Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Congressional research reportMay 17, 2023
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Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Updated May 17, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R42917
SUMMARY
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Mexico, the 10th most populous country and 15th largest economy in the world, is bound to the
United States by geography and strong economic, cultural, and historical ties. In addition to
sharing a nearly 2,000-mile border with the United States, Mexico is among the top U.S. trade
partners and a major U.S. energy supplier. Criminal violence in Mexico has imperiled U.S.
citizen security in parts of Mexico, and fentanyl production and trafficking from Mexico has
contributed to surging drug overdoses in the United States. U.S.-Mexico ties, both positive and
negative, manifest in legislative activity and interest across a wide range of issues in Congress.
R42917
May 17, 2023
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin
American Affairs
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, which he
created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018. López Obrador has remained popular (63% approval
rating in February 2023), likely because of his social programs, minimum wage increases, and ability to connect with voters.
Critics have expressed concerns about López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government
institutions, and judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform civilian functions.
According to the International Monetary Fund, Mexico’s economy expanded 3.1% in 2022 and may expand 1.8% in 2023.
Observers expect MORENA to dominate the July 2024 presidential elections even though President López Obrador is
constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection.
U.S. Policy
U.S.-Mexico relations have grown turbulent during the López Obrador administration. Mexico has accommodated changing
U.S. immigration and border security policies, negotiated a U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (USMCA), worked
with the United States on pandemic recovery, and relaunched security cooperation under a new Bicentennial Framework.
Nevertheless, ongoing insecurity in Mexico and illicit drug trafficking from Mexico, trade disputes, and U.S. concerns over
democracy and human rights issues have caused tension. The Mexican government has pressed for increased U.S. efforts to
address drug demand and gun trafficking. Key issues of congressional interest discussed in this report include the following:
•
Transnational Crime and Drug Control: Congress may continue to fund and oversee bilateral efforts to
combat cross-border crime a under the Bicentennial Framework signed in October 2021, particularly as
“phase two” of the framework, adopted in March 2023, focuses on combating U.S.-bound fentanyl
trafficking and Mexico-bound arms trafficking.
•
Irregular Immigration: Congress may continue to monitor Mexico’s role in reducing irregular U.S.bound migration, including migration control and humanitarian protection efforts, particularly now that
pandemic-related restrictions on seeking asylum at the Southwest border have been lifted.
•
Human Rights: Members of Congress may continue to support Mexico’s efforts to address human rights
challenges, including violence against journalists and human rights defenders, enforced disappearances,
and femicide.
•
Free Trade: Congress may closely monitor both countries’ adherence to the USMCA, with particular
interest in labor conditions in Mexico and energy policies in Mexico that may violate the agreement.
•
Border Environmental Concerns. Congress may oversee attempts to resolve long-standing transboundary
pollution issues and water sharing on the Southwest border and may consider funding for infrastructure
improvements to address such problems.
Legislative Action
The 118th Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 $111.4 million request for foreign assistance to
Mexico, which is 14% lower than the FY2022 enacted level of $127.1 million and 30% lower than the FY2023 request of
$141.6 million. Members of Congress have introduced a range of proposals to address fentanyl trafficking from Mexico,
including a House Foreign Committee-reported measure, H.R. 3205, that would prioritize working with Mexico to disrupt
fentanyl supply chains and countering Chinese fentanyl operations in Mexico. On migration, legislative proposals have
ranged from addressing irregular migration flows through humanitarian pathways and increased access to asylum to Housepassed legislation (H.R. 2) that would limit access to asylum and direct the Administration to reestablish the Migration
Protection Protocols (MPP) concluded during the Trump Administration. MPP required many migrants to await their U.S.
immigration proceedings in Mexico. See CRS Insight IN12159, Post-Title 42: U.S. Foreign Policy Initiatives to Manage
Regional Migration.
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Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Political and Economic Environment .............................................................................................. 3
Security Conditions and Policy Responses ............................................................................... 4
Addressing Corruption .............................................................................................................. 6
Human Rights............................................................................................................................ 7
Economic and Social Conditions .............................................................................................. 8
López Obrador Government’s Economic and Energy Policies ........................................... 9
Social Conditions .............................................................................................................. 10
Foreign Policy .......................................................................................................................... 11
U.S.-Mexico Relations and Issues for Congress ........................................................................... 12
Security Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Assistance................................................................. 13
Antidrug Efforts: Focus on Fentanyl Trafficking .................................................................... 15
Law Enforcement Cooperation and Extraditions .................................................................... 17
Human Rights.......................................................................................................................... 18
Migration Management ........................................................................................................... 20
Economic and Trade Relations and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement.............................. 22
Modernizing the U.S.-Mexico Border .............................................................................. 23
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement ...................................................................................... 24
Energy ..................................................................................................................................... 25
Border Environmental Issues .................................................................................................. 26
International Boundary and Water Commission ............................................................... 27
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ............................................................................ 27
USMCA Implementation Act, IBWC, and Minute 328 .................................................... 28
North American Development Bank ................................................................................. 28
Water Resource Issues ............................................................................................................. 29
U.S.-Mexico Health Cooperation ............................................................................................ 30
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 32
Figures
Figure 1. Mexico at a Glance .......................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Composition of Mexican Congress by Party: May 2023 ................................................. 4
Figure 3. Estimated Organized Crime-Related Homicides in Mexico ............................................ 5
Figure 4. U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Frameworks ........................................................... 14
Figure 5. Extraditions: from Mexico by Administration: 2000-2022 ............................................ 18
Figure 6. Mexico: Reported Asylum Applications and Apprehensions ......................................... 21
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico: FY2020-FY2024 ................................................................. 14
Table B-1. Estimated Mérida/Bicentennial Framework Funding: FY2008-FY2022 .................... 34
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Key Justice Institutions ............................................................................................ 33
Appendix B. Mérida Initiative Funding ........................................................................................ 34
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 35
Congressional Research Service
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Introduction
Congress has maintained interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading partner with
which the United States has a close but complex relationship (see Figure 1). In recent decades,
bilateral relations improved as the U.S. and Mexican economies became more integrated and the
countries worked together to address crime, migration, and other issues of shared concern.
Disagreements on these issues have emerged on occasion, however, as exemplified by U.S.
concerns about fentanyl production and trafficking from Mexico and Mexican government
concerns about U.S. counterdrug actions inside Mexico and arms trafficking.1 The history of U.S.
military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico has arguably exacerbated such tension.2
Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized crime-related violence in Mexico on
U.S. security interests and about U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico. It has increased oversight of
U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and may continue to do so as the two nations implement the
U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework agreement.3 Congress has continued to appropriate foreign
assistance for Mexico and oversee bilateral efforts to address illegal drug flows, unauthorized
migration, environmental issues, and lessons learned on health and supply chain management
from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Implementation of the United StatesMexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) and its labor commitments, Mexico’s treatment
of U.S. energy firms, and border environmental issues may also receive oversight attention.
This report provides an overview of political and economic conditions in Mexico, followed by
overviews of selected issues of congressional interest in Mexico—security cooperation and
foreign aid; fentanyl trafficking, extraditions; human rights, trade; migration; energy; and border
environmental, water, and health concerns.
Background
Over the past two decades, Mexico has transitioned from a centralized political system dominated
by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which controlled the presidency from 1929-2000,
to a true multiparty democracy.4 Since the 1990s, presidential power has become more balanced
with that of Mexico’s Congress and Supreme Court. Partially as a result of these new constraints
on executive power, the country’s first two presidents from the conservative National Action
Party (PAN)—Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)—struggled to enact
some of the reforms designed to address Mexico’s economic and security challenges.
The Calderón government pursued an aggressive anticrime strategy and increased security
cooperation with the United States. Mexico extradited many drug kingpins, but some 60,000
people died due to organized crime-related violence. Security challenges overshadowed the
government’s achievements, including its economic stewardship during the global financial crisis,
health care expansion and management of the H1N1 pandemic, and efforts on climate change.
In 2012, the PRI regained control of the presidency after 12 years in the opposition with a victory
by Enrique Peña Nieto over Andrés Manuel López Obrador, then standing for the leftist
1 Rocio Fabbro and Robbie Gramer, “U.S.-Mexican Relations Fray Over Fentanyl,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2023.
2 Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, eds., Mexico and the United States: the Politics of Partnership (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013).
3 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue,” October 8, 2022.
4 Emily Edmonds Poli and David A. Shirk, Contemporary Mexican Politics, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2020).
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Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). In 2013, Peña Nieto shepherded reforms on energy,
education, access to finance, and politics through the legislature by forming an agreement among
the PRI, PAN, and PRD. The energy reform opened Mexico’s energy sector to private investment,
prompting foreign companies to pledge hundreds of billions of dollars of new investment in the
country. During Peña Nieto’s term, Mexico continued to contend with high levels of homicides,
moderate economic growth (averaging 2% annually), and pervasive corruption and impunity.
Figure 1. Mexico at a Glance
Sources: Created by CRS using data from CIA World Factbook (CIA), Mexico’s National Council for the
Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Mexico’s National
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), and the Trade Data Monitor (TDM).
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Notes: Mexico’s 2020 census did not include ethnicity; two questions asked people whether they self-identify as
Indigenous language speakers (6.1% of the population) or as Afro-Mexican or Afro-descendant (2% of the
population). See the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Así Se Contó México, 2021.
Political and Economic Environment
Mexico has undergone significant changes under the populist rule of Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, leader of the leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who took
office for a six-year term in December 2018.5 President López Obrador, who created MORENA
in 2014, is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majority support in both
legislative chambers, although the size of those majorities decreased following the June 2021
midterm elections (See Figure 2 below).
President López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained high (63% in February 2023) even as
he struggled to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and continues to be challenged by entrenched
poverty and corruption.6 Supporters of the government have generally praised its social programs
and minimum wage increases, as well as López Obrador’s ability to connect with his constituents
through daily press conferences and frequent, countrywide travel. Critics of the government point
to López Obrador’s attacks on freedom of the press, independent government institutions, and
judicial independence, as well as his increasing reliance on the military to perform roles
previously carried out by civilian agencies in public security, health, infrastructure, customs, and
other sectors. López Obrador has spared his priority, military-built, infrastructure projects from
budget cuts while reducing certain other public spending. López Obrador’s administration has cut
public sector salaries and ministry budgets, especially those of autonomous institutions that he
proposes to eliminate or merge into existing bureaucracies.
As of May 2023, MORENA controlled 201 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 60 of
128 seats in the Mexican Senate (See Figure 2). MORENA relies on ad hoc support from other
parties, including the PT, PES, and Green Party, to pass legislation. With these parties, the
MORENA-led coalition controls 275 seats in the lower chamber and 76 seats in the senate, short
of the two-thirds majority needed to make constitutional amendments. In 2022, the congress
blocked a proposed constitutional reform that would have severely limited private sector
involvement in the electricity sector.7 In contrast, the congress approved MORENA-backed
legislation to place the National Guard, a military-led federal law enforcement body created by
the López Obrador government, under the authority of the defense ministry in September 2022.
Mexico’s Supreme Court declared that reform unconstitutional in April 2023.8 Domestic and
international observers criticized legislative reforms enacted in 2023 that could severely weaken
the independence and capacity of the country’s independent electoral commission ahead of the
5 Originally from the southern state of Tabasco, López Obrador, a former mayor of Mexico City (2000-2005), had run
for president in the past two elections. After his 2012 loss, he left the center-left PRD and founded MORENA.
6 Carin Zissis, “Approval Tracker: Mexico’s President AMLO,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, March 6,
2023; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: Mexico, March 2023. Hereinafter: EIU, March 2023. On
corruption, see “MEXICO: Scandal at Flagship Governmental Body Deepens,” Latin News Security & Strategic
Review, May 2023.
7 Drazen Jorgic and Dave Graham, “Mexican President’s Contentious Electricity Overhaul Defeated in Congress,”
Reuters, April 18, 2022.
8 Associated Press (AP), “Mexico Court: National Guard Shift to Army Unconstitutional,” April 18, 2023.
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2024 elections.9 In mid-May 2023, the Supreme Court struck down key elements of that electoral
reform in a decision that prompted harsh criticism by President López Obrador.10
Figure 2. Composition of Mexican Congress by Party: May 2023
Source: Created by CRS using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and Mexican Senate.
Notes: MORENA = National Regeneration Movement; PVEM = Green Party; PT = Worker’s Party; PAN =
National Action Party; PRI = Institutional Revolutionary Party; MC = Citizen’s Movement; PRD = Democratic
Revolutionary Party; and PES = Social Encounter Party.
