Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Congressional research reportDec 6, 2012
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Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space
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Specialist in Missile Defense
December 6, 2012
Congressional Research Service
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R42849
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Summary
Iran has long been a source of concern for the United States and other countries because its goals
are at odds with core U.S. objectives in the Middle East. Although it is not certain that Iran has
made the decision to develop a nuclear weapon, it is taking steps to drastically reduce the time
needed to obtain nuclear weapons should a decision be made to do so. It is the prospect of an
Iranian nuclear weapon mated to an effective missile delivery capability that is especially
worrisome to most.
Congress has long been interested in these matters. Congress has held numerous hearings on Iran,
passed various resolutions regarding Iran and approved a range of sanctions against Iran over the
past several decades.
According to the U.S. government, Iran has the largest number of ballistic missiles in the Middle
East; it is developing missiles and space launch vehicles for multiple purposes. Iran is pursuing its
missile and space programs with development and testing facilities that are scattered throughout
the country. Assessing Iran’s ballistic missile programs is challenging for many reasons, including
the lack of specificity in official public sources, the secretive nature of Iran’s regime and the
regime’s frequent exaggerations of its ballistic missile capabilities, and the overwhelming amount
of and often conflicting information found in non-official sources.
The vast majority of Iran’s heavy artillery rockets and ballistic missiles are short-range of less
than about 500 kilometers. Most of Iran’s ballistic missiles in fact are Scud-B and Scud-Cs, with a
majority likely being Scud Cs, which are 500 km range capable. Iran views its short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBM) capability as necessary for battlefield and tactical military purposes.
These missiles could not strike U.S. or allied bases in the region unless they were moved far from
their operating base and launched from vulnerable positions along Iran’s Persian Gulf coastline.
This is not likely because of logistical and operational security reasons. Although these SRBMs
are not very accurate, they could be fired against economic or civilian targets. Also, any such
missile attacks against U.S. bases, while not militarily decisive, could disrupt or complicate (but
not halt) base operations.
Iran has grown increasingly self-sufficient in the production of SRBMs, but it still probably relies
on others for some key components. Gaining access to these kinds of critical components and
materials has grown increasingly difficult for Iran. Stricter international enforcement of export
controls and broadening sanctions have reportedly slowed down Iran’s efforts and forced Iran to
find less reliable alternative sources of rocket and missile technology.
Iran is developing and producing medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capabilities with
ranges estimated up to about 2,000 kilometers (with some non-U.S. government sources citing
slightly higher ranges), sufficient to strike targets throughout the Middle East. U.S. intelligence
assessments state such missiles are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Although
the number of Iran’s MRBMs is thought to be relatively small by official U.S. estimates, it is
expected to continue to build more capable MRBMs. Iran views these missiles as an important
deterrent and retaliatory force against U.S. and other forces in the region in the event of war. Iran
has also constructed an underground network of bunkers and underground silo-like missile launch
facilities, and is seeking improved air defenses presumably to enhance the survivability of their
MRBMs against preemptive attack.
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Currently Iran must rely on others for certain key missile components and materials in its MRBM
program. Export controls and sanctions have made it increasingly difficult, but certainly not
impossible, for Iran to acquire the best of such items. On the other hand, these export control
measures and sanctions have forced Iran to try to exploit weaknesses in existing export and
nonproliferation regimes, including by trying to find foreign sellers willing to circumvent those
laws.
Iran also has a genuine and ambitious space launch program, which seeks to enhance Iran’s
national pride, and perhaps more importantly, its international reputation as a growing advanced
industrial power. Iran also sees itself as a potential leader in the Middle East offering space
launch and satellite services. Iran has stated it plans to use future launchers for placing
intelligence gathering satellites into orbit, although such a capability is a decade or so in the
future. Many believe Iran’s space launch program could mask the development of an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – with ranges in excess of 5,500 km that could threaten
targets throughout Europe, and even the United States if Iran achieved an ICBM capability of at
least 10,000 km. ICBMs share many similar technologies and processes inherent in a space
launch program, but it seems clear that Iran has a dedicated space launch effort and it is not
simply a cover for ICBM development. Since 1999, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has
assessed that Iran could test an ICBM by 2015 with sufficient foreign assistance, especially from
a country such as China or Russia (whose support has reportedly diminished over the past
decade). It is increasingly uncertain whether Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by
2015 for several reasons: Iran does not appear to be receiving the degree of foreign support many
believe would be necessary, Iran has found it increasingly difficult to acquire certain critical
components and materials because of sanctions, and Iran has not demonstrated the kind of flight
test program many view as necessary to produce an ICBM.
This report will be updated regularly.
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Contents
Congressional Interest...................................................................................................................... 1
Iran: A Source of Global Political Concern ............................................................................... 1
Iran: A Source of Military Concern ........................................................................................... 3
Context............................................................................................................................................. 5
Scope ......................................................................................................................................... 5
The Technological Challenge of Ballistic Missiles ................................................................... 6
Management and Organization .................................................................................................. 7
Missile Proliferation: Challenges with Estimates and Projections ............................................ 8
Iran: A Special Case in Opacity ............................................................................................... 10
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs ..................................................................... 12
Context and Historical Background ........................................................................................ 12
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Complex ............................................................... 13
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) ................................................................................ 15
Shahab 1 and Shahab-2 ..................................................................................................... 18
Qiam .................................................................................................................................. 18
Fateh-110 ........................................................................................................................... 19
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) .......................................................................... 21
The Shahab 3 and Its Variants ........................................................................................... 23
Modified Shahab-3/Ghadr-1/Kadr .................................................................................... 23
What of the Shahab-4, Shahab-5 and Shahab-6? .............................................................. 24
Sejil/Sejjil 2/Ashura .......................................................................................................... 25
The R-27/BM-25/Musudan Controversy .......................................................................... 25
MRBM Silo-like Launch Facilities ................................................................................... 27
“Secret” MRBM Tests (2010-2011) .................................................................................. 32
Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) ................................................................ 35
Intelligence Estimates: U.S. and Others ............................................................................ 35
The View from Iran ........................................................................................................... 38
Space Launch Program ............................................................................................................ 39
Organization ...................................................................................................................... 39
Space Launch Vehicles ...................................................................................................... 41
Orbital Launches ............................................................................................................... 42
Sub-orbital Launches......................................................................................................... 44
Manned Space Flight......................................................................................................... 44
Foreign-Iranian Cooperation.......................................................................................................... 45
The Libyan and Syrian Relationship ....................................................................................... 45
North Korean-Iranian Cooperation.......................................................................................... 46
The Russian-Iranian Relationship ........................................................................................... 47
Chinese-Iranian Cooperation ................................................................................................... 51
Net Effects on Iranian Programs.............................................................................................. 53
Challenges Today ........................................................................................................................... 54
Figures
Figure 1. Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Complex ...................................................... 14
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Figure 2. SRBM Sites and Ranges................................................................................................. 16
Figure 3. Kermanshah SRBM Base ............................................................................................... 17
Figure 4. MRBM Sites and Ranges ............................................................................................... 22
Figure 5. Iranian Launch Silo ........................................................................................................ 28
Figure 6. Tabriz Ballistic Missile Silo Base 1................................................................................ 30
Figure 7. Tabriz Ballistic Missile Silo Base 2................................................................................ 31
Figure 8. Space Launch Vectors (Current) ..................................................................................... 40
Figure 9. Space Launch Vectors (Prospective) .............................................................................. 41
Tables
Table 1. Iranian SRBMs (U.S. Government) ................................................................................. 20
Table 2. Iranian MRBMs (U.S. Government)................................................................................ 34
Table 3. Iranian Satellites (Current and Planned) .......................................................................... 43
Table C-1. Iranian SRBMs (Other Sources) .................................................................................. 64
Table C-2. Iranian MRBMs (Other Sources) ................................................................................. 65
Appendixes
Appendix A. The “Great Prophet” Exercises (2006-2012) ............................................................ 56
Appendix B. Reporting Requirements Relevant to Iranian Ballistic Missile Programs ................ 61
Appendix C. Other Estimates of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles ............................................................. 64
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 66
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 66
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Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Congressional Interest
Why does Iranian acquisition of ballistic missiles1 or Iran’s pursuit of a space launch capability
matter, especially to the Congress? For decades, most in Congress have viewed Iran with concern
because of its nuclear program and its support of anti-U.S. and anti-Israel militant movements in
the region. Congress has held numerous hearings on Iran, passed various resolutions regarding
Iran and approved a range of sanctions against Iran over the past several decades. Congress has
established a broad number of reporting requirements of the Executive Branch that encompass the
range of its concerns regarding Iranian WMD and ballistic missile programs. These reporting
requirements are detailed in Appendix B, “Reporting Requirements Relevant to Iranian Ballistic
Missile Programs.” Congress has also supported funding BMD programs aimed at countering
ballistic missiles especially those from Iran,2 including cooperative programs with friendly and
allied nations such as Israel. Iran’s current and prospective capabilities challenge U.S. national
security interests in many ways and are raised briefly below.
In response to the Iranian ballistic missile and space program, Congress is considering the
deployment of an ballistic missile defense site on the East coast to defend against possible Iranian
ICBMs. The House included a provision in the FY2013 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4310)
providing $103 million to begin developing a plan and a supporting environmental impact
statement to establish by the end of 2015 such a missile defense site on the East Coast to defend
against a possible Iranian ICBM attack. That plan would evaluate the effectiveness, from an East
Coast site, of various long-range BMD interceptor missiles.3 The Senate version of the
authorization bill does not include such a provision. The House FY2013 defense appropriations
bill (H.R. 5856) did not include any such provision. Neither did the Senate defense appropriations
bill.
Iran: A Source of Global Political Concern
Iran is often a topic of discussion and a source of concern for many policymakers and experts in
the national and international security community: “much of the debate over U.S. policy toward
Iran has centered on the nature of the current regime; some believe that Iran … is a threat to U.S.
1
After an initial powered phase of flight, a ballistic missile leaves the atmosphere and follows an unpowered trajectory
or flight path before reentering the atmosphere toward a predetermined target. Ballistic missile ranges can vary from a
hundred or so kilometers to more than 10,000 kilometers. The flight path may not be optimal if the trajectory is
depressed or lofted relative to the optimal range trajectory. Differences in trajectories also depend on the type of missile
(i.e., solid or liquid-fuel) and other factors. A space launch generally differs from a ballistic missile in that the launcher
will fly a steeper trajectory and the burn time will be longer to get the satellite into orbit. At about 750 km from the
launch site, these differences start to become apparent, thus allowing an assessment to be made about the purpose of a
long-range ballistic missile test. There are also other factors that would allow determination of whether a launch is
aimed at placing a satellite into orbit or delivering a warhead. Perhaps the quickest is to determine the direction of the
launch vehicle. In Iran’s case, a satellite launch would be in a south easterly direction to avoid overflight of other
countries and to take advantage of the rotation of the earth.
2
The Pentagon and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have long argued the value of BMD to provide for extended
deterrence, devalue missile proliferation, dissuade ballistic missile investment, and enable international cooperation for
regional defense.
3
These would include the three-stage weapon currently deployed at the existing GMD (Ground-based Midcourse
Defense) sites in Alaska and California, a two-stage version of the GMD missile first envisioned for deployment in
Poland during the Bush Administration, and several versions of the Navy’s SM-3 (Standard Missile-3).
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interests because hardliners in Iran’s regime dominate and set a policy direction intended to
challenge U.S. influence and allies in the region.”4 In his 2002 State of the Union address,
President George W. Bush labeled Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil” along with Iraq and North
Korea. More recently, the Obama Administration expressed its view of Iran as “a major threat to
U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran’s nuclear programs but
also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to Hamas and other
Palestinian militant groups, and to Lebanese Hezbollah.”5 To varying degrees these views are
shared by many across the political spectrum and around the world. Yet there are considerable
differences as to how to respond to Iran.
U.S. decision makers largely agree that Iran represents a threat to U.S. regional security interests.
The 2010 National Security Strategy states that “for decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
endangered the security of the region and the United States and failed to live up to its
international responsibilities.”6 The United States “has long seen a threat to U.S. interests posed
by Iran’s support for militant groups” throughout the Middle East, Iran’s support of the Syrian
regime against growing popular opposition, and especially Iran’s nuclear program, which “has
emerged as a top priority for the Obama Administration.”7 Thus, Iran has been subject to a wide
range of U.S. and international sanctions.
When coupled with its nuclear program, Iran’s ballistic missile programs are a focus of major
concern for a number of countries around the world. While discussing the implications of a
February 2, 2009 Iranian satellite launch and addressing growing concerns over the threat posed
by Iran, a Pentagon spokesman said such concerns affect Russia, Israel, the Middle East, Europe
and beyond:
We have long recognized that the threat—that they pose a real threat, and it is a growing
threat, and that they are determined to develop long-range ballistic missiles. And I think all
of Europe has recognized that to be the case, and that is why they unanimously embraced a
third site for missile defense in Europe. And the Russians have recognized it, telling the
secretary that they view Iran to be a threat as well. Clearly everybody in the Middle East
recognizes it. The Israelis in particular but also the Gulf States are very concerned about
Iran’s actions in this realm. So this development today is cause for concern, not just here in
the United States but in Europe, throughout the Middle East and, I believe, the greater
world.8
Similarly, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Losyukov, was quoted by news agencies
after a failed Iranian space launch attempt in 2008 saying the test “adds to general suspicions of
Iran regarding its potential desire to build nuclear weapons” and he noted that long-range missiles
“are one of the components of such weapons. That causes concern.”9
4
CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name redacted).
Ibid. Generally speaking, one of Iran’s primary objectives is to compel the United States and other outside powers to
vacate the Gulf so that Tehran can exercise greater hegemony. Iran maintains the Gulf States, if left alone, could live in
peace and security. The United States and many others disagree with this.
6
The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, May 2010, p. 26.
7
CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name redacted).
8
Department of Defense, DOD News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon, February 3,
2009, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4347.
9
“Iran: Russia Says New Rocket Raises Nuclear ‘Suspicions,’” Associated Press, February 7, 2008.
5
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Iran: A Source of Military Concern
More specifically, Iran’s ballistic missiles challenge U.S. military capabilities and U.S. influence
in the Middle East. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), “Iran already has the
largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and
sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a
nuclear payload.”10 According to the Pentagon, ballistic missiles in countries such as Iran threaten
“U.S. forces, allies, and partners in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains
security relationships.”11
Because of the size and capabilities of Iran’s ballistic missile force, some argue that in the event
of a crisis or conflict the United States might be deterred from engaging Iran militarily or that the
possibility of ballistic missile attacks might preclude certain U.S. force options. In fact, the U.S.
