered pre-disaster mitigation grants through the Building Resilience Infrastructure and
Communities (BRIC) program. BRIC is funded by a set-aside in the DRF equal to 6% of the
estimated aggregate amount of funding awarded under seven sections of the Stafford Act.179 As of
December 31, 2021, there was $1.81 billion set aside in the DRF for mitigation.180 This sum far
exceeds FEMA’s expectation that this fund would receive $300-500 million per year on average,
based on historical disaster expenditures.181 However, in its first year of operation, FY2020, BRIC
was over-subscribed, with over $3.6 billion requested from the $500 million available,182
suggesting that even the increased amount of pre-disaster mitigation funding due to the COVID19 disaster declarations is not sufficient to meet demands.
Congress might note the unusual availability of hazard mitigation funding across the country due
to the nationwide Stafford Act declarations. To be eligible for BRIC, applicants must have
received a major disaster declaration within the previous seven years. All jurisdictions are thus
currently eligible for BRIC due to the pandemic major disaster declarations, though that is
unlikely to be the case in the future. Normally, it would be unlikely for every jurisdiction to have
a major disaster declaration in the same year. Restricting pre-disaster mitigation funding to states
which have experienced a disaster recently could preclude communities with a clear risk under a
changing climate from receiving funding when that risk has not yet eventuated, and may make it
more difficult for locations facing major impacts of climate change to plan ahead. For this reason,
Congress may wish to consider whether these requirements should be relaxed. Congress may also
wish to consider the unusual situation where disaster declarations for a public health incident with
no physical damage has made funding available for physical mitigation activities.
177 CRS analysis of FEMA OpenFEMA data set on Hazard Mitigation Assistance Projects—v2, https://www.fema.gov/
openfema-data-page/hazard-mitigation-assistance-projects-v2. Accessed Nov. 21, 2021.
178 Ibid.
179 Stafford Act Sections 403 (essential assistance), 406 (repair, restoration and replacement of damaged facilities), 407
(debris removal), 408 (federal assistance to individuals and households), 410 (unemployment assistance), 416 (crisis
counseling assistance and training), and 428 (public assistance program alternative program procedures). See CRS
Report R45819, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA): A Summary of Selected Statutory Provisions, for
further details.
180 FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of December 31, 2021. Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress, Jan.
7, 2022, p. 25, https://www.fema.gov/about/reports-and-data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-reports.
181 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Disaster Preparedness: DRRA Implementation and FEMA Readiness,
Serial No. 116-17, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 22, 2019, p. 90, https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG116hhrg40590/CHRG-116hhrg40590.pdf.
182 FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) Annual Grant Cycle Submissions Summary, Mar. 17, 2021,
https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/hazard-mitigation-assistance-hma-annual-grant-cycle-submissions-summary.
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Figure 5. HMGP Funding for COVID-19 Disaster Declarations
Source: FEMA, COVID-19 Disaster Declarations, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Allocations for COVID-19
Declarations, Aug. 5, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/disaster-declarations.
FEMA Preparedness and Response Operations
FEMA’s Public Health Preparedness Coordination
Persistent challenges related to acquisition and delivery of diagnostic tests, production and
management of PPE, and development and distribution of vaccines have introduced new
questions about the state of national readiness for pandemics, as well as for other emergencies
more broadly. This is not the first time the nation has evaluated its state of preparedness. In the
wake of the much-criticized response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress directed the President to
develop a stronger system for building national preparedness for all types of emergencies and
disasters. In February of 2011, President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 8
(PPD-8),183 which established a National Preparedness Goal,184 System, and Report to provide the
nation with a framework for organizing preparedness activities. The strategies set forth in this
doctrine govern how individuals, families, communities, localities, tribal nations, territories,
states, and federal agencies can strengthen the security and resilience of the nation, even against
pandemics. PPD-8 defines preparedness as “actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and
exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the
effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of
the Nation.”185
183 White House, “PPD-8: Announcing the National Preparedness Goal,” Oct. 7, 2011,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/07/ppd-8-announcing-national-preparedness-goal.