Political attention in Mexico is focused on who will stand for MORENA in the 2024 elections, as
López Obrador is constitutionally prohibited from seeking reelection, and whether the opposition,
which remains relatively weak and divided, will be able to select a unified candidate. As of May
2023, no leading candidates for the opposition parties have emerged. Mexico City Mayor Claudia
Sheinbaum and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard are among the leading contenders vying to
stand for MORENA.
Security Conditions and Policy Responses
From 2015 to 2018, the homicide rate in Mexico surged some 71%, reaching a record 29
homicides per 100,000 people.11 Homicides in Mexico remained near those record-setting levels
leading up to and during the COVID-19 pandemic but have since declined.12 High levels of
homicides have largely mirrored trends in organized crime-related violence, as criminal groups
have fought for control over illicit smuggling routes into the United States (see Figure 3).13 On
March 3, 2023, cartel gunmen kidnapped four U.S. citizens (two of whom were subsequently
killed) who reportedly had traveled to the city of Matamoros for medical services, prompting
9 David Frum, “The Autocrat Next Door,” The Atlantic, February 21, 2023.
10 Juan Pablo Spinetto, “AMLO’s Legacy Is Threatened by Mexico’s Top Court,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2023.
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Homicide database, at https://dataunodc.un.org/
content/Country-profile?country=Mexico.
12 Laura Y. Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico: 2021 Special Report, Justice in Mexico,
University of San Diego, October 2021. Hereinafter Calderón et al., Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico, 2021.
13 Infighting among criminal groups has intensified since the rise of the Jalisco New Generation cartel. See CRS Report
R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel.
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significant U.S. concern.14 By 2021, femicides (targeted killing of women) increased
approximately 137% from 2015 levels.15 Enforced disappearances,16 kidnappings, and other
violent crimes also have surged periodically. The estimated number of missing and disappeared
people in Mexico now exceeds 112,000, with most of those reported since Calderón took office.17
Figure 3. Estimated Organized Crime-Related Homicides in Mexico
(2008-2022)
Source: Created by CRS. Information from Lantia Intelligencia, a Mexican security firm.
Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have fought to satisfy U.S. drug demand
while also engaging in other illicit activities such as alien smuggling, fuel theft, arms trafficking,
and money laundering. A 2021 Government Accountability Office report found that some 70% of
firearms recovered in Mexico originated in the United States.18 Bulk cash smuggling continues,
but TCOs also launder drug profits through complex schemes, some of which involve Chinese
businesses and money traders, as well as through schemes to hide illicit profits in remittance
flows sent from the United States.19
President López Obrador has rejected calls for a “war” on transnational criminal organizations, as
such an approached failed under his two predecessors. Instead, his administration’s security
strategy includes a focus on addressing the socioeconomic drivers of violent crime. The
administration launched a program that provides scholarships to youth to attend university or
complete internships. No one has evaluated the program’s effects on youth employability or crime
14 Kevin Sieff et al. “Two of the Americans Kidnapped in Mexico Are Found Dead,” Washington Post, March 7, 2023.
15 Woodrow Wilson Center, “Engendering Safety: Addressing Femicide in Mexico,” press release, July 15, 2022,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/collection/engendering-safety-addressing-femicide-mexico.
16 According to the United Nations, enforced disappearances occur when “persons are arrested, detained or abducted
against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by
organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or
acquiescence of the Government.” See http://www.un.org/en/events/disappearancesday/background.shtml.
17 “Mexico to Launch Database of over 100,000 ‘Disappeared’ People,” Reuters, May 11, 2023.
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling into
Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis, GAO 21-322, February 2021.
19 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, National Drug Threat Assessment, March 2021; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, “Treasury Announces 2022 National Illicit Finance Strategy,” May 13, 2022; Signos Vitales, Euforia de las
Remesas: Ėxodo, Lavado de Dinero, y Auge Económico, March 2023.
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prevention,20 and auditors have uncovered irregularities in the program’s implementation.21
Neither López Obrador nor Mexico’s prosecutor general have devoted resources to strengthening
the accusatorial justice system that took effect in 2016 or the independence of the National
Prosecutor’s Office.22 The administration has sought to increase the types of crimes subject to
mandatory pretrial detention, contravening a goal of the reforms. Impunity for homicide remains
above 90%, and Mexico ranks 135 out of 140 countries ranked by the World Justice Project in
2022 based on the performance of its criminal justice system.23
In contrast to his campaign pledges, President López Obrador has expanded, not limited, the
military’s role in public security and an array of other public sector tasks.24 In 2019, López
Obrador backed constitutional reforms that created a National Guard to replace the Federal Police
(a force that had received significant U.S. equipment and training). In May 2020, López Obrador
signed a decree to allow military involvement in public security to continue through 2025, a
policy that Mexico’s congress extended through 2028.25 Although Mexico’s National Guard
(composed mostly of military police units of the army and navy) is involved in territorial control
in high-crime areas, border and immigration enforcement, and communications interception, it
has limited capacity to investigate crimes.26 State and local police forces charged with
investigating most crimes, including homicides, have received less federal support from the
López Obrador government than they received under prior administrations.27
Addressing Corruption
Corruption is an issue at all levels of government and among all political parties in Mexico.
While most evident at the municipal and state level, corruption and collusion between public
servants and crime groups occurs at the federal level, as well. In February 2023, a U.S. federal
jury convicted Genaro García Luna, public security minister during the PAN administration of
President Calderón, on charges of accepting millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa
Cartel.28 In October 2020, the U.S. arrest of former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador
Cienfuegos (2012-2018) on drug and money-laundering charges surprised and angered the
Mexican government. Responding to Mexican pressure, the United States agreed to drop the case
and allow Cienfuegos to return to Mexico, where he was exonerated.
President López Obrador has taken steps to combat corruption, but the key institutions to detect
and address corrupt offenses—such as the new criminal justice system, the Prosecutor General’s
Office, and the National Anti-corruption System—remain weak (see Appendix A). President
López Obrador has been unwilling to allow prosecutors to investigate allegations involving his
20 Alán Lopez, “Jovenes Perdiendo su Futúro,” Nexos, February 17, 2020.
21 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las Irregularidades que la ASF Encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El
Financiero, February 21, 2021.
22 See, for example, Justice in Mexico, Prosecutorial Reform in Mexico: Assessing the Progress of the National
Prosecutor’s Office, March 16, 2021.
23 Impunidad Cero, Impunidad en Homicidio Doloso y Femicidio 2022, December 2022; WJP Rule of Law Index, 2022.
24 Craig Deare, Militarization a la AMLO: How Bad Can It Get?, Wilson Center, September 2021.
25 Those reforms contradict a 2018 Mexico Supreme Court ruling that prolonged military involvement in public
security violated the Mexican Constitution.
26 Iñigo Guevara, Mexico’s National Guard: When Police Are Not Enough, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico
Institute, January 2020; “Vigila Guardia Nacional 84 Hospitales de IMSS,” Reforma, April 15, 2020.
27 Maureen Meyer, Police Reform and Security Strategies in Mexico in the Context of the war on Drugs and U.S.
Support of These Efforts, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), July 2020.
28 U.S. Department of Justice, “Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Convicted of Engaging
in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Taking Millions in Cash Bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel,” February 21, 2023.
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family and allies.29 His administration’s focus on reducing government expenditures and efforts to
punish tax evaders have won praise from some citizens. Nevertheless, observers worry that cuts
in public sector salaries have made officials more susceptible to bribes and that tax-related “anticorruption” probes have sometimes been used to intimidate government opponents.30
Human Rights
Criminal groups, sometimes in collusion with state actors, have continued to commit serious
human rights violations against civilians in Mexico.31 The vast majority of those abuses have
gone unpunished, whether they were prosecuted in the military or civilian justice systems. Under
Mexico’s new justice system, judges have released defendants due to a lack of evidence or a lack
of admissible evidence.32 The government continues to receive criticism for not protecting
journalists, human rights defenders, migrants, and other vulnerable groups from abuses, as well as
for its expansion of military involvement in public security despite abuses committed by security
forces.33 Reports have documented the López Obrador government’s improper use of militarypurchased spyware to surveil public officials, civil society leaders, and others.34
For years, human rights groups and the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices have chronicled cases of Mexican security officials’ involvement in extrajudicial
killings, torture, and “enforced disappearances.”35 The unresolved case of 43 missing students
who disappeared in Iguala, Guerrero, in September 2014—which allegedly involved the local
police and federal authorities—galvanized global protests. Experts from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights disproved much of the attorney general’s investigation, and in
2018, a federal judge dismissed that investigation as biased. President López Obrador established
a truth commission, and Prosecutor General Gertz Manero created a special prosecutor’s office to
focus on the case. As of May 2023, authorities have arrested more than 80 suspects for crimes
related to the case but prosecutors have yet to secure any convictions.36
Among the human rights challenges facing Mexico, President López Obrador has prioritized
addressing enforced disappearances.37 His administration has met regularly with families of the
missing, launched an online portal for reporting missing persons, registered thousands of
clandestine graves, and increased the budget for Mexico’s national search commission. The
government has sought international assistance to identify tens of thousands of bodies that have
been exhumed. Still, in November 2021, the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances
29 See, for example, Andrés Bello, “Why Allegations About His Son Could Hurt Mexico’s President,” Economist,
February 19, 2022.
30 Economist, “AMLO Uses His Anti-Corruption Drive to Gain Power and Scare Critics,” November 30, 2019.
31 See U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Mexico, March 2023. Hereinafter
U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report, March 2023.
32 World Justice Project, Almanac: Achievements and Challenges of the New Criminal Justice System, October 25,
2019, at https://worldjusticeproject.mx/almanaque-enpol16/.
33 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2023: Mexico, at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/
mexico; Maria Abi-Habib and Galia García Palafox, “Deadly Attack Exposes Growing Threat in Mexico: The
Military,” New York Times, April 7, 2023.
34 Natalie Kitroeff and Ronen Bergman, “How Mexico Became the Biggest User of the World’s Most Notorious Spy
Tool,” New York Times, April 18, 2023.
35 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Report, March 2023.
36 For recent updates, see National Security Archive, “Ayotzinapa Investigations,” at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/specialexhibit/ayotzinapa-investigations.
37 CRS In Focus IF11669, Mexico: Addressing Missing and Disappeared Persons.
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criticized the “structural impunity” that continues for perpetrators of disappearances and the
involvement of public officials from all levels of government in such crimes.38
Human rights organizations have urged the López Obrador administration to fully enact the
country’s 2017 law against torture, investigate and punish cases of torture, and take steps to
ensure that state agents do not commit acts of torture. After an April 2019 review of Mexico, the
U.N. Committee Against Torture welcomed the passage of the 2017 law but stated that torture by
state agents occurred in a “generalized manner” and found torture to be “endemic” in detention
centers.39 López Obrador has spoken out against torture, but his government has yet to develop a
system to track statistics on torture cases as required by the 2017 law.
Analysts maintain that efforts to protect journalists, human rights defenders, and migrants remain
insufficient and, in some cases, have worsened under López Obrador.40 Some 157 journalists and
media workers have been killed in Mexico since 2000, including 7 in 2021 and at least 12 in
2022.41 Mexico ranks among the top 10 countries globally with the highest rates of unsolved
journalist murders as a percentage of population, according to the nongovernmental Committee to
Protect Journalists’ 2022 Global Impunity Index.
Mexico is also a dangerous country for human rights defenders. In 2022, an estimated 45 human
rights defenders were killed.42 As politicians discredited some human rights groups and
questioned their sources of funding, police periodically used excessive force against human rights
defenders protesting against femicide and other issues.43 The López Obrador government has
neither strengthened the mechanism intended to protect human rights defenders and journalists
nor ensured an adequate budget for prosecutors charged with investigating those crimes.
Migrants in Mexico are vulnerable to abuse by criminal groups and corrupt officials, including
human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. In January 2021, U.S.-trained state police
reportedly killed 18 migrants in Tamaulipas, Mexico.44
Economic and Social Conditions
Beginning in the late 1980s, Mexico transitioned from a closed, state-led economy to an open
market economy that has entered into free trade agreements with 50 countries.45 The transition
accelerated after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force in 1994.
Since NAFTA, Mexico has increasingly become an export-oriented economy, with the value of
exports equaling 41% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021, up from 12% of GDP
38 “Mexico: Over 95,000 Registered as Disappeared, Impunity ‘Almost Absolute,’” U.N. News, November 29, 2021.
