Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns

Congressional research reportDec 23, 2015

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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current

Conditions and Congressional Concerns

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Specialist in Latin American Affairs

December 23, 2015

Congressional Research Service

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R42559

Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns

Summary

Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. Since the fall of the Duvalier

dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of

authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. Economic and social stability

improved considerably, and many analysts believed Haiti was turning a corner toward sustainable

development when it was set back by a massive earthquake in January 2010 that devastated much

of the capital of Port-au-Prince. Although it is recovering, poverty remains massive and deep, and

economic disparity is wide: Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.

Throughout President Michel Martelly’s five-year term, Haiti has found itself in a prolonged

political crisis due to the government’s failure to hold a series of elections that were long overdue.

The government failed to hold elections by the end of 2012, leaving the Senate without one-third

of its members. Thousands of Haitians took to the streets to protest the lack of elections. When

the terms for another third of the Senate as well as the entire 99-seat Chamber of Deputies

expired on January 12, the legislature was immediately dissolved, and Martelly began ruling by

decree. A new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) organized legislative elections in August,

which were marred by violence, and runoff legislative, presidential, and local elections in October

2015. Some presidential candidates have led protests alleging fraud but have failed to file legal

complaints. Runoff presidential elections scheduled for December 27 have been postponed while

an independent commission makes recommendations. No new date has been set.

Haiti is a key foreign assistance priority for the Obama Administration in Latin American and the

Caribbean. Haiti’s developmental needs and priorities are many. The Haitian government and the

international donor community are implementing a 10-year recovery plan focusing on territorial,

economic, social, and institutional rebuilding. An outbreak of cholera in late 2010 has swept

across most of the country and further complicated assistance efforts. Progress has been made in

developing democratic institutions, although, as evident in the current crisis, they remain weak.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore

order since 2004. The mission has helped facilitate elections, combated gangs and drug

trafficking with the Haitian National Police, and responded to natural disasters. MINUSTAH has

been criticized because of sexual abuse by some of its forces and scientific findings that its troops

apparently introduced cholera to the country. The U.N. says it will not compensate cholera

victims, citing diplomatic immunity. As of June 30, 2015, MINUSTAH had decreased its military

troops from 5,021 to 2,338, leaving peacekeeping troops in only 4 of Haiti’s 10 departments. The

Haitian National Police had primary responsibility for election security.

The Dominican Republic ended its “immigrant regularization” process in June 2015. Since then

tens of thousands of Dominican-born people of Haitian descent have relocated to Haiti, some out

of fear of or intimidation by Dominican communities or authorities, increasing bilateral tensions.

The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes,

continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the

cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and

human trafficking; and alleviating poverty. Congress shares these concerns. The immediate

priorities are that free and fair elections be held as quickly as possible and a new administration

takes office, with hopes that that will reduce political tensions and instability.

Current legislation related to Haiti includes P.L. 114-113, P.L. 113-76, P.L. 113-162, P.L. 113-235,

H.R. 52, H.R. 1295, H.R. 1891, H.Res. 25, S. 503, S. 1009, and S. 1267.

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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns

Contents

Political Background ....................................................................................................................... 1

Haitian Democratic History in Brief ......................................................................................... 1

The 2010-2011 Election of President Martelly and a New Parliament ............................... 4

Adoption of Constitutional Reforms ................................................................................... 5

Overdue Elections Process: Delays and Disputes Under Martelly ..................................... 5

President Martelly’s Administration........................................................................................ 10

Stability and the Investigation of Former Heads of State; Death of Duvalier......................... 13

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) ............................................... 14

Haiti’s Development Challenges and Socioeconomic Conditions ................................................ 17

Cholera Epidemic .................................................................................................................... 18

Strategies for Haiti’s Reconstruction and International Assistance ............................................... 20

Reconstruction Efforts............................................................................................................. 20

Relations with Donors ............................................................................................................. 21

Coordination of Foreign Assistance .................................................................................. 22

Outlook Regarding Haitian Development......................................................................... 23

Potential for Mining .......................................................................................................... 24

U.S. Policy Objectives and Assistance .......................................................................................... 24

U.S. Assistance to Haiti ........................................................................................................... 25

Temporary Protected Status and Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program .................... 27

Congressional Response and Concerns ......................................................................................... 27

Post-Earthquake Reconstruction ............................................................................................. 28

Transparency and Accountability of the Haitian Government ................................................ 32

Respect for Human Rights ...................................................................................................... 33

Concerns over Haitians and People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic ....... 34

Investigations of the Late Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations ............... 37

Curbing Violence Against Women .................................................................................... 39

Security and the Debate over Reestablishing the Haitian Army ............................................. 39

Counternarcotics ..................................................................................................................... 41

Trade Preferences for Haiti ..................................................................................................... 42

Legislation in the 114th Congress .................................................................................................. 43

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Haiti ..................................................................................................................... 1

Figure 2. U. S. Government Post-Earthquake Assistance in Haiti ................................................ 26

Figure 3. Total Post-Earthquake USG Funding to Haiti Summary ............................................... 30

Tables

Table 1. Haiti Elections Budget Estimates—Assuming Three Rounds of Elections ....................... 9

Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Haiti Fiscal Years 2010 to 2016 ......................................................... 26

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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns

Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 44

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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns

Figure 1. Map of Haiti

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

Political Background

Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic; Haiti occupies the western

third of the island. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to

overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment.

While significant progress has been made in improving governance, democratic institutions

remain weak. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide. In proximity to

the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and fragile

economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. The U.S. Congress views

the stability of the nation with great concern and has evidenced a commitment to improving

conditions there.

Haitian Democratic History in Brief

Haiti has been struggling to build and strengthen democratic institutions for 25 years, ever since

massive popular protests and international pressure forced dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier to

abandon his rule and flee the country in 1986. Known as “Baby Doc,” Duvalier came to power in

1971, succeeding his father, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who had ruled since 1957. Their 29year dictatorship was marked by repression and corruption. Hoping to reverse almost 200 years of

mostly violent and authoritarian rule, Haitians overwhelmingly approved a new constitution

creating a democratic government in 1987.

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De facto military rule, coups, and thwarted attempts at democratic elections continued until a

provisional civilian government conducted what were widely heralded as Haiti’s first free and fair

elections in 1990, in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Catholic priest, was elected

president. In 1991, the Haitian military overthrew Aristide in a coup, just eight months after he

was inaugurated. Aristide went into exile in the United States. Three years later, under the threat

of a U.S. military intervention, the military finally bowed to international pressure and allowed

Aristide to finish his term. Aristide returned to Haiti in 1994 under the protection of some 20,000

U.S. troops, who transferred responsibility to a United Nations mission in 1995. With U.S.

assistance, President Aristide disbanded the army and began to train a professional civilian police

force.

In 1996 Haitians saw their first transfer of power between two democratically elected presidents

in Haitian history when Aristide was succeeded by René Préval.1 Five years later, in 2001,

Aristide was reelected, and there was another peaceful transfer of power. Political conflict

embroiled Aristide and the opposition, however, and led to the collapse of his government in

2004, and Aristide again went into exile, eventually ending up in South Africa. An interim

government followed, from 2004 to 2006. Charges of corruption against Aristide, dissolution of

the parliament by Préval in his first term, questions regarding the interim government’s

legitimacy, and flawed elections under all of them contributed to their inability to establish a fully

accepted or functioning government. Nonetheless, with the support of the United Nations

Stabilization Mission for Haiti (MINUSTAH)—which arrived in Haiti in 2004—and other

donors, security conditions improved, reform of the country’s police force began, and elections

were held in 2006.

As a result of those elections the Parliament, which had not been fully functional since the

collapse of the Aristide government in 2004, was reestablished, and René Préval began his second

five-year term as president of Haiti. During his first three years in office, Préval established

relative internal political stability and oversaw a period of economic growth. In 2007, the Préval

Administration published its Poverty Reduction Strategy, a key step in meeting International

Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements for debt relief. International donors pledged more than $1.5

billion in economic assistance to Haiti.

In the long term, democratization in Haiti has contributed to the slow strengthening of

government capacity and transparency. From 2004 to 2009, Haiti made what the IMF and others

called “remarkable progress” toward political stability and economic stabilization.2 With much

international support, the government conducted democratic presidential and parliamentary

elections and enacted wide-ranging reforms, especially in economic governance. Elected

governments have developed long-term development plans resulting in international technical and

financial assistance. They have developed national budgets and made them public. The number of

employees in bloated state enterprises has been reduced. The government carried out the fiscal

management and transparency reforms necessary to qualify for debt relief from multilateral and

some bilateral creditors under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 2009.

Jean Bertrand Aristide served as president in Haiti from February through September 1991; 1994-1996; and 20012004. René Préval served as president from 1996-2001; and 2006-2011. The Haitian constitution limits presidents to

two nonconsecutive terms.

Ugo Fasano, “Haiti’s Economic, Political Turnaround,” IMF Survey Magazine: Countries & Regions, September 17,

2007; and World Bank, “Haiti Country Brief,” September 2008, at http://go.worldbank.org/55NM6XlVQ0. See also,

“Remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon at a High-Level Donor Conference on Haiti (as released

by the UN),” and “Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, United States Permanent Representative to the United

Nations, in the U.N. Security Council (as Released by the US Mission to the U.N. in New York),” Federal News

Service, April 21, 2009.

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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns

Human rights violations have been drastically reduced. Although crime and violence continued to

undermine Haitian development, security improved significantly enough during this period that

the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was shifting the focus of its

biggest contingent from security to development.3

Haiti’s fragile stability has been repeatedly shaken, however, if not by political problems, then by

climatic ones. During this same period of relative stability, a worsening food crisis led to violent

protests and the removal of Haiti’s prime minister in 2008. U.N. officials said political opponents

and armed gangs infiltrated the protests and fired at U.N. peacekeepers in an effort to weaken the

government. Without a prime minister, Haiti could not sign certain agreements with foreign

donors or implement programs to address the crisis for over four months. There were some 19

political parties in the legislature competing for influence and positioning themselves for

legislative and presidential elections, further complicating governability.

And then a devastating earthquake struck the nation in January 2010, ravaging the Haitian capital

of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas.4 Political stability was especially uncertain after the

disaster, due to the loss of many political figures and government officials and massive damage to

government infrastructure. Some 17% of the country’s civil service employees were killed, and

the presidential palace, the parliament building, and 28 of 29 ministry buildings were destroyed.5

Along with the buildings, government records were destroyed; reestablishing and expanding

transparency in government spending has been particularly challenging.

After yet another controversial election cycle, Peasant Response party candidate Michel Martelly,

one of Haiti’s most popular entertainers, was sworn into office as Haiti’s new president on May

14, 2011, for a five-year term. When outgoing President René Préval, of the Unity party, gave

him the presidential sash it was the first time in Haitian history that a peaceful, democratic

transfer of power occurred between presidents of opposing parties. Much of his term to date has

been characterized by gridlock between the executive and legislative branches.

There is still much to be accomplished in the democratization of Haiti. Some parts of the

government are not fully independent, the judicial system is weak, and corruption and political

violence still threaten the nation’s stability. Haitian governance capacities, already limited, were

considerably diminished by the earthquake. President Martelly said that “all problems we are

facing today result from the weakness of our institutions,” and called on the international

community to keep helping Haiti strengthen its institutions.6 Much of the Haitian public perceives

progress in reconstruction and distribution of over $9 billion in pledged international assistance as

much too slow, adding to mounting public frustration with international donors and the

government. The government’s failure to hold elections that are several years overdue is

contributing to unrest and public calls for Martelly’s resignation.

Jonathan M. Katz, “Largest UN Force in Haiti to Focus on Development,” Associated Press, April 25, 2009.

For more information on the earthquake, see CRS Report R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by (name

redacted) and (name redact ed).

U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), FY2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget

Justification, p. 4.

Text of report by Haitian Radio Vision 2000 on 30 April, “Haitian President Returns, Calls for Unity, Seeks

Strengthening of Institutions,” BBC Monitoring Americas, May 1, 2012.

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The 2010-2011 Election of President Martelly and a New Parliament7

The president, senators, and deputies are elected to serve five-year terms. The constitution limits

presidents to two nonconsecutive terms. There are no term limits for the legislature, although

turnover for its members has been high. The first round of both the presidential and legislative

elections took place on November 28, 2010. According to the Haitian constitution, if no candidate

receives an absolute majority of the vote, a runoff vote between the top two candidates is held for

presidential and Chamber of Deputies seats. For Senate seats, candidates who lack an absolute

majority but have at least 20% more votes than the next candidate are declared the winner.

President Préval was completing his second nonconsecutive term, the maximum allowed by the

Haitian constitution. Nineteen candidates vied to succeed him in the first round. Like most

previous elections in Haiti, this one centered more on personalities than on parties or issues. A

group of Haitian journalists, the Public Policy Intervention Group, with the support of the

National Democratic Institute and the Commission on Presidential Debates, tried to encourage

more substantive discussions among the presidential candidates by holding a series of debates

that were broadcast nationwide. All 19 presidential candidates participated.

The first round produced contested results involving the governing party’s candidate, and

politically motivated violence. After the Haitian government accepted the recommendations of

international observers, the dispute was resolved and the vote went to a second round between

Mirlande Manigat, a professor of constitutional law and former first lady, and Michel Martelly.

Martelly, a famous Haitian kompa dance musician known for his bawdy performances, and called

“Sweet Micky,” was popular with young voters. Martelly, also a businessman, had personal

financial issues. He defaulted on over $1 million in loans and had three properties in Florida go

into foreclosure, raising questions about his financial management skills.8 Although Martelly won

68% of the votes cast in the March 20, 2011, elections, turnout was low, so those votes

constituted the support of only 15% of all registered voters. Martelly, age 50, was inaugurated on

May 14, 2011, for a five-year term ending in 2016.

The legislative offices up for election included the entire 99-member Chamber of Deputies, and

11 of 30 Senate seats. The results of the second round of voting for legislative seats were

contentious. Charges of fraud led to violent demonstrations across the country resulting in the

deaths of at least two people, including the director of a hospital that was set on fire.

The legislature sworn in on April 25, 2011, was incomplete: at that time the results in 19 districts

had been challenged. International observers reported that the final results released by the

provisional electoral council (CEP) for those districts had been changed to favor candidates

associated with then-President Préval’s Inité (Unity) coalition, and demanded that all 19 results be

annulled. The CEP reviewed the cases and endorsed 15 of the 19 original results; the government

published the official results; and those 15 legislators were able to take their seats. It appears that

the four remaining disputed seats in the chamber of deputies will be voted on in the next

elections. The Inité coalition captured a majority in both houses of the legislature, so President

Martelly had to negotiate with them to get his proposals passed.

For more in-depth discussion of the 2011 presidential and legislative elections, see CRS Report R41689, Haiti’s

National Elections: Issues, Concerns, and Outcome, by (name redact ed)

Frances Robles, “Haiti Candidate Martelly Lost three S. Florida Properties to Foreclosure,” Miami Herald, March 7,

2011.