IC believes that Iran views its missile forces “as an integral part of its strategy to deter—and if
necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including U.S. forces. Its ballistic missiles are
inherently capable of delivering WMD, and, if so armed, would fit into this strategy.”12
In addition, some observers have argued that because many of Iran’s neighbors lack their own
deterrent capabilities or effective ballistic missile defenses Iran could “blackmail such states into
meeting demands, for example, to raise oil prices, cut oil production or even withhold
cooperation with the U.S. on which their very survival depends.”13 In the event of a conflict, one
expert wrote, “U.S. military action would be to forestall Iranian interference with Gulf oil
exports, this would have to be near total in its effect on Iranian capabilities. This would be
difficult if not impossible to achieve, leading to a fear of attack which alone would have a
formidable impact on oil prices.”14 Iran thus is viewed as a challenge to U.S. national security
interests in the region, even with superior U.S. conventional military power. A major trend in U.S.
military sales to the Persian Gulf states today is for anti-missile systems intended precisely to
address this threat.15
Congress has long been concerned over the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems,
especially ballistic missiles. Over the past few decades, Iran has progressed from relying entirely
on the outright purchase of ballistic missile systems to becoming nearly self-sufficient in
important ways. Many now see Iran as a potential supplier to other nations or actors. This point is
elaborated upon elsewhere in this report. Finally, some Members are concerned that an Iran
armed with a nuclear ballistic missile, by the nature of the regime itself and the prospect of even
wider proliferation that may follow, will result in a deterrence dynamic that is less stable and less
10
James. R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence, Washington,
DC, January 31, 2012, p. 6.
11
Pentagon, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Washington, DC, 2010, p. 5.
12
See footnote 11.
13
See, for instance, Nick Braveman, “Iranian Nukes are not Heading Toward Tel Aviv,” Military Technology, vol. 36,
no. 2 (February 2012), p. 5.
14
Paul Rogers, Iran: Consequences of a War, Oxford Research Group, Briefing Paper, Oxford, England, February
2006, p. 10.
15
CRS Report R42678, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, by (name redacted) and
(name redacted), p. 14.
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reliable compared to the one that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during
the Cold War.
Finally, Iran’s ballistic missile and space launch programs are major drivers of the U.S. BMD
program. In addition to an extensive number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and a
smaller number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Iran, the United States remains
concerned about the possibility of an intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM) program in
Iran. Since 1999, the IC has assessed that Iran could test an ICBM capable of striking parts of the
United States by 2015 with sufficient foreign assistance.16 Interestingly, however, LTG Burgess,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) testified in 2010 that DIA “assesses that, with
sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) capable of reaching the United States,”17 but he did not include any particular date by
which this might be accomplished. More recently, however, the 2012 DOD Annual Report on
Military Power of Iran stated “Iran may be technically capable of flight-testing an
intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015.”18 The report added that “beyond steady growth in its
missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems
by improving accuracy and developing new submunition payloads,”19 repeating what the same
report said in 2010.
Potential Iranian missile threats to U.S. allies and friends in Europe and to the United States itself
in the future are the basis for the Pentagon’s plan to deploy increasingly capable phases of BMD,
called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), over the next decade in Europe and
perhaps in the Persian Gulf as well.20 At the May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the Alliance
declared an interim territorial missile defense capability based on U.S. ballistic missile defense
(BMD) assets placed under NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) command and control to
guard against possible missile attacks from Iran and other potential adversaries.21 The EPAA,
which seeks to develop and deploy increasingly capable BMD over four phases through 2020,
would serve as the cornerstone of this new NATO capability. Phase 1 of the U.S. EPAA was
completed in December 2011 as scheduled. Phase 2 is expected to be completed by 2015,
although Defense Secretary Panetta has stated that the future of the EPAA could be called into
question by the application of automatic defense spending limitations under the Budget Control
Act of 2012. The U.S. EPAA will be integrated with other BMD systems already being
developed, augmented and deployed by NATO individual member states under NATO command
and control architecture.22
16
National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Through 2015, Washington, DC, September 1999. The most recent public update is National Intelligence Council,
Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Washington, DC, December 2001.
17
“Iran’s Military Power,” Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., United States Army, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 14, 2010.
18
Annual Report on Military Power of Iran, Department of Defense, April 2012, p. 4.
19
Annual Report on Military Power of Iran, Department of Defense, April 2012, p. 1.
20
See CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
CRS Report R42529, NATO’s Chicago Summit, by (name redacted). Also, LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA,
BMD Overview—
Phased Adaptive Approach, Missile Defense Agency, 11-MDA-6321, Washington, DC, August 15, 2011,
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/bmds_briefing12.pdf.
21
Previously, at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO formally agreed to implement a territorial BMD capability
designed to cover all Member states in Europe, as well as the United States and Canada.
22
CRS Report R42529, NATO’s Chicago Summit, by (name redacted).
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Further, some analysts, including the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission on the evolving missile threat
to the United States and its allies, suggest that countries could threaten U.S. territory by pursuing
unconventional deployment modes.23 Among these, it is argued, is to deploy shorter range
missiles on surface ships. These analysts argue that such ships could be brought close to coastal
areas of the United States, thus giving the shorter range missiles the ability to strike targets in the
United States. Others discount the ease with which this could be accomplished.
Context
This report is limited to analyzing Iran’s efforts to develop, test and field ballistic missiles and to
develop a space launch capability. Iran has pursued these efforts with the assistance of other
countries and entities operating in those countries with and without direct or indirect official
government sanction. Assessing Iran’s progress and capabilities in this area are challenging given
the general difficulty in evaluating ballistic missile capabilities and projections in general,
especially from the vagueness of official assessments and the numerous, but specific and
conflicting analyses by experts and others in the public domain. Although Iran is transparent in
many ways, it remains secretive and attempts to obfuscate intent and capabilities in others. The
latter tendency frequently extends to matters related to advancing its military technologies. All
these things contribute significantly to the difficulty inherent in such a report as this. These issues
are addressed below.
Scope
In and of itself, the acquisition of ballistic missiles is not necessarily problematic to U.S. interests.
Indeed, many U.S. friends and allies have such missiles and pursue missile modernization
programs. But when a ballistic missile program is pursued by a state hostile to the national
security interests of the United States and its friends and allies, such an effort becomes a source of
concern. Such concerns are amplified considerably when that state might develop a weapon of
mass destruction (WMD), particularly a nuclear weapon that could be carried by that ballistic
missile force. In Iran’s case, no major intelligence community has concluded that Iran has made
the decision to develop a nuclear weapon. But Iran has taken steps in its civilian nuclear program
that raise serious questions about future intent to develop or break out of its nonproliferation
commitments and obtain nuclear weapons on short notice.
An effective nuclear weapons capability has three major elements, each of which presents its own
unique technical and other challenges. Additionally, each of these elements must work together as
part of an operational system. All this is required to make the case that a specific ballistic missile
threat is grave and imminent.
First is the production of fissile or nuclear material in sufficient quantity and quality as the source
of a nuclear device.24 The second element concerns the design, weaponization, miniaturization,
and survivability of the warhead and its physics package capable of being delivered to its
23
Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July
15, 1998, pp. 21-22.
24
For an assessment of Iran’s nuclear program see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by (name re
dacted).
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intended target, especially at long-range.25 The third element is providing an effective means for
delivery, such as a ballistic missile or, as some believe, a capability that could grow out of a space
launch program.
This report focuses solely on Iran’s ballistic missile and space programs. It is important to note
that this report does not assess Iran’s capabilities in the other two critical areas. Without a reliable,
survivable nuclear warhead the proliferation of Iranian ballistic missiles is arguably not an
imminent significant threat.
Finally, there are literally many thousands of articles, news accounts and other sources regarding
Iran’s ballistic missile and space programs. It is not possible to sort through the tremendously
varied and often different accounts of events or capabilities. This report does not rely on those
items or try to adjudicate any differences in them. As much as possible, this report instead
emphasizes U.S. Government and other official sources. It is noted, however, that official sources
are frustrating to rely on as they frequently do not provide much specificity. On the other hand,
some of the best non-government open sources provide much more specificity yet those same
sources can vary considerably from one to another on the very same elements of Iran’s ballistic
missile and space launch programs. There are, however, perhaps a dozen or so excellent analysts
who write and publish on Iran’s programs, but who may differ on their various facets. This report
attempts to make clear where some of those key differences exist.
The Technological Challenge of Ballistic Missiles
This section very briefly touches on some of the challenges inherent in rocket science and missile
engineering regarding the development, testing and production of ballistic missiles.
As enormously capable as the United States is regarding the development and acquisition of
ballistic missiles, it too experiences challenges and even failures on occasion. For instance,
several years ago when the Pentagon sought to develop the first variant of the Ground-based
Interceptor for long-range BMD, it experienced significant technical problems in developing a
new solid rocket motor. Eventually, the Pentagon chose to go forward with an interceptor based
on existing launch vehicles (Minotaur and Pegasus). Other modern states with advanced missile
and space launch programs will also run into problems while developing new missile systems
despite their long-standing expertise and an extensive industrial base that is unencumbered with
external trade constraints, such as sanctions or export controls. In contrast, Iran’s expertise and
industrial base is significantly challenged in this regard on a number of fronts and cannot be
viewed as comparable to that of the United States or of the other major nuclear powers.
Nevertheless, Iran has demonstrated persistence over decades in continuing to develop and
improve its indigenous capabilities in spite of widespread international opposition and
cooperation against Iran’s ballistic missile programs. A significant advantage that Iran has had is
that the basic technology of rocket science is established and reasonably well known around the
world.
25
Gen. Eugene Habiger, former Commander US Strategic Command, has said that “the miniaturization of a nuclear
warhead is probably the most significant challenge any proliferant would have to face.” See General Eugene Habiger –
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 20, 2004. Problems and Prospects of New Alaska Missile
Interceptor Site. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Habiger.pdf. See also Joe Cirincione and Elise Connor, How Iran
Can Build a Bomb, Ploughshares Fund, July 2, 2010, http://www.ploughshares.org/blog/2010-07-02/how-iran-canbuild-bomb.
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Another comparative marker is to contrast the number of missile flight tests between modern
missile countries such as the United States and Russia on one hand and Iran on the other. By the
end of their development efforts, the United States had conducted perhaps a couple dozen or more
flight tests of the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile and somewhat less than that
number for the MX ICBM. The Soviet Union/Russian flight test record for their ICBMs (SS-24,
SS-25, and SS-26) was comparable. Moreover these flight tests took advantage of decades of
flight testing of older systems dating to the 1950s. This record entailed scores of space launch
flight tests and over a hundred each of the earliest ICBMs (Atlas and Minuteman I) prior to their
deployments. In contrast, Iran has conducted very few flight tests of its modern missiles. This has
major implications for how much confidence Iranian decision makers and military leaders would
have in the reliability and expected performance of their ballistic missile force to achieve its
intended missions.
Iran may also have difficulties in developing rocket motors for various reasons some of which
might include the effect of sanctions and export control regimes. The U.S. IC has touched on this
on many occasions. Although many principles of rocket science are much better known and more
widely shared today, missile engineering remains a challenging skill acquired only through direct
experience—it cannot simply be studied and applied without much trial and error. For instance,
there is tremendous complexity in finding the right formulation of solid propellants for a specific
missile system. Although the underlying rocket science has been reasonably well understood and
publicly available for decades the predictability of how a solid rocket motor will perform depends
on very subtle factors. This means that even after a propellant is formulated, the manufacturing of
solid rocket motors still requires extreme reliability controls.26
Additional factors necessary for developing an effective ballistic missile include a guidance
system that directs the missile and its payload to its intended target. This requires testing of
missiles and their reentry vehicles, which produces data from which mathematical models can be
developed, further tested and fine-tuned. From the time a ballistic missile lies dormant in its silo
or launch vehicle to its actual launch, various errors can begin to accumulate. A systematic and
rigorous testing regimen of all the component parts can help reduce as much as possible such
structural or inherent errors even in proven systems, but such errors cannot be eliminated entirely.
Operational tests of the system are generally necessary to know whether the entire system will
work as intended, and the degree to which further testing may be required to ensure such missiles
will launch successfully and operate as planned.
Management and Organization
Many experts would argue that strong management and organization are considered critical to a
good ballistic missile program. Iran is generally assessed to have such an organizational and
managerial program, although it too cannot be compared to similar programs in the major nuclear
weapons states—the United States, Russia, China, the UK and France. Michael Elleman, for
26
The Annex Handbook of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) contains among other things considerable
information about solid rocket propellants and their complexity. Additionally, a classic textbook for aerospace
engineers similarly demonstrates the complexity associated with formulating and implementing a propellant for a given
rocket motor. See George P. Sutton and Donald M. Ross, “Solid Propellant Rocket Fundamentals,” in Rocket
Propulsion Elements: An Introduction to the Engineering of Rockets, 5th ed. (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1986).
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instance, among others, has said “Iran’s record in the area of overall systems management and
engineering involving a range of technologies and industries is impressive.”27 He has further said
their approach to missile development and modification is disciplined and well structured.
This is unique in the proliferation world. They are not up to Western standards, but they are
far more sophisticated than the DPRK, Iraq or even Pakistan. This capability empowers Iran
to develop and produce whatever missile range it decides the country needs. It may take a
decade or more, and they will still rely on foreign sources for some key items, but there
appears to be little the West can do to stop (as opposed to impede) progress.28
Aaron Karp, one of the first experts to write about this, said
There is much more to any major R&D project than just assembling metal and plastic. Easily
overlooked are the necessary skills, experience and judgment required of engineers and
programme managers. Also, behind every missile programme are conceptual, organizational,
financial, and command and control factors, each imposing its own problems for ballistic
missile development.29
Karp also said that, although countries may receive considerable amounts of foreign assistance in
their missile programs, “would-be rocket makers are almost entirely on their own” in the area of
program management: “foreign companies and governments can offer advice and their own
example, but little else.”
For instance, both appropriate organization and managerial choices have proven critical to
successful ballistic missile programs when governments are choosing their development
strategies. An incremental development strategy, which Iran appears to have pursued, in which a
missile program moves in sequence through progressively larger designs, improving the
performance of major components, and gradually introducing new ones is the most effective
according to Karp. He cites the experience of the French as the best example of this. By contrast,
states that have begun their missile programs by taking huge leaps tend to face greater difficulties.
For instance, the UK began by developing an IRBM using this approach and that program
eventually collapsed. Similarly, India began its space launch program in the early 1970s enduring
many false starts and serious delays.
Missile Proliferation: Challenges with Estimates and Projections
Assessing ballistic missile proliferation capabilities in general has proven to be challenging.
Further, projecting those capabilities over some near- or long-term future has proven unreliable.
As a result, efforts to time responsive measures precisely according to program advancements in
select countries are likely to fail by projecting such advancements coming later or earlier than
will turn out to be the case. In the first instance, the United States was surprised by the
advancement of the Soviet Union’s space rocket capability, and by implication its ballistic missile
program, with the launch of the Sputnik satellite. At the other end of the spectrum, in 1990 the
U.S. IC projection for MRBMs and ICBMs by 2000 did not transpire:
27
Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 100.