184 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal,
https://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-goal.
185 White House, “PPD-8: Announcing the National Preparedness Goal,” Oct. 7, 2011,
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The United States’ national preparedness is based on capability planning186 and the 32 core
capabilities outlined by the National Preparedness Goal represent the critical competencies
needed to address all types of emergencies, from local incidents addressed with local resources to
national disasters involving presidential declarations under the Stafford Act.187 While FEMA
coordinates the federal government’s preparedness broadly, HHS is largely responsible for the
development of the national capability to perform public health, healthcare, and emergency
medical services activities. FEMA supports HHS with preparedness guidance, training, exercise
support for specific activities related to community resilience, information sharing, incident
management, and medical countermeasures.188
Although HHS generally takes the primary role for public health incident preparedness,
responding to a pandemic requires several other adjacent capabilities, including public
information and warning, logistics and supply chain management, situational assessment,
operational coordination, and economic recovery. FEMA is the coordinator for logistics and
information sharing activities at the federal level.189
In May 2020, GAO released a report that identified actions necessary to address shortcomings in
the nation’s emergency management capabilities.190 GAO stated that FEMA had yet to determine
what steps were needed to address capability gaps at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
levels. GAO also concluded that FEMA had taken steps to strengthen national preparedness but
has not fully identified capability gaps and determined what actions were needed to enhance
national preparedness capabilities.191 To address these issues, GAO recommended the following:
Following the completion of the 2021 National Preparedness Report, 192 determine what
steps are needed to address the nation’s emergency management capability gaps across all
levels of government and inform key stakeholders, such as the Office of Management and
Budget and Congress, about what level of resources will be necessary to address the known
gaps.193
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/07/ppd-8-announcing-national-preparedness-goal.
186 This planning includes developing and maintaining knowledge, skills, and abilities to address threats and hazards, in
lieu of preparing for every potential scenario. For more information on these capabilities and FEMA’s capability-based
planning process, see FEMA, Core Capabilities, https://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities.
187 For more information on responding to and recovering from major disasters, see CRS Report R41981,
Congressional Primer on Responding to and Recovering from Major Disasters and Emergencies, by Bruce R. Lindsay
and Elizabeth M. Webster. The core capabilities are not the exclusive responsibility of any one government agency or
organization. Instead, they require the combined efforts of the “whole community,” including individuals and families,
non-profit and religious organizations, private sector companies, schools, media outlets, as well as SLTT governments
and federal partners.
188 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action, p. 65.
189
DHS, NRF 2019, pp. 39-41.
190 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed to Address Gaps in the
Nation’s Emergency Management Capabilities, GAO-20-297, May 4, 2020, (hereinafter GAO, National
Preparedness), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-297.
191 Ibid., p. 39.
192 In the DHS response to GAO’s report, FEMA stated that it does not believe that the cost of national resource gaps
can be estimated without first accounting for existing federal capabilities, which will be incorporated into the 2021
National Preparedness Report. The collection of necessary information was scheduled to begin in 2020, but was
delayed due to the response operations for the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, GAO’s recommendation has been
updated to reflect the updated timeframe following the publication of the 2021 National Preparedness Report.
193 GAO, National Preparedness, p. 39.
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GAO went further in an August 2021 report and stated that the U.S. emergency response
enterprise “lacked elements necessary for preparing for nationally significant biological
incidents,” including:
a set of defined capabilities that account for the unique elements specific to
responding to nationally significant biological incidents; and
a process at the interagency level for agencies to assess and communicate
priorities for exercising capabilities and consistently reporting on those
capabilities in after-action reviews.194
Congress may wish to monitor implementation of GAO’s recommendations, and may also
consider further clarifying the roles and responsibilities for pandemic preparedness between
FEMA and HHS.
FEMA’s Preparedness Grants for Public Health Incidents
FEMA also supports the development of preparedness capabilities nationally through a number of
grant programs. Some of these grants provide funding and resources for general emergency
management and preparedness activities (e.g., Emergency Management Performance Grants).
