Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations
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Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations
September 24, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46924
SUMMARY
Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations
Central Asia is a landlocked region that borders the Caspian Sea to the West, Russia to the north,
China to the east, and Afghanistan and Iran to the south. The five Central Asian countries—
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—collectively cover
an area approximately 40% that of the United States. The region’s overall population of about 73
million is ethnically diverse and predominantly under 30; the majority religion in Central Asia is
Sunni Islam, and the region is also home to religious minority groups including Shia Muslims
and various Christian denominations, primarily Russian Orthodox. In addition to the local Turkic
and Persian languages, Russian remains spoken throughout the region to varying degrees.
R46924
September 24, 2021
Maria A. Blackwood
Analyst in Asian Policy
Outside observers classify the governments of Central Asia as authoritarian to varying degrees; all five countries rank low on
international democracy and human rights indexes. Central Asia has been described as a challenging environment for efforts
to promote democracy, and observers have expressed concerns that democratic progress in the region has been uneven or
lacking. Members of Congress have drawn attention to human rights issues in Central Asia, including the lack of press
freedom and the detention of political prisoners. Although Central Asian governments have implemented varying degrees of
market reforms, political elites maintain significant control over the region’s economies, and corruption remains prevalent.
Central Asia remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. Fostering regional connectivity has long
been a major U.S. priority in Central Asia. Intra-regional relations have improved markedly since 2016, when Uzbekistan, the
region’s most populous country, embarked on a policy of reengaging with its neighbors. This has led to progress on issues
such as border demarcation and water disputes. Periodic border clashes have continued between some countries, and analysts
assess that water resources remain a potential source of conflict in the region. Much of Central Asia’s hydropower potential
remains unrealized. Some Central Asian governments are pursuing, with uneven progress, projects to develop solar and wind
power in their countries. Despite these and other efforts toward diversification, economies such as Kazakhstan’s and
Turkmenistan’s remain heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports.
The United States was among the first countries to recognize the five Central Asian countries when they became independent
amid the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since that time, the United States has emphasized support for the five
countries’ independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The U.S. Strategy for Central Asia defines the primary U.S.
strategic interest in the region as building a “more stable and prosperous Central Asia that is free to pursue political,
economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own terms; is connected to global markets and open to
international investment; and has strong, democratic institutions, rule of law, and respect for human rights.” The United
States has provided over $9 billion in direct assistance to the countries of Central Asia in the past three decades to s upport
security, democratic reform, and economic growth, and to meet humanitarian needs. Russia maintains strong political,
economic, and military ties with the region, and is the primary destination for labor migrants from Central Asia. China’s
economic presence in Central Asia has grown significantly in recent years and is accompanied by an expanding security
footprint. Many in Central Asia remain wary of China, however, due in part to fears of potential Chinese territorial
encroachment and anger at China’s repression of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities in China’s Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.
Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, many analysts assess that the primary concerns of Central Asian
governments are maintaining stability and ensuring their own countries’ security. The governments of Central Asia have
generally adopted a pragmatic approach toward the Taliban, particularly Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. The government of Tajikistan, which also shares a border with Afghanistan, has by contrast expressed strong
opposition to a Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. All five countries previously provided logistical assistance at various
times to U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan, ranging from overflight rights to hosting U.S. forces. The Kyrgyz Republic and
Uzbekistan leased bases to the United States from 2001 to 2014 and from 2001 to 2005, respectively. Given Central Asian
countries’ proximity to Afghanistan and interest in contributing to regional stability, security cooperation between the United
States and Central Asian countries may evolve in light of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Congressional Research Service
Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Overview ....................................................................................................................... 1
History..................................................................................................................... 2
Country Backgrounds ...................................................................................................... 4
Kazakhstan ............................................................................................................... 4
Political Background............................................................................................. 5
Human Rights...................................................................................................... 6
Economy ............................................................................................................ 8
U.S.-Kazakhstan Bilateral Relations ........................................................................ 9
The Kyrgyz Republic ............................................................................................... 10
Political Background........................................................................................... 12
Human Rights.................................................................................................... 15
Economy .......................................................................................................... 16
U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Relations ...................................................................... 17
Tajikistan ............................................................................................................... 19
Political Background........................................................................................... 20
Human Rights.................................................................................................... 22
Economy .......................................................................................................... 23
U.S.-Tajikistan Bilateral Relations ........................................................................ 24
Turkmenistan.......................................................................................................... 24
Political Background........................................................................................... 25
Human Rights.................................................................................................... 26
Economy .......................................................................................................... 28
U.S.-Turkmenistan Bilateral Relations ................................................................... 29
Uzbekistan ............................................................................................................. 29
Political Background........................................................................................... 31
Human Rights.................................................................................................... 33
Economy .......................................................................................................... 34
U.S.-Uzbekistan Bilateral Relations ...................................................................... 35
Regional Issues............................................................................................................. 36
U.S. Regional Relations and Interests ......................................................................... 36
U.S. Strategy for Central Asia .............................................................................. 37
C5+1 ................................................................................................................ 37
Intra-Regional Issues................................................................................................ 38
Border Disputes ................................................................................................. 39
Energy ................................................................................................................... 41
Oil and Gas ....................................................................................................... 41
Renewables ....................................................................................................... 43
Security ................................................................................................................. 45
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................... 45
Terrorism and Violent Extremism ......................................................................... 50
Foreign Terrorist Fighters .................................................................................... 50
Counternarcotics ................................................................................................ 52
Nonproliferation................................................................................................. 52
Foreign Relations .................................................................................................... 52
Russia .............................................................................................................. 52
China ............................................................................................................... 55
Congressional Research Service
Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations
Outlook and Issues for Congress...................................................................................... 57
Corruption and Human Rights ................................................................................... 58
Trade ..................................................................................................................... 58
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Central Asia ........................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia, 1992 ............................................................ 3
Figure 3. Map of Kazakhstan ............................................................................................ 4
Figure 4. Map of the Kyrgyz Republic.............................................................................. 12
Figure 5. Map of Tajikistan ............................................................................................. 20
Figure 6. Map of Turkmenistan ....................................................................................... 25
Figure 7. Map of Uzbekistan........................................................................................... 30
Figure 8. Exclaves in the Fergana Valley........................................................................... 40
Figure 9. Oil and Gas in Central Asia ............................................................................... 43
Figure 10. Aral Sea Watershed ........................................................................................ 44
Figure 11. The Eurasian Economic Union ......................................................................... 54
Figure 12. Russian Military Installations in Central Asia ..................................................... 55
Tables
Table 1. Kazakhstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes .................................... 6
Table 2. Kyrgyzstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes .................................. 15
Table 3. Tajikistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes..................................... 21
Table 4. Turkmenistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes ............................... 26
Table 5. Uzbekistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes................................... 32
Table 6. Oil and Natural Gas in Central Asia ..................................................................... 42
Table 7. Central Asia on Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes.............................. 60
Appendixes
Appendix. Central Asian Countries’ Performance on Selected Democracy and Human
Rights Indexes ........................................................................................................... 60
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 61
Congressional Research Service
Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations
Overview
Central Asia is a region rich in mineral resources that borders Russia, China, Afghanistan, and
Iran (see Figure 1). The United States was among the first countries to recognize the newly
independent Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic (commonly known as
Kyrgyzstan), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Since that time, the United States has repeatedly expressed support for the
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the five Central Asian countries, and has
implemented programs to support democracy, good governance, and economic reforms in the
region. Some observers contend that Central Asia’s importance to the United States has
historically been “derivative of interests that were not indigenous to Central Asia itself, but rather
were functions of U.S. policies, priorities, and relationships with countries around the region. ”1
Since 2001, U.S. engagement with Central Asia has largely focused on security cooperation,
particularly in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan. Russia maintains strong political and
military ties with the region, and China’s significant economic presence is accompanied by an
expanding security footprint. Central Asia’s combined population of approximately 73 million is
ethnically diverse, and the median age across all five countries is about 28. In addition to Turkic
(Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbek, among others) and Persian (Tajik) languages, Russian
remains spoken throughout the region. Outside nongovernmental observers characterize Central
Asian governments as authoritarian and repressive to varying degrees (see Appendix). The five
countries’ heads of state did not change between 1992 and 2005, and political elites maintain
significant influence over Central Asia’s economies.
Figure 1. Map of Central Asia
Source: Graphic created by CRS.
1 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, January 2016, pp. 3-4.
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Notes: Abbreviations: GEO—Georgia; ARM—Armenia; AZE—Azerbaijan; IND—India.
History
Historically inhabited by a combination of nomadic pastoralist and settled agrarian societies, the
territories that now make up the five Central Asian states were incorporated into the Russian
empire over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries through a combination of military conquests
and political settlements. They became part of the Soviet Union after a period of armed struggle
following the 1917 Russian Revolution. In 1924, Soviet authorities established the boundaries
that served as the basis for Central Asia’s modern borders. Soviet settlement policies and Stalinera internal deportations of certain ethnic groups brought new populations to the region. While
the name of each Central Asian republic derives from the locally predominant group, the region
has historically been ethnically diverse (see Figure 2). Soviet policies granted local languages
certain protections, but Russian functioned as a lingua franca and was privileged and promoted
for most of the 20th century. The Soviet legacy in Central Asia is complex, encompassing
universal literacy and economic development on the one hand, and brutal repression and
environmental degradation on the other. Central Asians’ contributions to the Soviet war effort
against Nazi Germany continue to find broad resonance and are officially commemorated in all
five countries.
The states of Central Asia became independent with the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. In
the assessment of one scholar, independence brought “massive transformations [that] coexist with
significant continuities with the Soviet past.”2 Following independence, many of the region’s
ethnic Russians moved to Russia, the ethnic German minority mostly left for Germany, and
almost all of Central Asia’s Jewish population emigrated. Nevertheless, the Central Asian
countries maintain varying levels of ethnic diversity, even as they have embarked on the process
of forging new identities as independent nation-states. The Islamic religious heritage of the
region’s traditionally Sunni Muslim majority is one factor that informs contemporary national
identities in Central Asia. 3 Soviet ideology was hostile to religion, and Soviet anti-religion
policies in Central Asia led to the elimination of Islam from public life. 4 Experts and stakeholders
assert that Islamic civil society is now growing in importance in the region. 5 At the same time,
Central Asian governments generally exert strict control over religious activity. 6
2
Adeeb Khalid, Central Asia: A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2021), p. 442.
3 Adeeb Khalid, Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Centra l Asia (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2014), pp. 117-119, 125-126, 132-133.
4
Khalid, Central Asia, pp. 218-220, 351-352; Khalid, Islam After Communism , pp. 82-83.
5 Edward Lemon, Samuel Doveri Vesterbye, and Bradley Jardine, Emerging Forms of Islamic Civil Society in Central
Asia, T he Hollings Center for International Dialogue, May 2021.
6 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom , May 12, 2021.
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Figure 2. Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia, 1992
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, available at https://www.loc.gov/item/92685272.
CRS-3
Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations
Country Backgrounds
Kazakhstan
Endowed with significant hydrocarbon and mineral resources, Kazakhstan is the most developed
country in Central Asia. 7 Kazakhstan shares lengthy borders with Russia to the north and China to
the east, and also borders Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (see Figure 3); it is the
world’s ninth largest country by land area (about four times the size of Texas). The ethnically
diverse population of approximately 19 million is predominantly Kazakh (69%), with minority
groups including Russians (18.4%), Uzbeks (3.2%), Ukrainians (1.4%), Uyghurs (1.4%), and
Tatars (1%), among others.8 About 70% of the population is Muslim, mostly Sunni, and
approximately a quarter is Christian, primarily Russian Orthodox. Since independence,
Kazakhstan’s authoritarian government has introduced market reforms, developed the energy
sector, and moved to diversify its economy. Kazakhstan pursues a “multi-vector” foreign policy,
seeking to balance its relations with major powers while actively participating in international
organizations. 9
Figure 3. Map of Kazakhstan
Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Notes: Abbreviations: GEO—Georgia; AZE—Azerbaijan; MNG—Mongolia.
7 Kazakhstan ranks 51 st in the U.N.’s 2020 Human Development Index, ahead of Kyrgyzstan (120 th), T ajikistan (125th),
T urkmenistan (111 th), and Uzbekistan (106 th). Rankings available at https://hdr.undp.org/.
8 Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2021 zhyl basyna Qazaqstan
Respublikasy khalqynyng zhekelgen etnostary boiynsha sany [Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan by individual
ethnic groups at the beginning of 2021], available at https://stat.gov.kz/api/getFile/?docId=EST AT 414397.
9 “ Mukhtar T ileuberdi: ‘Despite the Pandemic, the Foundations of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Remain Unchanged,’”
The Astana Times, January 7, 2021.
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Political Background
Since independence, Kazakhstan’s political system has been dominated by Nursultan Nazarbayev,
a former high-level Soviet official who became the country’s first president in 1991 and remained
in that office until 2019. He won reelection four times, most recently in 2015, although observers
from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report that elections in
Kazakhstan consistently do not meet international standards of impartiality, integrity, and
transparency. 10 While Nazarbayev’s authoritarian government faced international criticism for
human rights violations and suppression of political dissent, he enjoyed strong domestic
popularity for much of his presidency due to his largely successful efforts to promote stability and
economic development. 11 Nazarbayev resigned from the presidency in March 2019, but he
maintains his position as Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Security Council, an influential post to which
he is legally entitled for life, and as leader of the ruling Nur Otan (Radiant Fatherland) party. The
day after Nazarbayev’s resignation, Kazakhstan’s capital, formerly Astana, was renamed NurSultan in his honor. As First President and Elbasy (Leader of the Nation), Nazarbayev enjoys
constitutionally protected status, including lifelong immunity from prosecution as well as special
protections for property belonging to him and certain family members. 12
Nazarbayev was succeeded by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, an experienced politician and diplomat
who previously served as Kazakhstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director-General of the
United Nations Office at Geneva. Tokayev became acting president upon Nazarbayev’s
resignation and subsequently won a snap presidential election in June 2019 with 71% of the vote,
although independent observers questioned the integrity of this result. 13 Tokayev is widely seen as
a Nazarbayev loyalist, and his stated motivation for running was to maintain Nazarbayev’s
“strategic course” and “ensur[e] the continuity of our Leader’s policies.”14 Tokayev has coupled
his emphasis on continuity with promises of systemic reforms aimed at modernizing
Kazakhstan’s political system and improving government openness and accountability. 15
Some analysts contend that major changes are unlikely as long as Nazarbayev remains entrenched
in the political system, questioning the extent to which President Tokayev can act independently
of his predecessor. 16 In October 2019, Tokayev signed a decree further enhancing Nazarbayev’s
10
See OSCE Office for Democracy and Human Rights (ODIHR) reports on elections in Kazakhstan, available at
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan.
11 Annette Bohr et al., Kazakhstan: Tested By Transition, Chatham House, November 2019, p. 16.
12 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of July 5, 2018 , No. 178-VI, “On the Security Council of the Republic of
Kazakhstan,” available at https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=38039248#pos=4;-104; Constitutional Law of the
Republic of Kazakhstan of July 20, 2000, No. 83 -II, “On the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan —T he
Leader of the Nation,” available at http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitutional_laws/o-pervomprezidente-respubliki-kazahstan-lidere-nacii.
13 OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan Early Presidential Election, 9 June 2019: ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Final Report, October 4, 2019; Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, p. 40; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020:
Kazakhstan.
14
“Nazarbaev reshil vydvinut’ T okaeva v prezidenty Kazakhstana” [Nazarbayev has decided to nominate T okayev for
the presidency of Kazakhstan], BBC News Russian, April 23, 2019.