28
E-mail correspondence with author, September 12, 2012.
29
Aaron Karp was one of the first to write of this in Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (London:
SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 51-98.
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Most missiles likely to be fielded in the Third World over the next 5 years will have ranges
of less than 1,000 kilometers, but by the year 2000 at least six countries probably will have
missiles with range of up to 3,000 kilometers. At least three of them may develop missiles
with ranges of up to 5,500 kilometers.30
Instead, intelligence assessments in 2000 showed that no country in the developing world had
acquired such capabilities.31 And the 1990 forecast has not been borne out through today.
For a variety of reasons, projections of ballistic missile trends in countries over time may not
materialize as expected, instead slowing significantly, apparently halting, or even reversing from
earlier assessments.32 In some cases, missile proliferation estimates might show significant
projected increases from year to year only later to show that same effort apparently halting
entirely.33
In particular, few countries have successfully developed and deployed operational, nuclear-armed
ICBMs. The developmental record of those who were successful indicates how challenging that
effort was.34 The fact that more nations have not achieved this capability is perhaps witness in
part to the extraordinary technical effort it took. The long history of acquiring ICBM capability
30
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Threat Assessment; Military Strategy; and Operational
Requirements, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., December 12, 1989; January 23-26, 30; February 2, 6-8, 21-22; March 7, 1990,
S.Hrg. 101-780 (Washington: GPO, 1990), Statement of Hon. William H. Webster, Dir., Central Intelligence, p. 61.
31
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
September 2000. The 2000 report identified several countries that were developing medium-range ballistic missiles but
none were of that range and none had been deployed. These included North Korea (1,300-2,000 km.), India (2,0003,200 km.), Pakistan (1,300-1,900 km.), and Iran (1,300-2,400 km.). Two other countries, generally not considered
Third World, had some number of medium-range ballistic missiles with max ranges of 2,400 km (Saudi Arabia, which
received some number of Chinese CSS-2 missiles) and 2,800 km. (China). North Korea’s Taepo-Dong 2, estimated by
some with a max range of more than 5,470 km was the one Third World country considered developing a long-range
ballistic missile at the time.
32
For instance, in 2002, the Department of Defense assessed that China would deploy the DF-31 by mid-decade. This
did not occur, although DOD assessed the DF-31 in 2007 as having an “initial threat availability” and assessed that less
than 10 were deployed in 2008; that number has not changed. DOD also assessed in 2002 that the follow-on extended
ICBM version of the DF-31 (DF-31A) would be deployed by mid-to-late decade, which occurred in 2008. In 2003,
DOD correctly assessed that China could have up to 60 ICBMs by the end of the decade. Similarly, the Chinese SLBM
program shows such problems. Since 2000, NASIC has assessed that China may be developing a medium-range
submarine-launched ballistic missile, but NASIC never considered it actually deployed. In contrast, the Department of
Defense reported that China had one XIA class submarine for those missiles (referred to variously as the JL-1 or CSSNX-3) as early as 2001. In 2002, DOD reassessed that China would deploy the JL-1 before the end of the year and
moved its estimated date for deployment into 2003 the following year. DOD then stated from 2005-2007 that the XIA
had deployed SLBMs, but then in 2008 and 2009 questioned whether the submarine was operational. In its latest report
(2010), DOD questioned whether either the submarine or its associated ballistic missiles were operational. In 2002, the
Department of Defense assessed that China would deploy the follow-on SLBM version of the DF-31 (JL-2 SLBM) by
mid-to-late decade, which DOD indicated occurred in 2008-2009. But, in 2010, DOD assessed the JL-2 SLBM as still
developmental. A flight test failure of the JL-2 SLBM in summer 2004 reportedly delayed its initial deployment32 and
the 2010 DOD report said the JL-2 failed several of its final rounds of tests. DOD currently believes the JL-2 SLBM
and associated submarine combination renders uncertain when it will become operational at all.
33
Initial growth estimates made by the Department of Defense in 2002 were that China would add about 50 SRBMs
each year, but by 2003 DOD revised this estimate upward to over 75 missiles each year and in 2006 increased this
further to about 100 per year. This trend appears to have slowed considerably or even halted in 2009-2010.
34
This is taken from congressional testimony by the author, “Some Thoughts on ICBM Development and ICBM
Threats.” See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Oversight of Ballistic Missile Defense (Part 1): Threats, Realities and Tradeoffs, 110th
Cong., 2nd sess., March 5, 2008, Serial No. 110–148 (Washington: GPO, 2009), pp. 55-72.
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among the five nuclear-armed ICBM states (U.S., Russia, China, UK35 and France) demonstrates
that such success required considerable resources in time, funding, knowledge, infrastructure,
organization and national commitment. After 50 years of commitment and experience, these
nations still experience developmental or even operational failures in their missile or space launch
programs on occasion. Although there are frequent charges of the ease in which a country might
develop an intercontinental ballistic missile from a space launch program, this has not in fact
occurred under missile programs by emerging missile and rocket powers, despite the fact that so
many of the technologies are comparable. Perhaps the closest example is that of India, which may
have used a few elements of its more than 30-year old space program to develop and test an
ICBM-range missile for the first time in April 2012.36
Some argue, however, that the small number of ICBM programs to date may result from the small
number of countries who perceive the need for ICBMs rather than it being so difficult. Five
countries make ICBMs, but nine countries have made successful SLVs, which are close to
ICBMs. Additionally, it is argued, that countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union and
France took considerable time and money to build their ICBMs is not necessarily an indication
for other ICBM contenders. The superpowers and France adhere to high quality and reliability
standards, which may or may not be present in Iran. Iran also may be satisfied with an ICBM
capability of lesser quality and reliability, it is argued.
Contributing further to understanding missile proliferation in Iran is the difference in names often
given to various Iranian missiles by Iran, the United States, U.S. friends and allies, and other
good open sources, even when it appears specific missile capabilities seem to suggest the same
missile is being described. This report does not attempt to reconcile those differences, but rather
retains the missile designations in the sources cited.
Iran: A Special Case in Opacity
In many respects, a strong argument can be made that Iran is somewhat transparent in its ballistic
missile activities. Iran regularly televises and talks about its operational missile exercises,
publicly showcases many of its ballistic missile and space launch tests, and even holds televised
interviews with Iranian officials and leaders in some of its missile and nuclear plants. By
comparison, some countries considered allies or friends of the United States do not demonstrate
this much openness themselves. In the absence of a diplomatic relationship or any kind of
verifiable arms control regime between the countries, a few observers have suggested that Iran
may be signaling a certain level of transparency to the United States and others regarding its
ballistic missile and space launch programs.
Iran readily acknowledges that U.S. and other countries “possess satellite systems, especially the
countries which control the space above Iran, [who] can see our missiles quite clearly. That is,
their satellite systems, and not their radars, pick up the movement of our radars, including the
firing platform and even the landing site. It is quite clear to them” when maneuvers are real and
when Iran exercises with live weapons and are not simply exhibitions.37 After two MRBM tests in
35
Technically, the UK did not develop their strategic missiles; Trident II is purchased from the United States.
One might argue that India did not need an ICBM 30 years ago, rather than striving for that long to develop and test
an ICBM.
37
“Iran’s Guard Commander comments on Tehran’s missile power,” BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political,
November 13, 2006, source: Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2, Tehran, in Persian, November 12 2006.
36
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February 2011 that Iran said were observed by the U.S. military, Iran expressed surprise that the
United States chose not to disclose those launches publicly. Uzi Rubin, an Israeli missile
engineer, former head of Israel’s BMD program, and who is also a critic of Iran’s ballistic missile
programs, said the Iranians are transparent in these types of tests, openly wishing for “U.S.
satellites to take pictures of their weapons sites and to see their capability.”38
On the other hand, Iran has proven itself capable of misleading and deceitful statements regarding
its ballistic missile and space launch programs. It is useful to briefly point this out as it casts
serious doubt on relying heavily on Iranian statements about their ballistic missile and space
launch programs. Although some U.S. agencies do that, this report takes exception to that
practice. Although this report sources many Iranian statements about their missile programs and
tests, it does not assume those statements are accurate without further corroboration or notes that
Iranian claims are not confirmed. Although some examples of Iranian misinformation are
scattered throughout this report, some of the more notable deceits include
•
a photo-shopped “successful” test of a failed Iranian SRBM launch in 2008;39
•
a “successful” launch of a “long-range radar-evading” ballistic missile in 2006,40
which was actually video of a missile launch from a Chinese submarine;41 and
•
the “successful” launch of an Iranian satellite into orbit in 2008,42 which actually
exploded shortly after launch.43
It is possible that the Iranian media, rather than Iranian officials account for some of the
distortions reported. Some have also raised questions over the accuracy of translations from the
Persian language, which could then be read after translation as deliberate misinformation or
misleading reporting from official sources.
38
William Branigin, Thomas Erdbrink, and Walter Pincus, “Iran Test Fires Its Most Advanced Missiles,” The
Washington Post, September 28, 2009, On-line edition.
39
“Iran doctored missile test-firing photo: defence analyst,” Agence France Presse - English, July 9, 2008, and Al
Kamen, “Iran Apparently in Possession of Photoshop,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2008, p. A15, Suburban Edition.
40
“Iran test-fires ‘long-range’ naval missile,” Agence France Press - English, August 27, 2006, newswire. Iranian
Navy Commander Admiral Koochaki was quoted as saying “the highly destructive Sagheb was successfully shot from
a submarine but it can be carried on any other (naval) vessel.”
41
“World in Brief,” The Washington Post, September 10, 2006, p. A23. Pentagon officials confirmed the test was
“bogus” and U.S. intelligence determined the video matched a video of an earlier Chinese test.
42
Siavosh Ghazi, “Iran launches home-built satellite rocket,” Agence France Presse - English, August 17, 2008,
newswire. Both the head of Iran’s space agency and Iran’s Defense Ministry said the Safir rocket carrying the Omid
satellite launched successfully. Iranian officials later admitted that Iranian state media mistakenly claimed the satellite
entered orbit.
43
Nazila Fathi and Thom Shanker, “Iran sees itself assisting allies with satellites,” The New York Times, August 19,
2008, p. A11. The article cited Pentagon and U.S. military officials who said the first stage of the missile performed
successfully, but the second stage failed causing the missile to fly off wildly and destroying the top of the missile and
its nose cone. Another source said advance notice of the test allowed the USS Russell, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer
operating in the Persian Gulf to monitor and radar track the launch. Infrared data from the U.S. Air Force Defense
Support Program (DSP) missile warning satellite provided additional intelligence. Craig Covault, “U.S. radar and
satellite data indicate Iran launch failed,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, vol. 227, no. 6 2008, p. 1.
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Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Iran has been acquiring, developing and testing its ballistic missile capabilities for decades. This
section examines the long-term investment Iran has made in developing ballistic missiles and in
building an extensive network of facilities. It further examines Iran’s interest in and capabilities
for a space launch capacity as well.
What is striking is the degree to which there is an overwhelming amount of information written
about Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, performance parameters, testing results, infrastructure
and Iran’s cooperation with others compared to the paucity of public detail about how many
missiles Iran actually has.
Context and Historical Background
Iran’s interest in developing ballistic missiles can be traced back to the 1960s and can be tied to
its regional security interests even before the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In general, the U.S.
intelligence community has publicly stated that it believes Iran’s overall approach to its
international affairs “will remain relatively constant and will continue to be driven by
longstanding priorities of preserving the Islamic regime, safeguarding Iran’s sovereignty,
defending its nuclear ambitions, and expanding its influence in the region and the Islamic
world.”44 Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated the strategic objectives of
Iran’s leadership are “first and foremost, regime survival; making Iran the preeminent regional
power; and turning Iran into an economic, scientific, and technological powerhouse.”45
Currently, the U.S. intelligence community believes Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles,
as well as its production of anti-ship cruise missiles, provide capabilities to enhance its power
projection. Dennis Blair, then Director of National Intelligence, said in his 2010 annual threat
assessment report to Congress that
Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and it continues
to expand the scale, reach and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces – many of which
are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload….Tehran views its conventionally
armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter – and if necessary retaliate against –
forces in the region. Its ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD
(Weapons of Mass Destruction), and if so armed, would fit into this same strategy.46
Similarly, the DIA said in 2010 that Iran
continues to develop ballistic missiles capable of targeting Arab adversaries, Israel, and
central Europe, including Iranian claims of an extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 and a
2,000-km medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ashura. Beyond the steady growth in
44
Dennis C. Blair, Dir., National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010, p. 25.
45
Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Dir., Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 14, 2010, p. 1.
46
Dennis C. Blair, Dir., National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010, pp. 13-14.
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its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing
systems with accuracy improvements and sub-munition payloads.47
There is no reliable open-source assessment as to how much Iran spends to develop, test, and
field its ballistic missile capabilities, nor how much it spends relative to other nations that
develop, test, and field ballistic missiles. There is limited open-source data, however, regarding
Iran’s military expenditures in general. Over the period 1997-2009, Iran reportedly spent about
$6.2 billion annually (U.S. constant dollars).48 Iran’s military expenditures placed it fourth among
the other Gulf States and the GCC.49 As a function of GDP, Iran’s military expenditures placed it
sixth among those same states50 and 60th in the world according to the CIA.51
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Complex
Unclassified government and other open-source materials indicate that Iran has an extensive
ballistic missile and space launch complex scattered throughout the country.52 This section
highlights only some of those reports. Figure 1, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch
Complex,” illustrates where some of these facilities are apparently located. These include various
short- and medium-range missile sites, missile test and space launch sites, and a number of sites
suspected to be involved in the production, assembly and storage of ballistic missiles and missilerelated infrastructure.
47
Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Dir., Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 14, 2010, p. 13.
48
Anthony H. Cordesman and Aram Nerguizian, The Gulf Military Balance in 2010: An Overview, Center for Strategic
& International Studies, Washington, DC, April 2010, p. 36. Data for military expenditures was taken from the annual
Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London).
49
Ibid., Figure 24: Southern Gulf Military Expenditures by Country: 1997-2009, p. 36.
50
Ibid., Figure 25: Comparative Military Expenditures of the Gulf Powers as a Percent of GDP – 1989-2009.
51
The World Fact book, CIA: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
52
Some of this information has been gathered over the years from what little information is published in the Federal
Record regarding U.S. sanctions against specific Iranian entities. Additionally, UN sanctions reports and other UN
reports can also provide information about Iranian businesses and other entities involved with Iran’s ballistic missile
and space launch infrastructure.
