Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress
Congressional research reportJan 15, 2019
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Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Updated January 15, 2019
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R44822
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Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress
Summary
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human rights record. Current President
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro in April 2018, although Castro is continuing as first
secretary of Cuba’s Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual
market-oriented economic policy changes, but critics maintain that it has not taken enough action
to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate major policy changes
under Díaz-Canel, at least in the short term; the president faces the enormous challenges of
reforming the economy and responding to desires for greater freedom.
U.S. Policy
Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of
legislation strengthening and at times easing U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the
centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban
government. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift, moving
away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. The policy change included the restoration
of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of
information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes.
In June 2017, President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba that increased sanctions and
partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations. The most
significant changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained
injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State
Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds; the reduction has affected
embassy operations, especially visa processing, and made bilateral engagement more difficult.
Legislative Activity
In the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy continued, especially with regard to economic
sanctions. The 2018 farm bill, P.L. 115-334 (H.R. 2), enacted in December 2018, has a provision
permitting funding for two U.S. agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba. Two FY2019
House appropriations bills, Commerce (H.R. 5952) and Financial Services (H.R. 6258 and H.R.
6147), had provisions that would have tightened economic sanctions, but final action was not
completed by the end of the 115th Congress. Other bills were introduced, but not acted upon, that
would have eased or lifted sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442/S. 472
and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural
exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R.
2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports).
Congress continued to provide funding for democracy and human rights assistance in Cuba and
for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting. For FY2017, Congress provided $20 million in
democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-31). For FY2018, it
provided $20 million for democracy assistance and $28.9 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L.
115-141; explanatory statement to H.R. 1625). For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested
$10 million in democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The House
Appropriations Committee’s FY2019 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations
bill, H.R. 6385, would have provided $30 million for democracy programs, whereas the Senate
version, S. 3108, would have provided $15 million; both bills would have provided $29 million
for broadcasting. The 115th Congress approved a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 115-245
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Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress
and P.L. 115-298 ) that continued FY2019 funding at FY2018 levels through December 21, 2018,
but did not complete action on FY2019 appropriations, leaving the task to the 116th Congress.
In other action, several approved measures—P.L. 115-232, P.L. 115-244, and P.L. 115-245—have
provisions extending a prohibition on FY2019 funding to close or relinquish control of the U.S.
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the conference report to P.L. 115-232 also requires a
report on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
(P.L. 115-254) requires the Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress on certain
aspects of Cuban airport security and efforts to better track public air charter flights between the
United States and Cuba. In April 2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224, commemorating the
legacy of Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo Payá. For more on legislative initiatives in the 115th
Congress, see Appendix A.
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Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Cuba’s Political and Economic Environment .................................................................................. 5
Brief Historical Background ..................................................................................................... 5
Political Conditions ................................................................................................................... 6
Cuba’s Transition to a New President ................................................................................. 7
Human Rights.......................................................................................................................... 10
Economic Conditions .............................................................................................................. 15
Cuba’s Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................ 20
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba .............................................................................................................. 27
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations .................................................................................... 27
Obama Administration Policy ................................................................................................. 30
Shift Toward Normalizing Relations ................................................................................ 30
Trump Administration Policy .................................................................................................. 33
Partial Rollback of Engagement and Increased Sanctions ................................................ 34
Continued Focus on Human Rights .................................................................................. 36
Continued Engagement in Some Areas ............................................................................. 38
U.S. Response to Injuries of U.S. Personnel in Havana ................................................... 39
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy ................................................................................... 46
Selected Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations ....................................................................................... 47
U.S. Travel to Cuba ................................................................................................................. 48
U.S. Exports and Sanctions ..................................................................................................... 52
Trademark Sanction ................................................................................................................ 56
Democracy and Human Rights Funding ................................................................................. 59
Radio and TV Martí ................................................................................................................ 62
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 66
Antidrug Cooperation.............................................................................................................. 69
U.S. Property Claims............................................................................................................... 70
U.S. Fugitives from Justice ..................................................................................................... 73
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 75
Figures
Figure 1. Provincial Map of Cuba ................................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Cuba: Real Gross Domestic Product Growth (%), 2005-2017 ...................................... 17
Figure 3. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2002-2017 .................................................................................. 53
Figure 4. Maritime Interdictions of Cubans by the U.S. Coast Guard .......................................... 68
Tables
Table 1. Undocumented Cuban Migrants, FY2010-FY2018......................................................... 68
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislative Initiatives in the 115th Congress ............................................................ 77
Appendix B. Links to U.S. Government Reports .......................................................................... 89
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 90
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Recent Developments
On January 2, 2019, for the second year in a row, the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and
National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) reported a significant decline in the annual number of shortterm detentions for political reasons. In 2018, according to the CCDHRN, there were 2,873 shortterm detentions, almost a 45% decline from 2017 and the lowest level since 2010. (See “Human
Rights,” below.)
On December 22, 2018, Cuba’s National Assembly approved a draft constitution that will be
subject to a national referendum planned for February 24, 2019. Due to public opposition
orchestrated by religious groups, the draft eliminated a provision that eventually could have led to
approval of same-sex marriage and instead remained silent on defining matrimony. (See
discussion on constitutional changes in “Cuba’s Transition to a New President,” below.)
On December 20, 2018, President Trump signed into law the 2018 farm bill, P.L. 115-334 (H.R.
2), with a provision that permits funding for two export promotion programs—the Market Access
Program and the Foreign Market Development Cooperation Program—for U.S. agricultural
products in Cuba. (See “U.S. Exports and Sanctions,” below.)
On December 19, 2018, Major League Baseball announced it had reached an agreement with the
Cuban Baseball Federation to allow baseball players from Cuba to sign contracts without
defecting from Cuba. Some press reports indicate that the Trump Administration might take
action to prevent the deal from moving forward.
On November 15, 2018, the Trump Administration updated its list of restricted Cuban entities
controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct
financial transactions would disproportionately benefit those services or personnel at the expense
of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. Currently, there are 205 entities on the list,
including 99 hotels. (See “Partial Rollback of Engagement and Increased Sanctions,” below.)
On November 1, 2018, National Security Adviser John Bolton made a speech in Miami, FL,
strongly criticizing the Cuban government on human rights. In a press interview, Bolton also
maintained that the Administration was considering whether to continue to suspend Title III of the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (LIBERTAD Act; P.L. 104-114) to allow
lawsuits in U.S. federal court against those “trafficking” in confiscated property in Cuba, an
action that would significantly ratchet up U.S. sanctions on Cuba. (For more on Title III, see
“U.S. Property Claims,” below.)
On November 1, 2018, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution (as it has
annually since 1991) opposing the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The vote was 189-2, with Israel
joining the United States in opposing it. The United States also proposed eight amendments to the
resolution criticizing Cuba’s human rights record, but all these amendments were defeated by
wide margins. (See “Cuba’s Foreign Relations,” below.)
On October 26, 2018, U.S. media reports highlighted a disturbing TV Martí program originally
aired in May 2018 that disparaged U.S. businessman George Soros through anti-Semitic language
and unfounded conspiracy theories. Subsequently, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting pulled the
program from its website and the chief executive officer of the U.S. Agency for Global Media
stated that the program was “inconsistent with our professional standards and ethics.” (See
“Radio and TV Martí,” below.)
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On October 16, 2018, the State Department’s U.S. Mission to the United Nations launched a
campaign to call attention to Cuba’s estimated 130 political prisoners. (See “Human Rights,”
below.)
On October 15, 2018, the Cuban government released Cuban political opposition activist Tomás
Núñez Magdariaga from prison after a 62-day hunger strike. The State Department had called for
his release, maintaining that he was imprisoned on false charges and convicted in a sham trial.
(See “Human Rights,” below.)
On October 6, 2018, President Trump signed into law the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L.
115-254) with a provision requiring the Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress
on certain aspects of Cuban airport security, develop and implement a mechanism to better track
public air charter flights between the United States and Cuba, and direct public air charters to
provide updated data on such flights. (See “U.S. Travel to Cuba,” below.)
Introduction
Political and economic developments in Cuba and U.S. policy toward the island nation, located
just 90 miles from the United States, have been significant congressional concerns for many
years. Especially since the end of the Cold War, Congress has played an active role in shaping
U.S. policy toward Cuba, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA;
P.L. 102-484, Title XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). Both measures strengthened U.S. economic sanctions
on Cuba that had first been imposed in the early 1960s but also provided road maps for a
normalization of relations, dependent upon significant political and economic changes in Cuba.
Congress partially modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba when it enacted the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; P.L. 106-387, Title IX) allowing
for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
Over the past decade, much of the debate in
Congress over U.S. policy has focused on
U.S. sanctions. In 2009, Congress took
legislative action in an appropriations
measure (P.L. 111-8) to ease restrictions on
family travel and travel for the marketing of
agricultural exports, marking the first
congressional action easing Cuba sanctions in
almost a decade. The Obama Administration
took further action in 2009 by lifting all
restrictions on family travel and on cash
remittances by family members to their
relatives in Cuba. In 2011, the Obama
Administration announced the further easing
of restrictions on educational and religious
travel to Cuba and on donative remittances to
other than family members.
Cuba at a Glance
Population: 11.2 million (2016, ONEI)
Area: 42,426 square miles (ONEI), slightly smaller than
Pennsylvania
GDP: $96.9 billion (2017, nominal U.S. $, EIU est.)
Real GDP Growth: 0.5% (2016); 1.8% (2017, EIU est.)
Key Trading Partners: Exports (2017): Canada,
19.4%; Venezuela, 15.6%; China, 15.2%; Spain 8.6%.
Imports (2017): Venezuela, 18.1%; China, 16.3%; Spain,
10.8%. (ONEI)
Life Expectancy: 79.6 years (2015, UNDP)
Literacy (adult): 99.7% (2015, UNDP)
Legislature: National Assembly of People’s Power,
currently 605 members (five-year terms elected in
March 2018).
Sources: National Office of Statistics and Information
(ONEI), Republic of Cuba; U.N. Development
Programme (UNDP); Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).
In December 2014, just after the adjournment
of the 113th Congress, President Obama
announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy
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aimed at isolating Cuba toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The
policy shift led to the restoration of diplomatic relations, the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
state sponsor of international terrorism, and the easing of some restrictions on travel and
commerce with Cuba. There was mixed reaction in Congress, with some Members of Congress
supporting the change and others opposing it. Legislative initiatives in the 114th Congress
reflected this policy divide, with some bills introduced that would have further eased U.S.
economic sanctions and others that would have blocked the policy shift and introduced new
sanctions.
This report examines U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 115th Congress. It is divided into three major
sections analyzing Cuba’s political and economic environment; U.S. policy toward Cuba; and
selected issues in U.S.-Cuban relations, including restrictions on travel and trade, funding for
democracy and human rights projects in Cuba and for U.S. government-sponsored radio and
television broadcasting, migration, antidrug cooperation, U.S. property claims, and U.S. fugitives
from justice in Cuba. Legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress are noted throughout the report,
and Appendix A lists enacted measures and other bills and resolutions. Appendix B provides
links to U.S. government information and reports on Cuba. For more on Cuba from CRS, see
CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan;
CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the
Normalization of Relations, by Dianne E. Rennack and Mark P. Sullivan;
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by
Mark P. Sullivan;
CRS Insight IN10798, U.S. Response to Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in
Havana, Cuba, by Mark P. Sullivan and Cory R. Gill;
CRS Insight IN10788, Hurricanes Irma and Maria: Impact on Caribbean
Countries and Foreign Territories, by Mark P. Sullivan;
CRS Insight IN10722, Cuba: President Trump Partially Rolls Back Obama
Engagement Policy, by Mark P. Sullivan;
CRS Report R44119, U.S. Agricultural Trade with Cuba: Current Limitations
and Future Prospects, by Mark A. McMinimy;
CRS Report R44137, Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues
Regarding Its Lease Agreements, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Daniel H. Else; and
CRS Report R44714, U.S. Policy on Cuban Migrants: In Brief, by Andorra
Bruno.
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Figure 1. Provincial Map of Cuba
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
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Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress
Cuba’s Political and Economic Environment
Brief Historical Background1
Cuba became an independent nation in 1902. From its discovery by Columbus in 1492 until the
Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was a Spanish colony. In the 19th century, the country
became a major sugar producer, with slaves from Africa arriving in increasing numbers to work
the sugar plantations. The drive for independence from Spain grew stronger in the second half of
the 19th century, but independence came about only after the United States entered the conflict,
when the USS Maine sank in Havana Harbor after an explosion of undetermined origin. In the
aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States ruled Cuba for four years until Cuba
was granted its independence in 1902. Nevertheless, the United States retained the right to
intervene in Cuba to preserve Cuban independence and maintain stability in accordance with the
Platt Amendment,2 which became part of the Cuban Constitution of 1901. The United States
subsequently intervened militarily three times between 1906 and 1921 to restore order, but in
1934, the Platt Amendment was repealed.
Cuba’s political system as an independent nation often was dominated by authoritarian figures.
Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), who served two terms as president, became increasingly
dictatorial until he was ousted by the military. A short-lived reformist government gave way to a
series of governments that were dominated behind the scenes by military leader Fulgencio Batista
until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and was followed
by two successive presidents in a democratic era that ultimately became characterized by
corruption and increasing political violence. Batista seized power in a bloodless coup in 1952,
and his rule progressed into a brutal dictatorship that fueled popular unrest and set the stage for
Fidel Castro’s rise to power.
Castro led an unsuccessful attack on military barracks in Santiago, Cuba, on July 26, 1953. He
was jailed but subsequently freed. He went into exile in Mexico, where he formed the 26th of July
Movement. Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 with the goal of overthrowing the Batista
dictatorship. His revolutionary movement was based in the Sierra Maestra Mountains in eastern
Cuba, and it joined with other resistance groups seeking Batista’s ouster. Batista ultimately fled
the country on January 1, 1959, leading to 47 years of rule under Fidel Castro until he stepped
down from power provisionally in July 2006 because of poor health and ceded power to his
brother Raúl Castro.
Although Fidel Castro had promised a return to democratic constitutional rule when he first took
power, he instead moved to consolidate his rule, repress dissent, and imprison or execute
thousands of opponents. Under the new revolutionary government, Castro’s supporters gradually
displaced members of less radical groups. Castro moved toward close relations with the Soviet
Union, and relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban government
expropriated U.S. properties. In April 1961, Castro declared that the Cuban revolution was
1 Portions of this background section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,” April 28,
2011. For further background, see Rex A. Hudson, ed., Cuba, A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002), at https://www.loc.gov/item/2002018893/; “Country Profile: Cuba,” Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, September 2006, at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Cuba.pdf; Leslie
Bethell, ed., Cuba, A Short History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Hugh Thomas, Cuba:
The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971).
2 U.S. Senator Orville Platt introduced an amendment to an army appropriations bill that was approved by both houses
and enacted into law in 1901.
