Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy
and Key Issues in the 117th Congress
Updated December 28, 2022
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46781
SUMMARY
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy
and Key Issues in the 117th Congress
The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC) based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political,
and security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign
investment for many of the 33 countries in LAC, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic
linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and
irregular; major factors driving migration include proximity, economic and security conditions,
and familial ties. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs has been a long-standing component of
relations with the region, involving close cooperation with Mexico, Colombia, Central America,
and the Caribbean. U.S. Administrations have long supported democracy and human rights in the
region, with a current focus on authoritarian governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as
well as democratic backsliding and corruption in other countries. Since 2020, support to help the
region respond to the health and economic impacts of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic has been a major component of U.S. policy.
In its approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean, the Biden Administration espouses
three broad priorities—expanding economic opportunities, strengthening democracy, and
building security. The COVID-19 pandemic and related recession exacerbated long-standing
structural challenges in the region, fueled political social unrest, and prompted unprecedented
levels of irregular immigration. The Administration is attempting to confront these challenges
and advance its policy priorities through a strategy of intensified engagement comprising
increased foreign assistance and enhanced bilateral, multilateral, and institutional collaboration,
including through various commitments made at the June 2022 Summit of the Americas hosted
by the United States. Among its key efforts, the Administration is aiming to improve health
security in the region; collaborate on effective migration management; deepen engagement on
climate change and energy security; promote inclusive democracy and combat corruption; and
press for democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
R46781
December 28, 2022
Mark P. Sullivan,
Coordinator
Specialist in Latin
American Affairs
June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American
Affairs
Carla Y. Davis-Castro
Research Librarian
Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin
American and Canadian
Affairs
Karla I. Rios
Analyst in Latin American
Affairs
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin
American Affairs
M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International
117th Congress Action. Congress traditionally has played an active role in U.S. policy toward
Trade and Finance
LAC through legislation and oversight. In March 2021, Congress appropriated $10.8 billion (P.L.
117-2; American Rescue Plan Act of 2021) to respond to COVID-19 worldwide, including in
LAC. In November 2021, Congress approved the RENACER Act (P.L. 117-54), which directs
the use of diplomatic tools and targeted sanctions against antidemocratic actions and corruption
in Nicaragua. In December 2021, Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), or FY2022 NDAA, which included provisions on Colombia, Central America, and China’s
presence and influence in the region, among other LAC provisions.
In 2022, Congress completed action in March on FY2022 foreign aid appropriations as part of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), which included funding directives for several key countries and
regional programs; the State Department estimates an FY2022 allocation of just over $2 billion in assistance for LAC, a 13%
increase from FY2021. P.L. 117-103 also included, as Division V, the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional
Transparency Initiative Act, intended to promote the sustainable rebuilding and development of Haiti and support for anticorruption efforts and human rights. In December 2022, Congress enacted the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263), with several
LAC provisions, including reporting requirements on Mexico, the Caribbean Basin, and the activities of China and Russia in
LAC; the measure also incorporated the United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022. Congress also completed action in
December 2022 on FY2023 foreign aid appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division
K). Although the law did not include a total amount for assistance to the region, it included numerous funding directives for
countries, regional programs, and initiatives and continued to condition assistance to several countries.
Both houses approved several resolutions on the region, including H.Res. 760, S.Res. 37, S.Res. 81, S.Res. 310, and S.Res.
489 on the human rights situation in Cuba; S.Res. 22 on relations with Ecuador; S.Res. 120 on the Summit of the Americas;
H.Res. 1168 on trade with Caribbean ; S.Res. 753 on Brazil’s presidential election; and S.Res. 472 on relations with the
Dominican Republic. More than 40 congressional hearings focused on U.S. policy challenges in LAC (see Appendix).
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress
Contents
Regional Political and Economic Environment............................................................................... 1
COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean ....................................................................... 2
Political Situation ...................................................................................................................... 4
Electoral Practices............................................................................................................... 4
Decline in Democratic Practices ......................................................................................... 6
Economic Situation ................................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean .................................................................... 9
Trump Administration Policy .................................................................................................. 10
Biden Administration Policy .................................................................................................... 11
Legislative Action in the 117th Congress ................................................................................. 16
Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions .................................................................. 16
Additional Congressional Action ...................................................................................... 19
Regional U.S. Policy Issues........................................................................................................... 19
U.S. Foreign Aid ..................................................................................................................... 19
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 22
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs..................................................................................... 25
Trade Policy ............................................................................................................................ 28
Selected Country and Subregional Issues...................................................................................... 31
The Caribbean ......................................................................................................................... 31
Caribbean Regional Issues ................................................................................................ 31
Cuba .................................................................................................................................. 35
Haiti .................................................................................................................................. 36
Mexico and Central America .................................................................................................. 39
Mexico .............................................................................................................................. 39
Central America’s Northern Triangle................................................................................ 41
Nicaragua .......................................................................................................................... 44
South America ......................................................................................................................... 46
Brazil................................................................................................................................. 46
Colombia ........................................................................................................................... 49
Venezuela .......................................................................................................................... 52
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 53
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean ........................................................................ 1
Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries .................................................. 32
Figure 3. Map of Central America ................................................................................................. 41
Tables
Table 1. COVID-19 Deaths, Mortality Rates, and Vaccinations in Latin America and the
Caribbean ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Table 2. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2019-2023 Projection ........................ 8
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2023 Request .......... 20
Table 4. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, 20142021 ............................................................................................................................................ 28
Table A-1. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts ............................................... 55
Table A-2. Congressional Hearings in the 117th Congress on Latin America
and the Caribbean ....................................................................................................................... 57
Appendixes
Appendix. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Data and Hearings .......................... 55
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 60
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress
Regional Political and Economic Environment
The Latin American and Caribbean region consists of 33 countries, ranging from the Caribbean
nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, one of the world’s smallest states, to the South American nation of
Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country. (See Figure 1 and Table A-1 for a map and basic facts on
the region’s independent countries.) Over the past four decades, the region has made significant
advances in political and economic development. Notable political and economic challenges
remain, however, and some countries have experienced major setbacks.
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics.
Notes: Caribbean countries are in purple, Central American countries are in gold, and South American
countries are in green. Geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located
on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean1
Beginning in 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic had widespread public
health, economic, social, and political effects throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
Countries throughout the region suffered sharp recessions in 2020 and increases in poverty. Most
Latin American and Caribbean countries began to recover economically in 2021 and 2022 but are
still contending with the lingering effects of the pandemic, China’s economic slowdown, and
increases in global fuel and food prices due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (see “Economic
Situation,” below). Difficult economic times also have contributed to increased social protests in
some countries and have fueled an anti-incumbent electoral trend in the region (see “Political
Situation,” below).
In terms of public health, from the start of the pandemic through late December 2022, Latin
American and Caribbean countries reported almost 1.75 million COVID-19 deaths, according to
data from Johns Hopkins University. The region reported over 26% of deaths worldwide despite
the region accounting for about 8.4% of the world’s population. Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia,
and Argentina had the highest numbers of COVID-19 deaths in the region; Brazil had the secondhighest COVID-19 death toll globally, after the United States. The regional rankings change when
examining mortality (death) rates per 100,000 population; using this metric, Peru had the highest
recorded COVID-19 mortality rate in the region (and globally), followed by Chile, Brazil,
Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Colombia, and Paraguay. Some Caribbean countries that have
had fewer deaths compared with other countries in the region have had high mortality rates (see
Table 1).2 Experts have expressed concerns that countries worldwide, including in Latin America
and the Caribbean, have significantly undercounted deaths for various reasons, suggesting that
COVID-19 deaths in the region could be significantly higher.3
When the pandemic first surged in the region in 2020, Pan American Health Organization
Director (PAHO) Director Dr. Carissa Etienne expressed concern about the poor and other
vulnerable groups at greatest risk.4 In 2021, the PAHO director stated that the virus had deepened
inequities that had long divided the region and exposed vulnerabilities in the region’s health,
economic, and social sectors.5 In October 2022, PAHO’s director maintained that trends show
“we may be transitioning from the acute phase of the pandemic into a phase of sustained control”
but also noted the need to “rely on testing and increase vaccination rates in every country in the
region.”6 She noted that although over 70% of people in Latin America and the Caribbean had
1 For further background, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by
Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.
2 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” December 26,
2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality (hereinafter, Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” December 26,
2022). Data presented by Johns Hopkins reflect COVID-19 deaths as reported by countries worldwide.
3 See, for example, The Economist, “The Pandemic’s True Death Toll,” updated December 26, 2022, at
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/coronavirus-excess-deaths-estimates, which estimates that COVID-19
deaths in the Latin America and Caribbean region could be 50% higher than reported. Also see David Adam,
“COVID’s True Death Toll: Much Higher Than Official Records,” Nature, March 10, 2022.
4 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “PAHO Director Calls to Protect Vulnerable Groups from Effects of
COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, May 19, 2020; PAHO, “PAHO Calls on Countries to Intensify Efforts to Prevent
Further Spread of COVID-19 Among Indigenous Peoples in the Americas,” press release, July 20, 2020; and PAHO,
“Countries Urged to Face Challenge of Better Access to Health for Populations of African Descent in COVID-19
Pandemic,” press release, December 2, 2020.
5 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Remarks,” April 7, 2021; and PAHO, “Annual Report of
the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 2020, Director’s Remarks,” July 21, 2021.
6 PAHO, “Press Briefing on COVID-19: Director’s Opening Remarks,” October 12, 2022.
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been fully vaccinated, several countries and territories had yet to reach the 40% mark. As noted in
Table 1, as of late December 2022, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines had fully vaccinated less than 40% of their populations, with Haiti having fully
vaccinated only 2% of its population.
PAHO has helped countries with their vaccination campaigns and has facilitated access to
vaccines through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism
developed by global health organizations to facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19
vaccines; 22 countries in the region signed agreements to access vaccines through the facility. In
addition, 10 countries in the region—Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—benefit from the COVID19 Vaccines Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC) launched by Gavi, the Vaccine
Alliance, to provide donor-funded vaccines for low- and middle-income economies.7 As of late
December 2022, PAHO reported that over 151 million doses had been delivered through
COVAX.8
Latin American and Caribbean countries also acquired COVID-19 vaccines from other sources,
including China, Russia, and India. The United States significantly ramped up its donation of
vaccines to the region beginning in June 2021 and had provided over 70 million doses to 29 Latin
American and Caribbean countries by early December 2022, both bilaterally and through
COVAX (see “Biden Administration Policy,” below).9
Table 1. COVID-19 Deaths, Mortality Rates, and Vaccinations in
Latin America and the Caribbean
Deaths
(12/26/22)
Deaths per
100,000
(12/26/22)
Population Fully
Vaccinated (%)
(12/25/22)
Brazil
692,652
325.86
83
Mexico
331,013
259.02
65
Peru
218,008
661.19
87
Colombia
141,881
278.84
73
Argentina
130,080
287.81
84
Chile
63,039
329.77
93
Ecuador
35,940
203.71
82
Bolivia
22,282
190.88
54
Guatemala
19,993
111.60
42
Paraguay
19,666
275.72
50
Honduras
11,063
111.70
59
Costa Rica
9,072
178.09
85
Panama
8,554
198.25
74
Country
7 The COVAX Facility, “Committee Agreements; Confirmations of Intent to Participate, and AMC-Eligible
Countries,” December 15, 2020.
8 PAHO, “Tracker COVAX Initiative—COVID-19 Deliveries in the Region,” updated December 21, 2022.
9 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” updated December 6, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha.
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Deaths
(12/26/22)
Deaths per
100,000
(12/26/22)
Population Fully
Vaccinated (%)
(12/25/22)
Cuba
8,530
75.31
88
Uruguay
7,552
217.4
84
Venezuela
5,830
20.50
52
Dominican Republic
4,384
40.41
57
Trinidad and Tobago
4,277
305.61
51
El Salvador
4,230
65.22
67
Jamaica
3,461
116.88
25
Suriname
1,393
237.46
41
Guyana
1,286
163.50
49
Haiti
860
7.54
2
Bahamas
833
211.83
43
Belize
688
173.03
57
Barbados
568
197.65
54
St. Lucia
409
222.73
30
Nicaragua
245
3.70
90
Grenada
238
211.52
35
Antigua and Barbuda
146
149.09
*63
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
118
106.36
28
Dominica
74
102.79
*41
Saint Kitts and Nevis
46
86.48
*50
1,748,411
—
—
Country
Total LAC*
Sources: Statistics for COVID-19 deaths and deaths per 100,000 are from Johns Hopkins University School of
Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” December 26, 2022, at
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. Vaccination statistics are from Josh Holder, “Tracking Coronavirus
Vaccinations Around the World,” New York Times, updated December 25, 2022, at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html, which draws vaccinations data
from local governments via Our World in Data. Vaccination numbers marked with an asterisk are from Pan
American Health Organization, COVID-19 Vaccinations in the Americas, updated December 22, 2022, at
https://ais.paho.org/imm/IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp.
Notes: *Total LAC includes all independent countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) but not
overseas territories. Peru revised its official COVID-19 death toll in May 2021 to account for excess deaths
attributed to COVID-19 not previously counted.
Political Situation
Electoral Practices
In the early 1980s, authoritarian regimes (ideologically on both the left and the right) governed 16
Latin American and Caribbean countries. Today, observers consider four countries in the region—
Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and most recently Haiti—to be ruled by authoritarian governments
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or to be not free because of their poor records on political rights and civil liberties.10 Most
governments in the region are elected democracies. Nevertheless, although free and fair elections
have become the norm in Latin America and the Caribbean, elections for head of government at
times have been controversial and contested.