39 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Committee Against Torture Reviews the Report of
Mexico,” April 26, 2019.
40 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022: Mexico.
41 Article 19, “Periodistas Asesinados en México,” accessed May 3, 2023, a at https://articulo19.org/
periodistasasesinados/.
42 Frontline Defenders, Global Analysis 2022, April 2023.
43 Ibid.
44 Parker Asmann, “US-Trained Police Implicated in Mexico Migrant Massacre,” InSight Crime, February 3, 2021.
45 U.S. Department of State, 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Mexico, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2022investment-climate-statements/mexico/.
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in 1993.46 Mexico remains a U.S. crude oil supplier, but its top exports to the United States are
vehicles and auto parts, automatic data processing machines, and electrical machinery.47
From 2010 to 2019, Mexico recorded an average annual economic growth rate of 2.7%, but its
economy contracted 8.0% in 2020.48 Although the global pandemic was the principle cause for
the 2020 contraction, Mexico’s economy also shrank by 0.2% in 2019. Increased U.S. demand for
goods and services, higher vaccination rates, and the reopening of businesses powered an
economic rebound of 4.7% in 2021.49 Nevertheless, concerns about tightening monetary policy,
inflation and a reduction in U.S. growth projections led to 3.1% growth in 2022 and a 2023
growth forecast of 1.8%.50
Mexico’s future growth projections are mixed. According to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), financial exclusion, a lack of competitiveness,
employment in the informal sector, corruption, and low female participation in the workplace are
impediments to Mexico’s medium-term economic performance.51 Lingering pandemic-related
effects, energy sector reforms that discourage foreign investment, and new challenges related to
technological innovation and climate change also could hinder long-term growth.52 Experts have
posited that Mexico’s traditional economic assets—plentiful natural resources, a relatively young
labor force, and proximity and preferential access to markets in the United States—strategically
position it to take advantage of potential nearshoring opportunities as policymakers from the
United States and other countries seek to establish supply chains away from Chinese markets.53
Despite attempts to diversify its economic ties and build its domestic economy, Mexico remains
heavily dependent on the United States as an export market (roughly 76.8% of Mexico’s exports
in 2022 were U.S.-bound) and as a source of remittances, tourism revenues, and investment.54
Remittances reached a record of nearly $58.5 billion in 2022.55 U.S. foreign direct investment in
Mexico stood at $110.7 billion in 2021; the United States remains Mexico’s top source of foreign
direct investment.56
López Obrador Government’s Economic and Energy Policies
President López Obrador promised to govern austerely and bolster economic growth, but a lack
of public investment hurt Mexico’s pre-pandemic growth rate and the government’s limited fiscal
response to the pandemic worsened its economic impact on Mexico.57 López Obrador worked
with the Trump Administration to renegotiate the USMCA, which updated and modernized the
46 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed February 14, 2022.
47 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the United States, All Commodities, November, 2021,” accessed February
14, 2022.
48 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF DataMapper: Real GDP Growth,” accessed April 27, 2023.
49 IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021.
Hereinafter: IMF, 2021.
50 EIU, March 2023.
51 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico, February
2022.
52 IMF, 2021.
53 Daniel Zega, Alessandra Ortiz, “Mexico at the Cusp of Recovery,” Deloitte Insights, December 10, 2021.
54 Trade Data Monitor, “Mexico Exports to the World, All Commodities,” accessed May 3, 2023.
55 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed April 27, 2023.
56 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/
dici0722.pdf; U.S. Department of State, 2022 Investment Climate Statement: Mexico.
57 IMF, 2021.
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NAFTA agreement, assuaging some investor concerns about López Obrador’s economic policies.
However, his government’s energy policies have prompted international concerns, legal
challenges, and USMCA consultations that could result in a dispute settlement panel if U.S. and
Canadian concerns are not adequately resolved (See “Energy” section).58 Mexico’s congress also
passed mining reforms to shorten concessions for foreign companies invested in the sector and to
require a percentage of revenues be shared with local communities.59
Reduced spending on public administration and several tax settlements with large companies
since October 2019 have allowed the López Obrador government to devote significant resources
to social programs and major infrastructure projects without adding to public debt.60 Many of
those infrastructure projects have proven costly for the country. Upon assuming the presidency,
López Obrador paid $1.8 billion to cancel the construction of a new airport outside of Mexico
City, opting to build in a different location at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion.61 His government
has continued to construct the Maya Train, a $9.7 billion railroad line to promote tourism in five
southeastern states, despite criticism that it would damage the environment and opposition from
indigenous groups in the area.62 The government devoted $8 billion to build the Dos Bocas coalpowered refinery in Tabasco, but cost overruns, worker strikes, and operational setbacks have
derailed the project’s budget and timeline.63
Social Conditions
Mexico has long had relatively high poverty rates for its level of economic development, a
problem exacerbated by the pandemic. Experts estimate nearly 10 million Mexicans fell into
poverty in 2020, widening the poverty rate to 43.9%.64 Traditionally, poverty has been most acute
among those in southern Mexico’s rural regions, indigenous populations, and those employed in
subsistence agriculture or in the informal sector.65 Despite predictions to the contrary, poor and
working class households received continued remittances sent from family members abroad, even
during the pandemic. Remittances to Mexico rose 27% from 2020 to 2021.66
Mexico also has experienced high levels of income inequality. According to the 2022 World
Inequality Report, 57% of Mexico’s wealth was concentrated in 10% of the population, a figure
that has stayed between 55% and 60% over the past century. Inequality has historically been due,
58 In April 2022, the Mexican congress rejected a constitutional reform that would have dismantled the 2013 reforms
with respect to the electricity sector; however, Mexico’s Supreme Court narrowly upheld the constitutionality of
regulatory reforms enacted in 2021 that favor the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) over private companies.
ECPA, “Lingering Uncertainty in Mexico’s Energy Sector,” May 3, 2022; Jarrett Renshaw and David Lawder,
“Exclusive: US Plans Ultimatum in Mexico Energy Dispute, Raising Threat of Tariffs,” Reuters, March 27, 2023.
59
Associated Press, “Mexico Passes Mine Reform, 17 Other Bills in Frenzied Rush,” April 29, 2023.
60 Javier Martínez, Leonardo Núñez, “Análisis del Paquete Económico 2022: El Presupuesto de un Solo Hombre,”
Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción, September 13, 2021; OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, May 2021.
61 Sonia Corona, “El Nuevo Aeropuerto de México, a Punto del Despegue,” El País, February 12, 2022.
62 “El Tren Maya de López Obrador Arranca el Año Con Tropiezos y Dudas,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2022.
63 Amy Stillman, Lucia Kassai, Max de Haldevang, “Mexico’s Crown-Jewel Oil Refinery Is $3.6 Billion Over
Budget,” Bloomberg News, January 21, 2022; Jon Martín Cullell, “Trabajadores de la Refinería de Dos Bocas Chocan
Con la Policía en Su Segundo Día de Paro,” El País, October 13, 2021.
64 Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), Informe de la Política de
Desarrollo Social 2020, February 9, 2021.
65 This figure is from Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) and is
available in Spanish at https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza-2018.aspx.
66 Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, accessed February 14, 2022.
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in part, to the country’s regressive tax system, oligopolies that dominate particular industries, a
relatively low minimum wage, and a lack of targeting in some social programs.67
Economists have asserted that reducing the untaxed and unregulated informal sector, in which
workers lack job protections and benefits, is crucial for addressing poverty, while also expanding
Mexico’s low tax base. Under the Peña Nieto administration, a financial sector reform aimed to
increase access to credit for small and medium size businesses (SMEs), which employ a majority
of Mexican workers. A fiscal reform also sought to incentivize SMEs’ participation in the formal
economy. Barriers to formalization remain, however, including complex and sometimes costly
state and local regulations.68
López Obrador has improved many Mexicans’ socioeconomic conditions amid the deepest
recession in decades by increasing pensions for the elderly and raising the minimum wage several
times. His program to provide monthly payments to youth aged 18-29 to attend school or
complete internships has enrolled over 300,000 individuals, despite reported administrative and
financial irregularities.69 However, he has ended Prospera, Mexico’s largest social program,
which had won international praise for targeting those most in need.70 The government also
maintained a fiscally conservative approach during the pandemic, providing less budgetary
support to its population than some other countries in the region.71
Health experts have criticized the López Obrador government’s failure to coordinate “a coherent
and unified national response” to the COVID-19 pandemic, which killed roughly 333,188
Mexicans through April 2023.72 Throughout the pandemic, President López Obrador downplayed
the threat posed by COVID-19 and flouted public health guidelines. His administration’s budget
cuts reduced public health system personnel, testing availability, and hospital capacity; they likely
contributed to excess deaths from other causes such as heart disease and diabetes left untreated as
hospitals focused on pandemic response.73
Foreign Policy
In contrast to his predecessor, President López Obrador generally has maintained that the best
foreign policy is a strong domestic policy. He has rarely traveled outside the country since
assuming office. He met in Washington, DC, with President Trump in July 2020 and with
President Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for the North American Leaders
Summit in November 2021. Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard (former mayor of Mexico City) has
represented Mexico in global fora.
Under López Obradror, Mexico has returned to its historic noninterventionist and independent
approach to foreign policy. Mexico has sought to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
and proposed the creation of a high-level caucus for peace in Ukraine within the United Nations.
67 Gerardo Esquivel Hernandez, Concentration of Economic and Political Power, Oxfam Mexico, 2015.
68 Jorge Alvarez and Cian Ruane, Informality and Aggregate Productivity: the Case of Mexico, IMF Country Report,
November 2019; OECD, Economic Surveys: Mexico, February 2022.
69 Zenyazen Flores, “Estas son las irregularidades que la ASF encontró en Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro,” El
Financiero, February 21, 2022.
70 Stephen Kidd, “The Demise of Mexico’s Prospera Programme: a Tragedy Foretold,” Development Pathways, June 2,
2019.
71 IMF, Mexico: Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report, Country Report 2021/240, November 2021.
72 UCSF Institute for Global Health Sciences, Mexico’s Response to COVID-19: a Case Study, April 2021; Johns
Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center.
73 Lina Sofía Palacio-Mejía et. al., “Leading Causes of Excess Mortality in Mexico During the COVID-19 Pandemic
2020–2021: A Death Certificates Study in a Middle-Income Country,” The Lancet, Vol. 13, 100303, September 2022.
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The current administration reversed Mexico’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as Interim President of
Venezuela but then hosted Norway-led negotiations between officials representing Nicolás
Maduro and the political opposition in 2021. The López Obrador government established closer
relations with Cuba, granted temporary asylum to ousted Bolivian President Evo Morales,
abstained from OAS resolutions condemning the Daniel Ortega regime in Nicaragua, and
defended impeached Peruvian President Pedro Castillo.
Despite these developments, Mexico continues to participate in multilateral institutions and
support development in Central America. In addition to working within trade fora, such as the
Pacific Alliance, Mexico continues to promote its exports and seek new trade partners.74 The
López Obrador administration shares the view of prior Mexican governments that the best way to
stop illegal immigration from the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras) is to address the lack of opportunity and insecurity in that region. In December
2021, the United States and Mexico jointly announced Sembrando Oportunidades, a new effort to
coordinate development projects in the Northern Triangle.75
U.S.-Mexico Relations and Issues for Congress
Mexican-U.S. relations generally have grown closer over the past two decades. A range of
bilateral mechanisms and institutions have helped the Mexican and U.S. federal governments—as
well as stakeholders in border states, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations—find
common ground on difficult issues. U.S.-Mexico relations have nevertheless grown turbulent
during the López Obrador administration, reaching a low point in recent months over U.S.
criticisms of López Obrador’s public statements and policy reversals, antidrug investigations and
indictments, and proposals for addressing fentanyl trafficking from Mexico—a key congressional
concern. President López Obrador has strongly objected to some U.S. antidrug operations in
Mexico, U.S. support of democracy and human rights groups critical of his government, and
legislative proposals introduced in the 118th Congress, particularly those that would authorize the
use of U.S. military force in Mexico and designate Mexican TCOs as terrorist groups.76
Presidents Biden and López Obrador met in July 2022 and pledged to address inflation, promote
renewable energy, modernize border infrastructure, bolster efforts against fentanyl and arms
trafficking, and address the root causes of irregular migration.77 A High-Level Economic
Dialogue occurred in September 2022, a High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD) convened in
October 2022, and a second North American Leaders Summit (NALS) with Presidents Biden and
López Obrador and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau took place in January 2023 in
Mexico City. While the NALS advanced priorities on inclusivity, the environment,
competitiveness, migration, health, and regional security, the summit did not address ongoing
trade disputes or result in new initiatives to address irregular migration or fentanyl trafficking.78
74 CRS Report R43748, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America, by M. Angeles
Villarreal.