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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns

Adoption of Constitutional Reforms

The new legislature began to work before Martelly was sworn in, including adopting

constitutional reforms that had been passed under the previous legislature, in hopes of getting

them to take effect quickly. Constitutional amendments passed by two consecutive legislatures go

into effect when the next president takes office. Controversy arose around the status of these

amendments as well.

The amendments were in a state of constitutional limbo for about a year. To become law, bills

passed by the legislature must be published by the executive branch. The wording of the

amendments sent to be published by the outgoing Préval Administration differed from that

actually passed by the legislature, according to the State Department, so the amendments did not

become law. In June 2011, Martelly stopped the altered version from being printed, and there was

debate over whether the original version should be printed, or the process started anew.

In June 2012, the Martelly Administration finally published the constitutional amendments that

had been passed by two legislatures.9 These allowed Haitians with dual citizenship to vote and

hold many government positions, including cabinet positions. This had been a sore point for

Haitians in the diaspora who wanted to be able to vote, or return and serve in the government.

Those with dual citizenship will still be prohibited from becoming president, prime minister, or

members of either chamber of the legislature. Martelly said that leaders of the executive,

legislative, and judicial branches had agreed to publish the corrected amendments, cooperation he

described as a great step forward in Haiti’s democratic process.10

The amendments also included a streamlined process for creating a permanent electoral council to

replace the previous method of nine sectors of government civil society naming the CEP, as had

been stipulated in the 1987 constitution. Under the reformed constitution, the three branches of

government—executive, judicial, and legislative—each name three members of the CEP. Despite

that new process, forming an electoral council has been fraught with disputes and is a key reason

why Haiti has still not held long-overdue elections.

Overdue Elections Process: Delays and Disputes Under Martelly

An electoral council is the entity responsible for setting dates for and organizing new elections.

President Martelly fired the members of the previous CEP in December 2011. He did not begin to

form a new electoral council until June 2012, even though one-third of the Senate seats expired

on May 8, 2012. Elections to replace those legislators should have taken place by January 2012 at

the latest, according to Haitian law. Local elections for municipal councils, town delegates, and

other posts were also long overdue.

Because the Senate had only 20 members since May 2012, it was more difficult to meet the 16member quorum needed to conduct business, including naming its representatives to the CEP and

passing necessary electoral laws. The Inité party lost four senators and some of its clout in that

chamber. President Martelly’s Peasant Response party had no members in the Senate, and he lost

about four allies there, which may explain in part why his administration had such difficulty

dealing with the Senate.

The government failed to meet the minister’s pledge that the elections would be held by the end

of 2012; instead the process became contentious, progressed in fits and starts, and contributed to

Le Moniteur, Journal Officiel de la Republique d’Haiti, June 19, 2012, p. 17.

Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haiti Constitutional Amendments Finally Take Effect,” Reuters, June 19, 2012.

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political tensions. Thousands of Haitians took to the streets over the next couple of years to

protest the failure to hold elections and to call for Martelly’s resignation.

Additional concern has been raised over the Martelly Administration’s decision to replace most of

the 120 mayors elected in 2006, whose terms have expired, with government appointees.

According to the then-U.N. Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti,

Michel Forst, this decision “was met with bafflement and incomprehension on the part of the

national and international communities.”11

Tensions heightened as political deadlines loomed and elections were still not organized. In

December 2014, Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe (a close ally of Martelly) resigned under

pressure over the government’s failure to resolve the electoral impasse between the executive and

legislative branches. As Haiti entered 2015, the crisis escalated: street protests continued to grow,

and the executive and legislative branches failed to reach a political compromise. The terms for

another third of the Senate as well as the entire 99-seat Chamber of Deputies expired on January

12; the legislature was immediately dissolved, and President Martelly began ruling by decree.

Under Haitian law, the president appoints and the legislature confirms the prime minister. In early

2015, Martelly swore in a new cabinet, including Evans Paul, a former mayor of Port-au-Prince,

as his fifth prime minister, although the legislature declined to confirm Paul before it dissolved.

The Haitian government subsequently took steps to address its ongoing crisis: it established a new

Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)—the fifth iteration under Martelly—on January 23 and

announced dates in March for local, legislative, and presidential elections in 2015.

2015 Elections

The new CEP finally set about scheduling elections for 2015. They faced a difficult process:

electoral council personnel were largely inexperienced in elections work, and internal procedures

had to be established. The races would also be complex: the CEP deemed 166 political parties and

platforms qualified to participate and 1,857 candidates qualified to run for the 20 Senate seats and

118 Chamber of Deputies seats (the latter was recently expanded from 99 seats). Among the

Senate candidates is Guy Philippe, leader of the 2004 coup overthrowing President Jean-Bertrand

Aristide; Philippe is wanted in the United States under sealed indictment. About 70 candidates

registered to run for president. (Martelly cannot run for reelection: the Haitian constitution limits

presidents to two nonconsecutive terms.)

The CEP rejected about 170 candidates. The CEP did not clear former Prime Minister Laurent

Lamothe and six other former government ministers to run for president and did not list its

reasons. According to Haitian law, the Senate must certify that candidates have not misused

government funds before they can run for office. None of the rejected candidates had received the

required “discharge.” Lamothe said he requested a discharge but that Parliament was dissolved

before it could issue one. He said that on May 20, 2015, a judge issued a ruling confirming that,

without a functioning parliament, it is impossible to comply with the discharge requirement and

that it should therefore be waived, and that his exclusion was politically motivated.12 According

to another report, the superior court of auditors and administrative disputes alleged that

irregularities had taken place under Lamothe’s role as minister of planning (a post he held

simultaneously with being prime minister); Lamothe contested the findings.

Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, U.N. General Assembly

Human Rights Council, report A/HRC/22/65, February 7, 2013, p. 5.

Communications Office of Laurent Lamothe, “Elections Will Not Be Free or Fair in Haiti,” PRNewswire, June 17,

2015.

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First Lady Sophia Martelly was rejected as a Senate candidate, apparently on the basis of dual

citizenship and for failing to get a discharge. Although she was not elected, she had handled

public funds through a government program. President Martelly said that if his wife’s rejection

was politically motivated, it could discredit the process. Others saw the action as a sign of the

CEP’s independence.

The protests and political tensions preceding the elections led to worries over security for the

election cycle. Also fueling security concerns has been the United Nations’ reduction in the

number of international troops in the country. As of June 30, 2015, the United Nations

Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had decreased its military troops from 5,021 to

2,338, leaving peacekeeping troops in only 4 of Haiti’s 10 departments (slightly below the

mandated level of 2,370). The Haitian government asked the U.N. Security Council to delay the

plan until after elections were held, but the drawdown proceeded as scheduled. The Haitian

National Police has primary responsibility for election security.

First-round legislative elections. Haiti began to ease its long-term political crisis by holding the

first round of legislative elections on August 9, 2015. Polling in some areas was marred by

delays, disorder, low turnout—only 18% of voters cast ballots—and sporadic violence.

Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observers found that such irregularities were not

sufficient to invalidate the results as a whole. Nonetheless, violence and technical irregularities

were severe enough that the CEP invalidated the vote in 13% of polling centers; these races were

re-held in the ensuing October elections. Local observer organizations said the problems were

more widespread, reporting fraud, irregularities, and violence in half of all voting centers. For the

first time, according to the head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH), Sandra Honoré, Haiti had penalized instigators of electoral violence. Electoral

officials disqualified 14 candidates for engaging in or inciting violence during the elections.

Some opposition parties and protesters expressed a lack of confidence in the CEP, citing electionday problems and inconsistent decisions on election outcomes. Verite, a major party backed by

former President Rene Preval, said it was boycotting the October elections after the CEP barred

its presidential candidate, despite reportedly admitting it had made an error.13 Nonetheless, the

party won some congressional seats. A member of the CEP resigned in early October, expressing

concerns about CEP’s processes and the need for “inclusive and impartial elections.”14

Runoff legislative, first-round presidential, and municipal elections.

Despite those issues, the CEP managed runoff legislative elections for 18 of the 20 Senate seats

and most of the 119 Chamber of Deputies seats and first-round presidential elections

simultaneously with elections for 1,280 municipal administrations on October 25. There were 54

presidential candidates, most representing parties organized around personalities more than

platforms.

The OAS electoral observation mission called the October round a “significant improvement”

over the August vote.15 The elections were relatively peaceful, and the voter turnout was higher,

at about 26%. Various observers credited the Haitian National Police with improving security

over the previous round. The relative calm of the election day has been followed by protests and

disputes over the vote’s validity.

Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti Presidential Campaign Opens amid Protest,” Miami Herald, September 9, 2015.

Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti Election Official Resigns Ahead of Oct. 25 Vote,” Miami Herald, October 2, 2015.

OAS, “Preliminary Report OAS Electoral Observation Mission to Haiti,” October 26, 2015. The author was a

member of the delegation.

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The CEP declared that Jovenel Moise, the candidate for Martelly’s party (the Haitian Bald Head

party, PHTK) and a political novice, and Jude Celestin, who lost to Martelly in 2011, would

proceed to a runoff. Moise, a relatively unknown agricultural businessman who campaigned as

“The Banana Man,” garnered almost 33% of the vote, to Celestin’s 25%. Celestin was the

government’s construction chief under the Préval administration. He was the government-backed

candidate in the last presidential elections, and his campaign faced charges of fraud in those

elections.

Eight candidates calling themselves the G-8 alleged fraud, including by the government; rallied

street protests; and called for an independent commission to conduct a recount. They did not file

formal complaints of their charges, however. Among them is Celestin, who says he may not run

in the runoff. As in August, some called for the cancellation of the elections and the formation of

an interim government. Maryse Narcysse—who ran for Fanmi Lavalas, founded by former

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide—placed fourth. She and another candidate—neither are part of

the G-8—filed fraud complaints that were heard and resolved by the CEP, although Narcisse’s

lawyer reportedly found fault with the CEP process.16 Others have joined the call for an

independent recount, including religious leaders and a coalition of U.S.-based diaspora groups.

A local observation group published a report with long lists of irregularities, saying that there was

a “vast operation of electoral fraud.”17 The report stated that the majority of political parties were

“clearly involved in the commission of violence and electoral fraud,” and that the governing party

was one of the most aggressive. It also said the CEP lacked transparency in its tabulation.

Still others acknowledge that irregularities occurred, but say that the opposition has failed to

present evidence that they constitute orchestrated fraud, and instead continue to demand remedies

outside established procedures for electoral dispute resolution.

One independent national observer group expressed concern that “a group of presidential

candidates have refused to take the path of formal dispute and preferred to ... demand verification

of the tabulation of votes by an Independent Commission.”18 Haiti Special Coordinator Kenneth

Merten has repeatedly urged candidates to use the appeals process to file complaints and evidence

of fraud with the CEP.19

In December, allegations emerged that candidates paid CEP members bribes to secure places in

runoffs. This further heightened tensions and demands that an independent commission be

formed.

Runoff presidential and local elections delayed. Just one week before they were to be held, the

government postponed the runoff presidential elections scheduled for December 27. Under

pressure to resolve the impasse with the opposition, President Martelly formed a five-member

commission, sworn in on December 22. He said that because the commission is independent it

Jacqueline Charles, “Nearly Two Months After Vote, Haiti Elections Still in Dispute,” Miami Herald, Dec. 7, 2015.

Solidarite Fanm Ayisyen, Conseil National d'Observation Électorale, et al., “October 25, 2015 Elections: A Large

Planned Electoral Fraud Operation” (in French), November 12, 2015, quotes in paragraph from pp. 2, 48-49.

Observatoire Citoyen pour l’Institutionnalisation de la Démocratie (OCID), “Partial Results of the Oct. 25 Elections:

The Urgency to Dispel the Controversy and Defuse the Emerging Crisis,” (in French), press release no. 15, November

16, 2015.

Kenneth H. Merten, “Remarks by Haiti Special Coordinator Kenneth Merten - Haiti Elections, the View from

Washington,” November 16, 2015, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/249962.htm.

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can set the scope of its investigation, but that it only has a week to do so. The CEP says it will set

a date after it receives the commission’s recommendations.20

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon is urging that power be transferred through elections and

within the constitutional time frame. According to the constitution, the newly elected legislators

are to take office on January 11 and the new president on February 7, 2016.

Elections for 1,280 local administrations were to be held simultaneously with the presidential

runoff elections. About 38,000 candidates are participating in those races. Those are single-round

political contests; a simple majority suffices to win. Now it is unclear whether the local races will

still be held with the presidential runoff elections, whenever they take place, or be held

separately. This would simplify the process but incur additional costs.

Election funding. Experts estimated the cost to conduct three rounds of elections in Haiti to be

$66 million. The U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) manages the “Basket Fund” of

contributions from various donors. The Haitian government has allocated the largest portion of

the funding, followed by the U.S. government. See Table 1 for the amounts pledged by

international donors. Trinidad and Tobago became the first Caribbean country to make a

contribution, in October. Mexico has said it would also provide a financial contribution.

Table 1. Haiti Elections Budget Estimates—Assuming Three Rounds of Elections

UNDP Basket Fund—Budget Estimates as of July 16, 2015

Total resources required

$65,817,895

Total resources allocated

$49,305,083

Government of Haiti

$13,825,609

United States (USAID)

11,500,000

Canada

9,235,996

European Union

6,793,478

Japan

4,500,000

Brazil

2,000,000

Trinidad and Tobago

1,000,000

Norway

400,000

Argentina

50,000

Shortfall

$16,512,812

Sources: USAID, Department of State, UNDP.

Note: Pledges made at U.N. Donors Conference. Amounts for Trinidad and Tobago and Argentina announced in

October 2015.

That the election process has been contentious is not surprising. As Haiti has been making its

transition from a legacy of authoritarian rule to a democratic government, elections have usually

been a source of increased political tensions and instability in the short term. It is important to

note, however, that in the long term elected governments in Haiti have contributed to the gradual

strengthening of government capacity and transparency. Still, in the present circumstances, the

“Haiti commission installed to review electoral process,” AP, Dec. 23, 2015.

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international community has expressed concern that continual delays have exacerbated political

polarization and threatened stability.

Also fueling concern about security during the election cycle has been the United Nations’

reduction in the number of international troops it has in the country. As of June 30, 2015, the

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had decreased its military troops

from 5,021 to 2,338, leaving peacekeeping troops in only 4 of Haiti’s 10 departments (slightly

below the mandated level of 2,370). The Haitian government asked the U.N. Security Council to

delay the plan until after elections were held, but the drawdown proceeded as scheduled. The

Haitian National Police had primary responsibility for election security.