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socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. Over the next
30 years, Cuba was a close ally of the Soviet Union and depended on it for significant assistance
until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. In 1976, however, the Cuban government enacted
a new Constitution setting forth the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) as the leading force in state
and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. Cuba’s
Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Since then,
legislative authority has been vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice
annually for brief periods, although the Assembly has permanent commissions that work
throughout the year. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the
Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the president of the Council of
State is the country’s head of state and government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a
Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, that is, the
president of the Council of State.
Fidel Castro served as head of state and government through his position as president of the
Council of State from 1976 until February 2008. Although he provisionally stepped down from
power in July 2006 because of poor health and ceded power to his brother Raúl (who held the
position of first vice president), Fidel still officially retained his position as head of state and
government. National Assembly elections were held in January 2008, and Fidel was once again
among the slate of candidates elected to the legislative body. But as the new Assembly was
preparing to select the members of the Council of State from among its ranks in February 2008,
Fidel announced that he would not accept the position as president of the Council of State. This
announcement confirmed his departure as titular head of the Cuban government, and Raúl was
selected as president.
More than 10 years after stepping down from power, Fidel Castro died in November 2016 at 90
years of age. While out of power, Fidel had continued to author essays published in Cuban media
that cast a shadow on Raúl Castro’s rule, and many Cubans reportedly believed that he had
encouraged so-called hard-liners in Cuba’s Communist Party and government bureaucracy to
slow the pace of economic reforms advanced by his brother.3 His death accentuated the
generational change that has already begun in the Cuban government and a passing of the older
generation of the 1959 revolution.
Political Conditions
Current President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez was selected by Cuba’s National Assembly of
People’s Power to succeed 86-year-old Raúl Castro on April 19, 2018, after Castro completed his
second five-year term as president. Most observers saw Díaz-Canel, who had been serving as first
vice president since 2013, as the “heir apparent,” but Raúl will continue in his position as first
secretary of the PCC until 2021. Cuba does not have direct elections for president. Instead,
Cuba’s legislature, the National Assembly of People’s Power, selects the president of the
country’s 31-member Council of State; the president, pursuant to Cuba’s constitution (Article 74),
serves as Cuba’s head of state and government.
Raúl Castro had succeeded his long-ruling brother Fidel Castro in 2006, serving provisionally
until 2008 and then officially serving two five-year terms as president. He had announced in 2013
that he would not seek a third term, in line with his government’s imposition of a two-term limit
3 Simon Gardner and Sarah Marsh, “Fidel Gone and Trump Looming, Cuban Businesses Count on More Reforms,”
Reuters, November 29, 2016.
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in 2012. Under Raúl, Cuba implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over
the past decade, but critics maintain that the government did not take enough action to foster
sustainable economic growth.
Elections for the 605 member-National Assembly (as well as for 15 provincial assemblies) had
been expected to be held in January 2018, but the elections were postponed until March 2018.
The delay was not unexpected since Cuba’s municipal elections, scheduled for September 2017,
had been postponed to November 2017 because of significant damage caused by Hurricane Irma.
The municipal contests involved the direct election of more than 12,000 officials among 27,000
candidates, but the electoral process was tightly controlled, with the government preventing 175
independent candidates from being nominated. Candidates for the National Assembly and
provincial assemblies were also tightly controlled by candidacy commissions, and voters were
presented with one candidate for each position.
Cuba’s Transition to a New President
President Díaz-Canel, who turned 58 a day after becoming president, is an engineer by training.
His appointment as first vice president in 2013 made him the official constitutional successor in
case Castro died or could not fulfill his duties. His appointment also represented a move toward
bringing about generational change in Cuba’s political system. Díaz-Canel became a member of
the Politburo in 2003 (the PCC’s highest decisionmaking body), held top PCC positions in two
provinces, and was higher education minister from 2009 until 2012, when he was tapped to
become a vice president on the Council of State.
Although some observers believed Díaz-Canel to be a moderate and more open to reform, a
leaked video released in August 2017 appears to contradict that characterization. The video shows
him speaking at a closed Communist Party meeting earlier in the year in which he strongly
criticized dissidents and independent voices (including those arguing for reform of the socialist
system), criticized the expansion of Cuba’s private sector, and characterized U.S. efforts toward
normalization under President Obama as an attempt to destroy the Cuban revolution. Some
observers believe that Díaz-Canel’s rhetoric could have been aimed at increasing his acceptance
by so-called hard-liners in Cuba’s political system who are more resistant to change.4
Cuba’s political transition is notable because it is the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution
that a Castro is not in charge of the government. A majority of Cubans today have lived under the
rule only of the Castros. Raúl’s departure can be viewed as a culmination of the generational
leadership change that began several years ago in the government’s lower ranks.
It is also the first time that Cuba’s head of government is not leader of the PCC. Although
separating the roles of government and party leaders could elevate the role of government
institutions over the PCC, Raúl Castro has indicated that he expects Díaz-Canel to take over as
first secretary of the PCC when his term as party leader ends.5
Another element of the transition is the composition of the new 31-member Council of State. The
National Assembly selected 72-year-old Salvador Valdés Mesa as First Vice President, not from
the younger generation, but also not from the historical revolutionary period. Valdés Mesa, who
4 Nora Gámez Torres, “Video Offers Rare Glimpse of Hardline Ideology from Presumed Next Leader,” Miami Herald,
August 22, 2017; and William M. LeoGrande, “Cuba After Castro: The Coming Elections and a Historic Changing of
the Guard,” World Politics Review, October 17, 2017.
5 Anthony Failoa, “Castros’ Successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, Takes Over in Cuba, Pledges ‘Continuity,’” Washington
Post, April 19, 2018.
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already had been serving as one of five vice presidents and is on the Politburo, is the first AfroCuban to hold such a high government position. Of the Council of State’s members, 45% are
new, 48% are women, and 45% are Afro-Cuban or mixed race. Several older revolutionary-era
leaders remained on the Council, including Ramiro Valdés, 86 years old, who continues as a vice
president.6 Nevertheless, the average age of Council of State members was 54, with 77% born
after the 1959 Cuban revolution.7
Challenges for President Díaz-Canel. Although most observers do not anticipate immediate
major policy changes under President Díaz-Canel, his government will face two enormous
challenges—reforming the economy and responding to desires for greater freedom.
Raúl Castro managed the opening of Cuba’s economy to the world, with diversified trade
relations, increased foreign investment, and a growing private sector.8 Yet the slow pace of
economic reform has stunted economic growth and disheartened Cubans yearning for more
economic freedom. From mid-2017 through much of 2018, the government appeared to backtrack
by restricting private-sector development and slowing reforms, and for several years the
government has delayed a long-anticipated end to its dual-currency system that creates economic
distortion (see “Economic Conditions” below).9 A challenge for Díaz-Canel will be moving
forward with economic reforms opposed by some conservative elements in the party and state
bureaucracy.10
Few observers expect the Díaz-Canel government to ease tight control over the political system,
at least in the short to medium term, but it will need to contend with increasing calls for political
reform and freedom of expression.11 The liberalization of some individual freedoms that occurred
under Raúl Castro (such as legalization of cell phones and personal computers, and expansion of
internet connectivity) has increased Cubans’ appetite for access to information and the desire for
more social and political expression. More broadly, if the next government continues to repress
political dissidents and human rights activists, it will remain a point of contention in Cuba’s
foreign relations.
An important question looking ahead is the extent of influence that Castro and other revolutionary
figures will have on government policy. Some observers assert that Raúl will continue to have a
role in the decisionmaking process because he will head the PCC until 2021.The former president
also headed up a commission making changes to Cuba’s 1976 constitution (see discussion
below). In July 2018, President Díaz-Canel named his Council of Ministers or Cabinet, but a
majority of ministers were holdovers from the Castro government, including those occupying key
ministries such as defense, interior, finance, and foreign relations; just 9 of 26 ministers were
6 “Members of the Council of State to the Ninth Legislature of the National Assembly of People’s Power,” Granma,
April 20, 2018; Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Diversifies Key Government Posts with Somewhat Younger But Loyal
Leadership,” Miami Herald, April 27, 2018; and Nelson Acosta, “Factbox: Who’s Who at the Top of Cuba’s New
Government,” Reuters News, April 19, 2019.
7 William LeoGrande, “Cuba’s New Generation Takes the Helm with an Immediate Test: the Economy,” World
Politics Review, April 24, 2018.
8 Richard E. Feinberg, Order from Chaos, What Will Be Raúl Castro’s Legacy? December 4, 2017; and “Cuba Tightens
Regulations on Nascent Private Sector,” Reuters News, December 21, 2017.
9 Sarah Marsh, “Cuba’s Communist Party Admits Errors, Slowdown in Reforms,” Reuters News, March 27, 2018; and
Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Desperately Needs to Reform Currency System, But Timing Couldn’t Be Worse,” Miami
Herald, April 4, 2018.
10 William M. LeoGrande, “Cuba’s Getting a New President,” The Conversation, April 18, 2018.
11 Mimi Whitefield, “As the Selection of a New President Approaches, Cubans Say They Want Meaningful Change,”
Miami Herald, March 1, 2018.
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new, including 2 vice presidents and 7 new ministers.12 After Díaz-Canel marked his first 100
days in office in July 2018, some observers maintained that little had changed politically or
economically.
By the end of 2018, however, President Díaz-Canel made several decisions that appeared to
demonstrate his independence from the previous Castro government and indicate that he was
more responsive to public concerns and criticisms. In early December, as described below in the
section on “Economic Conditions,” Díaz-Canel eased forthcoming harsh regulations that were
about to be implemented on the private sector; many observers believed these regulations would
have shrunk the sector. Also in December, the Cuban government backed away from full
implementation of controversial Decree 349 that had been issued in July 2018 to regulate artistic
expression. After the unpopular decree triggered a flood of criticism from Cuba’s artistic
community, the government announced that the measure would be implemented gradually and
applied with consensus (it remains to be seen, however, whether the government’s action will
satisfy those working in Cuba’s vibrant arts community).13 In a third action in December, the
government eliminated a proposed constitutional change that could have paved the way for samesex marriage after strong public criticisms of the provision (see discussion below on
constitutional changes).
Constitutional Changes. As noted, Cuba is in the midst of a process to rewrite and update its
1976 constitution that will be subject to a referendum in February 2019. Drafted by a commission
headed by Raúl Castro and approved by the National Assembly in July 2018, the proposed
changes were subject to public debate in thousands of workplaces and community meetings into
November. After considering public suggestions, the National Assembly made additional changes
to the draft constitution, and the National Assembly approved this new version on December 22,
2018. Voters are now scheduled to go to the polls to approve the new constitution on February 24,
2019; it would then be approved in April 2019.
One of the more controversial changes made by the commission in its new draft in December was
the elimination of a provision that would have redefined matrimony as gender neutral compared
to the current constitution, which refers to marriage as the union between a man and a woman.
Cuba’s evangelical churches orchestrated a campaign against the provision, and Cuban bishops
issued a pastoral message against it.14 The commission chose to eliminate the proposed provision
altogether, with the proposed constitution remaining silent on defining matrimony, and
maintained that the issue would be addressed in future legislation within two years.15
Among other provisions of the draft constitution are the addition of an appointed prime minster to
oversee government operations, an age limit of 60 to become president (Article 127) with a limit
12 Sarah Marsh, Nelson Acosta, and Marc Frank, “Cuba’s New President Names Cabinet Resembling Castro’s” Reuters
News, July 21, 2018; and Mimi Whitefield, “Continuity But Some New Faces as Cuba’s Parliament Selects Ministers,”
Miami Herald, July 21 2018.
13 Amnesty International, “Cuba: New Administration’s Decree 349 Is a Dystopian Prospect for Cuba’s Artists,”
August 24, 2018; “El Gobierno frena la aplicación total del Decreto 349 y propone que sea gradual,” 14ymedio.com,
December 8, 2018; Santiago Pérez, “Cuba’s New Leader Cuba Tightens Screws on Art,” Wall Street Journal,
December 27, 2018.
14 Nelson Acosta and Sarah Marsh, “In Rare Campaign for Cuba, Churches Advocate Against Gay Marriage,” Reuters
News, October 16, 2018; Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Asked for Public Feedback on a New Constitution. Now It’s
Deciding Which Suggestions to Include,” Miami Herald, December 3, 2018.
15 Sasha Ingber, “Cuba Scraps Words Establishing Same-Sex Marriage from Drafted Constitution,” NPR, December
19, 2018; Sarah Marsh, “Cuba Panel Closes Door on Gay Marriage Constitutional Amendment,” Reuters News,
December 19, 2018.
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of two five-year terms (Article 126), and the right to own private property (Article 22). The draft
constitution would still ensure the state’s control over the economy and the role of centralized
planning (Article 19), and the Communist Party still would be the only recognized party (Article
5).16
Human Rights
The Cuban government has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply
restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights since
the early years of the Cuban revolution. The government has continued to harass members of
human rights and other dissident organizations. These organizations include the Ladies in White
(Las Damas de Blanco), currently led by Berta Soler, formed in 2003 by the female relatives of
the “group of 75” dissidents arrested that year, and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), led
by José Daniel Ferrer García, established in 2011 by several dissident groups with the goal of
fighting peacefully for civil liberties and human rights; in August 2018, the Cuban government
imprisoned Ferrer arbitrarily for 11 days with no access to his family, according to Amnesty
International. In recent years, several political prisoners have conducted hunger strikes; two
hunger strikers died—Orlando Zapata Tamayo in 2010 and Wilman Villar Mendoza in 2012. In
February 2017, Hamel Santiago Maz Hernández, a member of UNPACU who had been
imprisoned since June 2016 after being accused of descato (lack of respect for the government),
died in prison.17
Although the human rights situation in Cuba remains poor, the country has made some advances
in recent years. In 2008, Cuba lifted a ban on Cubans staying in hotels that previously had been
restricted to foreign tourists in a policy that had been pejoratively referred to as “tourist
apartheid.” In recent years, as the government has enacted limited economic reforms, it has been
much more open to debate on economic issues. In 2013, Cuba eliminated its long-standing policy
of requiring an exit permit and letter of invitation for Cubans to travel abroad. The change has
allowed prominent dissidents and human rights activists to travel abroad and return to Cuba. In
recent years, the Cuban government has moved to expand internet connectivity through
“hotspots” first begun in 2015 and through the launching of internet capability on cellphones in
late 2018. As noted below, short-term detentions for political reasons declined significantly in
2017 and 2018, although there were still almost 2,900 such detentions in 2018.