75 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S.-Mexico Joint Statement on Sembrando Oportunidades,”
December 1, 2021.
76 Rocio Fabbro and Robbie Gramer, “U.S.-Mexican Relations Fray over Fentanyl,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2023;
Associated Press, “Mexican President Complains U.S. Is Funding Opposition,” May 3, 2023.
77 White House, “President Biden and President López Obrador Joint Statement,” July 12, 2022.
78 CRS Insight IN12084, 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit: Issues for the 118th Congress, by M. Angeles
Villarreal and Clare Ribando Seelke.
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Security Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Assistance79
Mexico is a long-time recipient of U.S. counterdrug assistance, but cooperation was limited
between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s due to U.S. distrust of Mexican officials and Mexican
sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. Close cooperation resumed in
2007, when then-President George W. Bush requested, and Congress appropriated, increased
counterdrug assistance for Mexico. Although initial U.S. funding for what ultimately would be
known as the “Mérida Initiative” focused heavily on training and equipping Mexican security
forces, Congress shifted the emphasis of bilateral efforts over time to strengthening Mexican
institutions under four broad pillars (See Figure 4). Until FY2016, Congress withheld some U.S.
security assistance provided through the Mérida Initiative until certain human rights withholding
requirements were met (see “Human Rights,” below). In compliance with Leahy Law vetting
requirements (22 U.S.C. §2378d),80 U.S. agencies continue to vet individuals and units for
potential human rights abuses prior to delivering training and/or equipment.
Congress has funded and overseen the Mérida Initiative, which has accounted for the majority of
U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico since FY2008. Congress maintained level funding for the
Mérida Initiative even as the Trump Administration requested less support (See Table 1 for recent
U.S. assistance to Mexico and Table B-1 for Mérida Initiative funding). Nevertheless, elevated
organized crime-related violence in Mexico and drug overdose deaths in the United States have
led many to question the Mérida Initiative’s efficacy.81
U.S. security cooperation with Mexico has diminished since López Obrador took office in 2018.
López Obrador campaigned against Mexico’s military-led “war” on TCOs and his predecessors’
strategy of focusing on cartel leaders rather than broader cartel-related crime. He criticized the
Mérida Initiative for failing to stem drug-related violence. Cooperation deteriorated further after
the October 2020 U.S. arrest of retired defense minister Salvador Cienfuegos on drug traffickingrelated charges. By November 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice had dropped all charges
against Cienfuegos and released him to Mexico, where the López Obrador government published
the U.S evidence against Cienfuegos, declined to prosecute him, and called the U.S. evidence
“fabricated.”82 Meanwhile, the Mexican Congress enacted legislation to limit U.S. law
enforcement operations and intelligence sharing. The López Obrador government also paused the
issuance of visas for U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, slowed extraditions,
and declared the Mérida Initiative “dead.”83
On January 31, 2022, after months of negotiations, the U.S. and Mexican governments published
an action plan for implementing the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public
Heath, and Safe Communities. Launched at the October 2021 HLSD, the framework is a
replacement for the Mérida Initiative. The framework’s action plan has three broad pillars (see
Figure 4) that Congress could influence, particularly through the appropriations process. At
79 See also CRS In Focus IF10578, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial
Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
80 See CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”), by Michael A. Weber.
81 Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission,
December 2020.
82 Emilia López Pérez, “AMLO Respalda Exoneración a Cienfuegos: ‘Le Fabricaron Cargos in EU’, dice,” El
Financiero, January 15, 2021.
83 Mary Beth Sheridan and Nick Miroff, “They call him the Eagle: How the U.S. Lost a key Ally in Mexico as Fentanyl
Took off,” Washington Post, December 12, 2022; Mary Beth Sheridan and Kevin Sieff, “Mexico Declares $3 Billion
U.S. Security Deal ‘Dead,’ Seeks Revamp,” Washington Post, July 29, 2021.
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meetings in March and April 2023, U.S. and Mexican officials announced phase two of the
Bicentennial Framework, an effort focused on addressing fentanyl and arms trafficking.84
Figure 4. U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Frameworks
Source: U.S. Department of State.
Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2024 $111.4 million request for foreign
assistance to Mexico, which is 14% lower than the FY2022 enacted level of $127.1 million and
30% lower than the FY2023 request of $141.6 million (see Table 1). The explanatory statement
accompanying the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328) did not specify a total
funding amount for Mexico, The explanatory statement did direct the State Department to
continue focusing assistance on helping Mexico protect human rights, prosecute cases of human
rights abuses, improve its forensics capabilities, train justice sector operators, and combat
synthetic opioids. The explanatory statement includes reporting directives related to Western
Hemisphere drug control efforts, migration and refugee assistance, and updating reports required
in H.Rept. 117-84. Additional reporting requirements relate to the Bicentennial Framework,
human rights progress by the Mexican government, U.S. training of Mexican migration units, and
the resilience of North American supply chains, among other requirements.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico: FY2020-FY2024
(appropriations in millions of current dollars)
FY2023
(request)
FY2024
(request)
4.0
0.0
0.0
50.0
56.8
75.0
60.7
100.0
100.0
64.0
64.0
48.0
5.0
6.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Foreign Assistance Account
FY2020
FY2021
Development Assistance (DA)
0.0
0.0
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
50.0
International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
FY2022
84 White House, “Joint Statement from Mexico and the United States on the Launch of Phase II of the Bicentennial
Framework for Security,” March 10, 2023.
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Foreign Assistance Account
FY2023
(request)
FY2024
(request)
1.2
1.6
1.7
1,2
1.2
1.0
1.0
159.0
127.1
141.6
111.4
FY2020
FY2021
International Military Education and Training
(IMET)
1.8
1.8
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs (NADR)
1.2
158.0
Total
FY2022
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-FY2024.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is not providing assistance through Mérida accounts, nor is
the agency mentioned in the Bicentennial Framework. However, DOD implements International
Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, which totaled $1.2 million in FY2022, and
support training programs for the Mexican military, including courses in the United States. DOD
also provides additional training, equipping, and other logistical support to Mexico that
complements the Mérida Initiative through its own authorities including, but not limited to,
Section 333 Building Partner Capacity and Section 284 Counter-drug and Activities to Counter
Transnational Organized Crime (both authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code).85 Through 22
U.S.C. §2416, Congress requires an annual report on Foreign Military Training by DOD and the
State Department; the agencies submitted the most recent version of that report to relevant
committees in March 2022.
According Northern Command officials, current bilateral goals focus on “improving regional
security, strengthening military ties with regional partners, and expanding force interoperability
through the Defense Strategic Framework and the Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable.”86
Congress may seek to influence how the Biden Administration balances U.S. foreign assistance
priorities in Mexico; monitor the efficacy of U.S.-funded efforts; and recommend ways to
respond to challenges posed by evolving criminal activities and changes in Mexico’s policies.
Antidrug Efforts: Focus on Fentanyl Trafficking
Given the ongoing epidemic of fentanyl-related overdoses in the United States, fentanyl control
has become a top U.S. priority in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Some observers have questioned
the efficacy of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation since Mexico emerged as the leading source of
U.S.-bound fentanyl.87 At present, most U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl is produced clandestinely in
Mexico, using chemical inputs (i.e., precursors) from the People’s Republic of China.88 This
represents a significant shift in fentanyl production and trafficking trends since 2019, prior to
which China was the primary source of U.S.-bound illicit fentanyl. TCOs—particularly the
Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)—appear to be largely responsible for
the procurement of precursors from Asia (via maritime and air ports of entry).89 TCOs also
manufacture wholesale volumes of low-purity illicit fentanyl in Mexico and control the cross85 See ForeignAssistance.gov, “U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country,” at https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/mexico/,
accessed February 23, 2022.
86 CRS electronic correspondence with U.S. Northern Command officials, February 22, 2022.
87 See for example, Earl Anthony Wayne, “U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Doubling Down Against Fentanyl,
Arms Trafficking, Exploitation of Migrants and Illicit Money,” Wilson Center, opinion, November 4, 2022.
88 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical
Control, March 2023, According to the State Department, approximately 96% of all fentanyl seized by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) agency in FY2022 originated in Mexico (p. 73). Hereinafter: INCSR, 2023.
89 RAND Corporation, Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking: Final Report, February 2022, pp. 8-9.
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border trafficking of fentanyl into the United States. Domestically, U.S.-based TCO affiliates
distribute illicit fentanyl at the retail level.
As part of the Bicentennial Framework, the U.S. and Mexican governments committed to
establishing working-level mechanisms to coordinate on synthetic drugs and precursor
chemicals.90 In 2022, Mexico expanded its nascent “chemical watch list” for dual-use
precursors—a move that may spur opportunities for enhanced regional information sharing and
regulatory action targeting fentanyl precursors.91 Joint actions in 2022 included financial
sanctions targeting Mexican fentanyl traffickers, the development of a joint action plan to combat
synthetic opioids, and increased U.S. efforts to help Mexican military agencies create records of
fentanyl and precursor seizures to submit to a central database.92 The Mexican military leads
customs operations at all land, air, and sea ports of entry.93
At the Mexico City NALS in January 2023, President López Obrador appeared to recognize
concerns about fentanyl production in Mexico and pledged to take increased actions to interdict
precursor chemicals and destroy fentanyl labs.94 With the U.S. and Canadian leaders, President
López Obrador pledged to share information on chemicals used in illicit fentanyl production as a
key summit deliverable; some criticized the leaders for not announcing any other significant new
actions.95 A notable development in the lead up to the NALS was Mexico’s capture of Ovidio
Guzmán, son of imprisoned Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán (former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel),
on January 4.96 Ovidio Guzmán is one of the most wanted criminals in the United States for his
role in trafficking fentanyl and other drugs. Since the Mexico City NALS, President López
Obrador appears to have reversed some antidrug commitments made at the summit.97
Tension between the U.S. DEA and the Mexican government—as well as ongoing corruption in
Mexico, exemplified by the U.S. conviction of former Public Security Minister García Luna on
drug trafficking charges—remain obstacles to cooperation.98 In 2021, after the two governments
had agreed to target companies involved in diverting precursor chemicals used to produce
fentanyl, the DEA identified 50 Mexican companies to Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIU). Despite U.S. officials’ suspicions, the FIU declined to seize all but one businesses’
accounts.99 President López Obador also has criticized U.S. intelligence-gathering activities that
likely led to the April 2023 U.S. indictments of 28 individuals, including several of El Chapo
Guzmán’s sons, for fentanyl trafficking.100 These developments could hinder efforts that have
90 White House, Joint Statement: U.S.-Mexico High-Level Security Dialogue, October 8, 2021.
91 See for example, “Mexico Launches Online Platform for Dual-Use Precursors,” Associated Press, November 23,
2022.
92 INCSR, 2023, pp. 15, 73-75.
93 See for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Illicit Fentanyl-Trafficking La Nueva
Familia Michoacana and its Leaders,” November 17, 2022, See also U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2022, pp. 54-55.
94 White House, “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Trudeau, and President López Obrador in Joint Press
Conference,” January 10, 2023. Hereinafter: White House, January 2023.
95 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023.
96 Mary Beth Sheridan and Kevin Sieff, “Mexico Captures Son of El Chapo, Alleged Fentanyl Trafficker, Ahead of
Biden Visit,” Washington Post, January 5, 2023.
97 “Mexico asks China for Help on Fentanyl, Slams US Critics,” Reuters, April 5, 2023.
98 Gavin Voss, “García Luna Convicted, But Corruption Concerns Endure in U.S.-Mexico Partnership,” February 22,
2023.
99 Michael O’Boyle, “A U.S.-Mexico Crackdown on Drugs has Stalled Even as Fentanyl Deaths Rise,” Bloomberg,
May 15, 2023.
100 Associated Press, “Mexico President Slams U.S. ‘Spying’ After Traffickers Charged,” April 17, 2023.
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accelerated thus far in 2023 as phase two of the Bicentennial Framework has focused bilateral
efforts on combating fentanyl (and arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico).101
Legislative Initiatives. Members of Congress have introduced a range of proposals to address
fentanyl trafficking from Mexico, including a House Foreign Committee-reported measure, H.R.