15 President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart T okayev’s State of the Nation Address, September 2, 2019 , available at
https://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/president-of-kazakhstan-kassym-jomart-tokayevs-state-ofthe-nation-address-september-2-2019; Ann M. Simmons, “Kazakhstan’s Newly Elected Leader Calls Himself a
‘Reformer,’” Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2019; S. Frederick Starr, “First Glimpses of T okayev’s Kazakhstan: T he
Listening State?” Atlantic Council, September 17, 2019.
16 See, for example, Paolo Sorbello, “ T he Illusions of Post -Nazarbayev Kazakhstan,” The Diplomat, February 1, 2021;
Nurseit Niyazbekov, “Democracy, the T okayev Way,” The Diplomat, March 3, 2020; Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, pp. v,
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powers as Chairman of the National Security Council, requiring that most senior government
appointments be approved by Nazarbayev. 17 Moreover, Kazakhstan’s parliament is dominated by
Nazarbayev’s Nur Otan party. Legislation passed in 2020 formalized the concept of a
parliamentary opposition, but critics contend that real opposition groups have no chance of
entering parliament. 18 The most recent parliamentary elections, held in January 2021, reaffirmed
Nur Otan’s commanding majority (the party currently holds 76 of 98 elected seats).19
Table 1. Kazakhstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
the World
Not Free (Score: 24/100)
Not Free (Score: 23/100)
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
World Press Freedom Index
160 th of 180 Countries
155 th of 180 Countries
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Economic Freedom
Moderately Free (68 th of
178 Countries)
Mostly Free (34 th of 178
Countries)
Perceptions of
Corruption
Transparency International,
Corruption Perceptions Index
131 st of 168 Countries
94 th of 179 Countries
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
Law Index
73 rd of 128 Countries and
Jurisdictions
62 nd of 128 Countries and
Jurisdictions
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016
Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions
Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law
Index 2020.
Human Rights
According to the U.S. State Department, significant human rights issues in Kazakhstan include
restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association; restrictions on political
participation; the absence of an independent judiciary and due process; corruption; unlawful or
arbitrary killing by or on behalf of the government; and torture by police and prison officials. 20
The State Department notes severe limitations on media independence in Kazakhstan as well as
widespread government surveillance of the internet. 21 Reporters Without Borders ranks
Kazakhstan 155th out of 180 countries in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index (see Table 1).
Human Rights Watch assesses that Kazakhstan’s government actively persecutes real or
perceived political opponents, especially those associated with Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan,
an opposition movement banned as “extremist” since 2018. 22
10-15, 19-22.
17 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev T akes Back Control,” Eurasianet, October 21, 2019.
18 Zulfiya Raissova, “Why Does Kazakhstan Have Parliamentary Opposition?” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical
Reporting, July 2, 2020; Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: Would-Be Opposition Political Parties to Get Leg Up,”
Eurasianet, May 7, 2020.
19 Another nine deputies are appointed by the Assembly of t he People of Kazakhstan, a constitutional body chaired by
the president.
20
U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan , March 30, 2021.
21 Ibid.
22 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020, pp. 323-325; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021, p. 385.
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Although Kazakhstan’s constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, restrictive legislation on
public demonstrations makes it difficult to exercise in practice. President Tokayev signed a new
law on the organization and conduct of demonstrations in May 2020, and the government of
Kazakhstan touts the legislation as a positive reform. 23 Domestic and international human rights
organizations have criticized the law for failing to meet international human rights standards ,
however. According to Human Rights Watch, onerous restrictions and bureaucratic requirements
mean that the ability to protest remains “more a privilege than a right.”24 Local activists and
international human rights experts also expressed concerns that parliament considered the law
while the country was under lockdown due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic, impeding public debate and blocking potential protests of the bill. 25
In the past decade, economic inequality and a perceived lack of government accountability have
fueled discontent that has sometimes manifested in demonstrations despite Kazakhstan’s
restrictive protest rules. For example, in 2011, protests by oil workers in the western town of
Zhanaozen turned violent, leaving at least 15 demonstrators dead and dozens injured after police
opened fire. 26 In 2016, large-scale protests took place against proposed changes to the country’s
land code, which critics feared would lead to a Chinese takeover of Kazakhstan’s agricultural
land. 27 Since 2018, women have protested a perceived lack of support from the state for single
mothers and families with many children. 28 Nazarbayev’s resignation and the June 2019
presidential election catalyzed further protests and calls for broader political change, including
transition to a parliamentary system. 29
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan is led by Mukhtar Ablyazov, a fugitive businessman and former government official
accused of embezzling some $6 billion while serving as chairman of BT A Bank, a m ajor Kazakhstani financial
institution. A vocal Nazarbayev critic, Ablyazov maintains that the charges against him are politically motivated. He
received political asylum in France but lost court cases brought against him in the United States, the United K ingdom,
and other jurisdictions. He was sentenced in absentia on criminal charges in both Kazakhstan and Russia. Kazakhstan’s
government has been accused of abusing the INT ERPOL Red Notice system and other international law enforcement
mechanisms in its efforts to go after Ablyazov and his associates. See U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan, March 30, 2021; Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw, Dictators Without
Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), pp. 71-73; Serge Enderlin, “La
France accorde l’asile politique au principal opposant kazakh” [France grants political asylum to primary Kazakh
opposition figure], Le Monde, October 5, 2020; “ Russia Sentences Fugitive Kazakh Banker Ablyazov in Absentia to 15
Years,” RFE/RL, December 29, 2020.
23 Assel Satubaldina, “Freedom of Expression Is the Constitutional Right of Every Citizen, Says T okayev,” Astana
Times, February 17, 2021; Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: President Signs off on Contentious Rally Law,” Eurasianet,
May 26, 2020.
24 Mihra Rittman, “Kazakhstan’s ‘Reformed’ Protest Law Hardly an Improvement: Serious Restrictions on Right to
Free Assembly Remain,” Human Rights Watch, May 28, 2020.
25 Sarah H. Cleveland, “Joint Opinion on Compliance of the Draft Law on the Procedure for Organising and Holding
Peaceful Assemblies with the Republic of Kazakhstan’s Human Rights Obligations,” International Bar Associatio n’s
Human Rights Institute, T he International Commission of Jurists, and the Centre for Civil and Political Rights, May 1,
2020; Laura Mills, “ Kazakhstan Draft Law Would Undermine Freedom of Assembly ,” Human Rights Watch, March
31, 2020.
26 Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, pp. 48-49.
27 Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained,” BBC, April 28, 2016.
Catherine Putz, “ Social Benefits Remain at the Heart of Ongoing Kazakh Frustration ,” The Diplomat, January 13,
2020.
28
29 See CRS Insight IN11113, Kazakhstan’s Snap Presidential Election Met with Protests, by Maria A. Blackwood.
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Economy
Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s most economically developed country, with an export-oriented
economy highly dependent on hydrocarbons. 30 Major exports by value include oil, copper,
ferroalloys, uranium, and wheat. Dependence on oil exports renders Kazakhstan vulnerable to
external shocks. During a period of falling oil prices and currency devaluation tied to
international sanctions on Russia (Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner), Kazakhstan’s real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to an annual average of slightly above 1% percent in
2015-2016, later accelerating to over 4% in 2017-2019. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and
the related fall in oil prices have caused significant economic pressure.31 The World Bank
estimates that Kazakhstan’s economy contracted by 2.5% in 2020 as a result of the pandemic; the
country last experienced negative economic growth in the late 1990s. Projections indicate a
recovery of 2.5% GDP growth in 2021. 32
Energy
Kazakhstan is a major energy exporter, producing significant volumes of crude oil, natural gas,
and coal. The country is estimated to have the 12th -largest reserves of oil and 16th -largest reserves
of natural gas in the world. 33 Kazakhstan’s oil and gas resources attract significant investment
from U.S., European, Russian, and Chinese firms (see also “Oil and Gas,” below). According to
the U.N. Trade Statistics Database, crude oil accounted for about 58% of Kazakhstan’s exports by
value in 2019.
Kazakhstan holds 12% of the world’s uranium resources and has led world uranium production
since 2009. According to the World Nuclear Association, the country accounted for 43% of world
uranium production in 2019. 34 In 2015, Kazakhstan’s state-owned nuclear energy company
Kazatomprom and China General Nuclear Power Corporation agreed to a joint venture to build a
fuel fabrication plant, with production slated to begin in 2021. 35 Kazakhstan also hosts a lowenriched uranium (LEU) bank owned and operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The LEU bank is intended to decrease the global risk of nuclear weapons proliferation by
guaranteeing countries that lack enrichment capabilities access to fuel for peaceful purposes in
the event of supply disruptions on the commercial market. It is the only facility of its kind that is
not controlled by any individual country. 36
30 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, “Kazakhstan—Market Overview,” January 19,
2021, at https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-market-overview.
31
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia,
November 16, 2020, p. 18.
32 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, January 2021, p. 79.
33 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, July 2021, pp. 16, 34.
34 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan,” September 2020.
35 Kazatomprom National Atomic Company, “Kazatomprom and Chinese Companies Sign an Agreement on Nuclear
Cooperation,” December 15, 2015; Mattia Baldoni and Kamen Kraev, “ Kazatomprom-CGN Joint Venture to Supply
Framatome Assemblies t o China,” NucNet, March 5, 2020.
36 IAEA, “IAEA Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank,” at https://www.iaea.org/topics/iaea-low-enriched-uranium-
bank; Nuclear T hreat Initiative, “ IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank Launches in Kazakhstan, Significant Milestone
for NT I-Backed Nuclear Security Initiative,” August 28, 2017.
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Diversification
Kazakhstan’s government seeks to promote non-oil exports through ongoing structural and
institutional reforms. The Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, promulgated by Nazarbayev in 2012, aims
to position Kazakhstan as one of the world’s top 30 most-developed economies by 2050. 37 As part
of this framework, officials are prioritizing transport and logistics development and
modernization projects, largely aligned with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Kazakhstan’s
government also seeks to turn the country into a regional financial hub, in part through the Astana
International Financial Centre. This special economic zone, opened in 2018, is backed by Chinese
investment and is modeled on the Dubai International Financial Centre. 38 As part of its economic
diversification efforts, Kazakhstan’s government has announced that the country aims to produce
50% of its power from alternative energy sources by 2050. The U.S. Department of Commerce
has identified the agricultural sector as an area of opportunity for U.S. firms as Kazakhstan seeks
to reduce its dependence on extractive industries. 39
U.S.-Kazakhstan Bilateral Relations
The United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The two countries have developed a strong and wideranging bilateral relationship, even as Kazakhstan has sought to avoid alignment with any one
power. In February 2019 Senate testimony, General Joseph L. Votel, then-Commander of U.S.
Central Command, described U.S. relations with Kazakhstan as “the most mature and forwardthinking in Central Asia.”40
Nuclear threat reduction has been an area of close cooperation between the United States and
Kazakhstan from the inception of the bilateral relationship. Kazakhstan was home to the Soviet
Union’s primary nuclear test site, a 6,950-square-mile zone situated near the city of
Semipalatinsk (renamed Semey in 2007) in Kazakhstan’s northeast. Over 450 nuclear tests were
conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Site between 1949 and 1989. 41 The dissolution of the Soviet
Union left Kazakhstan with one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, including some 1,400
nuclear warheads and more than 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Kazakhstan denuclearized
and relinquished the Soviet warheads that remained on its territory, the last of which were
transferred to Russia in 1995. 42 Kazakhstan cooperated closely with the United States to secure
nuclear materials and dismantle associated infrastructure as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction program, through which the United States has provided over $275 million in
assistance to Kazakhstan’s efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and related
37 “Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Leader of the Nation, N.A. Nazarbayev, Strategy
Kazakhstan 2050: New Political Course of the Established State,” December 14, 2012, available at
https://strategy2050.kz/en/page/multilanguage/.
38
“Seeking Belt Buckle Role, Kazakhstan Launches China-Backed Financial Hub,” Reuters, July 5, 2018.
39 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, “Kazakhstan—Market Overview,” January 19,
2021, at https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-market-overview.
40
Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central Command,
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command , February 5, 2019.
41 Radiological Conditions at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan: Preliminary Assessment and Recommendations
for Further Study (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1998), pp. 3-7; Joanna Lillis, Dark Shadows: Inside
the Secret World of Kazakhstan (New York: I.B. T auris, 2019), pp. 234-243.
42 Federation of American Scientists, “Kazakhstan Special Weapons,” at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/kazakhstan/
index.html; Nuclear T hreat Initiative, “Nuclear Disarmament Kazakhstan,” January 2, 2019, at https://www.nti.org/
analysis/articles/kazakhstan-nuclear-disarmament.
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infrastructure since 1991.43 Kazakhstan also cooperates with the U.S. Department of Energy on
nuclear security and nuclear energy through the U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership, formalized
in 2001. 44
Military-to-military contacts constitute a significant aspect of the U.S.-Kazakhstan bilateral
relationship. Since 2003, Kazakhstan has hosted Exercise Steppe Eagle, a multilateral military
exercise that focuses on peacekeeping capabilities. In its most recent iteration, conducted in
southeastern Kazakhstan in June 2019, Exercise Steppe Eagle included participants from the U.S.
Army and the Arizona Army National Guard, as well as forces from the United Kingdom,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with observers from India, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.
Counternarcotics is an active area of cooperation between the two countries. Kazakhstan is a
transit country for heroin and other opiates from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe, and the
United States seeks to improve Kazakhstan’s capacity to combat drug trafficking and related
criminal activity. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration maintains a regional office in
Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city. The State Department has characterized U.S.-Kazakhstan law
enforcement and military ties as “strong and growing.”45
U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan aims to advance human rights and democratic values by supporting
the rule of law, fostering local media development, and building the capacity of civil society
organizations. Additionally, U.S. programs seek to support economic reform and promote
renewable energy and improved energy efficiency. 46 Another focus of U.S. assistance to
Kazakhstan is security cooperation, particularly strengthening military partnerships, fighting
transnational crime, and combatting weapons of mass destruction. 47 The State Department
requests $10.7 million in appropriations for aid to Kazakhstan for FY2022, as compared to $12.1
million allocated for FY2020. 48
The Kyrgyz Republic
The Kyrgyz Republic (commonly known as Kyrgyzstan) is a mountainous country slightly
smaller than South Dakota. Kyrgyzstan borders China in addition to three other Central Asian
states (see Figure 4) and maintains close ties with Russia. The population of approximately 6.6
million is predominantly Kyrgyz (73.8%) with minority groups including Uzbeks (14.8%),
Russians (5.1%), Dungans (1.1%), and Uyghurs (0.9%), among others. 49 Approximately 90% of
the population is Muslim, primarily Sunni; a plurality of the Christian minority, which accounts
for about 7% of the population, is Russian Orthodox. 50 For most of the 30 years since
independence, Kyrgyzstan has been considered by scholars and nongovernmental organizations
43 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Kazakhstan: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021.
44 Kazakhstan is seeking to produce 50% of its power from alternative energy sources by 2050. As such, the
Partnership has most recently focused on clean energy deployment and improving the efficiency of Ka zakhstan’s
electricity markets. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “ U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership,”
at https://www.energy.gov/ia/international-affairs-initiatives/us-kazakhstan-energy-partnership.
45 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kazakhstan, August 3, 2018, p. 2.
46 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2, p.
287.
47 Ibid., pp. 309, 380-381.
48 Ibid., p. 576.
National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia” [Ethnic composition of the
population], available at http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/312/.
49
50 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kyrgyz Republic, May 12, 2021.
