Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Congressional research reportMay 21, 2021
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020:
Selected Case Studies
May 21, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46796
SUMMARY
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020:
Selected Case Studies
Congress shaped U.S. national security policy toward several critical crises and contingencies in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) during the decade from 2011 through 2020—a period
of upheaval, conflict, and change in that region.
R46796
May 21, 2021
Christopher M. Blanchard,
Coordinator
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
Under the U.S. Constitution, the legislative and executive branches of government use a range of
tools in exercising their respective foreign policy powers. The President and the executive branch
provide leadership in the development of U.S. foreign policy and are principally responsible for
its implementation. Members of Congress may issue legislative directives, make policy statements, offer advice, and use
authorization, appropriations, and oversight powers to influence U.S. approaches. In response to emerging contingencies and
conflicts in the MENA region over the last decade, Congress created and modified foreign aid and security assistance
authorities; provided funding for humanitarian aid, stabilization efforts, transition support, and some military interventions;
imposed limitations on U.S. military operations and cooperation with foreign partners; and mandated that the President
implement stringent sanctions against U.S. adversaries. Reflecting the unique circumstances created by regional events and
the innovative executive branch approaches those events required, Congress enacted new oversight requirements to ensure its
consultation. Congress may examine the experiences over the decade to assess the results of its use of legislative tools to
influence U.S. foreign policy. Analysis of case studies of various specific legislative interventions in specific events and
countries shows use of a range of congressional policy tools with varied outcomes. Key considerations include how chosen
congressional policy tools relate to executive branch-led foreign relations initiatives and the effects that country- and contextspecific factors may have on policy results.
Among the tools that Congress used to shape U.S. policy responses in the MENA region from 2011 through 2020, the most
direct and tangible were its appropriation and authorization powers. Congress expanded U.S. assistance to Tunisia’s
emerging democratic government and to Jordan’s monarchy to help it cope with a range of challenges. Congress placed
conditions on U.S. assistance to longtime partner Egypt amid its various transitions. Congress authorized and funded novel
security assistance programs in Iraq and Syria. Reflecting changing congressional views, Congress acted to end U.S.
assistance to the Palestinian Authority, but later enacted revisions to allow for the possibility of resuming some types of aid.
Congress also provided for extensive U.S. sanctions targeting Iran for its nuclear program, weapons proliferation, restrictions
on human rights and democracy, and support to armed groups and U.S.-designated terrorists. Congress pressed the executive
branch to take a stringent approach to U.S. nuclear negotiations with Iran, made legislative p roposals that shaped the
international context for negotiations, and enacted measures that allowed it to review related agreements.
Congressional consensus about U.S. military operations and other security programs in the region proved more elusive.
Congress considered, but did not enact, proposals that alternatively would have authorized and funded or prohibited and
constrained the 2011 U.S. military intervention in Libya. Congressional oversight of U.S. support to some Arab Gulf
partners’ 2015 intervention in Yemen influenced efforts to limit U.S. involvement by invoking provisions in the War Powers
Resolution, rejecting certain arms sales, and imposing conditions on some forms of U.S. assistance. Vetoes of measures and
unresolved policy debates underscored deep differences between some Members and successive Administrations.
Costly military operations in Iraq from 2003 through 2011 and perceived domestic budget constraints led Members to
scrutinize funding requests and to direct the Administration to secure partner contributions as a condition of some U.S.
assistance. Congress also structured some U.S. aid as loans or loan guarantees. The United States did not engage in new
large-scale military ground operations in the region during the decade and instead led or participated in multilateral
responses. Nevertheless, the United States allocated more than $85 billion dollars (current dollars) from 2011 to 2020 to
support U.S. military operations in the region, provide foreign military financing assistance to Arab governments, and
alleviate humanitarian suffering, among other aid.
Over the decade in question, shared views about the gravity of unfolding changes in the MENA region did not always lead
Members of Congress to shared conclusions about the implications of regional transformation for U.S. interests or what steps,
if any, Congress should take independently or to support or constrain related executive branch policies. Advocates for greater
U.S. support for regional change or U.S. intervention in the region’s conflicts often faced opposition from skeptics concerned
about the wisdom or sustainability of greater U.S. involvement, particularly in light of competing domestic or other priorities.
These dynamics continue to characterize debate in Congress over U.S. policy toward the region.
Congressional Research Service
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Contents
Overview ....................................................................................................................... 1
Context and Congressional Approaches .............................................................................. 3
Prologue to Change.................................................................................................... 3
Revisiting Resources: Appropriations and the “Arab Spring”............................................ 5
Responding to Adversaries and Rivals .......................................................................... 7
Reexamining Assumptions: Regional Partnerships .......................................................... 9
Seeking Consensus?................................................................................................... 9
Selected Case Studies .................................................................................................... 10
Tunisia: Transition Assistance and Oversight ............................................................... 10
Congress and Tunisia’s Transition......................................................................... 12
Observations ..................................................................................................... 14
Libya: Military Intervention and its Aftermath ............................................................. 15
Congress and Conflict in Libya ............................................................................ 16
Observations ..................................................................................................... 20
Egypt: Aid Conditionality and Human Rights............................................................... 23
Mubarak’s Resignation and Military Rule: 2011-2012.............................................. 24
The Morsi Presidency: 2012-2013......................................................................... 26
President Sisi: 2014-Present................................................................................. 28
Observations ..................................................................................................... 31
Syria and Iraq: Security Assistance in Complex Conflicts .............................................. 31
Training and Equipping Partners in Syria and Iraq ................................................... 33
Observations ..................................................................................................... 42
Yemen: Arms Sales and Security Cooperation .............................................................. 48
Congressional Tools for Shaping Partner Behavior in Conflict................................... 50
Observations ..................................................................................................... 53
Jordan: Comprehensive Partnership............................................................................ 55
Congress Expands U.S. Assistance........................................................................ 57
Observations ..................................................................................................... 60
The Palestinians: Changes to U.S. Foreign Assistance ................................................... 61
Congress and Ending Aid .................................................................................... 62
Observations ..................................................................................................... 67
Iran: Sanctions, the JCPOA, and ‘Maximum Pressure’ .................................................. 68
Congress and U.S. Sanctions Policy ...................................................................... 69
Observations ..................................................................................................... 74
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 77
Figures
Figure 1. Map: Middle East and North Africa Region ........................................................... 2
Figure 2. Timeline: Selected Events in Tunisia’s Uprising and Transition and U.S.
Responses, 2011-2014................................................................................................. 12
Figure 3. Timeline: Selected Events in Libya and U.S. Responses, 2011-2014 ........................ 16
Figure 4. Timeline: Selected Events in Egypt and U.S. Responses ........................................ 27
Figure 5. Egypt: Withholding Conditions on U.S. Military Assistance Allocations................... 29
Figure 6. Timeline: Selected Developments and U.S. Actions in Syria and Iraq....................... 36
Congressional Research Service
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Figure 7. Timeline: Selected Events in Yemen’s Transition and Conflict ................................ 49
Figure 8. State Department and USAID Assistance to Jordan, FY2011-FY2021...................... 56
Figure 9. Timeline: Selected Decisions and Events in U.S. Assistance to Jordan...................... 57
Figure 10. U.S. Cash Transfers to Jordan .......................................................................... 58
Figure 11. Syrian Refugees Registered in Jordan and U.S. Humanitarian Aid in Jordan ............ 59
Figure 12. Timeline: Selected Events Regarding U.S. Aid to the Palestinians.......................... 62
Figure 13. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Palestinians since FY2011 ................................... 63
Figure 14. Timeline: Selected Developments in U.S. Iran Policy .......................................... 68
Tables
Table 1. Changes in Authorized Purposes for U.S. Train and Equip Assistance in Syria ............ 43
Table 2. Train and Equip Allocations (Iraq and Syria) FY2015-FY2021................................. 47
Table 3. Sanctions Legislation Pertaining to Iran 2010-2015 ................................................ 70
Appendixes
Appendix. Congress and Foreign Policy ........................................................................... 82
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 84
Congressional Research Service
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Overview
The legislative and executive branches of government use a range of tools in exercising their
respective foreign policy powers under the U.S. Constitution (Appendix). Interactions between
Congress and the Obama and Trump Administrations from 2011 to 2020 shaped U.S. policy
toward the Middle East and North Africa (MENA, Figure 1) in demonstrable ways during a time
of unrest, conflict, and change throughout the region. 1 The executive branch led in defining U.S.
responses as regional turmoil emerged and spread. Members of Congress issued legislative
directives, made policy statements, offered advice, and used their authorization, appropriations,
and oversight powers to influence U.S. approaches. As new contingencies and conflicts emerged,
Congress created and modified foreign aid and security assistance authorities; provided funding
for military intervention, stabilization, and humanitarian responses; imposed limitations on U.S.
military operations; and mandated that the President implement stringent sanctions against U.S.
adversaries. The case studies below highlight some tools of congressional influence on U.S.
foreign policy, as well as limits to those tools, by examining their use in the decade beginning in
2011. 2
On Tunisia, Congress supported an expansion of U.S. assistance to the country’s
emerging democratic government and engaged directly with transitional leaders,
within some constraints imposed by growing congressional skepticism of foreign
aid in general and concern about national security threats emanating from MENA
states in transition. See “Tunisia: Transition Assistance and Oversight.”
On Libya, Congress considered proposals both to restrict or authorize U.S.
military intervention, while exercising oversight over executive branch planning
for post-conflict scenarios. See “Libya: Military Intervention and its Aftermath.”
On Egypt, Congress enacted conditions on longstanding U.S. assistance to
promote continued compliance with regional peace agreements and to encourage
the executive branch to prioritize democratization and human rights in dealings
with transitional authorities. See “Egypt: Aid Conditionality and Human Rights.”
On Syria and Iraq, Congress created and annually modified novel train and
equip authorities to enable U.S. defense cooperation with non-state partners in
Syria and security forces in Iraq, balancing flexibility with constraints. See
“Syria and Iraq: Security Assistance in Complex Conflicts.”
On Yemen, Congress acted to direct an end to U.S. military involvement and
voted to block select arms sales to U.S. partners, leading President Donald Trump
to veto related legislation. See “Yemen: Arms Sales and Security Cooperation.”
On Jordan, Congress appropriated funds to expand U.S. partnership, amid a
range of security, economic, and humanitarian challenges facing the kingdom.
See “Jordan: Comprehensive Partnership.”
1 For the purposes of this report, the MENA region encompasses those countries and territories under the responsibility
of the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Morocco, Algeria, T unisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, the West
Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates,
Oman, and Yemen.
2
T he authors chose the cases as illustrative examples, among many others, of congressional use of various tools. Other
instances of congressional influence over policy occurred relative to other cases and countries in the region. T he report
presents the cases in rough chronological order, although the developments they describe in many cases occurred
simultaneously and influenced the views and act ions of U.S. policymakers iteratively.
Congressional Research Service
1
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
On the West Bank and Gaza, Congress acted to end prevailing patterns of U.S.
assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on concerns about PA leaders’
policies. See “The Palestinians: Changes to U.S. Foreign Assistance.”
On Iran, Congress provided for extensive U.S. sanctions targeting Iran for its
nuclear program, weapons proliferation, restrictions on human rights and
democracy, and support to armed groups and U.S.-designated terrorists. Congress
pressed the executive branch to take a stringent approach to U.S. nuclear
negotiations with Iran, made legislative proposals that shaped the international
context for negotiations (including by imposing secondary sanctions and
targeting sanctions evaders), and enacted measures that allowed Congress to
review related agreements. See, “Iran: Sanctions, the JCPOA, and ‘Maximum
Pressure’”
Figure 1. Map: Middle East and North Africa Region
Source: CRS. Includes Esri and U.S. State Department data.
Notes: All areas and boundaries approximate.
Congressional Research Service
2
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Context and Congressional Approaches
Prologue to Change
U.S. security concerns in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent
U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq motivated significant congressional interest in
countering extremism and promoting accountable governance in the MENA region and beyond. 3
The war in Iraq and its regional consequences dominated the policy agenda for the United States
in much of the region and demanded considerable investments of time and resources by Congress
and the executive branch. In addition to longstanding support for Israel, U.S. approaches largely
prioritized engagement with leaders of the region’s authoritarian Arab states and sought to
influence their policy choices, particularly on security matters.
Some in Congress sought to become more familiar with the internal challenges and emerging
social movements shaping the Middle East and North Africa, though in most MENA countries,
domestic politics remained uncompetitive and governance remained closed. Despite efforts by
some Members to engage with a broader range of local political and economic actors in the
region and address underlying social, governance, or economic trends, congressional initiatives
encouraging political reforms gained limited traction. 4 In contrast, consistent U.S. policy interest
in Iran spanned successive Administrations and periods of alternating political control in
Congress. Large-scale protests and state violence against demonstrators in Iran followed the
country’s disputed 2009 election, foreshadowing unrest to come elsewhere in the region.
President Barack Obama and other U.S. policymakers sometimes argued5 for the importance of
reform for the MENA region in the years immediately prior to the “Arab Spring”6 uprisings of
2011 (including in Iran) and had engaged in formal efforts to consider alternative U.S.
approaches. 7 Nevertheless, as of late 2010, U.S. assistance and policy initiatives reflected historic
patterns of engagement. Authoritarian governments and supportive elites across the region proved
3
T his report does not examine U.S. policy debates and congressional action with regard to the U.S. decisions to
intervene militarily in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 or subsequent U.S. attempts to stabilize th ose countries.
4 See, for example, S.Res. 375 in the 108 th Congress and S. 12 in the 109 th Congress. See also out of print CRS Reports
RS22053, The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: An Overview, by Jeremy M. Sharp; and RL33486, U.S.
Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma , by Jeremy M. Sharp, both available to
congressional requesters from the author.
5 Speaking in Cairo, Egypt, in June 2009, President Obama said, “ America does not presume to know what is best for
everyone, just as we would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election. But I do have an unyieldin g belief
that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed,
confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice, government that is transparent and doesn't steal
from the people, the freedom to live as you choose. T hese are not just American ideas, they are human rights. And that
is why we will support them everywhere.” U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Office of the
Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2009, Book 1 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 2010), Remarks in Cairo, June 4, 2009, pp. 760-8.
6 T he term “Arab Spring” came to be applied, primarily in non -MENA media and policy discussions but then globally,
as a catch-all term for the diverse and unique instances of political upheaval and popular activism that occurred in the
MENA region from late 2010 onward. T he use of the term remains contested. For an overview of related debates, see
Ibrahim N. Abusharif, Parsing “Arab Spring”, Occasional Paper, Northwestern University in Qatar, February 2014.
7
In August 2010, President Obama reportedly issued a Presidential Study Directive through which his Administration
“ identified likely flashpoints, most notably Egypt, and solicited proposals for how the administration could push for
political change in countries with autocratic rulers who are also valuable allies of the United States.” Mark Landler,
“Secret Report Ordered by Obama Identified Potential Uprisings,” New York Times, February 16, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
3
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
predictable, if at times unpalatable, interlocutors and partners for the United States, even as
corruption, human rights abuses, and a lack of accountability sowed the seeds of future upheaval.