FEMA also administers grant programs that provide funding for preparedness equipment,
training, and activities through the Homeland Security Grant Program, which is primarily195
composed of the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative.
In the past, SLTTs have used these grants to develop their preparedness for public health
emergencies by purchasing equipment such as PPE and by conducting training for biological
weapons attacks. According to a GAO report published in May 2020, DHS awarded over $52
billion in preparedness grants to SLTT partners to strengthen preparedness between FY2002 and
FY2019.196 Additionally, HHS also provides funding for public health preparedness through grant
programs such as the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program and Hospital
Preparedness Program (HPP). Prior to the pandemic, funding for preparedness grants from both
agencies declined several times.197
Given that Congress has appropriated funding for DHS preparedness grants for over 20 years,
Congress may wish to evaluate its continued investment. Congress may evaluate the need for
continued federal support and consider whether to reduce or eliminate funding. Some may argue
that states and localities should assume more responsibility for funding their preparedness, and
that the federal government should reduce its investment. Whether states and localities can
support this change may depend on their financial condition. Alternatively, Congress may choose
to maintain or increase present funding levels. Given the changing risk landscape, including the
presentation of novel threats such as COVID-19 and its variants, preparedness stakeholders may
need to develop new capacity and expand their capabilities. To support such changes, Congress
might consider expanding the eligible uses for FEMA’s preparedness grants beyond its traditional
aims to mitigate terrorism threats and redirect them towards public health applications.198
194 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings, p. 30.
195 FEMA’s Homeland Security Grant Program also includes funding for nonprofit security and jurisdictions on the
U.S. southwest border. These two programs do not appear to provide funding that would support pandemic
preparedness.
196 GAO, National Preparedness, p. 3.
197 See CRS Report R44669, Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Grants: A Summary and Issues, by
Shawn Reese.
198 For more information and recommendations on shifting DHS’s mission towards nonmilitary threats, see Thomas
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Congress may consider assessing whether it is efficient and effective to have two separate
agencies administering preparedness grants, and the impact of this approach on capability
development and coordination.
Validating National Readiness: Exercises
FEMA recommends using simulated disaster scenarios, known as exercises, to validate
preparedness and test emergency plans, equipment, and training. Every two years, FEMA
conducts a National Level Exercise (NLE) to gauge readiness for catastrophic events and evaluate
the nation’s progress towards the National Preparedness Goal. These exercises have multiple
components, and generally culminate in a large, full-scale exercise with thousands of participants
from multiple federal agencies, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, industry
partners, and nongovernmental organizations.
FEMA has never led an NLE that has focused on a pandemic scenario, although in the early
2000s, some of its “Top Officials” (TOPOFF) exercises explored national coordination for
response to certain types of public health emergencies, such as chemical or biological weapons
attacks.199 FEMA is also not the only agency conducting nationally scoped preparedness exercises
with broad stakeholder participation. For instance, the Department of Health and Human
Services’ Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) also conducts
major exercises involving multiple federal agencies, SLTT partners, private industry, and
nongovernmental participants. Some of these intergovernmental exercises have addressed
pandemic scenarios.200 Other departments and agencies that coordinate exercises are not required
to coordinate with the NLE, and their results and recommendations may not be integrated with
those from NLEs. Congress might consider mandates for better interagency coordination of
nationally scoped exercises as well as a more unified strategy for tracking outcomes. Congress
may also conduct oversight activities or mandate reporting on the results of these preparednessbuilding activities.
According to guidance published by FEMA, every exercise should yield lessons learned,
corrective actions, and an improvement plan for the participating stakeholders. These documents
provide a roadmap for closing gaps in core prevention, protection, response, recovery, and
mitigation capabilities. GAO has stated that FEMA lacks a formal mechanism to document and
track best practices, lessons learned, and corrective actions identified through after-action reports
(AARs), and lacks guidance on sharing AAR findings with stakeholders.201 The outputs and
benefits of NLEs, and other exercises may be lost without greater accountability for recording
and implementing the results. GAO recommended that DHS develop a better means of tracking
exercise outputs, and DHS officials concurred and planned to address them before March 31,
2022.202 Congress may consider oversight activities to ensure that the findings of NLEs are
properly leveraged to improve national capabilities.