President Martelly’s Administration

During most of Martelly’s first year in office, Haiti was without a prime minister, which severely

limited the government’s ability to act and the international community’s ability to move forward

with reconstruction efforts. Martelly was not able to form a government for almost five months

because of disputes with a parliament dominated by the opposition Inité coalition over his first

two nominees for prime minister. Dr. Garry Conille, a senior U.N. development specialist and

former aide to then-U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti Bill Clinton, was confirmed as prime minister on

October 4, 2011. Conille lasted only four months in the position, after which he was reportedly

pressured by President Martelly to resign in part because of disagreements over an investigation

of $300 million-$500 million in post-earthquake contracts linked to Martelly and former Prime

Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. Bellerive, now an adviser to Martelly, and also his cousin, said he

was the victim of a smear campaign.21

Authorities in the Dominican Republic are also investigating corruption allegations linked to

President Martelly. According to Dominican journalist Nuria Piera, a company owned by

Dominican Senator Felix Bautista was awarded a $350 million contract for reconstruction work

in Haiti, despite not meeting Haitian procurement requirements. Bautista allegedly gave over $2.5

million to President Martelly before and after he won the election. Martelly has denied the

charges.22

After the first prime minister resigned, another three months went by before a new prime minister

was confirmed. Laurent Lamothe, Martelly’s foreign affairs minister and a former

telecommunications executive, was named prime minister in May 2012. Parliament approved his

cabinet and government plan soon thereafter. The cabinet included two new posts: one minister to

address poverty and another to support farmers.23

Because Martelly and much of his team—reportedly mostly childhood friends—lack political or

management experience, many observers are concerned about the president’s ability to carry out

his promises of free and compulsory education, job creation, agricultural development, and

strengthened rule of law. That political inexperience may have contributed to the gridlock and

animosity between Martelly’s administration and the parliament that have characterized Haitian

politics since he took office. His justice minister resigned after police violated the immunity

legislators have and arrested a legislator who had allegedly escaped from jail. Legislators

Associated Press, “Martelly Denies Kickback in Construction Firm Scandal,” Jamaica Gleaner, April 4, 2012.

Associated Press, “Martelly Denies Kickback in Construction Firm Scandal,” op. cit., and “DR-Haiti Contracts

Scandal,” Caribbean Update, May 1, 2012.

Associated Press, “Haiti’s New Prime Minister Says New Mining Legislation Being Drafted to Benefit Country,”

Washington Post, May 15, 2012.

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responded by blocking many of Martelly’s legislative proposals, and opening an investigation

into whether he held U.S. citizenship, which would make him ineligible for office.

International donors, including the United States, have been working with the Haitian government

at all levels to rebuild government infrastructure, support the development of transparency and

accountability within government institutions, and broaden and strengthen the provision of public

services. International assistance continues to professionalize and strengthen the Haitian National

Police force and reform other elements of Haiti’s weak judicial system. Donors also are training

Haiti’s public sector workforce so that it will eventually be able to coordinate and carry out

development programs. In late 2011, the Haitian government adopted a “Roadmap for the Rule of

Law,” created with support from MINUSTAH, outlining short-, middle-, and long-term actions to

develop and guarantee the rule of law in Haiti.

Martelly began several other initiatives during his first year. He inaugurated a housing loan

program and appointed advisers to an earthquake recovery panel. He launched a free education

initiative being funded through taxes on phone calls and wired remittances from abroad. Critics

express concern that the fund lacks transparency and a clear policy.24 In May 2012 the

government launched a program in which it transfers cash credits of up to $20 a month to mothers

who keep their children in school. The program initially was to benefit 100,000 families in four of

Port-au-Prince’s poorest neighborhoods, and then extend nation-wide by year’s end.25

In May 2012 the president also launched two health initiatives in the government’s Office of

Workers’ Compensation Insurance, Illness, and Maternity. He opened a new physiotherapy

department, supported by the French Red Cross. He also announced a pilot program that will give

about 500 workers, including 100 in the informal sector, free health insurance cards facilitating

access to health care. Martelly stated that “we are fighting for all of Haiti to fully enjoy its right to

health by the end of my term.”26

President Martelly named three members to the Supreme Court, including its president. The latter

post had been vacant for six years. According to the State Department, this is the first time in over

25 years that Haiti has those three branches of government in place.27 As mentioned above,

Martelly, the legislature, and the court finally agreed on the nine new electoral council members

needed to organize overdue elections in April 2013. The publication of the constitutional

amendments was supposed to have made that process easier to accomplish. The amendments also

created a high council to conduct administrative management of the judicial branch, and a

constitutional court to resolve disputes between the executive branch and the parliament. The

amendments also require that at least 30% of government posts be held by women.28

In July 2012 then Prime Minister Lamothe visited Washington, DC, meeting with then Secretary

of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton noted that she had made Haiti “a foreign policy priority” when

she came into office, and has been committed to “building the capacity of the Haitian government

and the Haitian society so they can have the means and the experience and the expertise to solve

Jacqueline Charles, “Martelly Marks 100 Days in Haiti with Little Progress,” Miami Herald, August 22, 2011.

“Haiti to Pay Mothers School Incentives via Mobile,” BBC News, May 28, 2012.

Caribbean Journal staff, “Haiti’s Martelly Opens Therapy Centre, Launches Insurance Card Initiative,” Caribbean

Journal, May 29, 2012.

Cheryl Mills, Haiti—Two Years Post Earthquake: What You May Not Know, U.S. Department of State, Dipnote:

U.S. Dept. of State Official Blog, January 9, 2012, http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/

haiti_two_years_post_earthquake.

Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haiti Constitutional Amendments Finally Take Effect,” Reuters, June 19, 2012.

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their own problems.”29 Lamothe said progress had been made toward that end, as Haiti was

building its capacity to collect its own revenues through taxes and custom duties, among other

programs.

Lamothe said the Haitian government had made improving the fight against corruption its

“number one priority,” along with education and reducing extreme poverty. In his last report

before resigning in March 2013, the U.N. human rights expert, Michel Forst, acknowledged

progress made against corruption, but also expressed serious concerns. Forst praised the Haitian

government’s commitment to building police and judicial capacity for investigating transnational

crimes, corruption, and political crimes, and the allocation of both human and financial resources

to two anti-corruption units. He also said, however, that he was “struck by the corrosive effect

that corruption has had on [Haiti’s] judicial institutions …” and that “corruption remains rife at all

levels.”30 Some progress has been made on that front, however. By the end of 2013, the Martelly

Administration had detained or indicted over 90 people, including government officials.

The U.N. human rights expert also voiced concern over the politicization of the judiciary and the

national police under the Martelly Administration, stating that “the practice of appointing or

removing judges to advance partisan or political ends … continues unabated.” U.N. Secretary

General Ban Ki-Moon echoed that concern, adding that institutional politicization and frequent

Cabinet changes hindered the efforts of MINUSTAH and other international donors to build

capacity within those institutions.31 Human rights expert Forst also criticized the Martelly

Administration for making arbitrary and illegal arrests and for threatening journalists.

The international community increasingly pressed the Martelly Administration to end the political

impasse that donors and other analysts believed was inhibiting development and threatening

stability. The outgoing head of MINUSTAH said in February 2013 that, in addition to the

government’s failure to organize elections, its failure to address vast unemployment also needed

to be addressed as soon as possible. “They have a work force of 4.2 million people and in formal

jobs they have only 200,000,” said Mariano Fernandez, adding that “this is a permanent source of

instability.”32

Throughout much of President Martelly’s five-year term, Congress and the donor community

have expressed concern about his commitment to the democratic process. Members on both sides

of the aisle have expressed dismay that if the Haitian government does not soon hold elections

already two years overdue, Martelly might rule by decree. At a House Foreign Affairs Committee

(HFAC) hearing on Haiti on October 9, 2013, they added that the failure to hold legislative and

municipal elections could affect U.S. assistance to Haiti.

Martelly visited Washington in February 2014, meeting with President Obama, Secretary of State

Kerry, and Members of Congress. Encouraging continuing progress towards elections appeared to

be on the agenda of all of his meetings. Nine months later, elections are still not scheduled, and

the international community continues to press for them. Before a meeting with Prime Minister

Lamothe in Washington in October, Secretary of State John Kerry said, “the unwillingness to

“U.S. Department of the [sic] State” [transcript of joint press conference], FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database,

July 24, 2012.

Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst,op. cit., p. 7.

Ibid., pp. 6-7, and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, U.N.

Security Council report S/2013/139, March 8, 2013, p. 16.

“Elections, Jobs Critical for Haiti’s Current and Future Stability, Says Outgoing UN Envoy,” M2 Presswire,

February 1, 2013.

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allow the people to be able to have this vote—really challenges the overall growth and

development progress of the country. You need to have a fully functioning government.”33

Some observers are concerned that, without the checks and balances of a legislature, corruption

may expand unchecked. There have been investigations into corruption involving President

Martelly, some of his advisers, and family members—including his wife, Sophia Martelly—along

with reports that prosecutors who objected to interference from the executive branch in these

cases were fired or fled the country.34 In April 2015 Woodly Etheart, an indicted head of a

kidnapping ring with close ties to the president’s family, was freed from prison. Etheart’s trial

lasted about two hours and was run by a judge who has previously been accused of bowing to the

executive branch’s wishes. Human rights activists and other critics say the hasty decision was a

setback in the fight against organized crime.35

Stability and the Investigation of Former Heads of State; Death of

Duvalier

A potentially destabilizing factor over the last four years has been the reappearance on the scene

of two of Haiti’s most divisive leaders shortly before Martelly’s election and the possibility of

trials for both of them. Former dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier returned unexpectedly

from 25 years in exile on January 16, 2011. Two days later, the Haitian government under

President Préval formally charged him with corruption and embezzlement. Private citizens filed

charges of human rights violations against Duvalier for abuses they allege they suffered under his

15-year regime. Duvalier died of a heart attack on October 4, 2014. The Office of the U.N. High

Commissioner for Human Rights said that investigations into abuses committed during his

regime by Duvalier associates must continue after Duvalier’s death.36

After Duvalier’s return, former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in exile since his government

collapsed in the face of political conflict in 2001, then said that he would also like to return. He

did so, with a Haitian government-issued passport, on March 18, 2011, two days before the

second round elections. Reportedly greeted by thousands of supporters, Aristide did not directly

support any candidate, and has kept a low profile since his arrival. President Préval, once an

Aristide protégé, had long said Aristide was free to return, but that he should be prepared to face

corruption and other charges as well. For details on the status of charges against both Aristide and

Duvalier, see “Investigations of the Late Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations”

below. The investigation into the murder of reporter Jean Dominique, in which Aristide associates

were named as suspects, is also discussed there.

It is a significant accomplishment that Haiti, long characterized by impunity for its leaders, has

brought charges against its former dictator, and is questioning another former head of state. The

judicial system is not considered independent, though, and various U.N. officials have criticized

the Martelly Administration for interfering in the judicial system for political purposes. Trying

Duvalier or, now, his associates, and/or Aristide could be a severe strain on Haiti’s weak judicial

State Department Press Releases and Documents, “Remarks with Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe Before

Their Meeting,” October 10, 2014.

“Martelly Denies Kickback in Construction Firm Scandal,” Associated Press, April 4, 2012; Frances Robles, “Haiti

Leader’s Power Grows amid Scandals; Without a Parliament, President Has Been Able to Shrug Off Accusations,”

International New York Times, 18, 2015.

Jacqueline Charles, “Indicted Head of Haitian Kidnapping Ring Freed,” Miami Herald, April 17, 2015.

“UN Urges Continued Probe on Violations During Baby Doc’s Rule in Haiti,” RTT News, October 7, 2014.

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system. Both Duvalier and Aristide were seen as highly polarizing figures able to stir up unrest.

Aristide has said that his Lavalas party plans to participate in upcoming elections. President

Martelly met privately with Aristide in September 2013, as one of a series of meetings with

political party leaders.37 Before his death, Duvalier opened offices for his former political party

and said that his party would field candidates as well.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH)

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore

order for 10 years, since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government.

Armed rebellion and diminished international support for Aristide led him to flee into exile in

February 2004. An international force authorized by the U.N. arrived shortly after his departure,

and was replaced by MINUSTAH in June 2004. MINUSTAH worked closely with the interim

government from 2004 to 2006, when, after several delays, elections were held. The mission

continued to work closely with the Préval Administration. Although some Haitians call for the

removal of foreign troops, former President Préval supported the mission’s presence, saying that

he would “not adopt a falsely nationalist position,” and that MINUSTAH should stay until Haiti is

ready to assume responsibility for security.38 More recently, popular protests have called for

MINUSTAH’s removal because of allegations of its role in introducing cholera to the country,

and sexual abuse by some of its forces. Although critical of some aspects of MINUSTAH,

President Martelly nonetheless advocates extending MINUSTAH’s term to help maintain stability

and to assist in the reconstruction effort. He has called for its eventual replacement with a revived

Haitian army. The U.N. Security Council and international donors call instead for a continued

strengthening of the Haitian National Police.

MINUSTAH’s mandate includes three basic components: (1) to help create a secure and stable

environment; (2) to support the political process by fostering effective democratic governance

and institutional development, supporting government efforts to promote national dialogue and

reconciliation and to organize elections; and (3) to support government and nongovernmental

efforts to promote and protect human rights, as well as to monitor and report on the human rights

situation. MINUSTAH has played a key role in emergency responses to natural disasters,

including facilitating the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance. As part of its work, the

mission has also conducted campaigns to combat gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian

police.

Reduction of MINUSTAH troops. MINUSTAH’s current authorization runs through

October 15, 2015. The mission’s budget for this year (July 1, 2014-June 30, 2015) is about $500

million. The U.N. has been gradually reducing MINUSTAH’s number of troops since 2012. In

October 2014 the Security Council passed a resolution that will reduce military personnel by

more than half, to a maximum of 2,370 military personnel.39

The Group of Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Guatemala,

Peru, the United States, and Uruguay) expressed concern during the U.N.’s debate that reducing

the size of the military contingent before elections are held could hinder MINUSTAH’s ability to

AP, September 18, 2013.

“Haiti: MlNUSTAH to Stay on for 2 to 3 Years,” Latinnews Daily, March 13, 2006.

MINUSTAH, Facts and Figures, http://www.minustah.org/la-mission/faits-et-chiffres/, accessed June 18, 2015.

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respond to a crisis and that decisions regarding withdrawing MINUSTAH should be based on

conditions on the ground, not just budgetary factors.40 The European Union stated that while

overall security had improved, the number of demonstrations accompanied by violence had

doubled.

In addition to emphasizing the importance of holding elections, speakers also stressed the role

economic disparity plays in instability. The European Union stated that demonstrations with a

socioeconomic angle had increased by 30%, and that “there continue to be grave social and

economic inequalities that represent a real threat to Haiti’s stability and security.” The Group of

Friends stated that:

security, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and development are

interdependent and reinforce stability. We therefore underscore the importance of

systematically addressing the issues of unemployment, education and the delivery of

basic social services, and of ensuring the economic and political empowerment of

women.

The Security Council agreed that it could change the force level at any time if warranted. The

United States supports the drawdown of military forces. Haiti supported the resolution at the time,

but has since asked the Security Council to delay the plan until after elections are held because of

security concerns.