Military cooperation with the Arab Gulf states remained a key pillar of U.S. defense strategy as
the Obama Administration sought to draw down U.S. military forces in Iraq, expand U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan, and contain Iran. U.S. assistance to Egypt and partnership with the
Jordanian government had evolved to incorporate some reform-oriented elements, but longstanding security cooperation programs and diplomatic commitments to peace with Israel limited
the extent to which Congress and the Administration (along with its predecessors) were willing to
alter elements of those bilateral relationships. The Obama Administration had explored the
possibilities of rapprochement with antagonist regimes in Libya and Syria, but those efforts had
not provided for robust U.S. relationships with populations in either country. Congress had
pressured successive Administrations to reduce U.S. military involvement in Iraq (as discussed
below), and some Members sought to reduce U.S. military deployments in the region in light of
challenges at home and elsewhere. The outbreak of unrest and violence in several MENA
countries in late 2010 and early 2011 challenged Congress and the executive branch to overcome
these inertial influences quickly and to expand their shared knowledge of internal developments
in several countries.
The 2011 MENA Uprisings and Their Aftermath: Congressional Context
The 112 th Congress opened its first session in January 2011 with the 2010 election returning control of the House
of Representatives to the Republican Party and providing the Democratic Party with a slim majority in the Senate
(51 of 100 seats). Voters elected a large number of new, fiscally conservative Republican candidates to office in the
House, some of whom sought to address what they viewed as executive branch overreach in a range of policy
areas. Contentious consideration in early 2011 of a series of continuing resolutions to fund government
operations for FY2012 was punctuated by consideration of House proposals to cut spending and to repeal
recently enacted healthcare, investment reform, and consumer protection legislation. Congressional Quarterly’s
Almanac described the 112th Congress as of 2011 as having been “dominated by fiscal issues,” “widely
characterized as paralyzed and dysfunctional,” and highly partisan.8
In this environment, Members of Congress considered emerging crises in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and other
fluid, ambiguous, and rapidly evolving situations across the Middle East and North Africa, each of which posed
challenges for U.S. national security. Changing events placed pressure on executive branch officials to respond
quickly. Some policy responses invoked sensitive questions of executive and legislative authority, including with
regard to the use of military force and the redirection of previously appropriated funds for new purposes.
Throughout 2011 and repeatedly in the years that followed, these dynamics persisted. Competing, high profile
domestic agenda items occupied debate among Members and limited the amount of attention available for foreign
policy. Over time, the increasing prevalence of violence in the MENA region’s crises, mass displacement,
competing foreign interventions, attacks on U.S. government personnel and facilities, and transnational terrorism
raised the strategic and political stakes of U.S. responses and invited additional congressional attention. However,
the political sensitivity of these trends complicated efforts to build congressional and inter-branch consensus. By
2017, Congressional Quarterly’s Almanac described “legislative dysfunction that had grown pervasive for both
parties in recent years” and “continued weakening of the committee process and other parliamentary
deliberations.”9 These factors contributed to the emergence of limited-commitment, context-specific approaches
that defined overall U.S. policy toward the MENA region through 2020.
According to CQ in 2011, “so profound was the partisan enmity and distrust that it could not be bridged even by the
most powerful single players from each party.” CQ found that “votes in both chambers broke down along party lines
the most often of any of the 58 years that Congressional Quarterly had measured party unity votes.” See “Partisanship
and Stalemates Lead to Record Low Approval of Congress,” CQ Almanac, 2011.
8
9 In 2017, CQ analysts wrote that President T rump’s election and unique governing style led to “ a less robust legislative
agenda, especially given the unified partisan control of the legislative and executive branches.” See “ Republicans
Overhaul T axes, Confirm Gorsuch, but Falter at Health Care Push ,” CQ Almanac, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
4
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Over time and with considerable debate, Congress and the executive branch reoriented some U.S.
policies and realigned some resources to respond to the region’s interconnected, evolving crises.
Amid optimism among some in the United States and many in the region about the prospects for
positive change, Members of Congress and Administration officials sought to understand who
were the newly active and empowered movements and leaders, what grievances they sought to
resolve, what goals they sought to achieve, and how their actions might affect U.S. interests.
Initial U.S. insight into these questions was limited, and rapidly changing circumstances
continually required officials and lawmakers to adapt in the years that followed. 10
Revisiting Resources: Appropriations and the “Arab Spring”
Among the tools that Congress used to shape U.S. policy responses, the most direct and tangible
were its appropriation and authorization powers. The U.S. response to the MENA uprisings of
2011 and subsequent events in the region took place contemporaneously with significant
budgetary constraints in the United States. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton testified in
March 2011, citing the “extraordinarily difficult budgetary climate” and arguing, “existing budget
levels and earmarks greatly limit our flexibility to respond to contingencies.”11 She further
asserted
we must ensure that we have the resources to respond to the reality of un folding events in
the Middle East and recognize the opportunity, as well as the security imperative, that these
events bring with them. Simply put, current funding levels make it difficult for us to meet
the emerging needs of the region at this time of unparalleled opportunity. It is critical that
the parameters of our assistance remain flexible so that State and USAID [U.S. Agency for
International Development] can respond quickly and strategically within a rapidly
changing environment....
Congress completed work on FY2011 appropriations amid unfolding unrest in the MENA region
in April 2011, enacting a continuing resolution for foreign operations funding that largely left
spending levels and authorities unchanged from the previous fiscal year. 12 Nevertheless, the
executive branch and Congress consulted and reallocated nearly $800 million in prior-year funds
to respond to unrest and support transitions through March 2012.13
10 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton acknowledged that U.S. understanding of unfolding change was limited
when discussing Libya before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2011, testifying: “We don’t know
these players. We just opened an Embassy for the first time in years in 2009. We were just getting to know a lot of
these people. We are not as aware even of what went on in Egypt and T unisia, and I have to admit to a certain level of
opacity about both of those circumstances.” T estimony o f Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in U.S. Congress,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, National Security and Foreign Policy Priorities in the FY2012 International
Affairs Budget, hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 2, 2011, S.Hrg. 112-361 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011).
11 T estimony of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
National Security and Foreign Policy Priorities in the FY2012 International Affairs Budget, hearing, 112th Cong., 1st
sess., March 2, 2011, S.Hrg. 112-361 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011).
12 Appropriations legislation directed that bilateral economic aid “shall be made available to support democratic
transitions in the Middle East and North Africa, including assistance for civil society organizations and the
development of democratic political parties,” and required reporting on Egypt’s transition within 45 days. See FullYear Continuing Appropriations, 2011 (Division B, T itle XI, Sec. 2123, P.L. 112-10).
13 According to the State Department’s FY2013 congressional budget justification for foreign operations, “initial
transition support commitments in FY2011 and FY2012” amounted to “nearly $800 million.” T he Department stated
that, “While the USG [U.S. government] was able to respond quickly to the Arab Spring with additional resources,
these funds were reallocated from within programs in the region, resulting in real opportunity costs in bilateral
programs, or by reducing funding available in regional/global accounts for other needs.” U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2013, March and April 2012.
Congressional Research Service
5
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
In considering FY2012 appropriations levels during 2011, Congress chose not to make new,
large-scale transition support resources available as a comprehensive provision. Rather,
appropriations and authorizations were made on a discrete basis at levels that were not
dramatically different than Congress had provided in previous years. 14 As a result, most
transition-focused U.S. assistance to the Middle East and North Africa through 2012 came from
reprogrammed prior-year monies, especially from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account.15
The August 2011 enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), enforced new limits
on discretionary federal spending.
In an effort to continue transition assistance and better respond to contingencies while
maintaining preexisting aid commitments, the Obama Administration sought additional funding
and authorities from Congress. In its February 2012 budget request for FY2013 foreign
assistance, the Administration proposed a $770 million Middle East and North Africa Incentive
Fund (MENA-IF) to offer additional aid more flexibly as a democratization and liberalization
incentive to countries in transition. The proposal sought to create a new source of funding beyond
country allocations from established accounts that would remain available for a broad range of
potential economic, humanitarian, or security uses. The Administration proposed that the Fund be
established as a standalone account to eliminate some of the budget “trade-offs” and bureaucratic
delays associated with reallocating or reprogramming funds available within existing accounts. 16
Some Members of Congress opposed providing the Administration with the requested level of
additional funding and discretion, and supporters of the proposal sought to require additional
consultation with the executive branch in the event of its adoption. The House Appropriations
Committee declined to create or fund the new account in its version of the FY2013 Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Act (112th Congress,
H.R. 5857, reported out of committee in May 2012), but did direct the use of up to $200 million
for transition support activities from other accounts to be made available for transition support
activities by the act (under the committee report accompanying the bill, H.Rept. 112-494). 17 In
contrast, the Senate Appropriations Committee proposed to create the new MENA-IF account and
to appropriate $1 billion for it to respond to what it described as “historic and unprecedented
opportunities for change” (112th Congress, S. 3241, reported out of committee in May 2012, and
accompanying report S.Rept. 112-172). In the end, Congress did not reconcile these two
14 In the conference report on the FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2012, which included the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act (H.Rept. 112-331 on P.L. 112-74, adopted December 2011), Congress allocated $50 million to a
Middle East/North Africa Response Fund “to provide the Department of State and USAID with the necessary
flexibility to respond quickly to political crises” in the MENA region. In allocating the funds, which were a relatively
limited amount given existing aid levels for the region, Congress directed the Administration “to consult with the
Committees on Appropriations on the uses of such funds and submit a spending plan for all funds provided in this Act
and prior appropriations acts for these purposes.” T he Act (Division I, Section 7041) directed the use of assistance
funds for Libya and Syria, and provided for enterprise funds for Egypt and T unisia.
15 For information on foreign assistance accounts, see CRS Report R40482, Department of State, Foreign Operations
Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts, by Nick M. Brown and Cory R. Gill.
16
In discussing the Administration’s request, officials said the Administration had been “ doing lots of trade-offs to
come up with” funds to respond to contingencies and transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. Deputy Secretary
of State for Management and Resources T homas Nides and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, Special Briefing on the
2013 State Department and USAID Budget, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, February 13, 2012.
17
T he House recommended $175 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) monies and $25 million in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) “to promote regional peace and security, political and economic reform, and stabilization efforts in
the Middle East and North Africa.” T he committee directed that of these f unds, $70 million be made available for the
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), $5 million for USAID’s Office of Middle East Partnerships, and “not less
than” $50 million for Jordan.
Congressional Research Service
6
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
proposals: as it did in FY2011, Congress appropriated foreign assistance funding for FY2013
through a series of continuing resolutions that did not include or provide new funds for the
requested MENA-IF account. 18
The Obama Administration’s FY2014 request again proposed the MENA-IF account and sought
$580 million for it. The House again declined to create the account or appropriate funds for it.
The Senate instead proposed the creation of a Complex Foreign Crises Fund, to be funded with
$575 million to support, among other things, “loan guarantees and enterprise funds for Jordan,
Tunisia, and Egypt.” (S.Rept. 113-81)19
Throughout this period, congressional committees of jurisdiction worked with the Obama
Administration to reprogram prior year funding to meet emergent transition support and
contingency response needs. Consultations on these reprogramming actions created opportunities
for Members of these committees and their staff to engage with executive branch officials on
various proposals and initiatives. In January 2014, Congress provided a source of additional
funding with flexible authorities at the scale similar to that sought by the Administration. That
month, Congress passed an omnibus appropriations act for FY2014 that provided that the
Administration could reprogram up to $460 million in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO)designated20 funds from various accounts to a new Complex Crises Fund “mainly for the
prevention of complex crises and to respond to unanticipated contingencies.”21
By that date, revolution and counter-revolution had swept through Egypt, and conflict and
security threats had placed increased pressure on U.S. government officials in Libya in the
aftermath of the 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi. The raging war in Syria had
displaced millions, tested U.S. resolve, and empowered the Islamic State. Congress had grappled
with the ambiguity presented by the region’s upheaval, debated varying responses, and engaged
with executive branch counterparts to make additional resources available for U.S. responses.
Nevertheless, Congress, like the executive branch, faced challenges in predicting the impact of
discrete changes on the region as a whole and foreseeing how unfolding events might have
problematic second- and third-order effects on U.S. interests.
Responding to Adversaries and Rivals
As activism and unrest surged in the MENA region during 2011, U.S. policymakers debated the
final steps in the U.S. military drawdown and eventual withdrawal from Iraq. From 2006 onward,
Congress had signaled its decreasing willingness to continue support for U.S. military operations
there. Members expressed different preferences for what a post-drawdown U.S. presence in Iraq
For context, see Josh Rogin, “ State Department’s new Middle East fund falls victim to Capitol Hill dysfunction,”
Foreign Policy, September 27, 2012.
18
19 Congress separately provided funds for loan guarantees in successive appropriations measures after 2011, as
discussed in the T unisia and Egypt case studies below.
20
For background on OCO funding and usage, see CRS Report R44519, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding:
Background and Status, by Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M. Morgenstern .
21 Joint Explanatory Statement, Division K, P.L. 113-76. Section 8003(c) of the SFOPS Act permitted the Secretary of
State “to transfer funds, not to exceed a total of $460,000,000” from OCO funds made available under the ESF,
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and FMF accounts to funds available under the
Complex Crises Fund. T he Act required, however, “T hat upon determination that all or part of the funds so transferred
from such appropriations are not necessary for the purposes for which they were transferred, such amounts may be
transferred back to such appropriation and shall be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as
originally appropriated.”
Congressional Research Service
7
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
would look like. 22 As of 2011, the executive branch reported to Congress that Iraqi security forces
had demonstrable capability gaps and could face threats from remaining insurgent forces. From
the time of that report through 2014, the conditions that would facilitate the rise of the Islamic
State—wide-scale conflict in Syria and renewed sectarian antagonism in Iraq—emerged.
