Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and Options for Congress

Congressional research reportDec 5, 2014

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Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve

Component (RC) Force Mix:

Considerations and Options for Congress

(name redacted)

Specialist in Military Ground Forces

(name redacted)

Specialist in Military Manpower Policy

December 5, 2014

Congressional Research Service

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www.crs.gov

R43808

Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix

Summary

The Army is composed of both an Active Component (AC) and a Reserve Component (RC). The

AC consists of soldiers who are in the Army as their full-time occupation. The RC is composed

primarily of soldiers who serve part-time but who can be ordered to full-time duty. The Army’s

RC is made up of both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve

(USAR). AC/RC force mix refers to the distribution of units between the active and reserve

components of the armed forces.

The congressional role in AC/RC force mix is most obvious in its authorization of end strengths

for the active and reserve components of each Service. Congressional authority concerning

AC/RC mix, however, is much broader than that, as the Constitution provides Congress with

broad powers over the armed forces, including the power to “to raise and support Armies,” “to

provide and maintain a Navy,” “to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land

and naval Forces” and “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for

governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.... ”

Debates over AC/RC mix center on whether or not to shift force structure between the AC and the

RC and, if so, what types of units to shift. Although specific force mix recommendations can be

nuanced, policy advocates generally divide between those who favor a stronger AC emphasis and

those who favor a stronger RC emphasis. In the contemporary debate, those who favor a stronger

RC emphasis believe that RC units, if properly trained and equipped, are as capable as their AC

counterparts while costing less. Thus, they argue that RC units can replace a portion of AC force

structure while saving money. Those who favor a stronger AC emphasis believe that certain RC

forces—particularly larger direct combat units and higher echelon headquarters—are not as

capable as AC forces without substantial additional preparation; cannot respond to a crisis as

rapidly as AC forces; and cannot be used with the same frequency and duration as AC forces due

to policy limitations. Those who take this perspective believe that replacing too many or certain

types of AC units with RC units could reduce the Army’s ability to respond rapidly to an overseas

crisis and sustain operations over time, or could require too much additional RC funding and

training time to make such an approach cost-effective.

Given the nation’s current fiscal situation, the contemporary debate has shifted somewhat in favor

of a higher ratio of RC forces. For example, in its FY2015 budget request, the Administration

proposes that RC forces make up 54.1% of the Army by FY2017, in comparison to 53.6% just

before the September 11 attacks and 49.1% when the Army was at its peak size during the Iraq

and Afghanistan wars (2010). This proposal would also include a shift of the relative proportion

of brigade combat teams (BCTs) towards the ARNG, although the Army’s Aviation Restructuring

Initiative proposes moving attack helicopters from the USAR and ARNG to the AC.

Determining the appropriate mix of AC and RC forces is complex, with many factors affecting

the process. Of these, utilization, readiness, effectiveness, cost, and risk are generally considered

the major elements in developing the AC/RC force mix. Each of these factors is described in

some detail in this report, along with questions for further investigation. As Congress considers

the future AC/RC mix for the Army, it may wish to consider several approaches, including

supporting Administration proposals on AC/RC mix; gathering additional information on key

factors which contribute to AC/RC mix decisions; directly altering AC/RC mix; and influencing

AC/RC mix by adjusting factors that contribute to mix decisions.

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Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix

Contents

Issue Overview ................................................................................................................................ 1

Importance to Congress ............................................................................................................. 1

A Brief History of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix ........... 3

Army Active-Reserve Mix ........................................................................................................ 7

Background ...................................................................................................................................... 8

Components of the Army........................................................................................................... 8

The Active Component (AC) .............................................................................................. 8

The Reserve Component (RC) ............................................................................................ 9

Basic Organization of Army Forces ........................................................................................ 10

The Army and the Other Services............................................................................................ 11

Army AC/RC Force Mix................................................................................................................ 14

How the Army Determines AC/RC Force Mix........................................................................ 14

Army Plans to Change its AC/RC Force Mix.......................................................................... 17

Smallest Acceptable Force Size ............................................................................................... 17

Potential Force Mix Scenarios................................................................................................. 17

What’s Missing in the Force Mix Discussion? ........................................................................ 18

Proposed Aviation Restructuring ............................................................................................. 18

AC/RC Mix: Considerations for Congress .................................................................................... 18

Utilization ................................................................................................................................ 18

Missions ............................................................................................................................ 19

Access to the Reserve Components................................................................................... 19

Deployment to Dwell (AC) and Mobilization to Dwell (RC) Ratios................................ 20

Key Questions Related to Utilization ................................................................................ 21

Readiness ................................................................................................................................. 21

The Army Readiness System............................................................................................. 22

Cyclical Readiness: The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model......................... 25

Comparing Readiness Between Units ............................................................................... 26

Key Questions Related to Readiness ................................................................................. 27

Effectiveness............................................................................................................................ 28

Key Questions Related to Effectiveness............................................................................ 29

Cost .......................................................................................................................................... 29

Which Costs Do You Count?............................................................................................. 29

How Should These Costs be Apportioned Between the Active and Reserve

Components? .................................................................................................................. 30

How Often Will Reserve Units Be Activated? .................................................................. 31

What is the Most Appropriate Way to Measure the “Output” of the Cost “Inputs”? ........ 31

Key Questions Related to Cost.......................................................................................... 34

Risk .......................................................................................................................................... 34

Key Questions Related to Risk.......................................................................................... 35

Other Considerations ............................................................................................................... 35

Options for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 36

Support Administration Proposals on AC/RC Mix.................................................................. 36

Obtain Additional Information ................................................................................................ 37

Direct New Studies............................................................................................................ 37

Establish Processes to Collect, Analyze, and Share New Types of Data .......................... 38

Directly Change the Force Mix ............................................................................................... 39

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Adjust End Strengths ......................................................................................................... 39

Reallocate Force Structure Between the AC and RC ........................................................ 39

Influence the Force Mix .......................................................................................................... 39

Reallocate AC and RC Roles and Missions ...................................................................... 39

Enhance Training for RC Units ......................................................................................... 40

Promote Greater Use of the RC......................................................................................... 42

Figures

Figure 1. The AC/RC Force Mix Process ...................................................................................... 16

Figure 2. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model ............................................................. 58

Tables

Table 1. Examples of Army AC/RC Force Mix ............................................................................... 8

Table 2. What Readiness Ratings Mean......................................................................................... 25

Appendixes

Appendix A. Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) .................................................................... 44

Appendix B. Current Legislation Related to Army AC-RC Mix ................................................... 45

Appendix C. Historical Rationales for Reserve Forces ................................................................. 55

Appendix D. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model ................................................ 57

Appendix E. Laws Governing Access to the Reserve Components .............................................. 59

Appendix F. Contemporary Studies on AC/RC Force Mix............................................................ 64

Appendix G. Individual Study Examinations................................................................................. 68

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 93

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Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix

Issue Overview

The Army is composed of both an Active Component (AC) and a Reserve Component (RC). The

AC consists of soldiers who are in the Army as their full-time occupation. The RC consists

primarily of soldiers who serve part-time but who can be ordered to full-time duty. The Army’s

RC is made up of both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve

(USAR). AC/RC force mix refers to the distribution of units among the active and reserve

components of the armed forces.1 Debates over AC/RC mix center on whether to shift force

structure between the AC and the RC and, if so, what types of units to shift. Although specific

force mix recommendations can be nuanced, policy advocates generally divide between those

who favor a stronger AC emphasis and those who favor a stronger RC emphasis. In the

contemporary debate, those who favor a stronger RC emphasis believe that RC units can replace a

portion of AC force structure while saving money. Those who favor a stronger AC emphasis

believe that replacing too many or certain types of AC units with RC units is not cost-effective

and could reduce the Army’s ability to respond rapidly to an overseas crisis and sustain operations

over time.

Importance to Congress

Typically, the details of AC/RC force mix are determined by the individual services within broad

parameters set by Congress, but Congress has sweeping power to set policy in this area. The

congressional role in AC/RC force mix is most obvious in its authorization of end strengths2 for

the active and reserve components of each Service, but congressional authority concerning

AC/RC mix is much broader than that.

The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the armed forces, including the

power to “to raise and support Armies,” “to provide and maintain a Navy,” “to make Rules for the

Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” and “to provide for organizing,

arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in

the Service of the United States.... ”3 On the basis of its constitutional authority, Congress

authorizes and appropriates funds for the AC and RC on an annual basis and sets end strengths

limiting the size of the respective forces. Congress is also responsible for ensuring the AC and RC

are properly equipped and supplied, determining pay and benefits, establishing personnel policies,

and exercising oversight of Executive Branch management of the Department of Defense (DOD).