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Figure 1. Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Complex
Some of Iran’s ballistic missiles have reportedly been deployed at some time or another near
Tehran, Tabriz, Kermanshah, Khorramabad, Semnan, Sharud, Shiraz and Mashad. Iran is known
to have flight tested ballistic missiles of varying ranges and at different times in many locations;
some of these locations may lie dormant, while others are more active. They include sites near
Qom, Qeshm Island, Garmshar, Sharud, Semnan, and Tabas for instance. Although Iran currently
relies primarily on the Semnan Space Launch complex in north central Iran,53 it also has
reportedly conducted some space launch activities near Qom and perhaps elsewhere.54
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is part of the duly constituted armed forces, but
its primary role is to protect the Islamic regime.55 It is the IRGC Air Force that operates Iran’s
ballistic missile forces.
53
Orbital launches are conducted from Semnan, though some sub-orbital sounding rocket launches may have taken
place elsewhere.
54
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (www.nti.org) maintains a highly useful accounting of these and a wide variety of other
facilities and suspect sites not just in Iran, but elsewhere too. Additionally, Iran Watch (part of the Wisconsin Project
on Arms Control) maintains a large database of suspect ballistic missile facilities in Iran (www.iranwatch.org).
55
(name redacted), The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).
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Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)
Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) are generally defined as those ballistic missiles with
ranges of less than 1,000 km. Some analysts further differentiate tactical ballistic missiles as those
with ranges between 10-300 km. Iran views its SRBMs as an important part of its conventional
military capability. The DIA said in 2010 that SRBMs provide Iran “with an effective mobile
capability to strike coalition forces in the region. Iran continues to improve the survivability of
these systems through technological advances, such as solid-propellant and the use of anti-missile
defense tactics.”56
A precise, public accounting of Iran’s SRBM force is not available. Official U.S. sources often
cite the figure of “hundreds of SRBMs” with perhaps 50-100 launchers (a launcher can be reused
to fire additional missiles). There is no further breakdown of these numbers. See Table 1, “Iranian
SRBMs (U.S. Government).” Table 1 does not include an estimate for some years as nothing was
noted in that particular year. Figure 2, “SRBM Sites and Ranges,” illustrates the locations and the
estimated operational SRBM ranges from those sites. The dotted ring around Shiraz roughly
illustrates the operational range at a typical SRBM site.
56
Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Dir., Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 14, 2010, p. 13.
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Figure 2. SRBM Sites and Ranges
Other good public sources cite figures of perhaps 200-300 Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 SRBMs (with
as few as 18-20 launchers or up to around 50 launchers). See Table C-1, “Iranian SRBMs (Other
Sources).” These latter sources cite additional, different named SRBMs in Iran’s inventory, which
this report does not attempt to deconflict. This section provides a brief overview of Iran’s SRBM
missiles and programs.
Finally, imagery obtained through the Library of Congress shows what appear to be a number of
short-range missile bunkers in western Iran around Kermanshah and what a SRBM missile base
might look like. See Figure 3, “Kermanshah SRBM Base.”
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Figure 3. Kermanshah SRBM Base
Source: CRS.
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Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Shahab 1 and Shahab-2
Iran’s initial, limited purchases of SRBMs came from Libya and Syria during the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988). These missiles were used to strike targets deeper in Iraq from points further
removed from the war’s battlefront.57 Later in the war, Iran acquired large numbers of Soviet
Scud B and Scud C SRBMs primarily from North Korea. Iran began calling these missiles
Shahab-1 and Shahab-2. Both are liquid-fueled ballistic missiles now produced by Iran, which
developed an indigenous infrastructure with the help of the DPRK after the Iran-Iraq War to
assemble these missiles. Iran likely continues to rely on some foreign-produced components to
produce the Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles:58 “Uncertainty remains over Iran’s ability to
produce the Shahab-1 indigenously,” and although it can “reliably produce the Shahab-2 missile,”
Iran continues to rely on foreign sources.59
Both the Shahab-1 and the Shahab-2 are road-mobile systems that can be moved to any number
of pre-surveyed launch sites. Wartime experiences, such as in Iraq, show these missiles tend to
operate within a radius of about 100 km or less from their bases because of the need to ensure
operational security and to be able to maintain key logistics support. A notional operating area of
these missiles is shown in Figure 2 around Shiraz in southwestern Iran. The Shahab-1 has a range
estimated of about 300 km, while the Shahab-2, which carries a lighter conventional warhead, has
a range estimated at about 500 km. Iran has an unspecified number of Shahab-1 and Shahab-2
SRBMs, but they likely number on the order of a few hundred.
Qiam
The only reported test of this ballistic missile in the media was in August 2010. A UN Report said
a Member State “assessed the Qiam to be based on the Shahab-2, with a range between 500 and
1,000 kilometers. Some experts have raised questions about the missile’s lack of apparent testing.
Missiles are known to require extensive flight testing before they can be fully operational.”60
The status of the Qiam is unclear. According to a Hezbollah (Lebanese) media source, the Qiam 1
was delivered to the Aerospace Force of the IRGC in late May 2010.61 Iran’s Islamic Republic
News Agency quoted Defense Minister BG Vahdi as saying the Qiam is harder to detect than
older models and that mass production of the Qiam missile, the country’s first missile without
stabilizer fins, demonstrates Iran’s self-sufficiency in producing various types of missiles. Gen.
Vahdi added that the Qiam’s design reduces the possibility of being detected by enemy anti57
Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 13.
58
Ibid. Elleman points out, however, that open-source literature provides conflicting accounts of Iran’s indigenous
capabilities in this regard. Some analysts argue Iran has made significant strides in their own ability to produce the
Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles, and others argue that Iran must still import key components if not entire missiles from
countries such as North Korea. See Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, p. 36.
59
Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 32.
60
United Nations, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006, Final Report of the
Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1984 (2011), S/2012/395, June 12, 2012. The Panel of
Experts report was issued under UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which mandated the Panel of Experts. UN
Security Council Resolution 1984 renewed the 1929 Panel of Experts mandate.
61
Iran’s Guards Get Qiam Missiles, Israel Claims are Bound to Hezbollah, Al-Manar TV Lebanon, May 23, 2011.
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missile systems and the omission of its fins increases the missile’s speed enabling it to hit its
targets with high precision. According to the same Hezbollah source, IRGC Commander
Mohammed Ali Jafari, told reporters earlier in 2010 “these new missiles enjoy supersonic speed
and cannot be tracked or intercepted by the enemy.”
Before Syria’s civil war, some in Israel thought the Qiam might be exported to Iranian clients,
such as Hezbollah in Syria.62 This appears less likely today, however, given conditions within
Syria.
Fateh-110
The Fateh-110 is a solid-fuel, road-mobile battlefield or tactical ballistic missile with a range of
about 200 km. Its development probably started around 1995 and its first test flight reported in
2001. There may be three versions of the Fateh-110 in service; one is apparently called the
Khalij-Fasr.
An upgraded version of the Fateh-110 reportedly was tested in early August 2012. Iran claimed it
was the fourth generation of the Fateh, and equipped with a new guidance system capable of
striking targets up to 300 km away with high accuracy.63 Experts such as Elleman find the Iranian
assertion dubious; the missile has a maximum range of only 200-250 km, and claims of high
accuracy are questionable.
62
63
Katz, Yaakov, Israel; New Missile Like Bound for Hezbollah, Jerusalem Post, May 23, 2011.
“Iran test fires short-range missile,” Aljazeera, August 4, 2012, online edition.
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Table 1. Iranian SRBMs (U.S. Government)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
U.S. Intelligence Community Assessments*
CSS-8
Several
hundred
SRBMs
Scud B
Several
hundred
SRBMs
A few
hundred
SRBMs
A few
hundred
SRBMs
Hundreds
of SRBMs
Hundreds
of SRBMs
Scud C
Fateh110
In
production
National Air and Space Intelligence Center (U.S. Air Force), Reports on Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats**
CSS-8
< 50
launchers
< 50
launchers
< 50
launchers
SCUD B
< 50
launchers
< 50
launchers
< 50
launchers
< 50
launchers
< 50
launchers
< 50
launchers
not yet
deployed
< 50
launchers
SCUD C
Fateh110
< 100
launchers
Sources: *Annual Threat Assessments, 721 Reports. **NASIC (U.S. Air Force), Reports on Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. Missile designations as used by the source.
Notes: Where launcher numbers only are noted, actual missile inventory may be larger because launchers can be reused to fire additional missiles.
CRS-20
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs)
Iran has invested for several decades in an organized and well-planned effort to acquire, develop,
test and deploy MRBMs capable of striking targets throughout the Middle East. Iran views these
missiles as a deterrent to any military action that might be taken against it and has said that it can
now target about three dozen U.S. bases throughout the region. Some number of these missiles
may be housed or deployed in underground bunkers or silo-like structures. The United States and
others have long maintained that Iranian MRBMs are inherently capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.
No official numbers of MRBMs operationally deployed are provided by official U.S. government
sources. Those numbers that do exist show growth from less than 20 MRBM launchers to less
than 50 MRBM launchers by 2009. Actual numbers of the missiles are not publicly provided by
the U.S. government. Table 2, “Iranian MRBMs (U.S. Government),” shows that neither the
annual U.S. threat assessment nor the annual 721 proliferation reports64 provide any numbers of
MRBMs or launchers. Only the U.S. Air Force has provided an official, public number of
launchers, albeit not detailed. Table C-2, “Iranian MRBMs (Other Sources),” provides additional
information, but it too illustrates the lack of preciseness as to how many MRBMs Iran has
deployed. Other countries, such as Israel, have reported large numbers of MRBMs (i.e., 450) that
could not verified by others.65
Figure 4, “MRBM Sites and Ranges,” illustrates possible ranges of Iranian MRBMs from two
apparent missile silo launch complexes in western Iran and from Iran’s ballistic missile and space
launch complex in central Iran. This gives one an idea of the area potentially covered by Iranian
MRBMs.
64
Congress established that a bi-annual (now annual) report from the Director, Central Intelligence, be submitted to
identify acquisition and trends by foreign countries technology related to WMD and advanced conventional weapons.
The 721 Report derives its name from Section 721 (which requires this report) of the Combating Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. P.L. 104-293; 50 U.S.C. 2301 note.
65
“Israel ‘highly sceptical’ of IAEA deal with Iran,” Space Daily, May 22, 2012, on line.
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Figure 4. MRBM Sites and Ranges
Source: CRS.
In 2010, the DIA provided about as much specificity as has been seen about Iranian MRBMs,
stating that Iran has “developed medium-range ballistic missiles, and continues to increase the
range, lethality, and accuracy of these systems. The Shahab 3, based on the North Korean No
Dong, can reach all of Israel. The Ashura or “Sejil” is an indigenous, two-stage missile under
development, which uses solid-propellant technology, reducing the launch preparation and
footprint.”66
Iran faces geographical constraints in testing its ballistic and space launch systems. In a lengthy
2006 interview about Iran’s ballistic missile programs, then IRGC Commander Gen. RahimSafavi made this point. He said, “the longest distance from the northwestern region of Maku to
Chabahar is about 2,250 km. We usually fire towards Iran’s central desert [and] because Iran is
shaped like a trapezoid, we can fire along the longest diameter of the trapezoid. We also watch
very carefully to make certain that there are no villages or other inhabited areas along the firing
range of these missiles, lest they should be hit.”67
66
Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Dir., Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 14, 2010, p. 13.
67
BG Itai Brun, head of Israel’s intelligence service research division, testified before Israel’s parliamentary committee
on foreign affairs and defence, that Iran “currently had 450 missiles capable of hitting the Jewish state. See “Iran’s
Guard Commander comments on Tehran’s missile power,” BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political, November 13,
2006, source: Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2, Tehran, in Persian, November 12, 2006.
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Therefore, estimates of some of Iran’s MRBM tests may be based on observing missiles fired
non-optimally, such as in a lofted trajectory that sends missiles higher than they would be relative
to an optimal ballistic trajectory. Or these missiles might be flight-tested on nominal or minimum
energy trajectories. There is no public information available on this.
It is unclear if Iran possesses adequate telemetry gathering capabilities needed to determine flight
test results in a true ballistic trajectory over the ocean. On one hand, if Iran’s MRBM tests have
been lofted or on nominal trajectories, landing over land, this might suggest they lack that
capability. Additionally, various technical assessments, such as the UN Panel of Experts reports
cited earlier, indicate Iran lacks many things in its ballistic missile programs, including telemetry
and instrumentation devices.
Uzi Rubin, however, claims that Iran’s recent missile tests landed in the mouth of the Indian
Ocean and thus argues that Iran has some capability to deploy instrumented ships or aircraft near
the missile’s impact points. Iran would do this “to obtain data on the behavior of the missile
toward the end of its flight” and that such instrumented platforms could be deployed increasingly
down range in the Indian Ocean “to test ballistic missiles to any range it wants.”68 Rubin believes
the speed of Iranian recovery from failures is such that it implies plentiful telemetry data. Further,
he argues, a successful space program would necessitate a full suite of telemetry and ground
support equipment.
This section provides a brief overview of Iran’s MRBMs.
The Shahab 3 and Its Variants
The Shahab-3 is a ballistic missile imported from the DPRK and based on the No-dong 1. Iran
may have “purchased a production line for these missiles in the early 1990s and is now
manufacturing them rapidly,” according to one expert.69 The Shahab-3 has been given various
names by Iran and others over time. There reportedly have been several different versions of this
liquid-fueled missile flight tested with various other modifications made to it, perhaps providing
the Shahab-3 with ranges varying from about 800 – 1,000 km.
Modified Shahab-3/Ghadr-1/Kadr
Because the range of the Shahab-3 lies at the low end of an MRBM, Iran has sought to develop,
test and deploy a much longer range ballistic missile.70 It has sought to do this with both liquidfueled missile programs based off the Shahab-3, such as the Ghadr-1 or Kadr (or Kadr F), and a
separate solid-fuel missile such as the Sejil or Ashura.
Iran first pursued a number of efforts to extend the range of the Shahab-3 with mixed test results.
One expert wrote that “there are indications that perhaps as many as one-half of them [Shahab-3
68
Uzi Rubin, “Showcase of Missile Proliferation: Iran’s Missile and Space Program,” Arms Control Today,
January/February 2012.
69
Uzi Rubin, “The Global Range of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles.”
70
Portions of Israel and other targets in the region remained out of reach of the Shahab-3. In addition, Iran apparently
did not want to deploy its MRBMs on the borders of Iraq where it could be more vulnerable to attack than if moved
further inland. Iranian efforts to develop a 2,000 km or more MRBM, therefore, perhaps in underground bunkers or
silos further into the interior of Iran, seemingly are important drivers of Iran’s program.
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tests] failed.”71 Some have variously referred to this as an extended range or modified Shahab-3
or Ghadar-1. Range estimates for this missile vary widely, from 1,000 km to 2,000 km. Such
range differences could in large part be explained in terms of ranges associated with payloads of
different weights.