In 2021, six Latin American and Caribbean countries held successful free and fair elections for
head of government. Ecuador held two presidential rounds in February and April, electing
center-right candidate Guillermo Lasso, inaugurated in May.11 Peru held two president rounds in
April and June; in a close election, Peru’s national electoral court ultimately declared far-left
candidate Pedro Castillo the winner in July. St. Lucia held parliamentary elections in July in
which Philip Pierre of the opposition center-left St. Lucia Labour Party became prime minister in
a landslide election, ousting the conservative United Workers Party of Allen Chastanet from
power after one term. The Bahamas held parliamentary elections in September in which the
opposition center-left Progressive Liberal Party, led by Philip Davis, ousted the ruling center-right
Free National Movement of the outgoing prime minister in a landslide. In Honduras, Xiomara
Castro of the leftist Liberty and Re-foundation Party won a decisive victory in presidential
elections in November, alleviating concerns expressed prior to the election that a close race could
be marred by a lack of transparency or fraud allegations, as occurred in 2017. In Chile, leftist and
former student leader Gabriel Boric won a decisive victory in a second presidential round held in
December.
The November 2021 presidential race in Nicaragua was the regional exception to free and fair
elections for head of state in 2021. Ahead of the election, the government of President Daniel
Ortega escalated repression by arresting opposition figures and banning major opposition parties
from participating in the race, in which Ortega claimed victory for a fifth (and fourth consecutive)
term.
Latin America and the Caribbean:
In 2022, seven Latin American and Caribbean
2022 Elections
countries held free and fair elections. Barbados
held successful elections for head of
Barbados
January 19
government in January, in which Prime Minister
Costa Rica
February 6 / April 3
Mia Mottley won a second term, with her
Colombia
May 29 / June 19
center-left Barbados Labour Party winning all
Grenada
June 23
30 seats in the House of Assembly. Costa Rica
St.
Kitts
and
Nevis
August 5
had completed two presidential rounds by April,
Brazil
Oct. 2 / Oct. 30
electing Rodrigo Chaves of the center-right
12
Dominica
December 6
Social Democratic Progress Party. Colombia
elected leftist candidate Gustavo Petro, who led
Notes: Elections for head of government. Includes
a coalition of leftist parties and became
first and potential second rounds for presidential
Colombia’s first leftist president.13 In summer
elections.
2022, two Caribbean countries held elections in
which incumbent parties were ousted; Grenada
elected Dickon Mitchell of the center-left National Democratic Congress in June, and St. Kitts
10 See Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2021, February 2022 (hereinafter, EIU, Democracy Index
2021), which classifies all four governments as authoritarian based on some 60 indicators; and Freedom House,
Freedom in the World 2022, February 2022, which classifies Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as not free based
on their poor records on political rights and civil liberties.
11 See CRS In Focus IF11218, Ecuador: An Overview, by June S. Beittel and Rachel L. Martin.
12 See CRS In Focus IF10908, Costa Rica: An Overview, by Peter J. Meyer.
13 See CRS Insight IN11955, Colombia: Presidential Elections in 2022, by June S. Beittel.
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and Nevis elected Terrance Drew of the center-left St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party in August. In
late October 2022, Brazil conducted a second presidential round in which former president Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva of the center-left Workers’ Party defeated rightist populist President Jair
Bolsonaro. In early December 2022, Dominica held a snap election in which the center-left
Dominica Labour Party won its sixth consecutive race, with Roosevelt Skerrit continuing as
prime minister, a position he has held since 2004.
Candidates and parties from the political left and center-left won all but two elections for head of
government in the region in 2021 and 2022. This leftward political shift largely appears to be less
about ideology than about the unpopularity of incumbent leaders and parties seeking reelection
amid tough economic conditions as countries struggle to recover from the pandemic and contend
with increased food and fuel prices and other global economic challenges.
In early December 2022, Peru’s Congress impeached President Pedro Castillo and removed him
from office after Castillo announced the dissolution of Congress and the instillation of an
emergency government to rule by decree. Peru’s Congress swore in Vice President Dina Boluarte
as president and subsequently voted to move Peru’s presidential and legislative elections forward
two years to April 2024.
Decline in Democratic Practices
Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil liberties since the 1980s, many
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean still face considerable challenges. In a number of
countries, weaknesses remain in the state’s ability to deliver public services, ensure accountability
and transparency, advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security. Numerous
elected presidents in the region have left office early amid severe social turmoil, economic crises,
or high-profile corruption; in several cases, the presidents’ own autocratic actions contributed to
their ousters, as illustrated by the impeachment of Peru’s President Castillo in December 2022.
Although the threat of direct military rule has dissipated, civilian governments in several
countries have turned to their militaries or retired officers for support or during crises.
EIU Democracy Index. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU’s) 2021 democracy index,
issued in February 2022, showed a continuous decline in democratic practices in Latin America
since 2017.14 Prior to 2017, the EIU viewed Cuba as the only authoritarian regime in the region.
Venezuela joined Cuba’s authoritarian ranks in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro’s government
violently repressed the political opposition. Nicaragua escalated authoritarian practices in 2018
under longtime President Ortega, as the government violently repressed protests. The EIU added
Haiti to the list of authoritarian governments in the aftermath of the 2021 assassination of
President Jovenel Moïse, which left the country virtually bereft of elected officials functioning at
any level.
The downward trend in democratic practices accelerated in 2021, according to the EIU, with a
particularly sharp decline in the region’s commitment to democratic political culture. This reflects
widespread dissatisfaction with governments’ handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, growing
skepticism about democratic governments’ ability to address the region’s challenges, and
increasing tolerance of authoritarian practices. According to the EIU, the region’s weak
commitment to democratic political culture has enabled illiberal populists to thrive, including
Presidents Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, and Nayib Bukele
in El Salvador. Despite these and other notable challenges, the EIU noted that 80% of the region’s
14 EIU, Democracy Index 2021.
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population lived under democratic regimes, scoring below only Western Europe and North
America.15
Freedom House. Freedom House cited Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as not free in its
annual report assessing political rights and civil liberties worldwide in 2021. The report
highlighted concerns about Cuba’s repression against peaceful protestors in July 2021,
Nicaragua’s jailing of major opposition candidates to ensure the noncompetitive reelection of
President Ortega, and the Venezuelan government’s prioritization of political power over the
population’s well-being. Freedom House also raised concerns about El Salvador’s decline under
President Bukele and the normalization of claims of fraud by President Bolsonaro in Brazil.
According to Freedom House, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti were among the countries
worldwide with the most significant deteriorations in political rights and civil liberties.16
Decline in the Quality of and Satisfaction with Democracy. Public satisfaction with how
democracy is operating has declined along with the quality of democracy in Latin America and
the Caribbean. According to the 2018/2019 AmericasBarometer public opinion survey, the
percentage of individuals satisfied with how democracy was working in their countries averaged
39.6% among 18 countries in the region, the lowest level since the poll began in 2004.17 In the
2021 AmericasBarometer Survey, satisfaction with democracy increased marginally to 43%
among 20 countries in the region, still far lower than in 2012, when 57% of the region expressed
satisfaction with democracy.18
Several broad political and economic factors appear to be driving the decline in satisfaction with
democracy in the region. Political factors include an increase in authoritarian practices, weak
democratic institutions and politicized judicial systems, corruption, high levels of crime and
violence, and organized crime that can infiltrate or influence state institutions. Economic factors
include declining or stagnant regional economic growth rates; high levels of income inequality in
many Latin American countries; increased poverty; and the inadequacy of public services, social
safety net programs, and advancement opportunities, along with the increased precarity of the
region’s previously expanding middle class. Given these trends, the eruption of social protests in
many countries throughout the region in 2019 was unsurprising to many observers, though unique
circumstances sparked unrest in each country.
The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated many of these challenges, contributing to increased
protests in the region since late 2020. Regional economic decline, along with difficult security
and political conditions, also has helped fuel increased migration, especially from Central
America, but also from other countries, including Haitians who had migrated to South America in
the aftermath of the country’s 2010 earthquake and Venezuelans who had settled in countries
throughout the region since 2015.
Economic Situation
The COVID-19 pandemic took a significant toll on Latin American and Caribbean economies.
Even before the onset of the pandemic and its economic effects, the region had experienced
15 Ibid.
16 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, March 2021.
17 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, eds., LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy,
Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019.
18 Noam Lupu, Mariana Rodríguez, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, eds., LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse
of Democracy, Vanderbilt University, LAPOP, 2021.
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several years of slow economic growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported a 7.0%
economic contraction for the region in 2020. Caribbean nations that depend on tourism had deep
economic recessions, many with gross domestic product declines of 10% of more in 2020.19
Most of the region’s countries began some economic recovery in 2021, with the IMF estimating a
regional growth rate of 6.9% for the year, ahead of world economic output. The IMF projects
3.5% growth for 2022, still ahead of projected world output. For 2023, the IMF projects that
regional growth in Latin America and the Caribbean will slow to 1.7%, about one percentage
point behind projected world growth (see Table 2). Major economic challenges to the regional
and world economies include the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic; Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, which has led to increased energy and food prices; persistent and broadening inflation
pressures; and China’s economic slowdown.20
A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries implemented stimulus programs to help
protect their economies and vulnerable populations during the pandemic. Recognizing that many
countries required external financing to respond to the pandemic and associated economic
downturn, international financial institutions increased lending to countries throughout the region.
An important factor in the region’s economic recovery in 2021 was the availability and
distribution of vaccines.
Table 2. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2019-2023 Projection
(annual percentage change, constant prices)
Regional Average, Six
Largest Economies, and
World Output
2019
2020
2021
2022
Projection
2023
Projection
0.2
-7.0
6.9
3.5
1.7
Brazil
1.2
-3.9
4.6
2.8
1.0
Mexico
-0.2
-8.1
4.8
2.1
1.2
Argentina
-2.0
-9.9
10.4
4.0
2.0
Chile
0.9
-6.1
11.7
2.0
1.0
Colombia
3.2
-7.0
10.7
7.6
2.2
Peru
2.2
-11.0
13.6
2.7
2.6
World Output
2.8
-3.0
6.0
3.2
2.7
Region: Latin America and
the Caribbean
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022.
The decline in economic growth in 2020 exacerbated poverty and income inequality throughout
Latin America, with concerns that the region’s past development gains could be set back more
than a decade.21 According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), even before the pandemic, the reductions in poverty that the region made
from 2002 through 2014 had begun to erode. Overall poverty in Latin America decreased from
45.3% of the region’s population in 2002 to 27.8% in 2014 but crept up slowly to 30.4% in 2019,
influenced by several years of slow growth. With the pandemic-related economic recession
19 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022.
20 Ibid.
21 Michael Stott, “Poverty Surge Set Latin America Back over a Decade, Says UN,” Financial Times, March 4, 2021.
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experienced by most countries in the region in 2020, poverty increased to 32.8%. This accounted
for an estimated 203 million people—an increase of 17 million people in poverty from 2019 to
2020. With economic growth rates increasing in 2021 and 2022, poverty declined slightly to
32.3% in 2021 and 32.1% in 2022 and the estimated number of people living in poverty declined
to 201 million.22 According to ECLAC, however, extreme poverty in Latin America increased
from 11.4% of the population in 2019 to 13.1% in 2020, dipped to 12.9% in 2021, and increased
again to 13.1% in 2022, with an estimated 82 million in extreme poverty in 2022 (up from 70
million in 2019).23
Poverty and extreme poverty, according to ECLAC, were estimated to be highest in rural areas as
well as among working-age women, Indigenous people, Afro-descendant populations, children
and adolescents, people with less education, and single-parent and extended households. The
sharp fall in labor income was the main factor in increasing poverty and extreme poverty in Latin
America during the pandemic. ECLAC notes, however, that government transfers to vulnerable
populations helped partially offset the fall in income in the region and that poverty figures would
have reached higher levels without such transfers.24
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the
Caribbean
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political,
security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages
between the United States and the region, and the United States is a major trading partner and
source of foreign investment for many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Free-trade
agreements (FTAs) have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. In
addition, the Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and
irregular; geographic proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving
migration trends.
Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component
of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for over 50 years. The flow of
illicit drugs—including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine from
Colombia—poses risks to U.S. public health and safety, and the trafficking of such drugs has
contributed to violent crime and gang activities in the United States as well in Latin America and
the Caribbean. Since 2000, Colombia has received U.S. counternarcotics support through Plan
Colombia and its successor programs. In addition, for over a decade, the United States has sought
to forge close partnerships with other countries in the region to combat drug trafficking and
related violence and to advance citizen security. These efforts include the Mérida Initiative, begun
in 2007 to support Mexico; the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), begun in
2008; and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009.
Another long-standing component of U.S. policy, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has
been support for strengthened democratic governance and the rule of law. As described in the
previous section, although many countries in the region have made enormous strides in terms of
22 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America
2022, November 2022. The study examines poverty and extreme poverty in 18 Latin American countries.
23 Ibid. ECLAC estimates extreme poverty rates based on the cost of the basic food basket in each country, with the
monthly costs of the basic food basket known as the “extreme poverty line.” See ECLAC, “ECLAC Statistical
Briefings, No. 4, Subnational Poverty Estimates for Latin America,” December 2021.
24 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022.
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democratic political development, several face considerable challenges. Current U.S.-democracy
promotion efforts include initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society and promoting the rule
of law and human rights.
