Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Latin America and the Caribbean:

U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress

in 2012

-name redacted-, Coordinator

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

-name redactedAnalyst in Latin American Affairs

-name redactedInformation Research Specialist

-name redactedAnalyst in Latin American Affairs

-name redactedSpecialist in Latin American Affairs

-name redactedSpecialist in Latin American Affairs

December 21, 2012

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R42360

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Summary

Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin

American and Caribbean region, with diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political and

security concerns. U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration has focused on

four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security;

strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future. There has

been substantial continuity in U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration,

which has pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration.

Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has made several significant policy changes, including

an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility.

U.S. policy toward the region must also contend with a Latin America that is becoming

increasingly independent from the United States. Strong economic growth has increased Latin

America’s confidence in its ability to solve its own problems. The region has also diversified its

economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Over the past few years, several

Latin American regional organization organizations have been established that do not include the

United States.

Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and

oversight attention to the region during the 112th Congress focused on the continued increase in

drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida

Initiative; efforts to help Central American and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking

and violent crime; as well as continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia. The

January 2010 earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti, continued to focus congressional

attention on the enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction. As in past years, U.S.

sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, remained a contentious

issue in the debate over how to support change in one of the world’s last remaining communist

nations. Another area of congressional oversight was the deterioration of democracy in several

Latin American countries, especially Nicaragua and Venezuela. Congressional concern also

increased about Iran’s growing relations in the region, especially with Venezuela, and about the

activities of Hezbollah.

This report provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012,

including the Obama Administration’s priorities for U.S. policy and a brief comparison of policies

under the Obama and Bush Administrations. It then examines congressional interest in Latin

America, first providing an overview, and then looking at selected countries and regional issues

and key policy issues faced by Congress in 2012. The final section of the report analyzes several

key events in the region that took place in 2012: the Pope’s trip to Cuba in March, the sixth

Summit of the Americas in April, Mexico’s elections in July, and Venezuela’s upcoming elections

in October. An appendix provides a listing of hearings in the 112th Congress focused on Latin

America. For additional information and access to over 30 CRS reports on the region, see the

CRS Issues in Focus webpage on “Latin America and the Caribbean.”

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Contents

Latin America and the Caribbean: Overview of U.S. Policy ........................................................... 1

Four Priorities for the Region .................................................................................................... 1

Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy....................................................................................... 4

Latin America’s Increasing Independence ................................................................................. 5

Congressional Interest in Latin America and the Caribbean............................................................ 6

Overview ................................................................................................................................... 6

Brazil ......................................................................................................................................... 8

Central America and the Caribbean: Citizen Security ............................................................... 9

Colombia ................................................................................................................................. 10

Cuba......................................................................................................................................... 11

Haiti ......................................................................................................................................... 11

Mexico ..................................................................................................................................... 12

Venezuela................................................................................................................................. 13

Iran’s Growing Relations in Latin America ............................................................................. 14

Organization of American States ............................................................................................. 15

Key Events in 2012 ........................................................................................................................ 16

March 26-28, 2012: Pope Benedict XVI Visit to Cuba ........................................................... 16

April 14-15, 2012: Summit of the Americas ........................................................................... 17

July 1, 2012: Mexican Elections.............................................................................................. 18

October 7, 2012: Venezuelan Election..................................................................................... 19

Figures

Figure 1. Latin America and the Caribbean ..................................................................................... 2

Tables

Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 112th Congress on Latin America and the

Caribbean .................................................................................................................................... 22

Appendixes

Appendix. Hearings in the 112th Congress..................................................................................... 22

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 25

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Latin America and the Caribbean:

Overview of U.S. Policy

U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere are diverse, and include economic, political, security

and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages between

the United States and the region, with the United States being the major trading partner and

largest source of foreign investment for many countries. Free trade agreements (FTAs) have

augmented economic relations with many countries in the region, including Mexico, Chile, Peru,

Central America, and the Dominican Republic. Latin American nations, primarily Mexico and

Venezuela, supply the United States with almost one-third of its imported crude oil. The Western

Hemisphere is also the largest source of U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal, with geographic

proximity and economic conditions being major factors driving migration trends. Curbing the

flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component of U.S.

relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for almost two decades, and in recent

years has included close security cooperation with Mexico as that country struggles to combat

drug trafficking and related violence. With the exception of Cuba, the region has made enormous

strides in terms of democratic political development over the past two decades, but the rise of

undemocratic practices in several countries, especially Venezuela, has been a U.S. concern. The

United States has often taken the lead in responding to natural disasters in the region, as was

demonstrated once again in the aftermath of Haiti’s catastrophic 2010 earthquake.

Four Priorities for the Region

The Obama Administration has set forth a broad framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America

and the Caribbean centered on four pillars or priorities:

•

promoting economic and social opportunity;

•

ensuring citizen security;

•

strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance; and

•

securing a clean energy future.

According to former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo

Valenzuela, these policy “priorities are based on the premise that the United States has a vital

interest in contributing to the building of stable, prosperous, and democratic nations” in the

hemisphere that can play an important role in dealing with global challenges.1 The Obama

Administration has emphasized that its policy approach toward the region is one that emphasizes

partnership and shared responsibility, with policy conducted on the basis of mutual respect

through engagement and dialogue.2

1

U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,

“U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Look Ahead,” January 6, 2011.

2

Ibid; and U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere

Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Obama Era,” October 9, 2010. The same general policy approach has continued

under Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Secretary Roberta Jacobson, who was also

nominated to the position by President Obama and is awaiting Senate confirmation.

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Figure 1. Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.

Expanding economic opportunity focuses on one of the key problems facing Latin America:

lingering poverty and inequality. At the end of 2010, some 177 million people in Latin America

were living in poverty—31.4% of the region’s population—while 70 million people or 12.3%

lived in extreme poverty or indigence. These statistics reflect a significant improvement from

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

2002 when 44% of the region’s population lived in poverty.3 Moreover, the 2010 statistics showed

an improvement from 2009 when the region faced an uptick in poverty because of the global

financial crisis. In addition to traditional U.S. development assistance programs focusing on

health and education, expanding economic opportunity also has included programs such as: the

Pathways to Prosperity Initiative launched in 2008, designed to help countries learn from each

other’s experiences through the exchange of best practices; and support for the Organization of

American State’s Inter-American Social Protection Network (IASPN), launched in 2009 to

facilitate an exchange of information on policies, experiences, programs, and best practices in

order to reduce social disparities and inequality and reduce extreme poverty.4

Citizen safety is one of the most important concerns among Latin Americans, with high levels of

crime and violence (often associated with drug trafficking) a significant problem in many

countries.5 The Central America-Mexico corridor is the route for 95% of South American cocaine

entering the United States, while murder rates in several Central American and Caribbean

countries are among the highest in the world and drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has

risen to unprecedented levels. U.S. support in this area includes a series of partnerships to help

countries combat drug trafficking and organized crime such as the Mérida Initiative for Mexico,

the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and the Caribbean Basin Security

Initiative (CBSI). The Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) is designed to support

Colombia’s strategy in remote, but strategically important, areas by increasing the presence of

civilian state economic and social development institutions.

Over the past three decades, Latin America has made enormous strides in democratic political

development, not only in terms of regular free and fair elections, but in terms of an improvement

in respect for political rights and civil liberties. Despite this improvement, many countries in the

region still face considerable challenges. Improving and strengthening democratic governance

includes support to improve the capacity of state institutions to address citizens’ needs through

responsive legislative, judicial, law enforcement and penal institutions. It includes defending

press freedoms and democratic rights, such as free and fair elections and the protection of

minority rights. Most significantly, according to former Assistant Secretary Valenzuela, because

democratic institutions are absolutely critical and because of the history of military and other

coups in the region, hemispheric nations need to stand together collectively to ensure that elected

democratic institutions are not interrupted.6

Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are vulnerable to climate change, which can

have a negative effect on sustainable development and economic prosperity. Leaders in the region

have committed to working together to address the challenges of climate change and to strengthen

energy security. The Obama Administration advanced an Energy and Climate Partnership of the

Americas (ECPA) in 2009 through which nations have committed themselves to strengthen interAmerican collaboration on clean energy. ECPA includes voluntary bilateral and multi-country

initiatives to promote clean energy, advance energy security, and reduce greenhouse gas

3

U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 2011, Briefing

paper, November 29, 2011.