This missile reportedly carries a smaller payload than the Shahab-3, includes a lighter airframe
for greater distances, and has “an improved guidance system and uses a triconic aeroshell
geometry that provides greater aerodynamic stability.”72 The Ghadar-1 design, “almost certainly
includes a separating warhead,” could provide the capacity “to carry airburst warheads, or
warheads containing submunition packages.”73 It was reported in 2006 that some Western
intelligence experts believed Iran had been able to modify the nose cone or reentry vehicle (RV)
of the Shahab-3 with Russian and Chinese assistance. An identical RV was twice displayed on No
Dong missiles in North Korean parades, so it may have been designed by North Korea. One
source says that “instead of the single cone normally attached to this type of missile, the new
Shahab has three cones, or a triconic, warhead. A triconic warhead allows the missile to
accommodate a nuclear device and this type of warhead is normally found only in nuclear
weapons.”74 But others have suggested the triconic RV may be less suitable for a nuclear payload
than the previous conical RV associated with the older Shahab 3, and may instead be designed for
higher accuracy which may indicate a nonnuclear mission. But none of this has been officially
confirmed in Iran. U.S. and other intelligence reports indicate that Iran apparently has not made
the decision to develop a nuclear weapon, but developments such as these cause concern among
many decision makers and observers.
What of the Shahab-4, Shahab-5 and Shahab-6?
Various reports of a Shahab-4 surfaced in the 1990s and those missile designations are still used
or mentioned on occasion. It appears, however, that whatever was intended originally, any
“Shahab-4”missile effort likely led to the development of the extended-range Shahab-3 MRBMs
or the Ghadr-1.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, other reports said Iran was developing a solid- or liquid-fueled,
two- or three-stage MRBM or space launch vehicle. It is possible they once had a designation of
Shahab-5 and Shahab-6, which continues to cause some confusion today. But, more likely these
programs led to other ballistic missile and space launch programs in Iran today. One may have
become or led to the Ashura/Sejil and the other may have become or led to the Safir space launch
vehicle.
71
Uzi Rubin, “The Global Reach of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” Jerusalem Issue Brief (Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs), vol. 5, no. 26 (June 20, 2006).
72
This unreleased UN report is identified as: United Nations, Final Report, Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to
resolution 1929 (2010), May 2010. The only online copy that could be found is: http://www.scribd.com/doc/55737041/
Leaked-UN-Panel-of-Experts-Report-on-Iran-Sanctions-May-2011.
73
Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 20.
74
The article further said “the Iranian warhead is designed to carry a spherical nuclear weapon that would be detonated
2,000 feet above the ground.... Although U.S. officials believe Iran is several years away from acquiring nuclear
weapons, they point out that the warhead could hold a version of the nuclear bomb Pakistan is known to have
developed. Iran has acquired a detailed breakdown of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.” Con Coughlin, “Iran has missiles to
carry nuclear warheads. Updated Scud puts Israel in Teheran’s sights,” The Daily telegraph (London), April 7, 2006, p.
19.
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When asked in a lengthy and seemingly rather open interview in 2006 about Iranian military
exercises (‘Great Prophet’ IV) and Iranian ballistic missiles, then IRGC Commander Gen. Safavi
said, “I’d prefer not to answer,” whether there were Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 missiles.75
Sejil/Sejjil 2/Ashura
The Sejil is a solid-fueled ground-mobile ballistic missile that Iran says has a range about 2,000
km according to official U.S. sources. Both Postol and Elleman state a 2,200 km range. Some in
Israel and elsewhere believe the missile might have a range up to 2,500 km.
The Ashura was announced by Iran in November 2007. This announcement was accompanied
either by an unsuccessful test of the solid propellant motors or the Ashura missile itself depending
on whether an Israeli or Russian account, respectively, was accurate.
Subsequently renamed the Sejil, it was flight tested successfully in November 2008, reportedly at
about 800 km. Additional tests of the Sejil or a modified and apparently more capable version of
it (Sejil 2) took place in May, September and December 2009. From the progress shown in the
Sejil solid-fuel rocket program, Elleman concludes that “Iran is at a minimum in the process of
mastering the technology.”76 Many consider the Sejil 2 a nuclear capable ballistic missile as its
payload capacity could accommodate a first generation nuclear warhead. Some have suggested
that the MRBM silos near Tabriz and Khorramabad might be intended for the Sejil 2. Many
believe the missile is the same regardless of the naming designation (i.e., Sejil, Sejjil 2, or
Ashura).
The R-27/BM-25/Musudan Controversy
The issue of whether Iran received at some point some number of Soviet-era R-27 SLBMs
(submarine launched ballistic missiles) or components remains unsettled, controversial and
persistent. Early on, the German press named this missile the BM-25 when they referred to the
Iranian version, and others have referred to this as the Musudan when used in the context of
North Korean involvement. The pedigree of this system is far from trivial and its reported design
or redesign remains obscure. No official public U.S. assessment or word of this was found.
This issue, therefore, has been largely been a debate among technical experts and observers who
track Iranian missile programs. Whether Iran acquired these missiles or their rocket motors in
whole or part, or received other technical assistance regarding these missiles or their component
parts is important. If accurate, acquiring this capability or technical knowledge might enable Iran
to build more powerful and longer range ballistic missiles.
Some experts lend credence to assessments that Iran may have some number of these missiles or
their components. Uzi Rubin stated that “Iran has acquired eighteen BM25 land-mobile missiles
with launchers from North Korea, which can strike targets in Europe. In the past, the BM-25 has
been produced in two models: one with a range of 2,500 km and the second with a range of 3,500
75
“Iran’s Guard Commander comments on Tehran’s missile power,” BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political,
November 13, 2006, source: Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2, Tehran, in Persian, November 12, 2006.
76
Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 110.
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km.”77 Similarly, according to an unpublished May 2011 UN Panel of Experts Report, two
Member States shared the assessment that “Iran received a shipment of 19 BM-25 missiles from
the DPRK in semi-knock down and complete knock down kits.78 German missile scientists
Schmucker and Schiller acknowledge that the BM-25 is “seen as an operational part of the North
Korean and Iranian missile arsenals, though it was never actually launched,” but that its display in
a 2007 DPRK military parade turned out to be a different, very short-range missile.79
The Washington Post reported in 2010,80 citing U.S. cables, that Iran had obtained 19 of the BM25 or Musudan missiles from North Korea. The document reportedly summarized a meeting of
U.S. and Russian technical experts and officials, where the Russians claim the BM-25 might not
even exist and U.S. officials acknowledge never seeing the missile in Iran. It turns out that the
U.S. delegation reportedly relied heavily on a 2005 article from a conservative leaning German
tabloid called Bild Zeitung quoting German intelligence sources that Iran had purchased 18 (not
19) BM-25 kits made up of missile components for the BM-25 from North Korea. One technical
expert was quoted in the Post article as saying “the U.S. side does not firmly say we have
evidence that the BM-25 is in Iran.”
This missile has not been seen publicly in Iran and has not been tested. Some were reportedly
shown in North Korea, but subsequently discounted as mock-ups. Some analysts have reported
the BM-25 might be capable of reaching 3,500 km. It is reputedly based on a Soviet-era
submarine launched ballistic missile known as the R-27 in Russia and the SS-N-6 in the West.
Experts such as Michael Elleman believe that although it is “highly improbable that complete or
disassembled R-27 missiles were exported by Russia, it is possible that individual components of
the missile may have been smuggled out of the country.”81 Other missile experts such as Ted
Postol of MIT argue that the evidence suggests that an unknown quantity of Soviet-era naval
ballistic missile parts were shipped to North Korea without the approval or knowledge of the
central government during the collapse of the 1990s. Russia never acknowledged this transfer,
Postol and Elleman said, because it would tarnish Russia’s reputation as a country that claims to
have never sold technology that could be used in an intercontinental ballistic missile.82
77
Uzi Rubin, “The Global Reach of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” Jerusalem Issue Brief (Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs), vol. 5, no. 26 (June 20, 2006).
78
These terms are generally used within industry. Usually, a knock-down kit includes all the parts for a system, but is
shipped unassembled. Semi-knock-down can mean that some of the harder parts—engine installation, hydraulic
plumbing, electronics wiring—have been put together in advance, with only the minimal-skill items left for assembly
by the recipient.
79
Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, “The DPRK Missile Show: A Comedy in (Currently) Eight Acts,” Draft
report, Schmucker Technologies, Report XX/10, Germany, May 5, 2010, p. 12-13. The authors cite media reports that
North Korea had sold to Iran a reverse engineered and improved version of the Soviet R-27/SSN-6 now named BM-25.
Schmucker’s earlier assessment of Iran’s missiles includes the modified R-27/SSN-6 as procured via North Korea
without any DPRK modification, further describing its status as unknown and that there was no production of or
modification of the missile in Iran. See Robert H. Schmucker, “Iran and its Regional Environment,” Second
Transatlantic Conference, Berlin, Germany, March 27, 2006, pp. 4, 37-39.
80
John Pomfret and Walter Pincus, “Experts question North Korea-Iran missile link from WikiLeaks document
release,” The Washington Post, December 1, 2010, online edition.
81
Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 32.
82
John Pomfret and Walter Pincus, “Experts question North Korea-Iran missile link from WikiLeaks document
release,” The Washington Post, December 1, 2010, online edition.
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Over time, it appears that some of these missile parts and components, or at least their design
features, seem to have made their way into North Korean and Iranian missile and space launch
programs. Postol has made this argument in assessing the Iranian Safir space launch missile,
which has a second stage that appears to use the two vernier thrust chambers and common
turbopump from the R-27. In addition, the unusual spatial arrangement of the two thrust
chambers, their hydraulic mounts and the conical shape of the stage’s back-end are essentially the
same as that on the R-27.83 Some of this is touched on briefly in the section on Iran’s space
launch program.
MRBM Silo-like Launch Facilities
During the June 2011 “Great Prophet” military exercises, Iranian military leaders publicly
revealed for the first time the existence of a secret network of what they characterized as
‘underground missile silos’. These structures are distinctly different that those that have been built
by the United States, Russia and China. The Shahab-3 is housed in a chamber that has a vertical
tunnel that the missile flies through. Both the chamber and the tunnel are large relative to the
missile diameter. This creates a very large volume that the rocket exhaust gases can expand into,
greatly reducing the challenges associated with flying out of the types of ballistic missile silos
built by the United States, Russia and China.
Iran’s IRGC Aerospace Forces Commander BG Amir Ali Hajizadeh told state media that the
Guard had the capability to “attack all American facilities in the region by these [Shahab 3]
missiles.”84 In a televised segment another military official said that Iran had been building this
network for the past 15 years. The New York Times reported Iranian State TV as saying these silos
held medium and long-range missiles.85 In June 2012, the UN said these missile silos, “which
have been reported for a number of years, have not been confirmed to be operational.”86 Figure 5
shows pictures from Iranian television of what is reported as a ballistic missile in one of these
underground facilities as well as a partially opened launch door.
83
Theodore Postol, A Technical Assessment of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program. Technical Addendum to the Joint
Threat Assessment on Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential, EastWest Institute, Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A
Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts, by Siegfried Hecker and David Holloway, Stanford
University, Stanford, CA, May 2009, pp. 20-24.
84
“Iran Test Fires Missiles, Unveils Secret Silos,” The Frontrunner - English, June 29, 2011, newswire.
85
William J. Broad, “Iran shows off strengthened underground silos for missiles,” The New York Times, June 29, 2011,
p. 5.
86
United Nations, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006, Final Report of the
Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1984 (2011), S/2012/395, June 12, 2012, p. 22.
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Figure 5. Iranian Launch Silo
If the Iranian military official was quoted correctly, it would mean that work would have started
on these silos around 1996. In fact, perhaps the first public account of Iranian interest in such
came in 1993 when then Iranian Defense Minister Foruzandeh led an economic delegation to the
DPRK and may have discussed the possibility of joint production of the Nodong missile and
construction of underground missile shelters at 18 sites across Iran.87 Construction may have been
underway by 1998 when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said Iran is “building an enormous
infrastructure [including] hardened missiles silos,” which can house Iranian ballistic missiles and
protect them against U.S. or Israeli preemptive strikes.88
The next time there was any apparent mention of Iranian missile silos came in 2006. Former head
of Israel’s missile defense agency and missile engineer Uzi Rubin wrote that “there are
indications they [Iranians] are now constructing fixed silo-like hardened sites to make their
missiles even more survivable.”89 Rubin mentioned this in the context of Iran’s MRBMs.
87
Various secondary sources cite Hiroshi Kano, “Tehran, Pyongyang Push Arms,” International Review, Autumn 1994
for this account, but CRS was unable to find this article in any journal. After an exhaustive search of media and journal
articles, CRS was able to find only one report at the time that said anything about such shelters. According to The
Jerusalem Post, “sources say they believe Foruzandeh and North Korea discussed the possibility of joint production of
the [Nodong], along with underground shelters for the missiles.” See David Makovsky, in Israel said not pushing U.S.
to stop N. Korean missile sales to Iran,” The Jerusalem Post, December 24, 1993. Although the news account
demonstrates a relatively weak case, the report is worth mentioning as it fits the general time frame for when Iran may
have first begun its efforts to build such shelters, which were then under construction not long thereafter.
88
Martin Sieff and Bill Gertz, “Iran’s long-range missile plans worry Netanyahu; Says U.S. cities may be targeted,”
The Washington Times, October 1, 1998, p. A13.
89
Uzi Rubin, “The Global Reach of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” p. 65, http://jcpa.org/text/iran_page_62-67.pdf.
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It was not until 2008, however, that more specific claims about silo construction, hardened sites,
locations, and imagery, began to surface in public.90 Two different blogs, gemint.com and
armscontrolwonk.com, wrote about the same time in early 2008 of a possible silo missile base
near Tabriz, Iran. O’Connor (gemint.com) later wrote that:
between 2003 and 2005, a silo complex was constructed on the grounds of an existing SSM
[surface-to-surface missile] facility south of Tabriz in northwestern Iran. The complex
consisted of two missile silos, likely intended to house Shahab-3 series IRBMs (sic) based on
the existing facility. Between 2007 and 2008 a second pair of silos appeared roughly 700
meters SE of the initial pair. A third pair of silos appeared approximately 14 kilometers to
the west near the town of Khosro Shahr.91
Based on these previous assessments and using imagery obtained through the Library of
Congress, this report locates what appear to be those missile silos in northwest Iran near Tabriz.
See Figure 6, “Tabriz Ballistic Missile Silo Base 1,” and Figure 7, “Tabriz Ballistic Missile Silo
Base 2.” Imagery obtained through the Library of Congress dated around 2000 and examining
additional imagery dated about once every year or two at this location shows what appears to be
gradual construction of the second silo site referenced by O’Connor. This second silo pair may
have been completed by 2011 from looking at that imagery and is labeled ‘Site 2’ in Figure 6,
“Tabriz Ballistic Missile Base 1.”