3205, that would work with Mexico to disrupt fentanyl supply chains and counter Chinese
fentanyl operations in Mexico. Whereas that bill calls for U.S.-Mexican cooperation, others—
including bills that would authorize the use of U.S. military force in Mexico (H.J.Res. 18) and
that would designate Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (e.g., H.Res. 216, S.
698)—have prompted strong negative reactions from the Mexican government.
Law Enforcement Cooperation and Extraditions
Congress has expressed concerns about friction in U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. During the
118th Congress, oversight attention may focus on the Bicentennial Framework’s progress in
restarting bilateral law enforcement cooperation. The framework’s action plan envisions a joint
objective of building on past cooperation to investigate and prosecute corrupt actors through the
disruption of criminal financial networks, as well as increasing cooperation in extradition
matters.102 However, bilateral law enforcement cooperation on all criminal matters, especially
those pertaining to corruption cases, remains a source of friction between the countries.103
During the Calderón government (2006-2012), Mexico extradited an average of 98 people per
year to the United States, a significant increase over the prior administration. When President
Peña Nieto took office, extraditions fell to 54 in 2013 but rose to an administration high of 76 in
2016 (see Figure 5). In January 2017, Mexico’s decision to extradite Joaquín “El Chapo”
Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and one of the DEA’s top global targets, was a high point in
bilateral cooperation that was praised by many Members of Congress. Extraditions remained
relatively level during the first two years of the López Obrador government, fell in 2021, and rose
again in 2022 to 81.104 While some extraditions have increased, DEA Administrator Anne
Milgram asserted that Mexico extradited 24 drug-related defendants in 2022 and that more than
232 such defendants were awaiting extradition as of February 2023.105
101 White House, “Joint Statement from Mexico and the United States on the Implementation of the U.S.-Mexico
Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” April 13, 2023.
102 U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Summary of the Action Plan for U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for
Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities,” January 31, 2022.
103 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Crime and Anti-crime Policies in Mexico in 2022: A Bleak Outlook,” Brookings Institution,
January 24, 2022.
104 Email from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, May 10, 2023.
105 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Countering Illicit Fentanyl Trafficking, hearing, February 15, 2023, at
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/countering-illicit-fentanyl-trafficking.
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Figure 5. Extraditions: from Mexico by Administration: 2000-2022
Source: CRS based on data from U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State.
Human Rights106
The U.S. Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about human rights conditions in Mexico
through conditions on appropriations, support for human rights programming, oversight hearings,
and letters to, and visits with, successive U.S. and Mexican administrations. Recent attention has
focused on violence against journalists in Mexico.107 Congress has continued to monitor
adherence to the Leahy vetting requirements that must be met under the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA) of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. §2378d), which pertains to State Department aid, and 10
U.S.C. §2249e, which guides DOD funding. DOD suspended assistance to a brigade based in
Tlatlaya, Mexico, due to concerns about the brigade’s potential involvement in extrajudicial
killings but has also worked with Mexico to rehabilitate units once suspended from receiving U.S.
assistance.108 Congressional concerns about labor conditions in Mexico and the government’s
ability to implement USMCA commitments prompted the inclusion of $210 million in funds for
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) technical assistance
programs in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L. 116-113).109
106 See also: CRS Report R45199, Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief; CRS In Focus IF11669, Mexico:
Addressing Missing and Disappeared Persons.
107 Senator Tim Kaine, “Kaine and Rubio Urge State Department to Address Ongoing Violence Against Journalists in
Mexico,” February 8, 2022.
108 Michael Evans, US: Mexico Mass Graves Raise “Alarming Questions” About Government “Complicity” in
September 2014 Cartel Killings, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 515, May 2015; Col.
Andrew M. Leonard, “Leahy Law Diplomacy: Human Rights Vetting and Foreign Policy,” FAOA Journal of
International Affairs, 2019.
109 The purpose of the funding is for ILAB to administer technical assistance grants to support worker-focused capacity
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From FY2008 to FY2015, Congress made conditional 15% of U.S. assistance to the Mexican
military and police until the State Department sent a report to appropriators verifying that Mexico
was taking steps to comply with certain human rights standards. In FY2014, Mexico lost $5.5
million in funding due to human rights concerns.110 For FY2016-FY2021, human rights reporting
requirements applied to FMF rather than to Mérida Initiative accounts. In recent years, human
rights reporting requirements have been in explanatory statements rather than the legislation. The
explanatory statement accompanying the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117328) requires a report on human rights progress in Mexico, but the reporting directive is not tied
to any conditions on assistance provided to Mexico.111 The State Department reportedly has not
sent human rights reports to Congress since FY2017, as the agency maintains it is not legally
obligated to do so.112
U.S. assistance to Mexico has supported the Mexican government’s efforts to reform its judicial
system and improve human rights conditions in the country.113 Congress has provided funding to
support Mexico’s transition from an inquisitorial justice system to an oral, adversarial, and
accusatorial system that aims to strengthen due process and human rights protections for victims
and the accused.114 U.S. officials have issued statements on specific human rights concerns,
including a 2022 tweet by Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressing concern about violence
against journalists and a 2023 State Department spokesperson statement supporting “respect for
judicial independence” and an “independent electoral system.”115 Protecting human rights and
“vulnerable populations” is included under the first pillar of the Bicentennial Framework (see
Figure 4). The State Department engages with human rights and freedom of expression
organizations in Mexico and ensures U.S. training programs for justice sector actors have units on
human rights.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides technical assistance to the
Mexican federal and state governments as well as complementary support to think tanks and civil
society organizations on human rights issues.116 USAID’s human rights programming includes a
new $24 million initiative to support national and state implementation of laws against torture and
enforced disappearances and to provide forensic assistance to address unidentified remains. Other
ongoing initiatives seek to better protect journalists and human rights defenders, as well as to
address enforced disappearances, femicides, and torture in selected states. In December 2020,
USAID published its five-year strategy for Mexico, which integrates these efforts into a broader
building and efforts to reduce workplace discrimination, child labor, forced labor, human trafficking, child exploitation
and other efforts related to implementation of Mexico’s labor commitments.
110 As a result of the State Department’s decision not to submit a report for Mexico, some $5 million in FY2014
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance was reprogrammed by the State Department
to Peru. Mexico lost close to $500,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), as well.
111 The explanatory statement can be found at https://www.congress.gov/117/cprt/HPRT50348/CPRT117HPRT50348.pdf.
112 CRS interview with State Department official, March 20, 2020.
113 For an overview, see GAO, U.S. Assistance to Mexico: State and USAID Allocated over $700 Million to Support
Criminal Justice, Border Security, and Related Efforts from Fiscal Year 2014 Through 2018, GAO 19-647, September
10, 2019.
114 While DOJ has supported reform efforts at the federal level, USAID programs have been at the state level since
2016. See USAID, “Mexico: Rule of Law,” September 2020, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/rule-of-law.
115 Secretary Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken), “The high number of journalists killed in Mexico this year and the
ongoing threats they face are concerning. I join those calling for greater accountability and protections for Mexican
journalists,” Twitter, February 22, 2022, 8:47 p.m. U.S. Department of State, “Protests Against Electoral Overhaul in
Mexico,” press statement, February 23, 2023.
116 USAID, “Mexico: Human Rights,” December 2022.
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strategy to help state and local governments committed to addressing impunity and violence.117
USAID continues to support organizations that have received criticism for their anti-corruption
and human rights advocacy from President López Obrador and his party.118
Congress is likely to continue monitoring human rights conditions in Mexico, including
compliance with reporting requirements included in the explanatory statement to the FY2023
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-328) and commitments to improve labor conditions
made under USMCA.119 Some Members of Congress have written letters to U.S. and Mexican
officials regarding human rights concerns, including allegations of extrajudicial killings by
security forces, violence against journalists, and abuses of migrants.
Congress may monitor how the López Obrador administration moves to punish past human rights
abusers; how Mexico’s National Guard, along with other security and judicial actors, is or is not
respecting human rights; what mechanisms exist to address allegations of abuse and wrongdoing
by such actors; and the adequacy of victims’ assistance. Congress also may question how the
State Department and USAID can provide support to emerging human rights priorities, as well as
the effects of ILAB technical assistance programs on labor conditions in Mexico.
Migration Management
Migration issues continue to be a high priority for U.S. policy and Congress, particularly as U.S.
Customs and Border Protection encounters record levels of irregular migrants on the Southwest
border. Since a 2019 U.S.-Mexico migration agreement, and particularly since the March 2020
U.S. launch of so-called Title 42 expulsions, Mexico has accepted U.S. policies that have shifted
some of the burden of handling migrants from the United States to Mexico.120 The López Obrador
administration has worked jointly with U.S. officials to help arrest 7,000 human smugglers since
mid-2022 and to invest in development projects aimed at addressing the root causes of migration
from northern Central America.121 Asylum applications and apprehensions have risen
significantly in Mexico; both Mexico’s cash-strapped Commission for Refugee Assistance
(COMAR) and overcrowded shelter system have struggled to respond, even with U.S. assistance
(see Figure 6).122 In March 2023, 38 migrants perished because Mexican officials failed to unlock
117 USAID, Mexico: Country Development Cooperation Strategy, available at https://www.usaid.gov/mexico/cdcs.
118 Rafael Bernal. “Mexican President Calls on U.S. to Stop Funding Groups Critical of his Administration,” The Hill,
February 21, 2022.
119 The explanatory statement asserts,
Not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the
Committees on Appropriations on the extent to which the Government of Mexico is: (1) credibly
investigating and prosecuting violations of human rights in civilian courts; (2) enforcing
prohibitions against torture and the use of testimony obtained through torture; and (3) searching for
victims of forced disappearances and credibly investigating and prosecuting those responsible for
such crimes. Prior to the submission of such report, the State Department shall consult with United
States and Mexican human rights organizations regarding progress in meeting the elements detailed
in this paragraph.
120 In response to the pandemic, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) largely suspended asylum processing at
the U.S.-Mexico border in March 2020 under a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) public health order
(referred to as Title 42) that restricted the entry of foreign nationals without proper travel documents to prevent the
spread of disease. For additional background on Title 42, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10874, COVID-Related
Restrictions on Entry into the United States Under Title 42: Litigation and Legal Considerations, by Kelsey Y.
Santamaria.
121 White House, January 2023.
122 CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Ramon Miro.
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a migrant detention facility during a fire. Authorities charged Mexico’s National Migration
Institute’s director for involvement in the crime; he remains in his position.123
Figure 6. Mexico: Reported Asylum Applications and Apprehensions
(2013-2023)
Source: CRS, based on data from Mexico’s Commission for Refugee Assistance and Secretary of the Interior.
On October 12, 2022, Mexico agreed to accept an unspecified number of U.S.-bound Venezuelan
migrants who do not apply to come to the United States legally through a new Venezuela parole
program and are expelled at the U.S. border under Title 42.124 In exchange, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) made available additional H-2B visas for temporary nonagricultural
workers. Historically, the majority of H-2B visas have been issued to Mexican nationals. On
January 5, 2023, DHS announced the expansion of the Venezuela parole program to Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Cubans.125 As part of that agreement, Mexico agreed to receive up to 30,000
expelled migrants from those three countries per month who are encountered irregularly instead
of through the parole process, a number that U.S. officials assert could increase.126
President Biden thanked Mexico for this cooperation during his remarks at NALS, but the summit
did not address detailed migration policies.127 The summit did produce an expansion of U.S.123 Juan Montes, “Mexico’s Immigration Chief Indicted over Detention Center Fire,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2023.
124 The new parole program allows Venezuelans who have a U.S. sponsor to apply for immigration parole and fly
directly into the United States. CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants, by
Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke. For Mexico’s approach, see Government of Mexico, InteriorForeign Affairs-Migration Joint Press Release, “Mexico Is Coordinating with the U.S. a New Approach to Orderly,
Safe, Regular and Humane Migration in the Region,” October 12, 2022.
125 DHS, “DHS Implements New Processes for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans and Eliminates Cap for
Venezuelans,” January 6, 2022.
126 Government of Mexico, Interior-Foreign Affairs-Migration Joint Press Release, “Mexico Welcomes the
Announcement of new U.S. Actions to Achieve Orderly, Safe, Regular, and Humane Migration,” January 5, 2023;
White House, “Press Gaggle by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” January 9, 2023.
127 For more information, see CRS Insight IN12084, 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit: Issues for the 118th
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Mexico efforts to address the root causes of migration to a trilateral action plan, as well as the
creation of a virtual platform to allow migrants to access legal pathways to migration.
