Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and Select U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities
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Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and
Select U.S. Government Roles and
Responsibilities
Updated March 29, 2022
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46049
SUMMARY
Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and
Select U.S. Government Roles and
Responsibilities
Space weather refers to conditions on the sun, in the solar wind, and within the extreme reaches
of Earth’s upper atmosphere. In certain circumstances, space weather may pose hazards to spaceborne and ground-based critical infrastructure systems and assets that are vulnerable to
geomagnetically induced current, electromagnetic interference, or radiation exposure. Hazardous
space weather events are rare, but may affect broad areas of the globe. Effects may include
physical damage to satellites or orbital degradation, accelerated corrosion of gas pipelines,
disruption of radio communications, damage to undersea cable systems or interference with data
transmission, permanent damage to large power transformers essential to electric grid operations,
and radiation hazards to astronauts in orbit.
R46049
March 29, 2022
Eva Lipiec
Analyst in Natural
Resources Policy
Brian E. Humphreys
Analyst in Science and
Technology Policy
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (2010 NASA Authorization Act; P.L. 111267) directed the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to improve national preparedness for space
weather events and to coordinate related federal space weather efforts. OSTP established the Space Weather Operations,
Research, and Mitigation (SWORM) Working Group, which released several strategic and implementation plans, including
the 2019 National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan. The White House provided further policy guidance through two
executive orders (E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865) regarding space weather and electromagnetic pulses (EMPs), respectively.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is the primary civilian agency responsible for space weather
forecasting. Department of Energy national laboratories, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and
the National Science Foundation (NSF) support forecasting activities with scientific research. Likewise, the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) provides data on Earth’s variable magnetic field to inform understanding of the solar-terrestrial interface. The
Department of Homeland Security disseminates warnings, forecasts, and long-term risk assessments to government and
industry stakeholders as appropriate. The Department of Energy is responsible for coordinating recovery in case of damage or
disruption to the electric grid. The Department of State is responsible for engagement with international partners to mitigate
hazards of space weather. The Department of Defense (DOD) supports military operations with its own space weather
forecasting capabilities, sharing expertise and data with other federal agencies as appropriate.
The 116th Congress enacted legislation that further defines agency missions and interagency relationships regarding space
weather. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020 NDAA; P.L. 116-92) included a series of
homeland security-related provisions that parallel the E.O. 13865 framework for critical infrastructure resilience and
emergency response. The FY2020 NDAA also repealed a section of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2018 (P.L. 115-91), which authorized a “Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse
Attacks and Similar Events.” In October 2020, Congress enacted the Promoting Research and Observations of Space Weather
to Improve the Forecasting of Tomorrow Act (PROSWIFT Act; P.L. 116-181), which directed multiple federal entities,
including OSTP, NOAA, NASA, NSF, USGS, and parts of DOD, to improve space weather research, monitoring,
forecasting, and preparedness in certain ways.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that federal agencies participating in the SWORM Interagency Working Group
“allocated a combined total of nearly $350 million to activities related to space weather” in FY2019. NASA allocated the
majority ($264 million) of the $350 million total. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103) continues
support for maintenance and modernization of satellites used for space-weather forecasting. In addition, the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58) provides authorizations and appropriations that may support space weather
resilience, among other purposes.
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Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Federal Interagency Activities and Major Legislation .................................................................... 2
Space Weather Federal Coordination ........................................................................................ 3
Space Weather-Related Legislation Enacted in the 116th and 117th Congresses.............................. 7
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92) ........................... 7
The Promoting Research and Observations of Space Weather to Improve the
Forecasting of Tomorrow (PROSWIFT) Act (P.L. 116-181) ................................................. 9
Legislation in the 117th Congress ............................................................................................ 10
Select Department and Agency Roles and Responsibilities .......................................................... 10
Department of Commerce ........................................................................................................ 11
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) .......................................... 12
Department of Defense (DOD) ............................................................................................... 13
Air Force ........................................................................................................................... 15
Army ................................................................................................................................. 15
Navy .................................................................................................................................. 16
Department of Energy (DOE) ................................................................................................. 16
Office of Cyber Security, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) ............. 17
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)............................................................. 18
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) ............................................... 18
National Laboratories........................................................................................................ 18
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) .............................................................................. 19
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) ..................................................................... 20
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) .............................................. 21
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) .......................................................... 21
Department of the Interior (DOI) ............................................................................................ 22
Department of State (DOS) ..................................................................................................... 23
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ...................................................... 25
National Science Foundation (NSF) ....................................................................................... 27
Federal Agency Spending on Space Weather Activities ................................................................ 29
Additional Considerations ............................................................................................................. 29
Figures
Figure 1. Examples of Potential Effects of Space Weather ............................................................. 2
Figure 2. 2019 National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan Objectives by Agency ............. 6
Figure 3. NASA Heliophysics Satellites as of January 2022......................................................... 26
Tables
Table 1. Summary of Space Weather or EMP-Related Requirements in FY2020 NDAA .............. 7
Table 2. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Commerce Under E.O. 13744 and E.O.
13865 ........................................................................................................................................... 11
Table 3. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense Under E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865 ........... 14
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Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities
Table 4. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy Under E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865 ............ 16
Table 5. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security Under E.O. 13744 and
E.O. 13865.................................................................................................................................. 19
Table 6. Responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior Under E.O. 13744 and E.O.
13865 .......................................................................................................................................... 22
Table 7. Responsibilities of the Secretary of State Under E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865 ................ 24
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 30
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Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities
Introduction
Space weather refers to the dynamic conditions in Earth’s outer space environment. This includes
conditions on the sun, in the solar wind, and in Earth’s upper atmosphere.1 Space weather
phenomena include
solar flares or periodic intense bursts of radiation from the sun caused by the
sudden release of magnetic energy,
coronal mass ejections composed of clouds of solar plasma and electromagnetic
radiation, ejected into space from the sun,
high-speed solar wind streams emitted from low density regions of the sun, and
solar energetic particles or high-energy charged particles formed at the front of
solar flares and coronal mass ejections.2
Hazardous space weather events are rare, but may cause geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) that
affect broad areas of the globe. Such events may pose hazards to space-borne and ground-based
critical infrastructure (CI) systems and assets that are vulnerable to geomagnetically induced
current, electromagnetic interference, or radiation exposure (see Figure 1).3
Several notable events illustrate how the impact of space weather hazards has broadened over
time with technological advances. The 1859 “Carrington event,” named for the British solar
astronomer who first observed it, caused auroras as far south as Central America and disrupted
telegraph communications. In 1972, a GMD knocked out long-distance telephone service in
Illinois. In 1989, another GMD caused a nine-hour blackout in Quebec and melted some power
transformers in New Jersey. In 2005, X-rays from a solar storm disrupted GPS signals for a short
time.4 In February 2022, at least 40 of 49 broadband internet satellites launched to low earth orbit
by a Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) rocket were lost when a geomagnetic storm
changed conditions in the upper atmosphere, causing orbital degeneration of the satellites.5
This report provides an overview of federal government policy developed under the existing
legislative framework, and describes the specific roles and responsibilities of select federal
departments and agencies responsible for the study and mitigation of space weather hazards. It
includes information on legislation enacted in recent Congresses. Legislation in the 116th
Congress further codified federal authorities, roles, and responsibilities in space weather research
and forecasting. In the 117th Congress, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103)
1 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “Space Weather,” at https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/
rbsp/science/rbsp-spaceweather.html.
2 NASA, “Solar Storm and Space Weather—Frequently Asked Questions,” at https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/
sunearth/spaceweather/index.html#q2; National Science and Technology Council, National Space Weather Strategy
and Action Plan, March 2019, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/National-Space-WeatherStrategy-and-Action-Plan-2019.pdf; and University of California at Berkeley, “Solar Flares and Coronal Mass
Ejections,” at http://cse.ssl.berkeley.edu/coronalweather/CMEsFlares/.
3 Geomagnetic currents occur when changes in the Earth’s magnetic field caused by space weather induce currents in
power transmission lines or other long conductive lines. Such currents may cause damage to critical system
components such as large power transformers. See Michael Kelly and Russell Bent, “GMD Coupling to Power Systems
and Disturbance Mitigation,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, January 24, 2018, online at https://permalink.lanl.gov/
object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-UR-18-20499.
4 See NASA, “A Super Solar Flare,” at https://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2008/
06may_carringtonflare.
5 See SpaceX, “Updates: Geomagnetic Storm and Recently Deployed Starlink Satellites,” https://www.spacex.com/
updates/.
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continues support for maintenance and modernization of satellites used for space-weather
forecasting. In addition, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58) provides
authorizations and appropriations that may support space weather resilience, among other
purposes.
Figure 1. Examples of Potential Effects of Space Weather
Source: NASA, email communication with NASA Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, September
6, 2019.
Federal Interagency Activities and Major Legislation
Over the past several decades, the federal government’s interest in space weather and its effects
has grown. Congress has required individual federal agencies to conduct certain space weatherrelated activities related to agency missions. However, federal interagency work began in earnest
with the establishment of the interagency National Space Weather Program (NSWP) in 1995 by
the Department of Commerce’s Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology.6 The NSWP
Council included representatives from interested federal agencies. The NSWP Council
6 Michael F. Bonadonna, “The National Space Weather Program: Two Decades of Interagency Partnership and
Accomplishments,” 2016, at https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2016SW001523. Hereinafter
Bonadonna 2016.