When the 2014 resolution was passed, the Council said it would maintain U.N. police in Haiti at

about the same level. However, figures show that the number of police is falling as well as the

number of military officers. MINUSTAH had 2,449 police in December 2014 and 2,378 in June

2015; the resolution allows for up to 2,601 U.N. police officers.41 According to the State

Department, the U.N. has promised to try to bring the police component to its authorized level

before elections, but its deployment process is lengthy and no date has been given for doing so.

MINUSTAH and cholera. MINUSTAH and the U.N. have been widely criticized for not

responding strongly enough to an outbreak of cholera in October 2010, the first such outbreak in

at least a century in Haiti. A team of researchers from France and Haiti conducted an investigation

at the request of the Haitian government. They reported that their findings “strongly suggest that

contamination of the Artibonite [River in Haiti] and 1[sic] of its tributaries downstream from a

[MINUSTAH] military camp triggered the epidemic,” noting that there was “an exact correlation

in time and places between the arrival of a Nepalese battalion from an area experiencing a cholera

outbreak and the appearance of the first cases in [the nearby town of] Meille a few days after.”42

Other studies have come to the same conclusion. While the authors of the study caution that the

findings are not definitive, they and others have suggested that “to avoid actual contamination or

suspicion happening again, it will be important to rigorously ensure that the sewage of military

camps is handled properly.”

The U.N. has been under increasing pressure to take full responsibility for introduction of the

disease. Over 5,000 cholera victims or relatives of victims have filed legal claims against the

U.N., demanding reparations, a public apology, and a nationwide response including “medical

treatment for current and future victims, and clean water and sanitation infrastructure.”43 The

U.N. Security Council, 7262nd meeting, September 11, 2014, New York, S/PV.7262.

MINUSTAH, Facts and Figures, op.cit; and e-mail exchange with Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, U.S.

Department of State, June 19, 2015.

Renaud Piarroux et al., “Understanding the Cholera Epidemic, Haiti,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, July 2011,

http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1707.110059.

Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, Over 5,000 Haitian Cholera Victims Sue UN, Seeking Justice, press

(continued...)

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U.N. announced in early 2013, however, that it would not compensate cholera victims, claiming

diplomatic immunity.

The Boston-based Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti filed a class action suit against the

U.N. on behalf of victims in a U.S. federal court in October 2013, seeking establishment by the

U.N. of a standing claims commission to address claims for harm, and compensation for victims,

including remediation of Haiti’s waterways, provision of adequate sanitation, and “$2.2 billion

that the Haitian government requires to eradicate cholera.” In January 2015, a U.S. federal judge

dismissed that class action suit, determining the U.N. to be immune because of treaties. Two other

lawsuits by cholera victims are still pending in U.S. courts.44

Many Haitians’ mistrust of the U.N. has manifested itself in protests and strained relations

between MINUSTAH and the population for which it is there to help provide protection and

stability.

MINUSTAH and Charges of Sexual Abuse. Charges of sexual abuse by MINUSTAH personnel

have also fueled anti-MINUSTAH sentiment. The U.N. has a zero-tolerance policy toward sexual

abuse and exploitation.45 In the case of peacekeepers, the U.N. is responsible for investigating

charges against police personnel, but the sending country is responsible for investigating charges

against its military personnel. The U.N. returns alleged perpetrators to their home country for

punishment. Five MINUSTAH peacekeepers from Uruguay were sent home in 2011, to be tried

on charges of sexually abusing an 18-year-old man at a U.N. base while filming it on a cellphone.

According to the U.N., among 11 substantiated cases in 2012 were at least two cases of sexual

exploitation of children by U.N. police.46 The investigations led to three members of a Pakistani

police unit being convicted of raping a 14-year-old boy in one of the cases. The trial took place in

March 2012 in Haiti but was conducted by a Pakistani military tribunal, which dismissed the men

from the military and sentenced them to one year in prison. The unit had five cases pending as of

June 1, 2015.47

A major U.N. review of peacekeeping missions recommended that countries that disregard

children’s rights in armed conflict should be barred from U.N. peacekeeping missions; that

disciplinary action, or lack thereof, against sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. personnel

should be made public; and that investigations should be required to be completed in six months,

rather than the average 16 months it currently takes.48

(...continued)

release, November 8, 2011, http://ijdh.org/archives/22789.

Rick Gladstone, “Haiti: Judge Throws Out Cholera Suit Against U.N.,” New York Times, January 10, 2015.

For additional information, see CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by

(name redacted)

, section titled, “Prince Zeid Report (2005).”

U.N. News Centre, Haiti: U.N. Opens Probe into Cases of Alleged Child Sexual Exploitation, January 23, 2012,

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41008&Cr=haiti&Cr1=.

U.N. Conduct and Discipline Unit, “Statistics: Status of Investigations (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse),

MINUSTAH,” accessed June 23, 2015, http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/

StatusofInvestigationsSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx.

4848

André Viollaz, “UN Report Makes Recommendations to Stop Sex Abuse,” Agence France Presse, June 16, 2015.

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Haiti’s Development Challenges and Socioeconomic

Conditions

Long before the earthquake struck, Haiti was a country socially and ecologically at risk,

possessing some of the lowest socioeconomic indicators in the world,49 and in an acute

environmental crisis. Following several hurricanes that hit Haiti in 2008, the president of the

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Luis Moreno, called Haiti the most fragile of IDB’s

member countries, saying that no other nation in Latin America and the Caribbean is as

vulnerable to economic shocks and natural disasters as is Haiti.

Plagued by chronic political instability and frequent natural disasters, Haiti is the poorest country

in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti’s poverty is massive and deep. There is extreme economic

disparity between a small privileged class and the majority of the population. Over half the

population (54%) of 10 million people lives in extreme poverty, living on less than $1 a day;

about 80% live on $2 or less a day, according to the World Bank.50 Poverty among the rural

population is even more widespread: 69% of rural dwellers live on less than $1 a day, and 86%

live on less than $2 a day.

Hunger is also widespread: 81% of the national population and 87% of the rural population do not

get the minimum daily ration of food defined by the World Health Organization. In remote parts

of Haiti, children have been dying of malnutrition.51 Food security worsened throughout Haiti

following Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012, which destroyed about 70% of Haiti’s crops.

Some 1.5 million people live in severe food insecurity in rural areas affected by the storms. As

many as 450,000 people were at risk of severe acute malnutrition, including at least 4,000

children less than five years of age.52

Over 40 years, from the late 1960s until the early 2000s, Haiti’s per capita real GDP declined by

30%. By around 2007, Haiti began making some macroeconomic progress: the Haitian economy

was growing for three years prior to the earthquake, and the government had improved

management of its resources. In order to reach its Millennium Development Goal of eradicating

extreme poverty and hunger by 2015, Haiti’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would have to grow

3.5% per year, a goal the IMF says Haiti is not considered likely to achieve. Therefore, economic

growth, even if it is greater than population growth, is not expected to be enough to reduce

poverty; programs specifically targeted at poverty reduction are needed as well.

The global economic crisis led to a drop of about 10% in remittances from Haitians abroad,

which amounted to about $1.65 billion in 2008, more than a fourth of Haiti’s annual income.53

Damage and losses caused by the 2010 earthquake were estimated to be $7.8 billion, an amount

greater than Haiti’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009.54 Haiti’s GDP contracted by slightly

World Bank, Country Report: Haiti, 2010, http://go.worldbank.org/GBXI5JKM50.

World Bank, Haiti Overview, 2014, accessed February 4, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/

overview.

“Rural Haitian Children Starving,” Associated Press, November 21, 2008.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Haiti: Emergency Revision of the 2012 Consolidated

Appeal—Needs arising from the impact of Hurricane Sandy,” November 10, 2012, pp. 1, 8.

Mike Blanchfield, “In Recession, Haitians Abroad Send Less Money Home,” Canwest News Service, March 17,

2009.

Government of Haiti, “Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damage, Losses, General and Sectoral needs,”

March 2010, p.6.

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more than 5% in 2010, but grew by 5.6% in 2011. Growth fell again, to 2.8% in 2012, slowed by

hurricanes, drought, and “delays in implementing key public investment projects.”55 According to

the Economist Intelligence Unit, Haiti’s GDP (gross domestic product) growth rate was 4.3% in

2013; estimated at 2.7% in 2014, dropping slightly due to the effect of drought on the agricultural

sector and the underperformance of government projects; and expected to rise to 4.2 % by 2016.

Compared to developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, however, Haiti’s

socioeconomic indicators continue to rate extremely low. The GNI (gross national income) per

capita in the region’s developing countries has climbed steadily since 2000, from $4,415 to

$9,536 in 2013. During the same period, Haiti’s GNI per capita has remained stubbornly low,

rising only from $410 to $810.

The likelihood that economic growth will contribute to the reduction of poverty in Haiti is further

reduced by its enormous income distribution gap. Haiti has the second-largest income disparity in

the world. Over 68% of the total national income accrues to the wealthiest 20% of the population,

while less than 1.5% of Haiti’s national income is accumulated by the poorest 20% of the

population. When the level of inequality is as high as Haiti's, according to the World Bank, the

capacity of economic growth to reduce poverty “approaches zero.”56

In 2009, Haiti passed a minimum wage law. The law mandated increases in wages in two phases.

In 2010, the minimum wage rose from about $1.75 per day to $3.75 per day, and in October 2012,

it increased to $5.00 per day. The average daily wage for textile assembly workers is $5.25, above

the new minimum wage, so some manufacturers said that they would have to raise wages

proportionally. Despite the wage increase, the fundamental inequality of Haitian society remains

basically unchanged.

The Haitian government and international donors have focused efforts on manufacturing and

agricultural production; both were initially making a steady recovery. But agriculture faces

significant limitations in Haiti, with all but 2% of the forest cover deforested,57 85% of the

watersheds degraded, little or no rural infrastructure, and limited access to credit. Hurricane

Sandy caused further loss of agricultural land; the U.N. estimated that an addition $40 million

would be needed to address the new needs arising from that storm. High rates of unemployment,

income inequality, and poverty continue to be serious roadblocks to overall economic

development.

Nonetheless, U.S. Ambassador Pamela White said last year that Haiti had made much progress,

including: “Tens of thousands of Haitian farmers have higher incomes, ... exports to the United

States are up 41 percent since 2010 thanks to job creation in the manufacturing sector ... [c]rime

rates are down, and security is improved.” She said that “Haiti has made the transition to a period

of building and long-term development.”58

Cholera Epidemic

Cholera broke out in October 2010, in what may be the first such outbreak ever in Haiti. There is

strong evidence linking the outbreak to inadequate sanitation facilities at a MINUSTAH camp

International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation with Haiti,Public

Information Notice (PIN) No. 13/41, April 2, 2013, p. 1.

World Bank, “Income Distribution, Inequality, and Those Left Behind,” in Global Economic Prospects 2007:

Managing the Next Wave of Globalization, p. 83, December 1, 2006.

World Bank, Country Report: Haiti, 2010, http://go.worldbank.org/GBXI5JKM50.

Pamela White, ambassador to Haiti, “Still Committed to Haiti,” New York Times, January 20, 2014.

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(see “The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)” above). Because Haitians

had not been exposed to it previously and lacked immunity, and Haiti lacks adequate sewage and

sanitation facilities, the waterborne disease spread quickly. Less than two years later, according to

the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Haiti had the highest number of cholera

cases in the world.59 The Haitian government has recorded about 712,330 cases, with many cases

believed to go unreported. Over 8,600 people have died because of cholera.60 The number of new

cases has decreased over time but spikes during the rainy season, when flooding spreads the

disease. Haiti continues to have the largest cholera epidemic in the Western Hemisphere.61

President Martelly authorized a cholera vaccination program that began in April 2012. (The

previous government declined a pilot vaccination program, arguing that vaccinating only a

portion of the population would incite tensions among those not vaccinated.) The pilot program

inoculated only about 1% of the population: 90,000-100,000 people in some of the poorest areas

of Port-au-Prince and in the rural Artibonite River Valley. Partners in Health (PIH), a Bostonbased nongovernmental organization, which has worked in Haiti for decades, and its Haitian

partner in the pilot program, GHESKIO, say the program’s success led the Haitian Ministry of

Health to conduct targeted immunization campaigns in other parts of the country. About 300,000

more vaccinations were planned for late 2014. The vaccination is 60% to 85% effective and costs

$3.70 per patient for the two-dose treatment.62 “[T]here is zero funding available” for the Haitian

government’s $3 million plan to vaccinate 300,000 people in 2015, however, according to Senior

U.N. Coordinator for the Cholera Response in Haiti Pedro Medrano.63

Other, immediate, small-scale preventive measures include building latrines and distributing soap,

bleach, and water-purification tablets. Treatment includes oral rehydration salts, antibiotics, and

IV fluids. The United States has spent over $95 million for such preventive measures, and

supporting staff and supplies for 45 cholera treatment centers and 117 oral rehydration posts, and

working with the Haitian Ministry of Health to set up a national system for tracking the disease.

But most observers say cholera will persist in Haiti until nationwide water and sanitation systems

are developed. This would cost approximately $800 million to $1.1 billion, according to the New

York Times.64 Haiti’s first wastewater treatment site was opened in the fall of 2011. A study

released by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicated that the strain of

cholera in Haiti is changing as survivors develop some immunity to the original strain. This could

be an indication that the disease is becoming endemic in Haiti.65

The number of total cases and deaths began to decline in 2012. Nonetheless, some critics assert

that the international response to the epidemic has been inadequate, and warn that the closing of

cholera treatment centers is reducing the country’s ability to respond to the disease and

Associated Press, “CDC Study Shows Haiti Cholera Has Changed, Experts Say It Suggests Disease Becoming

Endemic,” Washington Post, May 3, 2012.

United Nations in Haiti, “Haiti Cholera Response,” November 2014.

Ibid.

Ibid; Partners in Health, Cholera, Next Steps, May 30, 2012, Cholera, PIH’s Response, February 12, 2013,

http://www.pih.org/pages/cholera, and Three Years in, the Fight against Haiti’s Cholera Epidemic Continues, October

21, 2013; and Richard Knox, “WHO Calls for Emergency Stockpile of Cholera Vaccine,” NPR, August 17, 2012.

“‘Haiti Cannot Wait 40 Years’ to Eliminate Cholera, Warns UN Envoy as Response Lags,” UN News Centre,

November 13, 2014.

Deborah Sontag, “In Haiti, Global Failures on a Cholera Epidemic,” New York Times, March 31, 2012.

Associated Press, “CDC Study Shows Haiti Cholera Has Changed, Experts Say It Suggests Disease Becoming

Endemic,” Washington Post, May 3, 2012.