If it so chooses, it can also allocate roles and missions for the Services and their reserve

components, adjust reserve activation authorities, determine training regimens, establish or

Or, as an Army Information Paper states, “Active Component / Reserve Component (AC/RC) Force Mix is the term

used by the Army to articulate the distribution of force structure among the three Army components within established

End Strengths.” See Army Posture Statement, 2012, Addendum A, “Active Component/Reserve Component Mix,” at

https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2012/InformationPapers/ViewPaper.aspx?id=

229

The term “end strength” refers to the authorized strength of a specified branch of the military at the end of a given

fiscal year, while the term authorized strength means “the largest number of members authorized to be in an armed

force, a component, a branch, a grade, or any other category of the armed forces.” 10 USC 101(b)(11). As such, end

strengths are maximum personnel levels. Congress also sets minimum end strengths for the active components from

time to time, which may be identical to or lower than the maximum strength levels.

Article I, Section 8.

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disestablish units, specify unit composition, and designate the number and types of units within

each component.

In recent years, several factors have coincided to stimulate interest in the AC/RC mix, particularly

for the Army. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan included large-scale and continuing mobilizations

of RC forces, and defense officials and other observers have generally expressed satisfaction with

the operational performance of these units. Additionally, concerns about federal spending,

coupled with the constraints of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), have led

many to look for ways to cut costs within the DOD. As a result, some policy makers have begun

considering whether part-time RC forces might provide a more cost-effective alternative to some

portion of the AC force structure, particularly for the Army, which has the largest reserve

component of all the Services.

In its FY2015 budget request, the Administration envisions shifting the AC/RC mix somewhat

more toward the RC. It proposes that RC forces make up 54.1% of the Army by FY2017, in

comparison to 53.6% just before the September 11 attacks and 49.1% when the Army was at its

peak size during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (2010). This proposal would also include a shift

of the relative proportion of brigade combat teams (BCTs) towards the ARNG, although the

Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative proposes moving attack helicopters (AH-64 Apaches)

from the USAR and ARNG to the AC to replace retiring armed reconnaissance helicopters (OH58D). In return, the USAR and ARNG would receive utility helicopters (UH-60 Blackhawk).

Others have advocated a greater shift towards the RC. For example, one proposal put forward by

the National Guard Association of the United States recommends the Army be realigned so that

RC forces make up 58% of the Army, with 420,000 AC, 385,000 ARNG and 195,000 USAR.4

This discussion is not purely academic, as various groups favoring the RC or the AC attempt to

persuade the Administration and Congress of the importance and relevance of their respective

components in relation to what they believe will be the future strategic environment facing the

United States.

The House Armed Services Committee Oversight Plan for the 113th Congress summarized the

importance of this issue to Congress, and the difficult choices it poses, noting:

The debate that began during the 112th Congress about the most appropriate force structure

mix of active and reserve components, about the proper roles and missions of the reserve

components—be they an operational or strategic reserve—and about the affordability of the

required force to meet national security requirements will intensify in the 113th Congress.

Competition among the active and reserve components for diminishing resources will serve

as a catalyst for that debate. As evidenced by the debate about the Air Force's active and

reserve component force structure recommendations submitted with the Fiscal Year 2013

President’s budget and subsequent Congressional action, reaching a consensus will be most

challenging.5

National Guard Association of the United States, briefing entitled “The National Guard: Affordable Solution for a

Strong Defense,” slide 17 (“Solution 2- The Million Man Army). Two other proposals to increase the Army National

Guard by 10,000 and 20,000 personnel are put forward by Major General Wesley Craig in an article “A Better Course

of Action for the Army,” September 6, 2013, available at http://www.ngaus.org/blog/13/09/better-course-action-army

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services 113th Congress Oversight Plan, undated, pp. 16-17.

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A Brief History of Active Component (AC) and Reserve

Component (RC) Force Mix

The ratio of AC and RC forces has shifted dramatically over time, and Congress has played a

central role in these shifts. From the founding of the nation to the Cold War era, the bulk of force

structure was maintained in the reserve component (especially the militia/National Guard), except

in times of major conflicts. When major conflicts arose—such as the Civil War, World War I, and

World War II—the comparatively small active component was expanded through the activation of

militia and federal reserves, recruitment of additional volunteers for the AC, and the use of

conscription.6 At the end of the conflict, active force levels were dramatically reduced. For

example, in 1939, there were fewer than 350,000 active duty personnel in all branches of the U.S.

armed forces. During World War II, this number grew enormously, reaching over 12 million

servicemembers on duty by 1945. With the end of World War II, the United States radically

reduced the size of its active armed forces to about 1.5 million in 1947-1950.

This approach changed with the onset of the Cold War. With the advent of the Korean War in

1950, the United States doubled the size of its active forces by 1951 to approximately 3.2 million.

This increase included a major reserve mobilization, with over 850,000 members of the National

Guard and Reserves called to active duty. However, with the end of the war in 1953, the size of

the active component did not decrease nearly as much as it would have in earlier eras. For the

next decade, it remained roughly between 2.5 million and 3 million for all services, while the size

of the reserve component hovered around 1 million. In response to the Vietnam War, the size of

the active component was increased again to about 3.5 million (1968), but there was no major

reserve mobilization.7 Thus, since the Korean War and continuing to the present, the United States

has maintained most of its force structure in the AC. (Although, it should be pointed out that

starting in 1989 and continuing to the present, a slight majority of Army force structure has been

RC.) In 2003, author Richard A. Lacquement Jr. noted:

Nevertheless, active duty forces dominate the military. This is unlike the peacetime history

of the U.S. armed forces before World War II when militia and other reserve forces far

outnumbered the much smaller standing elements of the armed forces ... Although there has

been a shift in relative emphasis to the ready reserves since the end of the Cold War, the

current American military posture is still dominated by the standing forces of the four

military services.8

This shift to an AC-centric force structure model in the aftermath of World War II began to ebb

somewhat starting in the 1970s. The downsizing that followed the Vietnam War, the end of the

Conscription in the United States did not begin until the Civil War, and it did not become a major source of military

manpower until World War I. The authority to use conscription lapsed in 1973.

Despite the United States’ substantial military involvement in Vietnam, only two comparatively minor reserve

activations occurred, both in 1968. The first reserve activation, announced on January 25, 1968, was not directly related

to the war in Vietnam. Rather, it was a response to the capture of the U.S. Navy intelligence ship Pueblo by North

Korea and the subsequent reinforcement of U.S. forces in South Korea. Most of the units activated remained in the

United States or were deployed to Korea, but some were stationed in Vietnam. The second reserve activation was

announced on April 11, 1968—just two months after the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam—and was intended “to meet

the needs of the Vietnam War and strengthen the depleted Active Strategic Reserve.” (Neil Sheehan,. New York Times.

“U.S. Calls 24,500 Reserves.” April 12, 1968, 1.) A total of 37,643 Guard and Reserve personnel were called up during

these activations.

Richard A. Lacquement Jr, “Shaping American Capabilities After the Cold War” 2003, p. 42.

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comparatively inexpensive manpower provided by conscription, budgetary pressures, and

dissatisfaction with the negative consequences of not using reserve forces more extensively

during Vietnam9 led to a renewed focus on using RC forces to supplement the AC. The Total

Force Policy, established in 1973 by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger on the basis of the

1970 Total Force Concept developed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, sought to integrate

“the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole” and emphasized that, instead of

draftees, “Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of active

forces.”10

General Creighton Abrams, the Chief of Staff of the Army from 1972-74, implemented this policy

for the Army by instituting changes which deeply integrated reserve forces into the active force

structure. This deeper integration helped General Abrams rebuild the Army to 16 divisions while

staying within budgetary limits; it also effectively ensured that the Army could not be sent to war

again without the Guard and Reserve, as had occurred in Vietnam.11 The most notable

manifestation of this increased active-reserve integration was the roundout brigade program,

which involved restructuring of certain AC divisions to include an RC brigade. Normally, an AC

division would have three AC brigades assigned to it. At Abrams’ direction, some AC divisions

were assigned two AC brigades, along with a “roundout” National Guard brigade; other AC

divisions kept three AC brigades but had some of their AC battalions replaced with “roundout”

RC battalions. Congress passed a new law to allow in 1976 to make it easier for the President to

The war in Vietnam resulted in a major increase in the size of the Army, which grew from about 1 million soldiers in

1965 to about 1.5 million in 1969. This expansion was accomplished with almost no recourse to the Guard and

Reserve, as President Johnson repeatedly denied requests for major reserve mobilizations (the exception being two

comparatively minor mobilizations in 1968). One author of several historical works concerning the Vietnam era Army,

noted that “Failure to call the reserves at a time when the Army was necessarily expanding, and expanding hugely and

rapidly, had a devastating effect on the force. The pool of leaders was depleted over and over again to cadre new units,

with officers and non-commissioned officers being spread thinner and thinner. With the trained and experienced leaders

in the Reserve and National Guard out of reach, the Army was forced to promote its young officers and sergeants

prematurely, and to replace them with newly inducted and hastily trained substitutes.” Lewis Sorley, “Creighton

Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” Parameters, Summer 1991, p. 38.