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(NGOs) as the most democratic country in Central Asia, with a vibrant civil society and a higher
degree of press freedom than is found elsewhere in the region (see Table 2). 51 Supporting a more
inclusive and accountable democracy is a stated U.S. goal in Kyrgyzstan. 52 The country is one of
21 states worldwide that participate in the House Democracy Partnership. 53 In light of recent
political developments (see “Political Background,” below), in 2021 the NGO Freedom House
classified Kyrgyzstan as “not free” for the first time in 11 years. U.S. officials and others have
voiced concern about the influence of organized crime in Kyrgyz politics. 54 Some Members of
Congress have expressed concerns about government pressure on independent media outlets,
including the congressionally funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). 55 The ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic strain in Kyrgyzstan, which is an
impoverished country that relies heavily on foreign remittances.
51 On Kyrgyztan’s “exceptionalism,” see, for example, Eugene Huskey, Encounters at the Edge of the Muslim World: A
Political Memoir of Kyrgyzstan (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 213 -215. See also Johan Engvall,
“Kyrgyzstan and the T rials of Independence,” in Marlene Laruelle and Johan Engvall, eds., Kyrgyzstan Beyond
“Democracy Island” and “Failing State” (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 1-19. Kyrgyzstan is the only
Central Asian country to be characterized as “Partly Free” by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report after
1993, although it did not consistently maintain that rating (Kyrgyzstan was rated “Partly Free” in 23 o f the 30 years
since the country became independent). In most years since 1991, Freedom House assessed that Kyrgyzstan exhibited a
higher degree of political rights and civil liberties than any other Central Asian country. See Freedom House, “Country
and T erritory Rankings and Statuses, 1973-2021,” available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/
Country_and_T erritory_Ratings_and_Statuses_FIW1973-2021.xlsx.
52 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kyrgyz Republic, November 16, 2018, pp. 5, 10.
House Democracy Partnership, “Kyrgyzstan,” available at https://hdp.house.gov/sites/
housedemocracypartnership.house.gov/files/Kyrgyzstan%20One-Pager.pdf/.
54
See, for example, House Foreign Affairs Committee (@HouseForeign), T witter, October 16, 2020, 12:17PM,
available at https://twitter.com/HouseForeign/status/1317137561018601475; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic,
“Statement on T hreats to the Kyrgyz Constitutional Order,” October 13, 2020.
53
55 See, for example, Senator Bob Menendez (@SenatorMenendez), T witter, December 13, 2019, 12:54PM, available at
https://twitter.com/SenatorMenendez/status/1205546563285798913, and House Foreign Affairs Committee
(@HouseForeign), T witter, December 14, 2019, 12:03AM, available at https://twitter.com/HouseForeign/status/
1205714827706015744.
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Figure 4. Map of the Kyrgyz Republic
Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Political Background
Kyrgyzstan experienced political upheavals that ousted authoritarian-leaning presidents in 2005
and 2010. 56 A new constitution adopted in 2010 limited the presidency to one six-year term and
converted the country to a semi-parliamentary system in which the president shared executive
power with the prime minister. Several Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers voiced
support for Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary democracy, the only such political system in Central
Asia. 57 In light of subsequent political developments, analysts raised concerns about democratic
backsliding in the country. 58 According to Freedom House, by 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s legislature had
“de facto surrendered its constitutionally granted power to form and control the executive
branch,” and become a rubber-stamp body “merely paying lip service to the declared goal of
building a parliamentary democracy.”59 Such concerns were heightened following an April 2021
referendum in which voters approved a new constitution. In addition to significantly increasing
presidential power and weakening the legislature, the new constitution also allows a president to
56 Bruce Pannier, “Rethinking Kyrgyzstan’s T ulip Revolution,” RFE/RL, August 25, 2009; Catherine Putz,
“Remembering Kyrgyzstan’s Revolutions,” The Diplomat, April 9, 2015.
57 See, for example, Sen. T ed Kaufman, “Kyrgyzstan,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.
156 (July 15, 2010), p. S5954; Sen. John Kerry, “Kyrgyzstan’s Democratic T ransition,” remarks in the Senate,
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (June 28, 2011), p. S4149; Rep. Joe Wilso n, “New Partnership with
Kyrgyzstan,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 158 (February 27, 2012), p. H951.
See, for example, Paul Stronski and Katherine Quinn -Judge, “Kyrgyzstan at 25: T reading Water,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2016.
58
59 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kyrgyzstan.
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serve two five-year terms. The document has drawn criticism as “undermin[ing] human rights
norms and weaken[ing] checks and balances necessary to prevent abuses of power.”60
The new constitution came after political upheaval in the wake of disputed October 2020
parliamentary elections whose results heavily favored pro-establishment parties. Opposition
parties alleged widespread irregularities, including vote-buying and voter intimidation; these
assertions were deemed credible by international election observers. 61 After mass protests broke
out in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan’s capital, the Central Election Commission annulled the election
results. 62 Amid the resulting power vacuum, Sadyr Japarov, a former member of parliament who
had been serving a lengthy prison sentence on charges he maintains were politically motivated,
emerged as the leading contender to assume power.63 Within 11 days of the elections, Japarov had
become both prime minister and acting president. 64
Upon taking power, Japarov and his allies began to push for a constitutional referendum to return
Kyrgyzstan to a presidential form of government, arguing that the country is not ready for
parliamentarism. New parliamentary elections were initially scheduled for December 2020; they
were postponed after the sitting parliament voted to extend its mandate through June 2021. 65 The
elections are currently scheduled to take place on November 28, 2021. A snap presidential
election and a referendum on whether or not Kyrgyzstan should adopt a presidential system took
place in January 2021, raising concerns about the state of democracy and rule of law in the
country. 66 Japarov was elected president with 79% of the vote amid relatively low turnout. In the
concurrent constitutional referendum, 84% of voters supported reverting to a presidential
system. 67
60 Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Withdraw Problematic Draft Constitution,” March 5, 2021.
“Kyrgyz Opposition Decries Mass Irregularities in Parliamentary Elections,” RFE/RL, October 4, 2020; OSCE
ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission, Kyrgyz Republic—Parliamentary Elections, October 4, 2020,
“Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” pp. 1-2, 9.
61
62 Central Commission on Elections and the Conduction of Referendums of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, “T sIK priznala
nedeistvitel’nymi itogi golosovaniia na vyborakh” [CEC has declared election results in valid], October 6, 2020;
Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Kyrgyzstan Election: Euphoria T urns to Insecurity as Mob Rule Spreads,” BBC News,
October 8, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Does Kyrgyzstan’s Post -Election Chaos Put It on the Road to Revolution?” The
Diplomat, October 6, 2020.
63T emur Umarov, “ Who’s in Charge Following Revolution in Kyrgyzstan?” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 26,
2020; Bruce Pannier, “ A Hidden Force In Kyrgyzstan Hijacks T he Opposition ’s Push for Big Changes,” RFE/RL,
October 13, 2020; “ Sadyr Japarov: Kyrgyzstan Needs to Change ‘Political Culture,’” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2020.
64 “Kyrgyzstan: Japarov’s Nomination as PM Pauses Crisis,” Eurasianet, October 14, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Kyrgyz
President Jeenbekov Offers Resignation,” The Diplomat, October 15, 2020; Peter Leonard, “Kyrgyzstan: Japarov
Seizes All Levers of P ower,” Eurasianet, October 16, 2020; “ Kyrgyz Parliament Gives Newly Elected PM Japarov
Presidential Powers,” RFE/RL, October 16, 2020.
65 Catherine Putz, “ Kyrgyzstan Punts on Elections to Pursue Constitutional Reforms,” The Diplomat, October 22, 2020;
Ilgiz Kambarov, “ Upcoming Parliament Elections Present New Opportunities and Challenges for Kyrgyzstan ,” The
Diplomat, August 4, 2021.
66 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Urgent Amicus Curiae Brief Relating to
the Postponement of Elections Motivated by Constitutional Reform Issued Pursuant to Article 14a of the Venice
Commission’s Rules of Procedure on the Basis of Comments by Mr. Richard Barrett (Member, Ireland), Ms. Marta
Cartabia (Substitute Member, Italy), Ms. Hanna Suchocka (Honorary President, Former Member, Poland) , Opinion No.
1007/2020, November 17, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Bad Faith Efforts to Overhaul Constitution ,”
November 21, 2020; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Statement on Constitutional Referendum in the Kyrgyz
Republic,” November 27, 2020; Ayzyiek Imanaliyeva, “ Kyrgyzstan: Constitutional Chamber Nixes Attempt to Halt
Power Grab,” Eurasianet, December 2, 2020.
67 “Kyrgyzstan: Japarov Secures Commanding Election Victory,” Eurasianet, January 10, 2021; Mariya Omelicheva,
“ Why Did Kyrgyz Voters Give Up Parliamentarism?” The Diplomat, January 12, 2021; Ana-Maria Anghelescu,
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Some analysts posit that Kyrgyz voters may be drawn to a strong presidential system due to
longstanding frustrations with corruption and the ineffectiveness of parliament. 68 Japarov enjoys
widespread popularity, and many in Kyrgyzstan support his populist platform. 69 In a poll
conducted by the International Republican Institute in February and March 2021, 70% of
respondents said the country is heading in the right direction, up from 41% in August 2020. 70
Nevertheless, some argue that the new constitution and the process by which it was adopted set
the stage for future political instability. 71
As he moved to consolidate power, Japarov announced his intention to combat crime and
corruption. In October 2020, Kyrgyz authorities arrested Raimbek Matraimov, a former highlevel customs official implicated in a large-scale corruption and money-laundering scheme, and
Kamchybek Kolbayev, who is designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a key member of a
transnational criminal organization. 72 In December 2020, Treasury added Matraimov to the
Specially Designated Nationals List under Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), due to his
involvement in corruption. The State Department additionally announced visa sanctions against
Matraimov and his spouse a day later. 73 While Kyrgyz authorities have expressed willingness to
cooperate with the United States on combatting corruption, some analysts question the sincerity
of Japarov’s anti-corruption efforts and speculate that he has backing from organized crime
leaders. 74 The handling of court cases against Matraimov and Kolbayev has raised concerns
among U.S. officials and others in light of their lenient treatment; both men have been released
from custody.75
“ Should Europe Worry About Kyrgyzstan?” The Diplomat, January 16, 2021.
68 See, for example, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “ Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Referendum: Another
Step Backward?,” event held on April 9, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tw5jjrXiFH8; Georgy
Mamedov, “‘Japarov Is Our T rump’: Why Kyrgyzstan Is the Future of Global Politics,” Open Democracy, January 6,
2021.
Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, “ Kyrgyzstan: Japarov, Last Hope or Populist Menace?,” Eurasianet, January 6, 2021; Gulzat
Baialieva and Joldon Kutmalaiev, “ How Kyrgyz Social Media Backed an Imprisoned Politician’s Meteoric Rise to
Power,” Open Democracy, October 15, 2020.
69
70 “ Ahead of Elections, IRI Poll Reveals Kyrgyz Public Expectations,” International Republican Institute, April 2,
2021.
71 Bruce Pannier, “ Does the New Kyrgyz Constitution Set the Country Up for Future Unrest?” RFE/RL, April 13, 2021.
72 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, “Plunder and Patronage in the Heart of Central Asia,” available
at https://www.occrp.org/en/plunder-and-patronage/; U.S. Department of State, T ransnational Organized Crime
Rewards Program, “ Kamchybek Asanbekovich Kolbayev Criminal Network ,” April 9, 2017; U.S. Department of the
T reasury, “ T reasury Designates Key Members of the Brothers’ Circle Criminal Organization,” December 20, 2012;
“Kyrgyzstan: Kolbayev Arrested in Dramatic Fashion, but Is It T heater?” Eurasianet, October 22, 2020.
73 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “ Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Actors in Africa and Asia,” December 9, 2020; U.S.
Department of State, “ On the Occasion of International Anticorruption Day and International Human Rights Day ,”
December 10, 2020.
74 Ilgiz Kambarov, “ Japarov’s Many Promises: Can Stability Emerge From Chaos in Kyrgyzstan?” The Diplomat,
October 22, 2020; Chris Rickleton, “ Kyrgyzstan’s Japarov: Revolutionary Crime-Fighting Anti-Corruption Crusader?”
Eurasianet, October 23, 2020; Bruce Pannier, “ Kyrgyz Judiciary Seemingly Moving in Step with New Leader
Japarov,” RFE/RL, October 26, 2020; Umarov, “Who’s in Charge Following Revolution in Kyrgyzstan?”; “ Former
Kyrgyz Security Council Chief Dismisses New Government ’s Anti-Corruption Efforts as a ‘T heatrical Show,’”
RFE/RL, October 27, 2020.
75 “Kyrgyzstan ‘Ready to Closely Work’ with U.S. After ‘Meddling’ Accusation,” RFE/RL, December 11, 2020; U.S.
Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Release of Kamchybek Kolbayev,” March 3, 2021;
U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ U.S. Embassy Statement on the Release of Criminal Boss Raimbek
Matraimov,” April 16, 2021.
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Table 2. Kyrgyzstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
the World
Partly Free (Score:
38/100)
Not Free (Score: 28/100)
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
World Press Freedom Index
85 th of 180 Countries
79 th of 180 Countries
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Economic Freedom
Mostly Unfree (96 th of
178 Countries)
Moderately Free (78 th of
178 Countries)
Perceptions of
Corruption
Transparency International,
Corruption Perceptions Index
136 th of 168 Countries
124 th of 179 Countries
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
Law Index
83 rd of 128 Countries and
Jurisdictions
87 th of 128 Countries and
Jurisdictions
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016
Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions
Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law
Index 2020.
Human Rights
According to the U.S. State Department, significant human rights issues in Kyrgyzstan include
serious restrictions on freedom of expression and the press, corruption, torture and arbitrary
detention, and inadequate judicial independence. 76 In 2015, the State Department recognized
imprisoned activist Azimjon Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek from southern Kyrgyzstan, with its Human
Rights Defender Award. This led to significant friction in the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan bilateral
relationship (see “U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Relations,” below). Multiple Members of Congress
called upon the Kyrgyz government to release Askarov, but he died in prison in July 2020. 77
Kyrgyzstan has a vibrant civil society relative to its neighbors, and its media pluralism has been
described as “exceptional” in the region. 78 NGOs assert that politicians and other powerful
individuals have used the justice system to pressure independent media outlets, particularly those
involved in reporting on corruption. 79 Recent legislative initiatives have also raised concerns
regarding freedom of expression. In June 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed a law that would
enable authorities to censor websites containing information they determined to be untruthful and
require internet service providers to turn user data over to government agencies on request. After
the bill sparked protests and drew criticism from international observers, then-President
76 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyz Republic, March 30, 2021.
U.S. Department of State, “Winners of the 2014 Human Rights Award,” July 17, 2015; U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, “Menendez, Six Senate Colleagues Call on Kyrgyzstan Pr esident to Release Prisoners,” May 8,
2020; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Bipartisan Group of Senators Call on Central Asian Leaders to
Release Unjustly Detained Prisoners at High Risk of COVID-19,” June 30, 2020; Committee to Protect Journalists,
“ Journalist Azimjon Askarov Dies in Pprison in Kyrgyzstan,” July 25, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ T he T ragedy of Azimjon
Askarov,” The Diplomat, July 27, 2020; Mihra Rittman, “ Kyrgyzstan Must Answer for the Death of Activist Azimjon
Askarov,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2020.
77
78 Reporters Without Borders, 2020 World Press Freedom Index: Kyrgyzstan.
79 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kyrgyzstan.