4

U.S. Department of State, “Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas, Fact Sheet,” April 8, 2011. See the website of the

IASPN at http://www.socialprotectionet.org/english/index.html.

5

Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2010 Report, December 2010.

6

U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,

“First Diplomacy Briefing Series Meeting: Issues and Challenges of U.S. Relations with Latin America,” December 11,

2009.

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

emissions. Some of the initiatives involve international and regional organizations and the private

sector.7

Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy

Substantial continuity characterizes U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama

Administration, which has pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush

Administration. Like the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration is providing significant

anti-drug and security support to Colombia and significant support to Mexico and Central

America to combat drug trafficking and organized crime through the Mérida Initiative and

CARSI. In anticipation of a potential “balloon effect” of drug trafficking shifting to the Caribbean

region, the Obama Administration also established the CBSI, the origin of which dates back to the

Bush Administration. Implementing bills for FTAs with Colombia and Panama that were

negotiated under the Bush Administration were officially introduced in early October 2011 after

extensive work by the Administration to resolve outstanding congressional concerns related to

both agreements, which were then approved by Congress. Just as the Bush Administration had,

the Obama Administration has expressed support for comprehensive immigration reform, an

especially important issue in U.S. relations with Mexico and Central America. In terms of

Venezuela, it can be argued that the Obama Administration is following a policy similar to the

latter years of the Bush Administration by attempting to avoid any unnecessary public spats with

President Hugo Chávez, but at the same time speaking out with regard to concerns about

undemocratic actions of the Venezuelan government as well as drug trafficking and terrorism

concerns.

Despite the continuity, the Obama Administration has made a number of changes that

differentiate its policy from that of the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration has put

an emphasis on partnership and multilateralism. It has also implemented several changes in Cuba

policy by lifting restrictions on family travel and remittances, restarting semi-annual migration

talks, and easing restrictions on other types of purposeful travel and remittances. At the same

time, the Administration has continued to speak out about the poor human rights situation in Cuba

and has repeatedly called for the release of a U.S. government subcontractor, Alan Gross,

imprisoned since late 2009. The Administration has also increased development assistance to the

region compared to that provided under the Bush Administration, although overall budget

cutbacks could end up reducing both development and other types of foreign assistance to the

region.

In some areas where there has been continuity in U.S. policy toward Latin America, there

nevertheless has been a change of emphasis. For example, assistance to Mexico is shifting toward

more support for rule of law programs (including police, judicial, and penal reform) and programs

to help communities withstand the pressures of crime and violence. Another example is

Colombia, where assistance has become more evenly balanced between enhancing rule of law,

human rights and economic development programs on the one hand, and continuing efforts on

security and drug interdiction on the other. Moreover, U.S. assistance levels to Colombia have

begun to decline as the country is increasingly taking over responsibility for programs once

funded by the United States.

7

White House, “Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas,” March 21, 2011.

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Assessments of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the Obama Administration offer a

mixed picture. Some policy analysts have lauded the Administration for its emphasis on

partnership and multilateralism; for deepening security cooperation with Mexico, Central

America, and the Caribbean; for broadening relations with Colombia beyond counternarcotics

and counterterrorism issues; and for a strong U.S. response to the earthquake in Haiti. On the

other hand, some have urged the Administration to articulate a strategic vision and approach

toward Latin America with a clearer explanation of why the region matters to the United States.8

Other critics of the Administration call for U.S. policy toward Latin America to be reshaped to

support Mexico more strongly in its efforts against organized crime and to provide more

sustained focus on Venezuela’s conduct and activities. 9 Some policy analysts maintain that the

growing polarization of U.S. domestic politics is an additional impediment to productive

engagement with the region.10

Latin America’s Increasing Independence

U.S. policy toward the Latin American region needs to be considered in the context of the

region’s increasing independence from the United States. The region has diversified its economic

and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region—China, for example, has become a major

trading partner for many countries in the region. Strong regional economic growth rates—6% in

2010 and 4.3% in 201111—also has increased confidence in Latin America’s ability to solve its

own problems, and has lessened the region’s dependency on the United States. The region’s

growing ideological diversity in recent years has also been a factor in the region’s increased

independence from the United States, as has the rise of Brazil as a regional and global power.

Several Latin America regional integration organizations have been established in the past few

years, a reflection of both the region’s increasing independence and its growing internal

cooperation. In December 2011, 33 hemispheric nations—excluding the United States and

Canada—met in Caracas to establish the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

(CELAC) to boost regional integration and cooperation. While some observers have concerns that

CELAC could be a forum for countries that have tense or difficult relations with the United

States, others point out that strong U.S. partners in the region are also members. Some observers

have predicted that CELAC could diminish the role of the Organization of American States

(OAS), while others maintain that CELAC does not have a permanent staff or secretariat that

could compete with the OAS. The organization reportedly will work in the areas of energy,

science and technology, infrastructure, finance, and social development.

Some observers contend that CELEC’s establishment reflects declining U.S. influence in Latin

America, but the United States still remains very much engaged in the region bilaterally and

multilaterally through the OAS and its numerous affiliated organizations. In addition, the Summit

8

Shifting the Balance, Obama and the Americas, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Lawrence

Whitehead (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

9

Roger F. Noriega, “Latin American Action Agenda for the New Congress,” American Enterprise Institute, January

2011; Testimony by Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, Hudson Institute, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December

1, 2010.

10

Testimony by Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, December 1, 2010.

11

U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Macroeconomic Report on Latin America and the

Caribbean, June 2012, p. 44.

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of the Americas process remains an important mechanism for the United States to engage with

Latin American nations at the highest level. While the April 2012 summit in Colombia displayed

U.S. divergence from the region in terms of policy toward Cuba and a reconsideration of the

region’s anti-drug strategy, the meeting also included a variety of initiatives to deepen

hemispheric integration and addresses key hemispheric challenges (also see “April 14-15, 2012:

Summit of the Americas” below).

Other regional organizations that have been established in recent years include the 12-member

Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), established in 2008 (largely because of Brazil’s

influence) to promote political coordination in South America. It has served as a forum for

dispute resolution. For example, the organization played a role in defusing tensions between

Colombia and Venezuela in 2008, and helped resolve political conflicts in Bolivia in 2008 and

Ecuador in 2010. Some analysts, however, have raised questions about UNASUR’s overall

efficacy, financial support, and ability to develop specialized capabilities and programs.12 Another

regional grouping, the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA, originally

established as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas), was launched by President Hugo

Chávez in 2004 with the goals of promoting regional integration and socioeconomic reform and

alleviating poverty. In addition to Venezuela, this eight-member group includes Bolivia, Cuba,

Ecuador, and Nicaragua as well as the Caribbean island nations of Dominica, Antigua and

Barbuda, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Some observers maintain that ALBA has lost its

initial energy. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper maintained in February 2012

congressional testimony that ALBA was “created in part to spread Chávez’s influence in the

region” but “is only muddling through.”13

Congressional Interest in Latin America

and the Caribbean

Overview

As in the previous Congress, legislative and oversight attention to Latin America and the

Caribbean during the 112th Congress focused on the continued increase in drug trafficking-related

violence in Mexico and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative; efforts to help

Central American and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking and violent crime; as

well as continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia, which still faces threats

from armed actors. The earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince in January 2010, combined

with a cholera outbreak in the fall of 2010, continued to focus congressional attention on the

enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction in Haiti. As in past years, debate over U.S.

sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, remained a contentious

issue with ongoing congressional debate over how to support change in one of the world’s last

remaining communist nations. Latin American nations, especially Mexico, which remained the

12

Michael Shifter, “The Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism,” Current History, February 2012;

Testimony of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,

January 31, 2012, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” available at

http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf

13

Ibid.