Memorandum from James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, “Readiness of the Selected Reserve,” August 23, 1973.

Emphasis in original.

For more on this, see Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” Parameters,

Summer 1991, pp. 45-46. General Abrams restructured the Army in such a way as to make it very difficult for the

Army to conduct any significant deployment without mobilizing the Guard and Reserve, but there are differing

historical interpretations as to his intent in doing this. One perspective is that he did so at least in part to ensure that the

President and Congress could not commit the Army to a future conflict without the knowledge and implicit consent of

the American people, who would be more deeply impacted by a reserve mobilization than a war fought with only active

component personnel or conscripts. Lewis Sorley’s article, cited above, quotes several prominent Army officers who

worked with General Abrams and who support this interpretation. A critique of this perspective is summarized by

another author as follows: “Facing a significant drawdown, the shift to an all-volunteer armed force, and a desire for

ethical reform from the rank and file of an officer corps who believed the Vietnam war had weakened service integrity,

Abrams primary goals were to establish an active force structure that maintained 16 division flags while also increasing

the readiness of reserve components. His subordinates later claimed that he also had a long-term vision to ensure that

no president could ever again fight another Vietnam without mobilization, but that is not clear from available

documents. In fact, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger considered the Army Chief of Staff the epitome of the

“good servant” who always deferred to civilian control of the military.” Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S.

Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), p. 5,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=58. Regardless of the motivation, it does not

appear that the Army’s reliance on its reserve component has been a significant barrier to the United States’ use of

military force, as demonstrated by substantial reserve activations in support of operations over the past 25 years (e.g.,.

Kuwait, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and Afghanistan).

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activate RC personnel and units.12 Other initiatives to improve active-reserve integration in the

1970s and 1980s included more modernized equipment for the RC, greater overseas training

opportunities, and rotations at the newly established National Training Center. 13

The first major test of this greater active-reserve integration came during the 1990-91 Persian

Gulf War, which saw the activation of over 238,000 RC personnel, including about 60,000

members of the Army National Guard and some 88,000 members of the Army Reserve.14 In many

respects, RC performance in this conflict strengthened support for the Total Force Policy among

defense policy makers.15 However, there were areas of RC readiness identified as needing

improvement. This was most apparent with respect to the roundout brigades.16 Three ARNG

roundout brigades were mobilized, somewhat belatedly, and deployed to the National Training

Center for post-mobilization training. Amid claims of serious readiness deficiencies, however,

they were not certified as combat ready until the war was over. A contemporary report by the

Congressional Research Service summarized this experience as follows:

In late 1990, three Army National Guard combat maneuver brigades were mobilized for

Operation Desert Shield (later Desert Storm), the U.S. military effort against Iraq. All three

brigades were “roundout” units, designated to bring an active Army division to full strength

upon mobilization. However, the brigades were not activated until four months after Desert

Shield began; the two whose parent divisions fought in the war did not deploy with those

divisions; none of the brigades left the U.S.; and the only one to be “validated” as combat

ready was so judged on the day of the cease-fire. The brigades' experience generated much

controversy about the viability of the roundout concept and the active Army's relationships

with the National Guard ... The major criticism of the roundout brigades is that they were not

ready to deploy with their parent divisions. However, roundout brigades were never intended

to deploy without some postmobilization training, and it was never envisioned that they

could deploy immediately in response to a no-notice crisis. Unfortunately, a combination of

excessive optimism, overreliance on numerical readiness ratings, and high-level inattention

to the actual readiness levels of the roundout brigades before Desert Shield/Storm led many

to assume that they were as ready as similar active Army brigades. Although the brigades

had major readiness problems when first called up, they were able to be validated for

This statute, originally codified at 10 USC 673b, formed the basis for what is today known as Presidential Selected

Reserve Call Up authority (10 USC 12304).

Michael Doubler and Vance Renfroe, “The National Guard and Total Force Policy,” in The Modern National Guard

(Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2003), pp. 42-47.

The total number of reservists mobilized for Operation Desert Shield/Storm was 238,729, broken out by reserve

component as follows: Army Reserve (88,282), Army National Guard (60,350), Naval Reserve (19,461), Air Force

Reserve (22,860), Air National Guard (10,456), Marine Corps Reserve (35,671), and Coast Guard Reserve (1,649). See

CRS Report RL30637, Involuntary Reserve Activations For U.S. Military Operations Since World War II, by (name red

acted).

The report which accompanied the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1993 stated “The

committee recommends a package of reforms designed to pave the way for an expanded role for combat units in the

future ... Operation Desert Storm provided a great deal of information about mobilizing and using the reserve

component. Although the experience revealed much that worked very well, it also pointed out the need for some

necessary changes in the Army National Guard, as well as the active Army.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on

Armed Services, Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on H.R. 5006 , 102nd Cong.,

2nd sess., May 19, 1992, H.Rept. 102-527 (Washington: GPO, 1992), p. 19.

The General Accounting Office published several reports which were fairly critical of the brigades’ readiness,

including U.S. General Accounting Office, Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf

War, NSIAD-91-263, September 24, 1991, http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-91-263 and U.S. General Accounting

Office, Army Guard Combat Brigade War Lessons Reflect Long-Standing Problems, T-NSIAD-92-36, May 5, 1992,

http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/104510.pdf.

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deployment to the theater of war three months after activation. This was an unprecedented

achievement compared with past call ups of similar reserve component units. 17

The Persian Gulf War experience led Congress to address identified readiness shortcomings

through passage of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (also known

as “Title XI,” in reference to its location within the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act18).

The reforms focused primarily, though not exclusively, on ARNG combat units. Title XI

contained 19 provisions which sought to improve the readiness of Army Guard units and their

compatibility with AC units by: increasing experience and leadership levels in the ARNG by

recruiting more prior-service personnel, Service Academy graduates, and ROTC graduates;

revising the training focus for combat units; providing for a more robust medical and dental

evaluation process; ensuring the compatibility of personnel, supply, maintenance and finance

systems across the AC, ARNG, and USAR; reforming the Army’s readiness system for USAR and

ARNG units; directing the Secretary of the Army to conduct inspections to ensure that ARNG

units meet deployability standards; and mandating that the Army provide greater funding to early

deploying ARNG and USAR units.19

Although the Department of Defense effectively ended the roundout brigade program in 1993,20

the disintegration of the Soviet Union gave further impetus to the ongoing integration of the AC

and RC. With the demise of the United States’ main military competitor, the requirement for large

numbers of ground forces at a high state of readiness was considered less critical for national

security. Subsequently, AC force structure was substantially reduced in the 1990s. During this

time, the Army also adjusted the roles of its reserve components. The Army’s 1993 “Offsite

Agreement”21 guided the realignment of force structure between the ARNG and USAR, and

stipulated that

•

The ARNG would retain a balanced mix of combat and support units;22

•

The USAR would be divested of nearly all its combat structure and would focus

on providing support units; it would also provide the bulk of the RC’s Echelon

Above Division (EAD) and Echelon Above Corps (EAC) units; and

•

The USAR and ARNG would swap approximately 12,000 spaces to facilitate this

agreement.

(name redacted), CRS Report to Congress, “The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War,” October

22, 1991, summary page. See also Anne W. Chapman, The National Training Center Matures, 1985-1993, U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command Military History Office, Fort Monroe, VA, 1997, pp. 237-248,

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/HISTORIAN/publications.htm and Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War:

The Army National Guard, 1636-2000 (Lawrence , KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), pp. 312-317, 330-332.

P.L. 102-484.

P.L. 102-484, Title XI (sections 1101-1137).

Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000 (Lawrence , KS:

University Press of Kansas, 2003), pp. 349-50.

Some information about the Offsite Agreement provided to CRS during a meeting with the Army G-8 office on May

19, 2014.

In the terminology common at that time, the ARNG would continue to maintain a balanced mix of combat, combat

support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units, while the USAR would be made up almost exclusively CS and

CSS units. Combat units include infantry, armor, artillery, special forces and certain aviation and engineer units.