By mid-2014, the Islamic State had come to dominate large areas of Syria and Iraq and to support
or encourage transnational terrorism in Europe and the United States. In response, the United
States launched military strikes against the group, returned thousands of U.S. military personnel
to Iraq, deployed troops inside Syria, and invested billions of dollars in partner forces in Syria and
Iraq through multi-year assistance and training programs (see “Syria and Iraq: Security Assistance
in Complex Conflicts”). From August 2014 through September 30, 2020, the executive branch
had obligated $49.2 billion for Operation Inherent Resolve in Syria and Iraq. 23
At the same time, longstanding concern about Iran’s nuclear program and regional policies had
motivated Congress to direct additional sanctions in conjunction with the Obama
Administration’s attempts to negotiate a multilateral agreement to constrain Iranian nuclear
activity. The Administration considered this diplomatic initiative to be among its top priorities in
the region, if not globally. The talks culminated in the United States, its allies, and Iran signing
the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement, which set in motion
subsequent U.S. and international sanctions relief for Iran (See “Iran: Sanctions, the JCPOA, and
‘Maximum Pressure’”). In 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the
JCPOA, asserting that the accord did not address the broad range of U.S. concerns about Iranian
behavior and would not permanently preclude Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. U.S.-Iran
tensions increased thereafter, and the potential for conflict heightened in 2019 and 2020, amid
Iran-attributed attacks on Arab Gulf State energy infrastructure and non-U.S. ships transiting the
region, attacks by Iran-backed groups targeting U.S. personnel in Iraq, and the U.S. killing in Iraq
of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force Commander Major General Qasem
Soleimani. 24
Throughout the decade, U.S. concerns about strategic competition with Russia and China also
grew. Having abstained when the U.N. Security Council voted in March 2011 to allow for
military operations to protect Libyan civilians, Russia and to a lesser extent China thereafter used
their veto power to prevent the Security Council from endorsing additional interventions in the
region. Both expressed concerns about preserving sovereignty and preventing political
interference. Russia’s 2015 military intervention in the civil war in Syria on behalf of the
government of Bashar al Asad bolstered that government’s attempts at self-preservation in the
face of threats from a variety of groups, including the Islamic State. In 2011, President Obama
22
See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Iraq: The Challenging Transition to a Civilian Mission ,
hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., February 1, 2011, S. Hrg. 112-360 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011); Senate Committee
on Armed Services, U.S. Policy Toward Iraq, hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., February 3, 2011, S. Hrg. 112-112
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2011); House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South
Asia, Preserving Progress: Transitioning Authority and Implementing the Strategic Framework In Iraq, Part 1,
hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 1, 2011, H.Hrg. 112-29 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011); and, Senate Committee on
Armed Services, The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., September 22, 2011, S.
Hrg. 112-349 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012).
23 Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) is the operation to eliminate the Islamic State group and the threat it poses to Iraq,
Syria, and the wider international community. Department of Defense (DOD) Comptroller, Cost of War Update as of
September 30, 2020, in Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, Report on Operation Inherent
Resolve, October 1, 2020–December 31, 2020.
24 See CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by Clayton
T homas.
Congressional Research Service
8
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
had called for Asad to step down. The intervention raised Russia’s strategic profile in the region
and engaged U.S. policymakers in diplomatic competition and military deconfliction.
Reexamining Assumptions: Regional Partnerships
Changes in the posture and assertiveness of some U.S. regional partners accompanied political
change in the region. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Turkey acted to
shape political outcomes, to back favored partners, and in some cases to intervene militarily to
protect their interests. These shifts led Congress to see these actors less as quiescent partners and
more as independent actors whose motives, actions, and suitability as partners would be more
rigorously examined. In some cases, Congress challenged long-time U.S. partners, for example,
voting to block certain arms sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE (“Yemen: Arms Sales and Security
Cooperation”) and the House rebuking Turkey for its policies in Syria (H.J.Res. 77 in the 116th
Congress). 25
U.S. assumptions about providing assistance to the Palestinians and Israeli-Arab relations also
evolved during the decade. Changing priorities and policies pursued by Palestinian leadership
generated opposition among some in Congress to prevailing patterns of U.S. aid, which had
contributed to Palestinian economic development and security institutions as a component of U.S.
support for a two-state solution (“The Palestinians: Changes to U.S. Foreign Assistance”).
In 2020, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan normalized their relations with Israel. This
moved away from a previous intra-Arab consensus that had predicated such normalization on the
establishment of a Palestinian state. The resulting Abraham Accords present a new model for
relations between Israel and other Arab states, but raise questions about what U.S. policy
commitments (such as arms sales, shifts in diplomatic engagement, or new assistance
arrangements), if any, should be made or maintained to incentivize or support related agreements.
Seeking Consensus?
During the decade from 2011 to 2020, Congress rarely exhibited durable consensus on how to
approach the changing MENA region, or to respond to events and conditions in its individual
countries. It is debatable whether Congress is or should serve as a consensus-seeking body in
national security matters, and it is difficult to determine authoritatively the relationship domestic
political factors have on foreign policy positions in Congress. Many in Congress expressed hope
that the United States could help establish a more durable form of stability in the MENA region—
stability that accommodated and reinforced peaceful political change, pluralism, and new
relationships among regional actors. As this report explores, some Members of Congress defined
stability as the maintenance of long-prevailing elements of the strategic status quo prior to 2011,
such as U.S. partnership with select governments and the preservation of core Arab-Israeli peace
agreements. Others advocated for new policies that would prioritize efforts to protect civilians,
promote the fundamental political rights of regional citizens, and create mutually advantageous
economic opportunities. The use of the U.S. military in various roles and contexts was an area of
continued congressional debate. A shared opposition to new U.S. military engagements united
some Members from disparate perspectives, while others argued for the selective use of military
force and suggested that the United States should embrace the costs and responsibilities of
expanded engagement.
25 A companion joint resolution S.J.Res. 57 introduced in the Senat e and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee was not considered further.
Congressional Research Service
9
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
In some areas of controversy within Congress, such as U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen,
successive debates and legislative initiatives demonstrated that majority views could change over
time in size and composition and that the actions of congressional majorities could force the
executive branch to change its approach or, alternatively, to reassert its will through veto. With
regard to Libya, disparate congressional perspectives precluded a clear signal from the legislative
branch as to whether to pursue or discontinue U.S. military action. In areas of agreement in
Congress, Members made available new resources (Jordan) or new authorities to support unique
partners (Syria and Iraq). The United States did not engage in new large-scale military ground
operations and encouraged multilateral responses, but the cumulative expense of U.S.
humanitarian assistance and military operations in response to certain regional crises exceeded an
estimated $67 billion as of March 2021. 26
Many Members of Congress argued that—whatever the U.S. approach—the demonstration effect
of U.S. responses to different challenges would shape perceptions of the United States in the
region and around the world for a generation. The interactions between Congress and the
executive branch examined in this report may similarly serve as reference points and provide
lessons for practitioners going forward.
Selected Case Studies
The following case studies explore selected U.S. policy interventions in selected country contexts
during the decade from 2011 through 2020. The case studies focus on particularly illustrative
examples of congressional engagement and highlight the use by some in Congress or by Congress
as an institution of specific tools to shape U.S. foreign policy. The case studies do not cover the
events of this period exhaustively, and do not address all uses of the selected tools. They also may
not address other important events, interventions, initiatives, and policy debates that occurred in
these contexts during this period.
Tunisia: Transition Assistance and Oversight27
In January 2011, a popular uprising in Tunisia that had begun the month before led to the ouster
of longtime authoritarian leader President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. Tunisian demonstrators’
example sparked a wave of protests and political contestation across the Arab world. Tunisians
held elections in October 2011 to select a national constituent assembly tasked with forming a
government, legislating during the transitional period, and drafting and approving a new
constitution. The assembly’s mandate stretched from one year into three, as an Islamist-secularist
political coalition faced growing social tensions and deep disagreements over economic policy. A
political crisis nearly derailed the transition after two secularist politicians were assassinated,
allegedly by Islamist militants, in 2013—coinciding with a military seizure of power from an
Islamist-led elected government in Egypt nearby. A quartet of Tunisian civil society and trade
union organizations ultimately mediated an agreement among political stakeholders that resulted
in the adoption of a new constitution in early 2014 and national elections later that year—for
which the mediators were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 28
26 T otal estimate includes the $49.2 billion cost of Operation Inherent Resolve as reported by the DOD Comptroller
through September 30, 2020, and the aggregate $18.677 billion in humanitarian assistance provided through March
2021 related to crises in Syria ($12.204 billion, FY2012 -FY2020), Iraq ($2.989 billion FY2014-FY2021), and Yemen
($3.437 billion, FY2015-FY2021) as reported in USAID Complex Emergency Fact Sheets.
27 Prepared by Specialist in African Affairs Alexis Arieff.
28 Norwegian Nobel Committee, T he Nobel Peace Prize for 2015: National Dialogue Quartet, October 10, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
10
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Despite these advances toward democratic governance, Tunisia’s economy suffered and living
standards declined due to a combination of domestic and international factors, including an
economic crisis in the European Union, Tunisia’s top trade and foreign investment partner. The
conflict in neighboring Libya and recruitment of thousands of Tunisians into Islamist extremist
groups at home and abroad (namely, Libya and Syria) grew into acute national security
challenges, fueling tensions between Islamist and secularist political factions and undermining
consensus around the need to reform the opaque and once-repressive state security apparatus.
U.S. reactions to the 2010-2011 protests in Tunisia were initially muted. Once President Ben Ali
was ousted on January 14, 2011, however, the Obama Administration and many Members of
Congress expressed strong support for Tunisia’s political transition, directly engaged with
Tunisian officials, and expanded U.S. foreign assistance. In his State of the Union address on
January 25, 2011, President Obama praised the “desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the
people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator,” asserting, “The United States of
America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all
people.”29 Prominent Tunisian politicians involved in steering the transition, for their part, praised
U.S. support for democracy in Tunisia and welcomed U.S. aid. 30
A violent assault by Islamist militants on the U.S. Embassy compound and American school in
Tunis in September 2012 appeared to prompt a temporary cooling of relations. It occurred days
after the deadly attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and amid multiple other violent
incidents targeting U.S. diplomatic facilities in the region. The events prompted the State
Department temporarily to order the departure of all nonemergency U.S. government personnel
from Tunisia. 31 U.S. officials called on Tunisia to bring the “masterminds” of the attack to justice,
and subsequently criticized the Tunisian government’s investigations and prosecutions as
insufficient. 32 Tunisia’s 2013 political crisis also likely constrained high-level engagement, as
Tunisian leaders focused on internal issues.
Relations appeared to warm again after the appointment of a new, technocratic government in
early 2014 (pursuant to the quartet-mediated accord), and expanded further in 2015, after the first
elections under the new constitution. U.S. officials continued to engage with Tunisian
counterparts at a high level for the remainder of the decade, with an increased focus on
counterterrorism cooperation amid the rise of the Islamic State. The Trump Administration
repeatedly proposed to decrease bilateral aid to Tunisia, consistent with its global foreign aid
proposals, but Congress did not enact the proposed cuts, as discussed below.
This case study focuses on the period from 2011 to 2014, when U.S. officials sought to use
foreign assistance tools to respond to fast-moving developments in Tunisia (alongside other
countries affected by the Arab Spring) amid stark divides in Congress regarding the value and
scale of U.S. foreign assistance writ large (see “Revisiting Resources: Appropriations and the
‘Arab Spring,’” above).
29 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011,
Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union ,
January 25, 2011, p. 56.
See, e.g., Robin Wright, “T unisia: Interview with Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi,” Wilson Center, November 2, 2012;
David Ottaway, “Inside T unisia’s Power Struggle,” The Cairo Review, Spring 2017.
30
31 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “T ravel Warning: T unisia,” October 19, 2012.
32 U.S. Embassy T unis, “Message from the American Ambassador Jacob Walles,” October 14, 2012; and “ Media Note
from the U.S. Embassy in T unis,” May 29, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
11
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Figure 2. Timeline: Selected Events in Tunisia’s Uprising and Transition and U.S.
Responses, 2011-2014
Sources: Prepared by CRS using media reports and U.S. government statements.
Congress and Tunisia’s Transition
Congress’ influence on U.S. policy during Tunisia’s transitional period was particularly evident in
the areas of U.S. aid and security cooperation, which reflected shared executive-legislative
objectives within several overarching constraints. Foreign assistance and security cooperation
funds allocated for Tunisia during the three fiscal years preceding the 2011 uprising (FY2008FY2010) totaled $67 million. 33 In contrast, allocations during the next three fiscal years (FY2011FY2013) totaled $510 million, more than seven times as much. 34 U.S. programs focused on
33 Includes funds appropriated to the State Department and USAID for bilateral foreign assistance, as reported in annual
budget request documents, as well as Defense Department “global train and equip” funds notified to Congress and
confirmed in subsequent communications with CRS.
34 Figures provided to CRS by the State Department. Includes funds appropriated to the State Department and USAID
for bilateral foreign assistance for T unisia, along with global and regional funds and reprogrammed funds, as well a s
Defense Department “global train and equip” funds. Humanitarian aid targeted at Libyan refugees is excluded.
Congressional Research Service
12
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
strengthening Tunisia’s civil society actors, encouraging economic stabilization and
liberalization, building counterterrorism capacity, and encouraging security sector reforms.
Many Members voiced strong support for Tunisia’s nascent democracy and national security, and
a number of them traveled to Tunisia to meet with transitional leaders, 35 but for the most part, the
increased aid allocations were not contingent on Congress appropriating new funds specifically
for Tunisia. The 2010-2011 protests, Ben Ali’s ouster, and the constituent assembly elections
unfolded after the Obama Administration had programmed much of its FY2011 bilateral aid
budget and finalized its budget proposals for FY2012, and in the context of congressional
attention to cutting some federal spending. In late 2012, some Members of Congress—including
Members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees—threatened to withhold U.S. aid
for Tunisia if the government did not turn over a suspect in the Benghazi attacks, but the Tunisian
government did not do so and aid largely continued. 36
Starting with the FY2012 SFOPS appropriations act (Division I, Section 7041(b), P.L. 112-74,
signed into law on December 23, 2011), Congress provided funds, and allowed the allocation of
previously appropriated funds, for sovereign loan guarantees for Tunisia and the establishment of
a new Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund, or TAEF. (Through FY2014, the United States
provided $79 million for the cost of two loan guarantees for Tunisia, and $60 million for the
TAEF. 37 Further loan guarantees and additional financing for the TAEF were provided after the
scope of this case study.) Bills establishing an enterprise fund for Tunisia had first been
introduced in the Senate (112th Congress, S. 618) and House (112th Congress, H.R. 2237) in
March and June 2011, respectively; neither was enacted.
Most early U.S. transition-related aid, however, involved the Obama Administration either
allocating funds appropriated for global or regional (versus country-specific) programs, or
reprogramming funds initially intended for other countries and/or purposes. Congressional
committees of jurisdiction reviewed and approved executive branch notifications of such
spending and reprogramming plans. Funds appropriated in global accounts that were directed
toward Tunisia, with congressional review, included, for example, a surge in funding managed by
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which supported civil society strengthening and
other programs. A notable example of reprogrammed funds, also subject to congressional review,
was the provision of a $100 million cash transfer in 2012 to help Tunisia’s government meet its
debt payments to international financial institutions. 38
Congress also encouraged expanded U.S.-Tunisia security assistance and cooperation during the
period under discussion. Congress appropriated increased State Department-administered
bilateral Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) assistance for Tunisia, and the Defense Department increased
See, e.g., Reuters, “Senators McCain and Lieberman in T unisia,” February 22, 2011; International Republican
Institute, “ IRI Hosts [House Democracy Partnership] Congressional Delegation for Meetings with T unisian Political
Leaders,” September 29, 2011; Honolulu Civil Beat, “Inouye Meets with T unisia Leaders,” January 6, 2012; Senator
Ed Markey, “Markey, Pelosi, Congressional Delegation Arrive in T unisia and Meet with High-Ranking Government
Officials,” March 15, 2012; Foreign Policy, “Corker in T unisia to Witness Fall of Government,” February 19, 2013.