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leading source country of both legal permanent residents and unauthorized immigrants in the

United States, were disappointed by what they viewed as a lack of effort in Congress on

comprehensive immigration reform.

The U.S. government has spent billions of dollars in anti-drug assistance programs since the mid1970s aimed at reducing the flow of Latin American-sourced illicit drugs (largely from the

Andean region) to the United States. Most of these programs have emphasized supply reduction

tools, particularly drug crop eradication and interdiction of illicit narcotics. Successes in one

country or sub-region have often led traffickers to alter their cultivation patterns, production

techniques, and trafficking routes and methods in order to avoid detection. Congress has

influenced U.S. drug control policy in Latin America by appropriating certain types and levels of

funding for counterdrug assistance programs and conditioning the provision of antidrug funding

on the basis of human rights and other reporting requirements. Congress has also sought to ensure

that counterdrug programs are implemented in tandem with judicial reform, anti-corruption, and

human rights programs. In the 112th Congress, numerous oversight hearings were held evaluating

drug assistance programs—especially the Mérida Initiative in Mexico, CARSI in Central

America, and CBSI in the Caribbean—and related domestic initiatives and border security

efforts.14

Another focus of congressional oversight in the 112th Congress was the deterioration of

democracy in several Latin American countries, including Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega was

re-elected in November 2011 in elections widely seen as seriously flawed, and Venezuela, where

there have been concerns for several years about the deterioration of democratic institutions and

threats to freedom of speech and press. Despite significant improvement in political rights and

civil liberties in the region over the past three decades, in a number of countries weaknesses

remain in the state’s ability to deliver public services, ensure accountability and transparency, and

advance the rule of law. The executive’s abuse of power in several countries in the region has led

to a setback in liberal democratic practices. The quality of democracy in Latin America is also

being negatively affected by organized crime and violence; some governments have been unable

to stem the wave of violence and to protect citizens, journalists, and elected officials.

With regard to energy, issues of congressional concern included declines in production as well as

U.S. dependence on oil from the region. Latin American and Caribbean nations supplied the

United States with almost one-third of U.S. crude oil imports in 2010—Mexico and Venezuela

accounted for 12.5% and 9.9%, respectively.15 There have been concerns in recent years,

however, about Mexico’s declining oil production; the country’s proven oil reserves are declining

because of insufficient funds available for maintenance and exploration. Venezuela has vast

proven oil reserves, the second largest in the world, but its production also has been in decline in

recent years because of maintenance issues, natural decline of older fields, and compliance with

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production cuts. Venezuela remains a

major supplier of crude oil to the United States (the fifth largest), but its U.S.-destined oil exports

have declined as the country has diversified its trading partners and supplied significant amounts

of oil at preferential prices to Caribbean and Central American nations, especially Cuba.16

Members of Congress expressed concern about the continued U.S. dependence on imported oil

14

For additional information, see P.L. 112-127CRS Report R41215, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug

Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, coordinated by (name redacted).

15

Derived from oil important statistics provided by the U.S. Energy Administration.

16

U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela,” March 2011.

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from Venezuela, although observers pointed out that the two countries are mutually dependent on

the oil sector since a large portion of Venezuela’s oil is refined in the United States. Another issue

for Congress was Cuba’s development of its offshore oil sector and the potential impact of an oil

spill on the United States.17

With regard to trade, the 112th Congress conducted numerous hearings during the first session on

the pending FTAs with Colombia and Panama, with implementing legislation for both agreements

introduced and approved in October 2011. Congressional attention then turned to the

implementation of those agreements, with the Colombia FTA entering into force on May 15,

2012, and the Panama FTA entering into force on October 31, 2012. Oversight on Colombia,

which was the more controversial of the two agreements, focused on the country’s commitments

under an “Action Plan Related to Labor Rights.” Progress on U.S. negotiations with 10 Pacific

rim countries for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement was also of congressional interest.

Chile, Mexico, and Peru are among the TPP countries negotiating the trade agreement.18 Other

trade issues related to Latin America included the safety of Mexican trucks operating in the

United States (the two countries resolved the issue in 2011) and consideration of potential

changes to U.S. cotton subsidies that would have allowed the United States to avoid retaliatory

trade measures imposed by Brazil, and

U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001

terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional

cooperation.19 The State Department maintains that terrorism in the region today is largely

perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean

groups, while the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remains low for most countries in the

hemisphere. Cuba has been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since

1982, and both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries

determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. There was increased

congressional concern in 2012bout Iran’s growing relations with several countries in the region,

especially Venezuela, and related concerns about the activities of Hezbollah in the region. Both

Hezbollah and Iran have been implicated in the bombing of two Jewish targets in Buenos Aires in

the early 1990s. The State Department maintains that there are no known operational cells of

either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere, but it has concerns about the

fundraising activities of these groups in the region.

Brazil

U.S. policy toward Brazil is in flux as policymakers seek to adjust to Brazil’s role as an emerging

center of influence. Brazil’s economy is now the seventh largest in the world, and the country has

utilized its economic clout to consolidate its power in South America and exert more influence on

global matters. Consequently, U.S.-Brazilian engagement increasingly involves regional and

international issues in addition to bilateral concerns. The changing relationship has occasionally

frustrated U.S. officials as the two multicultural democracies’ shared values have not always

17

For additional information, see the discussion of Cuba’s offshore oil development in CRS Report R41617, Cuba:

Issues for the 112th Congress, by (name redacted).

18

For additional information on the TPP, see CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and

Issues for Congress, coordinated by (name redacted)

19

For additional information, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by (name redacted) and

(name redacted).

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translated into common approaches to international affairs. In 2010 and 2011, for example, Brazil

used its temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council to advocate engagement with internationally

isolated regimes like Iran, Libya, and Syria, rather than sanctions, which it views as a prelude to

armed conflict. Although some U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns about Brazil’s foreign

policy, they have continued to pursue cooperation on many issues. Collaboration on energy

issues, especially biofuels development, has been a major focus of bilateral engagement, and the

decision by Congress to allow a 54-cent-per-gallon duty on imported ethanol to expire at the end

of 2011 removed a major barrier to further cooperation. U.S. policymakers have also sought to

boost trade relations as Brazil’s fast growing market is a potential destination for increased U.S.

exports.

Key Policy Issues in 2012: Congress maintained interest in Brazil in 2012 with several Members

introducing potential legislation related to energy and trade; however, none of the bills advanced.

H.R. 4621, introduced in April, would have authorized negotiations with Brazil to obtain open

and reciprocal market access for trade in ethanol products. Likewise, a bill introduced in

September, H.R. 6539, would have created a U.S.-Brazil Joint Commission on Commerce and

Trade to address bilateral trade issues and promote commercial opportunities in both countries.

Both versions of the 2012 farm bill, S. 3240 and H.R. 6083, would have addressed issues in the

long-running U.S.-Brazil cotton dispute through modifications of the U.S. cotton program.

For additional information, see CRS Report RL33456, Brazil-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted);

and CRS Report RL32571, Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program, by (name

redacted).