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Sooronbay Jeenbekov returned it to the legislature for revision. A new version of the bill passed
in July 2021 and was signed into law by President Japarov in August. 80
Nongovernmental organizations operating in Kyrgyzstan also face challenges. In July 2021,
President Japarov signed into law new financial and programmatic reporting requirements on
NGOs. The bill drew international criticism and inspired protests when it was initially introduced
in 2020. 81 Its passage prompted the State Department to express “deep concern” and urge
Kyrgyzstan’s leadership to reconsider the legislation. 82
Economy
Kyrgyzstan is a lower middle income country whose economy is heavily dependent on
remittances and mining. Gold, Kyrgyzstan’s main export commodity, is primarily produced by
the Kumtor mine, which accounted for 12.5% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP in 2020. 83 Kyrgyzstan is one
of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world, with remittances, predominantly from
Russia, equaling roughly 30% of GDP in 2019. 84 Kyrgyzstan’s large informal economy is
estimated at about 24% of GDP; some analysts argue it may be even larger. 85 China is
Kyrgyzstan’s largest trading partner, followed by Russia. Kyrgyzstan’s 1998 accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) helped establish the country as a hub for the re-export of
Chinese goods. 86 Kyrgyzstan has been a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU, also abbreviated EAEU) since 2015. Accession has proven somewhat controversial
domestically because EEU membership introduced new regulatory hurdles while failing to confer
some of the expected benefits. 87
80 Mariya Zozulya, “ Internet Censorship Looms in Kyrgyzstan,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, August 12,
2020; “Zhogorku Kenesh otklonil zakonproekt o zashchite ot lozhnoi informatsii” [Jogorku Kenesh rejects bill on
protection from false information], Radio Azattyk, June 30, 2021; Bermet T alant, “Kyrgyz Parliament Sneaks T hrough
‘Fake News’ Law With President’s Blessing,” Eurasianet, July 29, 2021; “ Kyrgyz President Signs Controversial ‘False
Information’ Bill Into Law,” RFE/RL, August 24, 2021.
81 Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Bills Curbing Basic Freedoms Advance,” June 20, 2020; Ayzirek Imanaliyeva,
“Kyrgyzstan: Draft Bill T hreatens to Drive NGOs Against the W all,” Eurasianet, May 22, 2020; Bakyt T oregel’din
ulu, “Usileniiu kontrolia nad NKO byt’? Spornyi zakon odobren parlamentom vo vtorom chtenii [Strengthening control
over NGOs? Controversial law approved by parliament in second reading],” Radio Azattyk, June 19, 2020.
82 U.S. Department of State, “Kyrgyz Republic’s New Law Directed at NGOs,” Press Statement, July 8, 2021.
83 Kumtor Gold Company, “Contribution to the Economy,” at https://www.kumtor.kg/en/contribution-to-the-kyrgyz-
economy/. Following Japarov’s rise to power, the government of Kyrgyzstan moved to nationalize the mine, which had
been owned by a Canadian company. See Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “ Kyrgyzstan Moves to Nationalise Gold
Mine Run by Canadian Company,” Al Jazeera, July 9, 2021; “ US Court Rules Kyrgyzstan in Contempt for Pushing
Ahead with Local Legal Action Against Kumtor Gold,” bne IntelliNews, July 23. 2021.
“COVID-19 Crisis T hrough a Migration Lens: Migration and Development Brief 32,” World Bank Group, April,
2020, pp. 18-20.
84
85 Hans Holzhacker and Dana Skakova, Kyrgyz Republic Diagnostic, EBRD, May 2019, p. 7.
86 Philipp Schroeder and Elina Schroeder, Entrepreneurship in Kyrgyzstan: Adjustments to a Changing Economic
Environment (Bishkek: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2017); Roman Mogilevskii, “Re-export Activities in Kyrgyzstan:
Issues and Prospects,” University of Central Asia, Inst itute of Public Policy and Administration, Working Paper no. 9
(2012); Bartlomej Kaminski and Gael Raballand, “Entrepot for Chinese Consumer Goods in Central Asia: T he Puzzle
of Re-exports T hrough Kyrgyz Bazaars,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 50, no. 5 (2009): pp. 581-590.
Nurjamal Djanibekova, “Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan Border Crises Complicated by Mutual Distrust,” Eurasianet,
February 6, 2020; “Here’s Looking at EAEU #1: Blowing Hot and Cold,” Eurasianet, June 4, 2020; Roman
Mogilevskii, James T hurlow, and Adeline Yeh, “Kyrgyzstan’s Accession to the Eurasian Economic Union: Measuring
Economy-Wide Impacts and Uncertainties,” University of Central Asia, Institute of Public Policy and Administration,
Working Paper no. 44 (2018).
87
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The expanding Chinese economic presence in Kyrgyzstan has sparked controversy and protests.
China’s Export-Import Bank owns almost 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s roughly $4.8 billion of foreign
debt. 88 As part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, China has supported several large-scale
infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan, financed primarily through concessional loans. In February
2020, a joint Chinese-Kyrgyz project to build a $280 million logistics center in Kyrgyzstan’s
Naryn province was cancelled after protests by local residents, who criticized the investment as a
Chinese land-grab. 89
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant negative impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economy and
the country’s under-resourced healthcare system. The World Bank estimates an 8.6% decline in
GDP in 2020 and projects a rebound to 3.8% growth in 2021. Previous forecasts had predicted
3.4% growth in 2020, and GDP growth had averaged 4% since 2014. 90 Remittances to
Kyrgyzstan fell sharply in 2020 as a consequence of the pandemic and the related economic
downturn in Russia. 91 Additionally, a large number of people either returned from abroad or were
unable to migrate for work, a circumstance analysts deemed likely to aggravate unemployment
and place additional stress on the country’s social services. 92 Kyrgyzstan has received emergency
financial assistance from international financial institutions, and the Kyrgyz government has
requested debt relief from China. 93
U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Relations
The United States was among the first countries to recognize Kyrgyzstan’s independence
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From 2001 to 2014, the United States operated a
Transit Center at Manas, near the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, in support of both Operation
Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. U.S.
relations with Kyrgyzstan deteriorated under President Almazbek Atambayev (in office 20112017), reportedly in part due to Russian pressure. 94 U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relations improved
somewhat under his successor, President Jeenbekov (in office 2017-2020). Bilateral security
cooperation has waned since 2014; the State Department is seeking to develop cooperation in
combatting terrorism and extremism, and promoting regional stability. Other U.S. priorities in
88 Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan’s China Debt: Between Crowdfunding and Austerity,” Eurasianet, November 17,
2020.
89 “ China-Led $280 Million Kyrgyzstan Project Abandoned After Protests,” Reuters, February 18, 2020.
90 World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Spring 2021: Data, Digitalization, and Governance ,
March 30, 2021, pp. 31, 131-132; OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia, June 4, 2020, pp. 5, 37; World
Bank, Global Economic Prospects, January 2021, p. 79.
91 “COVID-19 Crisis T hrough a Migration Lens: Migration and Development Brief 32,” World Bank Group, April,
2020, pp. 18-20; Konstantin Larionov, “The Impact of Global Economic Recession on Kyrgyz Labor Migrants in
Russia,” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, April 14, 2020; OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central
Asia, November 16, 2020, pp. 15-16, 18.
92 OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia, November 16, 2020, pp. 15-16; Asian Development Bank and
U.N. Development Programme, COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconomic and Vulnerability Impact
Assessment and Policy Response, August 2020, pp. 21-26.
Reid Standish, “ How Will Kyrgyzstan Repay Its Huge Debts to China?” RFE/RL, February 27, 2021; Paul Bartlett,
“China Offers Cash-Strapped Kyrgyzstan a Glimmer of Hope on Debt,” Nikkei Asia, December 3, 2020.
93
94 Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “T he United States Just Closed Its Last Base in Central Asia,” The Diplomat, June 10, 2014;
Olga Dzyubenko, “U.S. Vacates Base in Central Asia as Russia’s Clout Rises,” Reuters, June 3, 2014.
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Kyrgyzstan include supporting a more inclusive and accountable democracy and improving the
country’s business environment.95
In 2015, after the U.S. State Department presented Azimjon Askarov with its 2014 Human Rights
Defender Award, the Kyrgyz government terminated the bilateral cooperation agreement (BCA)
that had been in place between the United States and Kyrgyzstan since 1993. 96 The BCA had
facilitated the provision of U.S. humanitarian and technical economic assistance to Kyrgyzstan by
providing tax exemptions and guaranteeing certain protections for U.S. civilian and military
personnel present in Kyrgyzstan in connection with U.S. assistance programs.97 In 2015, the State
Department warned that the lack of a BCA could put U.S. assistance programs to Kyrgyzstan in
jeopardy. 98 Aid programs have continued, however, and U.S. officials have been involved in
efforts to conclude a new BCA. 99 The State Department requests $31.4 million in assistance to
Kyrgyzstan for FY2022, compared to $34.4 million allocated in FY2020, in order to pursue goals
that include supporting democracy in the country, strengthening civil society and independent
media, improving rule of law and promoting good governance, combatting corruption, protecting
human rights, promoting business competitiveness, and combatting tuberculosis. The United
States also seeks to promote law enforcement reform, counter violent extremism, and assist
Kyrgyzstan in professionalizing its military and safely managing its conventional munitions
stockpiles. 100
In January 2020, the Trump Administration suspended the issuance of most immigrant visas to
Kyrgyz citizens as part of its expansion of the travel restrictions introduced by Executive Order
13780 of March 6, 2017. The Administration cited Kyrgyzstan’s failure to comply with
information-sharing criteria, deficiencies in the security of Kyrgyz passports, and deficiencies in
the integrity of the country’s passport issuance process. 101 Kyrgyzstan’s introduction of biometric
passports was delayed in 2019, reportedly as the result of a corruption investigation involving the
tender for passport booklets. 102 Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the U.S. travel
restrictions, stating that they caused “significant damage” to U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relations and noting
that more than 80 countries had yet to introduce biometric passports. 103 President Biden revoked
95 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kyrgyz Republic, November 16, 2018.
96 “ Kyrgyzstan Ends U.S. Cooperation Agreement Amid Human Rights Dispute,” RFE/RL, July 21, 2015.
97 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
Regarding Cooperation to Facilitate the Provision of Assistance, May 19, 1993.
98 U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Kyrgyzstan: T angible Benefit s of U.S. Assistance in Response to
T ermination of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement ,” July 23, 2015.
99 See, for example, U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Readout of U.S. Ambassador Donald Lu’s Meeting with
Foreign Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Ruslan Kazakbaev,” December 3, 2020; Ibid., “ Successful U.S.-Kyrgyz
Annual Bilateral Consultations: Building Our Partnership,” July 31, 2019; Ibid., “ USAID Representative Visits the
Kyrgyz Republic to Advance Bilateral Cooperation Agreement ,” April 22, 2019.
100 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022 , Appendix 2,
pp. 160, 288, 309, 340, 380-381, 577-578.
T he White House, “ Proclamation on Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting
Attempted Entry,” January 31, 2020; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Kyrgyz Republic Designated for U.S.
Immigrant and Diversity Visa Restrictions,” February 1, 2020.
101
102 Alexandra Li, “ Multimillion Passport Deal Under Investigation in Kyrgyzstan ,” Organized Crime and Corruption
Reporting Project, April 19, 2019.
103 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Zaiavlenie Ministerstva innostrannykh del Kyrgyzskoi
Respubliki ot 1go fevralia 2020 goda [Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic dated
February 1, 2020],” February 1, 2020.
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Executive Order 13780 and related proclamations on January 20, 2021, ordering the resumption
of visa processing. 104 Kyrgyzstan began issuing biometric passports in May 2021.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan borders four other states, including China and Afghanistan (see Figure 5), and
maintains close ties with Russia. Tajikistan’s population of approximately 9.5 million is
predominantly Tajik (about 84% as of 2014), with a sizeable Uzbek minority (about 14% as of
2014). 105 The country’s territory is slightly smaller than Wisconsin. According to local estimates,
more than 90% of Tajikistan’s inhabitants are Muslim, primarily Sunni; Ismaili Shias account for
about 4% of the Muslim population. 106 Tajikistan’s long border with Afghanistan and the potential
for instability in that country to spill over into Central Asia draw interest in Tajikistan from China,
Russia, and the United States. Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the government of
Tajikistan has stood out from its neighbors in its strong opposition to a Taliban-led government,
signaling that it would not recognize a government in Afghanistan that it does not see as
inclusive. 107 In Afghanistan, opposition to the Taliban is concentrated in the country’s ethnic Tajik
community; Tajiks are estimated to be the second-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, accounting
for about a quarter of the population. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is causing significant
strain on foreign remittances, which come primarily from Russia and equaled roughly a third of
GDP in 2019. Tajikistan is increasingly dependent on China, which is Tajikistan’s largest foreign
creditor and is building a security presence in the country. Tajikistan has faced incidents of
violence attributed to the Islamic State (IS), but it has been asserted by some observers that the
government also uses the prospect of insurgent activity as a pretext for stifling opposition.
President Emomali Rahmon and his family control the government and significant sectors of the
economy. The U.S. Department of State describes corruption in Tajikistan as widespread. 108
104 T he White House, “ Proclamation on Ending Discriminatory Bans on Entry to The United States,” January 20, 2021.
105 T he CIA World Factbook.
106
U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tajikistan, May 12, 2021.
107 Umida Hashimova, “ T ajikistan and Uzbekistan T ake Different Approaches to Afghanistan ,” The Diplomat,
September 13, 2021; Bruce Pannier, “T ajikistan: T he T aliban’s T oughest Critic,” RFE/RL, September 13, 2021; Ivan
Klyszcz, “ Don’t Underestimate Tajikistan in the Afghanistan Crisis,” The Diplomat, September 2, 2021.
108 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Tajikistan, July 21, 2021.
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Figure 5. Map of Tajikistan
Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Notes: Abbreviations: TKM—Turkmenistan; KAZ—Kazakhstan.
Political Background
Tajikistan is a presidential republic with power heavily concentrated in the executive. The
president serves as both head of state and head of the government; the role and influence of the
legislature is limited. President Rahmon, 68, has been in power since 1992 and is now the oldest
and longest-serving head of state in the post-Soviet states. He was exempted from term limits in a
2016 constitutional referendum that also granted him and his family immunity from
prosecution. 109 Freedom House describes Tajikistan under Rahmon as a “nepotistic kleptocracy,”
as a small group of families close to the president dominate the political and economic spheres. 110
Although six parties have seats in parliament, all support Rahmon, and observers have described
Tajikistan as a de facto one-party state. 111 As speaker of the parliament’s upper chamber, the
president’s son, Rustam Emomali, 33, is first in the line of presidential succession. OSCE
observers describe the electoral process in Tajikistan as lacking credibility and transparency. 112
Shortly after Tajikistan became independent in 1991, the country entered into a five-year civil war
(1992-1997) during which as many as 300,000 people died and more than a million were
displaced. 113 The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which fought as part of a
109
Catherine Putz, “Meet Central Asia’s Newest President-for-Life,” The Diplomat, May 23, 2016.
110 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018: Tajikistan.
111 Edward Lemon, “T he Fall of T ajikistan’s Opposition,” The Diplomat, March 2020.
112 OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Presidential Election, 11 October 2020: ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission Final Report, 29 January, 2021, p. 1.