In advance of the May 11, 2023, ending of Title 42, the United States, Mexico, and other regional
partners ramped up cooperation on migration management, countering alien smuggling and
disinformation, and related efforts.128 The Biden Administration deployed 1,500 additional troops
to the border in anticipation of a migration surge. Mexico has pledged to continue receiving rapid
deportations of certain non-Mexican nationals who have to date been expelled under Title 42 and
has deployed its National Guard.129 Mexican border cities, some of which have high rates of
violent crime, have been sheltering tens of thousands of migrants. Some migrants have
experienced precarious living situations and attacks by criminal groups.130 Human rights groups
are concerned about how the end of Title 42 will affect conditions for migrants in Mexico.131
U.S. funds appropriated under the Mérida Initiative have supported Mexico’s immigration control
efforts and global funds provided through the Migration and Refugee Assistance program to
improve asylum processing, shelters, and assistance to migrants in Mexico. Congress is
considering legislation, foreign assistance, and restrictions on U.S. assistance that could affect
those efforts, as well as overseeing the adequacy of existing foreign policy efforts to manage
regional migration.
Legislative Initiatives. On May 11, 2023, the House passed H.R. 2, which incorporated
legislation reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (H.R. 1690) as Title III. Among
other measures, H.R. 2 would direct the Administration to seek to reestablish migration
agreements with Mexico similar to the Migration Protection Protocols concluded during the
Trump Administration.
Economic and Trade Relations and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
Agreement132
The United States and Mexico have a strong economic and trade relationship that deepened
significantly through the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in 1994. NAFTA removed virtually all tariff and nontariff trade and investment barriers among
the United States, Mexico, and Canada, and provided a rules-based mechanism to govern North
American trade. It also made permanent Mexico’s unilateral market opening measures of the late
1980s and early 1990s. Most economic studies concluded the net economic effect of NAFTA on
the United States and Mexico was small but positive, though there were adjustment costs to some
sectors in both countries. In July 2020, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)
Congress, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Clare Ribando Seelke; and White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the
2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023.
128 U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Announces Sweeping New Actions to Manage Regional
Migration,” April 27, 2023.
129 White House, “Mexico and United States Strengthen Joint Humanitarian Plan on Migration,” May 2, 2023.
130 Doctors Without Borders, “Pushed Back, Beaten and Exposed: Stories from the US-Mexico Border,” March 29,
2022.
131 WOLA, “U.S. And Mexico Must End Policies That Expose Migrants to Death and Danger,” March 29, 2023.
132 This section is drawn from CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
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replaced NAFTA. While maintaining most of the market opening measures of NAFTA, USMCA
updated and modernized the agreement in some areas but scaled back certain provisions.133
Recent U.S. Administrations have worked with Mexico to coordinate economic issues. The
Obama Administration worked with Mexico to balance border security while facilitating
legitimate trade and travel, promoting competitiveness, and pursuing greater energy integration
through a cabinet-level High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) chaired by then-Vice President
Biden. The High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council helped align regulatory principles.
Trilateral (with Canada) cooperation occurred under the aegis of the North American Leadership
Summits (NALS).
Under the Trump Administration, neither the HLED nor the NALS took place. However, the
Executive Steering Committee (ESC), which guided efforts along the border during the Obama
Administration, expanded to focus on boosting competitiveness. The U.S.-Mexico CEO Dialogue
also continued to convene biannual meetings and issue recommendations for both governments.
As previously mentioned, the Biden Administration has restarted both the HLED and the NALS.
Modernizing the U.S.-Mexico Border
Congress has long expressed concerns about delays and unpredictable wait times at the U.S.Mexico border. The majority of U.S.-Mexico trade passes through a port of entry along the
southwestern border, often more than once, due to the increasing integration of manufacturing
processes in the United States and Mexico. Past bilateral efforts have contributed to reductions in
wait times at some points of entry, but infrastructure and staffing issues remain on both the U.S.
and Mexican sides of the border. While Congress has enacted (P.L. 114-279) legislation to allow
public-private partnerships to address some border infrastructure issues, staffing issues remain
challenging.
In May 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing the
U.S.-Mexico border.134 A Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral ESC has met since then, most
recently in December 2022, to develop binational action plans and oversee implementation of
those plans.135 The ESC sets goals within broad objectives: coordinating infrastructure
development, expanding trusted traveler and shipment programs, establishing pilot projects for
cargo preclearance, improving cross-border commerce and ties, and bolstering information
sharing among law enforcement agencies.
The COVID-19 pandemic posed several challenge for U.S., Mexican, and Canadian officials that
Congress has examined via oversight hearings. Officials initially struggled to maintain the
integrity of supply chains for industries deemed essential during the pandemic while protecting
the health of workers employed in those sectors. More recently, concerns over the smuggling of
fentanyl through U.S. ports of entry have led to enhanced screening of commercial and passenger
vehicles entering from Mexico and have sped the deployment of advanced imaging technologies
used for cargo inspections. Congress may monitor how the Biden Administration balances trade
and infrastructure issues with other priorities along the U.S.-Mexico border.
133 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M.
Angeles Villarreal.
134 White House, “Declaration by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As mentioned,
U.S.-Mexico security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative.
135 The Executive Steering Committee (ESC) coordinates efforts with Mexico in three areas: infrastructure, secure
flows, and law enforcement/security. See U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Bilateral Executive Steering
Committee of the 21st Century Border Management Process, December 1, 2022.
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U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement136
Congress played a key role in modifying, considering, and approving implementing legislation
for the USMCA, which entered into force on July 1, 2020. Congress is actively overseeing the
USMCA’s implementation and USMCA-related trade disputes. In May 2017, the Trump
Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and
Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA). Negotiations began on August 16, 2017, and were concluded on September 30,
2018. USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018. The House Democratic leadership
recommended modifications to USMCA (on labor, the environment, and dispute settlement,
among other topics) that led to changes to the agreement and a subsequent negotiation with
Mexico and Canada on a USMCA protocol of amendment on December 10, 2019. The House
approved USMCA implementing legislation in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in
January 2020 (P.L. 116-113).
On April 24, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative notified Congress that Canada and Mexico had
taken the legal and regulatory steps necessary to implement the USCMA and that the agreement
would enter into force on July 1, 2020.
USMCA, composed of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA’s free-trade
provisions and other measures, but it makes notable changes to auto rules of origin, dispute
settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property right (IPR)
protection. It also modernizes provisions in services, labor, and the environment and addresses
new trade issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption, and currency
misalignment. Key issues for Congress in the debate surrounding USMCA included workers’
rights protection in Mexico, IPR provisions and access to medicine, the enforceability of labor
and environmental provisions, and the constitutional authority of Congress over international
trade and its role in revising, approving, or withdrawing from the agreement.
Congress included $180 million over four years in the USCMA’s implementing legislation (P.L.
116-113) for technical assistance projects related to the agreement and $30 million to pay for
labor attachés and other staff to monitor Mexico’s USMCA compliance.137 The goals of recent
assistance have been to ensure enforcement of Mexican labor laws and legitimate collective
bargaining rights; increase measures to mitigate COVID-19 among workers; and address child
labor and forced labor in Mexico’s supply chains, including in agriculture.138 Some Members of
Congress have praised two recent votes by Mexican workers in favor of establishing independent
unions at their automotive plants as steps toward improving workers’ rights and representation.139
Now that USMCA is in the implementation phase, Congress may wish to consider various issues
regarding the agreement. These issues include how the new importing requirements under
USMCA are being phased in; whether the new rules of origin for the motor vehicle industry are
being implemented as planned; how the more stringent requirements are affecting the North
American motor vehicle industry; how well Mexico is implementing labor law reforms to provide
more workers’ rights protection; how well the new labor enforcement measures are working; and
136 This section is drawn from the summary of CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal.
137 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Labor Rights and the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA),” at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/labor-rights-usmca.
138 U.S. Department of Labor, “U.S. Department of Labor Announces $20 Million in New Grants to Support USMCA
Implementation, Bringing the 2020 Total to Nearly $50 Million,” News Release, December 16, 2020.
139 Associated Press, “Mexico Sees 2 nd Major Win for Independent Unions,” March 1, 2022.
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the extent to which USMCA’s updated dispute resolution procedures are improving the
enforcement of the agreement’s provisions, among other issues.
Selected CRS Products on the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement
CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal
CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal
CRS In Focus IF11308, USMCA: Labor Provisions, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs
CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Villarreal
CRS In Focus IF12082, USMCA: Motor Vehicle Rules of Origin, by Liana Wong and M. Angeles Villarreal
Energy
Congress has expressed ongoing interest in the future of energy production in Mexico, as it is
important for Mexico’s economic growth and for the U.S. energy sector. Mexico has considerable
oil and gas resources, but its state oil company (Pemex), has struggled to counter declining
production and postponed needed investments due to fiscal challenges. Many Members of
Congress praised Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms on energy that opened up oil, electricity,
gas, transmission, production, and sales to private and foreign investment while keeping
ownership of Mexico’s hydrocarbons under state control. Members of Congress have expressed
serious concerns about the López Obrador administration’s treatment of U.S. energy companies
and measures it has taken to favor the state-owned electrical utility and Pemex. Members of
Congress demonstrated bipartisan support for the 2022 U.S. request for consultations with
Mexico over potential violations of the USMCA.140 Should those consultations not lead to an
agreement, the U.S. and Canada could request a dispute settlement panel; the panel could result in
retaliatory tariffs on Mexico.141
The 2013 reforms created opportunities for U.S. businesses in exploration, pipeline construction
and ownership, natural gas production, and commercial gasoline sales. Although the reforms did
not privatize Pemex, they did expose the company to competition and hastened its entrance into
joint ventures. Because of the reforms, Mexico received more than $160 billion in promised
investment.142 Many experts argued at that time that deepened energy cooperation with Mexico
could give North America an industrial advantage.143
Despite their promise, the energy sector reforms failed to reverse production declines or to
address structural problems within Pemex. While proponents still predict the reforms will bring
long-term benefits to Mexico, opponents within the López Obrador government have sought to
curtail private involvement in the sector.144
In light of concerns about the López Obrador government’s counterreform policies, the United
States sought to cement Mexico’s energy reforms through the NAFTA renegotiations. NAFTA
included some reservations for investment in Mexico’s energy sector. USMCA reinforces
140 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “What They Are Saying: United States Requests Consultations
Under the USMCA over Mexico’s Energy Policies on Behalf of U.S. Stakeholders,” July 20, 2022.
141 Jarrett Renshaw and David Lawder, “Exclusive: U.S. Plans Ultimatum in Mexico Energy Dispute, Raising Threat of
Tariffs,” Reuters, March 27, 2023.
142 Duncan Wood and John Padilla, Mexico’s new Hydrocarbons Model: a Critical Assessment Four Years Later,
Wilson Center & IPD Latin America, April 2018.
143 Earl Anthony Wayne and David Shedd, Assuring Energy Security with a Modern NAFTA, Wilson Center Mexico
Institute, May 9, 2018.
144 Duncan Wood et al., Changing the Guard in Mexico: AMLO’s Opportunities and Challenges, July 2018.
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Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reforms and the current legal framework for private energy projects
in Mexico. It includes investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms similar to those that existed
in NAFTA for the oil and gas, infrastructure, and other energy sectors, even as those mechanisms
were limited for other sectors.145 In addition, the free trade agreement maintains tariff-free exports
of U.S. natural gas to Mexico, which have increased significantly since the 2013 reforms.146
Over time, López Obrador’s energy policies have concerned energy investors and U.S. companies
with large parts of their supply chains in Mexico. The government’s decisions to halt new
auctions in the oil and gas sector, as well as in wind and solar energy projects, stunned investors
and put hundreds of existing projects in limbo.147 Private sector actors lobbied for adjustments in
the proposed electricity reform that would enable Mexico to keep its Paris climate agreement
pledges and respect private investment while still strengthening the CFE.148 They have filed
numerous legal challenges to the 2021 enacted reforms.
Opportunities exist for continued U.S.-Mexico energy cooperation in the energy sector, but the
future of those efforts may depend on the outcome of López Obrador’s reforms. The Biden
Administration has engaged Mexico in high-level meetings to express concerns over the
electricity reform and others, citing concerns that they could hinder U.S.-Mexico cooperation on
clean energy initiatives and violate the USMCA.149 Bilateral efforts to accelerate Mexican action
on renewable energy development and other policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could
continue through a newly created U.S.-Mexico Climate and Clean Energy Working Group.150
In addition to monitoring López Obrador’s proposed energy reform as it pertains to USMCA,
congressional oversight may involve broader issues related to the fairness of policies adopted by
the López Obrador government toward foreign energy companies and investors.