Congressional Resolutions. On April 11, 2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224 (Durbin), which
commemorated the legacy of democracy activist Oswaldo Payá, called on the Cuban government
to allow an impartial, third-party investigation into the circumstances surrounding Payá’s death in
a car accident in July 2012, and called on the Cuban government to cease violating human rights
and begin providing democratic freedoms to Cuban citizens. In 2012, the Senate had approved
S.Res. 525 (Nelson), which honored the life and legacy of Payá and also called for an impartial,
third-party investigation. Payá had founded the Christian Liberation Movement in 1988, a civil
society group advocating peaceful democratic change and respect for human rights. He founded
the Varela Project in 1996, which collected thousands of signatures supporting a national
plebiscite for political reform in Cuba.18
Two similar but not identical resolutions introduced in May 2018, S.Res. 511 (Rubio) and H.Res.
916 (Diaz-Balart), would have honored Las Damas de Blanco as the recipient of the 2018 Milton
16 Marc Frank, “Cuba’s Proposed New Constitution: What Will Change,” Reuters News, August 13, 2018.
17 “La CCDHRN denuncia la muerte de un preso politico a la espera de juicio,” 14ymedio.com, March 7, 2017.
18 For background, see “Death of Human Rights Activist Oswaldo Payá” in CRS Report R41617, Cuba: Issues for the
112th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
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Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty. The resolutions also would have expressed solidarity and
commitment to the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and call on the Cuban government
to allow members of the group to travel freely.
Political Prisoners. On October 16, 2018, the State Department’s U.S. Mission to the United
Nations launched a campaign to call attention to the plight of Cuba’s “estimated 130 political
prisoners.” Cuban diplomats attempted to disrupt the event by making noise and shouting,
although their actions appeared to call more attention to the event and, for some observers,
demonstrated the Cuban government’s disdain for freedom of expression.19 Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo wrote an open letter to Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez on December 7,
2018, asking for a substantive explanation for the continued detention of eight specific political
prisoners and an explanation of the charges and evidence against other individuals held as
political prisoners.20
In January 2019, the Havana-based Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation (CCDHRN) estimated that Cuba held some 130-140 political prisoners in some
150 prisons and internment camps. In June 2018, the CCDHRN made public a list with 120
prisoners for political reasons, consisting of 96 opponents or those disaffected toward the regime
(over 40 are members of UNPACU) and 24 accused of employing or planning some form of force
or violence.21
According to the State Department’s human rights report on Cuba covering 2017, issued in April
2018, the exact number of political prisoners was difficult to determine, but human rights
organizations estimated that there were 65 to 100 political prisoners. The report noted the lack of
governmental transparency, along with its systematic violations of due process rights, which
masked the nature of criminal charges and prosecutions and allowed the government to prosecute
peaceful human rights activists for criminal violations or “dangerousness.” As noted in the report,
the government refused international humanitarian organizations and the United Nations access to
its prisons and detention centers, and closely monitored and often harassed domestic
organizations that tracked political prisoner populations.22
Political activist Dr. Eduardo Cardet, designated by Amnesty International (AI) as a “prisoner of
conscience,” has been imprisoned since November 2016 for publicly criticizing Fidel Castro and
was sentenced to three years in prison. AI maintains that Cardet, a leader in the dissident
Christian Liberation Movement, was sent to prison solely for peacefully exercising his right to
freedom of expression and has called for his immediate release. The human rights group issued an
urgent action notice in January 2018 calling attention to Cardet’s case after he was attacked by
several prisoners in December 2017. In June 2018, AI issued another urgent action notice for
19 “Jailed for What? Plight of Cuba’s Political Prisoners,” meeting called by the United States, UN Web TV, October
16, 2018, at http://webtv.un.org/search/jailed-for-what-plight-of-cubas-political-prisoners-meeting-called-by-theunited-states/5849572041001/?term=&lan=english&page=5; U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “Remarks at a U.S. Event
Launching the ‘Jailed for What?’ Campaign Highlighting Cuba’s Political Prisoners,” October 18, 2018.
20 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, “An Open Letter to the Foreign Minister of the
Republic of Cuba,” December 7, 2018, at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/other/2018/287993.htm.
21 “En Cuba hay 120 prisioneros por motivos políticos, según la CCDHRN,” 14ymedio.com, June 11, 2018; and
Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional (CCDHRN), “Lista Parcial de Condenados o
Procesados en Cuba por Razones Politicas en Esta Fecha,” June 11, 2018, at https://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/
LISTA-PRESOS-JUNIO_CYMFIL20180611_0001.pdf.
22 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, April 20, 2018.
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Cardet, maintaining that Cuban authorities suspended family visiting rights for him because of his
family’s activism on the case.23
A second AI-designated prisoner of conscience, Cuban biologist Dr. Ariel Ruiz Urquiola, was
sentenced to a year in prison in May 2018 for the crime of disrespecting authority (desacato).
Urquiola reportedly had referred to several Cuban government forest rangers as “rural guards,” a
derogatory reference to a repressive agency before the Cuban revolution. The rangers had been
checking whether Urquiola had proper permits to cut down several trees and build a fence, which
reportedly he had. In June 2018, AI issued two urgent action notices on Urquiola calling for his
release and for visits while imprisoned. He was conditionally released from prison on July 3,
2018, following a prolonged hunger strike.24
On October 15, 2018, the Cuban government released UNPACU activist Tomás Núñez
Magdariaga from prison after a 62-day hunger strike. Magdariaga had been sentenced to a year in
jail for allegedly making threats to a security agent. The State Department had called for his
release, maintaining he was falsely charged and convicted in a sham trial. Amnesty International
had expressed concern for his health and called on Cuba to make public evidence against him.25
Over the past decade, the Cuban government has released large numbers of political prisoners at
various junctures. In 2010 and 2011, with the intercession of the Cuban Catholic Church, the
government released some 125 political prisoners, including the remaining members of the
“group of 75” arrested in 2003 who were still in prison. In the aftermath of the December 2014
shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, the Cuban government released another 53 political prisoners,
although several were subsequently rearrested.26 In 2017, the Cuban government released several
political prisoners that had been dubbed “prisoners of conscience” by Amnesty International. This
included graffiti artist Danilo Maldonado Machado (known as El Sexto) who subsequently
testified before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in February 2017.27
Short-Term Detentions. Short-term detentions for political reasons increased significantly from
2010 through 2016, a reflection of the government’s change of tactics in repressing dissent away
from long-term imprisonment. The CCDHRN reports that the number of such detentions grew
23 Amnesty International (AI) defines prisoners of conscience as those jailed because of their political, religious, or
other conscientiously held beliefs, ethnic origin, sex, color, language, national or social origin, economic status, birth,
sexual orientation, or other status, provided they have neither used nor advocated violence. Going beyond AI’s narrow
definition of prisoners of conscience, the Cuban government has held a larger number of political prisoners, generally
defined as a person imprisoned for his or her political activities. AI, “Urgent Action, Prisoner of Conscience Attacked
in Prison,” UA: 32/17, January 22, 2018; and AI, “Urgent Action, Family of Prisoner of Conscience Denied Visits,”
June 7, 2018.
24 “Ariel Ruiz Urquiola, condenado a un año de prisión por descato,” 14ymedio (Havana), May 9, 2018; Nora Gámez
Torres, “Cuban Scientist Sentenced to One Year in Prison for ‘Disrespecting’ Government Authority,” Miami Herald,
May 9, 2018; AI, “Urgent Action, Environmental Activist Imprisoned,” June 11, 2018, “Urgent Action, Allow
Environmental Activist Visits,” June 22, 2018, and “Urgent Action, Environmentalist Conditionally Released,” July 11,
2018.
25 “Antes de morirme tengo que ver a mi país libre,” 14ymedio (Havana), October 16, 2018; U.S. Department of State,
“The Wrongful Detention of Tomas Nunez Magdariaga in Cuba,” October 4, 2018; and AI, “Amnesty International
Calls on Cuba to Make Public the Evidence against Tomás Núñez Madariaga (sic),” October 10, 2018.
26 David Adams et al., “How Prisoners Names Were Drawn Up in U.S.-Cuba Secret Talks,” Reuters News, January 12,
2015; Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuba’s Catholic Church Trying to Fill Gaps in Social Safety Net,” Miami Herald, March 14,
2012.
27 Danilo Maldonado Machado, Testimony in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s
Issues, Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership, hearing, 115th Cong., 1st sess., February 16,
2017, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/machado-testimony-021617.
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annually from at least 2,074 in 2010 to at least 8,899 in 2014. The CCDHRN reported a very
slight decrease to 8,616 short-term detentions in 2015, but this figure increased again to at least
9,940 detentions for political reasons in 2016, the highest level recorded by the human rights
organization.
Since 2017, however, the CCDHRN has reported a significant decline in short-term detentions. In
2017, the number of short-term detentions fell to 5,155, almost half the number detained in 2016
and the lowest level since 2011. The decline in short-term detentions continued in 2018, with
2,873 reported short-term detentions, almost a 45% decline from 2017 and the lowest level since
2010.28
Bloggers and Civil Society Groups. Over the past several years, numerous independent Cuban
blogs have been established. Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez has received considerable
international attention since 2007 for her website, Generación Y, which includes commentary
critical of the Cuban government. In May 2014, Sánchez launched an independent digital
newspaper in Cuba, 14 y medio, available on the internet, distributed through a variety of methods
in Cuba, including CDs, USB flash drives, and DVDs.29
The Catholic Church became active in broadening the debate on social and economic issues
through its publications. The Church also has played a role in providing social services, including
soup kitchens, services for the elderly and other vulnerable groups, after-school programs, job
training, and even college coursework.
Estado de SATS, a forum founded in 2010 by human rights activist Antonio Rodiles, has had the
goal of encouraging open debate on cultural, social, and political issues. The group has hosted
numerous events and human rights activities over the years, but it also has been the target of
government harassment, as has its founder.
Other notable online forums and independent or alternative media that have developed include
Cuba Posible (founded by two former editors of the Catholic publication Espacio Laical),
Periodismo del Barrio (focusing especially on environmental issues), El Toque, and OnCuba (a
Miami-based digital magazine with a news bureau in Havana).30
Trafficking in Persons. The State Department released its 2018 Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Report on June 28, 2018, and for the fourth consecutive year Cuba was placed on the Tier 2
Watch List (in prior years, Cuba had Tier 3 status).31 Tier 3 status refers to countries whose
governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards for combatting trafficking and are
not making significant efforts to do so. In contrast, Tier 2 Watch List status refers to countries
whose governments, despite making significant efforts, do not fully comply with the minimum
standards and still have some specific problems (e.g., an increasing number of victims or failure
to provide evidence of increasing antitrafficking efforts) or whose governments have made
commitments to take additional antitrafficking steps over the next year. A country normally is
automatically downgraded to Tier 3 status if it is on the Tier 2 Watch List for three consecutive
years unless the Secretary of State authorizes a waiver. The State Department issued such a
28 CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represión Política en el Mes de Diciembre de 2018,” January 2, 2019.
29 Sánchez’s website is available at http://generacionyen.wordpress.com/, and her online digital newspaper is available
at http://www.14ymedio.com/. Access to both sites is usually blocked in Cuba by the government. For a listing of other
blogs from Cuba, see the website of the Cuba Study Group at http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/blogs-fromcuba.
30 Cuba Posible, at https://cubaposible.com/; Periodismo del Barrio, at https://www.periodismodebarrio.org/; El Toque,
at https://eltoque.com/; and OnCuba, at https://oncubamagazine.com/en/.
31 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018, Cuba, June 28, 2018, at https://www.state.gov/j/tip/
rls/tiprpt/countries/2018/282640.htm.
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waiver for Cuba in 2017 because the government had devoted sufficient resources to a written
plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards for
the elimination of trafficking. In the 2018 TIP report, the State Department again issued a waiver
for Cuba allowing it to remain on the Tier 2 Watch List for the fourth consecutive year. Such a
waiver, however, is only permitted for two years. After the third year, the country must either go
up to Tier 2 or down to Tier 3.
The State Department initially upgraded Cuba from Tier 3 to Tier 2 Watch List status in its 2015
TIP report because of the country’s progress in addressing and prosecuting sex trafficking,
including the provision of services to sex-trafficking victims, and its continued efforts to address
sex tourism and the demand for commercial sex.32
In its 2016 TIP report, the State Department maintained that Cuba remained on the Tier 2 Watch
List for the second consecutive year because the country did not improve antitrafficking efforts
compared to 2015. Nevertheless, the 2016 report noted that the Cuban government continued
efforts to address sex trafficking, including prosecution and conviction, and the provision of
services to victims. The State Department noted that the Cuban government released a report on
its antitrafficking efforts in October 2015; that multiple government ministries were engaged in
antitrafficking efforts; and that the government funded child protection centers and guidance
centers for women and families, which served crime victims, including trafficking victims.
However, the report also noted that the Cuban government did not prohibit forced labor, report
efforts to prevent forced labor, or recognize forced labor as a possible issue affecting Cubans in
medical missions abroad.33
In its 2017 TIP report, the State Department maintained that the Cuban government demonstrated
significant efforts during the reporting period by prosecuting and convicting sex traffickers,
providing services to sex trafficking victims, releasing a written report on its antitrafficking
efforts, and coordinating antitrafficking efforts across government ministries. The State
Department noted, however, that the Cuban penal code did not criminalize all forms of trafficking
and did not prohibit forced labor, report efforts to prevent forced labor domestically, or recognize
forced labor as a possible issue affecting Cubans working in medical missions abroad.34
In its 2018 TIP report, the State Department noted the Cuban government’s significant efforts of
prosecuting and convicting more traffickers, creating a directorate to provide specialized attention
to child victims of crime and violence, including trafficking, and publishing its antitrafficking
plan for 2017-2020. The State Department also noted, however, that the Cuban government did
not demonstrate increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period. It maintained that
the government did not criminalize most forms of forced labor or sex trafficking for children ages
16 or 17, and did not report providing specialized services to identified victims. The State
Department also made several recommendations for Cuba to improve its antitrafficking efforts,
including the enactment of a comprehensive antitrafficking law that prohibits and sufficiently
punishes all forms of trafficking.
Engagement between U.S. and Cuban officials on antitrafficking issues has increased in recent
years. In January 2017, U.S. officials met with Cuban counterparts in their fourth such exchange
to discuss bilateral efforts to address human trafficking.35 Subsequently, on January 16, 2017, the
32 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2015, Cuba, July 2015.
33 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2016, Cuba, June 2016.
34 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017, Cuba, June 2017.
35 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba to Hold Meeting to Fight Trafficking in Persons,” media note,
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United States and Cuba signed a broad memorandum of understanding on law enforcement
cooperation in which the two countries stated their intention to collaborate on the prevention,
interdiction, monitoring, and prosecution of transnational or serious crimes, including trafficking
in persons.36 In February 2018, the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security
hosted meetings in Washington, DC, with Cuban officials on efforts to combat trafficking in
persons.37
Human Rights Reporting on Cuba
Amnesty International (AI), Cuba, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/.
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation (Comisión Cubana de Derechos
Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional, CCDHRN), an independent Havana-based human rights organization
that produces a monthly report on short-term detentions for political reasons.
CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represión Política en el Mes de Diciembre de 2018,” January 3, 2019, at
https://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/Informe-arbitrarios-correspondientes-diciembreCCDHRN_CYMFIL20190102_0001.pdf.
CCDHRN, “Lista Parcial de Condenados o Procesados en Cuba por Razones Politicas en Esta Fecha,” June 11,
2018, at https://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/LISTA-PRESOS-JUNIO_CYMFIL20180611_0001.pdf.
14ymedio.com, independent digital newspaper, based in Havana, at http://www.14ymedio.com/.
Human Rights Watch (HRW), https://www.hrw.org/americas/cuba.
HRW’s 2018 World Report maintains that “the Cuban government continues to repress dissent and punish public
criticism,” at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/cuba
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2017, March 23, 2018, Chapter IV has a
section on Cuba, at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2017/docs/IA2017cap.4bCU-en.pdf.
U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2017, April 20, 2018, at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277567.pdf.
Economic Conditions
Cuba’s economy continues to be largely state-controlled, with the government owning most
means of production and employing a majority of the workforce. Key sectors of the economy that
generate foreign exchange include the export of professional services (largely medical personnel
to Venezuela); tourism, which has grown significantly since the mid-1990s, with an estimated
4.75 million tourists visiting Cuba in 2018; nickel mining, with the Canadian mining company
Sherritt International involved in a joint investment project; and a biotechnology and
pharmaceutical sector that supplies the domestic health care system and has fostered a significant
export industry. Remittances from relatives living abroad, especially from the United States, also
have become an important source of hard currency, amounting to some $3 billion in 2016. The
once-dominant sugar industry has declined significantly over the past 20 years. Because of
drought, damage from Hurricane Irma, and subsequent months of heavy rains, the 2017-2018
sugar harvest dropped by almost 44% to just over 1 million metric tons (MT), compared to 1.8
million MT the previous year. The outlook for the 2018-2019 harvest is 1.5 million MT, almost a
50% improvement; for comparison, in 1990, Cuba produced 8.4 million MT of sugar.38
January 11, 2017.
36 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba to Sign Law Enforcement Memorandum of Understanding,”
media note, January 16, 2017.
37 U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemisphere: United States and Cuba Meet to Combat Trafficking in Persons,”
February 14, 2018.
38 Information and statistics were drawn from several sources: U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Cuba,”
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For more than 15 years, Cuba has depended heavily on Venezuela for its oil needs. In 2000, the
two countries signed a preferential oil agreement (essentially an oil-for-medical-personnel barter
arrangement) that until recently provided Cuba with some 90,000-100,000 barrels of oil per day,
about two-thirds of its consumption. Cuba’s goal of becoming a net oil exporter with the
development of its offshore deepwater oil reserves was set back in 2012, when the drilling of
three exploratory oil wells was unsuccessful. This setback, combined with Venezuela’s economic
difficulties, has raised Cuban concerns about the security of the support received from Venezuela.
Since 2015, Venezuela has cut the amount of oil that it sends to Cuba, and Cuba has increasingly
turned to other suppliers for its oil needs, including Russia and Algeria. In the summer of 2018,
from June through August, Venezuela reportedly resumed exporting a key crude oil to Venezuela
that it had suspended in 2017 due to needs in Venezuela.39
The government of Raúl Castro implemented a number of economic policy changes, but
economists were disappointed that more far-reaching reforms were not implemented. At the
PCC’s seventh party congress, held in April 2016, Raúl Castro reasserted that Cuba would move
forward with updating its economic model “without haste, but without pause.”40 A number of
Cuba’s economists have pressed the government to enact more far-reaching reforms and embrace
competition for key parts of the economy and state-run enterprises. These economists criticize the
government’s continued reliance on central planning and its monopoly on foreign trade.
Economic Growth.41 Cuba experienced severe economic contraction from 1990 to 1993, with an
estimated decline in gross domestic product ranging from 35% to 50% when the Soviet Union
collapsed and Russian financial assistance to Cuba practically ended. Growth resumed after that
time, as Cuba moved forward with some limited market-oriented economic reforms, and growth
was especially strong in the 2004-2007 period, averaging more than 9% annually. The economy
benefitted from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors and from support from
Venezuela and China in terms of investment commitments and credit lines. The economy was
hard-hit by several hurricanes and storms in 2008 and the global financial crisis in 2009, with the
government forced to implement austerity measures that slowed growth. From 2010 to 2015,
Cuba’s economy experienced low to moderate economic growth, ranging from a low of 1% in
2014 to a high of 4.4% in 2015. In 2016, however, the economy grew by just 0.5% because of
lower export earnings, reduced support from Venezuela, and austerity measures (preliminary
Cuban government estimates had forecast an economic contraction of 0.9%, but this was revised
to 0.5% growth in January 2018).42
In September 2017, Hurricane Irma struck in September, killing 10 people in Cuba and affecting
more than 2 million people along 300 miles of the northern coast.43 The storm damaged
November 8, 2017; Mimi Whitefield, “This Will Be Record Year for International Visitors, But Barely,” Miami
Herald, December 28, 2018; Marc Frank, “Cuba Sees Sugar Recovery, More Exports, After Bitter Harvest,” Reuters
News, December 24, 2018; and Jeremy Smith, “Cuba’s Sugar Industry in Uphill Struggle,” Reuters News, February 26,
1997.
39 “Venezuela Resumes Domestic Crude Exports to Cuba – Documents,” Reuters News,
40 Raúl Castro Ruz, “Full Text of Central Report: The development of the national economy, along with the struggle for
peace, and our ideological resolve, constitute the Party’s principal missions,” Granma, April 18, 2016, at
http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-04-18/the-development-of-the-national-economy-along-with-the-struggle-for-peaceand-our-ideological-resolve-constitute-the-partys-principal-missions.
41 Economic growth figures are from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Data Tool, 2018.
42 Marc Frank, “Cuban Economy Ever More Opaque as Data Omitted from 2016 Accounts,” Reuters News, January
15, 2018; “Cuba Revises Data to Show Economy Grew in 2016,” Reuters News, February 1, 2018; and “Country
Report, Cuba,” EIU, February 2018.
43 Marc Frank, “Irma Lays Waster to Cuba’s Dreams of Prosperity,” Financial Times, September 14, 2017.
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infrastructure (electric power, water and sanitation systems), the agricultural sector, and tourism
facilities, and it flooded low-lying areas of Havana.44
Nevertheless, the Cuban government reports that the economy grew 1.8% in 2017 and an
estimated 1.2% in 2018, and it predicts 1.5% growth in 2019. President Díaz-Canel has said that
austerity measures begun in 2016 will continue in 2019. The economy has been hurt by reduced
support from Venezuela over the past several years and the unexpected December 2018 ending of
Cuba’s program sending medical professionals to Brazil, which had provided Cuba with some
$400 million a year.45 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) predicts economic growth will slow
to 0.8% in 2019 and 0.4% in 2020, as tourism grows more moderately because of a slowdown in
arrivals from the United States. According to the EIU, the biggest risk to Cuba’s economic
performance is the complete elimination of support from Venezuela.46
Figure 2. Cuba: Real Gross Domestic Product Growth (%), 2005-2017
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Data Tool, 2019.
Private Sector. The Cuban government employs a majority of the labor force, but the
government has been allowing more private-sector activities. In 2010, the government opened up
a wide range of activities for self-employment and small businesses to almost 200 categories of
work allowed; the number of self-employed or cuentapropistas rose from 144,000 in 2009 to
about 588,000 as of October 2018. Analysts contend that the government needs to do more to aid
the development of the private sector, including an expansion of authorized activities to include
more white-collar occupations and state support for credit to support small businesses.47
44 The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) developed a response plan for Cuba as part
of its coordinating mechanism to identify the most urgent needs and funding required. The plan requested $55.8 million
targeting the needs of almost 2.2 million people most affected by the hurricane. See OCHA, Plan of Action, United
Nations System in Cuba, September 2017.
45 Marc Frank and Nelson Acosta, “Cuba Sees 1.5 Percent Growth Next Year After Hard 2018,” Reuters News,
December 21, 2018; “Austerity Set to Deepen in 2019,” Cuba Briefing, The Caribbean Council, January 7, 2019.
46 “Country Report, Cuba,” EIU, December 2018.
47 “Cuba: Stuck in the Past,” The Economist, April 1, 2017; Nora Gámez Torres,” Fear is Driving Raúl Castro to Punish
Cuba’s New Entrepreneurial Class,” Miami Herald, August 2, 2017; and “Cuba Tightens Regulations on Nascent
Private Sector,” Reuters News, December 21, 2017.
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Beginning in mid-2017, the government took several steps to restrict private-sector development.
In August 2017, it stopped issuing new licenses for 27 private-sector occupations, including for
private restaurants and for renting private residences; closed a fast-growing cooperative that had
provided accounting and business consultancy services; and put restrictions on construction
cooperatives. The government maintains that it took the actions to “perfect” the functioning of the
private sector and curb illicit activities, such as the sale of stolen state property, tax evasion, and
labor violations.
In February 2018, press reports provided details about draft government regulations being
considered that would increase state control over the private sector, limit business licenses to a
single activity, reduce and consolidate the current 200 categories of work to 123 categories, and
limit the size of private restaurants.48 The regulations ultimately were released in July 2018 and
were to take effect in December, at the same time the government would resume issuing licenses
for business activities that had been frozen since August 2017. The objectives of the new
regulations were to increase taxation oversight of the private sector and to control the
concentration of wealth and rising inequality, but many observers believed the regulations were
aimed at stifling private-sector growth because of the government’s concerns regarding that
sector’s independence from the government.
Just two days before the regulations were to go into effect, President Díaz-Canel did an aboutface and announced on December 5, 2018, that some aspects of the regulations viewed as
especially egregious by the private sector would be eliminated or eased. Most significantly,
individuals would not be limited to one licensed activity; restaurants, bars, and cafeterias would
not be not subject to a limit of 50 seats; and the requirements for maintaining a minimum balance
in bank accounts would be reduced from the equivalent of three months of tax payments to two
months and would apply to just 6 of the 123 categories of employment.49 Analysts view the
backtracking as an indication that President Díaz-Canel is willing to make policy changes in
response to public opinion and as a sign that the government does not want to shrink the private
sector.
Currency Unification/Reform. A major challenge for the development of the private sector is
the lack of money in circulation. Most Cubans do not make enough money to support the
development of small businesses. Cuba has two official currencies—Cuban pesos (CUPs) and
Cuban convertible pesos (CUCs); for personal transaction, the exchange rate for the two
currencies is CUP24/CUC1. Most people are paid CUPs, and the minimum monthly wage in
Cuba is 225 CUPs (just over $9), although this minimum wage does not apply to the nonstate
sector. According to the State Department, even with other government support such as free
education, housing, some food, and subsidized medical care, the average monthly wage of 700
CUPs ($29) does not provide for a reasonable standard of living.50 For increasing amounts of
48 Raúl Castro Ruz, “We Will Continue to Advance Along the Path Freely Chose By Our People; Full Text of Speech
by Raúl Castro Ruz During the Closing Session of the National Assembly of People’s Power, July 14,” Granma
(Havana) July 17, 2017; Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Reins in Entrepreneurs Who Take Free Enterprise Too Far,” Miami
Herald, July 31, 2017; “Castro: Time-Out for Small Business and Co-ops,” Cuba Standard Monthly, August 2017;
Nora Gámez Torres, “Feat Is Driving Raúl Castro to Punish Cuba’s New Entrepreneurial Class, Experts Say,” Miami
Herald, August 2, 2017; Sarah Marsh, “Communist-Run Cuba Puts Brakes on Private Sector Expansion,” Reuters,
August 1, 2017; “Cuba Tightens Regulations on Nascent Private Sector,” Reuters News, December 21, 2017; Andrea
Rodriguez, “Castro Freezes Cuban Private Sector, Throws Future in Doubt,” World Press Review, February 1, 2018;
and “Cuban Draft Rules Propose Curtailing Fledging Private Sector,” Reuters News, February 23, 2018.
49 “Government ‘Rectifies’ Self-Employment Regulations Following Disquiet,” Cuba Briefing, The Caribbean Council,
December 10, 2018.
50 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, April 20, 2018.
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consumer goods, CUCs are used. Cubans with access to foreign remittances or who work in
private-sector activities catering to tourists and foreign diplomats have fared better than those
serving the Cuban market.
The Cuban government announced in 2013 that it would end its dual-currency system and move
toward monetary unification, but the action has been delayed for several years. Currency reform
is ultimately expected to lead to productivity gains and improve the business climate, but an
adjustment would create winners and losers.51 At the PCC’s April 2016 Congress, Raúl Castro
called for moving toward a single currency as soon as possible to resolve economic distortions. In
January 2018, EU officials visiting Cuba offered technical assistance regarding currency reform
and unification.52 Some economists assert, however, that Cuba is unlikely to go forward with
currency reform this year because of the country’s deep structural economic problems and
because of the ongoing constitutional reform process.53
Agricultural Sector. A reform effort under Raúl Castro focused on the agricultural sector, a vital
issue because Cuba reportedly imports some 70%-80% of its food needs, according to the World
Food Programme.54 In an effort to boost food production, the government turned over idle land to
farmers and given farmers more control over how to use their land and what supplies to buy.
Despite these and other efforts, overall food production has been significantly below targets. In
addition, as noted above, Hurricane Irma caused damage to the agricultural sector, particularly
sugar, in September 2017. As a result, in the first six months of 2018, overall food production
reportedly decreased about 10% to 15% compared to the same period in 2017.55
Foreign Investment. The Cuban government adopted a new foreign investment law in 2014 with
the goal of attracting increased levels of foreign capital to the country. The law cuts taxes on
profits by half, to 15%, and exempts companies from paying taxes for the first eight years of
operation. The law also eliminates employment or labor taxes, although companies still must hire
labor through state-run companies, with agreed wages. A fast-track procedure for small projects
reportedly streamlines the approval process, and the government agreed to improve the
transparency and time of the approval process for larger investments.56
A Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED Mariel) was established in 2014 near the port of
Mariel to attract foreign investment. To date, ZED Mariel has approved some 43 investment
projects, which are at various stages of development.57 In November 2017, Cuba approved a
project for Rimco (the exclusive dealer for Caterpillar in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and
the Eastern Caribbean) to become the first U.S. company to be located in the ZED Mariel. Rimco
plans to set up a warehouse and distribution center in 2018 to distribute Caterpillar equipment. In
September 2018, the Roswell Park Comprehensive Cancer Center of Buffalo, NY, announced it
51 “Cuba: Exchange Rate Unification Approaching,” Latin America Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America,
March 2014.
52 The Caribbean Council, “Europe Offers Technical Help on Currency Unification,” Cuba Briefing, February 5, 2018.
53 Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Badly Needs Currency Reform, But It Won’t Happen Yet, Economists Say,” Miami Herald,
July 26, 2018.