Central America and the Caribbean: Citizen Security

In recent years, U.S. policymakers have grown increasingly concerned about security conditions

in Central America and the Caribbean. Although conditions vary by country, many nations in the

region have struggled for years to deal with rising levels of crime and violence, which analysts

have linked to factors such as widespread social exclusion, security force corruption, and

impunity for the perpetrators of crime. These problems have been compounded by traffickers

seeking to exploit the region’s institutional weaknesses to transport illicit narcotics from

producers in South America to consumer markets in the United States and Europe. The U.S.

government has sought to counter these trends through the Central America Regional Security

Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Both initiatives provide

partner nations with equipment, training, and technical assistance to support immediate law

enforcement and interdiction operations. They also fund efforts to strengthen the long-term

capacities of governmental institutions to address security challenges and the underlying

conditions that contribute to them. Congress has appropriated an estimated $496.5 million for

CARSI since FY2008 and an estimated $203 million for CBSI since FY2010.

Key Policy Issues in 2012: Congress continued to closely track security developments and

support U.S. assistance efforts in Central America and the Caribbean during 2012. The Senate

Caucus on International Narcotics Control, for example, held a hearing on U.S.-Caribbean

security cooperation and issued a report on the subject. Both houses of Congress expressed

continued support for CARSI and CBSI in their annual foreign aid appropriations measures, H.R.

5857 (H.Rept. 112-494) and S. 3241 (S.Rept. 112-172). Congress chose not to act on either bill,

however, so funding for the two initiatives is being provided through a continuing resolution, P.L.

112-175, until March 27, 2013. Congress also closely tracked human rights conditions in the two

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sub-regions, and placed some security assistance to Honduras—a country of particular concern—

on hold.

For additional information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security

Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted

); CRS Report RL34112,

Gangs in Central America, by (name redacted); and

Latin

America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs,

coordinated by (name redacted).

Colombia

A key U.S. ally in the region, Colombia has endured internal armed conflict for nearly half a

century. In recent years, the Colombian government, in close cooperation with the United States

through a strategy known as Plan Colombia, has reestablished government control over much of

its territory, reduced poverty, and made significant headway in combating drug trafficking and

terrorist activities. Colombia’s achievements in improved citizen security and economic stability

are notable, but some observers continue to raise concerns about human rights conditions in the

country. Between FY2000-FY2012, Congress provided Colombia more than $8 billion in

assistance. This support, provided through U.S. State Department and Department of Defense

accounts, is gradually being reduced as programs are being turned over to Colombian control.

Under current President Juan Manuel Santos, Colombia has been strengthening its trade relations

with the United States and others, and improving its relationships with neighboring countries,

including Venezuela and Ecuador. In October 2011, Congress approved implementing legislation

for the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) with bipartisan support, despite continuing

concerns about allegations of anti-trade union violence and related human rights and labor issues.

In April 2012, when Colombia hosted the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena (see “Key Events

in 2012” below), the Obama Administration announced the CFTA would enter into force on May

15, 2012. Following its May entry into force, the trade agreement eliminated duties on 80% of

U.S. exports to Colombia. Most remaining tariffs and barriers to bilateral trade will be eliminated

within 10 years of implementation. In October 2012, formal peace talks with the country’s

dominant leftist guerrilla organization opened in Norway and are continuing in Cuba.

Key Policy Issues in 2012: Congressional interest in Colombia centered on trade, human rights,

counternarcotics and security. After entry into force of the U.S. Colombia-Free Trade Agreement,

some Members of Congress continued to monitor Colombia’s compliance with the “Action Plan

Related to Labor Rights” announced prior to the trade agreement’s passage. Policymakers also

considered U.S. assistance to Colombia with its ongoing counternarcotics, counterterrorism,

judicial reform, economic development, and human rights components. In House and Senate

FY2013 foreign aid appropriations bills, there was broad support for the Obama Administration’s

FY2013 request of $332 million for Colombian foreign assistance. Late in 2012, Members of

Congress monitored the progress of the peace negotiations between the government and leftist

guerrilla forces and their effect on security conditions in Colombia.

For additional information, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations,

and Congressional Interest, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL34470,The U.S.-Colombia Free

Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL34759,

U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues, by (name redacted).

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Cuba

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through a variety of

strong economic sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the

Cuban people, including U.S.-sponsored broadcasting and support for democracy and human

rights activists. After Fidel Castro’s stepping down from power in 2006 because of poor health

and the economic goals of the Raúl Castro government that could significantly alter Cuba’s state

economic model, a number of observers called for a new approach aimed at influencing the

Cuban government and society through increased contact and engagement. Others maintain that

despite Cuba’s release of many political prisoners, the human rights situation remains poor with

thousands of short-term detentions. They contend that easing U.S. sanctions without concrete

political reform would facilitate the survival of the communist regime. The Obama

Administration has relaxed various restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, most

significantly for Cuban families, but the Administration has continued to express concern about

the poor human rights situation. Moreover, a key impediment to improved relations since late

2009 has been Cuba’s imprisonment of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

subcontractor Alan Gross, who was working on USAID-funded democracy projects in Cuba.

(Also see “March 26-28, 2012: Pope Benedict XVI Visit to Cuba” below.)

Key Policy Issues in 2012: Strong congressional interest on Cuba continued in 2012. Policy

issues of sustained congressional interest included the country’s human rights situation; the status

of Cuba’s offshore oil development and oil prevention and response capability; funding for U.S.

government democracy and human rights projects; funding for Radio and TV Martí broadcasting

to Cuba; and the continued imprisonment of Alan Gross. In terms of legislative action, S.Res.

366, approved in February, condemned the Cuban government for the death of democracy activist

Wilman Villar Mendoza after a hunger strike; S.Res. 525, approved in July, honored prominent

Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá, killed in a car accident; and S.Res. 609, approved on December

5, 2012, called for the release of Alan Gross. While Congress did not complete action on FY2013

foreign aid appropriations legislation, funding for Cuba democracy programs and Cuba

broadcasting was continued through March 27, 2013 by a continuing appropriations resolution

(P.L. 112-175).

For additional information, see CRS Report R41617, Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress, by

(name redacted); CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by

(name redacted); and CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and

U.S. Policy Considerations, by (name redacted).

Haiti

In the almost three years since the January 2010 earthquake that devastated much of Haiti and

killed an estimated 316,000 people,20 the overarching goal of U.S. assistance there has been to

help Haiti “build back better.” U.S. assistance focuses on four key sectors, in alignment with

Haiti’s national plan for reconstruction and development: 1) infrastructure and energy; 2)

governance and rule of law; 3) health and other basic services; and 4) food and economic

security. Major accomplishments include removal of rubble at a much faster rate than in recent

20

U.S. Agency for International Development, “Haiti – Earthquake and Cholera, Fact Sheet #3, FY2012,” December

12, 2011.

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disasters elsewhere; the election of and transition to a new president and legislature; a coordinated

response to an ongoing cholera epidemic and prevention of its outbreak in displaced persons

camps in the capital; and increased agricultural production.

Nonetheless, there is widespread criticism that neither the disbursement of aid nor reconstruction

is occurring quickly enough. There are many obstacles to more rapid recovery and reconstruction,

including the concentration of damage in a densely populated urban area. Although an aid

coordinating mechanism, the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC), was criticized

for being slow to get organized and approve programs, its term expired in October 2011, and

about a year passed before the Haitian government created a committee to take over its

coordinating duties in late 2012. The cholera epidemic that broke out in late 2010 further delayed

the shifting of funds and efforts from emergency response to reconstruction programs and

continues to require substantial resources.

Another obstacle is political fragility and instability. The already weak Haitian government

suffered massive losses in infrastructure and personnel, and often seemed paralyzed with inaction

after the disaster. Gridlock between President Michel Martelly- who took office in May 2011- and

the legislature continue to make aid disbursal and development difficult. Former members of the

Haitian army and would-be soldiers protesting in favor of reestablishing the army disrupted

parliament; after one of their marches turned violent in May 2012, the government closed the ten

old bases they had been occupying. Elections for one-third of the Senate and a variety of local

officials are long overdue. Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe said in July 2012 that they would be

held before the year’s end, but as 2012 draws to a close, an election date has yet to be set.