Combat support (CS) includes intelligence, communication, chemical, military police and certain aviation and engineer

units. Combat service support (CSS) includes supply, ordnance, transportation, medical, legal, and finance units.

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The post-Cold War drawdown was followed by the increased employment of RC forces in Iraq

(low-intensity conflict with Iraq, 1998-2003), Bosnia (1995-2004), Kosovo (1999-present), and

Haiti (1994-1996). As the use of RC units increased and they gained experience through

repetitive deployments, the distinction between components faded somewhat, and RC units began

to be more seriously considered as suitable substitutes for AC units—provided they received

necessary personnel, equipment, training and preparation time prior to being deployed. This

perspective was further reinforced by the large-scale and continuing mobilizations of RC forces

for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which led many public officials and policy analysts to

conclude that the performance of the RC in these conflicts largely validated the Total Force

Policy. Some Army officials have argued, however, that AC and RC units are not interchangeable,

with one senior Army officer indicating that this was the reason RC BCTs were used for less

complex missions in Iraq and Afghanistan than their AC counterparts.23 RC advocates counter

that they had no control over the missions they were assigned in Iraq and Afghanistan, that they

were effective in all the missions they were given, and that they could have successfully

completed combined arms maneuver missions if they had been given the opportunity.24

In addition to the large scale mobilization of RC units during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,

Congress authorized significant expansions of the active Army and Marine Corps. This led to an

increase in the ratio of AC to RC forces in those Services. However, with the end of the war in

Iraq and the ongoing reduction of forces in Afghanistan, a multi-year drawdown of AC forces is

underway in these Services. This drawdown has rolled back the war-time increases in AC strength

and will likely end at a level lower than existed prior to the war. As such, the proportion of AC to

RC forces will also likely decline in those Services.

Army Active-Reserve Mix

The Army determines the distribution of units between the AC, ARNG, and USAR within the end

strengths25 mandated annually by Congress by a process it calls Total Army Analysis (TAA). The

TAA uses a deliberative campaign analysis process to determine the demand for forces from all

three components based on multiple possible future scenarios and current operational demands, as

well as lessons learned from past operations and conflicts and resource constraints. AC/RC force

mix is dynamic and changes over time in response to changing national security strategies and the

resources made available to the Army. Table 1 illustrates the changing nature of AC/RC force

See comments of Major General John Rossi, Army Quadrennial Defense Review Director, in Sydney J. Freedberg,

Jr., Breaking Defense, “National Guard Commanders Rise in Revolt Against Active Army; MG Rossi Questions Guard

Combat Role,” available at http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/national-guard-commanders-rise-in-revolt-againstactive-army-mg-ross-questions-guard-combat-role/. Chief of Staff of the Army Raymond Odierno made similar if less

specific comments at the National Press Club on January 7, 2014: “ ... the Army for many years now is structured to

become complementary. And what I mean by that is you have an active component that has a certain capability. You

have a National Guard that has a certain capability. And you have a U.S. Army reserve that has a certain capability.

The capabilities are not interchangeable. There's a reason why the active component is more expensive. It brings you a

higher level of readiness because they're full-time. They are trained and ready to do things at a higher level because

they spend every day focused on that. Our National Guard, who's done an incredible job in the last 10 years, trains 39

days a year. And that covers personnel training and—so when you're talking about integrating organizationally, it takes

a bit longer. So it's not—they're not interchangeable.”

See also National Guard Association of the United States, “NGAUS: Guard and Active Units are ‘Interchangeable,’”

January 13, 2014, available at http://www.ngaus.org/newsroom/news/ngaus-guard-and-active-units-areinterchangeable#

See footnote 2 for the definition of end strength.

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mix. Of all the Services, the Army has the largest reserve component, and the highest ratio of

reserve component personnel to active component personnel.

Table 1. Examples of Army AC/RC Force Mix

K = thousands; M = millions

Year

AC Levels

RC Levels

AC % of

force mix

RC % of

force mix

Total Size

of Army

1989 (end of the Cold War)

770 K

776 K

49.1%

50.1%

1.546 M

Sept 11, 2001

480 K

555 K

46.4%

53.6%

1.035 M

2010 (peak Army strength

related to wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan)

570 K

564 K

50.3%

49.7%

1.134 M

FY2015 Budget Request

490 K

552 K

47.0%

53.0%

1.042 M

Army proposal for FY2017

(“smallest acceptable force”)

450K

530K

45.9%

54.1%

980K

Army proposal for FY2019

(“worst case scenario”)

420K

500K

45.6%

54.4%

920K

Source: Historical data, Army budget documents, and information given to CRS during a meeting with the Army

G-8 office on May 19, 2014.

Note: The Army has the highest proportion of its force structure in the RC (52% at the end of FY2014). For

comparative purposes, the RC proportions for the other Services at the end of FY2014 are as follows: Navy

(15%), Air Force (35%), Marine Corps (17%).

Background

Components of the Army

The Army has an Active Component and two Reserve Components: the Army National Guard and

the Army Reserve. These three components are sometimes identified as Compo 1 (Active Army),

Compo 2 (Army National Guard), and Compo 3 (Army Reserve). Each component is discussed in

more detail below.

The Active Component (AC)

The Army’s active component consists of soldiers who are in the Army as their full-time

occupation. Soldiers in the AC can be deployed world-wide with little to no advanced notification

to participate in a wide variety of military operations. The AC has both direct combat and

support-type units. Examples of the former include infantry, armor, artillery, combat aviation, and

special forces units; while the latter include medical, transportation, communications, supply,

ordnance, intelligence, military police, and engineer units.

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The Reserve Component (RC)

The term “Reserve Component” normally refers to all seven of the individual reserve components

of the Armed Forces,26 but for the purpose of this report it refers only to the Army’s reserve

components: the Army National Guard of the United States and the United States Army Reserve.

The purpose of the reserve components, as codified in law, is to “provide trained units and

qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national

emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the

armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.”27

A DOD directive further states: “It is DOD policy that... The RCs provide operational capabilities

and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.... ”28

The Army National Guard also has a state role, described below.

Army National Guard (ARNG)

Descended from colonial-era militias29 which existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the

Army National Guard has a long historical pedigree. The Constitution contains provisions that

recognize the existence of the militia and that granted the federal government a certain amount of

control over it.30 Additionally, since 1933, the ARNG has been not only a part of the organized

The seven reserve components are the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy

Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast

Guard Reserve. Although the term “reserves” is often used as a generic term to refer to all members of the seven

individual reserve components, there is an important distinction between the five reserve components that are purely

federal entities (the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard

Reserve) and the two reserve components that are both federal and state entities (the Army National Guard and the Air

National Guard). Hence, in some contexts, the five purely federal reserve components are referred to collectively as the

Reserves, while the dual federal/state reserve components are referred to as the National Guard.

10 U.S.C. 10102. The language was changed by P.L. 108-375, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense

Authorization Act for FY2005. Prior to this change, the language was as follows: “The purpose of each reserve

component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war

or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces

whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the

planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.” The change in statutory

language, as explained in a House Armed Services Committee report, would “clarify that the purpose of the reserve

components is to provide trained units and qualified personnel not just as the result of involuntary mobilizations but

whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the active component. The revision recommended by this

section more accurately reflects recent and future employments of the reserve components.” H.Rept. 108-491, p. 316.

Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” October

29, 2008, paragraph 4a, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/120017p.pdf .

The colonial militia, which was derived from a longstanding English tradition and which required every able bodied

free male (though Native Americans and free blacks were frequently excluded) to participate in the common defense of

his town or locality, was the principal institution of colonial military power. Gradually, as the colonial population grew

and military threats waned, a distinction arose between the unorganized militia (those members of the militia who were

potentially liable for military service but who did not actively participate in military training) and the organized militia

(those members of the militia who regularly trained for war and who responded first to military threats). Today, the

U.S. Code still recognizes the militia as consisting of “all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and ... under 45

years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of

female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.” (10 U.S.C. 311) This provision of the

law further divides the militia into the organized and the unorganized militia, and declares the National Guard and the

Naval Militia to be the organized militia. At present New York, Ohio, and South Carolina have active Naval Militias.

See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clauses 15 and 16, and Article II, Section 2, clause 1.

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militia of the various states, but simultaneously a reserve component of the Army. In this latter

status, it falls under Congress’ broader constitutional authority “to raise and support Armies.”31

This unique history means that the ARNG is both a federal and a state organization. It is made up

of 54 separate National Guard organizations: one for each state, and one each for Puerto Rico,

Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. While the District of Columbia

National Guard is an exclusively federal organization and operates under federal control at all

times, the other 53 National Guards operate as state or territorial organizations most of the time.