Warrick and Caitlin Durkovich, “Future of DHS Project: Key Findings and Recommendations,” Atlantic Council,
August 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/future-of-dhs/future-of-dhs-project-key-findings-andrecommendations/.
199 For more information on National Level Exercises, see CRS In Focus IF11879, National Level Exercises: History,
Authorities, and Congressional Considerations, by Lauren R. Stienstra.
200 See, for example, the pandemic exercise conducted in 2019 and detailed in Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response, Crimson Contagion 2019 Functional Exercise After-Action Report, January 2020.
201 GAO, National Preparedness, pp. 36-37.
202 GAO, National Preparedness.
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Additionally, while FEMA administers NLEs on behalf of the federal government as a whole, it
does not select the focus of these exercises directly. The design and development of NLEs is
guided by the strategic priorities set by the Principals Committee of the National Security Council
and builds on real-world incidents.203 Should Congress desire to shift the focus, frequency, or
scope of NLEs, it may consider more prescriptive legislative language or rulemaking.
Pandemic Response and the Limits of FEMA’s Capacity and Expertise
The FEMA Administrators who have led the agency during the nation’s response to the COVID19 pandemic (Peter Gaynor, under President Trump; Bob Fenton (Acting) and Deanne Criswell,
under President Biden) have acknowledged the challenges posed by the agency’s simultaneous
response to the pandemic and other concurrent disasters. They have noted that the magnitude and
nature of the incident necessitated a re-examination of its practices, and emphasized the need to
reduce the risk to staff while still enabling FEMA to perform its mission.204 To support pandemic
response, they have focused on expanding FEMA’s workforce,205 and supporting state, local,
tribal, and territorial response partners (“response works the best when it’s locally executed, statemanaged, and federally supported”).206 Additionally, they have acknowledged that Congress
provided FEMA and the DRF with sufficient financial resources to perform its mission.207
Although the Administrators lauded the work of FEMA in managing the whole-of-government
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, GAO determined that the pandemic overwhelmed existing
preparedness and response structures and resources at the agency.208 Further, in 2020, GAO
reported on FEMA’s staffing shortages and workforce challenges, noting “[t]he large number of
declared COVID-19 disasters coupled with hurricane and wildfire seasons adds other potential
challenges.”209 Challenges identified by GAO related to FEMA’s support of the pandemic
203 The priorities for 2021-2022 include continuity of essential functions; cybersecurity; economic recovery and
resilience; national security emergencies and catastrophic incidents; operational coordination; public health and
healthcare emergencies; shelter and housing solutions; and stabilization and restoration of community lifelines.
204 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Environment, FEMA’s Natural
Disaster Preparedness and Response Efforts During the Coronavirus Pandemic, Statement of Peter Gaynor, thenAdministrator, FEMA, DHS, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2020, no. 116-107, p. 5 (hereinafter Statement by
Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19). See also FEMA, Initial Assessment,
pp. 110, 112; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, FEMA’s Priorities for FY 2022 and Beyond:
Coordinating Mission, Vision, and Budget, Statement of Deanne Criswell, FEMA Administrator, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 23, 2021, p. 2, https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Criswell%20Testimony1.pdf (hereinafter
Statement by Administrator Criswell, FEMA’s Priorities for FY2022 and Beyond).
205 Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19, p. 6; Statement by
Administrator Criswell, FEMA’s Priorities for FY2022 and Beyond, p. 3.
206 Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19, pp. 16-17; see also
Statement of Robert Fenton, then-Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Administrator, FEMA, DHS, in U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, The Role of FEMA and
Emergency Management in COVID-19 Response, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 16, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/factsheet/role-fema-and-emergency-management-covid-19-response (hereinafter Statement of Robert Fenton, The Role of
FEMA in COVID-19 Response).