Key policy issues: The key congressional concerns in 2012 included whether U.S. aid to Haiti is

being disbursed and implemented effectively. A related issue is corruption. Officials in Haiti and

the Dominican Republic have been investigating corruption allegations linked to President

Martelly, triggering protests against the President. Martelly has denied the charges. Other

concerns included how best to continue to improve security in Haiti. By year’s end, the Haitian

government had turned its focus to further strengthening the Haitian National Police, as outlined

in Haiti’s national plan for development, and agreed upon by international donors. Plans for recreation of an army, as initially proposed by President Martelly, appeared to be on the back

burner, and envisioning a limited, emergency response role if one were to be revived. Some

Members of Congress also expressed the desire to promote greater respect for basic human rights,

including addressing the problem of gender-based violence. Congress was also concerned that

U.S. aid programs further strengthen Haitian institutions of governance and rule of law, and that

the overdue elections be held in a free, fair, and transparent manner.

For background information, see CRS Report R42559, Haiti Under President Martelly: Current

Conditions and Congressional Concerns, by (name redacted); CRS Report R41689,

Haiti’s

National Elections: Issues, Concerns, and Outcome, by (name redacted); and CRS Report

R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by (name redacted) and (name redacte

d).

Mexico

Security issues have recently overshadowed immigration and trade in U.S. relations with Mexico,

but newly-inaugurated President Enrique Peña Nieto hopes to refocus attention to economic

matters. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated $1.9 billion in anticrime and counterdrug

assistance for Mexico as part of the Mérida Initiative, with the focus of aid gradually shifting

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from training and equipping security forces towards institution-building. Bilateral cooperation

helped the Felipe Calderón Administration (December 2006-November 2012) arrest or kill record

numbers of drug kingpins, but some 60,000 people may have died as a result of organized crimerelated violence during its term in office. Concerns about the violence in northern Mexico

prompted border security to return to the forefront of the bilateral agenda, as policymakers sought

to make the border as secure and efficient as possible. As comprehensive immigration reform

efforts stalled in the U.S. Congress, the enactment of tough state laws against illegal immigration

concerned the Mexican government. In the economic realm, the U.S. and Mexican governments

resolved a longstanding trade issue in 2011 involving the trucking provisions of the North

American Free Trade Agreement and sought to improve North American competitiveness through

regulatory cooperation. On June 18, 2012, President Obama announced that the nine countries

involved in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement had extended

an invitation to Mexico to join the negotiations. The February 2012 signing of a Trans-Boundary

Hydrocarbons Agreement for managing oil resources in the Gulf of Mexico could create new

opportunities for bilateral energy cooperation.

Key Policy Issues in 2012: Congress maintained an active interest in Mexico, with the agenda

dominated by the country’s security situation and the Mérida Initiative, human rights conditions,

border security, economic issues, and the July 2012 elections and December 1, 2012 political

transition (see “Key Events in 2012” below.) The Obama Administration asked for $269.5 million

in assistance for Mexico in its FY2013 budget request, including $234 million in Mérida

assistance. Congress also held hearings and issued reports on how organized crime and

government efforts to suppress it are affecting human rights and democracy in Mexico. Drug

trafficking-related violence in northern Mexico kept border security on the agenda, with P.L. 11293 increasing penalties for aviation smuggling; P.L. 112-127 tightening sentencing guidelines for

building illicit border tunnels; and P.L. 112-205 providing statutory authority for the bilateral

Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) program. Congressional action did not occur on

the Trans-Boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, but may be required in 2013 for the agreement to

take effect. Mexico’s recent accession to the TPP negotiations has generated congressional

interest. Congress has also monitored the policy positions taken by the incoming Peña Nieto

administration, particularly in the security realm.

For additional information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress, by (name

redacted); CRS Report R41349,

U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative

and Beyond, by (name redacted) and Kristin M. Finklea; CRS Report R41576,

Mexico’s

Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence, by (name redacted); and

CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by (na

me redacted).

Venezuela

While historically the United States has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of

oil, friction in bilateral relations has risen over the past decade under the populist government of

President Hugo Chávez. Among the concerns of U.S. policymakers have been the deterioration of

human rights and democratic conditions, Venezuela’s significant military arms purchases, lack of

cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and Venezuela’s

relations with Cuba and Iran. In September 2012, President Obama issued the eighth annual

determination (as part of the annual narcotics certification process) that Venezuela had “failed

demonstrably” to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics measures. The State

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Department maintains that individual members of the Chávez government and security forces

were credibly reported to have engaged in or facilitated drug trafficking activities. The United

States has imposed financial sanctions on six current Venezuelan government and military

officials for allegedly helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug

and weapons trafficking, including General Henry Rangel Silva, who Chávez appointed as

defense minister in January 2012. The United States has also imposed sanctions on three

Venezuelan companies for alleged support to Iran and on several Venezuelan individuals for

providing financial support to Hezbollah (for more details, see “Iran’s Growing Relations in Latin

America” below).

Key Policy Issues in 2012: In 2012, Congressional oversight on Venezuela continued on human

rights, drug trafficking, and terrorism concerns, including the extent of relations with Iran.

Venezuela’s October 2012 presidential elections also focused some attention on the state of

democracy in the country. President Chávez, who underwent significant treatment for two bouts

of cancer in 2011 and 2012, won reelection to another six-year term by defeating unified

opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski by an 11% margin. (Also see “October 7, 2012:

Venezuelan Election” below.) On December 8, 2012, however, Chávez announced that his cancer

had returned, and that he supported Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his successor if he were

unable to continue to lead the country. Several days later, Chávez returned to Cuba for surgery

that was described as complicated. At year’s end, Venezuela’s political future appeared uncertain.

While Congress did not complete action on FY2013 foreign aid appropriations legislation, U.S.

funding for democracy programs in Venezuela was continued through March 27, 2013 by a

continuing appropriations resolution (P.L. 112-175).

For additional background, see CRS Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by (name re

dacted).

Iran’s Growing Relations in Latin America

There has been concern among policymakers in recent years about Iran’s growing interest in

Latin America, particularly its relations with Venezuela. The personal relationship between

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has driven the

strengthening of bilateral ties, although there has been contention among policymakers over the

extent and significance of Iran’s relations with the region. A major rationale for Tehran’s

increased focus on Latin America has been Iran’s efforts to overcome its international isolation,

including efforts to circumvent U.S. and U.N. sanctions. To date, the United States imposed

sanctions on two companies in Venezuela in 2008 because of connections to Iran’s proliferation

activities, while in May 2011, the United States imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil

company for providing cargoes of a gasoline additive to Iran. Venezuela has played a key role in

the development of Iran’s expanding relations with other countries in the region, especially

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. While Iran has promised significant investment in these

countries, observers maintain that there is little evidence to show that such promises have been

fulfilled. President Ahmadinejad’s January 2012 trip to Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador

again increased concerns by some about Iran’s efforts to forge ties with the region. In a July 2012

press interview, President Obama maintained overall concern about “Iran engaging in

destabilizing activity around the globe,” but indicated that his “sense is that what Mr. Chávez has

done over the past several years has not had a serious national security impact on us.”21 This was

21

“The Situation Room,” Transcript, CNN, July 11, 2012.

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reiterated by the head of the U.S. Southern Command, General Douglas Fraser, who maintained

that he does not see Venezuela as a “national security threat,” and that Iran’s connection with

Venezuela is primarily diplomatic and economic.22

Another reason for U.S. concerns about Iran’s deepening relations with Latin America is its

support for the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah, a State Department-designated

Foreign Terrorist Organization, which along with Iran is reported to have been linked to two

bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s. In recent years, U.S. concerns

regarding Hezbollah in Latin America have focused on its fundraising activities among

sympathizers in the region, particularly in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay,

and in Venezuela. The United States has imposed sanctions on individuals and companies in the

region for providing support to Hezbollah.