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coordinated federal space weather strategy development between 1995 and 2015 in partnership
with federal agencies, industry, and the academic community.7
Space Weather Federal Coordination
In 2010, the Obama Administration released its “National Space Policy of the United States of
America,” which included a goal related to improving space-based Earth and solar observation
capabilities to forecast terrestrial and near-Earth space weather and directed the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) to work on space weather forecasting, among other goals.8 Under the
2010 NASA Authorization Act, Congress directed the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) to improve national preparedness for space weather events and to
coordinate federal space weather activities of the NSWP Council.9
OSTP’s National Science and Technology Council established the Space Weather Operations,
Research, and Mitigation (SWORM) Working Group in 2014 to lead federal strategy and policy
development.10 The following year, SWORM published a national strategy for space weather
preparedness, titled the “National Space Weather Strategy” (2015 Strategy), effectively
deactivating the NSWP Council.11 In 2016, President Obama signed Executive Order (E.O.)
13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events,” directing federal
space weather preparedness activities to be carried out “in conjunction” with those activities
already identified in the 2015 Strategy.12
The SWORM Interagency Working Group released an updated national space weather strategy in
2019, titled “The National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan” (the 2019 Plan).13 The same
year, President Trump signed E.O. 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic
Pulses,” directing the federal government to “foster sustainable, efficient, and cost-effective
approaches” to improve national resilience to the effects of electromagnetic pulses.14
7 The NSWP Council was composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security,
the Interior, State, and Transportation; National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); National Science Foundation (NSF); Office of Science and Technology
(OSTP); and Office of Management and Budget (OMB). See Bonadonna 2016.
8 Executive Office of the President, National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010, pp. 4 and 12.
9 P.L. 111-267; 42 U.S.C. §18388.
10 SWORM is referred to as a working group or task force, depending on the document (see Bonadonna 2016 and
National Science and Technology Council, National Space Weather Strategy, Washington, DC, October 2015). The
SWORM Working Group is composed of representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Federal Railroad Administration, NASA, NOAA, NSF, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Navy, U.S. Postal Service,
National Security Council, OMB, OSTP, and White House Military Office (SWORM, “About SWORM,” at
https://www.sworm.gov/about.htm).
11 National Science and Technology Council, National Space Weather Strategy, Washington, DC, October 2015.
12 E.O. 13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events,” 81 Federal Register 7157371577, October 18, 2016.
13 National Science and Technology Council, National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan, Washington, DC,
March 2019.
14 E.O. 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses,” 84 Federal Register 12041-12046,
March 29, 2019.
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Additionally, it defined GMDs as a subset of EMP—a definition with potential policy
implications (see “Additional Considerations”).
In 2020, President Trump released “The National Space Policy,” superseding the 2010 version
and reemphasizing other space-related guidance.15 Among other topics, the policy expanded
NASA and NOAA’s space weather responsibilities from the 2010 policy, and reiterated OSTP’s
role in implementing the 2019 Plan.
1995–2020 Chronology of Space Weather Federal Coordination
1995
NSWP is established under Department of Commerce auspices, and directed by the NSWP Council.
2010
Congress directs OSTP to improve national preparedness for space weather events.
2010
President Obama releases the “National Space Policy of the United States of America.”
2014
NSTC establishes the Space Weather Operations, Research, and Mitigation (SWORM) Working Group.
2015
The SWORM Interagency Working Group publishes the “National Space Weather Strategy.”
The NSWP Council is deactivated.16
2016
President Obama signs Executive Order (E.O.) 13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for
Space Weather Events.”
2019
The SWORM Interagency Working Group releases updated national space weather strategy, “The
National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan.”
President Trump signs E.O. 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses.”
2020
President Trump releases “The National Space Policy.”
Congress directs federal agencies to work together in certain ways, including instructing NSTC to
establish the Space Weather Interagency Working Group.
Taken together, the 2019 Plan and E.O. 13865 prioritize investment in CI resilience initiatives
over scientific research and forecasting, and represent a shift in policy from what the Obama
Administration set forth in the 2015 Strategy and E.O 13744.17 The 2019 Plan focuses on three
objectives related to protection of assets, space weather forecasting, and planning for space
weather events, and identifies the agencies and departments with responsibilities under each
objective (Figure 2). E.O. 13865 also directs relevant federal agencies to identify regulatory and
cost-recovery mechanisms that the government may use to compel private-sector investments in
resilience.18 This approach differs from most other federal infrastructure resilience initiatives,
which generally rely upon voluntary industry adoption of resilience measures.19
Implementation of the 2019 order has included individual department and agency actions, as well
as interagency efforts. For example, an interagency working group of the National Science and
15 Executive Office of the President, “The National Space Policy,” 85 Federal Register 81755, December 9, 2020.
16 Bonadonna 2016.
17 E.O. 13865 uses the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) definition of critical infrastructure: systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.
18 E.O. 13865, Section 6c(iii).
19 See CRS Report R45809, Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress, by
Brian E. Humphreys.
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Technology Council has identified space weather observational R&D needs in line with multiple
departmental and agency executive order responsibilities and core mission areas.20
20 Electromagnetic Pulse Research and Development Assessment Interagency Working Group, Research and
Development Needs for Improving Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses, June 2020, p. 12, at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Research-Development-Needs-For-ImprovingResilience-to-Electromagnetic-Pulses-June-2020.pdf.
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Figure 2. 2019 National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan Objectives by Agency
Source: CRS from National Science and Technology Council, National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan, Washington, DC, March 2019.
Notes: DHS = Department of Homeland Security; DOC = Department of Commerce; DOD = Department of Defense; DOE = Department of Energy; DOI =
Department of the Interior; DOS = Department of State; DOT = Department of Transportation; EPA = Environmental Protection Agency; FCC = Federal
Communications Commission; HHS = Department of Health and Human Services; NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration; NRC = Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; NSF = National Science Foundation; and Treas. = Department of the Treasury. Not all federal departments and agencies listed in the figure are discussed in
this report.
CRS-6
Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities
Space Weather-Related Legislation Enacted in the
116th and 117th Congresses
The 116th Congress considered and passed two bills related to space weather research,
forecasting, preparedness, response, and recovery. Both bills direct multiple federal departments
and agencies to support new and existing space weather-related activities. Some of the provisions
enacted certain parts of existing executive orders, which may lead to questions on agency
implementation when those directives are potentially unclear or overlap (see “Additional
Considerations”).
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L.
116-92)
In December 2019, Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020 (FY2020 NDAA; P.L. 116-92). The FY2020 NDAA amended the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (P.L. 107-296) and contains a series of homeland security-related requirements that parallel
the E.O. 13865 framework for critical infrastructure resilience and emergency response. Table 1
contains this information.21
Table 1. Summary of Space Weather or EMP-Related Requirements in FY2020
NDAA
Department or
Agency
Requirement
Deadline
Status
Agencies
supporting
National Essential
Functionsa
Update operational plans to
protect against and mitigate
effects of EMP/GMD
March 20, 2020
DOE stated that its updated
“response plans, programs, and
procedures and operational
plans all account for the effects
of EMP and GMD.”b
DHS (relevant
sector-specific
agencies)
Submit R&D Action Plan to
Congress
March 26, 2020
Pending.
DHS, DOD,
DOE, DOC
Brief Quadrennial Risk
Assessment to Congress
March 26, 2020
Delayed to end of FY2021.
DHS
Provide information on
EMP/GMD to federal, state, local,
and private sector stakeholders
June 19, 2020
Ongoing through existing
programs and activities.
21 Agency-provided information to CRS is current as of March 8, 2021. CRS research librarians Rachael Roan and
Alexandra Kosmidis searched public sources on March 29, 2022, to update agency-provided information where
possible. CRS has not independently verified this information. Terms searched: electromagnetic pulse, EMP,
geomagnetic disturbance, GMD, space weather, Quadrennial Risk Assessment, R&D Action Plan, emergency
notification systems, technological capabilities, and technological gaps. Sources searched: press releases and annual
reports for DHS, DOC, DOD, DOE, DOT, FCC, FEMA, FERC, CISA, and Los Alamos National Laboratory;
Congressional Record and Committee Reports on Congress.gov; Inside Defense: https://insidedefense.com/; Google
searches across .gov and .mil domains.
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Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities
Department or
Agency
Requirement
Deadline
Status
FEMA (CISA,
DOE, FERC)
Develop EMP/GMD response and
recovery plans and procedures
June 19, 2020
Ongoing compliance via existing
plans and procedures.
DHS (S&T, CISA,
FEMA, DOD,
DOE)
Pilot test of engineering
approaches to mitigate
EMP/GMD effects
September 22, 2020
Under contract with Los
Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) for completion by July
2021.
DOD (DHS,
DOE)
Pilot test of engineering
approaches to harden defense
installations and associated
infrastructure
September 22, 2020
Interagency pilot project in San
Antonio, TX, ongoing.
Additional work pending
completion of LANL pilot test
of engineering approaches.
FEMA (CISA,
DOE, FERC)
Conduct EMP/GMD national
exercise
December 21, 2020
Completed in December 2020.
DHS (FEMA,
CISA, DOD,
DOC, FCC, DOT)
Report to Congress on effects of
EMP/GMD on communications
infrastructure with
recommendations for changes to
operational response plans
December 21, 2020
Vulnerability assessment of
priority infrastructure ongoing
(scheduled completion July
2021). Report expected January
2022.
FEMA
Brief Congress on state of
emergency notification systems
December 21, 2020
Complied via briefing to House
Energy and Commerce
Committee on November 2,
2020.
DHS (DOD,
DOE)
Report on technological
capabilities and gaps
December 21, 2020
Report draft complete. Agency
review ongoing.
DHS (sectorspecific agencies,
DOD, DOE)
Review test data on EMP/GMD
effects on critical infrastructure
December 21, 2020
No information provided.