In this capacity, each of these 53 organizations is identified by its state or territorial name (e.g.,

the California National Guard or the Puerto Rico National Guard), and is controlled by its

respective governor. Due to their dual federal and state role, National Guardsmen can be called to

duty in several different ways.

The ARNG is made up primarily of part-time personnel who are usually required to train at least

one weekend a month and two weeks per year. Training time can be increased if needed; for

example, if an individual needs to attend a military school, or if the unit is preparing for

deployment. The ARNG also has a cadre of full-time support personnel, who are “assigned to

organize; administer; instruct; recruit and train; maintain supplies, equipment and aircraft; and

perform other functions required on a daily basis in the execution of operational missions and

readiness preparations as authorized in Title 5 [Government Organizations and Employees], Title

10 [Armed Forces], and Title 32 [National Guard].... ” The full-time cadre makes up about 17%

of the total strength of the ARNG. During times of war and in support of other military missions,

the ARNG can be federalized and deployed. It also participates in a wide variety of other

activities such as assisting during natural disasters or supporting homeland security operations,

although it typically does these missions while under the control of the state governor. Like the

AC, the ARNG has both direct combat and support type units.

United States Army Reserve (USAR)

In comparison to the ARNG, the USAR is of comparatively recent origin, having been established

in 1908 under Congress’s constitutional authority “to raise and support Armies.”32 It is a purely

federal entity and today is composed almost exclusively of support units rather than direct combat

units. Like the ARNG, the USAR consists primarily of part-time soldiers who are usually required

to train at least one weekend a month and two weeks per year, although training time can be

increased if needed. The part-time personnel are augmented by a cadre of full-time support

personnel, who constitute about 14% of total USAR strength. Unlike the ARNG, which normally

operates under state control, the USAR is always under the control of the federal government.

Basic Organization of Army Forces

The Army—whether AC or RC component—is organized along the following basic lines:

How the Army Organizes its Forces

Squad – 4 to 12 soldiers

U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, clause 12.

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From an operational perspective, the Army

focuses on the brigade level. Brigades have

the capacity to be employed independently on

operations as they possess organic

headquarters, combat, combat support, and

combat service support units. Brigades can be

combined along with other units to form

divisions. Divisions, along with a variety of

higher echelon support units, can be combined

into corps and armies, which are well suited

for large scale, long-duration operations.

Platoon – 16 to 50 soldiers

Company – 60 to 200 soldiers

Battalion – 400 to 1,000 soldiers

Brigade – 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers

Division – 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers

Corps – 40,000 to 100,000 soldiers

Army – 100,000 to 300,000 soldiers

The Focus on Army Brigades

From a 2012 RAND Report:

“In 2003, the U.S. Army began implementing a set of ambitious changes to its force structure to address the

challenges of waging war and conducting extended stabilization operations. A key change involved transitioning the

Army from a traditional, division-based force into a brigade-based force, a concept that has come to be known as

"modularity." Some important capabilities that were formerly part of the host division were made organic to the

brigade combat team organization. The Army also reduced the range of combat brigade types from 17 to three:

infantry, Stryker, and Heavy [now referred to as Armored] ... The move to modularity provided the Army with a

greater number of smaller, very capable force packages, making it easier to sustain the protracted operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan. Combat support and combat service support units and force structure were also redesigned to make

the entire force more modular.” 33

Types of Army Brigades

Brigade Combat Teams: Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs); Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs);

and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), including airborne, air assault, and light infantry variations; and.

Functional and Multi-Functional Support Brigades: Aviation, Fires (artillery, etc.), Air Defense, Intelligence,

Battlefield Surveillance, Cyber, Engineer, Maneuver Enhancement, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and

Explosive (CBRNE), Military Police, Civil Affairs, Medical, Transportation, Field Support, Sustainment, and

Contracting.

The Army and the Other Services

The Army is not a stand-alone service but instead part of a joint team. This relationship is

described in the following passage.

Although individual Services may plan and conduct operations to accomplish tasks and

missions in support of Department of Defense (DOD) objectives, the primary way DOD

employs two or more Services (from two Military Departments) in a single operation,

particularly in combat, is through joint operations. Joint operations is the general term to

describe military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces in specified

command relationships with each other.34

Stuart E. Johnson, John E. Peters, Karin E. Kitchens, Aaron Martin, Jordan R. Fischbach, “A Review of the Army’s

Modular Force Structure,” RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012, p. iii.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, March 23, 2013, p. xi.

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The Army’s most significant role as part of the joint force is the provision of landpower, further

defined as:

The Army’s contribution to joint operations is landpower. Landpower is the ability—by

threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land,

resources, and people. Landpower includes the ability to—

- Impose the Nation’s will on adversaries—by force if necessary—in diverse and complex

terrain.

- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for a lasting peace.

- Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and manmade—to restore

infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.

- Support and provide a base from which forces can influence and dominate the air and sea

dimensions of the joint operational area.

While the Army is an integral part of the joint force, the value of its contribution depends on

its ability to exercise landpower. Ultimately, Army forces’ ability to control land, resources,

and people through a sustained presence makes permanent the advantages gained by joint

forces.35

It should also be noted the Army provides critical enabling capabilities to joint operations

including joint command and control (Joint Force Headquarters), communications, air and missile

defense, and logistics.

Functions of the Department of the Army

a. The Department of the Army includes land combat, and service forces, and such aviation, water transport, and

space and cyberspace forces as may be organic therein, and shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for

prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land, and to support the other Military Services and joint

forces. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and

military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned. The Army is the Nation’s principal land force and

promotes national values and interests by conducting military engagement and security cooperation; deterring

aggression and violence; and should deterrence fail, compelling enemy behavioral change or compliance. The Army

shall contribute forces through a rotational, cyclical readiness model that provides a predictable and sustainable supply

of modular forces to the Combatant Commands, and a surge capacity for unexpected contingencies.

b. The Functions of the Army. In addition to the common military service functions listed in paragraphs 2.a. through

2.n. of this enclosure, the Army, within the Department of the Army, shall develop concepts, doctrine, tactics,

techniques, and procedures, and organize, train, equip, and provide forces with expeditionary and campaign qualities

to perform the following specific functions:

(1) Conduct prompt and sustained combined arms combat operations on land in all environments and types of

terrain, including complex urban environments, in order to defeat enemy ground forces, and seize, occupy, and

defend land areas.

(2) Conduct air and missile defense to support joint campaigns and assist in achieving air superiority.

(3) Conduct airborne and air assault, and amphibious operations. The Army has primary responsibility for the

development of airborne doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment.

(4) Conduct CAO [civil affairs operations].

Field Manual 1, The Army, June 2005, p. 1-1.

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(5) Conduct riverine operations.

(6) Occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer

of this responsibility to other authority.

(7) Interdict enemy sea, space, air power, and communications through operations on or from the land.

(8) Provide logistics to joint operations and campaigns, including joint over-the-shore and intra-theater transport

of time-sensitive, mission-critical personnel and materiel.

(9) Provide support for space operations to enhance joint campaigns, in coordination with the other Military

Services, Combatant Commands, and USG departments and agencies.

(l0) Conduct authorized civil works programs, to include projects for improvement of navigation, flood control,

beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories, and its

possessions, and conduct other civil activities prescribed by law.

(11) Provide intra-theater aeromedical evacuation.

(12) Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.

(13) Operate land lines of communication.36

Types of Army Operations

The Army conducts what is described as “full spectrum operations.”

During joint campaigns overseas, Army forces execute a simultaneous and continuous combination of offensive,

defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations as part of integrated joint, interagency, and multinational

teams. Concurrently with overseas campaigns, Army forces within the United States and its territories combine

offensive, defensive, and civil support operations to support homeland security. Strategically, the ability to

conduct offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations in overseas campaigns while

supporting homeland security domestically is central to full spectrum operations.37

Specific operations types described in the preceding paragraph are defined as:

•

Offensive operations carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces, seizing

territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander's will on the enemy. They focus on seizing, retaining,

and exploiting the initiative.38

•

Defensive operations counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks, destroying as many attackers

as necessary. Defensive operations preserve control over land, resources, and populations. They retain terrain,

guard populations, and protect key resources. Defensive operations also buy time and economize forces to allow

the conduct of offensive operations elsewhere. Defensive operations not only defeat attacks but also create the

conditions necessary to regain the initiative and go on the offensive or execute stability and reconstruction

operations.39

•

Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and

resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support civilian agencies.