Trump Administration Policy
Under the Trump Administration, the United States took a more confrontational approach to
relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, especially regarding efforts to curb irregular
immigration from the region, compared to previous U.S. Administrations’ emphasis on
partnership. In 2018, the State Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward the
region focused on three pillars for engagement—economic growth and prosperity, security, and
democratic governance. The framework reflected continuity with long-standing regional U.S.
policy priorities but at times appeared to be at odds with the Administration’s occasionally
antagonistic actions and statements on immigration, trade, and foreign aid. In 2020, the White
House also set forth a strategic framework for the Western Hemisphere that included the
prevention of illegal and uncontrolled human migration, smuggling, and trafficking as its first line
of effort in the region.25 According to Gallup and Pew Research Center polls, negative views of
U.S. leadership in the region increased markedly during the Trump Administration.26
On trade issues, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) FTA in 2017. As negotiated in 2015 by 12 Asia-Pacific countries, the TPP
would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, which were parties
to the agreement. The President also strongly criticized the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, threatened U.S. withdrawal, and initiated
renegotiations. The three countries agreed in 2018 to the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force July 1, 2020; the agreement retained many of
NAFTA’s provisions but included modernizing updates and changes. Before approval, the
agreement was amended to address congressional concerns regarding labor, the environment,
dispute settlement, and intellectual property rights.
From FY2018 to FY2021, the Trump Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for the
region would have cut assistance considerably, but Congress rejected those proposals by
providing significantly more assistance than requested. In 2019, the Trump Administration
withheld some assistance to the “Northern Triangle” countries of Central America—El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras—in an attempt to compel their governments to curb the flow of
migrants to the United States.
Perhaps no issue dominated Trump Administration policy toward the region as much as
migration, which tested U.S. relations with Mexico and Central America. In 2017, the
Administration announced it would end Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a
program begun in 2012 that provides relief from deportation for certain immigrants who arrived
as children; federal court challenges led to a June 2020 Supreme Court decision vacating the
Administration’s recession of DACA. The Administration also announced in 2017 that it would
terminate temporary protected status (TPS) designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and
Honduras, but federal court challenges put the terminations on hold. In 2018, Mexico’s president
25 White House, National Security Council, “Overview of Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework,” August 2020;
and Nora Gámez Torres, “Trump Adviser to Unveil U.S. Strategy for the Americas in South Florida Event,” Miami
Herald, August 16, 2020.
26 Gallup, Rating World Leaders, 2018-2020, The U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia; and Pew Research Center,
“Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” January 8, 2020.
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agreed to allow the United States to return certain non-Mexican migrants to Mexico while
awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions.
The Trump Administration used various policy tools intended to deter increased unauthorized
migration from Central America. In addition to aid cuts and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and
taxes on remittances, these tools included asylum cooperative agreements with Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras to permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants from third
countries to the Northern Triangle countries. At the end of 2020, Congress enacted the United
States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260; Division FF, Title III, Subtitle
F), requiring the State Department to develop a five-year strategy to advance economic
prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen democratic governance, and improve civilian security
conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
As democratic conditions in Venezuela deteriorated under President Maduro, the Trump
Administration imposed numerous broad financial sanctions, including sanctions against the state
oil company, the country’s main source of income. In January 2019, the Administration
recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. The
Administration also provided humanitarian and development assistance for Venezuelans who fled
to other countries, especially Colombia, and for Venezuelans inside Venezuela. Congress largely
supported the Administration’s policy approach toward Venezuela; in December 2019, it enacted
the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019 (P.L.
116-94, Division J), which, among its provisions, codified several sanctions and authorized
humanitarian assistance.
On Cuba, the Trump Administration reversed the engagement policy advanced during the Obama
Administration and imposed numerous economic sanctions on Cuba for its poor human rights
record and its support for the Maduro government in Venezuela. In January 2021, the Secretary of
State designated the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international terrorism.
On climate change issues, in June 2017, President Trump announced his intent to withdraw from
the Paris Agreement, an international accord to address climate change. Withdrawal took effect in
November 2020.27 Securing a clean energy future had been a key priority in U.S. policy toward
Latin America and the Caribbean under the Obama Administration.28
Biden Administration Policy
During the 2020 election campaign, then-candidate Biden indicated that his policy toward Latin
America and the Caribbean would be very different from the Trump Administration’s approach.
The Biden Administration’s early broad foreign policy objectives and outlook for U.S. policy
toward Latin America and the Caribbean appeared in its Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance, issued by the White House in March 2021. The interim guidance, which provided
broad foreign policy direction to U.S. agencies and departments, maintained that the Biden
Administration would expand engagement throughout the Western Hemisphere, especially with
Canada and Mexico, “based on principles of mutual respect and equality and a commitment to
economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.” This effort, according to the interim
27 See CRS In Focus IF10668, Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change, by Jane A. Leggett.
28 For background on climate change issues in U.S. policy toward Latin America under the Obama Administration, see
the section on “Climate Change and Clean Energy“ in CRS Report R43882, Latin America and the Caribbean: Key
Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
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guidance, included working with Congress to provide Central America with foreign assistance
and taking other steps “to address the root causes of human insecurity and irregular migration,
including poverty, criminal violence, and corruption.” The guidance also maintained that the
Administration would cooperate to confront the regional effects of climate change, and help
support good governance and democratic institutions in the region.29 The tone of the
Administration’s policy toward the region, which emphasized partnership and engagement,
contributed to a surge in positive views of U.S. leadership in the Americas in 2021.30
In October 2022, the Biden Administration issued its National Security Strategy and laid out three
broad U.S. priorities for the Western Hemisphere—expanding economic opportunities,
strengthening democracy, and building security—priorities that reflected long-standing continuity
with U.S. policy for the region. The Administration asserted that no region impacts the United
States more than the Western Hemisphere because of strong trade ties, shared democratic
traditions, and familial bonds; it maintained that “the security and prosperity of the United States
hinges on that of our neighbors.” According to the strategy, the United States has an overriding
strategic interest in strengthening collaboration Latin America and the Caribbean through
intensified diplomatic engagement with hemispheric partners to preserve economic resilience,
democratic stability, and citizen security.31
In its National Security Strategy, the Biden Administration acknowledged the considerable
challenges confronting the Western Hemisphere, remarking that the COVID-19 pandemic and
resultant recession exacerbated long-standing structural challenges, fueled political and social
unrest, undermined faith in democracy’s ability to deliver, and spurred unprecedented levels of
irregular migration. It also noted challenges posed by increased geopolitical and economic
volatility and climate change. The Administration vowed to confront these challenges and
advance its policy priorities in the region through regular interaction and engagement, multilateral
and institutional collaboration, and regional initiatives.
In June 2022, the Biden Administration hosted the Ninth Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles,
CA. The summit’s official theme was “Building a Sustainable, Resilient, and Equitable Future.”32
President Biden met with heads of government or representatives from 30 countries (excluding
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as the Administration did not invite representatives from these
countries). The hemispheric leaders approved political commitments related to health, climate
change, clean energy, digital transformation, and democratic governance.33 The Biden
Administration also announced several new regional policy initiatives at the summit, including
new aid commitments to advance food security in the hemisphere as well as a new framework,
the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, aimed at mobilizing increased investment,
making supply chains more resilient, creating clean energy jobs and energy, and ensuring
sustainable and inclusive trade.34
29 White House, President Joseph R. Biden Jr, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
30 Gallup, Rating World Leaders: The U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia, 2022. According to the Gallup study,
across 19 countries in the region, 52% approved of U.S. leadership and 32% disapproved. This was a reverse image of
2020, when Gallup polling showed 52% disapproved of U.S. leadership and 34% approved.
31 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
32 Ibid.
33 For background, see CRS Insight IN11934, 2022 Summit of the Americas, by Peter J. Meyer.
34 White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Commitments to Advance Food Security in the
Western Hemisphere,” and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces the Americas Partnership for Economic
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Policy analysts offered mixed assessments of the summit. Some asserted that U.S. initiatives were
modest and not fully developed, whereas others emphasized that the summit prompted pragmatic
steps on shared challenges that could portend stronger regional partnerships on such key issues as
health, migration, climate change, and economic recovery.35
The following areas discussed below—COVID-19 and health security, migration, climate change,
and democracy—highlight some of the Biden Administration’s key policies in Latin America and
the Caribbean.
COVID-19 and Health Security. At the June 2022 Summit of the Americas, the Administration
launched a partnership with PAHO to establish an Americas Health Corps that would provide
training to 500,000 public health, health science, and medical professionals throughout the
region.36 The initiative is aimed at supporting implementation of an Action Plan on Health and
Resilience in the Americas, agreed to at the summit. The action plan focuses on addressing the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in the region and strengthening the capacity and resilience of
the region’s health systems to address future infectious disease outbreaks. Through mid-2022, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had provided more than $539 million for
the COVID-19 response in the region. As noted, as of early December 2022, the United States
had donated over 70 million COVID-19 vaccine doses to 29 Latin American and Caribbean
countries, both bilaterally and through the COVAX Facility.37
Migration. Also at the June 2022 summit, the Biden Administration joined with 20 other
hemispheric countries to endorse the Los Angeles Declaration for Migration and Protection. The
agreement seeks to mobilize the region around actions to create conditions for safe, orderly,
humane, and regular migration, and to strengthen frameworks for international protection and
cooperation.38
Much of the Administration’s attention to the region in early 2021 focused on immigration from
Central America. By July 2021, the Administration released two new strategies to address the
underlying causes that push Central Americans to migrate and to collaboratively manage
migration in the region. The Administration subsequently broadened its engagement on migration
issues as the pandemic-driven economic downturn contributed to large-scale migrant flows
throughout the hemisphere. In October 2021, the United States participated in a migration
ministerial in Colombia to address regional cooperation regarding irregular migration, which
essentially was a precursor to the Los Angeles Declaration. In October 2022, the United States
participated in a ministerial in Peru on the Los Angeles Declaration and announced new U.S.
commitments in humanitarian and security assistance to address the immediate drivers and root
Prosperity,” June 8, 2022.
35 See, for example, Oliver Stuenkel, Shannon K. O’Neil, Andrés Rozental, and Juan Battaleme, “A Region Divided:
What Did the Summit of the Americas Accomplish? Global Memo by FGV, CFR, COMEXI, and CARI,” Council of
Councils, June 10, 2022, at https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/region-divided-what-did-summitamericas-accomplish; and Ralph Espach, “What Did the Summit of the Americas Accomplish?,” Center for Naval
Analyses, June 27, 2022, at https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2022/06/summit-of-the-americas-in-review.
36 White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Action on COVID-19 Pandemic Response and
Improving Health Systems and Health Security in the Americas,” June 8, 2022.
37 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “COVID-19-Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet
#5, FY2022, June 30, 2022; and U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,”
updated December 6, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/.
38 White House, “Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” June 10, 2022, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-andprotection/.
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causes of irregular migration. Also in October 2022, the Administration announced new policies,
coordinated with Mexico, to address the large number of Venezuelans arriving without visas at
the U.S. Southwest border.39 (Also see “Migration Issues,” below.)
Climate Change. The Biden Administration reincorporated climate change concerns into the
U.S. policy approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean.40 The Administration invited
seven Latin American and Caribbean heads of government to attend the April 2021 Leaders’
Summit on Climate.41 The summit sought to build support among the world’s leading economies
to adopt more ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in advance of the 2021 U.N.
Climate Change Conference (COP26). In September 2021, Special Presidential Envoy for
Climate John Kerry participated in a virtual High-Level Dialogue on Climate Action in the
Americas hosted by Argentina designed to build momentum for climate action in the region ahead
of COP26.
Among the climate change actions taken at the June 2022 Summit of the Americas, the
Administration announced a new U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030
(PACC 2030) aimed at supporting climate adaptation, strengthening energy security, and building
resilience for critical infrastructure and local economies.42 The National Security Strategy issued
in October 2022 maintains the Administration will use mitigation and adaptation efforts to fuel a
sustainable economic recovery and protect forest ecosystems, including by promoting trade and
investment in clean energy and mobilizing financing and other support for conservation of the
Amazon.43 At the November 2022 27th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the United States announced several new initiatives on climate
change; these initiatives included engagement and technical support for climate resilience and
sustainable development in small island developing states in the Caribbean (and Pacific) and
expanded access to risk-based insurance to protect vulnerable people in the Caribbean and
Central America (as well as Africa and the Pacific).44
Democracy. In its first year, the Biden Administration set forth its broad foreign policy priority of
renewing democracy to counter rising authoritarianism and nationalism around the world. In
Latin America and the Caribbean, this priority has included working with partners to promote
democracy in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as well as broader efforts in other countries to
reinforce democracy and combat corruption, which undermines citizens’ trust in government.45
39 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces New Migration Enforcement Process for Venezuelans,”
October 12, 2022.
40 Under the Biden Administration, the United States also rejoined the Paris Agreement in February 2021, reversing the
Trump Administration’s withdrawal of the United States from the agreement. See CRS In Focus IF11746, United
States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Options for Congress, by Jane A. Leggett.
41 The seven leaders were from Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico.
42 White House, “Fact Sheet: Vice President Harris Launches the U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate
Crisis 2030 (PACC 2030),” June 9, 2022.
43 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022.
44 White House, “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces New Initiatives at COP27 to Strengthen U.S. Leadership in
Tackling Climate Change,” November 11, 2022.