90
Sean O’Connor, who runs gemint.com, told the author in March 2011 that he thought he did “the first open-source
look at Iran’s silos in February of 2008.” This particular blog is no longer available on his website, but the copy he sent
to the author said there had been “a great deal of recent open-source reporting dealing with a purported missile site near
Tabriz in northwestern Iran. While these reports may or may not be true, they have all failed to note the presence of
another missile facility in the region [about 10 kilometers southwest of Tabriz]. The difference is that this facility can
be identified with much greater certainty: this facility houses Iran’s first missile silos.” A copy of this specific blog can
be found elsewhere, however, at http://www.irandefence.net/showthread.php?t=29952. O’Connor did not indicate
where the open-source reporting came from and the author was not able find any reports about Iranian silos during this
time. O’Connor has blogged many times since about the missile silos at Tabriz and Khorramabad, providing details and
satellite imagery. Jeffrey Lewis at armscontrolwonk.com wrote of a suspect missile facility near Tabriz in February
2008 as well, based on rough translations of a German newspaper (Bild) article that might have been published as early
as 2005 but was apparently no longer available. Although blog contributors provided various and somewhat different
translations, it appears the original source was the BND (German intelligence agency), which said Iran had bought 18
unassembled mobile BM-25 rockets (range of 2,500 km), which Iran remodeled to obtain a 3,500 km range, and that
“German intelligence had located a stationary starting system for the test of silo-supported rockets [as translated].”
Lewis’ blog too has written about the silos at Tabriz and Khorramabad at various times since.
91
Sean O'Connor, “Iranian SSM Facilities,” I&A (Imagery and Analysis), vol. 1, no. 2 (March 20, 2011), p. 11, selfpublished, http://www.gemint.com.
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Figure 6. Tabriz Ballistic Missile Silo Base 1
Source: CRS, Library of Congress.
CRS-30
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Figure 7. Tabriz Ballistic Missile Silo Base 2
Source: CRS, Library of Congress.
CRS-31
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Since then, only a few other experts have mentioned these silos until the Iranian videos and
interviews in June 2011. To date, there does not appear to have been any official U.S. public
assessment or acknowledgment of these silos. It is unclear what the absence of any such
assessment might mean.
“Secret” MRBM Tests (2010-2011)
In comments to the British parliament in June 2011, British Foreign Minister William Hague said
Iran had conducted three secret tests of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons in
contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1929.92 An Iranian spokesman denied the
British allegations, saying that none of the missiles tested by Iran has a nuclear capability.93
Britain apparently reported these tests to the UN, but had not previously made them public.94
Although it received little media attention at the time, a report by a Panel of Experts at the UN
became public the month before Hague’s speech in London. According to AP the UN report said
Iran launched a liquid-fueled Shahab-3 missile with a range of about 800 kilometers, and one or
two solid-fueled Sejil 1 missiles with a range of about 2,000 kilometers.95 AP further said the UK
believe these missile tests showed that Iran’s leaders wanted to avoid scrutiny over “the real
extent of their weapons programs.”
This unpublished May 2011 report96 was not circulated because it had not been approved by its
parent UN Security Council, apparently for political reasons—China and Russia opposed its
release according to UN sources. Nonetheless, the news it shed on previously undisclosed Iranian
MRBM tests was highly significant. Specifically, the report mentioned the launch of the
Sejil/Ashura in October 2010 and a Sejil and Shahab-3 test in February 2011.97 By early July
2011, Iran conceded the two February tests. Reuters reported that Iran state television admitted
test-firing two long-range missiles from the “Semnan province into the mouth of the Indian
Ocean” about 1,900 kilometers away sometime between January 21 and February 19, 2011.98 BG
Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC’s Aerospace Division, said U.S. spy planes were operating in the
area where the missiles hit, but it was “interesting that they [the United States] did not report it.”99
Jane’s said these medium-range missile tests were likely the Sejil-2 or the Shahab-3.100
92
James Kirkup, “Iran accused of secret missile tests,” The Daily Telegraph (London), June 30, 2011, p. 22. UNSCR
1929 prohibits Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using ballistic missile technology, and provides that UN Member States are to take all measures necessary to
prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities. Hague said these tests were
conducted from October 2010 to some point before his speech in June 2011.
93
“Britain accuses Iran of secretly testing nuclear-capable missiles,” States News Services, June 29, 2011, newswire.
94
Ibid.
95
David Stringer, “UK: Iran conducting secret ballistic missile tests,” The Associated Press, June 29, 2011, newswire.
96
This unreleased UN report is identified as: United Nations, Final Report, Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to
resolution 1929 (2010), May 2010. The only online copy that could be found is available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
55737041/Leaked-UN-Panel-of-Experts-Report-on-Iran-Sanctions-May-2011.
97
The report said, “The Panel was informed of [these two Sejil launches] by a Member State.” Ibid., p. 26.
98
“Iran says fires missiles to Indian Ocean for first time,” Reuters, July 9, 2011, newswire.
99
Ibid.
100
“Iran claims to have tested missiles in Indian Ocean,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, July 11, 2011.
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The fact that there was neither public announcement by Iran at the time of these launches, nor any
public condemnation from the United States or from any other any other nation represented a
notable departure from the past. Three key questions are thus raised. First, what might account for
this change in Iranian policy that normally publicizes or televises missile tests? There are several
conceivable explanations:
•
One or more of the tests might have failed and Iran did not want that known. This
could explain what happened with the first launch, but evidence is that the
February flights were successful, or
•
Iran may have tested to a new, untried range for which it did not want
international attention. Only after media reports and the leaked UN draft report
did Iran concede the longer range tests into the Indian Ocean; or
•
Iran may have decided for whatever reason that it no longer wanted to publicly
demonstrate its MRBM capabilities, perhaps over concern regarding UNSCR
1929. But in “Great Prophet” 7 Iran said it had flown a 2,000 kilometer missile,
which should be noted was not independently verified. And Iran had declared
two other Sejil launches and a Shahab-3 test in 2009, after UNSCR 1929 passed
earlier that year. Also, just because Iran did not publicly announce or show these
tests does not mean they cannot be verified by others.
A second key question is why neither the United States nor any other nation at the time chose to
criticize Iran for those tests, which to many seemingly violates UNSCR 1929. Possible reasons
might include:
•
The United States might have wanted to forge a consensus behind closed doors
for additional sanctions and worried that public attention to the tests might make
it harder to bring in Russian or Chinese support, or both. U.S. Permanent
Representative to the UN Susan Rice complained about Iran’s noncompliance
with UNSCR 1929 in June 2011 and referred to the draft Panel of Experts as
containing “troubling findings, including significant evidence about several
reported violations” of UN sanctions related to Iran, but implied some Member
States were holding up public release.101 Some have noted that the Final Report
released in June 2012102 did not mention the three tests from the unpublished
earlier Final Report in May 2011. This was for no other reason than the missile
launches occurred in a different mandated reporting period.
•
Due to the sensitive, ongoing talks with Russia over the U.S. European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA), there may have been some reticence within parts of
the U.S. Government to “shove this” into the Russian face. Keeping any
announcement of these Iranian tests out of the public debate may have been seen
as having a greater policy priority in order to facilitate an agreement with
Moscow.
101
Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council
Briefing on Iran and Resolution 1737, New York, NY, June 23, 2011.
102
United Nations, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006, Final Report of the
Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1984 (2011), S/2012/395, June 12, 2012.
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Table 2. Iranian MRBMs (U.S. Government)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
U.S. Intelligence Community Assessments*
National Air and Space Intelligence Center (U.S. Air Force), Reports on Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats**
Shahab 3
Not yet
deployed
< 20
launchers
Shahab 3
variant
Shahab 4
Not yet
deployed
< 50
launchers (all
variants)
Not yet
deployed/
not flight
tested
New
MRBM/
Shahab4?
Not yet
deployed
New
MRBM
Shahab 5
< 20
launchers
Not yet
deployed
Not yet
deployed
Not yet
deployed
Undetermined
Not yet
deployed/n
ot flight
tested
New
MRBM/
Shahab5?
Not yet
deployed
IRBM/
ICBM
Sources: *Annual Threat Assessments, 721 Reports. **NASIC (U.S. Air Force), Reports on Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. Missile designations as used by the source.
Notes: Where launcher numbers only are noted, actual missile inventory may be larger because launchers can be reused to fire additional missiles.
CRS-34
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Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
Traditionally, the United States has defined ICBMs as those ballistic missiles capable of
achieving ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (about 3,400 miles). To date, only five countries
have deployed operational ICBMs (all with nuclear weapons): the United States, Russia, China,
France, and the UK.103 Only the United States and the Soviet Union achieved those capabilities
entirely indigenously; to some degree China, France and the UK received significant assistance.
Some countries, such as Iran, are believed by some observers to have ICBM programs in varying
stages of development.
ICBMs, fitted with nuclear warheads, pose significantly greater challenges to U.S. national
security than nuclear weapons alone. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified in
2000, “these countries calculate that possession of ICBMs would enable them to complicate and
increase the cost of US planning and intervention, enhance deterrence, build prestige, and
improve their abilities to engage in coercive diplomacy.”104
Since the late 1990s, the U.S. intelligence community has repeatedly stated, with a number of
caveats, that Iran would be able to test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015,
which is at least 10,000 km away. Other countries do not necessarily share this assessment and
Iran has long denied that it is developing an ICBM capable of reaching the United States. Opensource analyses of ballistic missile tests in both Iran and North Korea raise questions about
whether Iran may be developing a ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States or
seeking to develop a space launch capability that could provide the technological basis for
conversion to an ICBM. This section examines these issues.
Intelligence Estimates: U.S. and Others
The United States
In 1999, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that at some point the United States would
probably face ICBM threats from Iran.105 This remains the official U.S. position. More
specifically, the 1999 assessment warned that “Iran could test an ICBM in the last half of the next
decade using Russian technology and assistance” (emphasis in the original). A similar report was
issued in 2001.106 Such a test did not occur in this time frame, but in 2010 the DIA assessed that,
by 2015:
103
India recently successfully tested a long-range ballistic missile just under what is defined as ICBM range (around
5,000 km), but it will still be several years before that missile class is considered operational and it is further unknown
whether it will carry a nuclear warhead.
104
U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., February 2, 2000, S.Hrg. 106-580 (Washington: GPO, 2000), p. 11.
105
National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
through 2015,” September 1999. This unclassified National Intelligence Estimate was provided in open testimony to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 16, 1999, by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, Central Intelligence Agency.
106
National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” December 2001, Unclassified
Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate.
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with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States. In late 2008 and early 2009, Iran
launched the Safir, a multi-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), demonstrating progress in
some technologies relevant to ICBMs. Iran displayed its next generation SLV, the Simorgh,
in February 2010. The Simorgh is much larger than the Safir and shows progress in booster
design that could be applicable to an ICBM design.107
The 2012 annual report on Iran’s military power to Congress (April 2012) restated that “Iran has
launched multistage space launch vehicles that could serve as a test bed for developing longrange ballistic missile technologies.”
These assessments are often interpreted as stating that Iran will have nuclear-tipped ICBMs
capable of striking the United States by 2015, but the unclassified intelligence statements
continue to place various caveats on potential capability to test at some date. These assessments
focus only on the ability to test an ICBM and do not make any judgments about the ability of Iran
to successfully deliver a nuclear warhead at ICBM range.
These intelligence statements serve as the official U.S. basis for assessing the Iranian ICBM
threat to the United States and to its friends and allies. These assessments drive U.S. military
efforts designed to respond to such threats, such as the U.S. BMD program in general and the
U.S. missile defense system in Europe specifically, as well as U.S. diplomatic and other efforts
such as sanctions to dissuade or slow down Iranian long-range ballistic missile programs.108
However, they do not offer a probability assessment for such technological assistance being
available.
These assessments do not mean that currently universal agreement exists within the U.S.
intelligence community on the issue of an Iranian ICBM. According to these same unclassified
statements, some within the intelligence community argued that an Iranian ICBM test was likely
before 2010 (which did not happen), and very likely before 2015. Other U.S. officials believed,
however, that there is “less than an even chance” for such a test before 2015. Furthermore, U.S.
assessments are also conditional in that an Iranian ICBM capability would have to rely on access
to foreign technology, from, for example, North Korea or Russia.109 Finally, some argue that an
Iranian ICBM could be developed out of the Iranian space program under which a space-launch
vehicle might be converted into an ICBM program. In the 1990s, some argued that Iran could
have developed and tested such a space launch vehicle by 2010. Iran successfully demonstrated a
space launch capability in 2009 with the launch of a low-earth orbit satellite, but the IC has not
assessed that Iran has conducted an ICBM test or acquired an ICBM capability.
Regarding the relation between ICBMs and space launch capability, a UN Security Council Panel
of Experts “reached a consensus” in 2012 that
107
Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Dir., Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran’s Military Power, Statement before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 14, 2010, pp. 13-14.
108
See CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), and
CRS Report CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name redacted).
109
See National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments, 1999,” and Robert D. Walpole, “The Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States,” Statement Before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation
and Federal Services, February 9, 2000.
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both ballistic missile and space launch programmes shared a great deal of similar materials
and technology, including systems for propulsion, control and navigation. The Panel also
noted that, although some examples existed of ballistic missile programmes developed from
space launch programs, in general there were more examples of the reverse – space launch
programmes developed on the basis of ballistic missile programmes.110
Some observers argue that although the U.S. position may be based upon a realistic assessment, it
is also a worst-case analysis of the potential threat from Iran. They argue that “with rare exception
this level of threat has rarely turned out to be the historical reality.”111
Other Governments and the UN
Some governments support the contention that Iran will be capable soon of developing ICBM
capabilities, while others do not share that assessment. In 2008, a UK House of Commons,
Foreign Affairs Committee report noted that Iran made no secret of its space launch aspirations,
which “technology has some value for longer-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. We
believe Iran could test such systems by the end of the decade [presumably meaning 2010]. If it
acquired a complete long-range ballistic missile system, it could achieve such a capability more
quickly.”112 Although dated, it is worth mentioning here as indicative of a broader belief that Iran
could develop an ICBM capability at some point.
In 2005, the conservative-leaning German tabloid newspaper Bild reported that, according to
information obtained by the German Intelligence Service (BND), “Iran has bought from North
Korea 18 assembly kits of the mobile BM-25 type [and that] Ahmadinejad has or had them
upgraded on the basis of the Russian submarine missile SS-N-6.”113
Russia, however, has long denied that any such transfer of R-27s or SSN-6s took place114 and has
indicated that an Iranian ICBM was not likely for the foreseeable future. In 2006, the Chief-ofStaff of Russia’s Armed Forces said Iran did not have the technological potential to build ICBMs.
Yury Baluyevsky said “according to our information, Iran possesses neither the technological nor
technical resources to build a missile with an intercontinental range.”115 A few years later, U.S.
and Russian technical experts and officials gathered to discuss Iranian programs. The Russians
indicated they believed Iran
110
United Nations, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006, Final Report of the
Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1984 (2011), S/2012/395, June 12, 2012, p. 23.