Stability and reconstruction operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before,

during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower

Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,

December 21, 2010.

Ibid.

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end of the range of military operations. Stability and reconstruction operations lead to an environment in which,

in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate.40

•

Within the United States and its territories, Army forces support homeland security operations. Homeland

security operations provide the Nation strategic flexibility by protecting its citizens and infrastructure from

conventional and unconventional threats. Homeland security has two components. The first component is

homeland defense. If the United States comes under direct attack or is threatened by hostile armed forces,

Army forces under joint command conduct offensive and defensive missions as part of homeland defense. The

other component is civil support, which is the fourth type of Army operation.41

•

Civil support operations address the consequences of man-made or natural accidents and incidents beyond

the capabilities of civilian authorities. Army forces do not conduct stability and reconstruction operations within

the United States; under U.S law, the federal and state governments are responsible for those tasks. Instead,

Army forces conduct civil support operations when requested, providing Army expertise and capabilities to lead

agency authorities.42

A central tenet of full spectrum operations is that all Army units—AC and RC alike—are required to be ready to

successfully conduct all of the aforementioned operations.

Army AC/RC Force Mix

How the Army Determines AC/RC Force Mix43

The starting point for determining AC/RC force mix is a series of national security strategic

guidance documents including the following:

•

The Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS);

•

DOD’s National Defense Strategy (NDS);

•

The congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR); and

•

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) National Military Strategy

(NMS).44

These high-level strategic documents broadly articulate the Army’s role in the national security

architecture. They also delineate specific missions and responsibilities as well as parameters that

the Army uses to help determine what kind of force the Army needs to “build.” Based on these

documents the Army could build a heavier (more armor) or lighter (more infantry) force, a force

oriented on fighting a major regional adversary, or one that is more focused on counterinsurgency,

etc. However, because there is risk associated with putting too much emphasis on one type of

force (heavy vs. light, for example), the Army tends to build a mix of forces that can address a

wide variety of operations—or what the Army refers to as a “full spectrum” force.

Ibid.

Information in this table is taken from information given to CRS during a meeting with the Army G-8 office on May

19, 2014.

For detailed information on the aforementioned national security documents see CRS Report R43174, National

Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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In addition to strategic guidance, budgetary considerations play a major role in determining the

size of the Army as well as, to an extent, the AC/RC force mix. Historically, during times of

conflict or national emergency, resources are made available to expand the Army as well as

provide necessary equipment and training. After conflicts or during periods of protracted peace,

traditionally fewer resources have been provided to the Army, often resulting in a drawdown of

forces as well as the rebalancing of the AC/RC mix based on the premise that RC forces are less

costly to maintain during peacetime. These decreases in resources can also adversely affect the

readiness of available forces as well as impact Army modernization efforts.

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Figure 1. The AC/RC Force Mix Process

From Conception to Employment

Source: CRS graphic developed by authors.

As previously noted, the Army determines much of the AC/RC force mix by the Total Army

Analysis (TAA) process. TAA generates the combat support (CS) and combat service support

(CSS) forces needed to support divisional and non-divisional combat forces that are set forth in

the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The TAA uses a deliberative campaign analysis process to

determine the demand for forces from all three components based on multiple possible future

scenarios, current operational demands, as well as lessons learned from past operations and

conflicts, and resource constraints. This force is then presented to Army leadership who use the

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Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix

approved force to build the Army’s annual budget request. Figure 1 graphically depicts the

process used to determine the Army’s AC/RC force mix.

Army Plans to Change its AC/RC Force Mix

In addition to overall force size, the Army also expresses AC/RC force mix in terms of units, with

the brigade combat team (BCT)45 being the most commonly used unit. Brigade combat teams

(BCTs) are the Army’s basic operational warfighting unit and it should be noted there are only AC

and ARNG BCTs—the USAR has no BCTs. As the Army reduces overall force size, the force

mix between AC and RC is altered to reflect these reductions. In FY2014, the Army has:

•

38 Active Component BCTs.

•

28 Army National Guard BCTs.

•

66 Total BCTs.

In 2013, the Army decided to add an additional “maneuver battalion”46 to its Infantry BCTs and

Armored BCTs which, prior to 2013, had only two maneuver battalions (unlike Stryker BCTs

which have always had 3 maneuver battalions). This additional maneuver battalion will come

from BCTs in the process of deactivating. Thus, even though BCTs are being eliminated from AC

and RC force structure, Infantry and Armored BCTs are gaining additional combat capability

which should be taken into consideration when discussing force reductions and force mix.

Smallest Acceptable Force Size47

The Army has stated a 450,000 AC, a 335,000 ARNG, and a 195,000 USAR—28 active BCTs

and 24 ARNG BCTs (52 BCTs total)—is the “smallest acceptable force to implement the defense

strategy.” Any force smaller than this “lacks the capacity to conduct simultaneous major combat

operations while defending the nation at home, sustaining minimal presence in critical regions,

and retaining a Global Response Force (consisting of one BCT) at the direction of the

Commander-in-Chief.” 48

Potential Force Mix Scenarios49

The Army has stated that force structure reductions are required to meet sequestration-imposed

funding levels. The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended by the

American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240), requires across-the-board spending

For additional information on brigade combat teams see CRS Report R42493, Army Drawdown and Restructuring:

Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Maneuver battalion is an Army term for either an infantry or armored (tank) battalions which are capable of

“maneuvering” to destroy enemy forces.

Information in this section is taken from an Army Briefing, “Army Force Mix: Least Risk: Best Value,” January 6,

2014.

Ibid. p. 3.

Information in this section is taken from an Army Briefing, “Army Force Mix: Least Risk: Best Value,” January 6,

2014. For more detailed information on the Army’s drawdown see CRS Report R42493, Army Drawdown and

Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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reductions (sequestration) in most federal defense and nondefense discretionary programs. The

American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 raised defense and nondefense budget spending limits

under the Budget Control Act (BCA) for FY2014 and FY2015 but BCA spending limits will

return in FY2016 if no further legislative action is taken.

Because of budget uncertainty, the Army’s “worst case” planning scenario is that sequestrationlevel funding levels return in FY2016. In addition, DOD has provided the Army with both

strategic and fiscal guidance which influences the force level the Army can “afford” as well as the

AC/RC force mix. Under this worst case scenario, the Army would reduce in size to a 420,000

AC; a 315,000 ARNG; and an 185,000 USAR which would translate to 24 AC BCTs and 22

ARNG BCTs. Army leadership has repeatedly stated that this force level would result in

insufficient capacity and the Army would be unable to implement the U.S. defense strategy.

What’s Missing in the Force Mix Discussion?

As previously noted, BCTs are the mostly commonly portrayed unit type when examining AC/RC

force mix but there are scores of other types of units ranging from combat aviation brigades,

engineer units, logistics units, to military police brigades as well as smaller units that are part of

the greater force mix equation. These non-BCT formations play a significant role in a wide range

of military operations and depending on the operation, they could be the focus of the operation

instead of BCTs. It is important to note that when determining AC/RC force mix, these non-BCT

units are also included as part of the process even though they are frequently not included in

related discussions. In this regard, when questioning Army AC/RC force mix proposals, it could

prove beneficial to also examine the mix of non-BCT units as well.

Proposed Aviation Restructuring

In March 2014, the Army proposed a plan (referred to as the Aviation Restructuring Initiative or

ARI) to restructure aviation units. Under the ARI, the AC and National Guard would be allocated

aircraft that supposedly better align with each component’s respective missions which would also

supposedly generate savings. This proposal, which has generated a great deal of discussion, is

further discussed in Appendix A.

AC/RC Mix: Considerations for Congress

Determining the appropriate mix of AC and RC forces is complex, with many factors affecting

the process. Of these, utilization, readiness, effectiveness, cost, and risk are generally considered

the major elements in developing the AC/RC force mix. These factors are all linked to the ability

of the specified military forces to meet national security requirements in a budget constrained

environment. However, there are other factors often considered with respect to AC/RC mix,

particularly with respect to the National Guard. These factors are discussed briefly as well, under

the heading “Other Considerations.”

Utilization

A key driver of Army force structure, both AC and RC, is the anticipated future demand for Army

units. What will they be used for? How quickly will they need to respond? For how long will they

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be needed? Answering these questions involves assumptions about likely threats to national

interests, how frequently the United States will deploy Army units in response to those threats,

and what type of mission they will need to conduct when responding to those threats. Given those

broad parameters, several factors should be considered in determining how much of the

“demand” can be met with AC forces and with RC forces.