54 World Food Programme, “Cuba, Current Issues and What the World Food Programme Is Doing,” at
https://www.wfp.org/countries/cuba.
55 “Cuban Agriculture Faces Another Hard Year as Produce Sales Drop,” Reuters News, September 17, 2018.
56 “Cuba Approves New Foreign Investment Law,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America,
April 2014; “What’s Changed in Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law,” Reuters News, March 29, 2014.
57 Mariel Special Development Zone, at http://www.zedmariel.com/en.
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was entering into a joint venture with Cuba’s Center for Molecular Immunology focused on the
development of cancer therapies; the joint venture will be located in the ZED Mariel.
According to Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment Rodrigo Malmierca, Cuba has
signed more than 200 investment projects valued at $5.5 billion since it made changes to its
investment law in 2014, with $1.5 billion of that in 2018. The actual amount invested reportedly
is much less, with about $500 million annually.58 In November 2018, the Cuban government
updated its wish list for foreign investment, which includes 525 projects representing potential
investment of $11.6 billion in such high-priority areas as tourism, agriculture and food
production, oil, the industrial sector, and biotechnology.59
For Additional Reading on the Cuban Economy
Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, annual proceedings, at http://www.ascecuba.org/
publications/annual-proceedings/.
Brookings Institution, at https://www.brookings.edu/topic/cuba/.
Richard E. Feinberg, Cuba’s Economy after Raúl Castro: A Tale of Three Worlds, February 2018, at
https://www.brookings.edu/research/cubas-economy-after-raul-castro-a-tale-of-three-worlds/.
Caitlyn Davis and Ted Piccone, Sustainable Development: The Path to Economic Growth in Cuba, June 28, 2017, at
https://www.brookings.edu/research/sustainable-development-the-path-to-economic-growth-in-cuba/.
Richard E. Feinberg and Richard S. Newfarmer, Tourism in Cuba, Riding the Wave Toward Sustainable Prosperity,
December 2, 2016, at https://www.brookings.edu/research/tourism-in-cuba/.
Richard E. Feinberg, The Cuban Economy Could Sing—with a Stronger Score, October 13, 2016, at
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/10/13/the-cuban-economy-could-sing-with-astronger-score/.
Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas, The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End? June 2014, at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/06/16-cuba-venezuela-alliance-piccone-trinkunas.
The Cuban Economy, La Economia Cubana, website maintained by Arch Ritter, from Carlton University,
Ottawa, Canada, available at http://thecubaneconomy.com/.
Revista Temas (Havana), links to the Cuban journal’s articles on economy and politics, in Spanish, at
http://temas.cult.cu/.
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información, República de Cuba (Cuba’s National Office of Statistics and
Information), at http://www.one.cu/.
U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., website at http://www.cubatrade.org/.
Cuba’s Foreign Relations
During the Cold War, Cuba had extensive relations with, and support from, the Soviet Union,
which provided billions of dollars in annual subsidies to sustain the Cuban economy. This subsidy
system helped to fund an activist foreign policy and support for guerrilla movements and
revolutionary governments abroad in Latin America and Africa. With an end to the Cold War, the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the loss of Soviet financial support, Cuba was forced to
abandon its revolutionary activities abroad. As its economy reeled from the loss of Soviet support,
Cuba was forced to open up its economy and engage in economic relations with countries
worldwide. In ensuing years, Cuba diversified its trading partners, although Venezuela under
populist leftist President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) became one of Cuba’s most important
58 Marc Frank, “Cuba Says Investor Interest Up Despite U.S. Hostility,” Reuters News, October 31, 2018.
59 República de Cuba, Ministerio del Comercio Exterior y La Inversión Extranjera, Cuba, Portfolio of Opportunities for
Foreign Investment, 2018-2919, November 2018, link to the study available at
https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/11/2/cuba-releases-2018-2019-portfolio-of-opportunities-for-foreign-investment.
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partners, leading to Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela for oil imports. In 2017, the leading sources
of Cuba’s imports in terms of value were Venezuela (18.1%, down from 40% in 2014), China
(16.3%), and Spain (10.8%); the leading destinations of Cuban exports were Canada (19.4%),
Venezuela (15.6%), China (5.2%), and Spain (8.6%).60
Russia. Relations with Russia, which had diminished significantly in the aftermath of the Cold
War, have strengthened somewhat over the past several years. Cuban President Díaz-Canel visited
Russia for three days beginning November 1, 2018, after which he visited North Korea, China,
Vietnam, and Laos.
Russia’s interest in the broader Latin America and Caribbean region appeared to increase in
response to U.S. actions taken in the aftermath of Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 and
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea region and military intervention in Ukraine in 2014. For many
observers, one of Russia’s main objectives in the Latin American and Caribbean region is to
demonstrate that it is a global power that can operate in the U.S. neighborhood, or “backyard.”61
Just before a 2014 trip to Cuba, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law an agreement
writing off 90% of Cuba’s $32 billion Soviet-era debt, with some $3.5 billion to be paid back by
Cuba over a 10-year period that would fund Russian investment projects in Cuba.62 In the
aftermath of Putin’s trip, press reports claimed that Russia would reopen its signals intelligence
facility at Lourdes, Cuba, which had closed in 2002, but President Putin denied that his
government would reopen the facility.63
Trade relations between Russia and Cuba have not been significant, although they grew in 2017
because of new Russian oil exports to Cuba. According to Russian trade statistics, total trade
between the two countries was valued at $290 million in 2017, an almost 17% increase over
2016. This represented less than 2% of Cuba’s trade worldwide. Russia’s imports from Cuba
amounted to almost $14 million in 2017, led by pharmaceutical products and rum, while Russia’s
exports to Cuba amounted to almost $277 million, led by motor vehicles (and parts) and oil.64
Russian energy companies have been involved in oil exploration in Cuba. Gazprom was in a
partnership with the Malaysian state oil company, Petronas, which conducted unsuccessful
deepwater oil drilling off Cuba’s western coast in 2012. The Russian oil company Zarubezhneft
began drilling in Cuba’s shallow coastal waters east of Havana in late 2012 but stopped work in
2013 because of disappointing results. In 2014, Russian energy companies Zarubezhneft and
Rosneft signed an agreement with Cuba’s state oil company Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET) for
the development of an offshore exploration block, and Rosneft agreed to cooperate with Cuba in
studying ways to optimize existing production at mature fields.65 In 2017, Rosneft began to ship
oil to Cuba, a result of Cuba’s efforts to diversify its sources of foreign oil because of Venezuela’s
diminished capacity.66
60 Statistics drawn from Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información, República de Cuba, Anuario Estadístico de
Cuba 2017, Sector Externo, Edición 2018.
61 For example, see R. Evan Ellis, The New Russian Engagement with Latin America: Strategic Position, Commerce,
and Dreams of the Past, United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015.
62 Anna Andrianova and Bill Faries, “Russia Forgives $32B of Debt, Wants to Do Business in Cuba,” Bloomberg
News, July 13, 2014.
63 “Putin Denies Russia to Reopen Soviet-Era Spy Post in Cuba,” Reuters News, July 17, 2014.
64 Statistics from Federal Customs Service of Russia, as presented by Global Trade Atlas.
65 “Russia Cements Energy Ties with Latin America,” Oil Daily, July 15, 2014.
66 “Russia Resumes Oil Shipments to Cuba, Helps Fill Venezuelan Breach,” Reuters News, May 3, 2017.
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Russian officials publicly welcomed the improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations under the Obama
Administration, although some viewed the change in U.S. policy as setback for Russian overtures
in the region. As U.S.-Cuban normalization talks were beginning in Havana in January 2015, a
Russian intelligence ship docked in Havana. In October 2016, a Russian military official
maintained that Russia was reconsidering reestablishing a military presence in Cuba (and
Vietnam), although there was no indication that Cuba would be open to the return of the Russian
military.67 The two countries signed a bilateral cooperation agreement in December 2016 for
Russia’s support to help Cuba modernize its defense sector until 2020.68
In June 2017, when President Trump announced a partial rollback of the U.S. policy of
engagement with Cuba, Russia’s foreign ministry criticized the president for resorting to “Cold
War” rhetoric.69 Some reports indicate that as U.S. relations with Cuba have deteriorated over the
past year, Russia has been attempting to further increase its ties to Cuba, with high-level meetings
between Cuban and Russian officials and increased economic, military, and cultural
engagement.70 In March 2018, the same Russian intelligence ship noted above again stopped in
Havana.71
For Cuba, a deepening of relations with Russia could help economically, especially regarding oil,
and also could serve as a counterbalance to the partial rollback of U.S. engagement policy by the
Trump Administration.72 However, President Díaz-Canel’s November 2018 trip to Russia
reportedly did not yield significant results. Press reports indicate that Cuba received a $50 million
credit line for purchases of Russian military weapons and spare parts and contracts valued at
more than $260 million (some that already were in the pipeline) to modernize three power plants
and a metal processing plant and upgrade Cuba’s railway system.73
The U.S. Southern Command’s February 2018 posture statement presented to Congress expressed
concern about Russia’s increased role in the Western Hemisphere. It stated that Russia’s
expanded port and logistics access in Cuba (as well as Nicaragua and Venezuela) provide the
country “with persistent, pernicious presence, including more frequent maritime intelligence
collection and visible force projection in the Western Hemisphere.” It stated that Russia’s robust
relationships with these three countries provide it “with a regional platform to target U.S. and
partner nation facilities and assets, exert negative influence over undemocratic governments, and
employ strategic options in the event of a global contingency.”74 Along these lines, there has been
concern in Congress about the role of Russia in Latin America, including in Cuba. The
67 Andrew Roth, “Russia Has Its Permanent Air Base in Syria; Now It’s Looking at Cuba and Vietnam,” Washington
Post, October 8, 2016; and Mimi Whitefield, “Russian Media Report: Kremlin Considering Reopening Bases in Cuba,
Vietnam,” Miami Herald, October 7, 2016.
68 “Russia to Help Cuba Upgrade Armed Forces,” TASS World Service Wire, December 15, 2016; “Russia, Cuba Sign
Program on Defense Technology Cooperation,” Sputnik News Service, December 8, 2016.
69 “Russia Criticizes Donald Trump’s Cuba Policy; Calls it ‘Cold War’ Rhetoric,” Deutsche Welle, June 18, 2017.
70 Nora Gámez Torres, “Amidst Growing Tensions with the U.S., Cuba Gets Cozier with Russia,” Miami Herald,
October 13, 2017; and Nora Gámez Torres and Antonio Maria Delgado, “Goodbye Venezuela, Hello Russia. Can
Vladimir Putin Save Cuba?” Miami Herald, December 26, 2017.
71 Nora Gámez Torres, “Russian Spy Ship Is Docked in Havana Harbor,” Miami Herald, March 16, 2018.
72 “Cuba Looks More to Russia as the Prospects for Better U.S. Ties Fade Under Trump,” (interview with William M.
LeoGrande) World Politics Review, January 2, 2018.
73 Scott B. McDonald, “Why Cuba Isn’t Getting Much from Russia or China,” The National Interest, November 27,
2018.
74 United States Southern Command, “Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd,” Senate Armed Services
Committee, February 15, 2018, at http://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-Coverage/2018-Posture-Statement-toCongress/.
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conference report to the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019, P.L.
115-232 (H.R. 5515), requires the Defense Intelligence Agency to submit a report on security
cooperation between Russia, and Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, including a description of any
military or intelligence infrastructure, facilities, and assets developed by Russia in the three
countries and any associated agreements or understanding between Russia and the three
countries.
China. During the Cold War, Cuba and China did not have close relations because of Sino-Soviet
tensions, but bilateral relations with China have grown closer over the past 15 years, including a
notable increase in trade. Since 2004, Chinese leaders have made a series of visits to Cuba: thenPresident Hu Jintao visited in 2004 and 2008; President Xi Jinping visited in 2014 (and when he
was vice president in 2011); and, most recently, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited in 2016,
reportedly signing some 30 economic cooperation agreements.75 Raúl Castro also visited China in
2008 and 2012; during the 2012 trip, he signed cooperation agreements focusing on trade and
investment issues. In January 2018, Raúl Castro met with Song Tong, a special envoy of
President Xi Jinping, with discussion reportedly focused on strengthening ties. Castro noted that
the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) would like to promote exchanges with its Chinese counterpart
in an effort to help upgrade Cuba’s social and economic model.76
More recently, as noted above, Cuban President Díaz-Canel visited China in early November
2018. According to Chinese state media, President Xi called for a long-term plan to promote the
development of China-Cuba ties and said that China would welcome Cuba’s participation in the
Belt and Road Initiative, which is focused on infrastructure development around the world.
President Xi called on both countries to enhance cooperation on trade, energy, agriculture,
tourism, and biopharmaceutical manufacturing.77
While Cuba’s relationship with China undoubtedly has an ideological component since both are
the among the world’s remaining communist regimes, economic linkages and cooperation appear
to be the most significant component of bilateral relations.
According to Cuban trade statistics, total Cuba-China trade in 2017 was valued at almost $2
billion (accounting for 16.1% of Cuba’s trade worldwide), with Cuba exporting $364 million to
China and importing almost $1.7 billion. This was a 21% drop from 2016, when total Cuba-China
trade almost reached $2.6 billion, and an almost 30% drop in Cuba’s imports from China in
2016.78 The fall in imports from China in reflects Cuba’s difficult economic situation as
Venezuelan support has diminished. In response to a cash crunch, the Cuban government has cut
imports and reduced the use of fuel and electricity.79 In contrast to declining imports from China,
Cuba’s exports to China increased by about 42% in 2017, led by increased exports of seafood,
nickel, and to a lesser extent cigars.80 According to Chinese trade statistics, the lion’s share of
Cuba’s exports to China in 2017 were sugar (53%), nickel (35%), and fish (almost 9%), whereas
Cuba’s imports from China included electrical machinery and equipment (22%), motor vehicles
75 “China, Cuba Agree to Deepen Ties During PM Li’s Havana Visit,” Reuters News, September 24, 2016.
76 “Raúl Castro Meets Xi’s Special Envoy on Advancing Ties,” Xinhuanet, January 25, 2018.
77 “China Focus: Xi Holds Talks with Cuban President to Advance Ties,” Xinhua, November 8, 2018.
78 ONEI, República de Cuba, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2017, Edición 2018.
79 “China’s Exports to Cuban Slump as Island’s Cash Crunch Deepens,” Reuters News, December 6, 2017.
80 “Cuban Cigar Sales Hit Record as China Demand Surges,” Reuters News, February 26, 2018.