45 See U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,”
speech, March 3, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/; and U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and International
Economic Policy, The Biden Administration’s Policy Priorities For Latin America and the Caribbean, 117th Cong., 1st
sess., November 16, 2021, Serial No. 117-90 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2022).
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Secretary of State Blinken addressed concerns about the state of democracy in the Americas
during an October 2021 visit to Ecuador. He noted how the pandemic had exacerbated economic
inequities in the region and contributed to an increase in dissatisfaction with the way democracy
works. Blinken focused his remarks on three major challenges and approaches to help make
democracy work: (1) more effectively fight corruption by strengthening existing, and developing
new, anti-corruption tools; (2) improve civilian security by taking a more holistic approach that
deals with the root causes of crime and violence; and (3) tackle economic and social challenges
such as by bolstering labor standards, expanding access to adequate education and health, and
providing more inclusive opportunities.46 President Biden highlighted many of those same
themes, as well as the need to defend against authoritarianism and respect human rights, during
the December 2021 global Summit for Democracy, in which 25 governments from Latin America
and the Caribbean, as well as various civil society activists, were invited to participate virtually. 47
At the June 2022 Summit of the Americas, the hemisphere’s leaders adopted a range of
commitments to promote democracy, good governance, and human rights. The Biden
Administration announced an initiative to protect, defend, and promote civic space in Central
America and new commitments to support civil society and promote independent media and
information integrity.48
On the Venezuela policy challenge, the Biden Administration is continuing to pressure the
Maduro government through economic sanctions and providing humanitarian support to
Venezuelans both inside and outside the country. The Administration supported negotiations
between the Venezuelan opposition and the Maduro government; after such negotiations resumed
in November 2022, the Administration issued a license for a U.S. oil company to resume some
operations in Venezuela, although further sanctions relief may depend upon the results of such
negotiations. (See “Venezuela,” below.)
On Nicaragua, the Administration has used targeted sanctions and broad sanctions against the
gold sector in response to the antidemocratic actions of the Ortega government. The
Administration has also worked multilaterally to increase international pressure against the
Nicaraguan government, including at the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United
Nations. (See “Nicaragua,” below.)
On Cuba, the Biden Administration in its initial months announced it would review policy
decisions made in the prior Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state
sponsor of terrorism.49 Since Cuba’s harsh response to street protests in 2021, the Administration
has imposed several rounds of targeted sanctions against Cubans officials involved in the
government’s repression. In May 2022, the Administration announced several policy changes
aimed at increasing support for the Cuban people, which included facilitating family reunification
and easing some U.S. restrictions on travel and remittances. (See “Cuba,” below.)
46 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Making Democracy Deliver for the Americas,”
speech, October 20, 2021.
47 White House, “Summit for Democracy Summary of Proceedings,” December 23, 2021. The eight Latin American
and Caribbean countries not invited to the summit were Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
48 White House, “Fact Sheet: Bien Harris Administration Advances Democratic Renewal Agenda at the Ninth Summit
of the Americas,” June 7, 2022.
49 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National
Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021.
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Since mid-2021, the situation in Haiti—with a presidential assassination, a surge in gang
violence, and an earthquake—has provided considerable challenges for the Biden Administration.
In October 2022, in light of increased violence by criminal gangs and deteriorating health
conditions that have included a cholera outbreak, the United States worked with Canada to
coordinate the delivery of equipment to the Haitian National Police with the goal of strengthening
the force’s ability to stem gang violence and permit the flow of humanitarian assistance. The
Administration has supported efforts to secure a U.N. Security Council resolution to create a
multinational force to address Haiti’s security situation, cholera outbreak, and food insecurity.50
(See “Haiti,” below.)
Legislative Action in the 117th Congress
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Given the region’s geographic proximity to
the United States, U.S. foreign policy toward the region and domestic policy often overlap,
particularly in the areas of immigration and trade.
Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions
Since 2020, Congress has appropriated some $17 billion in international affairs funding to
respond to COVID-19 globally. In the 117th Congress, this funding included $10.8 billion
appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), enacted in March 2021. The
funding has supported contributions to multilateral efforts and health interventions, humanitarian
assistance, and donation of COVID-19 vaccine doses worldwide, including to Latin America and
the Caribbean.
In November 2021, Congress completed action on the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to
Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of 2021, or the RENACER Act (P.L. 117-54). Among its
provisions, the measure directed the U.S. government to use its diplomatic tools and targeted
sanctions to advance democratic elections and combat corruption. Prior to the bill’s passage, the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs had ordered reported a similar, although not identical,
measure (H.R. 2946) in July 2021, and the Senate had approved S. 1041, amended, in August
2021.
In December 2021, Congress completed action on the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), which contained several provisions on Latin America
and the Caribbean, including
Section 1007 extended authority to support a unified counterdrug and
counterterrorism campaign in Colombia.
Section 1035 extended a prohibition on the use of funds to close or relinquish
control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Section 1205 provided temporary authority to obligate or expend not more than
$2 million in FY2022 to pay for travel and subsistence expenses of foreign
national security forces participating in the training program of the United SatesColombia Action Plan for Regional Security.
50 U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, “The
Secretary’s Upcoming Travel to Canada,” October 26, 2022.
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Section 1206 required the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a
security cooperation strategy for certain combatant commands, including the U.S.
Southern Command.
Section 1336 extended a certification requirement for the transfer of vehicles by
the Department of Defense (DOD) to Guatemala during FY2022 and required a
series of reports (by the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller General, and a
federally funded research and development center) on U.S. security cooperation
with the Northern Triangle countries.
Section 1337 required a report, within 180 days, from the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Secretary of State on the security cooperation
relationship between the United States and Colombia and activities focused on
human rights and the rule of law.
Section 1338 required a report by June 30, 2022, from the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and in consultation with the heads of
other appropriate federal departments and agencies, on efforts by China to
expand its presence and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In March 2022, Congress completed action on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (or FY2022 SFOPS legislation), included as Division
K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103). Although the law and its explanatory
statement did not specify total funding for Latin America and the Caribbean, they included
funding directives for several key countries (Colombia, Haiti, Mexico, Venezuela) and regional
programs for the Caribbean and Central America and included numerous reporting requirements;
ultimately the State Department allocated over $2 billion in assistance for the region (see “U.S.
Foreign Aid”). P.L. 117-103 also included, as Division V, the Haiti Development, Accountability,
and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act, to promote the sustainable rebuilding and
development of Haiti and the prioritization of U.S. support for anti-corruption efforts and human
rights.
In December 2022, Congress approved the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263, H.R. 7776; hereinafter referred to as the FY2023 NDAA).
The FY2023 NDAA, which was signed into law on December 23, 2022, included with several
provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean:
Section 1011 extended through 2025 authority to support a unified counterdrug
and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia. The provision also required an
annual report assessing the threat to Colombia from narcotics trafficking and
designated foreign terrorist organizations.
Section 1034 extended a prohibition through FY2023 on the use of funds to close
or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Section 1069 required a DOD report within one year on the U.S. military posture
and capabilities in the Caribbean Basin, particularly in and around Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Section 1070 required DOD quarterly briefings for the House and Senate
Committees on Armed Services on Department of Defense support for civil
authorities to address immigration at the Southwest border.
Section 1201 codifies the temporary authority in the FY2022 NDAA (Section
1205) to pay for travel and subsistence expenses of foreign national security
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forces participating in the training program of the United Sates-Colombia Action
Plan for Regional Security.
Section 5598 required the President to submit a report within 180 days on
bilateral security and law enforcement cooperation with Mexico.
Sections 5541-5550, the United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022
expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should take steps to
strengthen bilateral relations. Among its provisions, the act required the
development and implementation of strategies and other measures to facilitate
commercial and economic ties, foster inclusive economic development across
Ecuador, combat illicit economies, corruption, and negative foreign influence,
strengthen democratic governance, and foster conservation and stewardship.
Similar bills had been reported in the Senate (S. 3591) and introduced in the
House (H.R. 8711.)
Section 6805 required, within 90 days, a Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
assessment and report on mass migration in the Western Hemisphere regarding
(1) threats to U.S. interests and (2) the use, or threat of using, mass migration by
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela to diminish domestic dissent and increase
remittances from migrants in the United States.
Section 11203 required the Commandant of the Coast Guard to conduct a study
and issue a report within two years on threats to national security, drug
trafficking, and other relevant threats in the Florida Straits and Caribbean region,
including Cuba.
Several provisions relate to the influence of China and Russia in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Section 1259 required the Secretary of State to conduct a
review and issue a report, within one year, on the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) port and port-related infrastructure purchases and investments globally
that are critical to U.S. interests and national security. Section 6524 required a
DNI report, within 180 days, on the activities undertaken by China and Russia to
increase their influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Section 6526
required a DNI report, within 180 days, on Chinese financing of port
infrastructure globally.
In December 2022, Congress completed action on the Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act 2023 (FY2023 SFOPS legislation), included as
Division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617). The legislation and its
explanatory statement designated more funding than requested for Colombia, the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative, and the Inter-American Foundation; directed funding to various initiatives and
objectives throughout the region; placed conditions on some assistance to Central America,
Colombia, and Haiti; and included numerous reporting requirements. (See “U.S. Foreign Aid” as
well as country and subregional sections below.)
In the 117th Congress, the House and Senate approved several resolutions on U.S. relations with
the region. On the human rights situation in Cuba, the House approved H.Res. 760 in November
2021 and the Senate approved four resolutions (S.Res. 37, S.Res. 81, S.Res. 310, and S.Res. 489)
from April 2021 to January 2022. Among other resolutions, the Senate passed S.Res. 22 in April
2021, reaffirming the U.S. partnership with Ecuador; S.Res. 120 in May 2021, recognizing the
Summit of the Americas and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to a more prosperous, secure, and
democratic Western Hemisphere; S.Res. 753 in September 2022, expressing support for “free,
fair, credible, transparent, and peaceful” elections in Brazil; and S.Res. 472 in December 2022,
reaffirming the partnership between the United States and the Dominican Republic. In July
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2022, the House approved H.Res. 1168, urging the President to prioritize and implement trade
programs with the Caribbean region that promote sustainable and resilient economic
development.
Additional Congressional Action
In other unfinished congressional action in the 117th Congress, the House approved H.R. 6 in
March 2021, which would have provided a pathway to citizenship for those brought to the United
States as children and those from countries with TPS designations. In July 2021, the Senate
approved S. 2045, which would have renamed the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a
Cuban democracy activist. In April 2022, the House passed H.R. 4133, which would have
authorized Caribbean Basin Security Initiative assistance from FY2022 through FY2026 and
established monitoring and reporting requirements for the program.
The Senate and House separately approved broad bills aimed at positioning the United States to
better compete with China, both of which included numerous provisions on Latin America and
the Caribbean.51 The Senate approved S. 1260, the United States Innovation and Competition Act
of 2021, in June 2021, and the House approved H.R. 4521, the America COMPETES Act of
2022, in February 2022. In March 2022, the Senate approved H.R. 4521, substituting the
language of S. 1260, and the measure went to conference in April 2022. Ultimately, many
provisions, including those on Latin America and the Caribbean, were not included in a narrower
legislative vehicle signed into law in August 2022 (P.L. 117-167) aimed at supporting the
semiconductor industry, boosting renewable energy industries, and addressing climate change.
Both House and Senate versions of H.R. 4521 would have required a strategy to strengthen U.S.
economic competitiveness and promote good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in
Latin America and the Caribbean; required a report assessing China’s engagement in international
organizations and the defense sector in Latin America and the Caribbean; support U.S. defense
cooperation in the region; and increased U.S. engagement with civil society in the region
regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies. The
Senate version also would have required a strategy to increase exports of U.S. goods and services
to Latin America and the Caribbean and would have authorized a capital increase for the InterAmerican Development Bank. The House version also would have increased U.S. engagement
with the Caribbean on energy issues and disaster resilience; required a strategy to expand U.S.
educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean region (and a report on
China’s related activity in the region); and required reports on major Chinese infrastructure
investments in Latin America and the Caribbean and on multilateral efforts to address Latin
American fentanyl trafficking, including efforts between China and Latin America to combat such
trafficking.
Regional U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. Foreign Aid
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
support development and other U.S. objectives. The COVID-19 pandemic significantly increased
economic and development challenges in the region. As noted, the Latin American and Caribbean
51 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10982, China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, by Mark
P. Sullivan and Thomas Lum.
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economy as a whole contracted by 7.0% in 2020.52 Although the region began to recover in 2021,
with 6.9% GDP growth, Latin America’s extreme poverty rate nevertheless was 12.9%, with an
estimated 81 million people unable to satisfy basic nutritional requirements.53 Moreover, nearly
61% of individuals surveyed in the region in 2021 asserted that their personal economic situations
were worse than they had been a year earlier.54 This deterioration in living conditions has
contributed to political unrest and large-scale migration flows throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean.55
The Biden Administration requested more than $2.4 billion of foreign assistance for Latin
America and the Caribbean in FY2023, which (in current dollars) is more funding than the region
has received in any single year in more than a decade. This total included a proposed $369.9
million (18.2%) increase in State Department- and USAID-managed funding for the region,
compared with the FY2022 estimated level (see Table 3). The Administration’s FY2023 budget
request also included $38.0 million for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)—a small,
independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that supports community-led development in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean:
FY2016-FY2023 Request
(billions of U.S. dollars)
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022 (est.)
2023 (req.)
1.69
1.67
1.67a
1.69
1.72b
1.79b
2.04
2.41
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2023; and
U.S. Department of State, “FY2022 Estimate Data,” August 16, 2022.