Border Environmental Issues151
The transboundary flow of raw sewage and industrial wastewater has been a focus of bilateral
environmental dialogue since at least the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. Wastewater, trash,
and sediment flowing into the United States from Mexico have caused health and environmental
problems in the border region. Wastewater collection and treatment system capacity has not kept
pace with the region’s rapid population growth. In addition, the aging of existing wastewater
infrastructure has led to increased maintenance issues, such as pipeline ruptures. To address
border sanitation, Congress has appropriated funds for the International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the North American
Development Bank (NADB) to construct or finance wastewater infrastructure on both sides of the
border. Transboundary flows have continued to require bilateral cooperation, despite the
construction of several sanitation facilities on both sides of the border.
145 CRS In Focus IF11167, USMCA: Investment Provisions, by Christopher A. Casey and M. Angeles Villarreal.
146 “USMCA Deal to Keep Tariffs Off North American Oil, Gas Trade,” S & P Global Market Intelligence, December
10, 2019.
147 Kate Linthicum, “For Mexico’s President, the Future Isn’t Renewable Energy—It’s Coal,” Los Angeles Times, April
12, 2021.
148 Dave Graham, “Analysis: Hints of Compromise Emerge over Mexico’s Contentious Power Bill,” Reuters, February
15, 2022.
149 U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm on Travel to Mexico
City, Mexico,” press release, January 21, 2021,
150 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico, “Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry Visits Mexico City,”
press release, February 9, 2022.
151 Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy, authored this section.
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International Boundary and Water Commission
The IBWC, consisting of U.S. and Mexico sections, implements boundary and water treaties
between the United States and Mexico.152 IBWC’s activities are conducted through Minutes,
which have the force of law when both the U.S. and Mexican governments provide written
approval through their respective sections of the IBWC. To address the issue of transboundary
effluent flows, the IBWC has taken actions under numerous Minutes.153 Under this authority,
IBWC has constructed and currently operates three wastewater treatment plants, two of which
treat Mexican wastewater on the U.S. side of the border. These two wastewater treatment plants
are the South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Ysidro, CA, and the Nogales
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nogales, AZ. Further, IBWC operates the Nuevo Laredo
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico.
Congress appropriates funds to the IBWC for construction activities through State Department
appropriations. The State Department’s FY2023 budget requested $41.8 million in construction
funds for a range of projects, including rehabilitating IBWC wastewater infrastructure in Nogales,
AZ. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), includes an appropriation of
$53.0 million for IBWC construction, roughly $2 million above enacted FY2022 IBWC
construction appropriations. The State Department’s FY2024 budget requested $40.0 million in
construction funds.
In recent years, congressional appropriators have shown interest in oversight regarding
transboundary sewage flows. The joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), requires the IBWC to submit to the appropriations committees an
operating plan for FY2023, including plans for new and ongoing construction projects.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Congress annually provides funding to EPA for high priority water and wastewater infrastructure
projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region. In 1997, EPA and NADB entered into an agreement,
under which EPA contributes much of its annual border infrastructure appropriation to NADB for
grants to construct water infrastructure on both sides of the border. For FY2023, Congress
provided $36.4 million for the Border Water Infrastructure Program (BWIP) through an EPA
account in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328). EPA in turn provides these
funds to two programs: (1) the Project Development Assistance Program (PDAP) and (2) the
Border Environment Infrastructure Fund (BEIF).154 The PDAP and BEIF programs are intended
to identify and fund drinking water quality and/or wastewater management infrastructure projects.
152 In 1882, the United States and Mexico created the International Boundary Commission (IBC) as a temporary
boundary-setting body. See 1882 Boundary Convention, Article 3. The United States and Mexico reestablished the IBC
in 1889 and made it permanent in 1900. See Convention Between the United States of America and the United States
of Mexico, Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, Between the Two Governments, Known as
the Water Boundary Convention, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 21, 1900, 31 Stat. 1936. Treaty Between the United States of
America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.Mex., February 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, at https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/1944Treaty.pdf. The 1944 Treaty, Article 3,
states that the countries agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems.
153 These Minutes can be found at https://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes_ByProject.html.
154 Project funds are divided between EPA Region 6 (for projects in New Mexico, Texas, Chihuahua, Nueva Leon,
Coahuila, and Tamaulipas) and EPA Region 9 (for projects in Arizona, California, Baja California, and Sonora).
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Project sponsors can apply jointly to the PDAP/BEIF program through NADB, which screens for
initial eligibility and prioritizes projects using EPA’s ranking methodologies.155
The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113) included a supplemental appropriation of $300
million for EPA to support high-priority wastewater facilities, after consultation with the
appropriate border commission. The act directs EPA to carry out design, construction, operation,
and maintenance activities of high-priority treatment works in the Tijuana River Valley to treat
wastewater flows originating in Mexico. Section 7069 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2023, authorizes EPA to transfer funds provided by P.L. 116-113 to the IBWC to construct, own,
and/or operate treatment works to (1) address transboundary pollution and inadequacies or
breakdown of existing treatment works in Mexico, and (2) provide treatment of flows, including
the operations and maintenance of new treatment works.
USMCA Implementation Act, IBWC, and Minute 328
In July 2022, the U.S. and Mexican sections of the IBWC agreed to Minute 328, “Sanitation
Infrastructure Projects in San Diego, California – Tijuana, Baja California for Immediate
Implementation and for Future Development.”156 Minute 328 identifies specific projects to be
constructed in San Diego and Tijuana, and the financial commitments of each country to these
projects. These funds are dedicated to expanding the capacity of the South Bay International
Wastewater Treatment Plant in San Diego County; rehabilitating pumping plants, pump stations,
and pipelines in Mexico, as well as constructing a new wastewater treatment plant in Mexico.
North American Development Bank
In 1993, the United States and Mexico adopted an agreement to establish the Border Environment
Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the NADB to provide financial assistance for a range of
environmental infrastructure projects in the border region.157 The agreement noted the need for
environmental infrastructure, especially in the areas of water pollution, wastewater treatment, and
municipal solid waste. The BECC was authorized to help border states and communities
coordinate, design, and mobilize financing for environmental infrastructure projects, and to
certify projects for financing. The NADB evaluates the financial feasibility of BECC-certified
projects and provides financing as appropriate. In 1993, Congress authorized U.S. participation in
the BECC and NADB in legislation implementing the NAFTA (P.L. 103-182). In 2004, P.L. 108215 authorized several operational reforms to the NADB. In 2017, BECC and NADB were
integrated into a single institution.158
The USMCA Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113), Title VIII, Subtitle C, called for U.S. NADB
board members to urge NADB to prioritize financing environmental infrastructure projects (over
road or commercial projects), streamline project certification and financing procedures, and
develop project performance measures. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116260), Division O, Title VI, authorized the U.S. Treasury to contribute up to $1.02 billion for U.S.
155 Project application documents can be found at https://www.nadb.org/infrastructure-financing/grants/border-
environment-infrastructure-fund-beif-pdap.
156 IBWC, “Minute 328,” https://ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min328.pdf.
157 The amended agreement can be found at North American Development Bank (NADB) website “Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States
Concerning the Establishment of a North American Development Bank” at https://www.nadb.org/uploads/content/files/
Policies/Charter_Eng.pdf.
158 NADB, “NADB and BECC Merge,” press release, November 7, 2017, https://www.nadb.org/news/nadb-and-beccmerge.
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shares of NADB capital stock. The 2021 NADB annual report stated that, as of July 2022, the
United States has provided $225 million in paid-in capital to the NADB and that Mexico intended
to provide matching payments.159
Water Resource Issues160
The United States and Mexico share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. These
shared rivers have long presented complex issues leading to cooperation and conflict in the U.S.Mexico border region and between the United States and Mexico.
The U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944 and other binational agreements guide how the two
governments share the flows of these rivers.161 The binational IBWC administers these
agreements and includes a U.S. Section that operates under foreign policy guidance from the U.S.
Department of State. Since 1944, the IBWC has been the principal venue for addressing riverrelated disputes between the United States and Mexico.
Under the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, the United States is required to provide Mexico
annually with 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water.162 U.S. deliveries to Mexico in the
Rio Grande basin near El Paso/Ciudad Juárez occur annually under a 1906 binational convention,
whereas Mexico’s deliveries downstream of Fort Quitman, TX, are established in the U.S.Mexico Water Treaty of 1944. The 1944 treaty typically requires Mexico to deliver to the United
States a minimum amount during a five-year cycle.
Developments in the Colorado River Basin. The United States continues to meet its Colorado
River annual delivery requirements to Mexico pursuant to the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944.
Recent IBWC actions on the Colorado River have focused on how to manage the Colorado
River’s water and infrastructure to improve water availability during drought and to restore and
protect riverine ecosystems. The most recent minute governing Colorado River basin operations,
Minute 323 (signed in September 2017), is a set of binational measures that provides for
cooperative basin water management, including environmental flows to restore riverine habitat.
Minute 323 also provides for Mexico to share in cutbacks during shortage conditions in the U.S.
portion of the basin, including delivery reductions under drought contingency plans authorized by
Congress in April 2019.163 In addition, Minute 323 designates a “Mexican Water Reserve”
through which Mexico can delay its water deliveries from the United States and store its delayed
deliveries upstream at Lake Mead, thereby increasing the lake’s elevation.164 For the Colorado
River Basin, issues before Congress may be largely related to oversight of Minute 323
implementation and water management associated with potential shortage conditions and any
159 Paid-in capital consists of funds contributed by the two governments to NADB. NADB, North American
Development Bank 2021 Annual Report, June 30, 2022, p. 41.
160 This section is drawn from CRS Report R45430, Sharing the Colorado River and the Rio Grande: Cooperation and
Conflict with Mexico, by Nicole T. Carter, Stephen P. Mulligan, and Charles V. Stern.
161 Another example of a water resource related treaty provision is Article IV of the 1970 Treaty to Resolve Pending
Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-Mexico,
signed November 23, 1970.
162 Under the treaty, the United States must supply an additional 200,000 acre-feet when surplus is declared. During
drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. uses.
163 Drought Contingency Plans for the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basin were enacted in April 2019 in P.L. 11614. For more information, see CRS Report R45546, Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought,
and the Federal Role, by Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh.
164 Lake Mead elevation is the baseline used by the United States for determining shortage conditions and associated
water delivery cutbacks for the Lower Colorado River Basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada.
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additional proposed delivery reductions in response to ongoing drought.165 Congress also may be
interested in the upcoming 2026 expiration of Minute 323 and the negotiation of any extensions
or replacement agreements in the interim.
Developments in the Rio Grande Basin. On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has not met
its Rio Grande delivery obligations of 1,750,000 acre-feet within the five-year cycle established
by the U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, most recently during the five-year cycle from 2010 to
2015.166 Mexico avoided ending the October 2015 to October 2020 cycle with a water delivery
deficit by transferring to the United States Mexican water stored at binational IBWC dams. A
minute concluded in October 2020, Minute 325, provided that a shortfall would be avoided
through the transfer of water stored at two IBWC dams from Mexican to U.S. ownership. Minute
325 resulted in the transfer of ownership of 144,728 acre-feet of water.167
Minute 325 also allowed for negotiation of an agreement for potential temporary use of U.S.
water for minimum municipal needs in Mexico below the Amistad Dam. In addition, Minute 325
indicated that two Rio Grande working groups would be established as part of the efforts to reach
a goal of developing a minute on increased reliability and predictability of Rio Grande deliveries
to water users in the United States and Mexico by December 2023. To date, Congress has been
primarily involved in conducting oversight through reporting requirements for the U.S.
Department of State, such as those included in P.L. 116-6 (S.Rept. 115-282). Pursuant to the
various reporting requirements, reports have been delivered to various committees of Congress.
During the current five-year cycle (October 2020-October 2025), Mexico’s deliveries were
among the lowest observed for the first 22 months of a cycle. Deliveries increased in August and
September 2022 and then flattened out through March 2023. Mexico has another 2½ years to
meet the 5-year delivery obligation.