Missions

The missions anticipated for Army units play a key role in determining the number and types of

units the Army maintains in its force structure. If AC and RC units of the same type are identical

in capability and availability, they can be used in precisely the same manner and, consequently,

this factor would have limited applicability to AC/RC mix considerations. However, some

observers argue AC and RC units are not identical in terms of availability and, at least in some

circumstances, are not identical in terms of capability; hence, they are not always interchangeable

for mission planning purposes. For example, AC Army units are usually considered better

positioned to respond to crises requiring immediate action because they are more readily

available; that is, they typically require less notification, preparation and train up time prior to

deployment than similar RC units.50 RC Army units tend to be preferred for missions that permit a

substantial train up period; for example, as reinforcements for an initial response force or as part

of a periodic rotation for a long term mission. Additionally, given policy constraints on the length

of RC activations (discussed more below), AC units are often preferred for “forward presence”

missions overseas, such as the main Army forces in Europe and South Korea. More controversial

is the contention that AC and RC units of the same type are not identical in terms of their

capability. (See footnote 23) Some argue that AC units are superior to their RC counterparts in

certain respects, and are therefore better suited for certain missions—most notably high intensity

combat or “combined arms maneuver.”51 The reverse of this argument—that some RC units are

better suited to certain missions (such as homeland defense, disaster response, and missions with

a close civilian analogue)—is also advanced.

Access to the Reserve Components

Historically, one of the barriers to use of the RC was the limited circumstances under which they

could legally be ordered to active duty. The principal activation authorities in effect after World

War II—today known as Full Mobilization and Partial Mobilization Issues—limited reserve

activations to times of war or situations where a national emergency had been declared by

Congress or the President. In 1976, a new authority, now known as Presidential Reserve Callup

Authority, allowed the President to activate reservists for missions without a declaration of

Several factors relate to this: more rapid assembly of an active personnel (versus the time it takes to invoke activation

authorities for reservists and assemble the personnel); the full-time nature of active duty allows AC soldiers to maintain

a higher state of training readiness (whereas reserve soldiers typically need at least some post-mobilization training);

the location of AC units on bases which have support activities to enable deployment (whereas RC units frequently

have to travel some distance to arrive at such a base); and, more AC units are forward deployed and may thus be

located closer to the crisis location.

The Army’s doctrinal definition of combined arms maneuver is “the application of the elements of combat power in

unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical,

temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. It exposes enemies to

friendly combat power from unexpected directions and prevents an effective enemy response.” Department of the

Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, October 10, 2011, p. 6, available at

http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_0.pdf .

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emergency, though the duration of this type of activation was limited, as was the number of

reservists who could be activated at any given time. Subsequent amendments expanded the scope

of this authority significantly. The FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act added two new

activation authorities: one to permit activation of reservists for up to 120 days to respond to

disasters, and another to permit activation of reservists for up to one year for “preplanned mission

in support of a combatant command.” This latter authority opens the door for activations in

support of more routine military missions, rather than the crisis or “contingency” focus of the

other authorities. These activation authorities are summarized in Appendix E.

The lowering of legal barriers to reserve activations has contributed to the increased use of

reservists in recent decades and eased the concerns of senior defense officials that reservists will

be available when needed. Still, when considering whether to use reserve forces in a given role or

for a particular mission, the reserve activation authorities place constraints on defense officials

that do not exist for active forces. In particular, there are statutory limits on the number of

reservists that may be activated, and the length of time that they may be ordered to active duty.

Since 2007, there have also been DOD policy limitations on the frequency and duration of reserve

activations that are stricter in certain respects than the statutory limits (discussed in the next

section). Finally, in considering the use of reserve units for specific roles and missions, defense

planners must take into account the time it takes to invoke activation authorities for reservists,

notify affected units, assemble their personnel, and conduct post-mobilization training.

Deployment to Dwell (AC) and Mobilization to Dwell (RC) Ratios52

During World War II, Army units typically deployed for the duration of the conflicts; thus, units

and their personnel could spend three to four years deployed in combat zones. A different

approach was used starting with the Korean War, when individuals were rotated in and out of

theater on a periodic basis. During the Vietnam conflict, soldiers were rotated in and out of the

deployed unit for a one year “tour of duty” and then returned home. While this policy addressed

the issue of spending an extended period in combat, it also created a great deal of turbulence

which some cited as having had an adverse impact on unit cohesion and discipline.

With the advent of the All-Volunteer Force and the growth of military families, separating

soldiers from their families for extended periods raised concerns about impacts on retention.

When it became apparent to military leadership that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would

span many years, DOD established a deployment policy for the Active and Reserve components.

In 2007, the Secretary of Defense established a “deployment-to-dwell” policy for AC forces—

which remains in effect today—indicating that the planning objective would be one year of

deployment followed by two years at home station. He also limited RC activations to a maximum

of one year (excluding individual skill training and post-mobilization leave), and set the

“mobilization to dwell” planning objective for RC units at one year mobilized followed by five

years demobilized.53 These dwell time policies are typically expressed by the ratios of 1:2 and

1:5.

Information from this section is taken from Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force,

January 19, 2007.

Memo from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Utilization of the Total Force,” January 19, 2007, available at

http://www.armyg1.army.mil/MilitaryPersonnel/Hyperlinks/Adobe%20Files/

OSD%20Memo%20dtd%2020070119%20-%20Utilization%20of%20the%20Force.pdf

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In addition to the differences in ratios, another key distinction between the two policies is that the

deployment-to-dwell ratio for AC units is tied only to time deployed, while the mobilization to

dwell ratio for RC units is tied to time mobilized, which can include both pre-deployment training

and deployment time. For example, a one-year mobilization for an RC unit might include three

months of train up followed by a nine-month deployment. These differences in policy for AC and

RC units play a critical role in comparative cost estimates which use a deployed unit cost

approach (discussed later in the report).

Key Questions Related to Utilization

•

What are the major threats to which Army units will be expected to respond?

How fast will the Army be expected to respond and with what types of units?

How long will operations last? How long will units be expected to remain in a

deployed status. Will units need to conduct multiple deployments in order to

meet sustained demands?

•

Are there any roles or missions for which either AC or RC forces are clearly

more capable than their counterpart, and therefore might be the preferred force of

choice? How does this determination align with current AC and RC force

structure?

•

Should statutory limits in reserve activation authorities be modified? Should they

allow more reservists to be activated, and for a longer period of time, than

currently allowed?

•

Should the DOD policy on “deployment-to-dwell” ratios be modified for active

and/or reserve personnel? If so, what should those ratios look like? Are they

sufficiently robust to meet projected national security obligations? Do they allow

sufficient rest time between deployments so that recruiting and retention remain

at acceptable levels?

Readiness

Readiness is a term policy makers, analysts, and military leaders often cite when describing the

state of the U.S. military. The Department of Defense defines readiness as “the ability of military

forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.”54 There are two processes currently

in place for reporting the readiness of military units: the Department of Defense Readiness

Reporting System (DRSS) and the Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS). This report will focus

on the way in which Army commanders determine the readiness of their units to perform their

“core functions/designed capabilities”55 for submission to DRSS. The data for DRSS comes from

a report known as the Commanders Unit Status Reports (CUSR) or Unit Status Reports (USR),

which unit commanders submit to the Army component of DRSS (known as DRSS-Army or

DRSS-A).

Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

as amended through July 16, 2014, p. 214, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf .

There is a separate, though similar process, for reporting readiness for a unit’s “assigned mission,” as an assigned

mission may vary somewhat from what the unit was designed to do.

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The Army Readiness System

Readiness can be evaluated in different ways, but Army readiness evaluations revolve around four

main components: personnel, equipment availability, equipment readiness, and training, each

of which is described below. This readiness evaluation process is led by unit commanders, who

assess readiness levels within the parameters specified by Army regulations. Sometimes the

regulations require the commander to apply professional military judgment to a significant degree

(most notably in the case of training assessments); while in other areas the commander’s

discretion is much more limited.

Personnel (P-level)

There are three principal measures of personnel readiness (“P-level metrics”) for Army units:

1. The ratio of unit personnel available for deployment in comparison to the total

number of personnel the unit is authorized to have.

2. The ratio of unit personnel who are both available for deployment and qualified

in their assigned duty position in comparison to the total number of personnel the

unit is authorized to have.

3. The ratio of available “senior personnel” in comparison to the total number of

senior personnel the unit is authorized to have.