Source: FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92), Section 1740 and email correspondence on March 8, 2021, with James
Platt, Strategic Defense Initiatives, EMP/PNT/GMD Space Weather/Space Risks, National Risk Management
Center, CISA, and CRS search of public sources.
Note: Parentheses in the first column denote a coordination requirement for the lead department or agency (in
bold). CISA = Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (a part of DHS); DHS = Department of
Homeland Security; DOC = Department of Commerce; DOD = Department of Defense; DOE = Department of
Energy; DOT = Department of Transportation; EMP = electromagnetic pulse; FCC = Federal Communications
Commission; FEMA = Federal Emergency Management Agency (a part of DHS); FERC = Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (an independent regulatory commission within DOE); GMD = geomagnetic disturbance;
R&D = research and development; S&T = Science and Technology Directorate (a part of DHS).
a. National Essential Functions are defined in the bill as “the overarching responsibilities of the Federal
Government to lead and sustain the Nation before, during, and in the aftermath of a catastrophic
emergency, such as an EMP or GMD that adversely affects the performance of the Federal Government.”
b. U.S. Department of Energy, Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year 2020, DOE/CF-0170, November 2020, pp.
11-12, at https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/11/f80/fy-2020-doe-agency-financial-report.pdf.
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The Promoting Research and Observations of Space Weather to
Improve the Forecasting of Tomorrow (PROSWIFT) Act (P.L. 116181)
In October 2020, Congress enacted the Promoting Research and Observations of Space Weather
to Improve the Forecasting of Tomorrow Act (PROSWIFT Act; P.L. 116-181; 51 U.S.C.
§§60601-60608), which directed multiple federal entities, including OSTP, NOAA, NASA, the
National Science Foundation (NSF), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and parts of the
Department of Defense (DOD), to improve space weather forecasts and predictions. The act
repealed the space weather-related provision in P.L. 111-267; replacing it with similar language
directing OSTP to coordinate federal activities to “improve the ability of the United States to
prepare for, avoid, mitigate, respond to, and recover from potentially devastating impacts of space
weather.” OSTP is also directed, in collaboration with the interagency working group described
below and NOAA-administered advisory group described below, to develop and periodically
update a strategy for coordinated observations of space weather by the working group federal
agencies.22 The PROSWIFT Act builds on E.O. 13744, using similar language that enacts several
of the executive order’s key provisions as well as elements of the 2019 Plan that have provided
policy guidance for federal agencies.
In addition to agency-specific requirements, the PROSWIFT Act directs the National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC) to establish a space weather interagency working group to include
representatives from NOAA, NASA, NSF, DOD, the Department of the Interior, and “such other
federal agencies as the Director of [OSTP] deems appropriate.”23 The PROSWIFT Act directs the
group to “coordinate executive branch actions that improve the understanding and prediction of
and preparation for space weather phenomena, and coordinate [f]ederal space weather
activities.”24 Other provisions direct the working group to (1) develop, submit to certain
congressional committees, and make public a plan to implement the OSTP-coordinated strategy,25
(2) craft formal mechanisms to ensure transition of research to operations and communicate
operational needs to research,26 and (3) review and update NSTC’s space weather benchmarks.27
After enactment, NOAA determined that the existing SWORM Interagency Working Group
fulfills the act’s requirement to establish an interagency working group.28
The PROSWIFT Act also lists individual and shared requirements for certain agencies. (See each
department/agency section below for summary of agency-specific provisions.)
As enacted, the PROSWIFT Act did not include provisions from earlier versions of the legislation
that would have directed the National Security Council to “assess the vulnerability of the national
security community to space weather events” and to develop national security mechanisms to
22 51 U.S.C. 60602(a)(b), and (e).
23 51 U.S.C. §60601(c).
24 51 U.S.C. §60601(c). In March 2022, NTSC published an interagency framework to support space weather-related
research-to-operations and operations-to-research processes in partial fulfilment of the statutory mandate and certain
executive branch directives, including E.O. 13744. See NSTC (SWORM), Space Weather Research-to-Operations and
Operations-to-Research Framework, Washington, DC, March 2022, https://www.sbir.gov/node/2120223.
25 51 U.S.C. §60602(d).
26 51 U.S.C. §60604(d).
27 51 U.S.C. §60608.
28 Email communication with NOAA Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs (OLIA), September 14,
2021.
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protect national security assets from space weather threats.29 In a signing statement, President
Trump wrote that some provisions of the PROSWIFT Act were “unobjectionable,” but that the act
did not address “the resilience of national security assets or critical infrastructure to the effects of
space weather” and unduly limited his authority to conduct foreign affairs.30
Legislation in the 117th Congress
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103) continues support for maintenance and
modernization of satellites used for space-weather forecasting. In addition, the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58) authorizes $50 million for creation of an “advanced
energy security program” to support modeling of risks posed by natural and human-made threats
and hazards, including electromagnetic pulse and geomagnetic disturbance. Other eligible
activities include grid resilience exercises and assessments, research on grid hardening solutions,
mitigation and recovery, and “technical assistance to States and other entities for standards and
risk analysis.”31 IIJA also appropriates $157.5 million in research and development funding to the
Science and Technology Directorate of DHS for a variety of purposes, including “electromagnetic
pulse and geomagnetic disturbance resilience capabilities.”32 DHS is required to submit a detailed
spend plan for research and development appropriations made under this provision within 90 days
of enactment.
Select Department and Agency Roles and
Responsibilities
This section provides an overview of federal roles and responsibilities for space weather-related
research and emergency preparedness under current legislation and executive branch policy
guidance. Legislative or executive branch directives applicable only to human-made EMP threats,
such as high-altitude nuclear detonations, are excluded from this overview.
Federal agency roles and responsibilities fall into five major categories: early warning and
forecasting; research and development (R&D); basic scientific research; risk assessment and
mitigation, including modeling and information sharing; and response and recovery. Some
agencies have roles and responsibilities in more than one category. This section includes only
entities that relevant legislation, executive orders, or national strategies have designated as the
federal lead for a specific objective or requirement. Therefore, agencies whose role is confined to
participation in working groups, harmonizing internal policies with national strategy or directives,
contributing refinements to analytical products or models produced by other agencies, or ensuring
their own continuity-of-operations in case of a space weather event are not included.
Each subsection includes a summary of the department or agency mission and the relevant
authorities under which it operates.33 If applicable, the agency-specific provisions of the two
executive orders currently in force—E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865—are listed in a table, followed
by information about implementing programs and activities. The 2019 Plan is referenced in cases
where the executive orders do not provide specific or complete guidance to given federal entities.
29 S. 881 introduced in the Senate, March 26, 2019.
30 The White House, “Signing Statement from President Donald J. Trump on S. 881,” release, October 21, 2020,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/signing-statement-president-donald-j-trump-s-881/.
31 See P.L. 117-58, Sec. 40125(d)(2).
32 See P.L. 117-58, Division J, Title V.
33 Departments and agencies are ordered alphabetically for ease of reference.
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In addition, each subsection lists agency-specific requirements of the FY2020 NDAA and the
PROSWIFT Act that affect previously existing program authorities for a given department or
agency.
Department of Commerce34
In 1988, Congress authorized the Secretary of Commerce to “prepare and issue predictions of
electromagnetic wave propagation conditions and warnings of disturbances in such conditions.”35
The Secretary of Commerce delegated those responsibilities to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Secretary of Commerce also directed NOAA to fulfill
the department’s space weather responsibilities in 2016 under E.O. 13744 and in 2019 under E.O.
13865 (Table 2).
Table 2. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Commerce
Under E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865
E.O. 13744
E.O. 13865
“(i) provide timely and accurate operational space
weather forecasts, watches, warnings, alerts, and realtime space weather monitoring for the government,
civilian, and commercial sectors, exclusive of the
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense; and
(ii) ensure the continuous improvement of operational
space weather services, utilizing partnerships, as
appropriate, with the research community, including
academia and the private sector, and relevant agencies
to develop, validate, test, and transition space weather
observation platforms and models from research to
operations and from operations to research.”
“(i) provide timely and accurate operational
observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products
for natural EMPs, and
(ii) use the capabilities of the Department of
Commerce, the private sector, academia, and
nongovernmental organizations to continuously
improve operational forecasting services and develop
standards for commercial EMP technology.”
Source: Executive Order 13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events,” 81
Federal Register 71573, October 18, 2016, and Executive Order 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to
Electromagnetic Pulses,” 84 Federal Register 12043, March 29, 2019.
Both executive orders direct the Secretary to improve services and collaborate with relevant
stakeholders. The 2016 order refers to the hazard of concern as space weather, while the 2019
order refers to it as natural EMPs. The FY2020 NDAA does not include directives for the
Department of Commerce; PROSWIFT Act provisions are described below. The Department of
Commerce’s space weather programs and activities are concentrated in NOAA. The National
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), another agency within the Department of
Commerce, indicated that it has supported “important calibrations that enable systems to operate
in space and meet important performance criteria for other agencies.”36
34 For more information, contact Eva Lipiec, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy.
35 P.L. 100-418, Title V; 15 U.S.C. §1532.
36 Email correspondence between CRS and NIST Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs, January 26 and 28,
2021.