207 Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19, p. 17.
208 Statement of Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, in House Homeland Security Committee,
Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response; see also GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions
Needed to Address Deployment and Staff Development Challenges, GAO-20-360, May 4, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-20-360.
209 Statement by Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, in House Homeland Security
Committee, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, pp. 26, 32-33.
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response include workforce-related challenges, such as staffing shortages; unreliable/incomplete
staffing information from the qualification and deployment process, contributing to an ineffective
use of the deployed workforce; the need for contract management improvements;210 and a dearth
of pandemic disaster management experience.211
Operational Capacity
Sufficient staffing is critical to FEMA’s ability to support its partners during disasters. The
President’s pandemic declarations required FEMA to support response efforts in every state and
territory, as well as the District of Columbia and several tribes, while also supporting the ongoing
response to natural disasters, such as hurricanes and wildfires.
FEMA has dedicated significant numbers of staff to the COVID-19 pandemic response. Prior to
standing up the NRCC to manage federal interagency COVID-19 coordination efforts, FEMA
was already “supporting 43 concurrent, open disaster declarations with over 5,000 personnel
deployed.”212 As of July 22, 2020, “FEMA ha[d] 2,245 employees supporting COVID-19
pandemic response out of a total of 20,831 agency employees ready to respond to any other
potential emergencies ... [and] FEMA [was] responding to 114 active disasters and 97 emergency
declarations concurrently.”213 As of March 12, 2021, a year after President Trump declared a
nationwide emergency for the COVID-19 pandemic, “FEMA ... deployed 1,842 staff across the
nation to support vaccination missions.”214 In addition to deploying to support disaster response
activities, FEMA’s staff also have steady-state responsibilities associated with their “day jobs,”
and the increasing number of Stafford Act declarations and nationwide events like the COVID-19
pandemic “will continue to put unsustainable pressure on FEMA personnel.”215
Some members of FEMA’s workforce that contribute to day-to-day operations and long-term
projects may be deployed at length for incidents like the COVID-19 pandemic. GAO explains
that a FEMA “staff member who works day-to-day in FEMA’s Office of Policy and Program
Analysis could hold a primary incident management title as a Facilities Manager in FEMA’s
Logistics cadre and a subordinate title of Logistics Specialist in the same cadre, and may be
certified to operate certain types of forklifts” for response purposes.216 Some may worry that the
deployment of staff in this way could diminish the agency’s capacity to advance its day-to-day
mission.217
210 See, for example, GAO, 2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Post-Disaster Contracts
to Support Response and Recovery, GAO-19-281, April 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-281.pdf.
211 Statement by Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, in House Homeland Security
Committee, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, pp. 32-33.
212 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 11.
213 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Environment, FEMA’s Natural
Disaster Preparedness and Response Efforts During the Coronavirus Pandemic, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2020,
no. 116-107, p. 4.
214 Statement of Robert Fenton, The Role of FEMA in COVID-19 Response.
215 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Preparedness for COVID-19:
The Initial Pandemic Response and Lessons Learned, Statement of RADM Joseph L. Nimmich (USCG, ret.), 117th
Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 14, 2021, p. 3 (hereinafter Statement of RADM Joseph L. Nimmich, Preparedness for COVID19).
216 GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address Deployment and Staff Development Challenges,
GAO-20-360, May 2020, p. 13.
217 See, for example, the testimony of GAO representative Chris Currie and former FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate
in U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittees on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery and
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To enhance the agency’s capacity, then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor noted that, since the
beginning of FY2020, FEMA on-boarded more than 2,300 disaster personnel (more than a 22%
increase over FY2019).218 Additionally, in her statement before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
and Emergency Management, Administrator Deanne Criswell stated that FEMA is prioritizing its
workforce’s health and safety, and noted FEMA is evaluating how to enhance operational
capacity as they prepare for a post-COVID-19 environment.219 Administrator Criswell also
emphasized the need to have the right staffing levels to ensure workforce readiness, as well as
appropriate training, tools, and resources.220
Still, FEMA reported that capacity constrained the agency’s posture towards the pandemic.