111
For instance, see Charles P. Vick, “North Korean, Iranian, and Pakistani Common Russian, Chinese Nuclear
Weapons Heritage and Tests, What does it Reveal about the Missile Borne Warhead Development Status?” Part 1,
March 20, 2007, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-warhead-dev1.htm.
112
Global Security: Iran, Fifth Report of Session, 2007-08. Report together with formal minutes, oral and written
evidence, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 20
February 2008. HC 142, Incorporating HC 496-i, ii, iii Session 2006-2007. Published on 2 March 2008, London, p.
Ev.27.
113
Einar Koch, “German Intelligence Service Sees Iran Upgrading Missiles to Reach Israel, Europe,” Bild (Hamburg),
December 16, 2005, (Internet Version-WWW).
114
Gareth Porter, “Russians Refuted U.S. Claim of Iranian Missile Threat to Europe,” IPSNews.net, November 30,
2010, On-line edition.
115
“Iran does not have technology to build ICBMs - Russian Chief of Staff (Part 2),” Russia & CIS Military Newswire,
November 2, 2006. See also “Iran “not capable” of creating intercontinental missiles: Russia,” Agence France Presse English, November 2, 2006, newswire.
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was a long way from building intercontinental ballistic missiles that could hit the United
States.... Iran lacks appropriate structural materials for long-range systems.... Iran can build
prototypes, but in order to be a threat to the U.S. or Russia, Iran needs to produce missiles in
mass quantities, and it lacks materials sufficient for the type of mass production needed to be
a security threat. Russia further noted that the technology for longer-range missiles is
sophisticated and difficult to master.116
Israel reportedly believes Iran will have ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States
within two to three years. In recent remarks, Israeli Finance Minister Steinitz said the Israeli
assessment was in line with a 2010 Pentagon assessment that Iran could build a U.S. missile with
the range to strike the United States by 2015. He said, the Iranians “are working now and
investing a lot of billions of dollars in order to develop ICBMs ... and we estimate that in two to
three years they will have the first ICBMs that can reach the east coast of America. So their aim is
to put a direct nuclear ballistic threat ... to Europe and to the United States.”117
In 2012, a UN Security Council-approved Panel of Experts report that, among many other things,
cast doubt on Iran’s capacity to develop long-range ballistic missiles:
While the Islamic Republic of Iran is actively producing its own missiles, it remains reliant
on foreign suppliers for components, materials and equipment. According to some experts,
there is no evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran possesses the technology necessary to
... construct longer range missiles. It also appears that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues
to import whole engines, or at least critical engine components, for its liquid-fueled missiles,
and requires components for guidance systems.118
The View from Iran
Iran disputes that any of its ballistic missile programs under development would be capable of
reaching the United States. Its most recent denial came when the Pentagon released its April 2010
report on Iran’s Military Power. Among other things, that report reaffirmed previous intelligence
assessments since the late 1990s that Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching
the United States by 2015.119 In response to this report, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahdi
stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has no plans to build such a missile.”120
Iran denies reports that it collaborates with other nations to develop ICBMs. In response to
charges that Iran obtained ballistic missiles from North Korea based on the Russian R-27 SLBM
design, Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mahmoud Sajjadi said in November 2010 that “Iran has
116
David E. Hoffman, “In WikiLeaks: Russia’s doubts about Iranian missiles,” Foreign Policy Journal—online blog,
November 29, 2010.
117
Jeffrey Heller and Mark Heinrich, “Israel: Iran will have U.S.-range missile in 2-3 years,” Reuters, February 22,
2012, U.S., online edition.
118
United Nations, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006, Final Report of the
Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1984 (2011), S/2012/395, June 12, 2012, p. 20.
119
“Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” Department of Defense, April 2010, p. 11.
120
Ali Sheikholeslami, “Iran Say No Plan for Missile Able to Reach U.S.,” Bloomberg Business Week, April 21, 2010,
Online edition and “Iran has no Plan to Build Missiles Capable of Reaching U.S.,” Tehran Times, April 22, 2010,
Online edition.
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received no [such] missile from North Korea … [and] we do not need such military services from
any country at the present time.”121
The Commander of the Aerospace Division of the IRGC, BG Amir Ali Hajizadeh, said in 2011
that Iran “possesses the technology,” but has “no intention of producing” missiles with ranges
greater than 2,000 kilometers.122 Hajizadeh further said Iran was interested only in the ability to
target U.S. and Israeli bases in the region.123
Space Launch Program
Organization
The Iranian Space Agency (ISA) coordinates Iran’s space activities. Iran is also one of the 24
founding members of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, established in
1958, well before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The ISA was established in 2004 and given
responsibility to support all of Iran’s activities concerning the peaceful uses of space. ISA falls
under the leadership of a Supreme Council of Space that is chaired by Iran’s President. This
Council has policy making responsibilities regarding Iran’s use of outer space, for building,
launching and using satellites, approving all government and private sector space programs, and
identifying areas of potential regional and international cooperation. ISA is affiliated with Iran’s
Ministry of Communication and Information.
Iran conducts its space launch activities primarily out of the Semnan Launch Center in the north
central part of the country. Iran has reportedly launched previously from an area near Qom and
from Emamsharh as well. From these locations Iran is able to send its rockets in a southeastern
direction over the entrance of the Persian Gulf and then over the Indian Ocean. Figure 8, “Space
Launch Vectors (Current),” shows these launch corridors, which are somewhat constrained if Iran
wants to avoid overflying other countries such as Oman and Pakistan. The slightly darker lines
extending out a couple hundred kilometers show where the 1st stage rocket motors might be
expected to fall to earth.
121
“Iran Rejects Report on Transfer of N. Korean Missiles to Iran,” Fars News Agency (Tehran, Iran), November 29,
2010, On-line edition.
122
“Guard Chief: Iran can build longer-range missiles,” The Associated Press, June 28, 2011, newswire.
123
“Iran not to make longer-range missiles,” Iran Government News, June 28, 2011.
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Figure 8. Space Launch Vectors (Current)
Source: CRS.
Iran announced in December 2010 that it would build a new space launch complex in the Sistan
and Baluchistan Province, which is at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, and which Iran’s Defense
Minister Vahdi indicated in June 2012 was about 80% complete although Vahdi gave no clue as to
the center’s location. Some experts believe a new space complex, first mentioned in December
2010, is being built in southeastern Iran in the Sistan and Baluchistan Province.124 The fact that
such a complex is so close to the Gulf and highly vulnerable to attack suggests its purpose is for
space launch activities. Figure 9, “Space Launch Vectors (Prospective),” illustrates how
significantly enhanced and more flexible Iran’s space launch endeavors would be increased over
what they are currently with this new space complex. Range safety concerns would similarly be
greatly alleviated by having rocket stages and possible failed launches occur over wide swaths of
the ocean rather than land. From this southern launch location, a more southeastern trajectory also
provides some advantage of the earth’s rotation in achieving orbit.125
124
125
“Iran’s new space center boosts rocket plan,” UPI.com, August 3, 2012, online edition.
The more easterly the launch allows the launcher to gain maximum speed from the rotation of the earth.
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Figure 9. Space Launch Vectors (Prospective)
Source: CRS.
Space Launch Vehicles
Iran used the Safir SLV to launch the Omid satellite into orbit in February 2009. The Safir SLV
used a first stage based on the single stage Shahab 3 with a specially designed second stage. Iran
continued to develop this liquid-fueled SLV. The Safir is designed to carry a light payload into
low-earth orbit and as such is not considered to be capable of providing a long-range nuclear
weapons capability. The Safir-2B is a second generation Safir SLV designed to put a 50 kilogram
payload into low-earth orbit.
A more powerful rocket was displayed as a mockup in 2010 and named Simorgh. It appeared to
be designed to carry heavier Iranian satellites into orbit using four main engines. Iran claims the
Simorgh could put a 60 kilogram payload into low-earth orbit. Comments made by Iranian
officials suggest the design has since undergone various modifications. Simorgh (which Iran now
calls the Safir-2) was to have first flown in 2010, but is now expected to be launched at either a
newer site at Semnan or the newly planned space complex in southeastern Iran.
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Orbital Launches
Satellite Launch Effort to Date
Iran became the ninth country126 to demonstrate an indigenous space launch capability on
February 2, 2009 when it launched an Omid satellite from a Safir 2 rocket. The launch occurred
at the Semnan Missile and Space Center east of Tehran and flew southeast over the Indian
Ocean.127 Space-track.org confirmed soon thereafter that two objects had entered low-earth orbit.
The Omid satellite reentered the atmosphere on April 25, 2009 and fell into the south Atlantic.
The Safir 2 rocket body reentered the atmosphere on May 31, 2009. Iran said that Omid was a
communications satellite.128
U.S. officials, however, objected to the Iranian space launch. The Department of State said:
“Iran’s ongoing efforts to develop its missile capabilities remain a matter of deep concern.
Recently, Iran’s development of a space launch vehicle (SLV) capable of putting a satellite into
orbit establishes the technical basis from which Iran could develop long-range ballistic missile
systems.”129 A spokesman for the Department of Defense said the launch was
certainly a reason for us to be concerned about Iran and its continued attempts to develop a
ballistic missile program of increasingly long range. Although this would appear just to be
the launch of a satellite, their first, obviously there are dual-use capabilities in the technology
here which could be applied toward the development of a long-range ballistic missile. And
this is a cause of concern to us, and I think to certainly everybody in the region – Israel and
their Arab neighbors – as well as to our allies in the region.130
Various analysts have argued that to some degree Iranian missile experts have modified or
reverse-engineered older Soviet-era rockets in Iran’s space program. They point out how identical
they look, how comparable their performance parameters are, and so on. Despite compelling
evidence supporting their claims, others strongly disagree. German scientists Schmucker and
Schiller maintain that “reverse engineering is so difficult that there is not one single proven
example for successfully reverse engineered missiles and rockets.”131
Iran has launched two additional satellites. The Rasad-1, reportedly an imaging satellite, was
successfully launched on June 15, 2011. The Navid-e Elm-o Sanat was reportedly successfully
126
In order of first orbital launch are: the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Japan, China, the United Kingdom,
India, Israel and Iran. Russia and Ukraine are considered to have inherited their space launch capabilities as successor
states to the former Soviet Union. The European Space Agency (ESA) is not included because it is a consortium of a
number of European governments and commercial companies.
127
Stephen Clark, “Iran puts Satellite into Earth Orbit,” Spaceflight Now, February 3, 2009, http://spaceflightnow.com/
news/n0902/03iran/.
128
Iranian Space Agency, In the Name of God the Compassionate the Merciful, OMD Satellite Launch Report, 46th
Meeting of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS), 9th-20th February 2009, February 9, 2009.
129
Department of State, “Iranian Launch of Satellite,” press release, February 3, 2009.
130
Department of Defense, DOD News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon, February 3,
2009, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4347.
131
Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, “The DPRK Missile Show: A Comedy in (Currently) Eight Acts,” Draft
report, Schmucker Technologies, Report XX/10, Germany, May 5, 2010, p. 8.
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launched on February 3, 2012; it remained in orbit for about two months. The Navid is an
experimental student-built satellite designed to test camera and telecommunications equipment.
Planned Satellite Launches
In January 2011, Iranian Defense Minister Vahdi announced that two satellites were being
readied, including the Fajr satellite and the Rasad satellite mentioned above, which were capable
of capturing imagery with a resolution of more than 200 meters. He also said a space laboratory
called Explorer-4 was being readied.132 On February 7, 2011, President Ahmadinejad named four
satellites to be launched: Fajr, Rasad, Amir-Kabir-1 and Zafar.133 Table 3, “Iranian Satellites
(Current and Planned),” provides an overview of current and planned Iranian satellite launches.
Table 3. Iranian Satellites (Current and Planned)
Name
Purpose
Date
Sinah-1 (Iranian design, Russian
built)
Environment-1 (Iran, China,
Thailand)
Omid
Fajr
Reconnaissance
Launched by Russia on Oct. 28, 2005
Joint research; earth observation
Launched by China on Sept. 6, 2008
Research and Telecommunications
Imaging with experimental GPS
system
Telecommunications and
reconnaissance
Imaging
Telecommunications
Launched by Iran on Feb. 2, 2009
Delayed, planned for fall 2012
Navid-Elmo-Sannat or Ya Mahdi
(experimental student satellite)
Rasad
Mesbah (Iranian-Italian
collaboration)
Mesbah-2
AUT-SAT (experimental student
satellite)
Zafar-1
Zohreh
Qaem
Toloo
Pars Sepehr
Pars-2
Iran-APSCO (Asia-Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization)
Besharat (Iran-Organization of the
Islamic Conference)
Limited telecommunications
Remote Sensing
Imaging
Communications
Communications
Reconnaissance with SIGINT
capabilities
Remote sensing
Remote sensing
Design, build and launch 10 research,
remote-sensing and
telecommunications satellites
Not announced
Launched by Iran, February 3, 2012
Launched by Iran, June 15, 2011
Satellite being held by Italy because of
sanctions
Planned for 2011-2012
Planned for 2011-2012
Planned for 2012
Planned for 2014
Planned for 2016
Launch date not confirmed
Launch date not confirmed
Launch date not announced
Launch dates not confirmed
Not announced
Sources: Various Iranian and international news sources and Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 4, 2011.
132
133
Defense Minister: New Space Projects to be Unveiled, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), January 30, 2011.
Iran President Unveils Four New Satellites, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), February 7, 2011.
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Sub-orbital Launches
As part of a nation’s space program, it is common to develop, test and launch a number of rockets
into space for short durations to measure the effects of space and study its effects on animals in
preparation for subsequent manned space flight. Iran has outlined such a plan and has moved
forward with those plans. This is another indication that Iran intends to pursue advanced space
flight in the future.
On February 25, 2007 Iran reportedly launched a rocket, but no information on what equipment
or cargo it carried was provided. A year later on February 4, 2008 Iran said it launched a suborbital rocket named Kavoshgar-1, which reportedly transmitted various scientific data on the
earth’s atmosphere. Kavoshgar-2 launched in November 2008 carrying a small space laboratory.
A third rocket, Kavoshgar-3 launched on February 3, 2010 with several animals (a rodent, several
worms, and two turtles) and transmitted live video of the small environmental lab. Iran thus
became the sixth nation or consortium to send animals into space.134 Kavoshgar-4 launched on
March 15, 2011. Although designed to carry a monkey, this particular launch did not include any
animals. In September 2011, Kavoshgar-5 was launched with a monkey on board in a test
capsule, but the rocket failed. Later in 2011, Iran suspended its sub-orbital flight program for
further review, but in May 2012 Iran announced the program to send live animals into space
would resume shortly. The Kavoshgar-1 was apparently a modified Ghadr-1; the other
Kavoshgars likely were based on either Zelzal or Nazeat rocket motors.