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
NOAA’s space weather work falls primarily under two line offices: National Weather Service
(NWS) and National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS).37 NWS
operates and maintains observing systems to support forecasting of space weather, including the
National Solar Observatory Global Oscillation Network Group, a series of ground-based
observatories.38 NWS also operates the Space Weather Prediction Center, which provides realtime monitoring and forecasting of solar events and disturbances and develops models to improve
understanding and predict future events.39 NESDIS maintains NOAA’s space weather data
through the National Centers for Environmental Information.40 It also develops and manages
several satellite programs, which collect solar and space weather-related observations, including
the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES) and the Space Weather Followon program.41
The PROSWIFT Act requires the NOAA Administrator to establish a space weather advisory
group (SWAG) of stakeholders from the academic, commercial space weather, and space weather
end user communities.42 NOAA established SWAG in 2021; the group held its first meeting in
December 2021.43
The act allows interagency working group members to enter into agreements with one another
and requires NOAA to enter into agreements with NASA to develop “space weather spacecraft,
instruments, and technologies,” while maintaining existing capabilities in the interim. 44 NOAA
also is required to develop a contingency plan for space weather forecasting in the event that
existing space-based assets fail prior to replacement and brief Congress on its plan, and “should”
develop space-based capabilities beyond the baseline capabilities, with the potential to work with
commercial and academic communities.45 NOAA has indicated it has entered into interagency
agreements with NASA and DOD, continues to maintain existing back-up capabilities and plan
for those of the future, and is exploring partnerships with NASA, NSF, DOD, and the
international space agency and research communities to support research and ensure back-up and
space-based observational capabilities.46
37 NOAA, “Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 2021,” at https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020-02/
fy2021_noaa_congressional_budget_justification.pdf.
38 National Solar Observatory, “Global Oscillation Network Group,” at https://gong.nso.edu/.
39 NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center, “Space Weather Conditions,” at https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/.
40 NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, “Space Weather,” at https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/stp/
spaceweather.html.
41 NOAA, “Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites—R Series,” at https://www.goes-r.gov/ and NOAA
Office of Projects, Planning and Analysis, “Space Weather Follow-On,” at https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/OPPA/
swfo.php.
42 51 U.S.C. §60601(d). For more information about the PROSWIFT Act, see the section entitled “The Research and
Observations of Space Weather to Improve the Forecasting of Tomorrow (PROSWIFT) Act.”
43 NOAA, “Establishment of the Space Weather Advisory Group and Solicitation of Nominations for Membership,” 86
Federal Register 24390, May 6, 2021, and NOAA, National Weather Service, “Space Weather Advisory Group
(SWAG),” at https://www.weather.gov/swag.
44 51 U.S.C. §60601(c)(2), 51 U.S.C. §60603(b)(3), and 51 U.S.C. §60603(c).
45 51 U.S.C. §60603(d), 51 U.S.C. §60603(e), 51 U.S.C. §60603(i), and 51 U.S.C. §60604(b)(3).
46 Email communication with NOAA OLIA, August 6, 2021.
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The PROSWIFT Act also directs NOAA to support review of the integrated strategy and
associated research and development goals,47 and to provide for broad-based information sharing
with key stakeholders.48 As of August 2021, NOAA continues to work to inform the strategy and
expects to enter into an agreement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine (NASEM) to review the strategy in 2023.49 NOAA indicated that it provides near realtime space weather-related data freely and that it has entered into an agreement with NASEM to
establish the Government-University-Commercial Roundtable on Space Weather.50 The act also
requires NOAA to establish and administer a pilot program to obtain commercial sector space
weather data.51 NOAA solicited commercial space weather data in September 2020, but according
to NOAA, none of the responses met NOAA’s mission needs; 52 in November 2021 the agency
released another request for information on existing and planned commercial space-based space
weather data and related capabilities.53 The FY2020 NDAA does not contain specific provisions
addressing the roles and responsibilities of NOAA regarding EMPs/GMDs.
Department of Defense (DOD)54
E.O. 13744 directed DOD to provide space weather forecasts and related products to support
military operations of the United States and its partners (Table 3).
47 51 U.S.C. §60602(c).
48 51 U.S.C. §60605(b) and 51 U.S.C. §60606.
49 Email communication with NOAA OLIA, August 6, 2021.
50 Email communication with NOAA OLIA, August 6, 2021.
51 51 U.S.C. §60607.
52 Email communication with NOAA OLIA, August 6, 2021.
53 NOAA, Office of Space Commerce, “NOAA Commercial Space Weather Data RFI,” at
https://www.space.commerce.gov/noaa-commercial-space-weather-data-rfi/.
54 For more information, contact Stephen McCall, Analyst in Military Space, Missile Defense, and Defense Innovation.
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Table 3. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense Under E.O. 13744 and
E.O. 13865
E.O. 13744
E.O. 13865
“(a) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure the timely
provision of operational space weather observations,
analyses, forecasts, and other products to support the
mission of the Department of Defense and coalition
partners, including the provision of alerts and warnings
for space weather phenomena that may affect weapons
systems, military operations, or the defense of the
United States.”
“(i) in cooperation with the heads of relevant agencies
and with United States allies, international partners, and
private-sector entities as appropriate, improve and
develop the ability to rapidly characterize, attribute,
and provide warning of EMPs, including effects on space
systems of interest to the United States;
(ii) provide timely operational observations, analyses,
forecasts, and other products for naturally occurring
EMPs to support the mission of the Department of
Defense along with United States allies and
international partners, including the provision of alerts
and warnings for natural EMPs that may affect weapons
systems, military operations, or the defense of the
United States;
(iii) conduct R&D and testing to understand the effects
of EMPs on Department of Defense systems and
infrastructure, improve capabilities to model and
simulate the environments and effects of EMPs, and
develop technologies to protect Department of
Defense systems and infrastructure from the effects of
EMPs to ensure the successful execution of
Department of Defense missions;
(iv) review and update existing EMP-related standards
for Department of Defense systems and infrastructure,
as appropriate;
(v) share technical expertise and data regarding EMPs
and their potential effects with other agencies and with
the private sector, as appropriate.”
Source: Executive Order 13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events,” 81
Federal Register 71573, October 18, 2016; and Executive Order 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to
Electromagnetic Pulses,” 84 Federal Register 12042-12043, March 29, 2019.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (FY2018 NDAA; P.L. 115-91)
codified the language in E.O. 13744. According to the FY2018 NDAA
It is the sense of Congress that the [Secretary of Defense] should ensure the timely
provision of operational space weather observations, analyses, forecasts, and other
products to support the mission of the DOD including the provision of alerts and warnings
for space weather phenomena that may affect weapons systems, military operations, or the
defense of the United States.
E.O. 13865 reiterates the E.O. 13744 requirement verbatim, except that it substitutes the phrase
“naturally occurring EMPs” for “space weather phenomena.” E.O. 13865 also directs DOD to
take further steps related to EMP characterization, warning systems, effects, and protection of
DOD systems and infrastructure and the United States from EMPs.
The FY2020 NDAA requires DOD to provide quadrennial EMP and GMD risk assessment
briefings to Congress, pilot test engineering approaches to harden defense installations and
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associated infrastructure from the effects of EMPs and GMDs by September 22, 2020,55 and
coordinate with other departments and agencies on related activities (Table 1).
DOD is also a member of the interagency working group created by the PROSWIFT Act. The act
directs DOD, among other departments and agencies, to continue to carry out basic research on
heliophysics, geospace science, and space weather, as well as support competitive proposals for
research, modeling, and monitoring of space weather.56 NASA, NSF, and USGS are also required
to transition “space weather research findings, models, and capabilities” to DOD and NOAA,
subject to consultation with a designated stakeholder advisory group.57 Also under the
PROSWIFT Act, the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy are requires to maintain and improve
ground-based observations of the sun to meet user needs and to continue to provide space weather
data through ground-based facilities.58
Air Force
The U.S. Air Force is the lead for all DOD and Intelligence Community (IC) space weather
information.59 Air Force weather personnel provide space environmental information, products,
and services required to support DOD operations as required.60 Air Force space weather
operations and capabilities are to support all elements of the DOD and its decisionmakers. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Department of Defense, primarily the Air
Force, allocated $24 million to space weather activities in FY2019.61
The 557th Weather Wing, located at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, conducts most of DOD’s
space weather-related activities. (The 557th Weather Wing remains under the U.S. Air Force rather
than the U.S. Space Force). It uses ground-based and space-based observing systems, including
the Solar Electro-optical Observing Network (SEON), a network of ground-based observing sites
providing 24-hour coverage of solar phenomena; ground-based ionosondes and other sensors
providing data in the ionosphere; and space-based observations from the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program.62
Army
The Army has two full-time meteorologists to coordinate space weather support within the Army
and with other DOD and federal agencies.
55 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(1)(E)(ii) and P.L. 116-92, Section 1740(f).
56 51 U.S.C. 60604(a).
57 51 U.S.C. 60604(d).
58 51 U.S.C. 60603(f).
59 Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, April 10, 2018, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14.pdf.
60 Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, The Federal Plan for
Meteorological Services and Supporting Research—Fiscal Year 2017, FCM-P1-2016, at http://www.ofcm.gov/
publications/fedplan/FCM-p1-2017.pdf.
61 Email communication between CRS and Robert Reese, Congressional Budget Office, on October 1, 2019.
62 Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, The Federal Plan for
Meteorological Services and Supporting Research—Fiscal Year 2017, pp. 2-174 to 2-175.
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Navy
The Naval Research Laboratory’s (NRL’s) Remote Sensing and Space Science Divisions and the
Naval Center for Space Technology also contribute to the DOD’s space weather activities.63 For
example, the Wide-field Imager for Solar Probe Plus (WISPR), launched in August 2018, was
designed and developed for NASA by NRL’s Space Design Division. WISPR determines the
fine-scale electron density and velocity structure of the solar corona and the source of shocks that
produce solar energetic particles.64
Department of Energy (DOE)65
DOE is responsible for monitoring and assessing the potential disruptions to energy infrastructure
from space weather, and for coordinating electricity restoration under authorities granted to it by
the White House and Congress.66
Table 4. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy Under E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865
E.O. 13744
E.O. 13865
(i) “shall facilitate the protection and restoration of the
reliability of the electrical power grid during a
presidentially declared grid security emergency
associated with a geomagnetic disturbance pursuant to
16 U.S.C. 824o-1.”
(i) “shall conduct early-stage R&D, develop pilot
programs, and partner with other agencies and the
private sector, as appropriate, to characterize sources
of EMPs and their couplings to the electric power grid
and its subcomponents, understand associated potential
failure modes for the energy sector, and coordinate
preparedness and mitigation measures with energy
sector partners.”