U.S.-Mexico Health Cooperation
As with neighboring Canada, robust trade, migration, and an extensive shared border have made
public health cooperation a critical part of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship.168 Collaboration
on health matters has been strong for more than two decades, particularly since the Anthrax
release in 2001 when Mexico became part of the Global Health Security Agenda and later on in
response to the outbreaks of SARS-CoV (2002-2004). In response, both countries collaborated on
the development of an electronic early warning surveillance system for infectious diseases.
Building on lessons learned from the H1N1 (2009) Influenza pandemic, Mexico, Canada, and the
United States launched the 2012 North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza
(NAPAPI). The 2012 NAPAPI created a flexible platform to prevent, prepare, and respond to any
potential or actual health security threat to North America through the North American Health
Security Working Group (NAHSWG). Since its creation, the NAHSWG has hosted multiple
tabletop exercises on emergency communications and deployments of medical countermeasures,
165 For example, in January 2023 six of the seven Colorado River basin states submitted a proposal to the Department
of the Interior that recommends conserving Colorado River waters by assessing evaporative losses on deliveries to
Lower Colorado River basin states and Mexico. See Letter from Colorado River Basin State Representatives of
Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming to Tanya Trujillo, Assistant Secretary, Water &
Science, U.S. Department of the Interior, January 31, 2023.
166 Mexico made up for those shortfalls in subsequent five-year cycles, as authorized under the U.S.-Mexico Water
Treaty of 1944.
167 Amount of the transfer is described in Letter from Jayne Harkins, Commissioner, U.S. IBWC, to Greg Abbott,
Governor of Texas, November 3, 2020.
168 This paragraph draws from Andrew I. Rudman and Duncan Wood, Pandemics and Beyond: The Potential for U.S.Mexican Cooperation in Public Health, Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, March 2020.
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medical personnel, and laboratory samples.169 The NAHSWG is led by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and has U.S. government representation from several HHS
offices, such as the CDC, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and from other agencies (such as DHS and the State Department). In
addition to this trilateral collaboration, Mexico is one of five countries that has a permanent HHS
health attaché representing the Office of the Secretary, overseeing the work of HHS agencies
operating within the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and leading health diplomacy efforts.
Response to COVID-19. In January 2020, the NAHSWG convened to respond to COVID-19.
The group enabled the sharing of best practices on issues such as epidemiological surveillance,
laboratory diagnostics regulation, testing policies, supply chains, workers’ safety, COVID-19
variants, and vaccine confidence. Through the HHS health attaché, Mexico received funding
support to strengthen the COVID-19 response in the areas of epidemiological and laboratory
surveillance, risk communication, and research. HHS also supported Mexico with diagnostics test
kits, facilitated the acquisition of ventilators, hosted bilateral dialogues on vaccine and
therapeutics development, and provided expertise on vaccine deployment matters. Mexico
received nearly 17 million vaccine doses from the U.S. government.170
Border Health Coordination. The U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission was created in July
2000 with the signing of an agreement by the Secretary of Health and Human Services of the
United States and the Secretary of Health of México to provide international leadership to
improve health and quality of life along the U.S.-Mexico border.171 Under the Biden
Administration’s HHS leadership, the U.S. section of the commission is tasked with conducting
health needs assessments and serving as a key advisory body on border health matters to the HHS
Secretary in alignment with larger bilateral collaboration frameworks and with its public law
mandate. Since 2018, the U.S. section has provided funding and technical advice through the
CDC’s Binational Border Infection Disease Surveillance (BIDS) program, which in turn funds the
four U.S. states on the U.S.-Mexico border to improve the detection, reporting, and prevention of
infectious diseases of binational importance.
The NAHSWG and the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission reviewed lessons learned from
COVID-19 at the federal and border level, as called for during the 2021 North American Leaders’
Summit.172 While some transborder communities (e.g., San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja
California) used existing mechanisms to coordinate their pandemic responses, others (e.g., El
Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua) struggled to do so.173 Limited federal support from
underfunded border health entities and disjointed national travel restrictions and vaccine policies
169 CRS interview with the HHS Office of Global Affairs, March 16, 2022.
170 Ibid.
171 HHS, “U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission,” at https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/oga/about-oga/what-we-
do/international-relations-division/americas/border-health-commission/index.html.
172 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2021 North American Leaders’ Summit,” November 18, 2021.
That review reportedly examined emergency communications; joint outbreak investigation; laboratory capacity;
development of and access to medical countermeasures; supply chains; health systems capacity and interoperability;
and workers’ protections.
173 Barbara Jiménez and Justine Kozo, “The Development of a Collaborative Binational Strategy to Support the San
Diego-Tijuana Transborder Community During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Front Public Health, vol. 10, July 2022;
Martha Pskowski and Lauren Villagran, “'Too Many People Died for Us to Walk Away’: Renewed U.S., Mexico
Cooperation Vital to Saving Lives in Next Pandemic,” El Paso Times, March 24, 2022.
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added to the challenges faced by local officials in binational communities.174 At the 2023 NALS,
a key deliverable included revising the 2021 NAPAPI to better respond to health threats.175
Outlook
U.S.-Mexico relations are likely to be tested in 2023 by ongoing tension in security and energy
relations and by U.S. concerns over human rights, the weakening of Mexico’s democratic
institutions, and the military’s growing role in Mexico’s economy and society. Most experts
maintain the best way for both countries to address these challenges is to continue working
together and with Canada to ensure the best possible outcomes for North America. A series of
high-level meetings in 2022 and thus far in 2023 have kept dialogue open between the Biden and
López Obrador administrations. Nevertheless, tough U.S. congressional criticism of Mexico’s
inability to address fentanyl trafficking and Mexican criticism of U.S. intervention and violations
of Mexican sovereignty have caused renewed tension. In addition, bilateral cooperation may
falter as both countries convene presidential elections in 2024. Congress is likely to maintain
significant interest in Mexico, with trade, security, drug policy, migration, health, and
environmental issues as probable areas of funding and oversight efforts.
174 Ibid.
175 White House, “Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit,” January 10, 2023.
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Appendix A. Key Justice Institutions
Key Institutions for Strengthening the Rule of Law
New Criminal Justice System. By the mid-2000s, most Mexican legal experts had concluded that reforming
Mexico’s corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system was crucial for combating criminality and strengthening the
rule of law. In June 2008, Mexico implemented constitutional reforms mandating that by 2016, trial procedures at
the federal and state levels had to move from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a
judge to an adversarial public trial system, with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence. These changes
aimed to create a new, more transparent, impartial, and efficient criminal justice system.
Under then-President Enrique Peña Nieto, Mexico technically met the June 2016 deadline for adopting the new
system, with states that received technical assistance from the United States showing, on average, better results
than others. Nevertheless, problems in implementation occurred and public opinion turned against the system, as
judges released criminals due to flawed police investigations or weak cases presented by prosecutors. According
to the World Justice Project, the new system has produced better courtroom infrastructure, more capable judges,
and faster case resolution than the old system, but more training for police and prosecutors is needed.
President López Obrador has not dedicated significant resources to strengthening the justice system. His
administration passed a 2019 constitutional reform mandating mandatory pretrial detention for many crimes,
which runs counter to the new system’s goals. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ordered Mexico to
reform this pretrial detention system, but the government has not complied.
Building an Independent Prosecutor General’s Office. Analysts who study Mexico’s legal system have long
highlighted the inefficiency of the attorney general’s office (known as the PGR). The PGR struggled with limited
resources, corruption, and a lack of political will to resolve high-profile cases, including those involving corruption
or human rights abuses. Many civil society groups that pushed for the new criminal justice system also lobbied the
Mexican Congress to create an independent prosecutor’s office. Amid petitions from civil society organizations,
Mexico’s senate was to appoint an independent individual to lead the new prosecutor general’s office for a nineyear term under 2014 constitutional reforms.
President López Obrador downplayed the importance of the new office during his campaign, but Mexico’s
Congress established the office, now known as the Prosecutor General’s Office (FGR), after López Obrador’s
inauguration. In January 2019, Mexico’s senate named Dr. Alejandro Gertz Manero, a close associate and former
security adviser to López Obrador, as prosecutor general. Gertz Manero directed prosecutors to focus on
emblematic cases, but few have progressed. Critics maintain Gertz Manergo has been slow to implement the
reforms enacted by the Mexican Congress to strengthen the FGR.
National Anti-corruption System. In July 2016, Mexico’s Congress approved legislation that contained several
proposals put forth by civil society to fully implement the National Anti-corruption System (NAS) created by a
2015 constitutional reform. The legislation gave the NAS investigative and prosecutorial powers and a civilian
board of directors; increased administrative and criminal penalties for corruption; and required three declarations
(taxes, assets, and conflicts of interest) from public officials and contractors. Under the Peña Nieto government,
federal implementation of the NAS lagged and state-level implementation varied.
In February 2019, Prosecutor General Gertz Manero named a special anti-corruption prosecutor, who received a
significant budget for 2020 and 2021 amid generalized budget cuts for the institution. Cases involving corruption in
the social development ministry and corrupt payments from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht to the
head of Petróleos de México (Pemex) during the Peña Nieto administration are moving forward. However, some 500
reports of corruption referred to the FGR by the Ministry of Public Administration in the current administration
have yet to be presented before a judge. In January 2022, the López Obrador administration proposed to
eliminate NAS’s technical support arm charged with evaluating the country’s anti-corruption activities as part of a
larger consolidation strategy to reduce public spending.
Sources: Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David Shirk, Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The Final
Countdown to Implementation, Justice in Mexico, October 2015; World Justice Project México, Mexico’s New
Criminal Justice System: Substantial Progress and Persistent Challenges, June 2018; “AMLO Asegura que Respetará
Decisión de Prisión Preventiva Oficiosa por Defraudación Fiscal,” El Economista, October 26, 2021; Arturo Angel,
“Gertz en Tres Años con FGR: Despidos, Opacidad e Incumpliendo Plazos de su Propia Ley,” Animal Político,
January 27, 2022; and Jorge Monroy, Pedro Villa y Caña y Alberto Morales, “Va AMLO por Fusionar 16 órganos
en Dependencias,” El Universal, January 28, 2022; Stephanie Brewer, “International Ruling Finds Mexico’s Legal
Framework on Detentions Violates Human Rights,” WOLA, February 23, 2023.
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Appendix B. Mérida Initiative Funding
Table B-1. Estimated Mérida/Bicentennial Framework Funding: FY2008-FY2022
(in millions of dollars)
Account
ESF
INCLE
FMF
Total
FY2008
20.0
263.5
116.5
400.0
FY2009
15.0
406.0
39.0
460.0
FY2010
9.0
365.0
265.2
639.2
FY2011
18.0
117.0
8.0
143.0
FY2012
33.3
248.5
Not app.
281.8
FY2013
32.1
190.1
Not app.
222.2
FY2014
35.0
143.1
Not app.
178.1
FY2015
33.6
110.0
Not app.
143.6
FY2016
39.0
100.0
Not app.
139.0
FY2017
40.9a
90.0
Not app.
130.9
FY2018
39.0b
100.0
Not app.
139.0
FY2019
39.0c
110.0
Not app.
149.0
FY2020
33.0d
100.0
Not app.
133.0
FY2021
50.0
100.0
Not app.
150.0
FY2022
50.0e
64.0
Not. app.
114.0
Total
486.9
2,543.2
428.7
3,458.8
FY2023 req.
75.0
64.0
Not. app.
139.0
FY2024 req.
60.7
64.0
Not. app.
124.7
Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget office, November 3, 2016; U.S.
Department of State, November 18, 2016; P.L. 115-141; P.L. 116-6; P.L. 117-103; U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2022; Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-94;
Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260; and Explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-103.
Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; FMF =
Foreign Military Financing. FY2008-FY2010 included supplemental funding.
a. For FY2017, Mérida programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
were funded through the Development Assistance account rather than ESF.
b. Of the $45 million in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 million supported non-Mérida Initiative programs.
c. Of the $45 million in funds appropriated for ESF, some $6 million supported non-Mérida Initiative programs.
d. Of the $50 million in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $13 million will be used to support nonMérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #71, December
16, 2020.
e. Of the $50 million in funds appropriated for ESF, an estimated $18 million will be used to support nonMérida Initiative programs focused on clean energy and sustainable landscapes. USAID, CN #193, July 18,
2022.
f.
A portion of the funds appropriated will support programs related to clean energy and sustainable
landscapes.
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Author Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Acknowledgments
This report contains significant contributions from Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy;
Stephen P. Mulligan, Legislative Attorney; Charles V. Stern, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy; and
Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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Congressional Research Service
R42917 · VERSION 59 · UPDATED
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.