36 See, e.g., Foreign Policy, “ Graham threatens T unisia over U.S. access to Benghazi suspect ,” October 31, 2012; and
Representative Frank Wolf, “Stop Foreign Aid to T unisia,” Congressional Record, p. H612, December 12, 2012. T he
suspect in question, Ali Ani al Harzi, subsequently was released from detention in T unisia and was killed in a U.S.
airstrike in Iraq in 2015. (See T homas Joscelyn, “Why Was a Key Benghazi Suspect Free?” The Weekly Standard, June
25, 2015.)
35
37 Data provided to CRS by the U.S. Department of State, Office of Foreign Assistance, January 2015.
38 “U.S. to give $100 million to boost T unisia finances: Clinton,” Reuters, March 29, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
13
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
counterterrorism assistance for Tunisia under its global train and equip program, subject to
congressional notification and review. 39 The Obama Administration also selected Tunisia as a
focus country for its interagency Security Governance Initiative (SGI), established in 2014 with
funds appropriated in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation to global and regional accounts.
The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying S. 1253, the Senate version of the
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, affirmed that “expanded military assistance and
cooperation with the Tunisian Armed Forces is an important component of a comprehensive U.S.
policy to support the people and Government of Tunisia in its transition to democracy” (S.Rept.
112-26, issued June 22, 2011).
In 2013, after Congress had declined to enact the Obama Administration’s MENA-IF proposal
(see Revisiting Resources: Appropriations and the “Arab Spring” above), the State Department
indicated that its FY2014 budget request reflected a “normalization” of aid proposals for Tunisia,
after a prior reliance on reprogrammed funds to meet “urgent” needs.40 The Administration
secured congressional support for further increases in bilateral aid in the wake of Tunisia’s 2014
democratic elections. Starting in the FY2016 SFOPS appropriations act Congress began
allocating bilateral economic and security aid for Tunisia above a specified amount ($141.9
million under Division K, Section 7041(i), P.L. 114-113, signed into law on December 18, 2015),
which had the practical effect of ensuring aid funding for Tunisia in the context of competing
economic and security aid priorities. (Congress subsequently increased the foreign assistance
floor for Tunisia in FY2017, and again in FY2019 and FY2020, in the context of Trump
Administration proposals to decrease aid, and also provided new authorities and funds to the State
Department and DOD to assist Tunisia with responding to the Islamic State and securing its
border with Libya.)
Observations
The timing of Tunisia’s uprising and political transition coincided with debates within
Congress—and between Congress and the executive branch—over the size of the federal budget,
the scale of U.S. foreign aid, and U.S. policy toward MENA countries affected by unrest. The
2012 Benghazi attack and similar attacks in Tunis, along with political turmoil and paralysis in
Tunisia in 2013, further complicated U.S.-Tunisia relations, despite efforts on both sides to
promote close ties. By that point, escalating conflicts in Libya, Yemen, and Syria were receiving
U.S. officials’ attention and had tempered their enthusiasm about the power of events in Tunisia
to positively reshape state-society relations in other authoritarian states.
In seeking to foster democracy and economic stability in Tunisia and the wider region, Members
of Congress engaged directly with Tunisian leaders, oversaw increases in U.S. security
cooperation, and adapted some foreign assistance tools (e.g., enterprise funds) previously used in
Eastern Europe prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union. 41 At the same time, congressional
interest in providing large-scale, flexible assistance to Tunisia and other Arab states in political
transition proved limited, in part due to aforementioned stated skepticism of broad spending
authorities proposed by the Obama Administration, which might have limited Congress’s ability
to oversee and allocate funds specifically (see “Revisiting Resources: Appropriations and the
39 At the time, this program was authorized under §1206 of P.L. 109-163, as amended.
40
Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Elizabeth Jones in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, The Middle East and North Africa
FY2014 Budget: Priorities and Challenges, hearing, 113th Cong., 1st sess., May 22, 2013, H. Hrg. 113-41
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2013).
41 In November 1989, Congress enacted the Support for East European Democracy Act (P.L. 101-179) defining
enterprise funds and authorizing appropriations for such funds for Poland and Hungary .
Congressional Research Service
14
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
“Arab Spring””). Furthermore, Tunisia did not draw as much attention or financial support as
countries considered key national security partners, such as Egypt and Jordan (see below).
Today, Tunisia remains the sole country that experienced a change in government as a result of
the 2011 MENA region uprisings to have made a durable transition to multiparty democracy. Its
constitution enshrines individual liberties and states that Tunisia “is a civil state based on
citizenship, the will of the people, and the supremacy of law.” Tunisia’s example of peaceful
democratic change arguably remains potent throughout the region; possibly helping to fuel
ongoing demands for more responsive and accountable governance in Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon
in recent years, for example.
At the same time, worsening economic hardships in Tunisia, along with public corruption and
ongoing security challenges, have fueled growing discontent and a rejection of mainstream posttransition political leaders. The resulting election in 2019 of political outsiders and politicians
who express open nostalgia for the Ben Ali era has made it increasingly difficult for Tunisian
leaders to form durable governing coalitions or muster majority support for reforms. Tunisia’s
2014 constitution and planned political decentralization also have yet to be fully implemented.
Protests surged anew in early 2021, underscoring the fragility of Tunisia’s gains.
Libya: Military Intervention and its Aftermath42
The 112th Congress devoted considerable attention to the outbreak of unrest and conflict in Libya
in February 2011, amid a broader wave of uprisings and state repression in other countries in the
MENA region. Some U.S. policymakers were optimistic about the potential for activism to
deliver greater political pluralism and respect for individual rights in the MENA region, but
others had doubts. Libya’s authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi responded to resurgent
internal challengers with force, and, unlike counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, was not
constrained by domestic institutions or international scorn. As events unfolded, Members of
Congress sought to influence executive branch decisions and provide oversight of U.S. responses
to the crisis, including President Obama’s reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Libya, the U.S.
military’s March 2011 intervention to protect Libyan civilians, subsequent support of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) and coalition military operations in the country, and U.S.
recognition and material support of select Libyan opposition figures and forces.
Members of Congress debated the advisability, goals, scope, and costs of U.S. assistance to the
Libyan opposition and U.S. military intervention in Libya, questioned the President’s authority to
order U.S. military operations in Libya absent explicit congressional approval, and sought
information from the executive branch concerning U.S. policy and planning for post-conflict
scenarios. Congress did not enact an explicit authorization for the use of military force in Libya
during the 2011 conflict, but a majority of Members also voted to reject legislative proposals that
sought to force President Obama to end U.S. military operations immediately or condition the
availability of defense funds.
The aftermath of Qadhafi’s death in October 2011 proved chaotic, with infighting among Libyans
and foreign intervention resuming after an initial period of calm. Following terrorist attacks on
two U.S. facilities in Benghazi Libya in September 2012, Congress conducted eight
investigations into the attacks, including the investigation by the House Select Committee on
Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi. The 2014 rise of an Islamic State
affiliate in Libya, and the outbreak in 2019 of conflict in Libya have further reshaped public and
congressional perspectives on U.S. decisions taken in 2011. More broadly, the 2011 U.S.
42 Prepared by Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Christopher Blanchard.
Congressional Research Service
15
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
intervention in Libya and its results continue to influence debates at over war powers, the
protection of civilians, post-conflict stabilization, and military intervention as a foreign policy
tool.
This case study focuses on 2011, when Members of Congress and U.S. officials debated U.S.
military intervention in Libya and Congress used various policy tools to shape U.S. policy.
Figure 3. Timeline: Selected Events in Libya and U.S. Responses, 2011-2014
Source: Prepared by CRS using media reports and U.S. government statements.
Congress and Conflict in Libya
Prior to 2011, Congress had engaged with the George W. Bush and Barack Obama
Administrations to provide for a gradual and conditional reestablishment of U.S.-Libyan relations
after decades of confrontation with Qadhafi. U.S.-Libyan rapprochement remained a work in
progress at the end of 2010. The Obama Administration had engaged senior members of
Qadhafi’s government and entered into initial agreements to expand U.S.-Libya security
cooperation. 43 The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians in February 2011 derailed
43 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks with Libyan National Security Adviser Dr. Mutassim Qadhafi
before their Meeting, April 21, 2009; and Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene A. Cretz at the Carnegie
Congressional Research Service
16
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
the renewed relationship. Expressing concern about violence against peaceful protesters,
President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton called for Qadhafi to step down and the President
reimposed U.S. economic sanctions on Libyan officials and entities through a new executive
order (E.O. 13566). 44 In addition, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council via Resolution
1970 required its member states to impose sanctions on Libya, including an arms embargo, travel
ban, and asset freeze. 45
On March 1, 2011, the Senate adopted a resolution (S.Res. 85, 112th Congress) by unanimous
consent urging “the United Nations Security Council to take such further action as may be
necessary to protect civilians in Libya from attack, including the possible imposition of a no-fly
zone over Libyan territory.” The resolution did not explicitly authorize the use of U.S. military
force, and, as a simple resolution passed by only one chamber, was not legally binding.
Qadhafi’s continued military operations against Libyans and his threats to advance on the
opposition-held city of Benghazi prompted the U.N. Security Council to act. On March 17, 2011,
it enacted Resolution 1973, authorizing member states “to take all necessary measures... to
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”46
In a March 18, 2011, address, President Obama said the United States would not deploy ground
troops into Libya and would not “use force to go beyond a well-defined goal—specifically, the
protection of civilians in Libya.”47 After issuing an ultimatum to Qadhafi, President Obama, on
March 19, ordered U.S. armed forces to begin strikes against military targets in Libya for the
purpose of protecting civilians and enabling U.S. allies to impose a no-fly zone the country. The
U.S. operation came in the context of French and British government advocacy to the Obama
Administration for military intervention in Libya. The Obama Administration did not seek
specific congressional authorization for the use of military force in Libya, and Congress was in
recess when the initial U.S. strikes, organized as Operation Odyssey Dawn, began.
In a March 21, 2011, letter to Congress, President Obama stated that U.S. strikes in Libya would
“be limited in their nature, duration, and scope.”48 On March 23, Speaker of the House John
Boehner wrote to President Obama raising questions about U.S. strategy, operations, and
projected costs and expressing regret that, in his view, President Obama had not adequately
consulted with congressional leaders prior to the decision to order U.S. military operations. 49 On
Endowment for International Peace, “U.S.–Libyan Relations: T he Second Year of Normalization,” June 4, 2010.
Executive Office of the President , “Executive Order 13566 of February 25, 2011: Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Certain T ransactions Related to Libya,” 76 Federal Register 11315, March 2, 2011. In a February 26, 2011 readout of
President Obama’s call with Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, the White House said “t he President stated that
when a leader’s only means of staying in power is to use mass violence against his own people, he has lost the
legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now.” T he same day, Secretary Clinton more
directly stated, “ Moammar Qadhafi has lost the confidence of his people and he should go without further bloodshed
and violence.” See White House Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of President Obama's Call with Chancellor
Angela Merkel of Germany, February 26, 2011; and, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Holding the Qadhafi
Government Accountable, Press Statement, Washington, DC, February 26, 2011.
44
45 U.N. Document S/RES/1970 (2011), Resolution 1970, February 26, 2011.
46 U.N. Document S/RES/1973 (2011), Resolution 1973, March 17, 2011.
47 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011,
Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Remarks on the Situation in Libya, March 18, 2011, pp. 246 -8.
48 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011,
Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Commencement of Military
Operations against Libya, March 21, 2011, pp. 280-1.
49 Speaker of the House John A. Boehner, Letter to President Barack Obama Regarding Military Operations in Libya,
March 23, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
17
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
March 28, President Obama again addressed the nation. He announced that on March 30, NATO
would assume command of coalition operations to enforce Resolution 1973 and that U.S. armed
forces would then take a supporting role under NATO’s Operation Unified Protector. 50
Various legislative proposals in 2011 subsequently sought to require the President to seek explicit
authorization for U.S. military deployment in Libya, to require the submission of certain defense
and diplomatic oversight materials, to direct an end to U.S. operations, or to place conditions on
the use of U.S. forces and/or appropriated funds in relation to the conflict. Others sought to
authorize the continued use of U.S. armed forces in support of NATO operations, exclusive of the
potential use of ground troops.
In an April debate focused on Libya, the Senate voted against an amendment that
would have stated the sense of the Senate that the President’s war powers, in
general, are limited. 51
In May and July, the House voted to adopt amendments that would have
prohibited the use of FY2012 defense funds for ground combat operations in
Libya unless their purpose was “limited solely to rescuing members of the United
States Armed Forces from imminent danger.”52 These ultimately were not
enacted into law. U.S. military involvement ended before action on the FY2012
appropriation was complete. The conference report on the FY2012 Defense
Appropriations Act (H.Rept. 112-331 noted the change in power in Libya and the
conclusion of U.S. operations, but stated “the conferees insist that when
determining that military engagements are necessary, the President is subject to
the terms of the War Powers Resolution [P.L. 93-148].”
On June 3, the House adopted H.Res. 292 (112th Congress), which found that
“the President has not sought, and Congress has not provided, authorization for
the introduction or continued involvement of the United States Armed Forces in
Libya.” The resolution directed the Obama Administration to provide documents
on its consultation with Congress and a report “describing in detail United States
security interests and objectives, and the activities of United States Armed
Forces, in Libya since March 19, 2011.” The Administration submitted the report
on June 15, 2011. 53 A similar Senate resolution sought information and a strategy
from the Administration (S.Res. 148, 112th Congress) but was not considered
further.
In June, the House rejected a bill (H.R. 2278, 112th Congress) that would have
prohibited the use of appropriated funds for military operations in Libya, with
50 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011,
Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya, March 28, 2011, pp. 306 -311.
51 On April 5, 2011, t he Senate voted on a motion by Senator Rand Paul to commit a pending bill (S. 493) to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, with instructions to report back forthwith with an amendment stating the sense of the
Senate that “the President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a
situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.” The debate focused on the operation
in Libya, and the Senate tabled the motion. See Senator Reid motion to table Senator Paul motion to commit S. 493,
Adopted by recorded vote: 90-10, in Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 157, no. 48 (April 5, 2011), pp. S2110S2111.
52 Representative Conyers Amendment number 61 to H.R. 1540, Adopted by recorded vote: 416-5, Roll no. 366, May
26, 2011, debated in Congressional Record, vol. 157, no. 73-Part II (May 25, 2011), pp. H3673-H3674; and,
Representative Conyers Amendment to H.R. 2219, adopted by voice vote, in House debate, Congressional Record, vol.