113 Estimated fatalities vary widely, from 50,000 to 300,000. See Anna Matveeva, “The Perils of Emerging Statehood:
Civil War and State Reconstruction in T ajikistan,” Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, March 2009; and Bruce
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coalition of anti-government forces, was legalized following the 1997 peace deal and adopted an
agenda of democratization. It became Tajikistan’s second-largest political party and held seats in
parliament from 2000 to 2015. 114 In 2015, the Tajik government outlawed the IRPT and labelled it
a terrorist organization in what the U.S. State Department characterized as “steps to eliminate
political opposition.”115 Some of the party’s leaders have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms,
while others have fled the country. Tajikistan’s March 2020 parliamentary elections were the first
to be held since the IRPT was outlawed. One opposition party fielded candidates, but failed to
secure any seats. The president’s People’s Democratic Party won a decisive majority of 47 out of
63 seats in the lower chamber, among reports of widespread electoral fraud. International
observers questioned the integrity of the electoral results. 116
In October 2020, President Rahmon was reelected for a fifth term with 90.9% of the vote, in an
election that “lacked credibility and transparency” in the assessment of the OSCE. 117 Some
analysts had previously speculated that he might be replaced on the ballot by his son, who was
eligible to run in 2020 following constitutional changes that lowered the age requirement for
candidates. Some argue that it is likely Rahmon will not serve out his full seven-year term, and
will resign in favor of his son at some point before the next presidential election, which is set to
take place in 2027. 118
Table 3. Tajikistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
the World
Not Free (Score: 16/100)
Not Free (Score: 8/100)
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
World Press Freedom Index
150 th of 180 Countries
162 nd of 180 Countries
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Economic Freedom
Mostly Unfree (149 th of
178 Countries)
Mostly Unfree (134 th of
178 Countries)
Perceptions of
Corruption
Transparency International,
Corruption Perceptions Index
151 st of 168 Countries
149 th of 179 Countries
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
Law Index
Not Ranked
Not Ranked
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation,
2016 Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency I nternational, Corruption
Perceptions Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016
and Rule of Law Index 2020.
Pannier, “ T ajikistan’s Civil War: A Nightmare the Government Won’t Let Its People Forget ,” RFE/RL, June 23, 2017.
114 Ilya Lozovsky, “T he Death of T ajikistan’s Islamic Renaissance,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting
Project, June 5, 2018; Human Rights Watch, “T ajikistan: Reverse Political Party Closure,” September 14, 2015.
115
U.S Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Introduction , April 13, 2016.
116 “T ajikistan: Fraud-Ridden Election Hands Crushing Win to Ruling Party,” Eurasianet, March 2, 2020; OSCE
ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections, 1 March 2020: ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final
Report, May 27, 2020, p. 3.
117
OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Presidential Election, 11 October 2020: ODIHR Election Assessment
Mission Final Report, 29 January, 2021, p. 1.
118 T emur Umarov, “T he Secret of the T ajik President’s Staying Power,” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 10, 2020.
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Human Rights
According to the State Department, significant human rights issues in Tajikistan include
kidnapping and forced repatriation of citizens from foreign countries, forced disappearances,
torture, arbitrary detention, and a non-independent judiciary, as well as significant restrictions on
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, religious freedom, and
political participation. 119 Tajikistan has faced criticism, including from some Members of
Congress, for engaging in transnational repression of government critics.120 This includes
targeting IRPT members and other dissidents through law enforcement mechanisms such as
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) wanted persons notices and pressuring
family members who remain in Tajikistan (see also “Outlook and Issues for Congress,” below). 121
Media freedom in Tajikistan reportedly is curtailed severely. 122 Reporters Without Borders ranked
Tajikistan 162nd out of 180 countries in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index (see Table 3), down
from 149th in 2018. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about government
pressure on independent media outlets in Tajikistan, particularly the U.S.-funded RFE/RL. 123
Tajikistan’s government sometimes curtails internet access throughout the country, purportedly in
order to block citizens’ access to critical voices, including those of IRPT leaders. 124
The Tajik government restricts and strictly regulates religious practices. 125 Authorities target
outward signs of religiosity, such as hijabs and beards. Minors are prohibited from participating in
public religious activities. The government also places restrictions on minority religious groups,
including Christian denominations. 126 Tajikistan is designated a “Country of Particular Concern”
(CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA, P.L. 105-292), but the State
Department has consistently waived related sanctions in consideration of U.S. national interests .
In its 2021 Annual Report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
recommends that the State Department redesignate Tajikistan as a CPC and condition U.S.
assistance to Tajikistan, other than aid to improve humanitarian conditions or advance human
rights, on improvement of religious freedom conditions in the country and mandated religious
freedom training for Tajik officials. Additionally, USCIRF recommends targeted sanctions on
119 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tajikistan, March 30, 2021.
120 See, for example, Rep. Alcee Hastings, “Introduction of the T ransnational Repression Accountability and
Prevention Act of 2019 (T RAP Act),” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 165 (September
16, 2019), p. E1153; Rep. Steve Cohen, “ Congressman Cohen Introduces the T ransnational Repression Accountability
and Prevention (TRAP) Act ,” press release, July 29, 2021.
121
Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational
Repression, Freedom House, February 2021, pp. 48-49; Edward Lemon, “Weaponizing Interpol,” Journal of
Democracy 30, no. 2 (2019): pp. 15-29.
122 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020: Tajikistan.
123 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Bipartisan Group of Senators Sends Letter to President of T ajikistan
Regarding Harassment of T ajik Journalists,” October 25, 2019.
124 “ T ajikistan’s Internet Goes Down Just as Speech by Exiled Opposition Leader Delivered Online,” RFE/RL,
September 17, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Muhiddin Kabiri Speaks Online, T ajikistan’s Internet Shuts Down ,” The
Diplomat, September 18, 2020. See also “T ajikistan: Opposition Comes On, Internet Goes Off,” Eurasianet, February
23, 2019.
125
See Jason Morton, Promoting Religious Freedom and Countering Violent Extremism in Tajikistan , U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom, November 2020.
126 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tajikistan, May 12, 2021.
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government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious freedom in
Tajikistan. 127
Economy
Tajikistan is one of the world’s poorest countries, with an economy dependent on metal and
mineral exports and remittances from migrant workers. Although Tajikistan has no known
deposits of bauxite, the country’s primary industrial asset is the state-owned Tajikistan Aluminum
Company (Talco), the world’s fourth-largest aluminum smelter. The factory accounts for a
significant fraction of Tajikistan’s GDP. It also consumes about a third of the country’s electricity
supply at a steeply discounted rate and has been implicated in large-scale corruption involving
members of the president’s family. 128
Tajikistan has significant hydropower potential. The partially U.S.-funded Central Asia South
Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) aims to develop hydropower
infrastructure and export electricity to South Asia. 129 If completed, the Rogun Dam could alleviate
domestic electricity shortages and make the country a net energy exporter. Two of the planned six
turbines are currently operational, and construction is slated for completion in 2028. 130 Although
Tajikistan has increased electricity exports, the country continues to face rolling blackouts
domestically. 131
Tajikistan depends heavily on remittances from labor migrants in Russia, which equaled almost a
third of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2019 (down from almost half in 2013). 132 This renders Tajikistan
highly vulnerable to external shocks. Remittances fell significantly in 2020 due to travel
restrictions and economic disruption in Russia caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 133 The
pandemic response has increased unemployment and exacerbated Tajikistan’s chronic food
insecurity. According to the World Bank’s Listening to Tajikistan survey, in May 2020 more than
41% of respondents reported that their households had reduced their food consumption. The
World Bank estimates that Tajikistan’s GDP growth fell to 2.2% in 2020 (down from 7.5% in
2019), projecting a gradual acceleration in GDP growth in 2021 and 2022. 134
Although Russia remains Tajikistan’s primary economic partner, China has increased its presence
in the country in recent years. China has made a range of investments in Tajikistan as part of the
Belt and Road Initiative and now holds the majority of Tajikistan’s foreign debt. In April 2019, a
Chinese state-owned company entered into an agreement to receive a stake in Talco in exchange
127
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom , April 2021, p. 48.
128 Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders, pp. 80-111; “ Report: T ajikistan to Yield Share in Aluminum
Plant to China,” Eurasianet, December 5, 2019; David T rilling, “ Russian Aluminum Giant Pries Open Books at
T ajikistan’s Largest Factory,” Eurasianet, June 9, 2014.
129
USAID, Secretariat for CASA-1000 Power Transmission Project Fact Sheet, September 14, 2020.
130 Catherine Putz, “T ajikistan’s Rogun Dam Begins Operations,” The Diplomat, November 20, 2018; Catherine Putz,
“ Winter Energy Woes Bedevil Central Asia,” The Diplomat, January 13, 2021.
131 “T ajikistan Returning to Electricity Rationing Regime,” Eurasianet, January 6, 2021; “T ajikistan: Lights Out as
Dams Falter,” Eurasianet, November 17, 2020.
132 World Bank, “ Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP)—T ajikistan,” available at https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/BX.T RF.PWKR.DT .GD.ZS?locations=T J.
Khiradmand Sheraliev, “ A Critical Lesson for T ajikistan: T he State of Migrant Workers in 2020 ,” The Diplomat,
January 6, 2021; “ T ajikistan: Coronavirus T aking Heavy T oll on Remittances,” Eurasianet, July 22, 2020.
133
134 World Bank, Tajikistan Country Economic Update Fall 2020: Economic Slowdown Amid the Pandemic , December
23, 2020.
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for investing $545 million in modernizing the facility. 135 As much as 90% of Tajikistan’s
telecommunications infrastructure is from China, manufactured by Huawei. 136
U.S.-Tajikistan Bilateral Relations
Tajikistan works with the United States to promote greater regional connectivity in Central Asia,
and U.S. officials have viewed it as an important partner for promoting stability in Afghanistan. 137
The State Department requests $48.4 million for assistance to Tajikistan in FY2022, compared to
$50.9 million allocated in FY2020. U.S. aid to Tajikistan includes public health programs
targeting nutrition, tuberculosis, and maternal and child health, as well as programs intended to
build democratic institutions, political pluralism and civil society; support the modernization of
the country’s education system; address climate change; support agricultural development; and
improve private sector competitiveness.138 U.S. engagement with Tajikistan also includes security
cooperation, particularly in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and countering
violent extremism. Tajikistan lies along a major drug trafficking route for opiates from
Afghanistan, and the United States provides equipment and training to relevant Tajik agencies. 139
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan borders the Caspian Sea and four other countries, including Afghanistan and Iran
(see Figure 6). The country is slightly larger than California and is more than 80% desert. The
size of Turkmenistan’s population is disputed; the figure asserted by the government is 6.2
million, but some argue that it may be less than half of that. 140 According to the U.S. State
Department, Turkmenistan is approximately 89% Muslim (predominantly Sunni), and about 9%
Eastern Orthodox. 141 A large majority of the country’s population is Turkmen (approximately
85% according to U.S. government estimates), with minority groups including Uzbeks and
Russians. Since independence, Turkmenistan’s authoritarian government has kept the country
largely isolated from the outside world and maintained tight control over the economy, although
Turkmenistan’s natural gas resources have attracted foreign investment. Turkmenistan’s
constitution establishes “permanent neutrality” as the core principle of the country’s foreign
policy. History and geography underpin a complicated but important relationship with Russia, and
increasing economic dependence is driving closer ties with China. In recent years, U.S.
engagement with Turkmenistan has focused primarily on border security issues, particularly with
neighboring Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s government has not acknowledged any cases of
COVID-19 within its borders. Independent media operating outside the country have compiled
evidence of COVID-19 infections and deaths, and report that authorities have imposed pandemicrelated restrictions domestically. 142 The pandemic has exacerbated Turkmenistan’s economic
135 “ Report: T ajikistan to Yield Share in Aluminum Plant to China,” Eurasianet, December 5, 2019; “Chast’
imushchestva aliuminievogo giganta T adzhikistana peredadut novoi kompanii [Part of the assets of T ajikistan’s
aluminum giant will be transferred to a new company],” Fergana News, May 22, 2020.
136 Bradley Jardine, “ China’s Surveillance State Has Eyes on Central Asia,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 2019.
137 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Relations With T ajikistan: Bilateral Relations Factsheet,” January
20, 2021.
138 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2,
pp. 162, 288, 310, 340, 380-381.
139 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “T ajikistan Summary.”
140
“ T urkmenistan Faces ‘Shocking Population Decline’ As Exodus Continues,” RFE/RL, July 12, 2021.
141 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Turkmenistan , May 12, 2021.
142 T urkmen.news, Survival of the Fittest: All About Coronavirus in Turkmenistan, Though Officially the Country Has
No COVID-19 Infections, May 2021.
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situation. Residents face chronic food shortages as well as difficulties withdrawing cash, which is
used for most transactions.
Figure 6. Map of Turkmenistan
Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Political Background
Executive power in Turkmenistan is largely unchecked, and President Gurbanguly
Berdimuhamedov dominates the country’s political structures. The president has extensive
powers that include presiding over the Cabinet of Ministers, as well as appointing and dismissing
regional governors and mayors. Although the constitution stipulates the independence of the
judiciary, the president also appoints and dismisses judges. The legislature, termed a “rubberstamp body” by observers, became bicameral following constitutional changes introduced in
September 2020. 143 Following 2012 legislation allowing for a multi-party system, Turkmenistan
has three officially recognized political parties: the Democratic Party (established in 1991 as the
successor to the Soviet-era Communist Party), the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and
the Agrarian Party. The OSCE describes Turkmenistan’s political environment as “only nominally
pluralist,” as all three parties are aligned with the president and electoral procedures fail to meet
international standards. 144
Saparmurad Niyazov, former first secretary of Turkmenistan’s Communist Party, became the
country’s first elected president after an uncontested 1992 race. A 1994 referendum extended his
term to 2002, and in 1999, amendments to the constitution proclaimed him president for life.
Niyazov, known as Turkmenbashi, or Leader of the Turkmen, was an autocratic ruler who created
a cult of personality around himself and his family, isolated the country, and suppressed dissent.
143 Bruce Pannier, “T urkmen Elections Look Like Next Step T oward Dynasty,” RFE/RL, March 22, 2018.
144 OSCE ODIHR, Turkmenistan Parliamentary Elections, 25 March 2018, ODIHR Election Assessment Mission:
Final Report, May 30, 2018.
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Following Niyazov’s death in December 2006, former Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of
Ministers Berdimuhamedov was elected in a 2007 election widely seen as fraudulent. He was
reelected in 2012 and again in 2017 (in 2016, the presidential term was extended from five to
seven years). No constitutional limit exists on the number of terms a president can hold office.
With the passage of constitutional amendments in 2016, presidential candidates no longer have an
upper age limit. Berdimuhamedov has largely followed in his predecessor’s authoritarian
footsteps. 145 He has replaced Niyazov’s cult of personality with veneration of himself and uses
the title Arkadag (the Protector).146 Many analysts assess that Berdimuhamedov is positioning his
son Serdar, 39, as his successor.147
Table 4. Turkmenistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
the World
Not Free (Score: 4/100)
Not Free (Score: 2/100)
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
World Press Freedom Index
178 th of 180 Countries
178 th of 180 Countries
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Economic Freedom
Repressed (174 th of 178
Countries)
Repressed (167 th of 178
Countries)
Perceptions of
Corruption
Transparency International,
Corruption Perceptions Index
154 th of 168 Countries
165 th of 179 Countries
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
Law Index
Not Ranked
Not Ranked
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation,
2016 Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption
Perceptions Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016
and Rule of Law Index 2020.
Human Rights
The State Department identifies human rights issues in Turkmenistan, and Turkmenistan faces
human rights criticism from international nongovernmental organizations. The NGO Freedom
House describes the country as “a repressive authoritarian state where political rights and civil
liberties are almost completely denied in practice.”148 Citizens are reportedly subject to
widespread surveillance, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture. The government also imposes
severe restrictions on freedom of movement. 149 The State Department describes corruption in
145 Aisha Berdyeva, “T urkmenistan: Berdymukhamedov Marks First Year as President,” Eurasianet, February 11,
2008.