Notes: These figures exclude Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) food aid and assistance appropriated as voluntary
contributions to the Organization of American States.
a. Final FY2018 allocations are unclear, because the Administration reprogrammed approximately $396 million
of FY2018 aid that Congress appropriated for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating some of
those funds to countries outside of the Latin American and Caribbean region.
b. The FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include supplemental COVID-19 assistance.
Much of the increased funding for the region was requested to support continued implementation
of the Administration’s four-year, $4 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root
causes of irregular migration from Central America. The FY2023 request included $986.8 million
for bilateral and regional programs in the seven countries of Central America, which is $282.8
million (41.8%) more than the estimated amount allocated to the subregion in FY2022.56 The
Administration also sought increased funding for Haiti to help the country restore democratic
institutions, address the deteriorating security situation, and foster stability in the aftermath of the
July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and recurrent natural disasters. The FY2023
52 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2022.
53 Ibid; and ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2022, November 2022, pp. 56-57.
54 Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), “LAPOP Data Playground,” accessed
September 22, 2022.
55 Moisés Naím, “Why Hard-Liners Are Gaining Steam in Latin America,” Politico Magazine, July 12, 2022; and
Michael Stott, “Repression and Poverty Trigger Record Migration in the Americas,” Financial Times, September 11,
2022.
56 $27.8 million of the $986.8 million requested for Central America would be provided through global accounts that
are not included in the regional total for the Western Hemisphere. This comparison between the FY2022 estimate and
FY2023 request excludes assistance requested for Central America through global accounts, since FY2022 estimate
data for such assistance is not available.
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request included $274.8 million for Haiti, which is $55.6 million (25.4%) above the FY2022
estimate. With regard to other regional priorities in FY2023, the Administration requested $462.9
million to support counternarcotic efforts, peace accord implementation, and rural security and
development in Colombia; $141.6 million to strengthen the rule of law in Mexico; $63.5 million
for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative; and $55.0 million for democracy, human rights, and
health activities in Venezuela.
Congressional Action. In March 2021, Congress enacted the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
(P.L. 117-2), which provided $10.8 billion to respond to COVID-19 globally, including through
health interventions, humanitarian assistance, and contributions to multilateral response efforts.
That funding built on nearly $6.3 billion appropriated during the 116th Congress to support global
vaccine procurement and delivery and other pandemic-related foreign assistance programs. As of
June 2022, USAID had provided the region with at least $539.0 million of supplemental
pandemic response aid. As of late December 2022, the United States had provided Latin
American and Caribbean countries with more than 70 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines.57
Congress concluded action on FY2022 appropriations approximately halfway through the fiscal
year. The House passed the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept. 117-84; also known as the SFOPS bill), in July
2021, and an SFOPS bill (S. 3075) was introduced in the Senate in October 2021, but neither was
enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70,
P.L. 117-86, and P.L. 117-95) that funded foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2021 level
from October 1, 2021, until March 15, 2022, when President Biden signed into law the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L.
117-103, Division K). The act and accompanying explanatory statement did not specify a total
foreign assistance amount for Latin America and Caribbean; however, the State Department has
allocated more than $2.0 billion to the region.58
Congress concluded action on FY2023 appropriations on December 23, 2022, when it approved
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617), with FY2023 SFOPS appropriations
legislation included as Division K. Although the House Appropriations Committee reported its
SFOPS bill (H.R. 8282/H.Rept. 117-401) and Senator Coons introduced a separate SFOPS bill in
the Senate (S. 4662) in July 2022, Congress did not take further action on either bill. Instead,
before approving the FY2023 omnibus appropriations measure, Congress approved three
continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-180, P.L. 117-229, and P.L. 117-264), which funded most foreign
aid programs in the region at the FY2022 level from October 1, 2022, to December 30, 2022.
The FY2023 SFOPS appropriations legislation and its accompanying explanatory statement do
not specify a comprehensive appropriations total for Latin America and the Caribbean. They do
not specify comprehensive appropriations levels for top Administration funding priorities,
including Central America, Haiti, and Mexico. Nevertheless, the act and the explanatory
statement designate more funding than the Administration requested for Colombia ($487.4
million), the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative ($82.5 million), and the IAF ($47 million). They
also place conditions on some aid to Central America, Colombia, and Haiti, and direct funding to
various initiatives and objectives throughout the region.
For additional information, see CRS Report R47331, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean: FY2023 Appropriations, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R47070, Department
57 USAID, “COVID-19 – Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year 2022, June 30, 2022, and U.S.
Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” updated November 8, 2022, at
https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha.
58 U.S. Department of State, FY2022 estimate data, August 16, 2022.
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of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2023 Budget and Appropriations, by
Emily M. Morgenstern and Cory R. Gill; and CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the
Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.
Migration Issues
Latin America’s status as a leading source of both legal and unauthorized migration to the United
States means that U.S. immigration policies significantly affect countries in the region and
relations between the governments of those countries and the United States. Latin Americans
comprise the vast majority of individuals who have received relief from removal (deportation)
through the TPS program and the DACA initiative; they also comprise a large percentage of
recent asylum-seekers.59 The Trump Administration implemented many executive changes to
immigration policy; the Biden Administration revised some, but not all, of these policies.
The Trump Administration’s rhetoric, tariff threats, foreign aid cuts, and restrictive immigration
policies tested relations with many countries in the region, and particularly with Mexico and the
Northern Triangle countries. The Administration terminated TPS designations for Haiti, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras (those terminations are facing legal challenges),60 rescinded
DACA through a process that the Supreme Court ruled in June 2020 did not follow proper
procedures and had to be vacated,61 and restricted access to asylum.62 In January 2019, the Trump
Administration launched the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a program that required many
migrants and asylum-seekers to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico. The
Administration also signed what it termed asylum cooperative agreements (ACAs) with
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras; these agreements would allow the United States to
transfer certain asylum-seekers who arrive at a U.S. border to Guatemala, El Salvador, or
Honduras to apply for asylum in one of those countries. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) began to implement the agreement with Guatemala in November 2019 but suspended
implementation in March 2020. DHS finalized ACAs with El Salvador and Honduras in late
2020, but never implemented them.
The factors that drive U.S.-bound migration from Latin America are multifaceted, and some have
changed over time. These factors include poverty and unemployment; political and economic
instability; crime and violence; natural disasters, climate change, and food insecurity; relatively
close proximity to the United States; familial ties in the United States; and relatively attractive
U.S. economic conditions. The economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,
combined with ongoing turmoil in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Haiti, have prompted
increased migration from those and other countries in the region.
Migrant apprehensions at the Southwest border reached a 45-year low in 2017 but began to rise in
FY2019, with increasing numbers of unaccompanied children and families from the Northern
59 Temporary protected status (TPS) is a discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by armed conflict, natural
disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from the
United States. TPS designations began for Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999, for El Salvador in 2001, and for Haiti in
2010. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative the Obama Administration
implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present
individuals who arrived in the United States as children.
60 As legal challenges to the termination of TPS for these countries continue, DHS has extended the validity of TPS
documents for current beneficiaries through December 31, 2022.
61 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,—S. Ct.—, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3 (2020).
62 CRS Report R46755, The Law of Asylum Procedure at the Border: Statutes and Agency Implementation.
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Triangle, many of whom were seeking asylum, comprising a majority of apprehensions. In
FY2020, apprehensions declined by more than half, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic
began in March 2020.63 In response to the pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention issued an order to restrict travel across land ports of entry, known as Title 42, for the
part of the U.S. Code it falls under. DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented
the policy, which initially suspended asylum processing for those subject to Title 42. As a result,
most migrants without valid travel documents were expelled into Mexico or returned to their
home countries as quickly as possible. In FY2021, border enforcement encounters (apprehensions
and expulsions) reached a record 1.7 million at the Southwest border, although that total included
individuals expelled into Mexico more than once. Migrant origins also expanded beyond Mexico
and Central America to include South American countries and the Caribbean.64 In FY2022, border
encounters at the Southwest border reached nearly 2.4 million for the first time, with large
increases in migration from Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.65
The Biden Administration initially introduced a comprehensive immigration agenda that included
a focus on addressing unauthorized immigration from Central America. President Biden took
executive actions revising some of the Trump Administration’s restrictive immigration policies
but maintained certain COVID-19-related immigration restrictions while contending with a large
increase in the number of Central American and Mexican migrants seeking to enter the United
States at the Southwest border. In March 2021, the Administration designated Venezuela for TPS
(and in September 2022 extended that designation until March 2024). In July 2021, the
Administration released two new strategies to address the underlying causes that push Central
Americans to migrate and collaboratively manage migration in the region. Bilateral and regional
foreign assistance has sought to address the root causes of migration and to support migration
management efforts.
After several legal challenges, the Supreme Court ruled in June 2022 that the Biden
Administration could terminate the MPP program.66 While the MPP is being phased out, the
Administration has continued to use Title 42 authority to expel migrants. On November 15, 2022,
a federal court blocked the use of Title 42. The Department of Justice filed an unopposed stay
motion to keep Title 42 in place for some period to prepare for an orderly transition to new
policies at the border, and a federal judge issued a stay until December 21 2022. On December
19, 2022, however, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts issued an administrative stay order
permitting Title 42 to remain in effect and, on December 27, the court voted to keep Title 42 in
effect pending a ruling in an ongoing court case.67
63 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Southwest Border Migration FY2020.” See explanation of the
difference between a Title 8 apprehension under DHS authority and a Title 42 expulsion under Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention authority in the notes.
64 CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and
William A. Kandel.
65 U.S. CBP, “Nationwide Encounters,” accessed November 2, 20222, at
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters.
66 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10420, Supreme Court Grants Stay in MPP Case, by Ben Harrington and Hillel R. Smith.
67 Caroline Downey, “Federal Judge Blocks Use of Title 42 to Expel Migrants on Public-Health Grounds,” National
Review, November 16, 2022; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement from DHS on Decision Regarding
Title 42,” November 15, 2022; Nancy Gimena Huisha-Huisha et al. v. Alejandro Mayorkas, in his official capacity,
Secretary of Homeland Security et. al., Civil Action No. 21-100 (United States District Court for the District of
Columbia 2022); Joel Rose, “U.S. Supreme Court Extends Border Restrictions Just Before They Were Set to End,”
NPR, Morning Edition, December 19, 2022; Rebecca Santana and Elliot Spagat, “Supreme Court Keeps Immigration
Limits in Place Indefinitely,” AP, December 27, 2022, and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10874, COVID-Related
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The Administration has broadened its engagement on migration issues as the pandemic-driven
economic downturn has contributed to large-scale migrant flows throughout the hemisphere. In
June 2022, the Administration announced the Los Angeles Declaration for Migration and
Protection at the Summit of the Americas with 20 other Western Hemisphere countries.68 The
declaration recognized irregular migration management as a shared responsibility and sought to
bolster regional efforts to improve border controls, create legal migration and protection
pathways, support migrants and host communities, and coordinate responses to mass migration
movements. Several of the signatory countries announced commitments to regularize certain
unauthorized populations and to implement or expand temporary worker programs. The
Administration announced humanitarian aid to support vulnerable migrants, a commitment to
resettle 20,000 refugees from the region in FY2023-FY2024, and the resumption of family
reunification parole programs for Haitians and Cubans, among other measures.69 Implementation
of the Los Angeles Declaration officially began in September 2022.70
In October 2022, the Administration launched new border enforcement policies aimed to reduce
the number of Venezuelans encountered by CBP at the Southwest border. Venezuelans
apprehended between ports of entry are subject to the public health-related Title 42 policy, which
allows CBP to expel migrants back to Mexico (in coordination with the government of Mexico).
At the same time, up to 24,000 Venezuelans who are outside the United States, meet program
requirements, and have a financial sponsor in the United States can apply to travel by air to the
U.S. interior and be paroled into the country.71
Congressional Action. The 117th Congress did not consider comprehensive immigration
measures (S. 348/H.R. 1177), but immigration-related bills saw floor or committee action in one
chamber, mainly in the House. These bills would have addressed temporary and permanent
immigration, humanitarian admissions, and legalization of unauthorized immigrants, among other
issues.72 Congress continued funding and overseeing U.S. assistance to respond to the Venezuela
regional migration crisis, address the root causes of migration from Central America, and bolster
Mexico’s interdiction and humanitarian protection systems.
The FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) requires a DNI assessment and report on mass migration in
the Western Hemisphere regarding threats to U.S. interests and the use, or the threat of using,
mass migration by Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela to diminish dissent and increase remittances
from migrants in the United States. The measure also requires DOD quarterly briefings for the
House and Senate Committees on Armed Services on DOD support for civil authorities to address
immigration at the Southwest border.
For additional information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10874, COVID-Related Restrictions on
Entry into the United States Under Title 42: Litigation and Legal Considerations, by Kelsey Y.
Santamaria; CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants, by
Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R47182, International
Migration Trends in the Western Hemisphere; CRS Report R47061, Immigration Legislation and
Restrictions on Entry into the United States Under Title 42: Litigation and Legal Considerations, by Kelsey Y.
Santamaria.
68 The White House, “Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” June 10, 2022.
69 The White House, “Fact Sheet: The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection U.S. Government and
Foreign Partner Deliverables,” June 10, 2022.
70 The White House, “Readout of Los Angeles Declaration Implementation Launch,” September 27, 2022.
71 See CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants, by Audrey Singer, Jill H.
Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke.