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contributed to an increase in the mortality rate in late 2012.66 The U.N. also expressed concern,

noting that, “the number of international actors engaged in cholera responses [in Haiti] has

declined from 120 in 2011 to 43 in 2013, while national capacity has not increased by any

comparable degree,” causing a significant gap in quality treatment coverage. The number of

donors has decreased as well.67

In 2012 the U.N. announced an effort to raise over $2 billion for a 10-year cholera eradication

plan, to which it will contribute $23 million, or about 1% of what it says is needed. Of the total

amount, about $450 million was needed for the first two years (February 2013-February 2015);

only 40% of that had been “mobilized” as of November 2014. Of the $72 million needed for

2014-2015, donors have contributed only $40 million.68 In late 2014, the senior U.N. coordinator

for the cholera response in Haiti warned that, at the current “disappointing” rate of funding, “it

would take more than 40 years to get the funds needed for Haitians to gain the same access as its

regional neighbors to basic health, water and sanitations systems.”69 Medrano suggested that with

better funding cholera could be eliminated from Haiti in about a decade. “Like Ebola,” he said,

“cholera feeds on weak public health systems, and requires a sustained response.… The donor

community has to do better.”

Strategies for Haiti’s Reconstruction and

International Assistance70

Reconstruction Efforts

Prior to the earthquake in 2010, the United Nations had already designated Haiti as one of the 50

least developed countries in the world, facing greater risk than other countries of failing to

emerge from poverty, and therefore needing the highest degree of attention from the international

community.71

After the earthquake, the Haitian government established a framework for reconstruction in the

10-year recovery plan, Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti,

with four areas of concentration:72



Territorial building, including creating centers of economic growth to support

settlement of displaced populations around the country and to make Port-au-

Center for Economic and Policy Research, “Pressure Builds on UN to Take Responsibility as Cholera Still Far From

‘Under Control’,” January 11, 2013.

U.N., “UN Fact Sheet: Combatting Cholera in Haiti,” December 2013, p. 7; and January 2014 (updated February

2014), p. 7.

“Haiti Cholera Response: United Nations in Haiti,” November 2014, http://www.onu-haiti.org/wp-content/uploads/

2014/12/UN-Factsheet-Final-VersionCholera-October-November-2014.pdf.

“’Haiti Cannot Wait 40 Years’ to Eliminate Cholera, Warns UN Envoy as Response Lags,” op cit.

For further information, see CRS Report RL34029, Haiti’s Development Needs and a Statistical Overview of

Conditions of Poverty, by (name redact ed) and (name redacted)

; for background on the 2004-2007

strategy, see CRS Report RL33156, Haiti: International Assistance Strategy for the Interim Government and

Congressional Concerns, by (name redact ed)

United Nations Office for Least Developed Countries. “Facts About Least Developed Countries (LDCs),” available

at http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/Publications/Factsheet.pdf, January 15, 2010.

Republic of Haiti, “Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti,” March 2010, available at

http://www.haitisantodomingo2010.org/hsd2010/content/documents.

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

Prince less congested, developing infrastructure to promote growth, and

managing land tenure;

Economic rebuilding, including modernizing the agricultural sector for both

export and food security, promoting manufacturing and tourism, and providing

access to electricity;

Social rebuilding, prioritizing building education and health systems; and

Institutional rebuilding, focusing on making government institutions

operational again and able to manage reconstruction, and strengthening

governmental authority while also decentralizing basic services, and creating a

social safety net for the poorest population.

Some of the overarching goals of the plan are including environmental factors and risk and

disaster management in all recovery and reconstruction activities; actively providing employment

and vocational training; and providing assistance to the population affected by the earthquake

while hastening recovery efforts with an eye to reducing dependence on foreign aid.

Some analysts emphasize that the Haitian government and civil society must be partners in

designing any development strategy if they are to succeed and be sustainable. They also warn that

job creation and other development efforts must occur not only in the cities, but also in rural

areas, to reduce urban migration, dependence on imported food, and environmental degradation.

As mentioned above, economic growth alone is unlikely to reduce poverty in Haiti. Therefore, the

Haitian government and many in the international donor community maintain that donors must

continue to make a long-term commitment to Haitian development. Furthermore, in order to

reduce poverty across the board, some observers say that development strategies must specifically

target improving the living conditions of the poor and address the inequities and prejudices that

have contributed to Haiti’s enormous income disparity.73

The Haitian government, the Obama Administration, other international donors, and other

observers have all stated the need for improved accountability of all donor assistance to Haiti, to

improve aid effectiveness and reduce the potential for corruption. Recent Haitian governments

have made major progress in reducing corruption, increasing transparency, and improving fiscal

management. These improvements qualified Haiti for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)

debt relief in 2009. To ensure transparency further, the U.S. Agency for International

Development has helped Haiti establish an online system to monitor both donor pledges and

spending and implementation of assistance.

Relations with Donors

Since Haiti’s developmental needs and priorities are many, and deeply intertwined, the Haitian

government and the international donor community are implementing an assistance strategy that

attempts to address these many needs simultaneously. The challenge is to accomplish short-term

projects that will boost public and investor confidence, while also pursuing long-term

development plans to improve living conditions for Haiti’s vast poor population. The challenge

has been made more daunting by developments such as rising food and gasoline prices worldwide, internal political crises, and, of course, the lingering damage done by the earthquake and

other natural disasters.

See for example, Robert Maguire, “Paul Collier’s Report on Economic Security in Haiti,” March 2009. Focal Point,

Vol. 8, Issue 2.

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The Haitian government has criticized the donor community for not dispersing funds quickly

enough. Some international donors complain that the instability generated first by the elections

process, then by the prolonged lack of a prime minister, the ongoing gridlock between the Haitian

executive and legislative branches and the inability to organize elections hinder reconstruction

efforts as well.

There are other frustrations on the part of both donors and the Haitian government regarding

foreign assistance. The Haitian government is frustrated that U.S. and other foreign aid is

provided primarily through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rather than directly to the

government. Donors are worried about the lack of Haitian capacity to design and implement

programs, as well as corruption. The donor community has grown extremely frustrated at the lack

of coordination and the inability or unwillingness of various government actors to seek consensus

on development priorities and plans, such as elections that are now more than a year overdue. The

State Department’s Special Coordinator for Haiti, Thomas Adams, warned that, “Haiti will lose

international support if it is seen as undemocratic,” by failing to address corruption, human rights

violations, or government accountability through elections.74 At a House Foreign Affairs

Committee (HFAC) hearing on Haiti on October 9, 2013, Members on both sides of the aisle

suggested that the failure to hold legislative elections already two years overdue then could affect

U.S. assistance to Haiti. Since then, the Haitian government and the opposition have occasionally

reached consensus only to fall back into gridlock. The United States and other donors continue to

press all sides to reach an agreement and move forward on elections now three years overdue.

They are not likely to take place until mid-2015 at the earliest, when it will also be time to

prepare for the next presidential elections.

Coordination of Foreign Assistance

The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) was created after the earthquake to

coordinate foreign aid and reconstruction activities. It was co-chaired by the Government of Haiti

and the U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti, former President Bill Clinton. Its 18-month mandate expired

in October 2011 without the establishment of the Haitian-run Haitian Development Authority,

which was to take its place. (Clinton’s mandate as Special Envoy expired January 31, 2013, and

was not extended.) While there has been criticism that the IHRC was not approving and

distributing aid effectively, there has also been widespread concern that the Haitian government is

not ready to assume full control of the process either. The government’s nascent institutions,

which had limited capacity before the earthquake, were set back severely by the earthquake’s

destruction. The president asked the legislature to pass an extension of the IHRC while an

alternative mechanism was developed; it failed to do so. In the meantime, the 12 largest

international donors continued to coordinate among themselves and with the Haitian government.

The Haitian government presented to the donor community a plan for the coordination of foreign

aid, the Framework for Coordination of Foreign Aid for Haitian Development (Cadre de

Coordination de l’aide Externe au Developpement d’Haiti, CAED) in November 2012. Headed

by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Planning and External Cooperation, it will have an

international committee that is supposed to meet at least twice a year, a national committee that is

supposed to meet four to six times a year, and working groups to address various development

priorities such as education, employment, energy, extreme poverty, and rule of law. Although

some parts of the framework have begun to function, the government is seeking donor funds to

support the CAED. In February 2013, donors told the government they would not attend a CAED

U.S. Institute of Peace, “Haiti’s Election Conundrum: Fraught But Necessary?,” March 27, 2013.

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international committee meeting because it still had no plans or date for elections. Coordinating

aid and funding the CAED have been made more difficult by the political gridlock between the

Haitian executive and legislative branches.

Outlook Regarding Haitian Development

Despite the economic and social problems currently existing in Haiti and the comprehensive and

complex challenges facing the country, Haiti could become a middle-income country, according

to the State Department’s Special Coordinator for Haiti, Thomas Adams. Such a transition could

take about 30 years, even with good economic growth, Adams said, and would require continued

development of “credible democratic institutions” and private investment, in addition to support

from the international donor community.75

Statements by U.N. officials and other donors indicate growing frustration with the ongoing

political stalemate in Haiti, however. Political polarization is inhibiting the capacity building

needed to strengthen democratic institutions, keeping away private investment, they say, and

contributing to donor fatigue. As discussed earlier, donors and other analysts say that unless some

sort of national consensus is reached on a legislative agenda and development priorities, Haiti’s

reconstruction will continue to be stalled, and stability and security threatened.76

Prior to the earthquake, prominent analysts noted with optimism the progress Haiti had made and

its potential for sustainable development. In the wake of the damage wrought by the earthquake,

Haiti must recover from the enormous losses suffered and build on the advances and advantages

pointed out by these analysts.

The U.N. Security Council noted in 2009 that the country had made significant improvements in

security and judicial reform, although it still needed to contend with widespread poverty and

susceptibility to natural disasters. The two governments preceding the Martelly government (the

Préval and the preceding interim government) also made progress toward goals outlined in Haiti‘s

international assistance strategy, including improved macroeconomic management, procurement

processes, and fiscal transparency; increased voter registration; and jobs creation. The

government had also made progress in providing broader access to clean water and other

services.77

The U.N. secretary-general also had commissioned a report, which recommended a strategy to

move Haiti beyond recovery to economic security.78 Although published in 2009, many of its

findings still apply to a post-earthquake Haiti. According to the U.N. report, “the opportunities for

[economic development in] Haiti are far more favorable than those of the ‘fragile states’ with

which it is habitually grouped.” The report’s author, economist Paul Collier, is known for his

book, The Bottom Billion, which explores why there is poverty and how it can be reduced.

Among his reasons for optimism regarding Haiti: Haiti is part of a peaceful and prosperous

region, not a conflictive one; and while political divisions and limited capacity make governing

Associated Press, “Haiti Faces 30-Year Climb to Middle Income Status,” Jamaica Observer, May 28, 2012.

See “Overdue Elections Process Grows Contentious,” “President Martelly’s Administration,” above; and

International Crisis Group, “Governing Haiti: Time for National Consensus,” Latin America and Caribbean Report no.

46, February 4, 2013; and “Gridlock in Haiti; Our Opinion: Political Infighting Threatens to Paralyze the Recovery

Without Elections,” Miami Herald editorial, April 3, 2013.

“Haiti: U.N. Council Mission Reports Strides in Security, Worrisome Poverty,” States News Service, March 19,

2009.

Paul Collier, “Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security, A Report for the Secretary-General of the

United Nations,” January 2009, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.

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difficult, Collier believed that Haiti’s leadership at the time was “good by the standards of most

post-conflict situations … [exhibiting] integrity, experience and ability, and a deep concern with

the maintenance of social peace.” The U.N. report recommended that modest and focused actions

be taken to build economic security on the foundation of social stability that has been built in

Haiti in recent years. Because that stability was—and remains—fragile, the report advised that

such actions should be taken immediately and should focus on strengthening security by creating

jobs, especially in the garment and agricultural sectors; providing basic services; enhancing food

security; and fostering environmental sustainability. These strategies remain part of the postearthquake approach to development.

Collier and other analysts note that Haiti has an important resource in the 1.5 million Haitians

living abroad, for their remittances sent back home, technical skills, and political lobbying. The

efforts of Haitian Americans and others lobbying on Haiti’s behalf led to another advantage Haiti

has: the most advantageous access to the U.S. market for apparel of any country, through the

HOPE II Act (the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act, P.L.

110-246; see “Trade Preferences for Haiti” section below). Supporters say the HOPE Act

provides jobs and stimulates the Haitian economy. Critics worry that it exploits Haitians as a

source of cheap labor for foreign manufacturers, and hurts the agricultural economy by drawing

more people away from farming.

Potential for Mining

U.S. and Canadian companies have conducted exploratory drilling in Haiti, reporting a potential

$20 billion worth of gold, copper, and silver below Haiti’s northeastern mountains.79 While

discoveries of such mineral wealth have led to economic booms in many countries, they also

bring risks such as environmental contamination, health problems, and displacement of

communities. And like many poor countries that could use the revenue from mineral extraction,

Haiti does not have the government infrastructure to enforce laws that would regulate mining—

reportedly, the last time gold was mined there was in the 1500s. The Préval government

negotiated the agreement with the only company that has full concessions; the terms of that

agreement would return to Haiti $1 out of every $2 of profits, a high return. Prime Minister

Lamothe said the government is already drafting mining legislation to establish royalties paid to

the government and safeguards for citizens and the environment in mining areas.

U.S. Policy Objectives and Assistance

Obama Administration officials have said that Haiti is a key foreign policy priority and the

Administration’s top priority in the Latin America and Caribbean region in terms of bilateral

foreign assistance.80

In its FY2016 budget request, the Administration stated that Haiti had made progress by taking

steps to improve the business climate, attract investments, and create jobs; and by supporting

judicial sector reforms, which have contributed to the increased capability of Haitian officials to

Figures and dates in this paragraph from Associated Press, “Haiti’s New Prime Minister Says New Mining

Legislation Being Drafted to Benefit Country,” Washington Post, May 15, 2012; and Martha Mendoza, “Gold! Haiti

Hopes Ore Find Will Spur Mining Boom,” Associated Press, May 12, 2012.

“U.S. Department of the [sic] State” [transcript of joint press conference], FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database,

July 24, 2012; and briefings, conversations with State Department and USAID officials, February 22, 2011, June 22,

2012; refers to combined State Department and USAID funding; U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget

Justification (CBJ): Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, Fiscal Year 2016, p. 411.

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deliver better services. It also said the Haitian government had “reinforced its commitment to

improving and strengthening the health system,” and was working to enhance school standards

and increase student enrollment “drastically” by 2016. The Administration noted that “despite

these positive developments, however, the pace of much needed progress is still hindered by

weak public institutions, conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, lack of

accountability, and weak state capacity to provide basic services.”81

The Administration says that current U.S. assistance programs are emphasizing country

leadership and ownership, and strengthening local institutions, so that Haiti can “further chart its

own development and promote sustainability.” To spur greater progress, the Administration says

Haiti “needs to enact key laws to improve its investment climate, enact the new Criminal Code ...

and enact an anti-corruption law.”