Key Policy Issues in 2012: Congress continued its strong oversight of Iran and Hezbollah in

Latin America, with hearings on the issue in both houses. Congress took action by completing

action on H.R. 3783 in December 2012, a measure requiring the Secretary of State to conduct an

assessment within 180 days “of the threats posed to the United States by Iran’s growing presence

and activity in the Western Hemisphere” and submit to Congress the results of the assessment and

a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the region.

For additional background, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by (name

redacted) and (name redacted); and CRS Report RL32048,Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy

Responses, by (name redacted).

Organization of American States

Since its foundation in 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) has served as a forum

through which the United States has sought to foster regional cooperation and advance U.S.

priorities in the Western Hemisphere. Throughout much of the institution’s history, OAS actions

reflected U.S. policy as the other member states sought to closely align themselves with the

dominant economic and political power in the region. This has changed to a certain extent over

the past decade as Latin American and Caribbean governments have diversified their foreign

relations and grown increasingly independent of the United States. In recent years, U.S.

policymakers have expressed concerns about some of the organization’s actions (or lack thereof),

including the repeal of a 1962 resolution that had expelled Cuba from participation in the OAS,

and what some consider the organization’s insufficient support for democracy in nations such as

Nicaragua and Venezuela. These and other issues have led some Members of Congress to assert

that the OAS advances policies that run counter to U.S. interests, and that the United States

should no longer fund the organization. Others maintain that OAS actions continue to closely

align with U.S. priorities in most cases, and that U.S. policy should seek to strengthen the

institution since it links the United States to the rest of the region at a time when many nations are

intensifying relations with extra-regional powers and participating in multilateral organizations

that exclude the United States.

Key Policy Issues in 2012: Debate over the OAS continued in 2012 as Members of Congress

engaged in their oversight responsibilities by responding to various developments in inter22

Frank Bajak, “Top U.S. General: Venezuela Not a National Security Threat,” AP Newswire, July 31, 2012.

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American relations. Several Members reiterated their opposition to Cuban participation in the

OAS after most of the leaders attending the sixth Summit of the Americas voiced support for

Cuba’s inclusion at future summits (see “April 14-15, 2012: Summit of the Americas” below).

Some Members also spoke out against proposed reforms to the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights (IACHR), expressed concerns that the OAS is not fully pursuing its obligations

under the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and called for corrective measures to address the

organization’s administrative and financial challenges.

For additional information, see CRS Report R42639, Organization of American States:

Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Key Events in 2012

March 26-28, 2012: Pope Benedict XVI Visit to Cuba

Pope Benedict XVI visited Cuba from March 26-28, 2012, the first papal visit since the visit of

Pope John Paul II in 1998. The Pope’s visit coincided with the 400th anniversary of Our Lady of

Charity (La Virgen de Caridad del Cobre), the patron saint of Cuba. After a trip to Mexico, the

pontiff’s visit to Cuba began in the eastern city of Santiago, where he celebrated mass in the Plaza

of the Revolution, and visited the shrine of Our Lady of Charity in the town of El Cobre outside

Santiago. The Pope then traveled to Havana, where he celebrated an outdoor mass in the Plaza of

the Revolution and also met with church and Cuban government officials. While the purpose of

the Pope’s visit was pastoral (some 60% to 70% of Cubans are Catholic), the trip also highlighted

the increased social and political profile of the Catholic Church in Cuba and its efforts in recent

years to influence the Cuban government.

Cuba’s Catholic Church became more openly critical of the Cuban government in 1993 when

Cuban bishops issued a pastoral letter opposing limitations on freedom, excessive surveillance by

state security, and imprisonment and harassment of dissidents. For many observers, the bishops’

statement reflected a new era in which the Church would be more openly critical of the

government. Pope John Paul elevated Archbishop of Havana Jaime Ortega to the position of

Cardinal in 1994, which raised the profile of the Church in Cuba. Since then, Ortega has been

widely commended for reinvigorating the Cuban Catholic Church—the role of Caritas Cuban, the

Church’s social assistance agency, has expanded throughout Cuba under Ortega. Cuban bishops

have not refrained from speaking out on the need for change in Cuba, and Church publications

have become a way for the Church to broaden the debate in Cuba on social and economic

problems facing the country.

Beginning in 2010, the Cuban Catholic Church under Cardinal Ortega took on a prominent role in

engaging with the Cuba government over political prisoners. This led to the release of more than

125 prisoners, with the majority going to Spain. In anticipation of Pope Benedict’s visit, the

Cuban government pardoned almost 3,000 prisoners in late December 2011, although only seven

were reported to be political prisoners.23 Today, there are reported to be at least 50 prisoners

sanctioned for political reasons,24 although the government has continued to harass and intimidate

23

“2,991 Inmates Benefit from Cuba’s Pardons,” Agence France Presse, December 28, 2011.

Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional (CCDHRN), “Lista Parcial de Sancionados o

(continued...)

24

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dissidents and human rights activists with thousands of short-term detentions. The death of

imprisoned hunger striker Wilman Villar Mendoza on January 19, 2012, again focused world

attention on Cuba’s continuing poor human rights situation.

During his March 2012 trip to Cuba, Pope Benedict urged Cubans during his homily in Santiago

“to build a renewed and open society, a better society, one more worthy of humanity, and which

better reflects the goodness of God.”25 In Havana, the Pope invoked 19th century Cuban priest

Father Felix Varela (a candidate for sainthood) as someone who offers a “path to a true social

transformation ... to form virtuous men and women in order to forge a worthy and free nation.”

Emphasizing reconciliation, the Pope asserted that “Cuba and the world need change, but this will

occur only if each one is in a position to seek the truth and chooses the way of love, sowing

reconciliation and fraternity.”26 At the end of his visit, in reference to U.S. economic sanctions,

the Pope criticized “restrictive economic measures, imposed from outside the country,” as an

“unfair burden to the Cuban people.”27

Some Cuban dissidents, as well as some in the Cuban American community, criticized the Pope

for not more forcefully confronting the Cuban government during his visit. The Pope did not meet

with any dissidents or human rights activists during his visit or speak out about the increased

government harassment surrounding his visit. As a result, some in the dissident community felt

the church lost credibility as a result of the Pope’s visit. Other dissidents, however, emphasize the

record of the Cuban Catholic Church in supporting political prisoners and their families and for

the support provided to the Ladies in White. They point to the church’s role in opening space for

increased public dialogue, including criticism of the government, on economic and social issues,

through church publications.

The visit of Pope Benedict could provide the church with more space to speak out on significant

economic, social, and political issues facing the country. Given that the Catholic Church is Cuba’s

largest independent civil society group, it is likely that it will continue to have a significant voice

as Cuba confronts economic and political change in the years ahead.

April 14-15, 2012: Summit of the Americas

On April 14-15, 2012, 30 of the Western Hemisphere’s 34 democratically elected leaders gathered

in Cartagena, Colombia for the sixth Summit of the Americas. The Summits of the Americas,

which have been held periodically since 1994, serve as opportunities for the hemisphere’s leaders

to engage directly with one another and discuss issues of collective concern. The theme of the

Cartagena Summit was “Connecting the Americas: Partners for Prosperity,” and its official

agenda focused on how physical integration and regional cooperation can assist the countries of

the hemisphere in addressing the challenges of poverty and inequality, citizen security, natural

disasters, and access to technology.

(...continued)

Procesados por Motivos Políticos en Cuba,” April 25, 2012, available at http://cuba.blogspot.com/2012/04/lista-parcialde-sancionados-o.html

25

“Full Text of Pope Benedict XVI’s Homily in Santiago de Cuba,” Miami Herald, March 26, 2012.

26

“Full Text of Pope Benedict XVI’s Homily in Havana,” Miami Herald, March 28, 2012.