72 See CRS Report R47061, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno.
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Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report R46999, Immigration:
Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and William A.
Kandel; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10798, Supreme Court Rules That Migrant Protection Protocols
Rescission Was Not Unlawful, by Hillel R. Smith; CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American
Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s
Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report RS20844, Temporary
Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson; and CRS Report R46764,
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): By the Numbers, by Andorra Bruno.
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs
Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the
region’s role as a source and/or transit zone for several illicit drugs destined for U.S. markets—
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opioids, including heroin and fentanyl. Traffickers in
the region also divert and traffic in precursor chemicals used in illicit drug production. Heroin
abuse and synthetic opioid-related deaths in the United States have reached epidemic levels,
raising questions about how to address foreign sources of opioids. Policymakers also are
concerned that methamphetamine and cocaine overdoses in the United States are rising, with
some cocaine overdoses linked to the presence of synthetic opioids.
Drug demand in the United States and changes in the international drug market continue to drive
drug production in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Over 90% of heroin seized and sampled
in the United States comes from Mexico. Opium poppy cultivation and heroin production rose in
Mexico from 2012 through 2017 but have since declined, possibly replaced in part by the
expansion of illicit fentanyl production of fentanyl. After the Chinese government implemented
strict controls on all forms of fentanyl, including fentanyl analogues in mid-2019, Mexico became
“the only significant source of illicit fentanyl or fentanyl analogues trafficked to the United
States” by 2021.”73 Mexico is also the primary foreign source of methamphetamine encountered
in the United States. Estimated coca cultivation and potential cocaine production in Colombia,
which supplies roughly 89% of cocaine in the United States, decreased but remained near record
levels in 2021.74 Although estimated coca cultivation and production in Peru also fell, estimated
coca cultivation and production increased slightly in Bolivia.
Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and most other source and transit countries in the region have worked
closely with the United States to combat drug production and interdict illicit flows. However,
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has scaled back some cooperation and
Colombian President Gustavo Petro has criticized past supply-side efforts and urged a new
approach to drug policy. In March 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Venezuela’s
leader, Nicolás Maduro (whom the United States does not recognize as Venezuela’s legitimate
president), and other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials. As charged, Maduro
allegedly participated in a drug trafficking organization that conspired with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to traffic illicit drugs to the United States. Over the past
several years, Maduro government officials have been identified as conspiring with FARC
dissidents and National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas operating in Venezuela to smuggle
73 U.S. Department of State, Supplement to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, report to Congress
pursuant to Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)), as amended by Section 6610 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), June 17, 2022.
74 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Production in
the Andean Region,” July 14, 2022.
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cocaine and illicit gold.75 President Petro’s restoration of ties with the Maduro government and
decriminalization of marijuana and potentially cocaine could strain U.S.-Colombia antidrug
efforts, although Secretary Blinken said the countries’ approaches are “largely in sync” during a
recent visit to Colombia.76 U.S. antidrug cooperation with Bolivia decreased under former
President Evo Morales (2006-2019) and remains limited under his successor, President Luis Arce.
The lack of a constitutional government in Haiti and the ongoing political crisis in Nicaragua
have hindered antidrug efforts and cooperation with those countries as well.
Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates have contributed to
degradations in citizen security and economic development in some countries, often resulting in
high levels of violence. Despite efforts to combat the drug trade, many Latin American
governments, particularly in Mexico, Central America, and Haiti continue to suffer from weak
criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies. Public corruption, including high-level
cooperation with criminal organizations, further frustrates efforts to interdict drugs, investigate
and prosecute traffickers, and recover illicit proceeds. The COVID-19 pandemic lowered violence
in most countries, but drug trafficking-related violence remained elevated in Mexico. Criminal
gangs with origins in Southern California, principally the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th
Street gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in Central
America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, urban areas
in Guatemala. Gangs have been involved in a range of criminal activities, including local drug
distribution, extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, and they have used violence
to enforce COVID-19-related quarantines. Violent gangs, some tied to politicians and linked to
drug traffickers, threaten to overwhelm the de facto government in Haiti, exerting power and
control over territory, access to fuel, and the delivery of humanitarian aid.
U.S. Policy. For more than 50 years, U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean has
focused on countering drug trafficking and reducing drug production in the region. The largest
antidrug support program, Plan Colombia, helped the country combat both drug trafficking and
rebel groups financed by the drug trade. U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime
also has included partnerships with other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative with
Mexico, CARSI, and the CBSI. Through visa denials and revocations, targeted economic
sanctions, and federal criminal investigations and prosecutions, U.S. Administrations also have
sought to punish foreign officials and entities complicit with drugs traffickers, gangs, and other
criminal groups. The State Department manages several deterrence tools, including multiple visa
denial programs targeting foreign drug traffickers, as well programs to offer rewards for
information related to significant foreign narcotics traffickers and transnational organized crime.
The Biden Administration’s National Drug Control Strategy, released in April 2022, focuses on
using data to improve domestic treatment and harm-reduction efforts and disrupting the domestic
and international financial activities of transnational criminal organizations, as well as
strengthening foreign antidrug partnerships.77 Drug policy efforts complement broader efforts to
combat corruption, a core component of the Administration’s national security policy.78 To
75 Douglas Farah, The Maduro Regime’s Illicit Activities: A Threat to Democracy in Venezuela and Security in Latin
America, Atlantic Council, August 12, 2020.
76 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Colombian President Gustavo Petro At a Joint Press
Availability,” October 3, 2022.
77 The White House, ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, April 21, 2022, available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/National-Drug-Control-2022Strategy.pdf.
78 The White House, “Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National
Security Interest,” June 3, 2021.
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complement those strategies, the Biden Administration is implementing a new Bicentennial
Framework for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation that focuses on addressing drugs and violence
from a public health perspective, combating transborder crime, and dismantling illicit financial
networks. The Administration also announced new “holistic U.S.-Colombia counternarcotics
metrics” in May 2022; these metrics could further evolve with new bilateral approaches adopted
with the Petro government.79 Future regional drug policy may be further informed by the findings
of the congressionally mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, which
recommended the State Department take the lead in regional drug policy and replace the annual
drug certification process with compacts negotiated with countries to identify bilateral priorities.80
Congressional Action. The 117th Congress continued to address drug policy and other crimerelated issues through legislation, foreign assistance, conditions on foreign assistance, and
reporting requirements in legislation. Both the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) and the FY2023
NDAA (P.L. 117-263) had several provisions on Colombia, including an extension of authority to
support a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign. The FY2023 NDAA added an
annual reporting requirement assessing the threat to Colombia from narcotics trafficking and
designated foreign terrorist organizations. The FY2023 NDAA also required the President to
submit a report on bilateral security and law enforcement cooperation with Mexico and required
the Coast Guard to submit a report on threats to national security, drug trafficking, and other
relevant threats in the Florida Straits and Caribbean region, including Cuba.
With regard to foreign assistance, the Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
Division K) contained counternarcotics conditions on assistance to Colombia for FY2022. The
explanatory statement to the measure included several reporting requirements from H.Rept. 11784, such as a review of funds provided through the Mérida Initiative, plans to improve data
collection on synthetic drug trafficking, efforts to combat fentanyl flows, and the efficacy of U.S.
past drug policy efforts.
For FY2023, the Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division K), continued
counternarcotics and human rights conditions on assistance to Colombia. Concurrent with the
submission of a spend plan for assistance plan for assistance to Colombia, the law required a
report detailing Colombia’s counternarcotics strategy and the planned U.S. assistance in support
of such strategy. For assistance to Mexico, the law included as priorities security and justice
sector capacity building to combat and prosecute transnational criminal organizations and
activities to address the flow of illegal opioids into the United States. The explanatory statement
also endorsed language in H.Rept. 117-401 supporting State Department efforts to address the
flow of illegal opioids into the United States. In addition, the statement required the Secretary of
State to submit a report on U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Central and South America,
including a review of prior counternarcotics initiatives in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Central
America, and Mexico.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10578, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From
the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report
R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel; CRS
In Focus IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview, by Peter J.
Meyer; CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel; CRS
In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS In Focus
IF12182, Haiti: Political Conflict and U.S. Policy Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke and
79 The White House, “ONDCP Welcomes New Holistic U.S.-Colombia Counternarcotics Metrics,” May 4, 2022.
80 Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Charting a New Path Forward, December 2020.
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Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS Report R46695, The U.S. “Majors List” of Illicit Drug-Producing
and Drug-Transit Countries, by Liana W. Rosen.
Trade Policy
The Latin American and Caribbean region is among the United States’ most important regional
trading partners. Economic relations between the United States and most of its trading partners in
the region remained strong, despite challenges, such as the downturn in economic growth and
trade due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the high levels of violence in some countries. The
United States accounted for roughly 31% of the region’s merchandise imports and 45% of its
merchandise exports in 2021. Most of this trade was with Mexico, which accounted for 76% of
U.S. imports from the region and 61% of U.S. exports to the region in 2021. After a 15% decline
in total U.S. trade with the region caused by the 2020 global economic downturn, total trade
rebounded to 27% growth in 2021. U.S. exports to the region increased 33% in 2021, and imports
increased by 22% (see Table 4).
The United States has strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the
past 28 years through the negotiation and implementation of FTAs. Starting with NAFTA in 1994,
which was replaced by the USMCA on July 1, 2020, the United States currently has six FTAs in
force involving 11 Latin American countries: Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. NAFTA
was the first U.S. FTA with a country in the Latin American and Caribbean region, establishing
new rules and disciplines that influenced subsequent trade agreements on issues important to the
United States, such as intellectual property rights protection, services trade, agriculture, dispute
settlement, investment, labor, and the environment.
The United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into NAFTA renegotiations in 2017 and
concluded talks with the announcement of the USMCA on September 30, 2018. The agreement,
which entered into force on July 1, 2020, continues most of NAFTA’s market opening provisions
but modernizes and revises NAFTA with new provisions on digital trade, state-owned enterprises,
currency manipulation, anti-corruption, enforcement of workers’ rights, and the environment.
Certain revisions to USMCA, including tighter rules-of-origin requirements for the motor vehicle
industry, removal of government-procurement provisions for Canada, and changes to investorstate dispute settlement provisions, are significant because they scale back previous
Administrations’ U.S. trade policy goals.
Table 4. U.S.Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean,
2014-2021
(in billions of current U.S. dollars)
Partner
Country
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Mexico
241.0
236.5
230.2
243.6
266.0
256.7
211.4
276.5
Brazil
42.4
31.6
30.2
37.3
39.4
42.9
34.6
46.9
Chile
16.5
15.4
12.9
13.6
15.3
15.7
12.5
17.3
Colombia
20.1
16.3
13.0
13.4
15.1
14.8
11.9
16.7
Total LAC
418.9
383.4
360.7
388.8
424.0
418.4
340.2
451.3
1,621.9
1,503.3
1,451.5
1,547.2
1,665.8
1,645.9
1,428.5
1,754.3
U.S. Exports
World
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Partner
Country
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Mexico
295.7
296.4
293.5
312.7
343.7
356.1
323.5
384.7
Brazil
30.0
27.5
26.0
29.5
31.2
30.9
23.4
31.3
Chile
9.5
8.8
8.8
10.6
11.4
10.4
10.1
15.1
Colombia
18.3
14.1
13.8
13.6
13.8
14.2
10.8
13.2
Total LAC
445.3
411.6
400.6
428.2
465.5
464.9
414.3
505.7
2,356.4
2,248.8
2,186.8
2,339.6
2,536.2
2,491.7
2,330.8
2,831.1
U.S. Imports
World
Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Department of Commerce provided by Trade Data Monitor.
Note: This table provides statistics on the top four countries followed by the total of U.S. trade with 33
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
In addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries
in the region through several trade-preference programs. The Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67, subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides
limited duty-free entry of selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign
economic policy response to uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. Several
preference programs for Haiti, which expire in 2025, provide generous and flexible unilateral
preferences to the country’s apparel sector. Two other preference programs include the Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA, P.L. 106-200, Title II), which has been extended through
September 2030 (P.L. 116-164), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which expired
on December 31, 2020. The CBTPA extends to eligible Caribbean countries preferences on
apparel products, similar to those given to Mexico under NAFTA and USMCA. The GSP
program, first authorized in the 1970s, provides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products
imported from 120 designated developing countries throughout the world, including Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Numerous other bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere
do not include the United States. For example, the Pacific Alliance, a trade arrangement
composed of Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, has made efforts to negotiate a possible trade
arrangement with Mercosur, composed of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In June
2019, after 20 years of negotiations, the European Union and Mercosur reached a political
agreement in principle for a potential comprehensive trade agreement. Talks, however, appear to
have stagnated, and it is unclear if or when an agreement will move forward. In April 2020,
Mexico and the European Union finalized negotiations to update their original FTA from 2000
and remove most of the remaining trade barriers between the two partners. This agreement
appears to have stagnated, as well.
Numerous observers have proposed that the United States strengthen trade relations with
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean through regional trade agreements or other efforts.81
Some policymakers also have expressed an interest in enhancing trade ties in the Western
Hemisphere to enhance economic competitiveness. Although the United States remains the top
trading partner with the region, numerous lawmakers point to the rising influence of China and
the need to strengthen U.S. economic integration, reinforce regional supply chains, and promote
81 Margaret Spiegelman, “Former Envoys: U.S. Must Seize Trade Opportunities in Latin America,” Inside U.S. Trade’s
World Trade Online, January 11, 2022.