Other concerns for U.S. policy regarding Haiti include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid;

protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian

migration; and alleviating poverty. The United States and other members of the international

community continue to support efforts to hold free and fair elections in Haiti in the belief that in

the long run they will contribute to improved governance and, eventually, improved services to

Haitian citizens and greater stability, which will allow for increased development. Congress has

given bipartisan support to this policy approach.

U.S. Assistance to Haiti

The Obama Administration’s request for FY2016 assistance for Haiti is approximately $242

million. This represents about a $33 million decrease from the FY2015 funding request. (See

Table 2.)

U.S. assistance to Haiti focuses on the four key sectors outlined in the Action Plan for

Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti, with funding directed toward infrastructure

and energy projects, governance and rule-of-law programs, programs for health and other basic

services, and food and economic security programs. Many of the latter type of programs are

carried out under the President’s Feed the Future initiative, which aims to implement a countryled comprehensive food security strategy to reduce hunger and increase farmers’ incomes. The

Administration’s approach is detailed in its “Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy toward

Renewal and Economic Opportunity.” Figure 2 shows the distribution of reconstruction and

development spending by type of program.

The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113) prohibits assistance to the central

Haitian government unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the Committees on

Appropriations that the Haitian government “is taking effective steps” to hold free and fair

parliamentary elections and seat a new parliament; strengthen the rule of law in Haiti, including

by selecting judges in a transparent manner; respect judicial independence; improve governance

by implementing reforms to increase transparency and accountability; combat corruption,

including by implementing the anti-corruption law enacted in 2014 and prosecuting corrupt

officials; and increase government revenues, including by implementing tax reforms, and increase

expenditures on public services.

U.S. Department of State, CBJ: Fiscal Year 2016, op.cit; p. 411.

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Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Haiti Fiscal Years 2010 to 2016

FY2010 Actual

($ in thousands)

FY2010

Actual

Base

FY2010

Actual

Supp

FY2011

Actual

Base

FY2012

Actual

FY2013

Actual

FY2014

Actual

FY2015

Request

FY2016

Request

TOTAL

504,738

907,660

380,261

351,829

332,540

300,796

274,313

241,668

Economic Support

Fund

160,750

760,000

131,000

148,281

135,985

119,477

110,000

97,000

Foreign Military

Financing

1,600

–

1,597

–

1,519

1,600

800

1,200

Global Health

Programs - State

121,240

–

156,240

141,240

129,865

124,013

104,013

Global Health

Programs - USAID

22,800

–

26,946

25,000

25,017

25,200

International Military

Education and Training

–

220

224

208

241

300

255

International

Narcotics Control and

Law Enforcement

21,107

147,660

19,420

17,448

12,000

6,000

P.L. 113-480 Title II

177,149

–

44,838

17,664

22,498

18,265

8,000

Sources: U.S. Department of State, “Budget by Year-Haiti,” February 11, 2014 (FY2010-FY2011), Congressional

Budget Justification (CBJ), Fiscal Year 2014, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, p. 667 (FY2012); CBJ,

Fiscal Year 2015, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, p. 666 (FY2013, FY2015); CBJ, Fiscal Year 2016,

Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, p. 411 (FY2014, FY2016).

Figure 2. U. S. Government Post-Earthquake Assistance in Haiti

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State.

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Temporary Protected Status82 and Haitian Family Reunification

Parole Program

Over the years, after various domestic crises, Haitians repeatedly sought Temporary Protected

Status (TPS), which would allow them to remain in the United States without threat of

deportation for a specific amount of time. The Haitian government and others argued that the

return of deportees would contribute to instability and be a further drain on already inadequate

services, and that Haiti depends on the remittances those in the United States send back to Haiti.

Opponents of TPS argued that granting it could encourage a wave of new immigrants. After

2010’s devastating earthquake, the United States granted TPS to Haitians living in the United

States at the time of the disaster. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet

Napolitano has extended TPS on a yearly basis, and allowed eligible Haitians who came to the

United States up to one year after the earthquake to be granted TPS. The policy of interdicting

Haitian migrants on the high seas and returning them to Haiti continues.

U.S. citizens or permanent residents may apply for a residency visa, or green card, on behalf of

relatives living in Haiti. Currently, over 100,000 Haitians must wait—some for as long as 12

years—to join family members in the United States, even though they have already been

approved by the U.S. government to do so, because of annual caps on such visas. In 2015 DHS

began to implement the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program to expedite the

reunification of eligible families. Because this program will expedite reunification only for those

scheduled to receive their entry visas within two years, just a small portion of all Haitians

approved for residency will benefit from the program. DHS also warned Haitians against trying to

enter the United States illegally, stating that only people living in Haiti would be eligible to

participate in the reunification program.83 Potential beneficiaries in Haiti cannot apply for

themselves. The sponsoring family members in the United States, or “petitioner,” must wait for

the Department of State’s National Visa Center to invite them to apply for the program.

Congressional Response and Concerns

There has been bipartisan support in Congress to assist Haiti both before and since the

earthquake. In the years preceding the earthquake, Congress passed several bills, in addition to

appropriations bills, to support Haiti. This included a series of trade preferences for Haiti, which

are described in more detail below. Another issue of concern to Congress has been efforts to

ensure that free, fair, and safe elections are held in Haiti. As mentioned above (see “Overdue

Elections Process: Delays and Disputes…”), one-third of the Haitian Senate seats expired on May

8, 2012. Elections for those seats and for municipal councils, town delegates, and other posts,

which are also long overdue, have yet to be held, although they have finally been scheduled for

later this year. At a House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) hearing on Haiti on October 9,

2013, Members on both sides of the aisle suggested that the failure to hold legislative elections

already two years overdue could affect U.S. assistance to Haiti.

Other congressional concerns include post-earthquake reconstruction; transparency and

accountability of the Haitian government; respect for human rights, particularly for women;

For further information, see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by (name redac

ted) .

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “DHS to Implement Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program,”

Washington, DC, October 17, 2014; and Erick Eckholm, “Obama Administration to Expedite Reunification for Some

Haitians,” New York Times, October 17, 2014.

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security issues, including Martelly’s proposal to reconstitute the Haitian army; and

counternarcotics efforts.

Another concern is the consequences for Haiti of a September 2013 court ruling in the Dominican

Republic that could retroactively strip some 200,000 Dominicans, mostly of Haitian descent, of

citizenship. The end of the registration period in June 2015 raises concerns that there will be mass

deportations to Haiti.

Congress passed the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act of 2013; it was signed into law in August

2014. It directs the Secretary of State to report to Congress within 120 days, and every six months

thereafter through September 30, 2016, on the status of specific aspects of post-earthquake

recovery and development efforts in Haiti.

As it considered FY2016 funding for Haiti, the House Appropriations Committee said it “remains

concerned about the lack of progress in self-reliance and governance in Haiti more than five years

after the earthquake,” and that it expects the Department of State to provide regular updates on

progress in Haiti. The committee also notes “the significant unobligated balances for assistance

for Haiti from prior years and, given the continued high level of need in the country, directs the

Department of State and USAID to review and prioritize programs and take steps to execute these

funds in a responsible manner.”84 See “Legislation in the 114th Congress” below.

Post-Earthquake Reconstruction

In the aftermath of the earthquake, Congress appropriated $2.9 billion for aid to Haiti in the 2010

supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 111-212).85 This included $1.6 billion for relief efforts, $1.1

billion for reconstruction, and $147 million for diplomatic operations. Since then, Congress has

expressed concern about the pace and effectiveness of U.S. aid to Haiti. According to the U.N.

Special Envoy for Haiti’s office, of the approximately $1.2 billion the United States pledged at

the 2010 donors conference for aid to Haiti, 19% had been disbursed as of March 2012, and about

33% as of December 2012. All donors had pledged about $6.4 billion, disbursed just over 45% of

that as of March 2012, and disbursed 56% of it by the end of 2012.86

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued several reports on USAID funding

for post-earthquake reconstruction in Haiti. In a 2013 report, GAO concluded that “the majority

of supplemental funding ha[d] not been obligated and disbursed” as of March 31, 2013.87 The

report said that USAID had obligated 45% and disbursed 31% of the $651 million allocated in the

FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act for bilateral earthquake reconstruction activities. These

figures refer only to Economic Support Funds (ESF) provided in the FY2010 supplemental. The

supplemental required the State Department to submit five reports to Congress. GAO criticized

State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2016, draft report, June 2015,

http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hrpt-114-hr-fy2016-stateforop.pdf.

For further details, see CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and

Other Programs, coordinated by (name redacted)

, and CRS Report R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by

(name redacted) and (name redact ed)

Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, “New York Conference Recovery Pledge Status and Modalities as of [March

2012; December 2012] in USD Millions,” http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/download/International_Assistance/6-nypledge-status.pdf. According to discussions with the State Department, figures for the U.S. in the Special Envoy’s

December 2012 table were as of September 30, 2012, and USG calculations for that date showed a disbursal rate of

46%. The Special Envoy’s office is closed and therefore no longer tracking these numbers.

GAO, Report GAO-13-558, “Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and

Face Sustainability Challenges,” June 2013; this paragraph, pp. 8-10.

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the State Department for “incomplete and not timely” reports, noting that only four reports were

submitted and that they lacked some of the information specifically requested by the Senate

Committee on Appropriations, such as a description, by goal and objective, and an assessment of

the progress of U.S. programs. The State Department countered that it provides information to

Congress through other means as well, such as in-person briefings, according to GAO.

In June 2015 GAO released its latest report, Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Has Achieved Mixed

Results and Should Enhance Sustainability Planning. GAO reported that the USAID Mission in

Haiti reduced planned outcomes for 5 of 6 key infrastructure activities and 3 of 17 key noninfrastructure activities. USAID met or exceeded the target for half of all performance indicators

for key non-infrastructure activities. Mission officials said that inadequate staffing and unrealistic

initial plans affected results and caused delays. The mission has therefore increased staffing and

extended its reconstruction time frame for another three years, to 2018. GAO concluded that

although the mission in Haiti took steps to ensure the sustainability of its reconstruction efforts,

sustainability planning could be improved at both the mission- and agency-wide levels.

Looking at the broader range of funding available for Haiti, USAID and the State Department

report that 100% of the $1.3 billion allotted for humanitarian relief assistance, and 71% of the

$2.3 billion allotted for recovery, reconstruction, and development assistance had been distributed

as of March 31, 2015. The recovery, reconstruction, and development assistance includes the

amount pledged at the U.N. recovery conference (and appropriated through the FY2010

supplemental appropriations bill), plus other appropriated fiscal year funds (base FY2010, and

FY2011-FY2014). (It does not include USAID prior year funds reallocated to meet urgent Haitian

recovery and reconstruction needs.) Using these figures, the Administration calculates that it has

disbursed 80% of funding available for Haiti. (See Figure 3 below.)

Congressional Research Service

Figure 3.Total Post-Earthquake USG Funding to Haiti Summary

All accounts as of September 30, 2015

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State.

CRS-30

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While Haiti is making some progress in its overall recovery effort, enormous challenges remain.

International donors responded to the earthquake with a massive humanitarian effort. Most of the

rubble created by the earthquake has been removed and three-fourths of those living in tent

shelters have left the camps.88 Nevertheless, many criticize the pace and methods of the recovery

process regarding displaced persons. About 61,000 of those who left the camps were forcibly

evicted, and about 78,000 live on private land under threat of eviction, with the U.N. expressing

concern about the human rights violations involved in such expulsions.89 Various 2014 estimates

on the number of people still living in tent shelters range from 147,000 to 280,000. The latter

figure is from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which

estimates there are another 200,000 people living with host families or in internal settlements, for

a total of 480,000 internally displaced persons.

The Caracol Industrial Park. A major element of U.S. aid to Haiti has been the development of

the Caracol Industrial Park in Haiti’s northern region. Although the region was not hit by the

earthquake, the project is part of an effort—begun before the earthquake—to “decentralize”

development, stimulating the economy and creating jobs outside of overcrowded Port-au-Prince.

The Obama Administration said the Caracol park was supposed to create 20,000 permanent jobs

initially, with the potential for up to 65,000 jobs; as of October 2012 then-Secretary of State

Hillary Rodham Clinton said about 1,000 Haitians were employed there.90 As of April 2015 there

were 6,200 jobs at the park.91

The Caracol Industrial Park has generated much controversy. According to the New York Times,

State Department officials acknowledged that they did not conduct a full inquiry into allegations

of labor and criminal law violations by Sae-A in Guatemala before choosing the company to

anchor the park.92 Environmentalists, who had marked Caracol Bay to become Haiti’s first marine

protected area, were reportedly “shocked” to learn an industrial park would be built next to it.

U.S. consultants who helped pick the site said they had not conducted an environmental analysis

before recommending the site, the Times reported, and in a follow-up study said the site posed a

high environmental risk and that, even if wastewater were treated the bay would be endangered,

and the U.S.-financed power plant would have “a ‘strongly negative’ impact on air quality.” Civil

society groups argue that the park, built on some of Haiti’s rare arable land, displaced farmers and

promotes manufacturing at the expense of agriculture.93

A Haitian government website defended the park, saying Sae-A’s Guatemalan branch took

corrective action, and that the U.S. Department of Labor has led several delegations to review the

manufacturer’s compliance with labor law.94 The Ministry of Economy and Finances said that

Department of State, Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti:

Rubble,” and “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Shelter and Housing,” January 16, 2013.

Oxfam, Salt in the Wound: The Urgent Need to Prevent Forced Evictions from Camps in Haiti, December 10, 2012,

p. 3; and The Caribbean Journal, “Haiti: UN ‘Concerned’ over Forced Evictions of Displaced Persons,” March 12,

2013.

Department of State, Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti:

Caracol Industrial Park,” January 16, 2013; and Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Caracol Industrial Park

Opening Ceremony,” October 22, 2012.

Department of State, Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti:

Caracol Industrial Park,” April 1, 2015.

Deborah Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” New York Times, July 5, 2012.

Briefing with Camille Chalmers, Executive Director of the Haitian Advocacy Platform for an Alternative

Development, May 22, 2012.

Administrator, “Fact Check- The New York Times: Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” Parc Industriel

de Caracol, July 6, 2012, http://www.ute.gouv.ht/caracol/en/news/3-newsflash/174-fact-check-the-new-york-times(continued...)

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“environmental protection activity” was already underway, including development of a modern

wastewater treatment plant, and that “complementary alternative energy sources” were also being

pursued. As for the agricultural issues, the government said the farmers were given compensation

packages, including title to farmland elsewhere, and a U.S.-sponsored training program would

help local residents gain skills for new job opportunities.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported mixed results for U.S. funding at

Caracol, which includes $170 million for a power plant and port to support the Industrial Park.95

USAID completed the first phase of the power plant with less funding than allocated, and in time

to supply the park’s first tenant with power. GAO reports that the Caracol Industrial Park, the

power plant, and the port are interdependent, that “each must be completed and remain viable for

the others to succeed.” Yet port construction is at least two years behind schedule, and USAID

funding will be insufficient to pay for most of the projected costs, leaving a cost gap of $117

million to $189 million. GAO said it was unclear whether the government of Haiti could find a

private company willing to fund the rest of the port costs.