146 Farangis Najibullah, “ T urkmenistan: My Personality Cult Is Better T han Yours,” RFE/RL, February 13, 2012.
147 “ T urkmen Leader’s Son T akes On New Roles; Rapid Rise Renews T alk of Succession,” RFE/RL, February 12,
2021; Victoria Clement, “Passing the Baton in T urkmenistan,” Atlantic Council, October 21, 2019.
148 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018: Turkmenistan.
149 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkmenistan , March 30, 2021.
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Turkmenistan as rampant. 150 With billions of dollars in state revenues allegedly embezzled on
behalf of the president, one NGO has termed Turkmenistan a “model kleptocracy.”151
Because of its violations of religious freedom, Turkmenistan has been designated as a CPC under
the IRFA since 2014. The State Department regularly waives the related sanctions, citing U.S.
national interests. The Secretary of State redesignated Turkmenistan as a CPC in December 2020.
USCIRF describes religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan as “among the worst in the
world.”152 In its 2021 Annual Report, USCIRF recommends that the State Department continue to
designate Turkmenistan as a CPC and lift the sanctions waiver, given the country’s record of
severe and wide-ranging violations of religious freedom. Additionally, USCIRF recommends that
the U.S. government limit security assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA Section 405(a)(22) and
impose targeted sanctions on government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations
of religious freedom in Turkmenistan. 153
Turkmenistan has long faced international criticism for engaging in widespread use of stateorchestrated forced labor, particularly in the harvesting of cotton. Public sector employees are
reportedly forced to pick cotton, and private businesses are allegedly also forced to contribute
labor. In 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection responded to concerns about forced labor by
issuing a Withhold Release Order banning the importation of all cotton from Turkmenistan, as
well as all products produced using cotton from Turkmenistan. 154 In its 2021 Trafficking in
Persons Report, the State Department assessed that the government of Turkmenistan had a
documented “policy or pattern of forced labor,” and ranked Turkmenistan as a Tier 3 country for
human trafficking. 155 Although Turkmenistan has taken steps to mechanize the cotton harvest,
local officials continue to coerce soldiers, public sector workers, and private-sector employees to
pick cotton without pay in order to meet government production quotas. Additionally, students
and public sector workers, including teachers and doctors, continue to face compulsory
mobilization for public works projects such as preparing public spaces for presidential visits and
supporting government-sponsored events.156
Media outlets in Turkmenistan are predominantly state-controlled, and NGOs identify significant
abuses. The Committee to Protect Journalists has condemned the “systematic harassment” of the
few independent journalists active in the country, and, in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index,
Reporters Without Borders ranked Turkmenistan 178th out 180 countries in levels of freedom
available to journalists (see Table 4), terming Turkmenistan “an ever-expanding news ‘black
hole.’”157 The U.S.-funded RFE/RL is one of a small number of independent news outlets that
reports from within Turkmenistan. Internet censorship is prevalent, and the government blocks
access to many websites.
150 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements, July 21, 2021.
151 Crude Accountability, Turkmenistan: A Model Kleptocracy, June 2021.
152 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom , April 2021, p. 50.
153 Ibid.
154 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Withhold Release Orders and Findings,” May 18, 2018, at
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade-community/programs-outreach/convict-importations/detention-orders.
155 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2021, p. 565.
156
Ibid., pp. 565-567.
157 Reporters Without Borders, “T urkmenistan,” at https://rsf.org/en/turkmenistan; Committee to Protect Journalists,
“T urkmenistan Journalist Soltan Achilova Barred from T raveling Abroad,” March 25, 2019.
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Economy
The opaque nature of Turkmenistan’s government presents difficulties for accessing reliable data
on the country’s centrally-managed economy.158 Turkmenistan is largely dependent on the export
of hydrocarbons, especially natural gas, which was estimated to have accounted for 83.4% of the
country’s exports by value in 2019, with oil comprising another 9.5%. 159 Soviet industrialization
policies established a cotton monoculture in the country, and cotton is Turkmenistan’s largest
export after hydrocarbons. The country’s other major crop, wheat, is cultivated for the domestic
market. Foreign direct investment remains limited beyond the hydrocarbons sector. The
government of Turkmenistan maintains that the country has had no cases of COVID-19. The
country has experienced the economic effects of the global pandemic, with GDP growth slowing
to 0.8% in 2020 according to IMF data. 160
Turkmenistan is estimated to have the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, accounting
for about 7% of the global total. 161 The country’s export capacity is limited by its infrastructure.
Payment disputes with Russia and Iran halted gas flows from Turkmenistan in 2016 and 2017,
respectively, leaving China as Turkmenistan’s major export market. Roughly half of
Turkmenistan’s gas production is consumed domestically, while the majority of the rest is
exported to China. Turkmenistan is China’s largest natural gas supplier by pipeline, accounting
for over 60% of pipeline imports in 2019 (see “Oil and Gas,” below). China is also
Turkmenistan’s primary international lender, having provided over $8 billion in loans to develop
Turkmenistan’s gas infrastructure. Analysts speculate that Turkmenistan services its Chinese
loans through discounted gas sales. 162 Although Russia resumed gas imports from Turkmenistan
in 2019, the volume is relatively minor compared to Turkmenistan’s exports to China. 163 The drop
in natural gas prices and lower demand resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has had a
significant negative impact on Turkmenistan’s economy. The value of China’s imports from
Turkmenistan, which consist almost exclusively of natural gas, fell by 30% in 2020. 164
Even before the pandemic, declining revenue from gas exports put pressure on Turkmenistan’s
economy, reducing living standards in recent years. High inflation, currency devaluation, tight
foreign exchange controls, and import restrictions mean that the country faces chronic shortages
of food and constraints on the ability to withdraw paper currency at local banks. The U.S.
158 Economic indicators provided by the government of T urkmenistan are generally seen as unreliable. T he U.S.
Department of Commerce terms GDP and growth rate figures put forward by the government of T urkmenistan
“implausible” and “not credible” (see U.S. Department of Commerce, Turkmenistan Country Commercial Guide, July
21, 2019, available at https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=T urkmenistan-Market-Overview). Citing a lack of
reliable data, the World Bank does not publish economic output, income, or growth data for T urkmenistan. See also
Peter Leonard, “ T urkmenistan: End of the Road for the Roaring Growth Myth?” Eurasianet, April 7, 2021.
159
Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
160 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Managing Divergent Recoveries, April 2021, p. 38. T his
contrasts with the 5.8% growth claimed by the government of T urkmenistan. T he Economist Intelligence Unit
estimates a 0.8% contraction in T urkmenistan’s GDP in 2020.
161 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, July 2021, p. 34.
Luca Anceschi, “A T ale of Four Pipelines: T he International Politics of T urkmen Natural Gas,” in Adam Hug, ed.,
Spotlight on Turkmenistan, T he Foreign Policy Centre, July 2019, pp. 36-37; Jakub Jakobowski and Mariusz
Marszewski, “Crisis in T urkmenistan: A T est for China’s Policy in the Region,” Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW),
August 31, 2018.
162
163
Catherine Putz, “Russia Is Buying T urkmen Gas Again. Why?” The Diplomat, April 25, 2019.
164 People’s Republic of China General Administration of Customs, “Imports and Exports by Country (Region) of
Origin/Destination, 12.2020,” January 18, 2021, available at http://english.customs.gov.cn/Statics/81bd4a20-01a845be-bcbc-f0627fd206da.html.
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Department of Commerce describes corruption in Turkmenistan as “pervasive and endemic,” and
notes that foreign companies have reported problems collecting payments for government
contracts.165 The Heritage Foundation’s 2021 Index of Economic Freedom classifies
Turkmenistan as “repressed,” ranking it 167th out of 180 countries. The country’s dire economic
situation has prompted many citizens to emigrate to countries such as Turkey and Russia. 166
U.S.-Turkmenistan Bilateral Relations
Turkmenistan’s constitution outlines the principle of “permanent neutrality” as the basis for the
country’s foreign policy. The United Nations officially recognized Turkmenistan’s neutral status
in 1995. 167 In practice, Turkmenistan’s neutrality translates to foreign policy isolationism, and the
country is largely closed off from the outside world. While Turkmenistan’s geography and energy
resources make it a potential strategic partner for the United States, the development of U.S. Turkmenistan ties is hampered by the country’s uninviting investment climate, repressive
government, and generally closed nature. Bilateral engagement to date has focused largely on
regional security issues. In 2019 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General
Joseph L. Votel, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command, noted that while international
cooperation is limited by Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy, U.S. efforts have focused on English
language training, medical engagements, and the development of Turkmenistan’s Special Forces.
He identified Turkmenistan’s interest in enhancing its disaster response capability and border
security as avenues of opportunity for U.S. Central Command. “Maintaining a small, consistent
security cooperation portfolio in Turkmenistan has outsized impact and will help counter Russian
and Chinese influence,” he concluded. 168
The State Department requests $4.1 million in assistance to Turkmenistan in FY2022, compared
to $4 million allocated in FY2020. 169 In order to “help [Turkmenistan] become a partner whose
contributions can help stabilize Afghanistan,” U.S. programs include efforts to improve the
country’s business climate and foster a more diversified economy; combat trafficking in persons;
and advance good governance. 170
Uzbekistan
Many analysts see Uzbekistan a potential regional leader. 171 Uzbekistan has the largest population
in the region and is the only country that borders all four other Central Asian states (see Figure
165 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, Turkmenistan—Country Commercial Guide,
October 15, 2020.
166 “Istochniki: T urkmenistan v sostoianii depopulatsii. V strane ostalos’ 2,7 milliona naseleniia” [Sources:
T urkmenistan is in a state of depopulation. T here are 2.7 million inhabitants left in the country], Radio Azatlyk, July 2,
2021; Bruce Pannier, “How Many People Live in T urkmenistan? T he Official Figure Is Hard to Believe,” RFE/RL,
January 23, 2020.
167 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 50/80, Maintenance of International Security, December 12, 1995.
168 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central
Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command , February 5, 2019.
169 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2,
pp. 583-584.
170 Ibid., p. 289.
171 See, for example, Nathan Hutson and Marsha McGraw Olive, “Uzbekistan Rising as Central Asian Integration
Catalyst,” Eurasianet, February 8, 2021; Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, “ Will an Ascendant Uzbekistan Challenge
Kazakhstan’s Leadership in Central Asia?” Geopolitical Monitor, June 4, 2018; T imur T oktonaliev, “Could Uzbekistan
Lead Central Asia?” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, November 22, 2017.
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7). The country also shares a border with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is slightly larger than
California, and the majority of the country’s population of approximately 34.9 million is Uzbek
(83.8%), with Tajik (4.8%), Kazakh (2.5%), Russian (2.3%), Karakalpak (2.2%), and Tatar
(1.5%) minorities, among others. 172 Most of Uzbekistan’s inhabitants are Muslim (88% according
to U.S. government estimates, and 96% according to the government of Uzbekistan), almost
exclusively Sunni, and about 2.2% of the population is Russian Orthodox. 173 The United States
and Uzbekistan cooperate in addressing regional threats such as illegal narcotics, trafficking in
persons, terrorism, and violent extremism. 174 Additionally, the wide-ranging reform effort
currently underway in Uzbekistan potentially creates new opportunities for U.S. engagement with
the country across a range of sectors. Uzbekistan previously had sought to position itself as an
intermediary between the Taliban and the Afghan government, in line with Uzbekistan’s stated
aim of facilitating intra-Afghan peace talks. 175 Uzbekistan’s stance toward the Taliban is generally
seen as pragmatic, with the priority of ensuring Uzbekistan’s security (see “Afghanistan,”
below). 176
Figure 7. Map of Uzbekistan
Source: Graphic created by CRS.
172 Population estimate as of July 1, 2021, from the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics,
available at https://stat.uz/en/. Ethnic breakdown estimated as of 2017, from the CIA World Fact book.
173 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Uzbekistan , May 12, 2021.
174 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Uzbekistan: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021.
175 James Durso, “ Uzbekistan’s Role in Afghan Reconciliation,” The Diplomat, August 18, 2020; Umida Hashimova,
“What Is Uzbekistan’s Role in the Afghan Peace Process?” The Diplomat, March 11, 2019.
176 See, for example, Henry Foy, “T aliban T akeover T urns Uzbekistan into P owerbroker,” Financial Times, September
9, 2021; Muhammad T ahir, “ Majlis Podcast: Uzbekistan Walks the T ightrope in Its Policies T oward Afghanistan,”
RFE/RL, September 5, 2021; Gavin Helf and Barmak Pazhwak, “ Central Asia Prepares for T aliban T akeover,” United
States Institute of Peace, July 20, 2021.
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Political Background
From 1991 to 2016, Uzbekistan was led by President Islam Karimov, a former high-level Soviet
official. International observers considered his rule authoritarian and highly repressive. 177
Karimov’s economic policies emphasized self-sufficiency, and his government pursued a largely
isolationist foreign policy. After his death, Karimov was succeeded by Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who
was prime minister under Karimov for 13 years. After serving as acting president, Mirziyoyev
won a December 2016 presidential election that was criticized by international observers as
“devoid of genuine competition.”178 Although Mirziyoyev was widely expected to continue his
predecessor’s policies, he embarked on an ambitious reform program, aiming to transform
Uzbekistan by modernizing and liberalizing the economy, streamlining the bureaucracy, easing
political repression, addressing human rights concerns, reengaging with the international
community, and attracting increased foreign investment.
U.S. officials and other international observers have noted continuing reforms in Uzbekistan since
the country began that process in 2016. 179 Uzbek government officials consistently describe the
country’s reform process as “irreversible.”180 Longtime observers describe the overall changes
taking place in Uzbekistan as “remarkable,” particularly with regard to increased openness,
improved governance, and decreased repression, and U.S. officials have voiced strong support for
the country’s ongoing reforms.181 Reform remains a top-down, centralized process, leading to
skepticism among some analysts as to whether the government will implement true
democratization. 182 Analysts note a slower pace in areas such as the privatization of state assets,
decentralization of political power, and combatting corruption. 183 Some observers, including the
U.S. government, continue to express concerns about human rights and political freedoms. 184
177 See, for example, “Uzbekistan: Authoritarian President Karimov Reported Dead: Legacy Is Quarter Century of
Ruthless Repression,” Human Rights Watch, September 2, 2016; Casey Michel, “ Uzbekistan’s Karimov Leaves
Behind a Legacy of Repression, Slavery, and Kleptocracy,” The Diplomat, September 2, 2016.
178
OSCE ODIHR, Uzbekistan, Early Presidential Election, 4 December 2016: Final Report, March 22, 2017, p. 1.
179 See, for example, U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan, “ Secretary Michael R. Pompeo and Uzbekistan Foreign Minister
Abdulaziz Kamilov,” February 3, 2020; Navbahor Imamova, “U.S.-Uzbekistan: Strategic P artnership, Continuity, and
Mirziyoyev’s Challenges,” Amerika Ovozi, November 22, 2020.
180 See, for example, T he White House, “T he United States and Uzbekistan: Launching a New Era of Strategic
Partnership,” May 16, 2018; United Nations General Assembly, “General Assembly Debate Concludes Amid Calls to
Foster Global Stability through Multilateralism, Cooperation, Respect for Human Rights,” GA/12073, October 1, 2018;
Umida Hashimova, “Uzbek Foreign Minister on Reforms: ‘T here Is No Way Back,’” The Diplomat, February 13,
2019.
Navbahor Imamova, “Where Freedoms Are Expanding—Slowly,” The Atlantic, October 5, 2019; U.S. Embassy in
Uzbekistan, “Remarks by Ambassador Alice Wells,” February 27, 2019.