157, no. 100 (July 7, 2011), pp. H4737–H4738.
53 U.S. Department of State, Overview of United States Activities in Libya, Report to Congress, June 15, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
18
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
exceptions for search and rescue; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
aerial refueling; and operational planning. 54 The House also rejected a series of
other resolutions seeking to direct the removal of U.S. armed forces from Libya
or, alternatively, to explicitly authorize continuing U.S. participation in NATO’s
Operation Unified Protector. 55
Also in June, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee debated and reported a
proposed authorization for the use of military force in Libya (S.J.Res. 20, 112th
Congress), but the measure was not taken up on the Senate floor. 56 Committee
Members discussed the Obama Administration’s views on the President’s war
powers as they related to Libya in a June 28 hearing with the State Department
Legal Advisor. 57
Debate between Congress and the Obama Administration about congressional authorization and
the cost of U.S. military operations in Libya diminished as developments in Libya made a
sustained U.S. military campaign less likely. Libyan rebels isolated Qadhafi’s remaining
strongholds in western Libya in August 2011, and thereafter U.S. participation in NATO
operations became more limited in scope and intensity. U.S. military involvement in Libya in
support of allied operations continued until October 2011, when Qadhafi’s death at the hands of
rebel militiamen brought an ostensible end to the uprising. The cost of the 2011 U.S. military
operations in Libya was estimated between $1 billion and $2 billion. 58 No U.S. military personnel
were killed.
Members of Congress welcomed the announcement of Libya’s liberation and the formation of an
interim cabinet, while expressing concern about security in the country, weapons proliferation,
and the prospects for a smooth political transition—including implications for U.S. financial
resources. Securing stockpiles of Libyan conventional and chemical weapons emerged as an issue
of congressional focus. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012, Congress directed the
President to “develop and implement, and from time to time update ...a comprehensive strategy to
reduce and mitigate the threat posed to United States citizens and citizens of allies of the United
States from man-portable air-defense systems that were in Libya as of March 19, 2011.”59 As
noted above, Congress did not enact House-endorsed limits on the use of defense funds for
military operations in Libya, but did reassert congressional views about the validity of the War
“Limiting Use of Funds for Armed Forces in Libya,” House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 157, part 92 (2011),
pp. H4550-H4564. Failed by recorded vote: 180-238 (Roll no. 494), June 24, 2011.
54
55 H.Con.Res. 51 would have directed the President to remove U.S. forces from Libya pursuant to section 5(c) of the
War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)). It failed on passage by a vote of 148-265 (Roll no. 412), June 3, 2011.
H.J.Res. 68 would have authorized the President for one year from passage “to continue the limited use of the United
States Armed Forces in Libya, in support of United States national security policy interests, as part of the NAT O
mission to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) .” It failed on passage by a vote of 123 295 (Roll no. 493), June 24, 2011.
56 For a record of the committee’s consideration, see S.Rept. 112-27.
57
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Libya and War Powers, hearing, 112th Cong., 1 st sess., June
28, 2011, S. Hrg. 112–89 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011).
58
Remarks of Vice President Joseph R. Biden, State of the Union, CNN, October 23, 2011. President Obama later
estimated that the U.S. operations had cost $1 billion. See Jeffrey Goldberg, “T he Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic,
April 2016.
59 Section 1243 of P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011. A House subcommittee held a hearing on the topic of securing
weaponry in the aftermath of regime change in July 2012. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on T errorism, Nonproliferation, and T rade, When Regimes Fall: The Challenge of Securing Lethal
Weapons, hearing, 112th Cong., 2 nd sess., July 19, 2012, H. Hrg. 112-163., (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012).
Congressional Research Service
19
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) in the conference report on the FY2012 Defense Appropriations
Act. In the FY2012 foreign aid appropriations measure, Congress also directed that up to $20
million should be made available for transition support in Libya, but directed that the funds be
made available to the extent possible with matching Libyan contributions and prohibited non-loan
based assistance for infrastructure projects.60
Observations
The military intervention in Libya motivated the President and Members of Congress to articulate
their views and rationales about its relative necessity, advisability, and likely effects. It also
prompted them to consider their views on the relative authorities of the President and Congress to
initiate military operations for civilian protection purposes and sustain military operations in
support of partners for more than the 60-day period envisioned by the War Powers Resolution
(P.L. 93-148). 61 President Obama in 2011 asserted his authority to initiate military operations that
were limited in nature, duration, and scope. His Administration proposed a four-part test for use
in defining whether or not military operations constitute “hostilities” under the War Powers
Resolution. 62
Congress considered measures that would variously have provided or withdrawn authorization
and/or funding for U.S. military action, but congressional majorities declined to direct an
immediate end to U.S. military operations or to authorize them expressly. U.S. operations ended
before newly appropriated funds may have become necessary to sustain the activities. Via public
statements, media interviews, and legislative proposals, Members stated a range of views about
the President’s war powers and Congress’ proper role and responsibilities with regard to
presidentially initiated military operations.
The ambiguity of developments in Libya and the unfamiliarity of U.S. officials and Members of
Congress with emerging Libyan protagonists may have contributed to differences of opinion in
Washington over U.S. policy toward the unrest. Obama Administration officials directly and
publicly acknowledged their uncertainty about what could follow Qadhafi and predicted that the
United States would have a limited ability to influence outcomes in Libya should Qadhafi’s
government fall. Some Members recommended that the Administration extend official
recognition to Libyan opposition members, while others asked about the role of Islamists in the
anti-Qadhafi uprising and the potential for extremists to exploit the situation.
In early March 2011, the White House set up a special team of officials to consider potential
outcomes in Libya. 63 On March 10, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper
discussed various scenarios in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Among
the identified scenarios were that post-Qadhafi Libya could see a “reversion to the pre-Qadhafi,
pre-king history of Libya, in which there were three semiautonomous mini-states” or end up
60 Section 7041(f) of Division I, P.L. 112-74, December 23, 2011.
61 See CRS Report R42699, The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice, by Matthew C. Weed.
62 T estimony of State Department Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Libya and War Powers, hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 28, 2011, S. Hrg. 112 –89 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 2011). See also, Harold Hongju Koh, “Address: T he War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,” Houston Law
Review, 53:4, 2016, pp. 971-1033.
63 Interviews with senior Administration officials cited in Christopher Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits
of Liberal Intervention, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 162.
Congressional Research Service
20
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
dominated by autonomous armed groups like contemporary Somalia. 64 On March 31, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:
I think one of the challenges that we’re all going to face when Qadhafi falls is, as you
suggest, ‘What comes later?’ I think we shouldn’t exaggerate our ability to influence that
outcome. The tribes will have a big influence, whether the military splits or if the military
turns on Qadhafi. There are a number of different alternative outcomes here, only one of
which is some sort of proto-democracy that moves toward a protection of rights and so on.
So, I think we have to be realistic about that.65
Challenges that arose during the period of U.S. reengagement with Qadhafi foretold difficulties
that would plague U.S. efforts during the post-2011 transition. Qadhafi’s hobbling of national
bureaucracies had hollowed out the state’s ability to deliver services, his manipulation of
subnational groups exacerbated local, regional, and tribal tensions, and his personalization and
corruption of national security forces left few credible, capable partners for restoring order. In
2016, President Obama acknowledged that these factors meant “our ability to have any kind of
structure there that we could interact with and start training and start providing resources broke
down very quickly.”66 President Obama also then expressed disappointment that U.S. partners in
Europe had not done more to help stabilize Libya after Qadhafi’s fall, saying, “I had more faith in
the Europeans, given Libya’s proximity, being invested in the follow-up.”67
During the 2011 U.S. intervention, Congress actively questioned Administration officials about
their working assumptions about what a post-Qadhafi Libya might look like and sought details
about U.S. plans and preparations for securing U.S. interests vis-a-vis Libya under various
scenarios. Following Qadhafi’s death, Congress did not hold a hearing specifically about Libya
until after the terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi in September 2012, which shifted the
thrust of congressional engagement. As noted above, Congress conducted eight investigations
into the Benghazi attacks, including that by a House Select Committee.
Libya-related proposals introduced in the second session of the 112 th Congress (2012) sought to
ensure that Libya’s transitional leaders cooperated with investigations of past terrorism cases
dating from the Qadhafi era, pay related compensation claims in full, or reimburse the United
States for the cost of the 2011 military operations. 68 The domestic political fallout of the Benghazi
attacks in the United States and intensifying competition for influence among Libyan factions and
their foreign supporters further limited U.S. engagement after September 2012. Whereas others in
the region and U.S. policymakers looked at Tunisia as a contested but successful transition case,
Libya offered a cautionary example of perils that could follow regime change.
64 T estimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed
Services, The Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, hearing, 112th
Cong., 1 st sess., March 10, 2011, S. Hrg. 112-159 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011).
65 T estimony of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,
Operation Odyssey Dawn and the Situation In Libya , hearing, 112th Cong., 1 st sess., March 31, 2011, S. Hrg. 112-162
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2011).
Jeffrey Goldberg, “T he Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016. In his January 2021 confirmation hearing,
Secretary of State Antony Blinken similarly said “ we didn't fully appreciate the fact that one of the things Qaddafi had
done over the years was to make sure that there was no possible rival to his power. And as a result, there was no
effective bureaucracy, no effective administration in Libya with which to work when he was gone. T hat made things
much more challenging than I think we understood.” Bloomberg Government Transcripts, “Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on the Nomination of Antony Blinken to be Secretary of State,” January 20, 2021.
66
67 Jeffrey Goldberg, “T he Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016.
68 See 112 th Congress, S. 1520, H.R. 3725, and H.Con.Res. 75.
Congressional Research Service
21
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Libya and Demonstration Effects
Some Members of Congress and Obama Administration officials stated that one important consideration in their
responses to the Libya crisis was the demonstration effect that proposed courses of action might have on parallel
crises in other regional countries and the reputational effects that U.S. responses might have globally. Initial U.S.
statements about violence in Libya grouped the country with others experiencing unrest during the “Arab Spring”
and called on all governments to avoid violence against civilians. Libyan leaders’ use of deadly military force against
protestors and insurgents alike soon differentiated the Libyan situation, and U.S. leaders faced questions about
how they would respond. Some Members argued that U.S. action or inaction could each contribute to the
creation of standards by which others would judge the United States and on which others (including U.S.
adversaries and other governments facing unrest) would base future assumptions. In calling for U.S. intervention in
Libya, Senator John McCain stated his view that U.S. nonintervention would serve as
a dangerous counter-example to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. It would signal to rulers across
the region that the best way to maintain power in the face of peaceful demands for justice is through
swift and merciless violence. ...Perhaps the greater concern for us all should be what it would mean
for America’s credibility and moral standing if a tyrant were allowed to massacre Arabs and Muslims
in Libya and we watched it happen.69
President Obama made a similar argument in his March 18, 2011 statement on Libya suggesting that if Qadhafi
were left unchecked to commit atrocities, “The democratic values that we stand for would be overrun. Moreover,
the words of the international community would be rendered hollow.”
At the same time, others in Congress aimed to reduce the duration and cost of U.S. military entanglements, citing
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Representative John Conyers, principal sponsor of two amendments adopt ed by
the House to restrict the use of defense funding for ground operations in Libya argued,
The time has come for Congress to once again exercise its constitutional authority to place boundaries
on the use of our military forces overseas and clearly state that this conflict in Libya will not escalate
into an expensive occupation that could strain our resources and harm our national security interests. 70
The limited, coalition-based U.S. military operation in Libya—arguably designed with potential domestic
constraints in mind—suggested a conditional U.S. willingness to use some types of military force to protect
civilians as part of a coalition under an international mandate (manifest in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973).
Those conditions would prove elusive in other cases, such as Syria, where Russia and China actively blocked
consensus in Security Council bodies or vetoed resolutions, at times citing the example of Libya. U.S. domestic
debate over the 2011 Libya intervention and U.S. policy in its immediate wake also may have suggested a limited
U.S. willingness to take on new, unilateral, and/or long-term foreign policy commitments.
Separately, prior to 2011, some in Congress believed that Qadhafi’s decisions to renounce terrorism and divest of
his weapons of mass destruction programs could serve as a positive example to others who the United States
hoped would make similar decisions. Qadhafi’s use of force against Libya civilians in 2011 raised questions about
the wisdom of U.S. reengagement, and his commitment to disarmament later was shown to have been
incomplete.71 Observers have continued to discuss what the reimposition of U.S. sanctions and military
intervention against Qadhafi has meant for the applicability of the so-called Libya model of ‘reengagement for
disarmament’ to other cases.72
69 Statement of Senator John McCain, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, The Current and
Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, hearing, 112th Cong., 1 st sess., March 10,
2011. S. Hrg. 112-159, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011). See also Senator McCain colloquy with Senator Joseph
Lieberman, in Senate, Congressional Record ,vol. 157, no. 38 (March 14, 2011), pp. S1579 -S1584.
70 Representative John Conyers, in House, Congressional Record, vol. 157, no. 73-Part II (May 25, 2011), p. H3674.
71 “ Despite Libya's apparently unprecedented cooperation—including a voluntary renunciation of WMD [weapons of
mass destruction], revelations of previously undeclared facilities, and delivery of substantial amounts of equipment and
materials—it was still able to conceal a stockpile of CW [chemical weapons] and delivery vehicles.” Nathan E. Busch
and Joseph F. Pilat, “Disarming Libya? A reassessment after the Arab Spring,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs) Vol. 89, No. 2 (March 2013), pp. 451-475.
72 See, for example, Uri Friedman, “T he Word T hat Derailed the T rump -Kim Summit, The Atlantic, May 24, 2018.
Congressional Research Service
22
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
After the Benghazi attacks, Congress continued to appropriate funds for transition assistance, but
conditioned the availability of those funds on certification of Libyan cooperation with the U.S.
Benghazi investigation. Congress did not act to disapprove the Obama Administration’s January
2014 proposal to assist Libya in creating a General Purpose Force (a component of an envisaged
reformed national military) to improve security, but, later that year, the reemergence of civil
conflict among Libyans brought an end to those plans and led to the departure of all U.S.
diplomatic personnel from the country. 73
The 2014 conflict polarized Libyans and paralyzed Libya’s transition, and subsequent U.S. efforts
focused on supporting U.N.-sponsored negotiations among Libyans and their foreign patrons.
Islamic State supporters took advantage of Libya’s disorder to establish an affiliate branch of the
group in the country in 2014 and in 2015 seized the central city of Sirte. Western Libyan militia
forces recaptured it in 2016 with limited U.S. military intervention under the auspices of
Operation Odyssey Lightning. The Trump Administration lowered the profile of U.S. diplomacy
toward Libya, and intervention by other foreign actors in Libya increased after 2017. Renewed
conflict in 2019 and 2020 followed the eastern Libya-based Libyan National Army movement’s
attempt to seize power from internationally recognized Government of National Accord. A U.N. brokered ceasefire was in place at the end of 2020, but foreign forces and mercenaries remained
present.