Two recent reports criticized labor practices in Haitian factories, including at the U.S.-funded

Caracol Industrial Park, alleging widespread underpayment of workers and unsafe working

conditions at many of them.96

Transparency and Accountability of the Haitian Government

As part of its concern about the effectiveness of U.S. aid to Haiti, Congress has supported efforts

over the years to improve the transparency and accountability of the Haitian government’s

spending. Congress prohibited certain aid to the central government of any country that does not

meet minimum standards of fiscal transparency through the foreign assistance appropriations act

for 2012 (P.L. 112-74). While acknowledging Haiti’s progress toward fiscal transparency, the

State Department reported that Haiti did not meet those minimum standards, but waived the

restriction on the basis of national interest. In its memorandum of justification, the department

argued that, “Without assistance and support, Haiti could become a haven for criminal

activities…. Without sufficient job creation, Haiti could become a greater source of refugee

flows….”97

The justification noted progress made, such as the government’s routine posting of budgetary,

public finance, and investment documents and legislation online, public discussions of the draft

national budget for the first time, the increasing role of the parliament in budget oversight, and

the adoption of an integrated financial management system to track expenditures in one central

database. Some of Haiti’s transparency shortcomings include the failure to identify natural

resource revenues in the budget; inadequate access to contracting procedures for investors trying

to engage in public procurement; extra-budgetary spending; and the lack of skill within the

Supreme Audit Authority to carry out its oversight of public enterprises.

(...continued)

earthquake-relief-where-haiti-wasnt-broken.

GAO, Report GAO-13-558, “Haiti Reconstruction: USIAD Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and

Face Sustainability Challenges,” June 2013.

Better Work Haiti, Better Work Haiti: Garment Industry, 7th Biannual Synthesis Report Under the HOPE II

Legislation, International Labour Organization and International Finance Corporation, October 16, 2013; and Worker

Rights Consortium, Stealing from the Poor: Wage Theft in the Haitian Apparel Industry, October 15, 2013.

U.S. Department of State, Action Memo for Deputy Secretary Nides, Haiti—Fiscal Transparency National Interest

Waiver Request and Determination of Progress, undated (2012, probably August-October).

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Respect for Human Rights

Congress has long advocated for the respect for human rights in Haiti, which has improved

dramatically under civilian democratic government. The government is no longer an agent of

officially sanctioned and executed violations of human rights. Nonetheless, many problems

remain. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Human Rights report from 2013:

The most serious impediments to human rights involved weak democratic governance in

the country; the near absence of the rule of law, exacerbated by a judicial system

vulnerable to political influence, and chronic, severe corruption in all branches of

government.

Basic human rights problems included some arbitrary and unlawful killings by

government officials; excessive use of force against suspects and protesters;

overcrowding and poor sanitation in prisons; prolonged pretrial detention; an inefficient,

unreliable, and inconsistent judiciary subject to significant outside and personal

influence; rape, other violence, and societal discrimination against women; child abuse;

social marginalization of minority communities; and human trafficking. Allegations

continued of sexual exploitation and abuse by members of … MINUSTAH. Violence and

crime within camps for approximately 369,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)

remained a problem.

Other human rights problems included torture and excessive use of force against suspects

and prisoners; overcrowding and poor sanitation in prisons; prolonged pretrial detention;

an inefficient, unreliable, and inconsistent judiciary subject to significant outside and

personal influence; rape, other violence, and societal discrimination against women; child

abuse; and human trafficking. In addition there were multiple incidents of mob violence

and vigilante retribution against both government security forces and ordinary citizens,

including setting houses on fire, burning police stations, throwing rocks, beheadings, and

lynchings.98

The U.N. Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, made a

blunt assessment of the current state of human rights in Haiti in his final address before the U.N.’s

Human Rights Council. Before stepping down from the position he said, “I cannot, and I do not

want to hide from you my anxiety and disappointment regarding developments in the fields of the

rule of law and human rights….”99 Saying that “impunity reigns,” the human rights expert said,

“It is inconceivable that, under the rule of law, those responsible for enforcing the law feel

authorized not to respect the law and that such behavior goes unanswered by the judicial system.”

Forst strongly criticized the nomination of magistrates for political ends, citing the case in which

he said the current Minister of Justice appointed a judge especially for the purpose of ordering the

release of Calixte Valentin, a presidential adviser being held in preventive detention on a murder

charge. His statement bemoaned threats against journalists, arbitrary and illegal arrests, and the

failure to implement identified solutions that would improve conditions in the Haitian prison

system—which he said “remains a cruel, inhuman and degrading place.” He expressed his wish

that the Martelly Administration take up the work of the Ministry of Justice under President

Préval in the revision of the penal code. Forst applauded the strong efforts of the Préval and

U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Haiti, May 24, 2012,

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186522.

“Departing UN official Blasts Haiti’s Human Rights Record in Open Letter,” AP, March 28, 2013; “Michel Forst

vide son sac,” Le Nouvelliste, March 27, 2013, at http://lenouvelliste.com/article4.php?newsid=115004, author’s

translation; U.N. Office at Geneva, “Council Holds Interactive Dialogue with Independent Experts on the Situation of

Human Rights in Cote d’Ivoire and in Haiti,” March 19, 2013.

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Martelly Administrations in strengthening the police, with international support, and the renewed

public confidence in the police. He noted persisting problems however, commenting that the case

of a person tortured to death in a police station in a Port-au-Prince suburb was not an isolated

incident.

The human rights specialist also noted positive developments in human rights, including the role

played by the Office of Citizen Protection, Haiti’s human rights ombudsman, in promoting

respect for human rights, and a strong civil society with professional human rights organizations

advocating for issues such as women’s rights and food security. Forst also praised the

appointment of a Minister for Human Rights and the Fight against Extreme Poverty.

An aide to the Prime Minister, George Henry Honorat, was killed March 23, 2013, in a drive-by

shooting. Motives are not known, but Honorat was also the editor in chief for a weekly

newspaper, Haiti Progres, and was secretary general of the Popular National Party that opposed

the Duvalier regimes.

Concerns over Haitians and People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican

Republic100

A September 2013 court ruling in the Dominican Republic caused enormous controversy because

it could deny citizenship to some 200,000 Dominican-born people, mostly of Haitian descent,

making them stateless. The Dominican Republic’s 1929 constitution adhered to the principle that

citizenship was determined by place of birth. The country’s 2010 constitution excluded from

citizenship “those born to ... foreigners who are in transit or reside illegally in Dominican

territory.” For decades, Haitians have been brought into the Dominican Republic to work in sugar

fields and, more recently, construction.

The Dominican Constitutional Court ruled that the 2010 definition must be applied retroactively.

It also reinterpreted the provision in the 1929 constitution which excluded from citizenship

children born to foreigners “in transit,” so that it excluded all those born to undocumented

foreigners. (Previously, the “in transit” clause had mostly been applied to members of the

diplomatic corps or others in the country for a limited, defined period.) The decision stripped a

29-year old Dominican-born woman of Haitian descent of her citizenship, and denied citizenship

to her Dominican-born children. The court also ordered Dominican authorities to conduct an audit

of birth records to identify similar cases of people formally registered as Dominicans since 1929,

saying they would no longer qualify for citizenship under the new constitution. The decision

cannot be appealed.

Dominican authorities argue that such people will not be stateless, because they will qualify as

Haitian citizens or will be given a path to Dominican citizenship. The Haitian constitution grants

citizenship to children born of a Haitian parent, but does not address second and third generations

descended from Haitian citizens. There are thousands more who will not be on Dominican

registries because for decades, Dominican officials have denied birth certificates and other

documents to many Dominican-born people of, or perceived to be of, Haitian descent.

The ruling has heightened tensions with Haiti. With the possibility that the Dominican Republic

could render thousands of second and third generation Dominicans of Haitian descent stateless

and deport them to Haiti, the potential impact on Haiti could be enormous. Haiti has limited

resources to deal effectively with an influx of that size of possible deportees who were not born in

100

For more information, see CRS Report R41482, Dominican Republic: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name

redacted)

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Haiti and have little or no ties to Haiti. The Haitian government initially recalled its ambassador

from the Dominican Republic in response to the court ruling. Relations were further strained

when the Dominican Republic repatriated over 200 Haitians in November 2013, after the murder

of an elderly Dominican couple in a border town, which locals blamed on Haitians. Nonetheless,

some activists have criticized the Martelly Administration for not speaking out strongly enough

against the court decision.101

Haitian and Dominican officials held talks in January 2014. The Dominican government said it

would not negotiate the court decision or how it plans to implement it. According to a press

report, Haiti recognized Dominican sovereignty on migration policy and the Dominican

government assured Haiti that “concrete measures will be taken to safeguard the basic rights of

people of Haitian descent” living in the country.102

But Haitians also advocated at the talks for better treatment of Haitian migrant workers in the

Dominican Republic, long a subject of human rights concerns. The U.S. Department of Labor

issued a report in September 2013 citing evidence of violations of labor law in the Dominican

sugar sector such as payments below minimum wage, 12-hour work days and 7-day work weeks,

lack of potable water, absence of safety equipment, child labor, and forced labor.103 Haiti also

asked for better treatment of its students in the Dominican Republic.

Further talks in February 2014 led to agreement on several immigration issues, according to the

Dominican government, including a new type of Dominican visa for workers.104 The Dominican

Republic reviewed its rules and practices related to Haitian students. The Haitian government

reportedly reaffirmed its commitment to expedite the issuance of passports and national civil

registration cards at border posts and in consulates in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican

Republic says it provided details of how it will implement its “National Plan for regularization of

foreigners.”

Dominican President Danilo Medina issued a decree in November 2013, outlining the plan as a

special naturalization process for undocumented “foreigners” and their children born in the

Dominican Republic who currently lack any documentation. The decree said that those who do

not choose to seek eligibility can request repatriation or will face deportation.105

The Dominican government says it is trying to normalize a complicated immigration system. But

U.N. and Organization of American States (OAS) agencies, foreign leaders, and human rights

groups have challenged the decision’s legitimacy, concerned that it violates international human

rights obligations to which the Dominican Republic is party. The Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights (IACHR) concluded that the Constitutional Court’s ruling “implies an arbitrary

deprivation of nationality” and “has a discriminatory effect, given that it primarily impacts

Dominicans of Haitian descent.”106 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) “condemn[ed] the

101

Jacqueline Charles, “U.S. Expresses ‘Deep Concern’ over Dominican Court Citizenship Ruling,” Miami Herald,

December 18, 2013.

102

Ezra Fieser, “Can Haiti and Dominican Republic Repair Relations After Citizenship Ruling?,” Christian Science

Monitor, January 8, 2014.

103

U.S. Department of Labor, “US Labor Department Issues Report on Labor Concerns in Dominican Sugar Sector,

Announces $10 million project in Agriculture,” new release 13-1979-NAT, September 27, 2013.

104

Embajada de la Republica Dominicana, Washington, DC, letter summarizing meeting of 2/3/2014, EDW-0076-14,

Feb. 4, 2014.

105

Manuel Jimenez, “Dominican Government Gives Details of Naturalization Plan for ‘Foreigners’,” Reuters,

November 30, 2013.

106

Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “IACHR Wraps Up Visit to the

(continued...)

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abhorrent and discriminatory ruling,” and said it was “especially repugnant that the ruling ignores

the 2005 judgment made by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights that the Dominican

Republic adapt its immigration laws and practices in accordance with the provision of the

American Convention on Human Rights.”107 CARICOM then suspended the Dominican

Republic’s request for membership.

The Obama Administration did not publicly address the Dominican court ruling until almost three

months after it was issued, in mid-December 2013. It then said it had “deep concern” about the

ruling’s impact on the status of people of Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic.108

Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that the ruling places hundreds of thousands

of Dominican born persons, most of whom are of Haitian descent, at risk of statelessness (see

H.Res. 443 in “Legislation in the 114th Congress”).

In May 2014, the Dominican Congress passed a bill proposed by President Medina setting up a

system to grant citizenship to Dominican-born children of immigrants. The law created different

categories, depending on whether people have documents proving they were born in the country.

According to the Dominican government, those with birth certificates that are “irregular” because

of their parents’ lack of immigration status will have their certificates legalized and will be

confirmed as Dominican citizens. People without documents had 90 days to prove they were born

in the Dominican Republic and register with the government; after two years of residency they

could then apply for citizenship.109 Critics say the law continues to discriminate against people

without documents.110

On November 14, 2014, the Dominican Republic withdrew its membership in the Inter-American

Court of Human Rights. The Inter-American Court found that the Dominican Republic

discriminates against Dominicans of Haitian descent and gave the government six months to

invalidate the ruling of the Constitutional Court. The Dominican government charged that the

findings were “unacceptable” and “biased.”111

The Dominican Republic ended its “immigrant regularization” process on June 17, 2015, raising

concerns that it may deport tens of thousands of people to Haiti. Most of those, according to the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are Dominican-born people of

Haitian descent. The UNHCR appealed to the Dominican Republic government to ensure that

“people who were arbitrarily deprived of their nationality as a result of [the] 2013 ruling ... will

not be deported.”112 The UNHCR expressed concern about the possible expulsion of people who

are not considered Haitian citizens, which could create a new refugee situation. The UNHCR

offered to work with the Dominican authorities to find an “adequate solution for this population

and to ensure the protection of their human rights.”

(...continued)

Dominican Republic,” press release, December 2013.

107

CARICOM Secretariat, “CARICOM Statement on Developments in the Aftermath of the Ruling of the

Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic on Nationality,” press release 265/2013, Nov. 26, 2013.

108

Jacqueline Charles, December 18, 2013, op.cit.

109

Embajada de la Republica Dominicana, “Dominican National Congress Approves Historic Citizenship Legislation,”

press release, Washington, DC, May 21, 2014.

110

BBC News, “Dominican Republic Lawmakers Pass Citizenship Bill,” May 22, 2014.

111

Panky Corcino, Danica Coto, “Dominican Republic Quits OAS’s Human Rights Court,” AP, November 4, 2014.

112

UNHCR, “UNHCR Urges Dominican Republic to Refrain from Deportations of Stateless Individuals,” Briefing

Notes, June 19, 2015.

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The government is giving conflicting signals of its intentions, which are said to reflect internal

divisions over the issue. The head of the Dominican immigration agency, Army General Ruben

Paulino, said his agency and the army would begin patrolling neighborhoods with high numbers

of migrants and would deport those who were not registered.113 Meanwhile, Interior Minister

Ramon Fadul issued a statement saying there would be no mass deportations after the registration

period expired.114

Investigations of the Late Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations

Legal proceedings against both the late former dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier and

former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide have posed extremely challenging tests of Haiti’s judicial

system and its ability to prosecute human rights abuses and other crimes. As mentioned above,

about a third of U.S. assistance to Haiti supports governance and rule-of-law programs, which

include judicial reform and strengthening.