181
182 See, for example, Fred Harrison, “Uzbekistan Is Being T ransformed, but Where Are the Democratic Reforms?”
BNE Intellinews, January 6, 2021; Dilmira Matyakubowa, “ T here Won’t Be Political Reform in Uzbekistan. Here’s
Why,” The Diplomat, December 22, 2020.
183
See, for example, Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, “ Uzbekistan Reform Agenda Shows Signs of Slowing,” Financial
Times, September 9, 2021; Fred Harrison, “Uzbekistan Is Being T ransformed, but Where Are the Democratic
Reforms?” BNE Intellinews, January 6, 2021; Dilmira Matyakubowa, “T here Won’t Be Political Reform in Uzbekistan.
Here’s Why,” The Diplomat, December 22, 2020.
184 See, for example, Laurence Fletcher, “Uzbekistan Fails to Address Human Rights Violations,” Financial Times,
September 9, 2021; Navbahor Imamova, “ Uzbekistan Reform Pace Questioned as Presidential Election Approaches,”
Voice of America, May 26, 2021; Steve Swerdlow, “Uzbekistan Needs a Nav ruz for Human Rights,” March 1, 2021;
U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uzbekistan , March 30, 2021.
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Freedom House continues to classify Uzbekistan as “not free,” assessing that the country
“remains an authoritarian state with few signs of democratization.”185
Uzbekistan’s centralized government structure grants the executive branch extensive powers,
with the president exercising significant control over the legislature and the judiciary. The
president nominates the prime minister, the chair of the Senate, the general prosecutor, and all
regional governors. He also approves the cabinet of ministers, and appoints and dismisses all
judges. By law, the president is limited to two five-year terms, but this limit was not observed by
Karimov. The bicameral legislature (Oliy Majlis) has historically provided neither an effective
check on the executive nor a venue for genuine political debate. Its role has expanded somewhat
under Mirziyoyev, who has urged more oversight over the executive and greater initiative from
parliament. 186
The country’s first post-Karimov parliamentary elections were held in December 2019 under the
slogan “New Uzbekistan—New Elections.” According to international observers, the elections
took place in an atmosphere of unprecedented openness and engagement with voters but did not
demonstrate genuine competitiveness. 187 The composition of parliament remains largely
unchanged, and the five parties that currently hold seats are seen as pro-government. Although no
party has an outright majority, Mirziyoyev’s Liberal Democratic Party received the highest
number of seats (53 of the 150 seats in the chamber). More than half of the incoming deputies
were elected for the first time, and they are on average younger than their predecessors.188 In
2020, legislative amendments expanded the oversight powers of the Oliy Majlis, and the new
parliament has engaged in increased debate on policy issues. 189
Table 5. Uzbekistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes
Issue
Index
2016 Status/Rank
2020/2021 Status/Rank
Democracy
Freedom House, Freedom in
the World
Not Free (Score: 3/100)
Not Free (Score: 11/100)
Press Freedom
Reporters Without Borders,
World Press Freedom Index
166 th of 180 Countries
157 th of 180 Countries
Economic Freedom
Heritage Foundation, Index of
Economic Freedom
Repressed (166 th of 178
Countries)
Mostly Unfree (108 th of
178 Countries)
Perceptions of
Corruption
Transparency International,
Corruption Perceptions Index
156 th of 168 Countries
146 th of 179 Countries
Rule of Law
World Justice Project, Rule of
Law Index
93 rd of 128 Countries and
Jurisdictions
92 nd of 128 Countries and
Jurisdictions
185
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021: Uzbekistan.
186 “ Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Oliy Majlis,” December 28, 2018,
available at https://www.un.int/uzbekistan/news/address-president-republic-uzbekistan-shavkat-mirziyoyev-oliy-majlis0.
187
OSCE ODIHR, Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elections, 22 December 2019: Final Report, May 13, 2020; OSCE
ODIHR, “Important Progress in Election Legislation Could Not Offset Lack of Real Contest in Uzbekistan’s
Parliamentary Elections, International Observers Say,” December 23, 2019.
Zaki Shaikh, Uzbekistan’s New Parliament: Real Reform or Just the Will of the “President’s Men?”, Al Jazeera
Center for Studies, January 23, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Final T ally on Uzbekistan’s New Parliament: A 2014 Repeat?”
The Diplomat, January 7, 2020.
189 Oleg Zamanov, “Olii Mazhlis poluchil pravo provodit’ rassledovaniia” [Oliy Majlis received the right to conduct
investigations], Norma, August 11, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Checking in on Uzbekistan’s Political Progress in 2020: An
Interview with Farkhod T olipov,” The Diplomat, December 15, 2020.
188
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Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without
Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016
Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions
Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law
Index 2020.
Human Rights
International organizations have lauded Uzbekistan’s progress on human rights since 2016, but
concerns persist among some observers. Human rights activists have long criticized Uzbekistan
for its use of forced labor in harvesting cotton, the country’s primary cash crop. Under Karimov,
the government annually forced millions of people to pick cotton, a practice that dated to the
Soviet era. In its 2019 Trafficking in Persons report, the State Department assessed that
Mirziyoyev’s government has taken “substantive actions” to combat forced labor, and in 2021 the
State Department noted Uzbekistan’s “increasing efforts” in this area. 190 The U.S. Department of
Labor (DOL) continues to classify cotton and silk cocoons as goods produced through forced
labor in Uzbekistan. DOL removed Uzbek cotton from a list of products produced through forced
child labor in 2019. In a report published in January 2021, the International Labour Organization
(ILO) found that systematic child labor and systematic forced labor did not occur in the 2020
cotton harvest, although some incidents were reported. While the central government has stated
its strong commitment to eradicating child labor and forced labor, some local officials reportedly
continue to coerce people into picking cotton. The ILO assesses that reforms have led to a
significant and accelerating reduction in forced labor in the cotton harvest, with an estimated 4%
of cotton pickers subjected to direct or perceived forms of coercion in 2020. 191
Mirziyoyev has received recognition for releasing dozens of political prisoners, including two
journalists who had been jailed for almost 20 years. 192 In August 2019, Mirziyoyev announced
that the notoriously brutal Jaslyk Prison would be closed, a move heralded as a “very positive
step” by international observers. 193 Nevertheless, the U.N. Committee Against Torture noted that
as of December 2019, there were reports that torture and ill-treatment of prisoners remain
“widespread” and “routine.”194 Although at least 60 political prisoners have been released, they
have not been formally rehabilitated, meaning they remain legally presumed guilty of having
committed a crime. 195
The Uzbek state strictly controls and monitors religious practices, and unregistered religious
activity is criminalized. 196 A law on religion signed by President Mirziyoyev in July 2021 eases
some restrictions but has drawn criticism from religious freedom advocates for maintaining
190 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2019, p. 493; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in
Persons Report, June 2021, p. 597.
191 International Labour Organization, 2020 Third-Party Monitoring of Child Labour and Forced Labour During the
Cotton Harvest in Uzbekistan, January 2021.
192 Freedom House, “ Uzbekistan: Freedom House Welcomes Release of Political Prisoners,” August 31, 2020; Steve
Swerdlow, “Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan,” The Diplomat, September 1, 2019.
193 Hugh Williamson and Steve Swerdlow,
“Shuttering Notorious Jaslyk Prison A Victory for Human Rights in
Uzbekistan,” Human Rights Watch, August 27, 2019; Steve Swerdlow, “Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s
Uzbekistan,” The Diplomat, September 1, 2019.
194 United Nations Committee Against T orture, “Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Uzbekistan:
Advanced Unedited Version,” December 2019.
Steve Swerdlow, “ Rehabilitation Here and Now: Pursuing T ransitional Justice in Uzbekistan ,” Central Asian Bureau
for Analytical Reporting, October 5, 2020.
195
196 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Uzbekistan , May 12, 2021.
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registration requirements and other elements of government control over religious life. 197 In
December 2020, the U.S. State Department removed Uzbekistan from its Special Watch List of
countries that engage in severe violations of religious freedom. Uzbekistan had previously been
designated as a CPC from 2006 to 2017, and was placed on the Special Watch List in 2018 and
2019. 198 In its 2021 Annual Report, USCIRF noted positive changes in religious freedom
conditions in Uzbekistan, but recommended that the State Department return Uzbekistan to the
Special Watch List. 199
Uzbekistan’s media and civil society now operate more freely than under Karimov, but still face
constraints (see Table 5). Local media have begun covering previously taboo topics such as
forced labor and corruption, but self-censorship persists. Journalists representing international
media outlets have received accreditation, and independent news, social media, and human rightsrelated websites that had long been blocked in the country are now accessible. RFE/RL’s Uzbek
service remains blocked, however, and the government has refused to accredit its journalists. The
Mirziyoyev government has eased barriers to NGO registration, but both local and international
organizations face bureaucratic obstacles. It also remains difficult to create a new political party.
No new parties have been able to register, and all existing parties support the government. 200
Economy
Uzbekistan is a lower-middle-income country with significant natural resources and relatively
well developed infrastructure. Major exports include cotton, natural gas, uranium, and gold. The
country is the world’s seventh-largest producer of cotton, and the Uzbek government is moving to
transition from raw cotton exports to textile production. Uzbekistan has sizeable natural gas
reserves; the primary destination for natural gas exports is China, although the majority of
production is consumed domestically. Uzbekistan is the world’s seventh-largest uranium supplier
and has concluded long-term supply agreements with various countries, including the United
States, China, India, and Japan. According to official figures, about two million Uzbeks work
abroad as labor migrants, primarily in Russia; the actual number may be higher. Remittances
amounted to about 15% of GDP in 2019.
In April 2020, Uzbekistan’s parliament voted in favor of seeking observer status in the Russia-led
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU); the country officially became an EEU observer in December of
that year. Uzbekistan is also pursuing accession to the WTO, a move supported by the United
States. 201 Uzbekistan has received sizeable investment from China as part of the Belt and Road
Initiative.
197 Felix Corley and Mushfig Bayram, “ UZBEKIST AN: President to Sign Restrictive New Religion Law?” Forum 18,
July 5, 2021; “ Uzbekistan Disappoints with Secretively Adopted Religion Law,” Eurasianet, July 7, 2021. See also:
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE ODIHR, Uzbekistan: Joint
Opinion on the Draft Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” Venice Commission Opinion
No. 998/2020, OSCE/ODIHR Opinion No. FORB-UZB/387/2020, October 12, 2020.
198 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Uzbekistan , May 12, 2021.
199
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom , April 2021, p. 84.
200 Bruce Pannier, “ New Uzbek Opposition Party Runs into the Same Wall as Its Predecessors,” RFE/RL, March 24,
2021.
201 Uzbekistan began the accession process in 1994, but froze talks in 2005, a move related to Karimov’s emphasis on
economic self-sufficiency. Accession negotiations resumed in 2020. See World T rade Organization, “ Uzbekistan
Resumes WT O Membership Negotiations,” July 7, 2020 and Richard Pomfret, “Uzbekistan and the World T rade
Organization,” June 2020, available at https://iit.adelaide.edu.au/ua/media/726/uzbekistan-wto.pdf.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has had a negative impact on Uzbekistan’s economy, which faces
pressure due to lower exports, lower natural gas prices and export volumes, decreased
remittances, and domestic economic disruption. The World Bank estimates that Uzbekistan’s
GDP expansion slowed to 1.6% in 2020 (down from 5.6% growth in 2019), and projects a
rebound to 4.8% growth in 2021. 202
Economic Liberalization
Under President Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has implemented economic reforms aimed at reducing
the role of the state in favor of the private sector and attracting large-scale foreign investment. 203
The government has prioritized improving the country’s business environment and streamlining
public administration. The World Bank has commended Uzbekistan’s “strong progress” on
economic reforms.204 In 2017, Uzbekistan’s government eased long-standing currency controls
and liberalized its monetary policy, eliminating a major impediment to foreign investment and
privatization. Economic growth remains driven largely by state-funded projects. State-owned
enterprises (SOEs) dominate key sectors of the economy, and some SOEs are slated for
privatization. According to the State Department, Uzbekistan’s government has achieved “notable
improvement” in fiscal transparency and has increased engagement with international experts. 205
The U.S. Department of Commerce identifies insufficient protection of intellectual property
rights, an overregulated and inefficient financial sector, and the dominant role of SOEs as among
the challenges facing foreign businesses operating in Uzbekistan. 206
U.S.-Uzbekistan Bilateral Relations
U.S. relations with Uzbekistan have improved markedly since 2016, reflecting the country’s
broader development of international ties, and U.S. officials have expressed strong support for
Uzbekistan’s reform efforts. President Mirziyoyev traveled to Washington, DC, in May 2018, the
first official visit by an Uzbek president to the United States since 2002, and lauded the “new era
of the strategic partnership” between the two countries. 207 According to Trump Administration
officials, Uzbekistan’s reengagement with its neighbors invigorated the U.S.-led C5+1
framework, which provides a high-level forum for discussing regional issues. 208
From 2001 to 2005, relations between the United States and Uzbekistan were relatively robust,
and focused heavily on security cooperation related to Afghanistan. In 2002, during a visit by
then-President Karimov to Washington, DC, the two countries signed a Declaration of Strategic
Partnership and Cooperation. U.S.-Uzbekistan relations experienced a severe downturn in 2005,
after government forces killed over 100 unarmed civilians during unrest in the eastern city of
202 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, June 2021, p. 71.
Lilia Burunciuc et al., “How Uzbekistan Is T ransforming into an Open Economy,” The Brookings Institution,
December 20, 2018.
203
204 T he World Bank, “Uzbekistan Economic and Social Reforms Building Better Opportunities for People, Says World
Bank Regional Vice-President,” February 27, 2019.
205
U.S. Department of State, 2019 Investment Climate Statements: Uzbekistan, July 11, 2019.
206 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, Uzbekistan—Country Commercial Guide,
October 14, 2020.
T he White House, “Remarks by President T rump and President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan Before Bilateral
Meeting,” May 16, 2018.
207
208 Navbahor Imamova, “Uzbekistan Faces Choice Between Closer T ies to US, Russia,” Voice of America, December
1, 2019.
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Andijan. The government responded to foreign criticism by expelling numerous international
NGOs and media organizations, ending the Peace Corps program, and demanding the withdrawal
of U.S. forces stationed at the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in support of military operations in
Afghanistan. 209 Uzbekistan continued to provide logistical support for NATO forces in
Afghanistan by allowing the transit of non-lethal shipments through its territory as part of the
Northern Distribution Network, established in 2009.
The value of bilateral trade between the United States and Uzbekistan more than doubled from
2017 to 2018, from approximately $150 million to $315 million, and reached $540 million in
2019. 210 The first U.S. Department of Commerce Certified Trade Mission visited Uzbekistan in
June 2019; the then-Secretary of Commerce assessed that “significant opportunities exist to
strengthen commercial and economic ties.”211
U.S. foreign assistance to Uzbekistan aims to support the country’s reform efforts, especially in
the judicial, education, economic, and financial sectors, in order to increase protection of human
rights, combat corruption, and improve resiliency. Assistance to Uzbekistan includes
nonproliferation activities and public health programs aimed at combatting tuberculosis, as well
as support for the expansion of civil society, strengthening journalistic professionalism, and
developing the capacity of Uzbekistan’s parliament to initiate legislation and provide meaningful
oversight over the other branches of government. Aid is also intended to promote security and
regional stability by helping Uzbekistan professionalize its defense forces and bolstering border
security and counterterrorism capabilities. The State Department requests $44 million in
assistance to Uzbekistan in FY2022, compared to $43.7 million allocated in FY2020. 212
Regional Issues
U.S. Regional Relations and Interests
As noted above, the United States was among the first countries to recognize the independence of
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since that time, the United States has repeatedly
expressed support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the five Central
Asian states, and has implemented programs to support democracy, good governance, and
economic reforms in the region. The United States has provided over $9 billion in direct
assistance to the countries of Central Asia in the past three decades to support security,
democratic reform, and economic growth, and to meet humanitarian needs. 213 Some observers
contend that Central Asia’s importance to the United States has historically been “derivative of
interests that were not indigenous to Central Asia itself, but rather were functions of U.S. policies,
priorities, and relationships with countries around the region.”214 Central Asia has been described
209 OSCE ODIHR, Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, May 13, 2005.
210 Office of the United States T rade Representative, “Uzbekistan,” October 2, 2020.
211 U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan, “First Commerce Department Certified U.S. T rade Mission Visits Uzbekistan,” Jun e
18, 2019.