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(17%), machinery and appliances (15%), and a wide variety of other industrial and consumer
products.81
China reportedly had been reluctant to invest in Cuba because of the uninviting business
environment, but that has begun to change over the past several years. In 2015, the Chinese
cellphone company Huawei reached an agreement with the Cuban telecommunications company
ETECSA to set up Wi-Fi hotspots at public locations, and is helping to wire homes. In 2016, the
Chinese company Haier set up a plant assembling laptops and tablets in Cuba. Over the past two
years, Chinese financing has been supporting the modernization of a port in Santiago Cuba. Other
planned Chinese investment projects reportedly include pharmaceuticals as well as the tourism
sector involving two hotels and a golf course.82
European Union. The European Union (EU) and Cuba held seven rounds of talks from 2014 to
2016 on a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement covering political, trade, and
development issues; ultimately, a cooperation agreement was reached and initialed in Havana in
March 2016 and the European Council signed the agreement in December 2016. The agreement
was submitted to the European Parliament, which overwhelmingly endorsed the agreement in
early July 2017, welcoming it as a framework for relations and emphasizing the importance of the
human rights dialogue between the EU and Cuba. The agreement will enter into force in full after
it has been ratified in all EU member states, but the provisional application of the agreement
began in November 2017.83
The new cooperation agreement replaces the EU’s 1996 Common Position on Cuba, which stated
that the objective of EU relations with Cuba included encouraging “a process of transition to
pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The position also
had stipulated that full EU economic cooperation with Cuba would depend upon improvements in
human rights and political freedom.84 Nevertheless, the new agreement states that a human rights
dialogue will be established within the framework of the overall political dialogue and has
numerous provisions related to democracy, human rights, and good governance. In October 2018,
the EU and Cuba held their first human rights dialogue under the agreement, with the meeting
addressing issues related to civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and
multilateral cooperation.85
As noted above, EU officials visiting Cuba in January 2018 offered to provide Cuba with
technical assistance regarding the country’s long-awaited currency unification (see “Economic
Conditions,” above).
81 Statistics from China Customs, as presented by Global Trade Atlas.
82 “Cuba Welcomes More Chinese Investment, Visitors to Boost Tourism,” Xinhua, September 20, 2018; “China Piles
into Cuba as Venezuela Fades and Trump Looms,” Reuters News, February 14, 2017; Nathan Hodge and Josh Chin,
“China Apt to Fill U.S.-Cuba Breach,” Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2016; “Feature: China Helps Convert
Santiago de Cuba into Modernized Port,” Xinhuanet, August 8, 2017; and Ted Piccone, “The Geopolitics of China’s
Rise in Latin America,” Brookings, November 2016, pp. 18-19.
83 European Council, Council of the European Union, “EU-Cuba: Council Opens New Chapter in Relations,” press
release, December 6, 2016, at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/06-eu-cuba-relations/;
and European Parliament, “EU-Cuba Relations: A New Chapter Begins,” July 18, 2017, at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/570485/EXPO_IDA(2017)570485_EN.pdf.
84 European Union, Official Journal of the European Commission, “Common Position of 2 December 1996, Defined by
the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba,” (96/697/CFSP), December 2, 1996.
85 The Caribbean Council, “First EU-Cuba In-Depth Exchange on Human Rights Takes Place,” Cuba Briefing, October
15, 2018; European Parliament, Policy Department for External Relations, Directorate General for External Policies of
the Union, “Rule of Law and Human Rights in Cuba and Venezuela and EU Engagement,” November 2018.
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Venezuela and Other Latin American Countries. For more than 15 years, Venezuela has been a
significant source of support for Cuba. Dating back to 2000 under populist President Hugo
Chávez, Venezuela began providing subsidized oil and investment to Cuba. For its part, Cuba has
sent thousands of personnel to Venezuela. Cuba has been concerned about the future of
Venezuelan financial support, however, as a result of Chávez’s death in 2013 and Venezuela’s
mounting economic and political challenges since 2014 due to the rapid decline in oil prices and
the unpopularity of the increasingly authoritarian regime of President Nicolás Maduro. As noted
above, oil imports from Venezuela have declined, leading to Cuba’s imposition of austerity
measures and contributing to economic contraction.
Estimates of the number of Cuban personnel in Venezuela vary, but a 2014 Brookings study
reported that “by most accounts there are 40,000 Cuban professionals in Venezuela,” with 75% of
those healthcare workers.86 The roughly 30,000 healthcare personnel include doctors and nurses,
while the balance of Cuban personnel in Venezuela includes teachers, sports instructors, military
advisers, and intelligence operatives. According to the Brookings study, various sources estimate
that the number of Cuban military and intelligence advisers in Venezuela range from hundreds to
thousands, coordinated by Cuba’s military attaché in Venezuela. The extent to which the level of
Cuban personnel in Venezuela has declined because of the drop in Venezuelan oil exports to Cuba
and Venezuela’s deepening economic crisis is uncertain, but Cuba may have withdrawn some
personnel.87
Cuba also is engaged in Latin America beyond its close relations with Venezuela. Cuba is a
member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, a Venezuelan-led integration and
cooperation scheme founded in 2004 that has been weakened by Venezuela’s economic and
political decline. For several years, Cuba also hosted peace talks between the Colombian
government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which culminated in a peace
agreement in 2016.
Brazil was a major investor in the development of the port of Mariel, west of Havana, from 2009
to 2014, although in 2018 Cuba missed payments to Brazil’s development bank on loans for the
project. In 2013, Cuba began deploying thousands of doctors to rural Brazil in a program known
as Mais Médicos, with Cuba earning hard currency for supplying the medical personnel. Even
before his inauguration in January 2019, Brazil’s new right-wing president, Jair Bolsonaro,
espoused a more confrontational policy approach toward Cuba by warning in November 2018
that he may break diplomatic relations with Cuba and abolish the medical assistance program.
Bolsonaro strongly criticized the medical program, maintaining that Cuban doctors should be able
to receive 100% of the money Brazil pays Cuba for them (instead of the 25% they receive) and
should be able to bring their families with them to Brazil. Cuba responding by ending the
program and bringing its more than 8,000 medical personnel home by late December 2018.
Although Bolsonaro and other critics have labeled the medical workers as “slave labor,” others
contend that the Cuban medical personnel understand the conditions they will be working in and
sign contracts for the work. Cuba has a long history of providing medical personnel overseas.88
86 Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas, “The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End?” Latin America
Initiative Policy Brief, Brookings, June 2014, p. 3.
87 Harold Trinkunas, Stanford University, testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere, hearing on “The Venezuela Crisis: The Malicious Influence of State and Criminal Actors,”
September 13, 2017, at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20170913/106398/HHRG-115-FA07-WstateTrinkunasH-20170913.pdf.
88 “Life in ‘Slavery’ or as a Refugee? Cuban Doctors’ Stark Choice in Brazil,” Reuters News, December 12, 2018; and
“Cuba Says Nearly All Its Doctors Have Returned from Brazil,” Reuters News, December 21, 2018.
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International and Regional
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
Organizations. Cuba is an active
Votes on Ending the U.S. Embargo
participant in international forums,
In 2016, the UNGA vote took place on October 26, with 191 in
including the United Nations (U.N.)
favor and, for the first time, the United States (and Israel)
and the controversial United Nations
abstaining, instead of voting against the resolution. ThenHuman Rights Council. Cuba also
Ambassador Samantha Power, the U.S. Permanent Representative
has received support over the years
to the United Nations, stated the U.S. abstention did not mean the
from the United Nations
United States agreed with the Cuban government’s policies and
practices, adding that the United States remained “profoundly
Development Programme and the
concerned by the serious human rights violations that the Cuban
United Nations Educational,
government continues to commit with impunity against its own
Scientific, and Cultural
people.” (U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Samantha Power,
Organization, both of which have
“Remarks at a UN General Assembly Meeting on the Cuba
offices in Havana. Cuba is also a
Embargo,” October 26, 2016.)
member of the U.N. Economic
In 2017, the United States returned to voting against the
resolution. On November 1, 2017, the UNGA approved the
Commission for Latin America and
resolution by a vote of 191 to 2, with Israel also voting against it.
the Caribbean (ECLAC, also known
Then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley asserted that “as
by its Spanish acronym, CEPAL),
long as the Cuban people continue to be deprived of their human
one of the five regional commissions rights and fundamental freedoms—as long as the proceeds from
of the U.N., and hosted ECLAC’s
trade with Cuba go to prop up the dictatorial regime responsible
for denying those rights—the United States does not fear isolation
37th session in May 2018. U.N.
in this chamber or anywhere in the world.” (U.S. Department of
Secretary-General António Guterres
State, “Remarks at a U.N. General Assembly Meeting on Cuba,
attended the opening of the
Ambassador Nikki Haley,” November 1, 2017.)
conference. ECLAC’s Executive
On November 1, 2018, the UNGA again approved the resolution
Secretary Alicia Bárcena reaffirmed
by a vote of 189-2, with Israel again joining the United States in
the organization’s commitment to
opposing it. The United States also proposed eight amendments to
the resolution criticizing human rights record, but these
accompanying Cuba in its efforts
amendments were defeated by wide margins.
toward achieving sustainable
89
development. Bárcena referred to
the U.S. embargo on Cuba as costing Cuba more than $130 billion at current prices, the same
estimate as the Cuban government.90 Since 1991, the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) has
approved a resolution annually criticizing the U.S. embargo and urging the United States to lift it
(see text box above).
Among other international organizations, Cuba was a founding member of the World Trade
Organization, but it is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the
Inter-American Development Bank. In 2016, Cuba signed a memorandum of understanding with
the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) with the objective of supporting technical
cooperation programs for Cuba’s social and economic development and laying the foundation for
Cuba’s future membership in the CAF; the CAF’s current membership includes 17 Latin
American and Caribbean countries as well as Spain and Portugal.91
89 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “ECLAC and Cuba Join in a Dialogue About Its
Path to Sustainable Development,” press release, May 7, 2018.
90 “U.S. Trade Embargo Has Cost Cuba $130 Billion, U.N. Says,” Reuters News, May 9, 2018. Also see República de
Cuba, Cuba vs. Bloqueo, June 2018.
91 Marc Jones, “Interview – Latam Development Bank CAF Sees Cuba Joining in Weeks,” Reuters News, January 15,
2016; Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), “CAF and Cuba Sign First Agreement of Understanding To
Establish a Joint Working Agenda,” September 3, 2016.
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Cuba was excluded from participation in the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962
because of its identification with Marxism-Leninism, but in 2009, the OAS overturned that policy
in a move that eventually could lead to Cuba’s reentry into the regional organization in
accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS. Although the Cuban
government welcomed the OAS vote to overturn the 1962 resolution suspending Cuba’s OAS
participation, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS.92 In February 2017, Cuba denied
OAS Secretary-General Luis Almagro entry into the country to accept a democracy award in
honor of the late democracy activist Oswaldo Payá.
Cuba became a full member of the Rio Group of Latin American and Caribbean nations in
November 2008 and a member of the succeeding Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC) officially established in December 2011 to boost regional cooperation, but
without the participation of the United States or Canada. In 2013, Cuba assumed the presidency
of the organization for one year. Cuba also hosted the group’s second summit in 2014, which was
attended by leaders from across the hemisphere as well as by then-U.N. Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon, who reportedly raised human rights issues with Cuban officials.93
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations94
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in
the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis, in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Panama; and the 1996
shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban-American
group Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the deaths of four U.S. crew members.
Beginning in the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba consisted largely of isolating the island
nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial
transactions. President Kennedy proclaimed an embargo on trade between the United States and
Cuba in February 1962,95 citing Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA),
which authorizes the President “to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between
the United States and Cuba.”96 At the same time, the Department of the Treasury issued the
92 For further background, see section on “Cuba and the OAS” in CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th
Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan; also see CRS Report R42639, Organization of American States: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer.
93 “UN Chief Pushes Cuba on ‘Arbitrary Detentions,’” Agence France Presse, January 28, 2014.
94 For additional background, see CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
95 Presidential Documents, “Proclamation 3447, Embargo on All Trade with Cuba,” 27 Federal Register 1085,
February 7, 1962.
96 In October 1960 under the Eisenhower Administration, exports to Cuba were strictly controlled under the authority
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Cuban Import Regulations to deny the importation into the United States of all goods imported
from or through Cuba.97 The authority for the embargo was later expanded in March 1962 to
include the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).98
In July 1963, the Department of the Treasury revoked the Cuban Import Regulations and replaced
them with the more comprehensive Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)—31 C.F.R. Part
515—under the authority of TWEA and Section 620(a) of the FAA.99 The CACR, which include a
prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in
the United States, remain the main body of Cuba embargo regulations and have been amended
many times over the years to reflect changes in policy. They are administered by the Department
of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and prohibit financial transactions as
well as trade transactions with Cuba. The CACR also require that all exports to Cuba be licensed
by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), under the provisions of
the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. Appendix 2405(j)).100
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are found at 15 C.F.R. Sections 730-774.101
Congress subsequently strengthened sanctions on Cuba with enactment of the Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992 (CDA; P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; P.L. 106-387, Title IX).
Among its provisions, the CDA prohibits U.S. foreign subsidiaries from engaging
in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any seaborne
vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within
the previous 180 days unless licensed by the Department of the Treasury. (In
October 2016, OFAC issued a general license for vessels involved in trade with
Cuba.)102
The LIBERTAD Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down two U.S.
civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase
pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the
transition to democracy. Most significantly, the act codified the Cuban embargo
as permanent law, including all restrictions imposed by the executive branch
under the CACR. This provision is noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect
on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is prevented from
lifting the economic embargo without congressional concurrence through
legislation until certain democratic conditions set forth in the law are met,
of the Export Control Act of 1949 in response to the expropriation of U.S. properties. This action in effect amounted to
an embargo on exports of all products with the exception of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
97 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 27 Federal Register 1116, February 7, 1962.
98 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 27 Federal Register 2765-2766, March 24, 1962.
99 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Control of Financial and Commercial Transactions Involving Cuba or Nationals
Thereof,” 28 Federal Register 6974-6985, July 9, 1963.
100 31 C.F.R. §515.533.
101 See especially 15 C.F.R. §746.2 on Cuba, which refers to other parts of the EAR.
102 A general license provides the authority to engage in a transaction without the need to apply to the Department of
the Treasury for a license. In contrast, a specific license is a written document issued by the Department of the Treasury
to a person or entity authorizing a particular transaction in response to a written license application. U.S. Department of
the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 81 Federal Register 71372-71378, October 17, 2016; U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, “Treasury and Commerce Announce Further Amendments to
Cuba Sanctions Regulations,” October 14, 2016.
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although the President retains broad authority to amend the regulations therein.
Another significant sanction in Title III of the law holds any person or
government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government
liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the
law, however, all Administrations (including the Trump Administration) have
suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month intervals, most recently in
June 2018 (effective August 1, 2018 through January 2019).103 In November
2018, National Security Adviser John Bolton maintained in a press interview that
the Administration was exploring whether to continue to suspend Title III or to
allow lawsuits to go forward.104 (For additional information, see section on “U.S.
Property Claims,” below.)
TSRA authorizes U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba, but it also
includes prohibitions on U.S. assistance and private financing and requires
“payment of cash in advance” or third-country financing for the exports. The act
also prohibits tourist travel to Cuba.