Source: Executive Order 13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events,” 81
Federal Register 71573, October 18, 2016, and Executive Order 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to
Electromagnetic Pulses,” 84 Federal Register 12043, March 29, 2019.
E.O. 13744 directs DOE to protect and restore the electric power grid in the event of a
presidentially declared grid emergency associated with a geomagnetic disturbance. E.O. 13865
assigns additional roles and responsibilities to DOE specific to R&D and coordination with the
private sector to better understand electromagnetic threats and hazards, and their possible effects
on the electric power grid (Table 4). The FY2020 NDAA directs the Secretary of Energy to
provide quadrennial EMP and GMD risk assessment briefings to Congress,67 as well as to
coordinate with other departments and agencies on related activities. The Secretary of Energy
may also develop or update benchmarks that describe the physical characteristics of EMPs to be
shared with CI owners and operators.68 DOE stated that it “made progress on a number of
63 U.S. Navy, “NRL Sensor Provides Critical Space Weather Observations,” at http://www.navy.mil/submit/
display.asp?story_id=49408; and U.S. Navy, “NRP Brings New Hyperspectral Atmospheric and Ocean Science to
ISS,” at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=48197.
64 U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, “Headlines and Areas of Research,” at https://www.nrl.navy.mil/ssd/overview/
areas-of-research.
65 For more information, contact Richard J. Campbell, Specialist in Energy Policy.
66 The White House, “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” Presidential Policy Directive 21, February 12,
2013. P.L. 114-94 enacted into law the designation of DOE as the sector-specific agency for the energy sector (6
U.S.C. §121 note).
67 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(E)(ii).
68 6 U.S.C. 195f note.
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actions” under E.O. 13865 and the FY2020 NDAA, but did not specify which DOE agencies and
offices had led the efforts.69 The PROSWIFT Act does not contain specific energy infrastructure
protection requirements or explicitly name DOE as a member of the interagency working group;
however, DOE is a part of the existing SWORM Interagency Working Group.70
Relevant programs and activities for energy infrastructure protection and threat mitigation are led
by the DOE’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), and DOE’s national laboratories.
Office of Cyber Security, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER)
In February 2018, DOE announced the creation of CESER.71 CESER has two main divisions:
Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER), and Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery
Systems. ISER’s mission is “to secure U.S. energy infrastructure against all hazards, reduce the
impact of disruptive events, and respond to and facilitate recovery from energy disruptions, in
collaboration with the private sector and state and local governments.”72
DOE has produced a number of reports on GMDs and EMPs. In compliance with the National
Space Weather Action plan, ISER produced a 2019 report on geomagnetic disturbances and the
impact on the electricity grid.73 This report was designed to provide a better understanding of
GMD events in order to protect the U.S. electricity grid.
Prior to the reorganization, DOE’s OE collaborated with the Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI), a nonprofit organization that conducts research and develops projects focused on
electricity. In 2016, the OE and EPRI together developed the Joint Electromagnetic Pulse
Resilience Strategy, and subsequently the DOE Electromagnetic Pulse Resilience Action Plan in
January 2017. E.O. 13865 refers to EMPs in two categories: human-made high-altitude (HEMP)
and natural EMPs—often referred to as GMDs by government agencies. These DOE-EPRI
documents focus specifically on human-made nuclear threats and categorize GMDs separately
from EMPs.74 However, the 2017 plan notes that “many of the actions proposed herein ... are also
relevant to geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), which are similar in system interaction and effects
to the E3 portion of the nuclear EMP waveform.”75
69 Stated activities included “identifying critical equipment and systems; preparing unclassified waveforms for partner
use; working so that DOE’s response plans, programs, and procedures and operational plans all account for the effects
of EMP and GMD testing equipment to identify vulnerabilities; and implementing pilot programs” (U.S. Department of
Energy, Agency Financial Report Fiscal Year 2020, DOE/CF-0170, November 2020, pp. 11-12,
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/11/f80/fy-2020-doe-agency-financial-report.pdf). The FY2021 agency
report does not make reference to these or any other related activities. (U.S. Department of Energy, Agency Financial
Report Fiscal Year 2021, DOE/CF-0180, November 2021, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/fy-2021doe-agency-financial-report_0.pdf)
70 SWORM, “About SWORM,” at https://www.sworm.gov/about.htm.
71 DOE, “The CESER Blueprint,” at https://www.energy.gov/ceser/ceser-blueprint.
72 U.S. Department of Energy, “Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response,” at
https://www.energy.gov/ceser/ceser-mission.
73 U.S. Department of Energy, Geomagnetic Disturbance Monitoring Approach and Implementation Strategies,
January 2019.
74 U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Electromagnetic Pulse Resilience Action Plan, January
2017. Hereinafter U.S. Department of Energy 2017.
75 U.S. Department of Energy 2017, p. 3.
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
FERC is an independent government agency officially organized as part of DOE.76 The Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct05; P.L. 109-58) authorized FERC to oversee the reliability of the bulkpower system.77 FERC’s jurisdiction is limited to the wholesale power market and the
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce.
EPAct05 authorized the creation of an electric reliability organization (ERO) to establish and
enforce national reliability standards subject to FERC oversight.78 FERC certified NERC as the
ERO in 2006. The ERO authors the standards for critical infrastructure protection. These
standards, which FERC can approve or remand back, are mandatory and enforceable (with fines
potentially over $1 million/day for noncompliance).79 In November 2018, FERC issued a final
rule on reliability and transmission system performance standards for GMDs directing NERC to
develop “corrective action plans” to mitigate GMD vulnerabilities, and to authorize time
extensions to implement “corrective action plans” on a case-by-case basis.80 Additionally, the
final rule accepts the ERO’s submitted research plan on GMDs.
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
In 2006 FERC certified NERC as the ERO for the United States. NERC works closely with
public and private electric utilities to develop and enforce FERC-approved standards.81 Part of
NERC’s role includes reducing risks and vulnerabilities to the bulk-power system. In April 2019,
NERC created a task force in response to E.O. 13865 to examine potential vulnerabilities
associated with EMPs and to develop possible areas for improvement, focusing on nuclear EMP
threats.82
National Laboratories
The 17 DOE national laboratories advance research and development to support DOE’s mission.
For example, Los Alamos National Laboratory has funded work on an ongoing study of EMP and
GMD physical characteristics and effects on critical infrastructure.83
76 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “History of FERC,” at https://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp?csrt=
4360715013901212967.
77 Defined by NERC as “(A) facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy
transmission network (or any portion thereof); and (B) electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain
transmission system reliability. The term does not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.”
NERC, Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards, May 13, 2019, at https://www.nerc.com/files/
glossary_of_terms.pdf.
78 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “History of NERC,” at https://www.nerc.com/news/Documents/
HistoryofNERC01JUL19.pdf.
79 For more information on FERC, see CRS Report R45312, Electric Grid Cybersecurity, by Richard J. Campbell.
80 Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard; Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance
for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, Order no. 851, 165 FERC ¶ 61,124 (2018).
81 NERC is required to submit an assessment of its performance to FERC three years from the date of certification as
the ERO and every five years thereafter. North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “ERO Performance
Assessment,” at https://www.nerc.com/gov/Pages/Three-Year-Performance.aspx.
82 NERC, “Electromagnetic Pulses Task Force, Background,” at https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/
EMPTaskForce.aspx.
83 See Michael Rivera, Scott Backhaus, and Jesse Woodroffe, et al., EMP/GMD Phase 0 Report, A Review of EMP
Hazard Environments, Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-16-28380, Los Alamos, NM, October 24, 2016, at
https://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-UR-16-28380. The last update on the research was
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS)84
Under Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), DHS is the lead U.S. agency for critical
infrastructure protection and disaster preparedness.85 E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865 assign several
roles and responsibilities to DHS specific to space weather and EMPs (Table 5).
Table 5. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security
Under E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865
E.O. 13744
E.O. 13865
“(i) ensure the timely redistribution of space weather
alerts and warnings that support national preparedness,
continuity of government, and continuity of operations;
and
(ii) coordinate response and recovery from the effects
of space weather events on critical infrastructure and
the broader community”
“(i) provide timely distribution of information on EMPs
and credible associated threats to Federal, State, and
local governments, critical infrastructure owners and
operators, and other stakeholders;
(ii) in coordination with the heads of any relevant SSAs
[Sector-Specific Agencies], use the results of risk
assessments to better understand and enhance
resilience to the effects of EMPs across all critical
infrastructure sectors, including coordinating the
identification of national critical functions and the
prioritization of associated critical infrastructure at
greatest risk to the effects of EMPs;
(iii) coordinate response to and recovery from the
effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure, in
coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs;
(iv) incorporate events that include EMPs as a factor in
preparedness scenarios and exercises;
(v) in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs,
conduct R&D to better understand and more
effectively model the effects of EMPs on national critical
functions and associated critical infrastructure—
excluding Department of Defense systems and
infrastructure—and develop technologies and
guidelines to enhance these functions and better
protect this infrastructure; and
(vi) maintain survivable means to provide necessary
emergency information to the public during and after
EMPs”
Source: Executive Order 13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events,” 81
Federal Register 71574, October 18, 2016, and Executive Order 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to
Electromagnetic Pulses,” 84 Federal Register 12043, March 29, 2019.