Ratios in each of these metrics generate a rating between 1 (highest) and 4 (lowest) according to a

published scale, and the lowest of these three ratings is used to determine the overall “P-rating” of

the unit.56 In essence, units with a full or nearly full complement of soldiers by specialty and

grade are assessed as P-1, while those with substantial shortages in one or more of the measured

areas are assessed as P-2, P-3, or P-4, depending on how significant the shortfalls are. This aspect

of readiness is relatively objective and therefore requires limited application of a commander’s

professional judgment.

Equipment Availability (S-level)

Another readiness factor for Army units is the availability or supply of key equipment. This is

called the “S-level,” and it is based on two metrics:

1. The ratio of designated critical equipment items (known as pacing items)

currently in the unit’s possession, under its control, or available within 72 hours

in comparison to the number of such items the unit is authorized to have. For

example, a pacing item for an armor unit would be M-1 Abrams tanks.

2. The ratio of other mission essential equipment items57 currently in the unit’s

possession, under its control, or available within 72 hours in comparison to the

number of such items the unit is authorized to have. Examples of this type of

equipment might include radios, machine guns, and night vision devices.

That is, if the three personnel metrics are rated as 1, 1, and 2, respectively, the P-level will be P-2.

These items are designated as “Equipment Readiness Code A” or ERC A.

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Like the P-level, ratios in each of these metrics generate a rating of between 1 and 4 according to

a published scale, and the lowest of these two ratings is used to determine the overall “S-rating”

of the unit.58 Units with all or nearly all of their most important equipment are assessed as S-1,

while those with substantial shortages in pacing items or other mission essential equipment are

assessed as S-2, S-3, or S-4, depending on how significant the shortfalls are. This aspect of

readiness is readily measurable.

Equipment availability is heavily influenced by whether there is sufficient funding to procure the

required equipment for a given unit, and by how senior policy makers chose to allocate

equipment among units. In the Cold-War era, RC units had comparatively low S-level ratings, as

senior defense officials considered equipping these units to be a lower priority than equipping AC

units. This changed significantly with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the large-scale and

ongoing mobilization of RC units. In 2013, according to the Department of Defense, AC units had

approximately 91% of their authorized equipment on hand, the ARNG had approximately 91%,

and the Army Reserve had approximately 86%.59

Equipment Readiness (R-level)

The third measured area for Army units is equipment readiness or serviceability. That is, is the

unit’s equipment fully functional or not? A unit could have all of its authorized equipment by type

and numbers, but still suffer from poor equipment readiness if a large portion of authorized

equipment or weapon systems does not work. The “R-level” is determined by calculating the

percentage of each pacing item that is fully mission capable, and the aggregate percentage of

certain designated equipment (“maintenance reportable equipment”) in the unit’s possession that

is fully mission capable. Each of these categories is rated between 1 and 4 according to a

published scale, and the lowest of these ratings becomes the overall R-level.

The R-level is heavily influenced by funding. If there is not enough money for spare parts or to

send a vehicle into depot level maintenance, equipment readiness can suffer. Unit manning can

affect equipment readiness too. If there are not enough trained mechanics and supply personnel,

repairs can be delayed. RC units have full-time support personnel dedicated to equipment

maintenance, and the number of these personnel have increased since the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan began. However, some argue that RC full-time manning levels are still less than

optimal.

Training (T-level)

The final measured area for Army readiness is the most subjective, and relates to training.

Training readiness does not lend itself to quantifiable evaluation to the same extent as personnel

and equipment readiness, and so relies more heavily on the commander’s professional military

judgment. In assessing training readiness, unit commanders evaluate how well trained the unit is

on certain key tasks, known as “mission essential tasks” or METs. Commanders evaluate their

unit’s training proficiency in each MET as either trained (T), needs practice (P), or untrained (U).

That is, if the two equipment metrics are rated as 1 and 3, respectively, the S-level will be S-3.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Materiel

and Facilities), National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for FY2015, March 2014, pp. 2-3, available at

http://ra.defense.gov/Portals/56/Documents/NGRER%20FY2015.pdf . The figures refer to MTOE (Modified Table of

Organization and Equipment) units, which are units designed for deployment.

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Based on these ratings, a specified calculation methodology, and a published scale, the unit

receives a T-level rating of between 1 and 4.60

An important tenet of training readiness is that all units—AC and RC—train to the same

standards. However, AC and RC units do not necessarily achieve proficiency at the same

organizational level (i.e., platoon, company, battalion, or brigade). During the ARFORGEN cycle,

RC units are typically funded to achieve platoon or company level proficiency prior to

deployment, while AC units are often funded to achieve battalion or brigade level proficiency

prior to deployment (see “Differences in ARFORGEN Training Levels” later in the report).

Additionally, the data on which the commander’s judgments are made can vary substantially. For

example, there may be variations between units in the frequency of training, the ranges and

resources available for the training, and the number and type of units represented in a training

exercise. Operational deployments may also be used when evaluating a unit’s training

proficiency, so the commander of a recently deployed unit may be able to more accurately assess

his or her unit’s training status.

Overall Readiness (C-level)

The C-level rating, or overall readiness assessment, is derived from the four areas discussed

above (P, S, R & T). The C-level is equivalent to the lowest of these four levels,61 although

commanders have some ability to upgrade or downgrade the rating based on their professional

military judgment. The C-rating is meant to reflect the unit’s ability to accomplish its core

functions, provide its designed capabilities, and carry out its mission essential tasks.62 The

meaning of each C-level is described in Table 2.

Subjective Upgrades and Downgrades

Army commanders may not upgrade or downgrade the ratings of the four main resource

categories (i.e., they cannot upgrade or downgrade the P, S, R, or T ratings). However, under

certain circumstances, commanders may upgrade or downgrade the “C-level” rating of their unit.

They do this by comparing the C-level rating initially determined with the descriptions outlined in

Army Regulation 220-1, which are summarized in Table 2. If the two are mismatched in the

commander’s professional judgment, he or she may upgrade or downgrade the unit’s C-level

rating so it more closely aligns with the appropriate C-level description. Commanders of brigades

and smaller organizations may upgrade or downgrade the C-level by one rating level on their own

authority; changes of two rating levels require approval of a higher ranking commander of a

specified rank. Commanders of divisions and corps headquarters may upgrade or downgrade by

The methodology assigns a weight of 3 to each “T,” 2 to each “P,” and “1” to each U. These figures are summed and

then divided by the product of 3 multiplied by the number of METs. The resulting quotient is multiplied by 100 to

produce a percentage, which is interpreted according to a published scale. As an example, if a unit had 5 METs, which

the commander evaluated as T, P, T, U, and P this would be converted to 3, 2, 3, 1, and 2. The sum of these numbers

(3+2+3+1+2=11) would then be divided by the 3 times the number of METs (3x5=15). The resulting percentage would

be 73.3% (11/15*100). If the unit had no untrained tasks (U), this percentage would result in a T-2 rating. However,

since the unit has an untrained task, the result is a T-3 rating.

That is, if the unit was evaluated as P-1, S-1, R-1, and T-3, it would receive a C-3 rating, subject to the possible

upgrade or downgrade by the commander.

AR 220-1, para4-4(a).

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up to two levels on their own authority. The commander must explain the rationale for any such

subjective change.

Table 2. What Readiness Ratings Mean

For Army “C-Level” Ratings

C-1

C-2

C-3

The unit possesses the

required resources and is

trained to accomplish or

provide the core

functions and

fundamental

capabilities for which it

was designed.

The unit possesses the

required resources and is

trained to accomplish or

provide most of the

core functions and

fundamental

capabilities for which it

was designed.

The unit possesses the

required resources and is

trained to accomplish or

provide many, but not

all, of the core

functions and

fundamental

capabilities for which

was designed.

The status of resources

and training in the unit do

not limit flexibility in

methods to accomplish

core functions.

The status of resources

and training in the unit

may cause isolated

decreases in the

flexibility of choices to

accomplish core functions.

The status of resources

and training in the unit will

result in significant

decreases in flexibility

to accomplish core

functions.

The status of resources

and training in the unit will

not increase vulnerability

of unit personnel and

equipment.

The status of resources

and training in the unit will

not increase the

vulnerability of the unit

under most envisioned

operational scenarios

The status of resources

and training in the unit will

increase the vulnerability

of the unit under many,

but not all, envisioned

operational scenarios.

The unit does not

require any

compensation for

deficiencies.

The unit will require

little, if any,

compensation for

deficiencies.

The unit will require

significant

compensation for

deficiencies.

C-4

The unit requires

additional resources or

training to accomplish or

provide the core

functions and

fundamental

capabilities for which

was designed.

Source: Adapted from AR 220-1, paragraph 4-6. Emphasis added to highlight the differences between ratings.