Egypt: Aid Conditionality and Human Rights74
Over the course of the decade from 2011 through 2020, the fundamental elements of U.S. policy
toward Egypt— the Arab world’s most populous country and largest historical recipient of U.S.
assistance—stayed remarkably constant. On balance, U.S. policy remained focused on sustaining
U.S.-Egyptian military-to-military ties while advocating for respect of democratic principles and
human rights in Egypt’s newly tumultuous domestic politics. As Egypt transitioned from the
resignation of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 to the election of Mohamed Morsi as Egypt’s
first democratically elected president in 2012, and then to Morsi’s subsequent ouster by current
President Abdel Fattah al Sisi in 2013, U.S. officials and lawmakers debated how best to support
or pressure the Egyptian government during swings from autocracy to limited democracy and
back to authoritarianism.
In response to political changes in Egypt from 2011 through 2016, the Obama Administration
altered U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, and strains increased in U.S.-Egyptian relations. 75 From 2017
through 2020, some bilateral tensions diminished as President Trump sought to improve ties with
President Sisi. Nevertheless, President Trump only partially restored some of the foreign aid
benefits removed during President Obama’s tenure, and President Trump took some additional
steps to cut military aid to Egypt.
This case study focuses on the role Congress played during this pivotal decade in U.S.-Egyptian
relations. Historically, Congress had placed certain conditions on economic aid to Egypt prior to
2011. 76 After Egypt’s 2011 uprising and initial change of government, Congress added (and has
73 U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency T ransmittal No. 13 -74, January 22, 2014. U.S. engagement with Libyan
counterparts continued via a Libya External Office established within the U.S. Embassy in T unis, T unisia.
74 Prepared by Specialist in Middle East ern Affairs Jeremy Sharp and Research Assistant Sarah Collins.
75 For background, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
76
From the late 1990s through FY2005, Congress specified that economic aid (ESF cash transfer) would be provided
“with the understanding that Egypt will undertake significant economic reforms” beyond those previously undertaken.
Beginning in the FY2006 appropriations act (P.L. 109-102), Congress changed the phrasing of this condition to include
Congressional Research Service
23
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
maintained) various certification and reporting requirements that aim to ensure that Egypt is
sustaining its strategic relationship with the United States and upholding its peace treaty with
Israel. Lawmakers also have conditioned, and in some cases withheld, U.S. military aid to Egypt
on executive branch certifications to the Committees on Appropriations that the Egyptian
government is taking steps toward democratic governance and supporting human rights.
In imposing these democracy and human rights certification requirements via successive
appropriations measures, Congress also has allowed the executive branch to waive most of them
on national security grounds, which successive Administrations largely have done. Due to the
scope and complexity of U.S. assistance to Egypt and the course of Egypt’s post-2011 political
changes, related provisions often reflected consideration of various contingencies and possible
outcomes. Through legislative provisions, Congress created mechanisms for additional required
consultation between the executive branch and Congress, principally though the Committees on
Appropriations.
This case study documents selected examples of aid conditionality on U.S. foreign assistance to
Egypt from 2011 to 2020. It primarily focuses on conditions related to Egypt’s ties to the United
States and Israel and its progress, or lack thereof, in advancing democracy and human rights. It
does not cover all such provisions exhaustively. Other instances of aid conditions pertaining to
Egypt’s treatment of individual U.S. citizens or Egypt’s policies in the Sinai Peninsula are
discussed in other CRS products.77
Mubarak’s Resignation and Military Rule: 2011-2012
As protests mounted in Egypt in early 2011, President Obama pressed President Mubarak to
provide for an orderly transition to greater democracy, without explicitly calling for his
immediate resignation. 78 When Mubarak stepped down on February 11 and a council of military
commanders announced an interim government, President Obama stated, “The people of Egypt
have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same… But this is not the
end of Egypt’s transition. It’s a beginning.”79 In the months following Mubarak’s resignation, the
Obama Administration focused on developing contacts with new political forces, working with
the ruling military to ensure a smooth transition to an elected civilian-led government, and
offering support to stabilize the economy. Starting in early 2011, the Administration and Members
of Congress debated the appropriate types, scope, and scale of U.S. transition assistance.
As with Tunisia, the President and Congress found common support for the use of enterprise
funds, which are U.S. government-funded entities whose purpose is to promote the development
and strengthening of a private sector in a foreign country by directly investing in its local firms.
In May 2011, President Obama laid out his Administration’s initial response to the MENA
uprisings by remarking that U.S. officials were “working with Congress to create enterprise funds
to invest in Tunisia and Egypt. And these will be modeled on funds that supported the transitions
“significant economic and political reforms” (emphasis added). Beginning in FY2008 and thereafter through FY2010,
Congress changed the condition phrasing to “significant economic and democratic reforms.” For FY2010, Congress
also allocated “up to” $20 million for democracy, human rights and governance programs, and “not less than” $35
million for education programs. See Division F, T itle III, Economic Support Fund, P.L. 111-117.
77 e.g. CRS Insight IN11216, Egypt: Death of American Citizen and Congressional Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
78
NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011,
Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Remarks on the Situation in Egypt, February 1, 2011, pp. 69 -70.
79 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011,
Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Remarks on the Situation in Egypt, February 11, 2011, pp. 103 -104.
Congressional Research Service
24
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.”80 As noted above (“Tunisia: Transition
Assistance and Oversight”), in December 2011, Congress drew on a late Cold War precedent to
authorize the establishment of enterprise funds in Tunisia and Egypt in the FY2012 SFOPS
appropriations act (Division I, Section 7041(b), P.L. 112-74, see textbox).
The Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund
The Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF) was established by grant agreement with USAID on March 23,
2013. After seven years in operation, it generally has been considered a modest success in boosting Egypt’s private
sector, particularly in the financial and technology sectors. According to USAID, the EAEF produced an annual
return of 17.5% and has helped create 5,000 new full-time jobs, attracted several hundred million dollars in foreign
direct investment, and seeded some of the top private equity funds in Egypt.81
At the same time, lawmakers also enacted new restrictions on aid to Egypt that have carried
forward to today. The same 2012 SFOPS appropriations act (Section 7041 of Division I, P.L. 11274) specified that no funds could be made available to Egypt until the Secretary of State certified
that Egypt was meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (due to concerns
that a future democratically elected Egyptian government might abrogate the treaty). It further
specified that no military funds could be provided until the Administration certified that the
government of Egypt was supporting a transition to civilian rule, including by holding free and
fair elections and by implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and
religion, and due process of law. It permitted the Secretary of State to waive these requirements
by reporting to Congress with a “detailed justification” that doing so was “in the national security
interest of the United States.”
The 2012 appropriations act also eliminated the early disbursal of FMF funds for Egypt, and since
then, the conditions imposed on FMF obligations for Egypt have varied relative to political
conditions in Egypt and corresponding congressional priorities. Appropriations provisions have
sought to link aid to transition benchmarks and human rights conditions, while also providing for
continuity in U.S.-Egyptian strategic ties and military cooperation. (See “President Sisi: 2014Present” below). 82
The popular uprising in Egypt unleashed a wave of pent-up anti-Americanism due to the decadesold U.S. relationship with the former Mubarak regime. Even as longstanding U.S.-Egyptian
defense cooperation continued during the 16-month rule of the interim military government that
followed Mubarak, some Egyptian leaders and politicians demonstrated and encouraged antiAmerican sentiment. During this time, the Egyptian military pushed back against U.S. support for
80
NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2011,
Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), Remarks at the Department of State, May 19, 2011, pp. 552-60.
USAID, “Activity Fact Sheet: Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, available at:
https://www.usaid.gov/egypt/economic-growth-and-trade/egyptian-american-enterprise-fund.
82 Between FY2001 and FY2011, Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the
enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest bearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Egypt
could then use any interest accrued after the rapid aid disbursement to purchase U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012,
Congress began to condition FMF obligations, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had been met
before releasing FMF funds, thereby effectively eliminating their automatic early disbursal (Section 7041(a) of
Division I, P.L. 112-74). Most recently, the FY2021 appropriations act allowed for FMF funds for Egypt to be
transferred to an interest bearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York “following consultation with the
Committees on Appropriations” (Division K, Section 7041(a)(3)(A), P.L. 116-260). The act further stated, “ the uses of
any interest earned on such funds shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.”
81
Congressional Research Service
25
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
a competitive, transparent electoral process.83 After reasserting power in 2013, the military moved
to arrest American employees (as well as Egyptian and other foreign nationals) of U.S. -based and
foreign democracy promotion organizations. 84
The Morsi Presidency: 2012-2013
In Egypt’s first post-Mubarak presidential election (May-June 2012), Mohamed Morsi—a leading
figure in the Muslim Brotherhood—became that nation’s first democratically elected president.
Obama Administration officials cautiously engaged the new Egyptian government following the
election. As Morsi engaged in an increasingly open power struggle with military commanders and
struggled to respond to a surge in domestic terrorist attacks, Administration officials attempted to
balance U.S. interests in maintaining close ties to the Egyptian military with the desire to
acknowledge the legitimacy and authority of Egypt’s newly elected civilian leaders.
In Congress, there was hesitancy amongst some lawmakers to embrace the Morsi presidency for a
variety of reasons, including: skepticism over the democratic bona fides of the Muslim
Brotherhood; concern over whether Morsi would adhere to the 1979 Israel-Egyptian peace treaty;
and doubt over whether Morsi would crackdown on terrorist groups in Egypt. As a result, some
Members attempted to restrict U.S. foreign aid and arms sales to Egypt. For example, between
2012 and 2013, Lockheed Martin had been scheduled to deliver 20 F-16 jet fighters (valued at an
estimated $2.5 billion) to Egypt under a sale notified to Congress in 2009 and contracted in
2010. 85 When the State Department notified the planned sale of these F-16 fighters to Egypt in
2009, Congress did not object. However, with Morsi in power, some lawmakers in 2013 proposed
prohibiting the United States from delivering F-16s to Egypt, and maintained their objections
following Morsi’s ouster. 86 Ultimately, related legislative proposals were not enacted and the
aircraft were delivered by the end of 2015.
On September 28, 2012, the Obama Administration notified Congress of its intent to provide a
$450 million cash transfer to Egypt. The notification was issued weeks after a violent gathering
outside the U.S. Embassy in Cairo in which a mob breached the Embassy walls and replaced the
U.S. flag with a black flag associated with Islamist extremist movements. Some in Congress
83
Prior to 2011, U.S. funding for democracy promotion activities and good governance had been a source of acrimony
between the United States and Egypt. Using the appropriations process, Congress has mandated that “democracy and
governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval by the government of any foreign country. ” Originally
referred to as the Brownback amendment, this legislative language began in reference to Egypt (Division D, T itle II,
Economic Support Fund, P.L. 108-447), and was expanded in FY2008 to include “any foreign country.” (Division J,
Sec. 634(o), P.L. 110-161).
84 From FY2014 to FY2019, Congress mandated in annual appropriations legislation that the Secretary of State shall
withhold an amount of ESF to Egypt determined to be equivalent to that expended by the United States Government for
bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with democracy -related trials in Egypt
until the Secretary certifies that Egypt has dismissed the convictions issued by the Cairo Criminal Court on June 4,
2013. In 2013, an Egypt ian court convicted and sentenced 43 individuals from the United States, Egypt, and Europe,
including the Egypt country directors of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican
Institute (IRI), for spending money from organizat ions that were operating in Egypt without a license and for receiving
foreign funds (known as Case 173 or the “foreign funding case”). More than five years later, the 43 defendants in Case
173 were acquitted in a retrial.
85 U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency T ransmittal No. 09-34, October 9, 2009. Since 1980, under the Peace
Vector Foreign Military Sales Program, Egypt has acquired over 220 F-16s. It is the fourth largest operator of the F-16
after the United States, Israel, and T urkey.
86 For example, see 113 th Congress, S.Amdt. 9 to H.R. 325, the No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013. On January 31, 2013,
the Senate tabled the amendment. See Leahy motion to table S.Amdt. 9, Adopted by recorded vote: 79-19 (Roll. no. 9),
in Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 159, no. 14 (January 31, 2013), debate pp. S424-S425, vote pp. S427-S428.
Congressional Research Service
26
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
expressed outrage at the incident and questioned the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to
Egypt. 87
Figure 4. Timeline: Selected Events in Egypt and U.S. Responses
Source: Prepared by CRS using media reports and U.S. government statements.
See e.g. Representative Jeff Fortenberry, “The Storming of Our Embassies: An Attack Against America,” in House
of Representatives, Congressional Record, Vol. 158, No. 122 (September 12, 2012), p. H5869; Representative Ted
Poe, “T ime to Rethink our Foreign Aid,” in House of Representatives, Congressional Record, Vol. 158, No. 128
(September 20, 2012), H6158-9; and, Senator Marco Rubio, “T he Middle East,” Congressional Record, Vol. 158, No.
128 (September 20, 2012), S6488-6490
87
Congressional Research Service
27
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Representative Kay Granger, chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State and
Foreign Operations, placed a hold88 on the $450 million cash transfer, blocking its disbursement,
stating, “This proposal comes to Congress at a point when the U.S. - Egypt relationship has never
been under more scrutiny, and rightly so. I am not convinced of the urgent need for this assistance
and I cannot support it at this time.”89 House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Ileana RosLehtinen also placed a hold on the aid. 90 The holds remained in place until lawmakers lifted them
on the first tranche of $190 million only, allowing U.S. budget support to Egypt in March 2013. 91
The Obama Administration placed the remaining $260 million under review and in October
announced that it would not proceed. 92
President Sisi: 2014-Present
On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military suspended the constitution and ousted President Morsi.
These events led U.S. policymakers to engage in activities to preserve strategic aspects of the
U.S.-Egypt relationship and to express displeasure at the change in Egypt’s government.
Some lawmakers sought to protect aid to Egypt by amending appropriations language that could
have prohibited U.S. funding. Section 7008 of the annual SFOPS appropriations act93 prohibits
foreign assistance to a country whose elected head of government is deposed by military coup
d’état or decree. 94 The provision does not impose a timeline on the executive branch
determination of whether or not a coup has occurred, and the State Department did not issue one
with respect to Egypt. In the FY2014 SFOPS appropriations act, Congress enacted language that
made funds available for Egypt, subject to certain conditions, “notwithstanding any other
provision of law restricting assistance for Egypt.” Congress since has maintained that
notwithstanding language in annual SFOPS measures, in effect exempting Egypt from restrictions
that could have accompanied a coup determination. 95
88 On holds, which in practice may allow the leadership of congressional committees of jurisdiction to delay or block
funds that have already been appropriated, see CRS In Focus IF11515, U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development
and Execution, by Nick M. Brown. Formally, the relevant legal provisions pertaining to aid after appropriation only
require the Administration to notify relevant committees, but do not offer authority for the committees to block the
obligation of funds. Informally, the executive branch and committees of jurisdiction have arrangements for managing
legislators’ objections raised during required notification review periods. Executive branch officials have consistently
maintained the position that standard provisions on foreign assistance obligations impose “notification and wait”
requirements and that congressional objections to obligation notifications do not legally bind the executive branch.