212 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2,
pp. 162, 289-290, 310, 350, 371, 584-585.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “ United States Strategy for Central Asia
2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview) ,” February 5, 2020.
213
214 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, January 2016, pp. 3-4.
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as a challenging environment for democracy promotion efforts, and observers have voiced
concerns that democratic progress in the region has been uneven or nonexistent. 215
Since 2001, U.S. engagement with Central Asia has largely focused on security cooperation,
particularly in relation to U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. The United States engages in
security cooperation with all five Central Asian countries, implementing programs to provide
training, improve peacekeeping and disaster response capabilities, and bolster border security. In
some cases, security cooperation provides an opportunity to maintain and develop a bilateral
relationship where other opportunities for engagement are limited. Through the National Guard’s
State Partnership Program, four of the five Central Asian countries are paired with U.S. states
(Kazakhstan-Arizona, Kyrgyzstan-Montana, Tajikistan-Virginia, and Uzbekistan-Mississippi),
developing military-to-military contacts and receiving training in areas such as counterterrorism
and disaster preparedness. Turkmenistan previously partnered with Nevada from 1996 to 2011. 216
U.S. Strategy for Central Asia
U.S. policy priorities for the region are outlined in the United States Strategy for Central Asia, the
most recent version of which was issued in February 2020. 217 The strategy defines the primary
U.S. strategic interest in Central Asia as building “a more stable and prosperous Central Asia that
is free to pursue political, economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own
terms; is connected to global markets and open to international investment; and has strong,
democratic institutions, rule of law, and respect for human rights.”218 The strategy reiterates U.S.
commitment to supporting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Central
Asian states, while acknowledging that shifts within the region present new opportunities to
promote regional connectivity and intra-regional cooperation. 219 Other U.S. priorities in Central
Asia outlined in the Strategy include reducing the threat of terrorism, promoting the rule of law
and human rights, and promoting U.S. investment in the region.
C5+1
Since 2015, U.S. bilateral relationships in the region have been complemented by the C5+1
diplomatic platform, which provides a forum for the United States and the five Central Asian
countries to address the common challenges they face in areas such as security, economic
connectivity, and environmental vulnerabilities. The State Department notes the format’s success
in “enhancing regional dialogue, cooperation, and partnership among the participating countries”
and contributions to “increasing economic and energy connectivity and trade, mitigating
environmental and health challenges, jointly addressing security threats, and advocating for the
full participation of women in all aspects of the political, economic, and social life of member
215
See, for example, Rumer et al, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0; Sean Roberts, Saving Democracy Promotion
From Short-Term U.S. Policy Interests in Central Asia, T he Century Foundation, 2009; Martha Brill Olcott,
“Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: From High Expectations to Disillusionment,” CORE Workshop on
Democratization in Central Asia, February 10, 2007.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “ U.S. Security Cooperation with Central Asia,” May
19, 2021.
217 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “ United States Strategy for Central Asia
2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview) ,” February 5, 2020.
216
218
Ibid.
219 Catherine Putz, “A New U.S. Strategy for Central Asia: Continuity Under Better Conditions,” The Diplomat,
February 6, 2020.
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countries.”220 The most recent C5+1 ministerial took place in September 2021, bringing together
Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. U.S.-led C5+1 initiatives bring together
government officials, practitioners, and other key stakeholders from all six countries to address
common obstacles and discuss best practices on issues ranging from the rehabilitation and
reintegration for returnees from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to fostering clean energy
development and regional electricity trade.
Intra-Regional Issues
Central Asia remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. 221 After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, economic links within Central Asia were disrupted. Some of the
bilateral relationships within the region grew tense over issues such as water management and
border disputes. For much of the past three decades, border closures and restrictive visa regimes
hampered travel within the region, and intra-regional trade remained limited.
According to the U.S. State Department, the shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy after the
country’s 2016 leadership transition has encouraged regional connectivity. 222 Uzbekistan under
Karimov represented “an obstacle to regional integration” and “a knot at the heart of the region,”
in the assessment of one longtime observer, due to tense relations with neighboring countries. 223
Trump Administration officials reportedly credited Uzbekistan’s reengagement with its neighbors
with invigorating the U.S.-led C5+1 framework. 224 Upon assuming power, President Mirziyoyev
embarked on a “good neighbor” policy, reengaging with the region and declaring Central Asia to
be Uzbekistan’s main foreign policy priority. 225 Uzbekistan has moved to normalize and improve
previously strained relations with its Central Asian neighbors, resolving border disputes with
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and engaging in increased regional outreach. Uzbekistan’s government
eased visa restrictions and opened border crossings. Economic integration and intra-regional trade
have grown markedly. Uzbekistan’s trade turnover with each of its four Central Asian neighbors
increased between 53% and 131% from 2016 to 2018.226 In 2018, a meeting between Central
Asia’s heads of state took place for the first time in nine years. The summit, held in Kazakhstan,
was initiated by Mirziyoyev. U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Daniel Rosenblum was later quoted
in the press as crediting President Mirziyoyev with “dramatically changing the tenor of relations
in the region from mutual suspicion to mutual cooperation.”227
220 U.S. Department of State, “ Joint Statement on the C5+1 Virtual Ministerial,” May 4, 2021.
221 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, Prospects for Regional Integration in Central Asia: Remarks by Fatema
Z. Sumar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of South and Central Asia, October 28, 2014.
222 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Uzbekistan, August 3, 2018.
223 Bruce Pannier, “Uzbekistan: T he Suddenly Good Neighbor,” RFE/RL, October 4, 2016.
Navbahor Imamova, “Uzbekistan Faces Choice Between Closer T ies to US, Russia,” Voice of America, December
1, 2019.
225 “Central Asia—T he Main Priority of Uzbekistan’s Foreign P olicy,” O’zbekiston Miliy Axborot Agentligi, August
12, 2017.
224
226
Sam Bhutia, “Uzbekistan’s T rade with Neighbors Rises Sharply,” Eurasianet, September 30, 2019.
227 Navbahor Imamova, “ Analysis: Will Uzbekistan’s Champion of Reform Stay the Course?” Voice of America,
August 30, 2020.
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Border Disputes
Central Asia’s current borders date back to the Soviet government’s effort to carry out a
delimitation of the region along ethnic lines in the 1920s, although they underwent some
subsequent changes.228 These borders were drawn as administrative divisions and were not
intended to serve as international boundaries. Borders were not fully demarcated during the
Soviet period, and it was not uncommon, for instance, for residents of one republic to farm land
that belonged to another. 229 This led to a range of issues after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
when Central Asia’s pre-independence borders became de jure international boundaries. In the
past three decades, border disputes have disrupted travel and economic activity and led to
occasional outbreaks of violence. 230 In addition to disagreements over land and water rights,
relations among some Central Asian countries have at times been complicated by the existence of
exclaves—territories belonging to one country but entirely surrounded by the territory of another.
There are eight exclaves in the Fergana Valley (see Figure 8), which is divided between
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The largest, Uzbekistan’s Sokh exclave, covers roughly
80 square miles, has a primarily ethnic Tajik population of about 85,000, and is entirely
surrounded by Kyrgyz territory. 231 The Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek governments have taken steps to
ease access to some exclaves, but residents of these territories continue to report difficulties.
Periodic clashes along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz, Kyrgyz-Tajik, and Tajik-Uzbek borders continue to
occur, although all three governments have taken steps in recent years to address outstanding
border disputes. 232
228 See, for example, Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet
Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); T erry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism
in the Soviet Union, 1923-1929 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Arne Haugen, The Establishment of National
Republics in Soviet Central Asia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
229
Nick Megoran, Nationalism in Central Asia: A Biography of the Uzbekistan -Kyrgyzstan Boundary (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017); Madeleine Reeves, Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Madeleine Reeves, “A Weekend in Osh,” London Review of Books, July 8,
2010.
“Convoluted Borders are Hampering Central Asian Integration,” The Economist, October 31, 2019; Bruce Pannier,
“ Signs of Hope (and Conflict) On Central Asia’s Borders,” RFE/RL, May 16, 2020; T imur T oktonaliev, “ Settling
Kyrgyz-T ajik Border Conflicts,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, September 19, 2019.
231 At the time the exclave was created, T ajikistan was an autonomous region within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist
Republic, which is why this predominantly T ajik territory became part of Uzbekistan. Sokh remained part of
Uzbekistan after T ajikistan became a separate republic in 1929. See Rashid Gabdulhakov, “Geographical Enclaves of
the Fergana Valley: Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?” OSCE Academy Central Asia Security Policy Briefs, no.
14 (2014).
230
232 Catherine Putz, “ Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: ‘Resolved 100 Percent ,’” The Diplomat, March 30, 2021.
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Figure 8. Exclaves in the Fergana Valley
Source: Graphic created by CRS.
Notes: “Sokh,” a variant spelling of So‘x, is used in the text of this report.
Since 2016, Uzbekistan has demined its border with Tajikistan, and rail and flight connections
between the two countries have resumed. 233 The two sides are working to finalize the demarcation
of their shared boundary. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are in the process of delimiting and
demarcating their border and settling outstanding disputes related to land and water rights,
although the prospect of land swaps has spurred some protests among local residents. 234
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are also in the process of demarcating their border. Efforts to resolve
outstanding border issues between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been less successful; just over
half of their shared border has been delimited and demarcated. 235 In April 2021, a fight at a water
intake station that releases water into canals in both countries escalated into a broader clash that
reportedly left dozens of people dead and homes destroyed on both sides of the border. 236
233 “ T ajik-Uzbek Border Cleared Of Mines,” RFE/RL, January 6, 2020; “ Uzbekistan, T ajikistan Railroad Set for
Imminent Reactivation,” Eurasianet, February 28, 2018; Catherine Putz, “ After Cancellations and Delays, Uzbekistan
and T ajikistan Reopen Air Link,” The Diplomat, April 12, 2017.
“Pogranichnye voprosy s Kygystanom namereny reshit’ za tri mesiatsa—Shavkat Mirzieev” [We intend to resolve
border issues with Kyrgyzstan within three months—Shavkat Mirziyoyev], Gazeta.uz, March 11, 2021; Ernist
Nurmatov, “Kyrgyzstan i Uzbekistan namereny za tri mesiatsia reshit’ vse voprosy po granitsam” [K yrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan intend to resolve all border issues within three months], Radio Azattyk, March 13, 2021; Guliza Avazova,
“V Kara-Suiskom raione zhiteli vyshli protiv peredachi 50 gektarov zemli Uzbekistanu” [In Kara -Su region, residents
demonstrated against the transfer of 50 hectares of land to Uzbekistan], Kaktus Media, April 1, 2021.
235
Bruce Pannier, “‘No Issues Remain’? Not So Fast. Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Disputes Don’t Appear to Be Decided,”
RFE/RL, April 2, 2021; Catherine Putz, “ Settling Central Asia’s Borders Is No Easy T ask,” The Diplomat, April 10,
2021; Kamila Baimuratova, “T ashiev otvetil na kritku eks-glavy MID T adzhikistana ob anklave Vorukh” [T ashiev
responded to criticism from former head of T ajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affair s on Vorukh enclave], Kloop, April
1, 2021.
234
236 Ayzirek Imanaliyeva and Kamila Ibragimova, “ Kyrgyzstan, T ajikistan: Officials T alk peace, but Popular Moods
Still Raw,” Eurasianet, May 1, 2020; Bruce Pannier, “ Conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Moves from Sticks and
Stones to Bullets and Bombs,” RFE/RL, April 30, 2021.
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Energy
Oil and Gas
Central Asia is rich in hydrocarbons (see Table 6), and the oil and gas sector has attracted foreign
investment to the region, particularly to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Because they
are landlocked, these Central Asian countries depend primarily on pipelines to transport their
hydrocarbon production to world markets (see Figure 9). The Caspian Pipeline Consortium
transports crude oil from western Kazakhstan to the port of Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea
coast; other major export routes for Kazakhstan’s crude oil include the Kazakhstan-China
pipeline and the Uzen-Atyrau-Samara pipeline to Russia. Kazakhstan also ships oil by tanker
across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, from where it is transported by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast or by the Northern Route pipeline to
Novorossiysk. 237 Turkmenistan exported some oil via the BTC pipeline in the past, but diverted
those flows to Novorossiysk in 2019. 238 Central Asian countries previously exported some of their
crude via oil swaps with Iran; little to no crude oil has been swapped since 2011, reportedly due
to complications arising from international sanctions on Iran and Iran’s desire for higher fees per
barrel swapped. 239
In the past decade, China has become the primary export destination for Central Asian natural
gas, followed by Russia, although the majority of natural gas produced in Central Asia is
consumed domestically. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline transports natural gas from
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to China. Turkmenistan is China’s largest natural gas
supplier by pipeline. The planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline,
first proposed in the 1990s, would open new markets for Turkmenistan and improve South Asia’s
regional energy security, but its completion remains highly speculative. 240 Because Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all produce significant volumes of natural gas, many in the United
States and the European Union have argued that these countries represent a potential alternative
to Russian natural gas for the European market. 241 To date there has been no direct gas trade
between Central Asia and Europe. The proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline would enable
Turkmenistan to supply gas to European markets, but this project has been hampered by
opposition from Russia and Iran, as well as by unresolved questions concerning the delimitation
of Caspian seabed rights. 242 Azerbaijan has begun exports of Caspian natural gas to Europe, and
in January 2021 the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to jointly
develop a previously disputed gas field on their maritime border, potentially facilitating future
export of gas from Turkmenistan to Europe. 243
237 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Background Reference: Kazakhstan, January 7, 2019.
238 “ Oil Exports from Ceyhan Poised to Fall Due to T urkmen Diversion,” Reuters, January 25, 2019; “ Azerbaijan’s Jan-
May Oil Exports via BT C Pipeline Fall 6.6% y/y,” Reuters, June 12, 2020.
239 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Background Reference: Kazakhstan, January 7, 2019.
240
Catherine Putz, “ T aliban Visit T urkmenistan, Promise (Again) to Protect T API,” The Diplomat, February 9, 2021.
241 See CRS Report R42405, European Energy Security: Options for EU Natural Gas Diversification , coordinated by
Michael Ratner.
242
See CRS Report R42405, European Energy Security: Options for EU Natural Gas Diversification , coordinated by
Michael Ratner.
243 David O’Byrne, “Azerbaijan and T urkmenistan Agreement Advances Caspian Gas Cooperation,” Eurasianet,
January 22, 2021.
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Kazakhstan’s oil and gas resources have attracted significant foreign investment, and the country
has longstanding relationships with American energy companies. Chevron and ExxonMobil have
both maintained a presence in Kazakhstan since 1993. The two companies hold 50% and 25%
interests, respectively, in Tengizchevroil, the consortium developing Kazakhstan’s largest oil and
gas field, located in the northwest of the country along the Caspian Sea coast. Chevron, the
largest private oil producer in Kazakhstan, also holds an 18% stake in Karachaganak, one of the
world’s largest gas condensate fields, and is the largest private s
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