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economic growth.82 Although some of the largest economies in South America, such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Venezuela, resisted the idea of forming comprehensive FTAs with the United States in
the first 15-20 years after NAFTA, subsequent changes in government led to new efforts. For
example, during the Trump Administration, Brazil and Ecuador, took steps to enhance their trade
relationships with the United States through “mini” bilateral trade agreements on trade
facilitation, regulatory cooperation, and anti-corruption. However, some Members of Congress
have stated that FTAs with Brazil or Ecuador are not feasible, due to concerns regarding the
environment, labor standards, and human rights.
The Biden Administration has made statements that the United States needs to strengthen trade
relations with partners in the Asia-Pacific region, but through a different course of action than an
FTA. Following the 2017 U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), all
remaining TPP parties signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP), which essentially brought into effect a modified TPP.83 The CPTPP has
entered into force among nine countries—Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Other parties, including China, Taiwan, Ecuador, and the
European Union, have taken an interest in joining the pact and have formally requested to accede
to the agreement. The Biden Administration has stated that it is not currently interested in joining
CBTPP in its current form and that other arrangements are better suited to address U.S. economic
interests in the region. Some stakeholders argue the U.S. absence from the CBTPP and other
regional agreements limits the U.S. ability to shape trade rules in the region. They contend that
without binding new trade rules, including on market access, the United States may be limited
and potentially impaired from influencing trade policy and countering China’s initiatives. China’s
announcement that it had formally submitted a request to join the CPTPP may be an issue for
Congress as it considers future of trade policy in the Asia-Pacific region.84
Congressional Action. In the 117th Congress, the House approved H.Res. 1168 in July 2022,
urging the President to prioritize and implement trade programs with the Caribbean region that
promote sustainable and resilient economic development. The explanatory statement to FY2023
SFOPS appropriations legislation (H.R. 2617, Division K) enacted in December 2022 directed
departments and agencies to comply with reporting requirements and directives contained in
H.Rept. 117-401. These requirements and directives included a State Department directive to
review whether the parties to the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) are compliant with its obligations and are taking steps to improve
conditions for U.S. trade and investment. They also included and a joint State DepartmentUSAID report requirement, within 60 days, on plans to implement FY2023 trade capacity
building activities, including in the Western Hemisphere.
In uncompleted action, the Senate-passed version of a broad bill aimed at positioning the United
States to better compete with China (S. 1260/H.R. 4521) contained a provision (Section 3219J)
that would have required the Administration to develop a strategy to increase exports of U.S.
goods and services to Latin America and the Caribbean. Several other bills and resolutions
introduced in the 117th Congress would have aimed at advancing or expressing support for
82 See, for example, Madeline Halpert, “GOP Lawmakers Urge Engagement in Latin America to Counter China,”
Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, October 13, 2021.
83 The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is free trade agreement
among 11 countries, including Canada, Mexico, Chile, and Peru. Ecuador has formally applied to accede to the pact.
84 CRS Insight IN11760, China and Taiwan Both Seek to Join the CPTPP, by Brock R. Williams and Michael D.
Sutherland.
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nearshoring initiatives to increase and strengthen supply chains in Latin America and the
Caribbean; these included H.R. 7579, H.R. 7935, S. 4112, and S.Res. 661.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF11175, U.S.-Mexico Trade Relations, by M.
Angeles Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF10394, Dominican Republic-Central America-United States
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS Report R44981, The United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS In Focus IF10997,
U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS In Focus
IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams.
Selected Country and Subregional Issues
The Caribbean
Caribbean Regional Issues
The Caribbean is a diverse region of 16 independent countries and 18 overseas territories,
including some of the hemisphere’s richest and poorest nations. Among the region’s independent
countries are 13 island nations stretching from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago
in the south. In addition, geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and
Suriname are located on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of
CARICOM (see Figure 2).
U.S. interests in the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political, and security concerns.
The U.S.-Caribbean relationship is characterized by extensive economic linkages (involving
trade, investment, tourism, and large Caribbean diaspora communities in the United States) and
by significant cooperation on counternarcotics and other security efforts. Because most Caribbean
countries, with the exception of Haiti, have relatively high per capita incomes (classified by the
World Bank as upper-middle-income or high-income economies), the region traditionally has not
received large amounts of U.S. development assistance.85 However, the United States has
responded with humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of hurricanes that have devastated
several countries in recent years. Beginning in the early 2000s, the United States significantly
expanded assistance to the region to combat HIV/AIDS, with both Guyana and Haiti designated
as focus countries in the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief initiative.
In 2016, Congress enacted the United States-Caribbean Strategic Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L.
114-291), requiring the State Department to develop a multiyear strategy to support U.S.
engagement in the Caribbean. Completed in 2017, the strategy established a framework to
strengthen U.S.-Caribbean relations in six priority areas: (1) security, with the objectives of
countering transnational crime and terrorist organizations and advancing citizen security; (2)
diplomacy, with the goal of increasing institutionalized engagement to forge greater cooperation
at the OAS and the U.N.; (3) prosperity, including the promotion of sustainable economic growth
and private sector-led investment and development; (4) energy, with the goals of increasing U.S.
exports of natural gas and the use of U.S. renewable energy technologies; (5) education, focusing
on increased exchanges for students, teachers, and other professionals; and (6) health, including a
focus on long-standing efforts to fight infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
World Bank, “World Bank Country and Lending Groups,” at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/
articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
85
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Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries
Source: Prepared by Amber Hope Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist, CRS Graphics.
Notes: With the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the remaining 14 independent countries of the
Caribbean region are members of the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, an organization established by
English-speaking Caribbean nations in 1973 to spur regional integration. Six Eastern Caribbean nations—Antigua
and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—are
members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, established in 1981 to promote economic integration,
harmonization of foreign policy, and other forms of cooperation among member states.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean
nations are vulnerable to use as transit countries for illicit drugs from South America destined for
the U.S. and European markets. Many Caribbean countries also have suffered high rates of
violent crime, including murder, often associated with drug trafficking activities. In response, the
United States launched the CBSI in 2009, a regional U.S. foreign assistance program seeking to
reduce drug trafficking in the region and advance public safety and security. The program
dovetails with the first pillar of the State Department’s Caribbean multiyear strategy for U.S.
engagement, security. From FY2010 through FY2022, Congress appropriated a total of $831
million (current dollars) for the CBSI. These funds benefitted 13 Caribbean countries.86 The
program has targeted assistance in five areas: (1) maritime and aerial security cooperation, (2) law
enforcement capacity building, (3) border/port security and firearms interdiction, (4) justice
sector reform, and (5) crime prevention and at-risk youth. For FY2023, the Biden Administration
requested $63.5 million for the CBSI, almost 21% less than Congress appropriated for FY2022.
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative and Caribbean Energy Initiative. Many Caribbean
nations depend on energy imports and once participated in Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program,
86 The 13 countries benefiting from the CBSI are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
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which supplied Venezuelan oil under preferential financing terms. The United States launched the
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI) in 2014, with the goal of promoting a cleaner and
more sustainable energy future in the Caribbean. The CESI includes various initiatives to boost
energy security and sustainable economic growth by attracting investment in a range of energy
technologies through a focus on improved governance; increased access to finance; and enhanced
coordination among energy donors, governments, and stakeholders.87 In 2019, USAID launched
the Caribbean Energy Initiative, a five-year program that focuses on building clean, secure, and
reliable energy systems throughout the Caribbean. The initiative aims to increase renewable
power generation, increase the efficiency and quality of utilities services, and enhance the ability
of electricity systems in the region to withstand shocks.88
Disaster Resilience and Climate Change. Many Caribbean countries are susceptible to extreme
weather events such as tropical storms and hurricanes, which can significantly affect their
economies and infrastructure. In 2019, the State Department launched a U.S.-Caribbean
Resilience Partnership, with the goal of increasing regional disaster response capacity and
promoting resilience to natural disasters, and USAID announced it was providing $10 million to
improve local resilience to disasters in the Caribbean.89 In 2020, USAID joined with
CARICOM’s Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency to launch the Caribbean
Climate Resilience Initiative. As noted, the leaders of both Antigua and Barbuda and Jamaica
were invited to participate in President Biden’s Leaders’ Summit on Climate in April 2021.
Biden Administration’s Strengthened Engagement with the Caribbean in 2022. President
Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris met with Caribbean leaders at the Ninth Summit of the
Americas in Los Angeles in June 2022. Discussions centered on the impact of climate change;
food and energy insecurity; lack of access to financing; and security cooperation and engagement,
including on small arms trafficking.90 As noted, at the summit, Vice President Harris announced
PACC 2030, a new initiative with the Caribbean aimed at facilitating renewable energy
infrastructure development and bolstering resilience to climate-based natural disasters.91 PACC
2030 activities and programs focus on four areas: (1) improving access to development financing;
(2) facilitating clean energy project development; (3) enhancing local capacity building; and (4)
deepening collaboration with Caribbean partners. In September 2022, Vice President Harris held
a follow-up meeting in Washington, DC, with several Caribbean leaders, with talks centered on
U.S.-Caribbean collaboration on promoting energy security, access to finance, and food security
in the Caribbean. At the meeting, the United States committed $28 million to address urgent food
security needs in the Caribbean.92
Congressional Action. Support for Caribbean regional programs continued in the 117th Congress,
including support for the CBSI as well as assistance to address other challenges in the Caribbean,
including disaster resilience, energy security, and climate change.
87 For background, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative (CESI),” at https://www.state.gov/caribbean-energy-security-initiative-cesi/.
88 USAID, “Caribbean Energy Initiative,” last updated August 9, 2022, at
https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1862/caribbean-energy-initiative.
89 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership,” at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-caribbean-resilience-partnership/.
90 White House, “Joint Readout of President Joe Biden & Vice President Kamala Harris’ Meeting with Leaders of the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic,” June 10, 2022.
91 White House, “Remarks by Vice President Harris in a Meeting with Leaders of Caribbean Nations,” June 9, 2022.
92 White House, “Remarks by Vice President Harris Before Multilateral Meeting with Caribbean Leaders,” and “Fact
Sheet: U.S. Actions to Promote Caribbean Energy Security, Access to Finance, and Food Security,” September 15,
2022.
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In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), and its joint
explanatory statement, Congress appropriated “not less than $80 million” for the CBSI and
required a spend plan for CBSI funds. Among its provisions, the joint explanatory statement also
provided $6.5 million for the Caribbean Energy Initiative and $25 million in development
assistance for the Caribbean. Of the development assistance, $12 million was to strengthen
disaster resilience, $10 million was to support inclusive economic growth (especially focusing on
opportunities for women, youth, and other disadvantaged populations), and $5 million for
Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean.
In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division K), and its explanatory
statement, Congress appropriated “not less than $82 million” for the CBSI. The explanatory
statement also allocated $19 million in assistance for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, $18.1
million for the Dominican Republic, $17 million for strengthening resilience to natural disasters
in the Caribbean, $12 million for promoting inclusive growth in the Caribbean, and $13 million
for USAID’s Caribbean Development Program (with $7.5 million for the Caribbean Energy
Initiative). It also required the State Department and USAID to review the U.S. diplomatic and
development presence in the Caribbean and develop and submit a plan for expanding such
presences, with a particular focus on the Eastern and Southern Caribbean, and required USAID to
consult with the appropriations committees on the design and allocation of funds for inclusive
economic growth in the Caribbean for FY2022 and FY2023. The explanatory statement also
directed departments and agencies to comply with reporting requirements and directives
contained in H.Rept. 117-401; for the Caribbean, these included reports on CBSI funding on a
country-by-country basis from FY2015 to FY2021 and on funds provided in this and prior fiscal
years for strengthening resilience to natural disasters in Caribbean countries.
In the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263), Congress included two Caribbean-related reporting
requirements: a DOD report on the U.S. military posture and capabilities in the Caribbean Basin,
particularly in and around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and a Coast Guard report on
threats to national security, drug trafficking, and other relevant threats in the Florida Straits and
Caribbean region, including Cuba.
In other action, the House approved a resolution and took action on two other bills with
provisions on the Caribbean. In July 2022, the House approved H.R. 1168, which, among its
provisions, urged the President to prioritize and implement trade programs with the Caribbean
region that promote sustainable and resilient economic developments. In February 2022, the
House passed the America COMPETES Act of 2022, H.R. 4521, which would have, among its
provisions, required a multiyear strategy to promote regional cooperation with the Caribbean on
energy issues and would have authorized assistance for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership
from FY2022 to FY2024 (such measures also were included in H.R. 3524, the EAGLE Act,
ordered to be reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2021). In April 2022, the
House passed the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act, H.R. 4133, which would
have authorized $74.8 million for the CBSI for each fiscal year from FY2022 to FY2026 and
established monitoring and reporting requirements for the program.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by
Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In
Focus IF10912, Jamaica, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10666, The Bahamas: An
Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF11381, Guyana: An Overview, by Mark P.
Sullivan and Joshua Klein; CRS In Focus IF10914, Trinidad and Tobago, by Mark P. Sullivan
and Joshua Klein.
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Cuba
Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human
rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959
Cuban revolution. Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
2018 and as head of Cuba’s Communist Party in 2021. Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019
that introduced some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the economy and the
Communist Party’s predominant political role. In July 2021, anti-government demonstrations
broke out throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans protesting poor economic conditions
(e.g., food and medicine shortages, blackouts) and long-standing repression of freedom of
expression and other basic rights. The government responded with harsh measures that led to the
prosecution of hundreds of protesters. The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the COVID-19
pandemic, reduced support from Venezuela, and increased U.S. economic sanctions. In 2022, a
fire severely damaged Cuba’s main oil storage facility in early August and Hurricane Ian caused
severe damage to western Cuba and a nationwide power outage in late September.
Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions
aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy
toward Cuba, including by enacting legislation strengthening—and at times easing—U.S.
economic sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift away from
sanctions and toward engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic relations; the
rescission of the Cuban government’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism;
and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. The Trump
Administration began to reverse course in 2017, introducing new sanctions, including restrictions
on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump
Administration had largely abandoned engagement and significantly increased sanctions,
particularly on travel and remittances.
In its initial months in office, the Biden Administration announced it was conducting a review of
policy toward Cuba, with human rights as a core pillar, and would examine policy decisions made
by the prior Administration. After the Cuban government’s harsh response to the July 2021
protests, the Biden Administration imposed a series of targeted financial sanctions and visa
restrictions on those involved. In May 2022, the Administration announced several policy
changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban people. The Administration increased
immigrant visa processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana and said it would reinstate an
immigration parole program for Cuban families. It eased travel restrictions by reauthorizing
flights to cities beyond Havana and reinstating group people-to-people travel. It also eased
restrictions on sending cash remittances by eliminating dollar and frequency limits for family
remittances and by reauthorizing donative remittances to Cuban nationals. In October 2022, the
Administration announced that USAID would provide $2 million to independent relief
organizations for emergency relief in the aftermath of Hurricane Ian that devastated western
Cuba.
Driven by Cuba’s difficult economic conditions and political repression, among other factors,
irregular Cuban migration to the United States has surged over the past year. U.S. and Cuban
officials held migration talks in April and November 2022. The Administration also announced
that the U.S. Embassy in Havana would resume full immigrant visa processing on January 4,
2023, the first time since 2017.
Congressional Action. The 117th Congress continued to support funding for Cuba democracy
programs and broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2022, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022
(P.L. 117-103, Division K), and its explanatory statement, Congress provided $12.973 million for
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Cuba broadcasting, fully funding the Administration’s request. The law did not specify an amount
for Cuba democracy programs, but an estimated $20 million (the amount requested) is to be
provided. For FY2023, the Administration requested $20 million for democracy programs and
$13.432 million for broadcasting. Congress provided $12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting in
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617 Division K) and its explanatory statement,
and it again did not specify an amount for democracy programs. The explanatory statement also
contained several Cuba-related reporting requirements regarding consular services, illnesses
suffered by U.S. government personnel, and reforms undertaken by the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting (of the U.S. Agency for Global Media) to address deficiencies and align its
activities and personnel with its budget.
The FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) also contained several Cuba-related provisions, including two
reporting requirements: a DNI report on mass migration in the Western Hemisphere that includes
information on Cuba’s use, or the threat of using, mass migration to diminish dissent and increase
remittances from migrants in the United States, and a Coast Guard report on threats to national
security, drug trafficking, and other relevant threats in the Florida Straits and Caribbean region,
including Cuba.
In other significant action, in July 2022, the House rejected H.Amdt. 300 to H.R. 8294 (a six-bill
FY2023 appropriations measure), which would have prevented funding to enforce a prohibition
on private financing for U.S. agricultural exports. The House and the Senate also approved
several human rights resolutions: H.Res. 760 (November 2021); S.Res. 37 (April 2021); S.Res.
81 (May 2021); S.Res. 310 (August 2021), and S.Res. 489 (January 2022). In addition, the Senate
approved S. 2045 in July 2021, which would have renamed the street in front of the Cuban
Embassy after a democracy activist.
Members of Congress introduced a wide variety of other legislative initiatives on Cuba in the
117th Congress. These included bills that would have eased or lifted sanctions or promoted
engagement and bills that would have imposed further sanctions or restrictions on Cuba. Other
initiatives focused on immigration parole programs for family reunification and for Cuban
medical professionals.
For additional information, see CRS Report R47246, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th Congress, by
Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS
Insight IN11937, Biden Administration’s Cuba Policy Changes, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS Report
RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS
Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In
Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack.
Haiti
More than a year after the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and an August
2021 earthquake that killed 2,000 people, Haiti lacks an elected president, legislature, and
mayors. No elections are scheduled to replace the expired terms of Haitian officials at any level of
government. A political standoff between de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s government and
political and civil society leaders has occurred amid a worsening security crisis caused by
rampant gang violence. The ongoing crises in Haiti are major concerns for the Biden
Administration and many Members of Congress. Although Members have introduced legislation
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that would support recent U.S. and U.N. calls to sanction Haitian gang leaders and their financial
backers, congressional support for any future military intervention is uncertain.93
As in past periods when Haitian presidents failed to hold timely elections, former President Moïse
of the Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK) had been governing extra-constitutionally prior to his
assassination. Moïse failed to convene parliamentary elections due in 2019 and began ruling by
decree in 2020. Moïse, like other Haitian politicians and business leaders, allegedly provided
money and arms to gangs and other criminal groups in exchange for suppressing anti-government
protests.94
Following Moïse’s assassination, the United States and other donors supported Henry’s bid to
serve as prime minister over other competitors. Shortly before the assassination, Moïse had
nominated Henry, a neurosurgeon, to be prime minister. The legislature lacked a quorum to
consider him, however, and the president had not sworn him in. Henry’s irregular path to his
position and allegations of his possible involvement in Moïse’s assassination, a case that remains
unresolved, have eroded his credibility.95 Henry has fired officials who have sought to question
him about the case.
In September 2021, Henry and his supporters proposed that he name a provisional electoral
council to convene elections and that Henry remain the single head of government until a new
elected government takes office. He has yet to appoint that council, and many civil society and
political actors oppose Henry’s proposal. As an alternative, numerous civil society organizations
and political parties, some in coalitions, have sought to form an interim government. After
months of broad consultations, the Citizen Conference for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (widely
known as the Montana Group) came to an agreement in August 2021. The Montana Accord
proposed a two-year interim government led by a president and prime minister, with oversight
committees, to restore order, administer elections, and create a truth and justice commission to
address past human rights violations. Although many civic leaders and political parties signed the
Montana Accord, others did not (including some business groups, churches, and the PHTK and
allied parties). Negotiations between Henry and the Montana Group have yet to bear fruit; civil
society groups have called on the Biden Administration to withdraw U.S. support for Henry.96
Under Henry, inflation, protests, and gang-led blockades of ports and roads have led to food and
fuel shortages that have worsened already dire humanitarian conditions in the country, with nearly
50% of the population experiencing food insecurity.97 Gangs have exerted power and control over
territory, access to fuel, and the delivery of humanitarian aid, challenging the authority of the
underfunded and outmanned Haitian National Police and other state institutions. Gang violence
fueled a July 2022 outbreak in violence Port-Au-Prince that the U.N. estimates resulted in more
than 470 deaths. Gang violence also has led to the loss of millions of dollars’ worth of food
supplies and the displacement of nearly 100,000 people.98 An October 2022 resurgence of cholera
93 See, for example, U.S. Mission to the U.N., “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security
Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022.
94 “G9 and Family,” InSight Crime, Updated July 18, 2022.
95 Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” The Hill,
February 8, 2022.
96 Rafael Bernal, “More than 100 Groups Call on Biden to Drop Support for Haitian Prime Minister,” The Hill,
September 16, 2022.
97 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Catastrophic hunger levels recorded for the first time in
Haiti,” October 14, 2022.
98 International Organization for Migration, “96,000 Haitians Displaced by Recent Gang Violence in Capital: IOM
Report,” October 28, 2022.
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amid a population that lacks access to water and sanitation alarmed global health experts. In
October 2022, the Henry government asked for a foreign security force to help reestablish control
and enable humanitarian aid to the population, a request many Haitian civil society groups
oppose.99
U.S. policy goals in Haiti aim to support Haitians in their efforts to confront insecurity; restore
democratic institutions; and promote economic growth, educational opportunities, and health
care. The Biden Administration’s political approach to Haiti has evolved from supporting the
Henry government to pushing Henry, the Montana Group, and other stakeholders to reach an
inclusive political accord to working to pass U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning gang
leaders and their financial backers (approved) and backing a non-U.N. led security assistance
mission in Haiti (not yet approved). In November and December 2022, the State and Treasury
Departments imposed sanctions on Haitian politicians for drug trafficking and the Department of
Justice unsealed criminal charges against leaders of several Haitian gangs.100
The United States provided an estimated $188.6 million in bilateral assistance to Haiti in FY2021
and $219 million in FY2022, and the Biden Administration requested $274.8 million in bilateral
assistance in FY2023. Haiti also received an additional $171.3 million in humanitarian assistance
in FY2021 and FY2022 as well as $47 million to address COVID-19.101
Congressional Action. The 117th Congress enacted legislation, appropriated and conditioned
foreign assistance, and conducted oversight of U.S. policy toward Haiti. For FY2022, in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), Congress required the State
Department to withhold assistance for the central government of Haiti until a new president and
parliament have taken office following free and fair elections or the Secretary of State determines
a transitional government representative of Haitian society is in place and it is in the U.S. interest
to provide assistance; exceptions included assistance to support elections, anti-gang police and
justice administration, public health, food security, water and sanitation, education, disaster relief
and recovery, and other programs to meet basic human needs. Congress also enacted the Haiti
Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act as Division V of P.L.
117-103. The act requires U.S. agencies to measure the progress of post-disaster recovery and
efforts to address corruption, governance, rule of law, and media freedoms in Haiti.
For FY2023, Congress again restricted assistance to Haiti’s central government in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division K), with the same conditions and
exceptions as in FY2022. The explanatory statement to the FY2023 measure stated that the
Secretary of State should use every appropriate diplomatic tool to press for meaningful dialogue
between the current authorities, civil society, the political opposition, and other relevant
stakeholders to restore democratic governance through free and fair elections, counter violent
gangs, improve security, and deliver basic services to the Haitian people. The statement also
directed the Secretary of State to continue to take strong legal action against individuals engaged
in human rights abuses, corruption, and other illicit activities. In H.Rept. 117-401, Congress
99 Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2022.
100 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Haitian Politicians for Narcotics Trafficking,”
November 4, 2022, and “U.S. Sanctions Additional Corrupt Haitian Politicians for Drug Trafficking,” December 2,
2022; U.S. Department of Justice, “Criminal Charges Unsealed Against Haitian Gang Leaders for Kidnappings of U.S.
Citizens,” November 7, 2022; and U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights,”
December 9, 2022.
101 USAID, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, “Haiti: Assistance Overview,” August 2022; U.S. Department of
State, “Senior State Department Leadership Participate in International Partners Ministerial Meeting on Haiti,” July 12,
2022.
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required a USAID report on proposed resources and programs to improve access to maternal
health care in Haiti.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF12182, Haiti: Political Conflict and U.S. Policy
Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Maureen Taft-Morales; and, for earlier background, CRS
Report R45034, Haiti’s Political and Economic Conditions, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
Congress has demonstrated sustained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading
partner with which the United States has a close but complex relationship. In recent decades,
bilateral relations improved as the U.S. and Mexican economies became more integrated and the
countries worked together to address crime, migration, drugs, and other issues of shared concern.
Disagreements on these issues have emerged on occasion. In addition, the history of U.S. military
and diplomatic intervention in Mexico has periodically provoked tension.
Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, leader of the leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took
office for a six-year term in December 2018. López Obrador, who created MORENA in 2014, is
the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both legislative
chambers, although the size of those majorities decreased following June 2021 midterm elections.
López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained high (61% in August 2022), even as his
government has struggled to address organized crime-related violence, corruption, and the health
and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in more than 331,000
deaths in Mexico as of late December 2022.102 Supporters have generally praised the
government’s social programs and minimum-wage increases, as well as López Obrador’s ability
to connect with average Mexicans through daily press conferences and frequent, countrywide
travel. Many observers have criticized López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press,
independent government institutions, and judicial independence as well as his increasing reliance
on the military to perform roles previously carried out by civilian agencies in public security and
other sectors. His government also has received broad criticism for significantly reducing public
spending while sparing his priority, military-built infrastructure projects from cuts. Observers
have criticized the López Obrador administration’s mishandling of prosecutions against the
former attorney general, a retired general, and other officials accused of involvement in the deaths
of 43 students who disappeared in Guerrero in 2014.103
U.S.-Mexican relations under the López Obrador administration generally have remained cordial,
although some tensions have emerged. Mexico has accommodated changing U.S. immigration
and border security policies, worked closely with the United States on pandemic recovery, and
relaunched security cooperation under a new Bicentennial Framework after the 2020 U.S. arrest
of a former defense minister strained relations. Nevertheless, trade disputes, U.S. concerns over
human rights issues (such as impunity for the killing of journalists and enforced disappearances)
and President López Obrador’s energy policies that may violate the USMCA each have strained
relations with the Administration. Presidents López Obrador did not attend the June 2022 Summit
102 Carrin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas,
September 12, 2022; and Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” December 26, 2022.
103 Maria Verza, “Experts: Mexico Jeopardizes Justice in Missing Students Case,” AP, September 29, 2022.
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of the Americas in Los Angeles, a decision that disappointed U.S. officials. Presidents Biden and
López Obrador met in July and pledged to address inflation, promote renewable energy,
modernize border infrastructure, bolster efforts against fentanyl and arms trafficking, and address
the root causes of irregular migration.104 A High-Level Economic Dialogue occurred in
September 2022, a High-Level Security Dialogue occurred in October 2022, and a second Nort
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