Manned Space Flight
Iran first expressed interest in manned space flight during a Soviet-Iranian Summit on June 21,
1990. Both Presidents agreed in principle to conduct joint Soviet-Iranian manned flights to the
Soviet Mir space station. This goal was not realized because of the break-up of the Soviet Union
soon thereafter.
It was not until 2008 that Iran announced plans for its own manned space program, as well as
plans for the development of its own spacecraft and a space laboratory. 135 The head of Iran’s
Aerospace Industries Organization added that Iran intended to launch a manned mission into
space within a decade. He described this as Iran’s top priority for the next decade in order to
make Iran the leading space power of the region by 2021.136
In August 2010, Iranian President Ahmadinejad said Iran’s first astronaut would be sent into
space on an Iranian space craft no later than 2019. This would be preceded by an Iranian manned
sub-orbital spaceflight by 2016 in preparation for the eventual orbital spaceflight. There has also
been some unconfirmed news regarding Iranian participation in a Chinese space station.
The fact that Iran has signified a commitment to a public, manned space effort over the next
decade is indicative of the kind of space launch program one would expect from a country
pursuing a legitimate program. Although this does not mean Iran will not learn much from a
space launch program that it could apply to long-range ballistic missiles, some might argue that
134
Others are the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the European Space Agency.
“Iran plans manned space mission in 10 years,” Reuters, August 21, 2008, newswire.
136
“Iran to send first astronaut into space within 10 years,” RIA Novosti, August 20, 2008.
135
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its use of personnel and resources in this way significantly weakens the case that Iran’s space
program is merely rhetorical masking of a covert ICBM program.
Foreign-Iranian Cooperation
Since the early 1980s, many thousands of articles and news stories have been written about Iran’s
efforts to procure ballistic missiles, components and materials, and to develop an indigenous
missile and space launch infrastructure. A considerable number of these items provide details of
interest. Although many of those articles are likely accurate, it is not entirely possible to sort them
all out from those accounts that are not entirely accurate. On the other hand, official public U.S.
and other government sources generally do not provide such specificity, but instead are very
useful to track broader trends over time.
This section is included to provide an overview from such public official assessments because no
such overview is found elsewhere probing the extent of foreign cooperation with Iran’s ballistic
missile and space launch programs. Furthermore, this section describes not only the degree to
which Iran developed close working relationships with others on the way to developing its own
indigenous capabilities, but also demonstrates that these relationships largely continue out of
necessity for Iran.
Around 1982, Iran began to focus on developing an indigenous solid-propellant rocket industry,
but turned subsequently to other countries in varying degrees to acquire whole systems,
components and training to build up its own ballistic missile force and develop its own
production capabilities. Iran’s efforts in this regard evolved and perhaps even diminished over
time with respect to specific countries. As a result of this decades long effort, Iran is now
considered to have become self-sufficient in major parts of its own ballistic missile programs, yet
it is still apparently reliant on outside sources for some key missile components, especially for
further development of its longer range ballistic missile program.
The Libyan and Syrian Relationship
Perhaps the earliest evidence of direct foreign missile cooperation with The Islamic Republic of
Iran began in the early 1980s.137 Iran reportedly began secret negotiations with Libya in 1984 to
acquire short-range Scud-B ballistic missiles and in the following year received 20 Scud-Bs and 2
TELs (transporter erector launcher).138 In 1986, Iran apparently received about a dozen Scud-Bs
from Syria. It does not appear that Iran acquired additional Scuds from Libya or Syria after those
transfers.
137
Prior to the 1979 Revolution, Iran had ties to Western countries such as the United States. Iran had some it inherited
from under the rule of the Shah. These were older, short-range tactical and battlefield missiles it used in the Iran-Iraq
War (1980-1988).
138
Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, England, May 2010, pp. 13-14.
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North Korean-Iranian Cooperation
Iran’s relationship with the DPRK in developing ballistic missiles has been of long-standing.
Starting with acquisition of Scud missiles from the DPRK in the 1980s, Iran has developed a
close working relationship with Pyongyang in many if not all of its ballistic missile programs that
subsequently led to Iran becoming increasingly self-sufficient in those programs.
Currently, Iran has likely exceeded the DPRK in its technical capacity to develop, test and build
ballistic missiles.139 But Iran may, to some extent, remain reliant on others, perhaps including the
DPRK itself, for certain materials in the production of its ballistic missiles.
Then-Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates testified in 1992 that North Korea had sold
other countries longer range missiles and the technology to produce them.140 The following year,
then-Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey141 added that North Korea has sold Syria
and Iran extended range Scud Cs and apparently agreed to sell missile technology prohibited by
the MTCR. The IC further expressed concern that the DPRK was developing and marketing a
new 1,000 km range missile and apparently had no threshold governing its sales; it appeared
willing to sell to any country with the cash to pay. Already, North Korea was selling two versions
of ballistic missiles—the normal modified Scud (500 km range), which they sold to several
countries in the Middle East. They also had a number of discussions and contract talks for the
1,000 km missile, Woolsey testified. In follow-up questions for the record, the IC later wrote that
Iran, “one of North Korea’s best customers for ballistic missiles and related technology, is likely
to be one of the first recipients of the 1,000 km No Dong. By the end of this decade [1990s], Iran
could be able to assemble short-range (Scud B and Scud C) and medium-range No Dong ballistic
missiles.”142
Woolsey also commented on a report by the Russian intelligence community: “the IC has
reviewed the Russian report on nonproliferation and finds it to be a credible unclassified
document that generally corresponds to Western appraisals.”143 That Russian report said Iran’s
missile potential was confined to Scud B SRBMs received from Syria and North Korea. Using
technology obtained from Egypt, North Korea was upgrading the Scud-class missiles purchased
earlier from the USSR and exporting them to countries such as Iran. The same Russian report
noted that North Korea’s “Nodong 1 IRBM,” which the DPRK intends to offer on the world
market, was at the testing stage.144
139
E-mail correspondence with Michael Elleman (IISS), September 2012.
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Threat Assessment, Military Strategy, and Defense Planning,
102nd Cong., 2nd sess., January 22, 1992, S.Hrg. 102-755 (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp. 8-21.
141
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, 103rd Cong., 1st
sess., February 24, 1993, S.Hrg. 103-208 (Washington: GPO, 1993), pp. 8-12
142
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, 103rd Cong., 1st
sess., February 24, 1993, S.Hrg. 103-208 (Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 192.
143
In response to hearing questions, the IC responded thusly some months later. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., February 24, 1993, S.Hrg. 103-208
(Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 172.
144
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Proliferation Issues. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service
Report. A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, JPRS-TND-93-007,
Washington, DC, March 5, 1993, p. 29-30.
140
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The 1990s saw several recurring trends 1990s between Iran and North Korea as assessed by the
IC in its annual threat assessments before Congress. First, North Korea’s ongoing export of
ballistic missiles provided a qualitative increase in capabilities to countries such as Iran. Second,
Iran was using its relationship with North Korea, and the significant amount of ballistic missile
goods and services it provided to Iran, as an important means by which Iran was achieving its
goal of self-sufficiency in the production of MRBMs. Third, Iran could significantly shorten the
acquisition time for an ICBM by purchasing key components or entire systems from potential
sellers such as North Korea, including potentially significant inputs of space launch vehicle
technology and support.
It was not until 2006 that Iran publicly acknowledged for the first time that it had obtained
missiles from North Korea during its war with Iraq, but added that it no longer needed
Pyongyang’s assistance: “We received these [Scuds] from foreign countries like North Korea but
17 years after the war we were able to design all of these pieces and even their fuel,” said the
chief commander of the IRGC.145 Some observers cast doubt on Iran’s ability to produce even the
Scud Bs and Scud Cs (Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 respectively) entirely indigenously without any
foreign support for materials or components, or both, even through today.
In the latter 2000s, the IC continued to provide testimony on Iran’s longstanding relationship with
North Korea with respect to the purchase and development of ballistic missile technology. The IC
continued to assess that North Korean cooperation was ongoing and significant to Iran’s ballistic
missile programs.
The Russian-Iranian Relationship
According to official public accounts, since the early 1990s, Russia’s involvement with Iranian
ballistic missile programs evolved slowly at first. But whether the Russian government itself was
officially or indirectly involved with non-government Russian entities and Iran on these matters
remains unclear. Whatever the case may be, the involvement of Russian individuals and entities
expanded despite Russian government efforts to curb such involvement, leading to the
acceleration of some Iranian missile programs. In the last few years, Russian involvement appears
to have receded. From 2004-2007, Russian arms transfer agreements with Iran totaled about $1.6
billion (current U.S. dollars); from 2008-2011 total arms transfer agreements totaled about $100
million (current U.S. dollars).146
During the era of the Soviet Union, it does not appear that Iran acquired any ballistic missile
systems, technology or training from that country. As the Soviet Union broke up, however, U.S.
officials began warning that the former Soviet Union could become a source of proliferation
concern. Then-Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates testified in 1992 that specialized
Soviet-era defense industries facing cuts in military funding might turn to the international
marketplace where pursuit of hard currency could take precedence over proliferation concerns.147
145
“Iran admits buying missiles from North Korea during Iraq war,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific—Political,
November 7, 2006, translated from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 3, 2006, p. 7.
146
CRS Report R42678, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, by (name redacted) and
(name redacted), p. 44.
147
Gates also said tens of thousands of scientists and engineers are emigrating from the former Soviet Union, and
“some have expertise applicable to special weapons and missiles… some may find a better market for their expertise in
Third World countries trying to acquire or improve special weapons capabilities.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on
(continued...)
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Gates repeated these concerns in 1993,148 and his successor, R. James Woolsey testified that
Russia and Ukraine were showing a growing willingness to sell missile technology prohibited by
the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) because of internal nationalist and economic
pressures.149 Woolsey added that most reports of any such transfers to that date were hoaxes,
exaggerations or scams, but that a few transfers of sensitive technology had occurred to China.
He warned further that China in turn could pass more advanced Russian or Ukrainian military
technologies to others. Although the potential for Iranian-Russian ballistic missile cooperation
existed, the U.S. IC made no mention of any such relationship in 1994150 or 1995.151
The Iranian-Russian relationship had changed by 1996, however. Congress was notified in the
annual 721 Report152 that Russia had become a “primary source for missile related goods” and
had “supplied a variety of ballistic missile goods during the reporting period to foreign countries,
especially Iran.”153 The 1997 annual threat assessment from the Intelligence Community stated
that Iran acquired Kilo-class submarines from Russia and was upgrading its anti-ship missile
capabilities.154 Additionally, the 721 Report stated “that entities in Russia and elsewhere
continued to supply missile-related goods and technology to Iran. Iran is using these goods and
technologies to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of MRBMs. The
foreign equipment obtained in 1997 will be essential for achieving that goal.”155
Russian officials, apparently concerned about these activities, issued a broad decree in January
1998 prohibiting Russian companies from exporting items known or believed to be used for
developing WMD or their delivery systems, whether or not those items were on Russia’s export
control list.156 Acknowledging that Russian efforts had shown some signs of slowing proliferation
activities, the U.S. IC noted the difficulty in restricting technologies with dual civil and military
applications, especially when countries such as Iran could take advantage of shortcomings in
Russian export controls.157 More specifically, the 1998 721 Report said that Iran’s success in
(...continued)
Armed Services, Potential Threats to American Security in the Post-Cold War Era, Hearings Before the Defense Policy
Panel, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., December 10, 1991, H.A.S.C. No. 102-52 (Washington: GPO, 1992), p. 9.
148
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Threat Assessment, Military Strategy, and Defense Planning,
102nd Cong., 2nd sess., January 22, 1992, S.Hrg. 102-755 (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp. 8-21.
149
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, 103rd Cong., 1st
sess., February 24, 1993, S.Hrg. 103-208 (Washington: GPO, 1993), pp. 8-12.
150
U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States and its Interests Abroad, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., January 25, 1994, S.Hrg. 103-630 (Washington: GPO,
1994), pp. 4-78.
151
Perhaps a key reason, according to Director, DIA, Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper was that Iran’s military was rebuilding
from its war with Iraq and that major economic constraints, such as hard currency shortages and a poor debt servicing
record limited Tehran’s ability to acquire weapon systems in the international marketplace. U.S. Congress, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Intelligence Review, 104th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 1995, S.Hrg. 10415 (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 34.
152
This report is referred to as the 721 Report because it is a congressionally mandated under section 721 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-293). Initially, it was a biannually-required report to
Congress, but legislation changed that to an annual reporting requirement starting in 2004.
153
Director of Central Intelligence, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, July - December 1996, Washington, DC, June 1997.
154
1997 Annual Threat Assessment.
155
Director of Central Intelligence, Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997, Washington, DC.
156
Ibid.
157
1998 Annual Threat Assessment.
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gaining technology and materials from Russian companies accelerated Iranian development of the
Shahab-3 MRBM, which was flight tested in July 1998. The Report added that following intense
and continuing engagement with the United States, “Russian officials have taken some positive
steps in curtailing proliferation activities.”158
Despite Russia announcing additional, new export controls, the IC reported in 1999 that
“expertise and material from Russia continued to assist the Iranian missile effort in areas ranging
from training, to testing, to components. There is no doubt this will play a crucial role in Iran’s
ability to develop more sophisticated and longer range missiles.”159 The first of two 721 Reports
in 1999 stated that entities in Russia and elsewhere continued to supply considerable ballistic
missile-related goods and technology to Iran, whose goal was to become self-sufficient. Despite
steps taken to curtail proliferation activities, the Russian Government’s “commitment,
willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remains uncertain. Moreover,
economic conditions in Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian entities
to circumvent export controls.”160 The second of the two 721 Reports for 1999 reiterated much of
the previous report and added that Russian entities provided substantial missile-related
technology, training, and expertise to Iran that “almost certainly will continue to accelerate
Iranian efforts to develop new ballistic missile systems, especially longer range ballistic
missiles.”161 These assessments aligned with the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that
stated Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to many
parts of the United States in the last half of the next decade (i.e., the late 2000s) using Russian
technology and assistance.162
Russian entities continued to engage in transfers of missile related technology, goods and
technical know-how throughout the 1990s until at least 2010. During this period, Iran moved
increasingly toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. However, Iran
certainly remains dependent on foreign suppliers for some key missile components,” such as
Russian suppliers (among others) according to the IC.163
A limited but significant level of ongoing cooperation is seen in each of the 721 Reports provided
to Congress during the 1990s until the last several years. Also, a number of the IC’s Annual
Threat Assessments provided information about ongoing proliferation activities and concerns
over the cooperation of some Russian entities with Iran. Through this period too, various Russian
entities and individuals were sanctioned by the United States for their proliferation activities with
Iran.
158
Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress, January – June 1998, Washington, DC.
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