Both executive orders assign responsibility to DHS for early warning, response, and recovery
functions related to space weather preparedness. However, E.O. 13865 also requires DHS to
incorporate EMP scenarios into preparedness exercises, to conduct extensive R&D initiatives to
better model EMP hazards and develop mitigation technologies, and to enhance critical
infrastructure resilience against EMP hazards in coordination with other relevant federal agencies.
dated September 10, 2018; see “Update on LANL GMD Research Tasks,” at https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1469512update-lanl-gmd-research-tasks.
84 For more information, contact Brian Humphreys, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy.
85 See PPD-21, “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.”
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The FY2020 NDAA includes several provisions directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to
complete activities related to EMPs and GMDs. For example, Congress directed the Secretary, in
coordination with other partners and under certain deadlines, to
distribute EMP/GMD information to federal and nonfederal CI owners and
operators and brief Congress on the effectiveness of the distribution;86
conduct R&D to model the effects of EMPs/GMDs on CI, develop technologies
to enhance CI resilience, and submit an action plan to address modeling shortfalls
and technology development;87
conduct a quadrennial EMP/GMD risk assessment, brief Congress on the results,
and improve CI resilience using said results;88
periodically report on technological options to improve CI resilience, identify
gaps in available technologies, and develop and implement an integrated crosssector plan to address the identified gaps;89 and
submit a report to Congress assessing the effects of EMPs/GMDs on
communications CI and recommendations to operational plans to enhance
response and recovery efforts after an EMP/GMD.90
The PROSWIFT Act does not contain specific critical infrastructure protection requirements or
explicitly name DHS as a member of the interagency working group; however, DHS, and one of
its agencies, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), are both a part of the existing
SWORM Interagency Working Group.91
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, along with DHS operational components (the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and FEMA), manage relevant programs and
activities. DHS utilizes an all-hazards risk management approach. Therefore, programs are
generally not hazard-specific. Rather, DHS components leverage program capabilities as
appropriate to support space weather resilience activities. High-level guidance for these programs
and activities is provided by the DHS strategy “Protecting and Preparing the Homeland Against
Threats of Electromagnetic Pulse and Geomagnetic Disturbances,” published on October 9,
2018.92
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
S&T conducts R&D projects in partnership with federal agencies and the national laboratories,
providing tools and analyses to help electric utilities better predict localized effects of space
weather and enhance grid resilience.93 For example, the Geomagnetic Field Calculator Tool,
86 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(1)(A).
87 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(1)(C).
88 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(1)(E).
89 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(2).
90 P.L. 116-92, Sec. 1740 (g).
91 SWORM, “About SWORM,” at https://www.sworm.gov/about.htm.
92 Department of Homeland Security, Strategy for Protecting and Preparing the Homeland Against Threats of
Electromagnetic Pulse and Geomagnetic Disturbances, Washington, DC, October 9, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/
publication/protecting-and-preparing-homeland-against-threats-electromagnetic-pulse-and-geomagnetic.
93 DHS Science and Technology Directorate, Solar Storm Mitigation, fact sheet, 2015, at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/Solar%20Storm%20Mitigation-508_0.pdf.
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developed for this purpose by S&T in partnership with NASA, is in the online testing phase.94
Under the FY2020 NDAA, the Under Secretary for S&T, in coordination with federal and
nonfederal partners, is required to develop and implement a pilot test to evaluate available
engineering approaches to mitigate EMP/GMD effects on CI, and to brief Congress on its
findings.95 The pilot test was placed under contract with Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) and was scheduled for completion by July 2021 (Table 1).
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
CISA administers public-private partnership programs that provide training, technical assistance,
and on-site risk assessments to relevant private sector and federal partners. CISA, the Department
of Energy, and interagency partners are producing technical guidance for electric utilities and
other industry stakeholders on mitigation of electromagnetic hazards, which may include space
weather. CISA provides long-term risk guidance and recommendations on EMP and other hazards
to industry stakeholders through the National Risk Management Center.96 CISA provides realtime space weather advisories to private sector owner-operators of vulnerable infrastructure on an
as-needed basis.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)97
FEMA develops operations plans and annexes that coordinate use of national resources to address
consequences of space weather events. Recent operational documents include the Federal
Operating Concept for Impending Space Weather Events (Space Weather Concept of Operations
(CONOP)) and the Power Outage Incident Annex and Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the
Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. FEMA also periodically
incorporates space weather scenarios into all-hazard education, training, and exercise programs.
In 2017, FEMA conducted operational and tabletop exercises with federal and state partners. In
2018, FEMA conducted a space weather exercise for senior federal officials.98
Under the FY2020 NDAA, Congress directed the Administrator of FEMA, in coordination with
other agencies and by certain deadlines, to
coordinate the response to and recovery from the effects of EMPs/GMDs on CI;99
incorporate EMPs/GMDs into preparedness scenarios and exercises;100
conduct a national exercise to test the preparedness and response of the nation to
the effects of EMPs/GMDs;101 and
94 NASA, “Geomagnetic Field Time Series Source,” at https://kauai.ccmc.gsfc.nasa.gov/efieldtool/#about.
95 P.L. 116-92, Sec. 1740(e).
96 CISA, “National Risk Management,” at https://www.cisa.gov/national-risk-management.
97 Research for this section was contributed by CRS Analyst Elizabeth M. Webster, Analyst in Emergency
Management and Disaster Recovery.
98 Based on CRS email communication with Kyle Thomas, FEMA Congressional Affairs Specialist.
99 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(1)(B).
100 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(1)(B).
101 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(1)(B).
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maintain a network of systems capable of providing emergency information to
the public before, during, and after an EMP/GMD and brief Congress on such a
system.102
These activities are in addition to the Secretary’s required tasks. According to FEMA, it
conducted a national exercise in December 2020 and continues work on other FY2020 NDAA
requirements as part of ongoing programs (See Table 1).
Department of the Interior (DOI)103
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is a scientific agency in DOI and aims to provide unbiased
scientific information to describe and understand the geological processes of the Earth; minimize
loss of life and property from natural disasters; and support the management of water, biological,
energy, and mineral resources. 104 The Secretary of the Interior has delegated responsibilities from
E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865 to the USGS (Table 7).
Table 6. Responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior
Under E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865
E.O. 13744
E.O. 13865
“The Secretary of the Interior shall support the
research, development, deployment, and operation of
capabilities that enhance the understanding of variations
of the Earth’s magnetic field associated with solarterrestrial interactions.”
“The Secretary of the Interior shall support the
research, development, deployment, and operation of
capabilities that enhance understanding of variations of
Earth’s magnetic field associated with EMPs.”
Source: Executive Order 13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events,” 81
Federal Register 71573, October 18, 2016, and Executive Order 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to
Electromagnetic Pulses,” 84 Federal Register 12043, March 29, 2019.
E.O. 13865 requires the USGS to enhance understanding of the variations of the Earth’s magnetic
field associated with all EMPs, human-made and space weather-related, whereas E.O. 13744
specifies only those resulting from solar-terrestrial interactions.
The USGS conducts space weather-related activities through the Geomagnetism program under
the Natural Hazards Mission Area. The Geomagnetism program collects data about the Earth’s
dynamic magnetic field at 14 observatories.105 The USGS provides these data and resulting
products to federal agencies, oil drilling services companies, geophysical surveying companies,
the electric-power industry, and several international agencies, among others.106 For example,
NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Center and the Air Force use USGS observatory data in
geomagnetic warnings and forecasts. Congress appropriated $4.0 million to the Geomagnetism
102 6 U.S.C. 195f(d)(1)(D).
103 For more information, contact Anna E. Normand, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy.
104 For more information on the USGS, see CRS In Focus IF11850, The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): FY2022
Budget Request and Background, by Anna E. Normand.
105 U.S. Geological Survey, Budget Justifications and Performance Information, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 76, at https://prdwret.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/atoms/files/
FY2022%20USGS%20Budget%20Justification%20%28Greenbook%29.pdf. Hereinafter USGS FY2022.
106 The USGS magnetic observatory network is also part of the global INTERMAGNET network. For more
information, see INTERMAGNET, “International Real-Time Magnetic Observatory Network,” at
http://www.intermagnet.org/index-eng.php.
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program in FY2020 and $4.1 million in FY2021.107 These appropriations included funding for the
USGS to complete a national magnetotelluric survey initially started by NSF and NASA. 108 For
FY2022, the Administration requested an increase of $1.5 million over FY2021 appropriations for
the Geomagnetism program in order to begin adding the first of three planned new permanent
observatory sites and to initiate the addition of roughly a dozen new low-cost variometer
stations.109
Under the PROSWIFT Act, DOI is required to be a member of the interagency working group.
The act also requires the Director of the USGS, in addition to other agency heads, to maintain and
improve ground-based observations of the sun to meet data user needs and continue to provide
space weather data through ground-based facilities.110 The interagency working group is expected
to develop formal mechanisms to (1) transmit space weather research findings, models, and
capabilities from the USGS, and other agencies, to NOAA and DOD, and (2) communicate
operational needs of NOAA and DOD space weather forecasters to the USGS and other
agencies.111 The FY2020 NDAA does not contain any specific provisions addressing the roles and
responsibilities of DOI and the USGS in EMPs/GMDs.
Department of State (DOS)112
DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency in the executive branch. Among DOS’s responsibilities is
negotiating and promoting international norms and practices with respect to outer space. DOS
maintains that these efforts contribute to its broader objective of promoting American prosperity
through advancing bilateral relationships and leveraging international institutions.113
107 Explanatory Statement submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on Appropriations,
regarding the House amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 166, part 218 (December 21, 2020), p. H8533.