In addition to these acts, Congress enacted numerous other provisions of law over the years that
impose sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade, foreign aid, and support from
international financial institutions. The State Department also designated the government of Cuba
as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1982 under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act and other laws because of the country’s alleged ties to international
terrorism.105
Beyond sanctions, another component of U.S. policy has consisted of support measures for the
Cuban people. This support includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to
Cuba under the terms of the CDA, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and
U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. The enactment of TSRA by the 106th
Congress also led to the United States becoming one of Cuba’s largest commercial suppliers of
agricultural products. Authorization for purposeful travel to Cuba and cash remittances to Cuba
has constituted an important means to support the Cuban people, although significant
congressional debate has occurred over these issues for many years.
Despite the poor state of U.S.-Cuban relations, several examples of bilateral cooperation took
place over the years in areas of shared national interest. Three areas that stand out are alien
migrant interdiction (with migration accords negotiated in 1994 and 1995), counternarcotics
cooperation (with increased cooperation dating back to 1999), and cooperation on oil spill
preparedness and prevention (since 2011).
103 See U.S. Department of State, “Secretary’s Determination of Six Months’ Suspension Under Title III of
LIBERTAD Act,” June 28, 2018. For additional background, see the section on “Helms/Burton Legislation” in CRS
Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
104 Nora Gámez Torres, “Bolton: Somebody Must Be Held Accountable in Cuba Attacks,” Miami Herald, November 1,
2018.
105 See CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by
Dianne E. Rennack. Cuba’s designation on the state sponsor of terrorism list allowed U.S. nationals injured by an act of
international terrorism to file lawsuits against Cuba in the United States for damages. For information on current
sanctions, see CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations,
by Dianne E. Rennack and Mark P. Sullivan.
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Obama Administration Policy
During its first six years, the Obama Administration continued the dual-track policy approach
toward Cuba that had been in place for many years. It maintained U.S. economic sanctions and
continued measures to support the Cuban people, such as U.S. government-sponsored radio and
television broadcasting and funding for democracy and human rights projects.
At the same time, however, the Obama Administration instituted some changes in policy that
advanced support for the Cuban people. In April 2009, at the Summit of the Americas held in
Trinidad and Tobago, President Obama fulfilled a campaign pledge by lifting all restrictions on
family travel and remittances (for more details, see “U.S. Travel to Cuba,” below). The President
said that “the United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba.” While recognizing that it would
take time to “overcome decades of mistrust,” the President said “there are critical steps we can
take toward a new day.” He stated that he was prepared to have his Administration “engage with
the Cuban government on a wide range of issues—from drugs, migration, and economic issues, to
human rights, free speech, and democratic reform.”106 In 2011, the Obama Administration
introduced new measures to further reach out to the Cuban people through increased purposeful
travel (including people-to-people educational travel) and an easing of restrictions on nonfamily
remittances.
Overall, however, engagement with the Cuban government during the Administration’s first six
years was stymied because of Cuba’s December 2009 imprisonment of an American
subcontractor, Alan Gross, who had been working on democracy projects funded by the U.S.
Agency for International Development. Securing the release of Alan Gross became a top U.S.
priority, and the State Department maintained that it was using every appropriate channel to press
for his release.
Shift Toward Normalizing Relations
On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced major developments in U.S.-Cuban
relations and unveiled a new policy approach toward Cuba. First, he announced that the Cuban
government had released Alan Gross on humanitarian grounds after five years of imprisonment.
He also announced that, in a separate action, the Cuban government released an individual
imprisoned since 1995 who had been an important U.S. intelligence asset in Cuba in exchange for
three Cuban intelligence agents who had been imprisoned in the United States since 1998. In the
aftermath of these releases, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward
Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy aimed at isolating Cuba toward a policy of
engagement. The President said that his Administration would “end an outdated approach that, for
decades, has failed to advance our interests.” He maintained that the United States would
continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba but stated that “we can do
more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement.”107
President Obama outlined three major steps to move toward normalization: (1) a review of
Cuba’s designation by the Department of State as a state sponsor of international terrorism; (2)
the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba; and (3) an increase in travel, commerce,
and the flow of information to and from Cuba.
106 White House, “Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony,” April 17, 2009.
107 White House, “Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes,” December 17, 2014.
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Rescission of Cuba’s Designation as a State Sponsor of International Terrorism
Cuba was first added to the so-called terrorism list in 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 and other laws because of its alleged ties to international terrorism
and support for terrorist groups in Latin America. President Obama directed the State Department
to review Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and stated that “at a time when we
are focused on threats from al Qaeda to ISIL, a nation that meets our conditions and renounces
the use of terrorism should not face this sanction.”108
Following the State Department’s review, the President transmitted a report to Congress in April
2015 justifying the rescission, which maintained that Cuba had provided assurances that it would
not support acts of international terrorism.109 No resolutions of disapproval were introduced in
Congress to block the rescission, which paved the way for then-Secretary of State John Kerry to
rescind Cuba’s designation on May 29, 2015, 45 days after the submission of the report to
Congress. Subsequently, to reflect the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
terrorism in U.S. regulations, the Department of the Treasury’s OFAC amended the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations (CACR) in June 2015 and the Department of Commerce’s BIS amended the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in July 2015.110
Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations and Advancement of Engagement
U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations were severed by the Eisenhower Administration in January 1961
in response to the Cuban government’s demand to decrease the number of U.S. Embassy staff
within 48 hours. In 1977, under the Carter Administration, both countries established Interests
Sections in each other’s capitals to represent each country’s interests. Beginning in January 2015,
the United States and Cuba conducted four rounds of talks on reestablishing relations. Ultimately,
the United States and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations in July 2015 and embassies were
reopened in Havana and Washington.
With the restoration of diplomatic relations, government-to-government engagement increased
significantly under the Obama Administration. U.S. and Cuban officials held five Bilateral
Commission meetings to coordinate efforts to advance the normalization process.111
Officials negotiated numerous bilateral agreements after the restoration of relations, including
those in the following areas: marine protected areas (November 2015); environmental
cooperation on range of issues (November 2015); direct mail service (December 2015); civil
aviation (February 2016); maritime issues related to hydrography and maritime navigation
(February 2016); agriculture (March 2016); health cooperation (June 2016); counternarcotics
cooperation (July 2016); federal air marshals (September 2016); cancer research (October 2016);
seismology (December 2016); meteorology (December 2016); wildlife conservation (December
108 Ibid.
109 For further information on the Administration’s justification for rescinding Cuba’s state sponsor designation, see the
section on “State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation” in CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th
Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. Also see CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—
Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack.
110 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Terrorism List Governments Sanctions
Regulations,” 80 Federal Register 34053-34054, June 15, 2015; and U.S. Department of Commerce, “Cuba:
Implementing Rescission of State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation,” 80 Federal Register 43314-43320, July 22,
2015.
111 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Fifth Bilateral Commission Meeting in Havana,” media
note, December 7, 2016, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/264968.htm.
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2016); animal and plant health (January 2017); oil spill preparedness and response (January
2017); law enforcement cooperation (January 2017); and search and rescue (January 2017). The
United States and Cuba also signed a bilateral treaty in January 2017 delimiting their maritime
boundary in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral dialogues were held on all of these issues as
well as on other issues including counterterrorism, claims (U.S. property, unsatisfied court
judgments, and U.S. government claims), economic and regulatory issues, human rights,
renewable energy and efficiency, trafficking in persons, and migration.
In March 2016, President Obama traveled to Cuba, the first presidential visit since 1928, with the
goals of building on progress toward normalizing relations and expressing support for human
rights. In a press conference with Raúl Castro, President Obama said that the United States would
“continue to speak up on behalf of democracy, including the right of the Cuban people to decide
their own future.”112 He also spoke out forcefully for advancing human rights during his televised
speech to the Cuban nation. He stated his belief that citizens should be free to speak their minds
without fear and that the rule of law should not include arbitrary detentions.113
In October 2016, President Obama issued a presidential policy directive on the normalization of
relations with Cuba.114 The directive set forth the Administration’s vision for normalization of
relations and laid out six medium-term objectives: (1) government-to-government interaction; (2)
engagement and connectivity; (3) expanded commerce; (4) economic reform; (5) respect for
universal human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic values; and (6) Cuba’s integration
into international and regional systems. The directive also outlined the roles and responsibilities
for various U.S. departments and agencies to move the normalization process forward. It noted
that the Administration would seek to build support in Congress to lift the embargo and other
statutory provisions constraining efforts to normalize economic relations with Cuba. The directive
can be viewed as an attempt to keep up the momentum toward normalizing relations in the next
Administration and to protect the changes that have been made to date in U.S. policy toward
Cuba. (As noted below, however, President Trump issued a national security presidential
memorandum on June 16, 2017, that superseded and replaced the October 2016 policy directive.)
Increase in Travel, Commerce, and the Flow of Information
The Obama Administration’s third step of increasing travel, commerce, and the flow of
information to and from Cuba required amendments to U.S. regulations—the CACR and EAR—
administered, respectively, by the Department of the Treasury’s OFAC and the Commerce
Department’s BIS. To implement the President’s new policy, the two agencies issued five rounds
of amendments to the CACR and EAR in January and September 2015 and in January, March,
and October 2016.115
112 White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Raúl Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference,”
March 21, 2016.
113 White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba,” March 22, 2016.
114 White House, “Presidential Policy Directive – United States-Cuba Normalization,” October 14, 2016, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/14/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cubanormalization.
115 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Cuba: Providing Support for the Cuban People,” 80 Federal Register 2286-2291,
January 16, 2015; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “ Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 80 Federal Register 22912302, January 16, 2015; U.S. Department of Commerce, “Enhancing Support for the Cuban People,” 80 Federal
Register 56898-56904, September 21, 2015; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 80
Federal Register 56915-56926, September 21, 2015; U.S. Department of Commerce, “Cuba Licensing Policy
Revision,” 81 Federal Register 4580-4583, January 27, 2016; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control
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The Treasury and Commerce Department amendments to the regulations eased restrictions on
travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and financial services. They also
authorized certain U.S. companies or other entities to have a physical presence in Cuba, such as
an office, retail outlet, or warehouse. These entities include news bureaus, exporters of authorized
goods to Cuba, entities providing mail or parcel transmission services, telecommunication or
internet-based service providers, entities organizing or conducting certain educational activities,
religious organizations, and carrier and travel service providers. (For more on the regulatory
changes, see “U.S. Travel to Cuba” and “U.S. Exports and Sanctions,” below.)
Such changes fall within the scope of the President’s discretionary licensing authority to make
changes to the embargo regulations. When President Obama unveiled his policy shift, however,
he acknowledged that he did not have the authority to lift the embargo because it was codified in
permanent law (Section 102(h) of the LIBERTAD Act). As noted above, the LIBERTAD Act ties
the lifting of the embargo to conditions in Cuba (including that a democratically elected
government is in place). Lifting the overall economic embargo would require amending or
repealing the LIBERTAD Act as well as other statutes that have provisions impeding normal
economic relations with Cuba, such as the CDA and TSRA.
Trump Administration Policy
During the electoral campaign, then-candidate Trump said he would cancel or reverse President
Obama’s policy on Cuba unless Cuba took action to improve political and religious freedom and
free political prisoners.116 After Fidel Castro’s death in November 2016, then-President-elect
Trump issued a statement referring to Castro as a “brutal dictator who oppressed his own people
for nearly six decades.”117 This statement was followed by a longer message maintaining that “If
Cuba is unwilling to make a better deal for the Cuban people, the Cuban/American people and the
U.S. as a whole, I will terminate [the] deal.”118
In February 2017, the White House maintained that the Trump Administration was conducting a
full review of U.S. policy toward Cuba and that human rights would be at the forefront of those
policy discussions.119 In May 2017, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs Francisco Palmieri emphasized that “one of the areas that is going to be a
Regulations 81 Federal Register 4583-4586, January 27, 2016; U.S. Department of Commerce, “Cuba: Revisions to
License Exceptions and Licensing Policy,” 81 Federal Register 13972-13974, March 16, 2016; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 81 Federal Register 13989-13994, March 16, 2016; U.S. Department
of Commerce, “Cuba: Revisions to License Exceptions,” 81 Federal Register 71365-71367, October 17, 2016; and
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 81 Federal Register 71372-71378, October 17,
2016. For background on the regulatory changes, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuba Sanctions,” at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/cuba.aspx; U.S. Department of the Treasury,
“Frequently Asked Questions Related to Cuba,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Cuba,” at
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/cuba; and U.S.
Department of Commerce, “Cuba, Frequently Asked Questions,” at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/formsdocuments/doc_download/1446-bis-cuba-consolidated-faqs.
116 Jeremy Diamond, “Trump Shifts on Cuba, Says He Would Reverse Obama’s Deal,” CNN, September 16, 2016.
117 Eugene Scott, “Donald Trump: Fidel Castro Is Dead!” CNN, November 26, 2016.
118 Donald Trump @realDonaldTrump, Twitter, November 28, 2016.
119 White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sean Spicer, February 3, 2017.
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high priority is ensuring that Cuba makes more substantive progress toward a greater respect for
human rights inside the country.”120
On May 20, 2017, President Trump issued a statement to the Cuban American community and the
people of Cuba in celebrating the anniversary of Cuban independence. That date is in
commemoration of Cuba’s independence from the United States in 1902 in the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War in 1898, but is not celebrated in Cuba because of the continued U.S.
intervention in Cuba under the Platt Amendment until its repeal in 1935 (see “Brief Historical
Background” above). In the strongly worded statement, President Trump said, “The Cuban people
deserve a government that peacefully upholds democratic values, economic liberties, religious
freedoms, and human rights, and my Administration is committed to achieving that vision.”121
Cuba’s state television published an “official note” describing the statement as “controversial and
ridiculous.”122
Partial Rollback of Engagement and Increased Sanctions
President Trump unveiled his Administration’s policy on Cuba on June 16, 2017, which partially
rolls back some of the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations with Cuba.
President Trump set forth his Administration’s policy in a speech in Miami, FL, where he signed
a national security presidential memorandum (NSPM) on Cuba replacing President Obama’s
October 2016 presidential policy directive (discussed above), which had laid out objectives for
the normalization process. The new policy leaves most of the Obama-era policy changes in place,
including the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and a variety of eased sanctions to increase
travel and commerce with Cuba. The new policy also keeps in place the Obama Administration’s
action ending the so-called wet foot/dry foot policy toward Cuban migrants, which, according to
the NSPM, had “encouraged untold thousands of Cuban nationals to risk their lives to travel
unlawfully to the United States.”123
The most significant policy changes set forth in President Trump’s NSPM included (1)
restrictions on financial transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military,
intelligence, or security services or personnel and (2) the elimination of individual people-topeople travel. President Trump’s memorandum directed the heads of departments (Treasury and
Commerce, in coordination with the State Department) to initiate a process within 30 days to
adjust current regulations. On November 8, 2017, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
issued amended regulations (effective November 9) to implement the new policy, and, as
discussed below, the State Department took complementary action in November 2017 and
November 2018.124
120 “U.S. to Press Cuba on Human Rights,” Agence France Presse, May 9, 2017.