Duvalier died at age 63 in Haiti on October 4, 2014. After he had unexpectedly returned from

exile in 2011, private citizens filed charges of human rights violations against him for abuses they

allege they suffered under his 15-year regime. In 2012 a judge ruled that Duvalier could be tried

for corruption, but that a statute of limitations would prevent him from being tried for any murder

claims. Upon appeal, however, a three-judge panel reversed that decision in February 2013. The

appellate court ruled that Duvalier could be charged with crimes against humanity—such as

political torture, disappearances and murder—for which there is no statute of limitations under

international law. Haitian human rights lawyer Pierre Esperance called the decision

“monumental.” Duvalier’s defense attorney Fritzo Canton said the judicial panel acted under the

influence of “extreme leftist human rights organizations.”115

After Duvalier’s return, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights offered to help Haitian

authorities prosecute crimes committed during Duvalier’s rule.116 U.N. Secretary General Ban KiMoon called on the international community to continue to work with the Haitian government to

bring about systemic rule-of-law reform, saying that

... the return of Jean-Claude Duvalier has brought the country’s turbulent history of Statesponsored violence to the fore. It is of vital importance that the Haitian authorities pursue

all legal and judicial avenues in this matter. The prosecution of those responsible for

crimes against their own people will deliver a clear message to the people of Haiti that

there can be no impunity. It will also be incumbent upon the incoming Administration to

build on the achievements of the Préval presidency, which put an end to State-sponsored

political violence and allowed Haitians to enjoy freedom of association and expression.117

Duvalier repeatedly failed to appear in court, then, under threat of arrest from the judge, appeared

in court on February 28, 2013, much to the astonishment of many observers. When asked about

murders, political imprisonment, summary execution, and forced exile under his government, the

113

Ezequiel Abiu Lopez, “Official: Dominican Republic Ready to Resume Deportations,” Washington Post, June 16,

2015.

114

Ibid.

115

George Rodriguez, “Victims Rejoice at Haitian Judges’ Decision to Allow Charges of Human Rights Violations

Against Former Dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier,” Notices, Sept. 18, 2014.

116

United Nations Radio, UN Offers to Help Haitian Authorities Prosecute Duvalier, February 1, 2011,

http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/112772.html.

117

UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, March

24, 2011, S/2011/183, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9448d32.html, paragraphs 81-82.

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former dictator replied that “Murders exist in all countries; I did not intervene in the activities of

the police.”118 Initially, Duvalier was not allowed to leave Haiti, but in December 2012 the

Martelly government re-issued his diplomatic passport.119 He remained in the country, and was

President Martelly’s guest at official government ceremonies.

After Duvalier’s death, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights called it

“essential” that legal proceedings and investigations against people associated with Duvalier

continue.120

Former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide is also facing charges since his return in March 2011. A

small group of people has filed a complaint against Aristide, alleging they were physically abused

and used to raise money when they were children in the care of Aristide’s Fanmi se Lavi

organization, created in the late 1980s to house and educate homeless children. A prosecutor

questioned Aristide in January 2013. Now a court must decide whether to dismiss the case or

refer it to a judge to decide whether to file formal charges.

In May 2013 Aristide testified before a judge regarding an investigation into the murder of

prominent Haitian journalist Jean Dominique in 2000. Thousands of supporters followed his

motorcade through the capital. Earlier in the year, former President Rene Préval, who was in

office at the time of the murder, also testified in the case. Both men were once friends of

Dominique. At the time of his death Dominique was seen as a possible presidential candidate;

Aristide was already preparing to run for a second term. Several people allegedly involved in the

assassination and witnesses have been killed or disappeared over the years.121 Dominique’s

widow, Michele Montas, is a former journalist and U.N. spokeswoman. She says, “The

investigation has led to people close to the high levels of the Lavalas Family party that Aristide

headed.... I am sure he knows who did it.” In January 2014 a Haitian appellate judge

recommended that nine people be charged for their alleged roles in Dominique’s murder. The

investigative report alleged that a former Lavalas senator was the mastermind behind the crime

and that several others involved belonged to Aristide’s Lavalas Family party as well.122 It is now

up to the Court of Appeals to accept or reject the judge’s report.

The government has an ongoing investigation into corruption, money laundering, and drug

trafficking charges against Aristide. A judge issued an arrest warrant for Aristide in August 2014,

after which protesters blocked access to Aristide’s home. The same judges placed Aristide under

house arrest on September 9, 2014. Some in the opposition claim the judge is close to President

Martelly. According to IHS Global Insight, Aristide’s house arrest “is likely to strengthen

opposition claims of persecution ... [and] reduces the likelihood of a compromise agreement that

would allow a second candidate registration process and the participation of opposition parties” in

the overdue elections.123

Because the judicial system is not fully independent, the attitudes of the president could have a

large impact on any judicial process. As a candidate, Martelly called for clemency for the former

118

“Haiti-Duvalier: Everything That Was Said at the Hearing of 28 February,” HaitiLibre.com, March 2, 2013.

Trenton Daniel, “Attorney: Haiti’s ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier Hospitalized,” Associated Press, March 4, 2013.

120

“UN Urges Continued Probe on Violations During Baby Doc’s Rule in Haiti,” RTT News, Oct. 7, 2014.

121

Susana Ferreira, “Ex-Haiti Leader Aristide Testifies on Assassination; Statement to Aid Investigation into

Journalists’s Death,” Chicago Tribune.

122

“International Press Freedom Group Urges Haiti’s Government to Act in Case of Slain Journalist,” AP Newswire,

January 21, 2014.

123

Arthur Dhont, “Arrest of Former Haitian President Likely to Increase Risk of Rioting and Disorder in Port-auPrince,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, September 10, 2014.

119

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leaders, saying that, “If I come to power, I would like all the former presidents to become my

advisors in order to profit from their experience.”124 He also said he was “ready” to work with

officials who had served under the Duvalier regimes,125 and adult children of Duvalierists hold

high positions in his government.126 Since becoming president, Martelly repeated the possibility

that he would pardon Duvalier, citing a need for national reconciliation.127 He retracted at least

one of those statements, and Prime Minister Lamothe stated that the Haitian state was not

pursuing a pardon for Duvalier.128

The U.N.’s Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, in a visit to Portau-Prince in July 2011, urged the creation of a truth commission, which she said would help

promote national reconciliation in Haiti.

The U.N. expert on human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, called the appearance of former president

Jean-Claude Duvalier before the Haitian courts a victory for the rule of law. He also said that

despite assurances “at the highest level of State” that the executive branch would not interfere in

the judicial proceedings, “that unfortunately was not the case.”129

Curbing Violence Against Women

Some Members of Congress have expressed special concern about violence against women in

Haiti. Discrimination against women has been practiced in Haiti throughout its history. The

widespread nature and Haitian society’s tolerance of this sexual discrimination, says the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, “has in turn fueled brutal acts of violence and abuse

towards women on a regular basis.”

Gender-based or sexual violence against women and girls has been described by many sources for

many years as common and under-reported in Haiti. The most prevalent forms of this violence are

domestic abuse, rape—sometimes as a political weapon—and childhood slavery. Violence against

women has also included murder. Haitian girls and women in the poor majority are at particular

risk of violence. The issue gained new attention after the earthquake, when women in tent camps

became especially vulnerable to gender-based violence. Haitian government enforcement of or

adherence to its obligations to protect rights that would protect women and girls from genderbased or sexual violence in particular is weak and inadequate.

The Martelly Administration has dramatically increased the budget of the Ministry for Women’s

Affairs and Rights, which is responsible for developing national equality policies and the

advancement of women. The FY2012 budget for the ministry was US$40.76 million, an increase

of 828.2% (from 0.17% of the government’s budget in FY2011 to 1.41% in FY2012).

Security and the Debate over Reestablishing the Haitian Army

For years, Congress has expressed concern over citizen security in Haiti. Congress has supported

various U.N. missions in Haiti, and the professionalization and strengthening of the Haitian

124

Clarens Renois, “Haiti Politicians Hope for Reconciliation,” Agence France Presse, January 21, 2011,

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/01/21/11/haiti-politicians-hope-reconciliation.

125

“Haitian Candidate Open to Including Duvalier Officials,” Agence France Presse, March 2, 2011.

126

Jacqueline Charles, “The Case Against Haiti’s ‘Baby Doc’,” Miami Herald, February 27, 2013.

127

Niko Price, “Haitian Leader Could Pardon Duvalier,” Associated Press, January 27, 2012.

128

Statement at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Statesmen’s Forum, April 18, 2013.

129

“Michel Forst vide son sac,” op.cit.

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National Police force and other elements of Haiti’s judicial system in order to improve security

conditions in Haiti. In what proved to be a very controversial move, President Martelly proposed

recreating the Haitian army to replace MINUSTAH in a few years. The army, which committed

gross violations of human rights over decades, according to numerous reports by the State

Department, the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, and

others, and carried out numerous coups, was disbanded by President Aristide in 1995.

Martelly’s initial plan called for creation of a 3,500-member army130 to be built over three and a

half years, at a cost of approximately $95 million, including $15 million to compensate former

soldiers who were discharged.131 In January 2012 Martelly reportedly acknowledged that a new

army was not realistic, but also pledged to build a new Haitian security force of 3,000-5,000

members. It was not clear what difference there was between an army and a new security force.132

Martelly is proceeding with steps for re-creating a military force, although on a smaller scale for

now. Ecuador trained 41 Haitian military recruits—30 soldiers, 10 engineers, and 1 officer—in

2013, who will now work on engineering projects such as road repair, and will report to the

Defense Ministry. According to a press report, Defense Minister Jean-Rodolphe Joazile said the

troops “won’t carry weapons for now but could carry handguns, in three to four years, if either

the recruits pay for the weapon themselves or the government receives financing to do so.”133

While some observers express concern over such steps, others say they are token gestures to

address Martelly’s campaign promise to reinstate the army. State Department officials have said

that there has been virtually no funding of the Defense Ministry to carry out larger plans.

Former members of the Haitian army and would-be soldiers have protested in favor of

reestablishing the army, and in 2012 occupied 10 old military bases. About 50 such protestors,

wearing fatigues and some bearing arms, disrupted a session of parliament in April 2012 to voice

their demands. After months of inaction, and under pressure from the U.N., the Haitian

government closed the occupied bases and arrested dozens of pro-army protesters—including two

U.S. citizens—after a march turned violent in May 2012.134

Under Haitian law, Parliament is supposed to approve recreating the force, which it has not done.

The majority Inité coalition said the government cannot afford an army, and should further

develop the Haitian National Police, which MINUSTAH is already training to assume its

functions.135 The United States and other international donors support reform and capacity

building in the police force as the best means of continuing to improve citizen security. Others

have also suggested establishing civilian corps to carry out disaster response and other duties

Martelly is proposing for the army.

A U.N. Security Council mission to Haiti lamented the slow pace of police strengthening and

worried that it could foster pro-army sentiments:

130

“Haiti President Wants to Start Recruiting New Army,” Agence France Presse, September 28, 2011.

“Martelly Moves Ahead with Plan to Restore Army,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, RC11-10, October 2011, p. 16.

132

Niko Price, “Haitian Leader Could Pardon Duvalier,” Associated Press, January 27, 2012.

133

Trenton Daniel, “Haiti Takes Step Closer to Restoring Abolished Army as Trainees Return to Repair Roads,”

Associated Press, September 17, 2013. See also “Haiti Takes Steps to Rebuild its Army,” VOA, September 17, 2013.

134

Associated Press, “Mass. Man Jailed in Haiti Could Face Three Years behind Bars,” CBS Boston, May 24, 2012,

http://boston.cbslocal.com/2012/05/24/mass-man-jailed-in-haiti-could-face-three-years-behind-bars/. The two men are

Jason William Petrie of Ohio and Steven Parker Shaw of Massachusetts. If convicted of conspiracy charges, the two

could face up to three years in prison according to a Haitian prosecutor.

135

Ibid.

131

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Although the performance of the Haitian National Police has been slowly improving … it

still lacks the quantity and quality of personnel necessary to assume full responsibility for

internal security…. The pace of recruitment, vetting and training, however, has been

unsatisfactory. The mission was informed that the start of training for the next group of

cadets was delayed owing to funding shortfalls and other administrative difficulties. The

mission heard accounts that the slower-than-expected pace of development of the Haitian

police risks fuelling support among certain Haitian sectors for the near-term creation of a

national army.136

When MINUSTAH arrived in Haiti in 2004, there were about 5,000 officers in the HNP. About

1,000 new officers have been graduated from the police academy in recent years. The HNP now

has about 11,900 officers, including 1,022 women. MINUSTAH’s goal was to have at least

15,000 police officers trained by 2016.

Counternarcotics

Haiti is a transit point for cocaine being shipped by both sea and air from South America, and for

marijuana coming from Jamaica to the United States, Canada, Europe, and other Caribbean

countries. Some drugs are also sent through Haiti by land to the Dominican Republic. Weak

institutions, poorly protected borders and coastlines, and widespread corruption are conditions

that make Haiti attractive to drug traffickers and make it difficult for Haiti to combat trafficking.

Nonetheless, the Haitian government has committed itself to combating narcotics trafficking in

recent years. According to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report (INCSR) published in March 2013, the Martelly Administration is planning to strengthen

the Haitian National Police to make them more effective in counternarcotics efforts, approving a

new five-year development plan for the Haitian National Police (HNP) which will expand the

counternarcotics unit to 200 officers.137 The Obama Administration worked with other donors to

update the development plan for the Haitian Coast Guard, and coordinate international efforts.

Although corruption is a widespread problem, the State Department reports that the government

does not encourage or facilitate distribution of illicit drugs or the laundering of drug trafficking

profits, and has fully staffed the HNP Inspectorate General at the upper leadership level for the

first time in its 17-year history. Low pay and widespread poverty make low-level police and other

officials vulnerable to bribery, however. The State Department has noted in the past that Haitian

law enforcement officials cannot investigate allegations that some legislators may be involved in

illicit activities because the constitution provides them with blanket immunity. The 2013 INCSR

adds that “… resource shortages, a lack of expertise, and insufficient political will represent

substantial obstacles to anti-corruption efforts.”

Since 2008, Congress has included counternarcotics funds for Haiti in regional initiatives in

addition to bilateral funding—first through the Merida Initiative, and then through the Caribbean

Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The Merida aid package aimed to “combat drug trafficking and

related violence and organized crime.”138 Although the Merida Initiative initially included Central

America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, its main focus was Mexico. CBSI, launched by the

136

U.N. Security Council, Report of the Security Council Mission to Haiti, 13-16 February 2012, S/2012/534, July 11,

2012, p. 3.

137

U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. I, Drug and Chemical Control,

“Haiti,” March 5, 2013.

138

U.S. Department of State, The Merida Initiative, U.S.-SICA Dialogue on Security, December 11-12, 2008,

Washington, DC, December 2008, p. 3, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB861.pdf.

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Obama Administration in 2010, is a regional security effort by the United States and Caribbean

nations aiming to reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and sec

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