108 $1.7 million was allocated to the effort in FY2021. The initiative began in April 2020 through a cooperative
agreement with Oregon State University, and the USGS estimates completion in 2024. According to the USGS, the
survey will improve U.S. electric grid resilience, improve forecast models for geomagnetic storms, and aid in mineral
resource assessments. The USGS further stated that collection of the data on a national scale is a basis for modeling the
Earth’s electric field, which can be used to assess the impact of electrical storms, and is responsive to priorities
established in the National Space Weather Strategy and Executive Order 13865 for Coordinating National Resilience to
Electromagnetic Pulses. The initiative includes scientists from NASA, NOAA, DOD, FERC, FEMA, and NSF. (U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Bill, 2021, Report together with minority views to accompany H.R. 7612, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July
14, 2020, H.Rept. 116-448, p. 46; and USGS FY2022, pp. 76-77).
109
A variometer can measure ground-based monitoring of geomagnetic field variation for low frequencies that can be
useful for many applications. Magnetic observatories are more expensive and labor-intensive to operate than
variometer stations, but are needed for other applications. The USGS would conduct this expansion in coordination
with the NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center and in response to the Space Weather Action Plan. The USGS states
that this “expansion would enable delivery of accurate geoelectric hazard maps by reducing uncertainties that are
primarily associated with the limited number of current observatories.” USGS FY2022, pp. 76.
110 51 U.S.C. 60603(f) and (g).
111 51 U.S.C. 60604(d).
112 For more information, contact Cory R. Gill, Analyst in Foreign Affairs.
113 U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Joint Strategic Plan: FY2018–FY2022,
February 2018, p. 36, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Joint-Strategic-Plan-FY-2018-2022.pdf.
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Table 7. Responsibilities of the Secretary of State Under E.O. 13744 and E.O. 13865
E.O. 13744
“(h) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
heads of relevant agencies, shall carry out diplomatic
and public diplomacy efforts to strengthen global
capacity to respond to space weather events.”
E.O. 13865
“(a) The Secretary of State shall:
(i) lead the coordination of diplomatic efforts with
United States allies and international partners regarding
enhancing resilience to the effects of EMPs.”
Source: Executive Order 13744, “Coordinating Efforts to Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events,” 81
Federal Register 71573, October 18, 2016, and Executive Order 13865, “Coordinating National Resilience to
Electromagnetic Pulses,” 84 Federal Register 12042, March 29, 2019.
E.O. 13744 requires the Secretary of State to lead implementation of U.S. diplomatic and public
diplomacy efforts to enhance the international community’s capacity to respond to space weather
events. Similarly, E.O. 13865 directs the Secretary of State to lead U.S. engagement with allies
and partners to enhance resilience to the effects of EMPs, which may include space weather
(Table 7).114 DOS’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
(OES) has traditionally been responsible for advancing U.S. diplomatic engagement on these
matters. The FY2020 NDAA and PROSWIFT Act do not contain specific provisions addressing
the roles and responsibilities of the State Department regarding space weather or EMPs/GMDs
(DOS has been and continues to be a part of the existing SWORM Interagency Working
Group).115
Congress established OES in Section 9 of the Department of State Appropriations Authorization
Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-126).116 OES is responsible for building international partnerships in
multilateral fora to strengthen both U.S. and international resilience to extreme events, including
those pertaining to space weather.117 For example, OES’s Office of Space Affairs leads U.S.
delegations to the United Nations (U.N.) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS).118 In 2020, COPUOS’s Legal Subcommittee noted the importance of increasing
international cooperation in mitigating risks associated with adverse space weather to ensure
increased global resilience against space weather effects.119 COPUOS has also endorsed recent
progress in this area, including the November 2019 launch of a new service under the auspices of
the International Civil Aviation Organization to provide real-time information to the civil aviation
sector regarding space weather that could potentially affect communications, navigation, and the
114 E.O. 13865 further requires the Secretary of State to coordinate with the Department of Defense and other agencies
to bolster nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence efforts with the intent of reducing the likelihood of an EMP attack
against the United States or its allies and partners. However, a discussion of this tasking falls outside the scope of this
report.
115 SWORM, “About SWORM,” at https://www.sworm.gov/about.htm.
116 See 22 U.S.C. §2655a.
117 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Functional
Bureau Strategy, August 31, 2018, p. 8, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FBS-OES_UNCLASS508.pdf.
118 U.S. Department of State, Office of Space Affairs, “About Us,” at https://www.state.gov/about-us-office-of-spaceaffairs/.
119 United Nations, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee, “Revised Draft ‘Space2030’
Agenda and Implementation Plan,” 59th Session, Vienna, March 23-April 3, 2020, p. 6, at https://www.unoosa.org/res/
oosadoc/data/documents/2020/aac_105c_2l/aac_105c_2l_316_0_html/AC105_C2_L316E.pdf.
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health of passengers and crew.120 NOAA’s aforementioned Space Weather Prediction Center is
among the entities participating in this service.121
In recent years, Congress has conducted oversight of U.S. participation in COPUOS through
annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations
laws. The FY2020 SFOPS law required the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress
describing U.S. efforts to support COPUOS.122 The State Department submitted this report to
Congress in May 2020, which endorsed the 21 guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of
Outer Space Activities (LTS Guidelines) that COPUOS adopted in June 2019. Among other
priorities, these guidelines call on the international community to share operational space weather
data and forecasts and, separately, identify and fill gaps in research and operational models and
forecasting tools needed to meet the needs of providers and users of space weather information
services.123
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)124
Under 51 U.S.C. §20301, NASA is responsible for scientific research on the “Sun-Earth
connection through the development and operation of research satellites and other means.”125
While E.O. 13865 does not address NASA, E.O. 13744 further directs NASA to
(i) implement and support a national research program to understand the Sun and its
interactions with Earth and the solar system to advance space weather modeling and
prediction capabilities applicable to space weather forecasting;
(ii) develop and operate space-weather-related research missions, instrument capabilities,
and models; and
(iii) support the transition of space weather models and technology from research to
operations and from operations to research.
The Heliophysics Division of NASA’s Science Mission Directorate supports fundamental
research on the sun, some of which is important for space weather prediction, but most of which
is less directly applicable.126 Congress appropriated $751 million to the Heliophysics Division in
120 United Nations, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, “Progress
report on the work of the Expert Group on Space Weather at the 57th session of the Subcommittee,” 57th Session,
Vienna, February 3-February 14, 2020, p. 3, at https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2020/
aac_105c_12020crp/aac_105c_12020crp_13_0_html/AC105_C1_2020_CRP13E.pdf; and United Nations, Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, “Draft Report,” 57 th Session, Vienna,
February 3-February 14, 2020, p. 5 at https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2020/aac_105c_1l/
aac_105c_1l_385_0_html/AC105_C1_L285E.pdf.
121 International Civil Aviation Organization, “New Global Aviation Space Weather Network Launched,” November
19, 2019, at https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/New-global-aviation-space-weather-network-launched.aspx.
122 To read the reporting requirement, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, “Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2020,” report to accompany S. 2583, 116th Cong., 1st
sess., S.Rept. 116-126, September 26, 2019 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2019), pp. 38-39. This reporting requirement was
included in the final appropriations law pursuant to Section 7019(e) of P.L. 116-94.
123 United Nations, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, “Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space,” 62nd Session, June 12-21, 2019, pp. 62-63 at https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/
a/a7420_0_html/V1906077.pdf.
124 For more information, contact Daniel Morgan, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy.
125 51 U.S.C. §20301(a)(3)(B).
126 For more information, see https://science.nasa.gov/heliophysics.
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FY2021. CBO estimates that NASA allocated $264 million to space weather activities in
FY2019.127 The Heliophysics Division funds intramural and extramural research and operates a
fleet of research spacecraft in Earth orbit and beyond. These study the sun, the solar wind, and
their interaction with Earth and the rest of the Solar System (see Figure 3). NASA provides
research data and modeling results to NOAA for operational use by the Space Weather Prediction
Center when it observes a space weather event or disturbance.
In addition to its research activities, NASA has unique operational concerns regarding space
weather. First, while multiple agencies and the private sector operate satellites in Earth orbit,
above the protection provided by Earth’s atmosphere, NASA also has spacecraft in orbits far
beyond Earth for planetary exploration and other missions. Earth’s magnetic field provides
significant protection against space weather for Earth-orbiting satellites, but spacecraft outside
Earth’s magnetosphere do not benefit from this protection and so have additional requirements
for radiation shielding and other countermeasures. Second, NASA is the only U.S. agency with
astronauts in space, so it has unique human safety concerns. Human safety concerns are
particularly significant for planned future missions to the Moon and other destinations that are
beyond Earth’s protective magnetosphere.
Figure 3. NASA Heliophysics Satellites as of January 2022
Source: NASA, “NASA Heliophysics,” at https://science.nasa.gov/heliophysics
The PROSWIFT Act contains several relevant requirements for NASA. NASA is required to be a
part of the interagency working group, and, together with NOAA, is required to enter into
interagency agreements to develop “space weather spacecraft, instruments, and technologies.”128
NASA and NOAA are also required to enter into an agreement with NASEM to review the
OSTP-developed space weather observation strategy and transmit NASEM findings to
Congress.129 NASA must maintain operation of the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory Large
Angle Spectroscopic Coronagraph (SOHO/LASCO), a spacecraft orbiting the sun that provides
imagery of coronal mass ejections, for “as long as the satellite continues to deliver quality
127 Email communication between CRS and Robert Reese, Congressional Budget Office, on October 1, 2019.
128 51 U.S.C. 60601(c).