121 White House, “Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Cuban Independence Day,” May 20, 2017.
122 “Cuba TV Rejects Trump 20 May Message as ‘Ridiculous,’” BBC Monitoring Americas (summary of report by
Cubavision TV on May 20), May 22, 2017; and Nora Gámez Torres, “Havana Lashes Out Against Trump’s May 20
Message to the Cuban People,” Miami Herald, May 22, 2017.
123 White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” June 16, 2017, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/16/remarks-president-trump-policy-united-states-towards-cuba;
and Department of State, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” 82 Federal Register 4887548878, October 20, 2017 (consists of the text of National Security Presidential Memorandum, NSPM-5, issued by the
President on June 16, 2017).
124 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 82 Federal Register 51998-52004,
November 9, 2017; U.S. Department of Commerce, “Amendments to Implement United States Policy Toward Cuba,”
82 Federal Register, 51983-51986, November 9, 2017; and U.S. Department of State, “The State Department’s List of
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On November 1, 2018, National Security Adviser John Bolton made a speech in Miami, FL,
strongly criticizing the Cuban government on human rights and stating that that “we will only
engage with a Cuban government that is willing to undertake necessary and tangible reforms—a
government that respects the interests of the Cuban people.”125 Bolton’s speech was full of anticommunist rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War era. Bolton referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua as a “troika of tyranny” and the “cause of immense human suffering, the impetus of
enormous regional instability, and the genesis of a sordid cradle of communism in the Western
Hemisphere.” He referred to the three countries’ leaders as “three stooges of socialism” and as
“clownish pitiful figures.” In a press interview before the speech, Bolton also maintained that the
Administration was considering whether to continue to suspend Title III of the LIBERTAD Act to
allow lawsuits in U.S. federal court against those “trafficking” in confiscated property in Cuba, an
action that would significantly ratchet up U.S. sanctions on Cuba; since the enactment of the
LIBERTAD Act in 1996, all Administrations have suspended, at six month intervals, the right to
file such lawsuits.126 (For more on Title III, see “U.S. Property Claims,” below.)
Restrictions on Transactions with the Cuban Military. Pursuant to the NSPM, the State
Department was tasked with identifying entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or
security services or personnel and publishing a list of those entities with which direct financial
transactions would disproportionately benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.127 The NSPM specifically identified the Grupo de
Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), a holding company of the Cuban military involved in
most sectors of the Cuban economy, particularly the tourism sector.128
The State Department issued a list of “restricted entities” in November 2017 and updated the list
with additional entries in November 2018. Currently, there are 205 entities on the list, including 2
ministries, 5 holding companies (including GAESA) and 43 of their subentities (including the
Mariel Special Development Zone), 99 hotels (with 28 in Havana), 2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas,
10 stores in Old Havana, and 39 entities serving the defense and security sectors.129 The Treasury
Department forbids financial transactions with those entities, with certain exceptions, including
transactions related to air or sea operations supporting permissible travel, cargo, or trade; the sale
of agricultural and medical commodities; direct telecommunications or internet access for the
Cuban people; and authorized remittances.130 The new prohibitions limit U.S. economic
engagement with Cuba, particularly in travel-related transactions and potential investment
opportunities.
Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (Cuba Restricted List),” 82 Federal Register 52089-52091, November 9,
2017.
125 The White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Administration’s
Policies in Latin America,” November 2, 2018.
126 Nora Gámez Torres, “Bolton: Somebody Must Be Held Accountable in Cuba Attacks,” Miami Herald, November 1,
2018.
127 U.S. Department of State, “State Department FAQs on the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) on
Cuba,” June 16, 2017, at https://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/cu/rls/2017/271977.htm.
128 Nora Gámez Torres, “High on Cuba Policy Proposal: Restricting U.S. Business Deals with Cuba’s Military-Run
Entities,” Miami Herald, June 12, 2017.
129 U.S. Department of State, “List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated With Cuba as of November 15,
2018,” at https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/cubarestrictedlist/287349.htm.
130 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury, Commerce, and State Implement Changes to the Cuba Sanctions
Rules,” fact sheet, November 8, 2017 (effective November 9, 2017), at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_fact_sheet_11082017.pdf.
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Restrictions on People-to-People Travel. With regard to people-to-people travel, the
Department of the Treasury amended the CACR to require that people-to-people educational
travel take place under the auspices of an organization specializing in such travel, with travelers
accompanied by a representative of the organization. Individuals are no longer authorized to
engage in such travel on their own. The Obama Administration had authorized such individual
travel in March 2016, which, combined with the beginning of regular commercial flights and
cruise ship service, led to an increase in Americans visiting Cuba. With the new Treasury
Department regulations issued, the level of U.S. travel to Cuba has fallen. (Also see “U.S. Travel
to Cuba,” below.)
Cuban Government Reaction. As expected, the Cuban government’s reaction to President
Trump’s June 2017 speech announcing Cuba policy changes was critical. Foreign Minister Bruno
Rodríguez asserted that the speech “was a grotesque spectacle straight from the Cold War.”131
Nevertheless, the Cuban government also reiterated its willingness to continue a respectful and
cooperative dialogue on issues of mutual interest and the negotiation of outstanding issues,
although it maintained that Cuba would not make concessions to its sovereignty and
independence.132
At a meeting of Cuba’s National Assembly in July 2017, then-Cuban President Raúl Castro
criticized the Trump Administration’s new policy toward Cuba as a setback to bilateral relations
and reaffirmed that any strategy with the goal of destroying the Cuban revolution would fail.
Nevertheless, Castro also reiterated that Cuba has the will to continue negotiating outstanding
bilateral issues with the United States. He maintained that “Cuba and the United States can
cooperate and live side by side, respecting differences and promoting all that can benefit both
countries and peoples,” but he also asserted that no one should expect Cuba to make concessions
inherent to its sovereignty and independence.133
Continued Focus on Human Rights
When President Trump announced his Cuba policy, he asserted that he was “canceling the last
administration’s policy change with Cuba,” which he labeled as “a terrible and misguided deal
with the Castro regime.” The President maintained that “the outcome of the last administration’s
executive action has been only more repression and a move to crush the peaceful democratic
movement.” Although the Cuban government’s human rights record remained poor after the
Obama Administration’s policy of engagement was initiated in December 2014, President Obama
continued to speak out strongly about human rights conditions in Cuba, including during his
March 2016 visit to Havana; the two countries subsequently engaged in a bilateral human rights
dialogue in October 2016.134
In his June 2017 Miami speech, President Trump called for the Cuban government to end the
abuse of dissidents, release political prisoners, stop jailing innocent people, and return U.S.
131 Francois Murphy, “Cuba Calls Trump Speech on Island ‘Grotesque Spectacle,’” Reuters News, June 19, 2017.
132 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “Statement by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba,” June 17, 2017, at
http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/statement-revolutionary-government-cuba-0.
133 Raúl Castro Ruz, “Seguiremos avanzando en el camino escogido soberanamente por nuestro pueblo,” Cubadebate,
July 14, 2017, at http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2017/07/14/raul-castro-seguiremos-avanzando-en-el-caminoescogido-soberanamente-por-nuestro-pueblo/; and “Cuba’s Castro Rebuts Trump at National Assembly,” Reuters
News, July 14, 2017.
134 See U.S. Department of State, “Assistant Secretary Malinowski and Acting Assistant Secretary Aponte Travel to
Cuba,” October 13, 2016.
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fugitives from justice in Cuba, all issues that the Obama Administration had raised with the
Cuban government. The President stated that “any changes to the relationship between the United
States and Cuba will depend on real progress toward these and other goals.” Once Cuba takes
concrete steps in these areas, President Trump said “we will be ready, willing and able to come to
the table to negotiate that much better deal for Cubans, for Americans.”135
The Trump Administration also cited concern about human rights for its November 1, 2017, vote
against the annual UNGA resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. In October 2016, under the
Obama Administration, the United States abstained for the first time on the resolution, but U.S.
officials also took the opportunity to express profound concerns about the Cuban government’s
Cuba’s poor human rights record. (For more on the U.N. votes, see “Cuba’s Foreign Relations”
above.)
Trump Administration officials continued to speak out on Cuba’s human rights situation in 2018.
Vice President Mike Pence spoke out on the human rights situation in Cuba during an address to
the OAS in May. Pence stated that “the longest-surviving dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere
still clings to power” and that even though “the Castro name is now fading, the oppression and
police state they imposed is as powerful as ever.” He asserted, “Today, the United States once
again stands with the Cuban people in their stand for freedom.”136 As noted above, National
Security Adviser John Bolton also spoke out on Cuba’s poor human rights record in a November
1, 2018, speech in Miami,
The State Department has continued to call attention to the plight of political prisoners in Cuba.
In April 2018, then-Acting Secretary of State John Sullivan and USAID Administrator Mark
Green met with members of Cuba’s independent civil society on the margins of the Summit of the
Americas held in Peru. According to the State Department, Sullivan called “for democratic
reforms to Cuba’s flawed electoral process and an end to arbitrary detention and intimidation of
independent civil society.”137 In June 2018, the State Department reiterated the U.S. call for the
release of all political prisoners in Cuba and highlighted U.S. concern for two Cuban political
prisoners declared “prisoners of conscience” by Amnesty International—Dr. Eduardo Cardet and
Dr. Ariel Ruiz Urquiola, who was subsequently released in July 2018. In October 2018, the State
Department called for the release of UNPACU activist Tomás Núñez Magdariaga, who had been
on a hunger strike since August; the Cuban government subsequently released him on October 15,
2018. A day later, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations launched a campaign to call attention to
Cuba’s “estimated 130 political prisoners.” Cuban diplomats attempted to disrupt the event by
making noise, an action that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo dubbed “a childish tantrum.”138
Secretary of State Pompeo subsequently wrote an open letter to Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno
Rodriguez in early December 2018 asking for evidence against those held as political prisoners.
(For more details, see “Human Rights” section, above.)
Internet Task Force. In January 2018, the State Department announced the establishment of a
Cuba Internet Task Force, composed of U.S. government and non-U.S. government
representatives, to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet
135 White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” June 16, 2017.
136 White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence During a Protocolary Meeting at the Organization of American
States,” May 7, 2018.
137 U.S. Department of State, “Acting Secretary Sullivan’s Meeting with Cuban Independent Civil Society,” April 12,
2018.
138 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks to the Press,” October 23, 2018.
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access and independent media in Cuba.139 The task force was convened pursuant to President
Trump’s NSPM on Cuba and held its first meeting on February 7, 2018, with two subcommittees
formed to develop recommendations—one to explore the role of media and freedom of
information in Cuba and the other to explore internet access in Cuba.140 According to the State
Department, the task force will review the subcommittees’ recommendations and prepare a final
report for the Secretary of State within a year.141
Cuban state media criticized the State Department’s establishment of the task force, maintaining
that the move “was aimed at subverting Cuba’s internal order.”142 Cuba’s foreign ministry issued
a note of diplomatic protest to the U.S. Embassy in Havana and called upon the U.S. government
to respect Cuba sovereignty.143
Continued Engagement in Some Areas
In a demonstration of continuity in U.S. policy between the Trump and Obama Administrations,
the U.S. and Cuban governments have continued to engage on various bilateral issues through
meetings and dialogues. The two countries have continued to hold semiannual migration talks,
which, since 1995, have provided a forum to review and coordinate efforts to ensure safe, legal,
and orderly migration between Cuba and the United States; talks were held in April and
December 2017, and most recently in July 2018.
The United States and Cuba also have continued to hold Bilateral Commission meetings that
began under the Obama Administration in which the two government review priorities and areas
for engagement. Officials held a sixth Bilateral Commission meeting in September 2017 and a
seventh meeting in June 2018. According to the State Department, at the June 2018 meeting, the
two countries reviewed such areas for engagement as trafficking in persons, civil aviation safety,
law enforcement matters, agriculture, maritime safety and search and rescue, certified claims, and
environmental challenges. The State Department maintained that the United States reiterated the
urgent need to identify the source of the “attacks” on U.S. diplomats and to ensure they cease,
expressed continued concerns about the arbitrary detention of independent journalists and human
rights defenders, and acknowledged Cuba’s progress in repatriating Cubans with final orders
while also emphasizing that Cuba needs to accept greater numbers of returnees.144 Cuba’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained the meeting provided an opportunity to review areas of
exchange and cooperation, but it also criticized several aspects of U.S. policy, including the
“intensification” of the U.S. embargo and what Cuba viewed as the “political manipulation of the
alleged health cases” that became a “pretext” to reduce staff and therefore affect embassy
operations in both countries.145
Both countries also have continued engagement on other bilateral issues. The U.S. Coast Guard
and the Cuban Border Guard participated in professional exchanges in July 2017 and January
139 U.S. Department of State, “Creation of the Cuba Internet Task Force,” January 23, 2018.
140 U.S. Department of State, “Inaugural Meeting of the Cuba Internet Task Force,” February 7, 2018.
141 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward
Cuba, “Testimony by Kenneth Merten, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, and Ambassador Peter W. Bodde, Health Incidents Response Task Force,” September 6, 2018.
142 “Washington Creates Internet Task Force to Promote Subversion in Cuba,” Granma, January 24, 2018.
143 “Cuba Hands Note of Protest to U.S. Over Internet Task Force,” Reuters News, February 1, 2018.
144 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Seventh Bilateral Commission Meeting,” June 14, 2018.
145 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “Seventh Meeting of the Cuba-United States Bilateral Commission Held in
Washington D.C.,” June 14, 2018.
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2018 covering a variety of topics, including search and rescue. The U.S. Departments of State,
Justice, and Homeland Security participated in law enforcement dialogues with Cuban
counterparts in September 2017 and July 2018; the 2018 dialogue included such topics as
fugitives and the return of Cuban nationals with final orders of removal. Additional bilateral
meetings and exchanges have been held in 2018 on such topics as cybersecurity and cybercrime,
counternarcotics efforts, and counterterrorism in January; anti-money laundering efforts and
trafficking in persons in February; search and rescue in March; and agriculture and scientific
cooperation related to environmental disaster in April.146
As noted below, for more than a decade, Cuba has returned some wanted fugitives to the United
States on a case-by case basin. In 2018, this included the return of a man wanted on charges
related to ecoterrorism in August and the return in November of a fugitive from New Jersey
wanted for murder. In February, with assistance from U.S. law enforcement, Cuba prosecuted a
Cuban national for the 2015 murder of a Florida doctor. (See “U.S. Fugitives from Justice,”
below.)
U.S. Response to Injuries of U.S. Personnel in Havana147
On September 29, 2017, the U.S. Department of State ordered the departure of nonemergency
personnel assigned to
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