27

“Full Text of Pope Benedict XVI’s Farewell Speech at Jose Martí Airport,” Miami Herald, March 28, 2012.

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The hemisphere’s leaders were unable to establish a consensus vision for the region and failed to

produce a summit declaration as a result of several contentious issues that overshadowed the

official agenda. Two issues that often divide the United States from other countries in the region,

engagement with Cuba and U.S.-backed antidrug policies, were discussed extensively. All of the

leaders present—with the exceptions of President Obama and Prime Minister Harper of Canada—

reportedly voiced support for Cuba’s inclusion at the next Summit of the Americas, which is

scheduled to be held in Panama in 2015. On drug policy, the hemisphere’s leaders agreed to

commission a study from the Organization of American States (OAS) analyzing the results of

current efforts and exploring new approaches that may be more effective. They also agreed to

establish a new regional body to help coordinate efforts to combat transnational organized crime.

With regards to the official agenda, the hemisphere’s leaders issued a list of 47 commitments

involving individual and cooperative efforts to reduce poverty and inequality, improve citizen

security, mitigate the effects of natural disasters, integrate physical infrastructure, and expand

access to information and technology.

President Obama’s actions at the Cartagena Summit suggest he intends to maintain the current

direction of U.S. policy toward the region. He reiterated his pledge from the previous summit to

seek partnerships of equality and mutual respect, but remained firmly opposed to changes in U.S.

policies concerning Cuba and illicit drugs. Likewise, the new initiatives he introduced appear to

be relatively limited in scale. The Small Business Network of the Americas initiative, for

example, is designed to foster an interconnected network of business development centers to

strengthen connections between the region’s businesses and increase entrepreneurs’ access to

financing. Similarly, the Women’s Entrepreneurship in the Americas initiative will utilize publicprivate partnerships to strengthen the skills and capacities of women entrepreneurs, as well as

increase their access to financing and markets. As part of a third initiative, USAID’s Innovation

Fund of the Americas will solicit proposals and finance projects to find, test, support, and scale

cost-effective solutions to the hemisphere’s development challenges.

July 1, 2012: Mexican Elections

On July 1, 2012, Mexico held federal (presidential and legislative) elections. Turnout reached

record levels as 63% of eligible voters cast their ballots. Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute

(IFE) conducted the elections with the oversight of the Federal Electoral Tribunal, which must

certify the results by September 6, 2012. While some election observers assert that vote-buying

and other irregularities marred the electoral process, observers from the Organization of American

States generally praised IFE’s handling of the elections.

As predicted, the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that governed Mexico from

1929 to 2000 retook the presidency after 12 years of rule by the conservative National Action

Party (PAN) and won a plurality in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. PRI/Green Ecological

Party (PVEM) candidate Enrique Peña Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, won the

presidential election, albeit by a smaller margin than polls had forecast. Peña Nieto captured

38.2% of the vote, followed by Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic

Revolution (PRD) with 31.6%, Josefina Vázquez Mota of the PAN with 25.4%, and Gabriel

Quadri of the National Alliance Party (PANAL) with 2.3%. The relatively narrow margin of Peña

Nieto’s victory, coupled with the fact that López Obrador has challenged the election results

before the Electoral Tribunal, could complicate the transition period. And, while PAN President

Felipe Calderón has pledged to work with the incoming administration, his party has joined the

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PRD in calling on authorities to investigate whether the PRI used any illicit finances to fund Peña

Nieto’s campaign. Peña Nieto is to take office for a six-year term on December 1, 2012.

Polls predicted that the PRI might also capture a simple majority in one or both chambers of the

Mexican Congress, a feat not accomplished since 1994. The PRI and the allied PVEM party

failed to capture a simple majority in either house. As a result, the PRI will have to form crossparty coalitions in order to pass key reforms, particularly those requiring constitutional

amendments. The PRI will most likely find support from the PANAL and possibly the PAN,

which lost seats in the Chamber but retained a powerful bargaining position. The PRD-led

coalition, which will now have more seats in the Chamber than the PAN and remains the thirdlargest force in the Senate, could complicate some reform efforts, including those aimed at

increasing private participation in the energy sector, a key priority for Peña Nieto.

Some Members of Congress may be concerned that the leadership changes resulting from the July

1, 2012, Mexican elections will significantly impact U.S.-Mexican relations, particularly now that

the party controlling the presidency has changed. However, few analysts are predicting that the

transition from PAN to PRI rule will result in seismic shifts in bilateral relations. During the

campaign, Enrique Peña Nieto sought to reassure U.S. policy makers that a PRI administration

would continue to combat organized crime, while also striving to reduce violence in Mexico. He

also expressed support for increased bilateral and trilateral (with Canada) economic and energy

cooperation. Since the elections, Peña Nieto has said that he is committed to “having an intense,

close relationship of effective [security] collaboration measured by results”28 with the United

States. President Obama has congratulated Peña Nieto on his victory and Assistant Secretary of

State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson has said that U.S. officials “look forward

to working with him”29 after he takes office.

For additional background, see CRS Report R42548, Mexico’s 2012 Elections, by (name redacted

).

October 7, 2012: Venezuelan Election

In Venezuela’s October 7, 2012 presidential race, President Chávez won reelection by a margin of

11%, receiving 55.07% of the vote compared to 44.31% for opposition candidate Henrique

Capriles, according to the National Electoral Council. Chávez received almost 8.2 million votes,

about 1.6 million more than Capriles, who received almost 6.6 million votes.30 President Chávez

won all but two of Venezuela’s 23 states, including a very narrow win Capriles’s home state.

Unlike the last presidential election in 2006, Venezuela did not host international observer

missions. Instead, two domestic Venezuelan observer groups monitored the vote. Most reports

indicate that election day was peaceful with only minor irregularities.

A White House spokesman, while acknowledging differences with President Chávez,

congratulated “the Venezuelan people on the high level of participation, as well as on what was a

28

William Booth and Nick Miroff, “Closer Ties to U.S. on Horizon,” Washington Post, July 9, 2012.

U.S. Department of State, ‘Foreign Press Center Briefing with Roberta S. Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of State for

Western Hemisphere Affairs,” press release, July 11, 2012.

30

See the official results on the website of the National Electoral Council at http://www.cne.gob.ve/

resultado_presidencial_2012/r/1/reg_000000.html

29

Congressional Research Service

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

relatively peaceful process.”31A State Department official added “that the views of the more than

6 million people who voted for the opposition should be taken into account going forward.”32

Credited with running an effective well-organized campaign that increased the strength of a

unified opposition, Capriles accepted defeat and congratulated President Chávez, but also

maintained that being president entails “working to solve the problems of all Venezuelans.”33

Capriles said that he would continue to serve the Venezuelan people. For the opposition, the

election showed a significant strengthening of support – it received about 2.2 million more votes

than in the last presidential election in 2006, and its share of the vote grew from almost 37% in

2006 to 44% in 2012.

If Capriles had won the presidency, he would have faced a National Assembly still dominated by

Chávez supporters since the country’s next legislative elections are not due until September 2015.

Without legislative support, he would have faced difficulty in making significant policy changes.

For the United States, however, an opposition victory would likely have reduced tensions in

bilateral relations and allowed potential progress in the key areas of anti-drug and

counterterrorism cooperation.

For President Chávez, the election was his fourth presidential victory. It affirmed his longstanding

popular support as well as support for his government’s array of social programs that have helped

raise living standards for many Venezuelans. In his victory speech, President Chávez

congratulated the opposition for their participation and civic spirit and pledged to work with

them. At the same time, however, the president vowed that Venezuela would “continue its march

toward the democratic socialism of the 21st century.” 34

With Chávez’s reelection, it is likely that there will be a deepening of statist economic policies,

and some fear that there will be continued erosion of democratic institutions and practices. Under

President Chávez, it is likely that relations with the United States will continue to be strained as

the government continues to espouse an anti-U.S. agenda and close relations with Iran. On the

other hand, Venezuela’s role in supporting Colombia’s peace process and its increased

counternarcotics and security cooperation with Colombia could lead to an easing of tension in

some aspects of U.S.-Venezuelan relations.