129 51 U.S.C. 60602(c).
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observations” and must prioritize the reception of SOHO/LASCO data.130 The act also directs
NASA, among other agencies, to continue to carry out basic research on heliophysics, geospace
science, and space weather; support competitive research, modeling, and monitoring proposals;
and pursue multidisciplinary research to further the understanding of solar physics, space physics,
and space weather.131 NASA is also required to make space weather-related data obtained for
research available to space weather forecasters, and support model development and applications
for space weather forecasting.132 Finally, NASA “should” implement missions that meet the
science objectives identified in NASEM decadal surveys.133 The FY2020 NDAA does not contain
specific provisions addressing the roles and responsibilities of NASA regarding EMPs/GMDs.
National Science Foundation (NSF)134
Congress established the NSF to “promote the progress of science; to advance the national health,
prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defense; and for other purposes.”135 E.O. 13744
further directs NSF to “support fundamental research linked to societal needs for space weather
information through investments and partnerships, as appropriate.” NSF supports space weather
research in two directorates: (1) the Geosciences Directorate (GEO), including through the
Division of Atmospheric and Geospace Sciences (AGS) and the GEO Office of Polar Programs
(OPP); and (2) the Mathematical and Physical Sciences (MPS) Directorate, through the MPS
Division of Astronomical Sciences (AST).136 E.O. 13865 does not address NSF.
NSF reports that FY2019 space weather funding totaled approximately $90 million, including
about $65 million provided by GEO and about $25 million provided by AST.137 CBO estimated
that NSF allocated $22 million to space weather activities in FY2019.138 FY2020 space weather
funding totaled approximately $109 million, including about $77 million provided by GEO and
about $32 million provided by AST.139 NSF primarily provides grants to research institutions to
130 51 U.S.C. 60603(b)(1).
131 51 U.S.C. 60604(a) and (b)(3).
132 51 U.S.C. 60605(a).
133 51 U.S.C. 60604(c). As mandated by 51 U.S.C. 20305, the NASEM conducts regular decadal surveys of each of
NASA’s science divisions, recommending scientific priorities for the coming 10 years. These reports are an influential
source of guidance for NASA’s program planning. See NASA, “Most Recent Decadal Surveys,” at
https://science.nasa.gov/about-us/science-strategy/decadal-surveys. The most recent decadal survey of solar and space
physics was published in 2013. The next is planned for 2024 (see NASA, “Heliophysics 2024 Decadal Survey,” at
https://science.nasa.gov/heliophysics/resources/2024_decadal_survey).
134 For more information, contact Laurie A. Harris, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy.
135 National Science Foundation (NSF) Act of 1950, May 10, 1950, ch. 171, 64 Stat. 149.
136 In NSF’s organizational structure, directorates contain multiple divisions and offices; see https://www.nsf.gov/staff/
orglist.jsp.
137 Email communication between CRS and NSF, February 2, 2021.
138 Email communication between CRS and Robert Reese, Congressional Budget Office, October 1, 2019. According
to NSF, “the CBO FY2019 Estimate comes from the Federal Weather Enterprise Budget and Coordination Report and
corresponds to the National Space Weather Strategy and National Space Weather Action Plan. [The NSF estimate]
provided to CRS was in response to a data call for ‘NSF support [of] space weather activities.’ This request was based
off of a broader definition to include activities in support of space weather versus those more narrowly defined as
related to the National Space Weather Strategy and National Space Weather Action Plan. The broader definition of
support activities include[s] research on solar surface, as well as a larger set of atmospheric and geospace sciences
research not included in the Federal Weather report.” Email communication between CRS and NSF on October 18,
2019.
139 Email communication between CRS and NSF, February 2, 2021.
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conduct scientific studies, including universities and private entities that focus on fundamental
research questions related to space weather and its impacts. The AGS division supports both basic
sciences research and observational and cyber-infrastructure facilities—including the National
Center for Atmospheric Research’s High Altitude Observatory (NCAR/HAO)—to improve
understanding of the dynamics of the sun, Earth’s atmosphere, and near-Earth space environment,
and how the sun interacts with Earth’s atmosphere. OPP support includes the Antarctic and
Astrophysics Geospace program and the IceCube Neutrino Observatory (jointly funded with the
MPS Division of Physics). In the MPS ATS division—the federal steward for ground-based
astronomy in the United States—observations focus mainly on the sun, and activities include
management of the National Solar Observatory (NSO) Integrated Synoptic Program and the
Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope (DKIST). According to NSF, DKIST will play an important
role in enhancing the fundamental understanding of space weather and its drivers. In addition,
NSF supports the development of numerical models of the space weather chain, including the
sun, solar wind, and geospace.140 Additionally, FY2020 funding for the MPS division included
contributions to the new NSF-NASA joint program on Next Generation Software for Data-driven
Models of Space Weather with Qualified Uncertainties (SWQU).141
E.O. 13744 further directs NSF, in collaboration with other federal agencies, to identify
mechanisms for advancing space weather observations, models, and predictions, and for
sustaining and transitioning appropriate capabilities from research to operations and from
operations to research. As noted in the agency’s March 2018 announcement regarding space
weather operations-to-research proposals, NSF’s primary role in space weather readiness efforts
is support for basic research that advances fundamental understanding of space weather and
related processes, including “the generation of solar storms, their propagation through the
interplanetary medium, and their impact on the near-Earth space environment.”142
Under the PROSWIFT Act, NSF is required to be a part of the interagency working group and
help to fulfill the working group’s responsibilities.143 The act requires the Director of NSF, among
other agency heads, to maintain and improve ground-based observations of the sun to meet data
user needs, and continue to provide space weather data through ground-based facilities.144 NSF is
required to make SOHO/LASCO data publicly available, develop data models for experimental
purposes, and support transitions from experimental models to operations.145 The Director of
NSF, among other agency heads, is also tasked with (1) continuing to carry out basic research on
heliophysics, geospace science, and space weather; (2) supporting competitive space weather
research, modeling, and monitoring proposals;146 and (3) pursuing multidisciplinary research in
subjects that further the understanding of solar physics, space physics, and space weather.147
Finally, NSF and NASA are to continue to make space weather-related data obtained from
research available to space weather forecasters and to support model development and
140
Email communications between CRS and NSF, August 12, 2019; and NSF, FY2021 Budget Request to Congress,
February 10, 2020.
141 Email communication between CRS and NSF on February 2, 2021.
142 National Science Foundation, “Dear Colleague Letter: Space Weather Operations-to-Research Proposals,” NSF 18052, March 9, 2018, at https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2018/nsf18052/nsf18052.jsp.
143 51 U.S.C. 60601(c).
144 51 U.S.C. 60603(f).
145 51 U.S.C. 60603(h).
146 51 U.S.C. 60604(a).
147 51 U.S.C. 60604(b)(3).
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applications to space weather forecasting.148 The FY2020 NDAA does not contain specific
provisions addressing the roles and responsibilities of NSF regarding EMPs/GMDs.
Federal Agency Spending on Space Weather
Activities
A comprehensive account of total federal agency spending on space weather-related activities is
not available. In a cost estimate for the Space Weather Research and Forecasting Act (S. 881 in
the 116th Congress), CBO estimated that the federal agencies in the National Space Weather
Program and the Space Weather Operations, Research, and Mitigation Working Group “allocated
a combined total of nearly $350 million to activities related to space weather” in FY2019.149 CBO
estimated that NASA allocated the majority ($264 million) of the $350 million total.150 Total
federal agency allocations towards space weather activities may differ from year to year. For
example, CBO estimated federal agencies that were a part of the National Space Weather
Program “spent a total of $160 million” in FY2016 on activities related to space weather.151 More
recent spending estimates are not available.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103) continues support for maintenance and
modernization of satellites used for space-weather forecasting. IIJA authorizes over $200 million
in additional appropriations that support certain infrastructure resilience programs and activities,
which—depending on implementation—may include some space weather projects (see
“Legislation in the 117th Congress”).
Additional Considerations
Members may continue to be interested in providing oversight of existing space weather
responsibilities, including the multiple space weather-related provisions enacted in the 116th and
117th Congresses described above. Congress may also modify existing space weather policy
guidance if needed. For example, E.O. 13865 applies to both space weather and human-made
electromagnetic hazards (such as a nuclear attack) and refers to both types of hazard as
electromagnetic pulse (EMP). This may create ambiguity in cases where a given provision could
apply either to manmade human-made or natural electromagnetic hazards.152 That E.O. 13865
does not formally supersede E.O. 13744 (which refers solely to space weather) may create further
ambiguity in cases where policies of different Administrations are not in direct alignment, or else
reflect differing priorities.
148 51 U.S.C. 60605(a).
149 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Cost Estimate, At a Glance, S. 881, Space Weather Research and Forecasting
Act, May 31, 2019, at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/s881.pdf.
150 Email communication between CRS and Robert Reese, Congressional Budget Office, on October 10, 2019.
151 CBO, Cost Estimate, S. 141, Space Weather Research and Forecasting Act, February 24, 2017, at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/costestimate/s141.pdf.
152 For example, E.O. 13865 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to “incorporate events that include EMPs as a
factor in preparedness scenarios and exercises,” without specifying whether a space weather event or nuclear attack
scenario should be exercised, or which should be prioritized. Federal agencies typically regard—and refer to—humanmade EMP and naturally occurring GMDs as related, but distinct phenomena.
Congressional Research Service
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Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities
Author Information
Eva Lipiec
Analyst in Natural Resources Policy
Brian E. Humphreys
Analyst in Science and Technology Policy
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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Congressional Research Service
R46049 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED
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