Despite the efforts discussed above, in June 2020, FEMA cited the need to adequately prepare for
hurricane and fire seasons as one reason it was reducing engagement in certain pandemic
response efforts (some of which transitioned to DOD and HHS in late spring through fall
2020).221 Further, FEMA’s January 2021 self-assessment noted that the agency was unprepared to
staff the NRCC for an incident of such scale and duration as the pandemic.222 Federal personnel
across the government that FEMA deploys to supplement SLTT capacity also appeared near
exhaustion during the healthcare worker shortage in fall 2021. FEMA instructed SLTTs seeking
supplemental federal personnel to first exhaust other means to build capacity, including
decompressing hospitals and recalling retirees, before requesting federal assistance given “the
possible scarcity of medical personnel resources.”223 A recent survey of federal civil servants
suggests that capacity constraints across agencies may have hindered the pandemic response.224
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the disaster seasons (notably, floods, fires, and
hurricanes), and the potential for novel and emerging threats and hazards may continue to affect
FEMA’s workforce and future staffing needs.225 FEMA and Congress continually evaluate the
Oversight, Management, and Accountability, FEMA: Building A Workforce Prepared And Ready To Respond, hearing,
117th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 20, 2022.
218 Statement by Administrator Gaynor, FEMA’s Natural Disaster Response During COVID-19, p. 6.
219 Statement by Administrator Criswell, FEMA’s Priorities for FY2022 and Beyond, p. 2.
220 Ibid., p. 3.
221 Statement of then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, in HSGAC, Federal
Procurement and Distribution.
222 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 12, 122.
223 FEMA, “Medical Staffing Requests Advisory,” Aug. 18, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/medical-staffingrequests-advisory.
224 David Lewis, “Is the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?” Daedalus, vol.
150, no. 3, Summer 2021, pp. 68-88; “Partnership for Public Service Releases Preliminary Federal Executive Survey
Data, Announces New Initiative to Renew the Federal Government,” Partnership for Public Service, Oct. 14, 2020,
https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Partnership-Survey-Reform-Release-2.pdf.
225 Statement of Elizabeth Zimmerman, Former Associate Administrator, FEMA Office of Response and Recovery, in
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Preparedness for COVID-19: The
Initial Pandemic Response and Lessons Learned, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 14, 2021, p. 8 (hereinafter Statement of
Elizabeth Zimmerman, Preparedness for COVID-19).
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agency’s funding and staffing needs,226 and Congress could also consider evaluating the need for
building staffing surge capacity to further support disaster response.227
Infectious Diseases Incident Experience/Expertise
As noted by GAO, “the response to the COVID-19 pandemic has relied on both public health and
emergency management capabilities, which are often governed by different authorities and
directed by different agencies at the Federal and non-Federal level.”228 HHS is the lead federal
agency for Emergency Support Function #8—Public Health and Medical Services, and has
statutory authority for health and medical events.229 Despite this, as described above, FEMA was
placed in charge of the federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In an earlier hearing, former
FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate noted that FEMA is
the ultimate support agency.... By putting FEMA in the lead role, I think we lost a lot of
the expertise that CDC should have had that FEMA could have supported. So I think
FEMA’s role as the Nation’s crisis manager should be enforced, but I think it should also
be seen that we want to make sure that the lead agencies with the jurisdiction, the legal
authority, and the expertise are taking that lead and FEMA is supporting it and hopefully
making them more successful.230
Emergency mangers commonly support overall incident coordination, and work with the lead
agencies that possess the subject matter expertise needed to manage the incident response efforts.
According to GAO, during previous health-related incidents in the United States, such as H1N1,
Ebola, and Zika, HHS and the CDC possessed the capacity to handle the pu
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