89 Reuters, “U.S. plan for emergency Egypt aid hits roadblock,” September 28, 2012.
90 Josh Rogin, “Ros-Lehtinen rejects Obama’s plan to send $450 million to Egypt — in Spanish,” Foreign Policy,
October 2, 2012.
91 Emily Cadei, “Obama Push to Aid Egypt Remains Stalled in Congress,” CQ Roll Call, November 13, 2012; and
Reuters, “ U.S. to give Egypt budget aid after assurance on IMF: Kerry ,” March 3, 2013.
92 “U.S. withholding of aid to Egypt military includes hundreds of millions of dollars,” Reuters, October 9, 2013; and,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Egypt: U.S. Government Should Examine Options for Using Unobligated
Funds and Evaluating Security Assistance Programs, GAO-15-259, February 2015.
93 In 2013, the relevant legislation had been Division I, P.L. 112-74; 125 Stat. 1195.
94 For background, see CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations, by
Alexis Arieff, Marian L. Lawson, and Susan G. Chesser.
95 As of 2020, in annual State and Foreign operations (SFOPs) legislation, Congress made an additional exception to
the “notwithstanding” clause in the SFOPS subsection on Egypt (currently, Division K, Sec. 7041(a), P.L. 116-260):
Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (known as the “Leahy Law,” pertaining to human
rights vetting for recipients of U.S. security assistance).
Congressional Research Service
28
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Congress has otherwise conditioned the obligation of all assistance to Egypt since FY2012 by
requiring certification by the Secretary of State that Egypt is “sustaining the strategic relationship
with the United States” and is “meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace
Treaty.”96 From FY2014 onward, Congress has not provided a waiver for these overarching
requirements.
Figure 5. Egypt: Withholding Conditions on U.S. Military Assistance Allocations
in millions of current dollars
Source: Prepared by CRS based on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocations and terms from annual SFOPS
appropriations acts, FY2011-FY2021.
Note: In FY2014, Congress did not provide a waiver for certification requirements, but allowed for the
obligation of tranches of aid for defined purposes and at defined rates if the executive branch could not make
certain democracy and human rights-related certifications. For FY2015, Congress again linked aid tranches and
rates to certain democracy and human rights-related certifications, but provided a waiver. From FY2012 through
FY2021, Congress conditioned all U.S. assistance to Egypt by requiring the executive branch to certify that Egypt
was meeting its commitments under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and sustaining its strategic relationship
with the United States. From FY2014 onward, Congress did not provide a waiver for these certifications.
Other conditions and waiver provisions have varied over time (Figure 5). In some years,
Congress has further conditioned the obligation aid for Egypt by applying certification
requirements to distinct tranches of aid: in FY2014, for example, the Secretary of State was
required to certify to the Committees on Appropriations prior to obligation of one tranche that
Egypt had held a constitutional referendum and was taking steps to support a democratic
transition. Prior to obligation of a second tranche, Congress required certification that Egypt had
held parliamentary and presidential elections, and had a new elected government that was taking
steps to govern democratically. 97
96 Previously, Congress had required these certifications in the FY2012 SFOPS appropriations act but provided a
waiver. By reference, they applied to FY2013 appropriations under the terms of P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013.
97 Congress did not provide a waiver for these conditions, but took steps to allow for the continuation of some aid under
some circumstances. Congress provided that if the certifications could not be made, then FMF obligations were to “be
made available at the minimum rate necessary to continue existing contracts... except that defense articles and services
from such contracts” were not to be delivered until the certification requirements were met. Congress applied parallel
Congressional Research Service
29
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
The Obama Administration also took several steps to express U.S. displeasure with Morsi’s
ouster. President Obama announced a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign assistance policy
toward Egypt, 98 canceled a joint U.S.-Egypt military exercise (Operation Bright Star), suspended
the deliveries of certain military items to Egypt (such as F-16s, along with Apache helicopters,
Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 tanks) pending progress toward democracy, and cancelled planned
cash transfers of economic aid. 99 Ultimately, however, the Obama Administration accepted the
Egyptian military’s overthrow of a democratically elected president as a fait accompli and
attempted to redefine certain components of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship. 100
By the spring of 2015, as terrorist attacks against Egypt continued amid the global rise of the
Islamic State, some lawmakers called on the Administration to end its weapons export
suspension. 101 The Obama Administration responded with a change in U.S. policy. On March 31,
2015, the White House announced it would allow the deliveries of select weapons systems to
Egypt that had been on hold since October 2013, and pledged to continue seeking $1.3 billion in
annual military aid from Congress.
However, the White House simultaneously announced that future military assistance to Egypt
would be largely reformulated by ending cash flow financing. 102 Section 23 of the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2763)103 authorizes the President to finance the “procurement of
defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign
countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine
consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this
authority to permit Israel and Egypt to set aside almost all FMF funds for current year payments
only, rather than set aside the amount needed to meet the full cost of multi-year purchases. 104
During 2020, the FY2021 SFOPS appropriations act (Division K, Section 7041, P.L. 116-260),
provided a total of $1.42 billion for Egypt in bilateral foreign assistance. As in previous fiscal
requirements on any use of prior-year FMF and International Military Education and T raining (IMET ) funds that
remained available. Congress exempted funds that were to be used for counterterrorism, border security, and
nonproliferation programs in Egypt, and for development activities in the Sinai. Congress applied a similar tranche and
minimum rate necessary framework in FY2015, requiring certification of different criteria, a nd providing a waiver.
98 NARA, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack H. Obama, 2013,
Book 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2019), Statement on the Situation in Egypt , July 3, 2013, pp 802-3.
99 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Assistance to Egypt,” Press Statement, October 9, 2013.
100 President Obama said, “ going forward, the United States will maintain a constructive relationship with the Interim
Government that promotes core interests like the Camp David Accords and counterterrorism. We'll continue support in
areas like education that directly benefit the Egyptian people. But we have not proceeded with the delivery of certain
military systems, and our support will depend upon Egypt's progress in pursuing a more democratic path.” U.S.
President (Obama), “ Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City ,” Daily Compilation of
Presidential Documents, 2013 DCPD-201300655, September 24, 2013, pp. 6-7.
101
In February 2015, House SFOPS Appropriations Subcommittee Chairwoman Kay Granger wrote to President
Obama stating that “T hey [the Egyptians] need these planes and other weapons immediately to continue the fight
against ISIL and other terrorists threatening Egypt’s security, but your Administration has refused to use the authority
Congress provided you in law to provide Egypt these weapons.”
102
For more information, see out of print CRS Report R44060, Ending Cash Flow Financing to Egypt: Issues for
Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp, available to congressional requesters from the author.
103 Section 23(g)(1) of the AECA requires congressional notification of Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs),
amendments, and commercial contracts for $100 million or greater that are partially or totally funded with cash flow
financing.
104 In the past, other countries such as Greece, Portugal, and T urkey have been granted the benefit of cash flow
financing but only for specific purchases, such as F-16 aircraft. See, U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Military
Sales, Cash Flow Financing, GAO/NSIAD-94-102R, February 8, 1994.
Congressional Research Service
30
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
years (Figure 5), the Act conditions U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt by withholding some FMF
funds from obligation ($225 million out of $1.3 billion total) until the Secretary of State certifies
that the Government of Egypt is taking steps to, among other things, strengthen the rule of law,
democratic institutions, and human rights in Egypt. The Secretary may waive this certification
requirement on national security grounds. The Act also includes a condition that withholds $75
million in FMF until the Secretary of State determines that the Government of Egypt is making
clear and consistent progress in releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with due
process of law. This condition is new in the FY2021 act, and affords no national security waiver.
Observations
While Congress has continued to appropriate over a billion dollars annually in military and
economic aid to Egypt, the conditions it has placed on the executive branch’s obligation of such
assistance have grown significantly since 2011. Even while the Trump Administration sought
improved ties with the Sisi government, Congress did not restore the Egyptian military’s ability
to benefit from cash flow financing. Moreover, President Trump reduced the FY2017 FMF
obligation to Egypt by $65.7 million, citing “Egypt’s ongoing relationship with the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, lack of progress on the 2013 convictions of U.S. and Egyptian
nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers [the aforementioned employees of democracy
promotion organizations], and the enactment of a restrictive NGO law that will likely complicate
ongoing and future U.S. assistance to the country.”105
Throughout all three periods of Egypt’s delicate political transition, Members ultimately sought
to preserve traditional avenues of U.S.-Egyptian defense cooperation by continuing to provide
Egypt’s military with $1.3 billion annually in FMF and through a combination of
“notwithstanding” exceptions and national security waiver authorities. These provisions have
provided the executive branch discretion to bypass most congressionally enacted restrictions on
the obligation of appropriated funds. The FY2021 restriction on $75 million without a waiver
may indicate some shift in congressional views, but is not unprecedented. 106
Within this broadly consistent approach, lawmakers’ reactions to U.S.-Egypt policy have differed
in response to changes in Egypt’s leadership. During Morsi’s presidency, some Members
attempted to restrict economic and defense cooperation out of concern that Morsi’s leadership
threatened democratization efforts and was empowering extremists. During Sisi’s tenure, others
have supported comparable constraints on U.S. assistance out of concern that the new Egyptian
government’s practices pose risks to “the rule of law, democratic institutions, and human rights in
Egypt.”107 How Congress might in the future balance these impulses with other U.S. strategic
concerns remains to be seen, though Congress has not returned to the comparatively permissive
appropriations language that applied to U.S. aid to Egypt before 2011.
Syria and Iraq: Security Assistance in Complex Conflicts108
In 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq, then an Al Qaeda affiliate, announced that it was merging with
the Syria-based Al Nusra Front to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS/ISIL, after
105 Department of State Congressional Notification Transmittal, January 23, 2018.
106
Congress also did not provide the executive branch with the authority to issue a waiver of certain restrictions on
assistance to Egypt in Section 7041(a) of Division K, P.L. 113-76, the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
107 Sec. 7041(a)(3)(i) of Division G, P.L. 116-94.
108 Prepared by Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Christopher Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Carla
Congressional Research Service
31
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
2014 known as the Islamic State, IS).109 The Islamic State went on to seize vast stretches of
territory across Iraq and Syria, which it used as a base to launch attacks throughout the region and
beyond and to which it attracted tens of thousands of global volunteers. The threat posed by the
group prompted the Obama Administration in 2014 to propose and Congress to authorize two
novel security assistance programs to combat it.
The Syria and Iraq train and equip programs sought to strengthen local forces to combat the
Islamic State in different ways. The Syria program initially sought to recruit, train, and equip new
non-state forces but later evolved into a training and assistance program for vetted existing armed
groups, with which U.S. armed forces sometimes conducted partnered operations. The Iraq
program worked largely with preexisting state and sub-state security forces, some of which
participated in joint operations with the United States. Guiding both programs were executive and
congressional judgments that U.S. armed forces could not unilaterally establish durable security
in the region at a sustainable cost when balanced against other global commitments, and that local
actors should be supported to enable them to assume primary responsibility for defeating the
Islamic State and maintaining stability. 110
The train and equip programs helped to break the Islamic State’s grip on Syria and Iraq with
minimal involvement by U.S. ground forces, relative to past operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Local forces’ ground operations, backed at times by U.S. and coalition air strikes and other
measures, ended the Islamic State’s control of territory in both countries by March 2019.
Security assistance from the United States and other foreign governments also contributed to
observable changes in the balance of power and relationships among regional actors in ways that
may have lasting effects on U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Namely, external
funding, weaponry, and training empowered emergent armed groups in Syria and made some preexisting security forces in Iraq more formidable and effective.
Members of Congress considered the content, terms, cost, and duration of each program before
and during their execution. As operations against remnants of the Islamic State have continued,
U.S. debates have focused on the future of the train and equip efforts and on the prospects for
transitions toward a smaller U.S. footprint. Congress also has enacted appropriations and
authorization provisions encouraging ongoing cooperation to shift from the train and equip
framework toward more standard security cooperation arrangements. Both these trends echo
elements of policy discussions about military drawdown and aid transition in Iraq during 2010
and 2011. Experience in training and equipping partner forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
countries informed the programs’ development and authorization. Lessons learned during
executive branch implementation and congressional authorization and oversight of the Syria and
Iraq train and equip programs may inform future debates about partnership operations in other
complex conflict settings.
This case study focuses on the creation and evolution of unique train and equip authorities for
Syrians and Iraqis during the period from 2014 through 2020. It discusses, but does not recount or
Humud, and Research Assistant Sarah Collins.
109 Having fought under the name “the Islamic State of Iraq,” since 2006, the group in 2013 renamed itself “the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL),” and in 2014 began referring to itself simply as “the Islamic State” (IS).
110 T estimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Armed Services, United States Strategy and Military Operations to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
and United States Policy Toward Iraq and Syria, hearings, 114th Cong., 1 st sess., July 7, 2015, S. Hrg. 114–342
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2016). CENT COM Commander General Lloyd Austin argued in September 2015 that, “it is
important that the people in the country and in the region take ownership and work to put in place lasting solutions. If
we don’t do that, we will be back in another 2 or 3 years.” Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
32
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
analyze in full, previous political and security developments in both countries. It also does not
document comprehensively U.S. policy debates over withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 or possible
intervention in the conflict in Syria, including debate in Congress over authorizing aid to Syrian
opposition fighters or the use of military force in response to Syrian government chemical
weapons use during the Obama and Trump Administrations.
Training and Equipping Partners in Syria and Iraq
In 2014, at the Obama Administration’s request, Congress authorized and funded two distinct
train and equip programs for vetted Syrians and Iraqi security forces to counter the Islamic State.
Syria. Congress conditionally authorized, through 2016, the Department of
Defense to provide overt, lethal aid to Syrians for several select purposes
(Section 1209 of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], P.L.
113-291, as amended). 111 These purposes initially included supporting U.S.
efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and
“promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war.”
Conditions placed on the authority included vetting of trainees and partners and
congressional approval of funding obligations. The authority’s purposes and
terms reflected issues raised in previous debate in Congress over possibly
providing lethal U.S. assistance to Syria’s opposition groups in their struggle
against the government of Bashar al Asad,
Iraq. Congress conditionally authorized the Department of Defense, through
2016, to train and equip “military and other security forces of or associated with
the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other
local security forces, with a national security mission” for select purposes
(Section 1236 of the FY2015 NDAA, P.L. 113-291, as amended). Those purposes
were defined as “defending Iraq, its people, allies, and partner nations” from the
Islamic State and its supporters and “securing the territory of Iraq.” Conditions
placed on the authority included vetting of trainees and cost-sharing
requirements.
The Syria Train and Equip Program
As conflict in Syria intensified during 2012 and 2013, executive branch officials and Members of
Congress debated how, if at all, to provide support to the Syrian opposition, as well as possible
responses to the Asad government’s indiscriminate attacks and repeated use of chemical weapons
against civilians. 112 The designation (since 1979) of Syria’s government as a state sponsor of
111 For a detailed discussion of the conditions placed on the original authority, see out of print CRS Report R43727,
Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress, by Christopher M. Blanchard and
Amy Belasco, available to congressional requesters from the author.
President Obama called for Syrian President Bashar Al Asad’s departure from p ower in August 2011. For
background on unrest and conflict in Syria, see CRS In Focus IF11080, Syria Conflict Overview: 2011-2021, by Carla
E. Humud and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E.
Humud. T he White House relayed U.S. intelligence community findings on chemical weapons use in Syria in June
2013. See T he White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for
Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use, June 13, 2013. Following chemical
weapons attacks by Syrian government forces killed an estimated 1,400 civilians near Damascus in August 2013,
President Obama submitted a proposed authorization for the use of military force to Congress. Congress debated the
proposal and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported an amended version for consideration (113 th Congress,
S.J.Res. 21). President Obama withdrew the request after Syria agreed to a joint U.S.-Russian proposal to join the
112
Congressional Research Service
33
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
terrorism, along with other factors, legally restricted the Obama Administration’s ability to
provide non-humanitarian foreign assistance inside the country. 113 First using narrow existing
authorities that enabled the President to bypass certain legislative restrictions in certain
circumstances, and later with explicit congressional authorization, the Obama Administration
established and expanded U.S. foreign assistance programs for opposition-held communities in
Syria and began providing nonlethal assistance to select armed opposition groups.
The Administration, in consultation with Congress, provided foreign assistance to Syrian
communities and nonlethal assistance to select armed opposition groups through early 2013 under
authorities that allow the use of funds for aid notwithstanding other provisions of law that would
prohibit such aid. These included an unanticipated contingency authority provided by Section 451
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA) and Section 614 of the FAA, which
allows the President to provide up to $50 million in a country pursuant to a finding that it is
important to the security interests of the United States. Beginning in the FY2014 SFOPS
Appropriations Act (Division K, Sec. 7041(i), P.L. 113-76), Congress provided specific
authorities for U.S. assistance in Syria, making ESF monies available “notwithstanding any other
provision of law” for select nonlethal purposes inside Syria. Through FY2018, Congress
expanded the list of approved purposes and made more accounts eligible as sources for such
assistance. From FY2019 onward, Congress reduced the number of specified purposes and
narrowed aid authority in appropriations acts.
Congress considered alternative approaches to U.S. engagement in Syria, but lacked sufficient
agreement regarding a broader Syria strategy to pass legislation. Various legislative initiatives
signaled support among some in Congress for greater U.S. involvement in Syria at the time,
including lethal support to armed opposition groups. Others initiatives reflected enduring
congressional concerns about war powers, extremism, intervention costs, responsibility for
imposed regime change, and possible unintended consequences. 114
To some degree, the latter concerns reflected congressional-executive branch frictions dating
from the Libya intervention (see “Congress and Conflict in Libya”). Congressional attention
focused largely on the course and implications of the Syrian conflict writ large, with the need to
combat terrorist groups active in Syria as one among many congressional concerns. Members of
Congress requested and received U.S. military advice about the potential scope and implications
of a lethal assistance program. 115 The Department of Defense refrained from overtly arming and
Chemical Weapons Convention, dispose of its declared chemical weapons sto ckpiles (completed in 2016) and destroy
declared production facilities (completed in 2018).
113 See CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism —Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by
Dianne E. Rennack.
114 In May 2013, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee endorsed S. 960, the Syria T ransition Support Act of 2013,
which would have, among other things, authorized the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law restricting
assistance to Syria, to provide assistance, including defense articles, defense services, and training to vetted opposition
forces. (See S.Rept. 113-79). T he bill was not enacted into law. See also 113 th Congress, H.R. 1327 , the Free Syria Act
of 2013. In June 2013, the House of Representatives passed its version of the FY2014 NDAA (113 th Congress, H.R.
1960), Section 1251 of which would have expressed the sense o f Congress that “ the President should fully consider,
and the Department of Defense should conduct prudent planning for, the provision of lethal aid and relevant operational
training to vetted Syrian opposition forces, including an analysis of the risks of the provision of such aid and training.”
T he House rejected an amendment that would have removed Section 1251 from the bill ( Gibson Amendment number
36, failed by recorded vote: 123 - 301 (Roll no. 234)). T he conference version of the bill adopted in December 2013
(P.L. 113-66) did not contain the House language.
115
In July 2013, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Chairman Carl Levin and Ranking Member John McCain
requested that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey provide his “assessment of the
costs, benefits, and risks associated with training and arming vetted elements of the Syrian opposition.” Dempsey’s
Congressional Research Service
34
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
training Syrian opposition fighters, amid a lack of consensus among Representatives and Senators
about the purpose, terms, and attendant risks of such support. 116 For example, U.S. military
leaders warned Congress that plans to equip armed groups in Syria could result in the loss of
U.S.-supplied equipment to extremists, an outcome which later occurred with nonlethal and lethal
aid. 117
While U.S. policy debates unfolded, the Islamic State group and other armed Islamist extremists
in Syria were growing stronger, and other threats in Syria demanded U.S. attention. An August
2013 chemical weapons attack by Syrian government forces prompted vigorous debate in
Congress over possible authorization of U.S. military intervention, but Congress did not act to
authorize the use of force. By late 2013, Obama Administration officials were warning Congress
that the Islamic State group was benefitting from a “permissive operating environment” in Iraq
and “sanctuary across the porous border in Syria.”118 The Administration revisited its approach to
Syria during the spring of 2014, as some Senators called in March 2014 for a shift in U.S. policy
that would “break the stalemate on the ground” and “change the balance of power.”119
Events in Iraq then motivated changes in U.S. policy toward both countries. Iraqi Prime Minister
Nouri al Maliki’s coalition won Iraq’s national election on April 30, 2014, amid U.S. concerns
about his continued leadership. In June 2014, Islamic State forces swept through northwestern
and north-central Iraq, seizing Iraq’s third-largest city, Mosul, and threatening its capital,
Baghdad. The fall of Mosul and the cascading failure of Iraq’s military forces in the face of IS
advances
reply outlined a potential scalable, nonlethal program to “Train, Advise, and Assist the Opposition” estimated at $500
million per year initially. See Letter from Senators Levin and McCain to General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 18, 2013, and Dempsey’s response, July 19, 2013 .
116
Press reports suggested that Members of Congress differed over reported plans for covert U.S. aid to armed groups
in Syria. See T im Starks and Emily Cadei, “Divided over Arming Syrian Rebels, Congress Declines to Block Obama’s
Plan,” CQ, July 23, 2013. In June 2013, National Security Council spokesman Ben Rhodes said that President Obama
had “authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC)” in an effort “aimed at
strengthening the effectiveness of the SMC, and helping to coordinate the provision of assistance by the United States
and other partners and allies. ...T hese efforts will increase going forward.” In September 2013, Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Obama Administration was providing lethal
assistance to Syrian rebels under covert action authorities. T estimony of Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, The Authorization of Use of Force in Syria, hearing, 113th Cong.,
1st sess., September 3, 2013, S. Hrg. 113–479 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014).
117
In correspondence with SASC leaders, CJCS Gen. Martin Dempsey in July 2013 stated his view that an assistance
program for Syrian armed groups would entail related risks including “extremists gaining access to additional
capabilities, retaliatory crossborder attacks, and insider attacks or inadvertent association with war crimes due to
vetting difficulties.” Dempsey letter to Sens. Levin and McCain, July 19, 2013. In December 2013, extremists seized
nonlethal U.S.-supplied equipment from a Syrian opposition force warehouse, leading the State Department to suspend
its transfer program and then shift to providing support “ directly to vetted unit commanders in the field rather than first
warehousing equipment for later distribution.” Responses of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Ambassador Anne Patterson to Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Syria After Geneva: Next Steps for U.S. Policy, hearing, 113 th Cong., 2 nd sess., March 26, 2014,
S.Hrg. 113-629, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015).
118 T estimony of Hon. Brett H. McGurk, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the
Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iraq, hearing, 113th Cong., 1st sess., November 13, 2013,
H.Hrg. 113-83 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014).
119 Letter from Senators Robert Menendez, Bob Corker, Carl Levin, James Inhofe, T im Kaine, John McCain,
Christopher Coons, Lindsey Graham, and Angus King Jr. to President Barack Obama, M arch 14, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
35
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
Figure 6. Timeline: Selected Developments and U.S. Actions in Syria and Iraq
Source: Prepared by CRS using media reports and U.S. government statements.
Notes: NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act
Congressional Research Service
36
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
presented U.S. decision makers with a crisis scenario. Iraqi forces appeared unable to stem the IS
assault and had lost control of large quantities of weapons, including some U.S.-origin small arms
and military vehicles. 120 IS fighters enjoyed sanctuary in Syria and now controlled large areas of
northern Iraq. Iraqi leaders did not formally request international military intervention, but U.S.
(and, separately, Iranian) support helped Iraqi forces regroup. Small U.S. military deployments to
Iraq for advisory and security purposes began in June 2014. Limited U.S. air operations against
Islamic State targets in Iraq began in August 2014, with some congressional scrutiny.
Consensus among Members of Congress and between Congress and the Obama Administration
over U.S. engagement in Syria and Iraq remained elusive. Congress debated several proposals to
prohibit or condition U.S. military assistance in the context of considering the FY2015 NDAA
and Department of Defense Appropriations Act. On June 2, 2014, the Senate Armed Services
Committee reported its version of the FY2015 NDAA, 113th Congress, S. 2410, which would
have provided a conditional authority to train vetted elements of the Syrian opposition. The bill
would have authorized assistance for the purposes of defending Syrians from attacks by the
Syrian government and protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people
from threats posed by terrorists in Syria. In a June 26, 2014, amendment to its FY2015 defense
appropriations request, the Administration requested $500 million for “a proposed authority to
train and equip vetted elements of the Syrian armed opposition.”121
The Obama Administration’s views of the proposed Syria program and its overall role in U.S.
policy in Syria evolved in mid-2014, in parallel to growing concerns about the Islamic State
threat. In September, the Administration again revised its request to Congress for train and equip
authority to include aid for the purposes of, among other things, “defending the Syrian people
from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the Syrian regime, facilitating the
provision of essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition.”122
In Congress, Members’ differences over the proposed Syria training program led House leaders to
structure consideration of the initial program authorization as a standalone roll call vote on an
amendment offered by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard P. “Buck”
McKeon. 123 The Syria program was authorized and funded first in the September 2014 continuing
120 In April 2015, Conflict Armaments Research found that “A number of weapons that IS forces used in Kobane
[Syria] originate in Iraqi military stockpiles. T he procurement and/or capture by IS forces of this materiel helped fuel
its siege of Kobane.” T he group’s report noted that this included U.S. origin weaponry. Similarly, a December 2015
Amnesty International report concluded that, at the time, “the bulk of the arms and ammunition currently in the
possession of IS has been seized from or has leaked out of Iraqi military stocks.” T he group’s report noted that this
included U.S. origin weaponry. See CAR, Islamic State Weapons in Kobane: Analysis of Weapons and Ammunition
Captured from Islamic State Forces in Kobane, London, April 2015; and, Amnesty International, Taking Stock: The
Arming of Islamic State, December 2015. A DOD spokesperson told the press in 2016 that, “the U.S. military does not
have a means to track equipment that has been taken from the Government o f Iraq by ISIL,” Commander Elissa Smith
quoted in Max Rosenthal, “ T he Pentagon Has No Clue How Many Weapons It Has Lost to ISIS,” Mother Jones,
January 22, 2016.
121 T he Administration sought the funds “ to help defend the Syrian people, stabilize areas under opposition control and
facilitate the provision of essential services, counter terrorist threats, and promote conditions for a negotiated
settlement,” as part of a $1 billion “ Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative” under a proposed Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund. Over the following months, defense officials negotiated with Congress over train and equip
authorities for the program. See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DOD
Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Amendment , Overview - Overseas Contingency Operations, June 2014.
122 Executive branch communication to Congress provided to CRS by congressional defense committee staff.
123 On the McKeon Amendment, the House voted in the affirmative 273 -156, with three not voting (Roll no 507). See
consideration of H.Amdt 1141 to H.J.Res 124 in House of Representatives, Congressional Record, vol. 160, no. 133
(September 17, 2014), pp. H7637-H7662.
Congressional Research Service
37
Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case Studies
resolution (P.L. 113-164). After the new Iraqi government formally requested U.S. and other
international military support in September, U.S. strikes spread to Syria. The Obama
Administration in November further amended its FY2015 defense requests to Congress, seeking
authority and funds for a train and equip program for Iraq (see “The Iraq Train and Equip
Program” below). 124 Congress authorized and funded the Syria and Iraq programs for the
remainder of FY2015 through the FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291) and omnibus appropriations act
(P.L. 113-235), both enacted in late 2014, and training began for Syrians in regional countries in
early 2015.
As originally designed and implemented, the Syria program sought to recruit, vet, train, and equip
thousands of Syrians for a “New Syrian Force.”125 However, U.S. military leaders informed
Congress that the program got off to “a slow start,”126 and by July 2015, the program had
approximately 60 graduates, dozens of whom soon were deployed into northern Syria. 127 Local
Islamist extremist groups quickly disrupted these U.S. trainees’ operations, leading to the loss of
some U.S.-provided ammunition and equipment. 128 The program’s limited results and Russia’s
September 2015 expansion of its military presence in support of Syria’s government contributed
to the Obama Administration’s decision to alter the program, in consultation with Congress.
In October 2015, the Obama Administration announced plans to revamp the train and equip effort
in Syria. These plans would shift its focus away from creating wholly new units outside of Syria
and toward “equipping and enabling ...a select group of vetted leaders and their units” who were
already present and active inside Syria. 129 Thereafter, the program focused on equipping, arming,
and supporting members of pre-existing and/or reorganized forces headed by vetted leaders in
their efforts to fight the Islamic State organization. U.S. training, advice, and air strike support
supplemented equipment and weaponry supplied to select forces through the program. Obama
Administration officials subsequently described the redesigned program as “transactional”130 and
124
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Depart ment of Defense Fiscal Year
2015 Budget Amendment, Overview - Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment, November 2014.
125 T estimony of Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Policy Towards Iraq and Syria and the Threat Posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) , hearings, 113th
Cong., 2 nd sess., September 16, 2014, S. Hrg. 113-589 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015); and, Julian Barnes and Adam
Entous, “U.S. to Give Some Syria Rebels Ability to Call Airstrikes,” Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2015.
126 T estimony of U.S. Central Command (CENT COM) Commander General Lloyd Austin, in U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Armed Services, United States Strategy and Military Operatio
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.