Post-Election Developments: Venezuela’s political future became increasingly uncertain when

President Chávez announced on December 8, 2012 that his cancer had returned, and that he

supported Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his successor if he were unable to continue to lead

the country. Several days later, Chávez returned to Cuba for surgery that was described as

complicated. Chávez had undergone significant treatment in Cuba for two bouts of cancer in 2011

and earlier in 2012. Venezuela’s Constitution (Article 233) calls for new elections within 30 days

if Chávez died before being sworn into office in January 2013 or if he died or had to leave office

permanently in the first four years of his new term. Venezuela’s opposition would then have

another opportunity to compete at the polls, and would be advantaged by not having Chávez on

31

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney En Route Bakersfield,

CA,” October 8, 2012.

32

“U.S.: Venezuelan Opposition Views Should be Considered,” Agence France Presse, October 8, 2012.

33

William Neuman, “Chávez Wins a Third Term in Venezuela Amid Historically High Turnout,” New York Times,

October 8, 2012.

34

Laurent Thomet, “Chávez Reaches Out to Opposition After Victory,” Agence France Presse, October 8, 2012.

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

the ballot. In such a scenario, however, sympathy for Chávez could also engender support for a

Chavista candidate aiming to protect Chávez’s legacy and programs.

For additional background, see CRS Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by (name re

dacted).

Congressional Research Service

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Appendix. Hearings in the 112th Congress

Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 112th Congress on

Latin America and the Caribbean

Committee and Subcommitteea

Date

Title

House Ways and Means Committee,

Subcommittee on Trade

January 25,

2011

Hearing on the Pending Free Trade

Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and

South Korea and the Creation of U.S. Jobs

House Ways and Means Committee

February 9,

2011

President Obama’s Trade Policy Agenda

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

February

15, 2011

Does the U.S. Have a Policy Toward Latin

America?

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,

Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs

February

17, 2011

U.S. Policy Toward Latin America

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics

Control

March 9,

2011

Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling

Across the Southwest Border

House Foreign Affairs Committee

March 16,

2011

Agency for International Development and

the Millennium Challenge Corporation: Fiscal

Year 2012 Budget Requests and Future

Directions in Foreign Assistance

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere

March 17,

2011

The Colombia and Panama Free Trade

Agreements: National Security and Foreign

Policy Priorities

House Ways and Means Committee,

Subcommittee on Trade

March 17,

2011

Job-Creating Trade Agreements Part I

House Armed Services Committee

March 30,

2011

Hearing on National Defense Authorization

Act for FY 2012 and Oversight of Previously

Authorized Programs: FY 2012 NDAA

Budget Requests for U.S. European

Command, U.S. Southern Command, and

U.S. Northern Command

House Ways and Means Committee,

Subcommittee on Trade

March 30,

2011

Job-Creating Trade Agreements: Panama

Trade Promotion Agreement, Part II

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,

Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs

March 31,

2011

A Shared Responsibility: Counternarcotics

and Citizen Security in the Americas

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

April 13,

2011

Priorities for U.S. Assistance in the Western

Hemisphere

House Agriculture Committee

May 12,

2011

Hearing To Review Pending Free Trade

Agreements

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics

Control

May 25,

2011

Combating Drug Violence in Central

America

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

June 14,

2011

Holding Honduras Hostage: Revoked Visas

and U.S. Policy

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics

Control

June 15,

2011

Illegal Tunnels on the Southwest Border

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Committee and Subcommitteea

Date

Title

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,

Peace and Subcommittee on International

Development and Foreign Assistance,

Economic Affairs, and International

Environmental Protection

June 23,

2011

Rebuilding Haiti in the Martelly Era

Joint hearing, House Committee on

Oversight and Government Reform,

Subcommittee on National Security,

Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations

and House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

and Subcommittee on the Middle East and

South Asia

June 24,

2011

Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activity

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,

Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs

June 30,

2011

The State of Democracy in the Americas

House Homeland Security Committee,

Subcommittee on Counter-terrorism and

Intelligence

July 7, 2011

Hezbollah in Latin America—Implications for

U.S. Homeland Security

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

and Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations

September

13, 2011

Has Merida Evolved? Part One: The

Evolution Of Drug Cartels And The Threat

to Mexico’s Governance

Joint Subcommittee Hearing: House Foreign

Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

October 4,

2011

Merida Part Two: Insurgency and Terrorism

in Mexico

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations

October

12, 2011

The International Exploitation of Drug Wars

and What We Can Do About It

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Terrorism,

Nonproliferation, and Trade

October

12, 2011

Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S.

Law Enforcement, Part I

House Foreign Affairs Committee

October

13, 2011

Emerging Threats and Security in the

Western Hemisphere: Next Steps for U.S.

Policy

Senate Energy and Natural Resources

Committee

October

18, 2011

Hearing to examine the status of response

capability and readiness for oil spills in

foreign Outer Continental Shelf waters

adjacent to US waters

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics

Control

October

19, 2011

U.S.-Andean Security Cooperation

Joint hearing, Committee on Homeland

Security, Subcommittee on Oversight,

Investigations, and Management and

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and

Intelligence

October

26, 2011

Iranian Terror Operations on American Soil

House Homeland Security Committee,

Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,

and Management

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Committee and Subcommitteea

Date

Title

House Natural Resources Committee,

Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral

Resources

November

2, 2011

North American Offshore Energy: Mexico

and Canada Boundary Treaties and New

Drilling by Cuba and Bahamas

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Terrorism,

Nonproliferation, and Trade

November

17, 2011

Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S.

Law Enforcement, Part II

House Foreign Affairs Committee

December

1, 2011

Nicaragua: Part 1Democracy Held Hostage

in Nicaragua: Part I

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,

Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs

December

15, 2011

The U.S.-Caribbean Shared Security

Partnership: Responding To The Growth Of

Trafficking And Narcotics In The Caribbean

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

December

15, 2011

Markup Hearing on H.R. 3401 and H.R. 2542

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics

Control

February 1,

2012

U.S.-Caribbean Security Cooperation

House Foreign Affairs Committee

February 2,

2012

Ahmadinejad’s Tour of Tyrants and Iran’s

Agenda in the Western Hemisphere

Joint Hearing, House Foreign Affairs

Committee, Subcommittee on Africa,

Global Health, and Human Rights and

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

February

16, 2012

Further Human Rights Violations in Castro’s

Cuba: the Continued Abuse of Political

Prisoners

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,

Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs

February

16, 2012

Iran’s Influence and Activity in Latin America

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Terrorism,

Nonproliferation, and Trade

March 1,

2012

To Provide for a Comprehensive Strategy to

Counter Iran’s Growing Presence and

Hostile Activity in the Western Hemisphere,

and for Other Purposes; Markup Hearing of

H.R. 3783)

House Foreign Affairs Committee

March 20,

2012

The Fiscal Year 2013 Budget: A Review of

U.S. Foreign Assistance Amidst Economic

Uncertainty

House Committee on Appropriations

Subcommittee on State, Foreign

Operations, and Related Programs

March 29,

2012

Security Challenges in Latin America

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

April 25,

2012

Western Hemisphere Budget Review 2013:

What are U.S. Priorities?

House of Representatives, Tom Lantos

Human Rights Commission

May 10,

2012

Human Rights in Mexico

House of Representatives, Tom Lantos

Human Rights Commission

May 17,

2012

Threats to Civil Society and Human Rights

Defenders Worldwide

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

May 17,

2012

Cuba’s Global Network of Terrorism,

Intelligence, and Warfare

House Committee on the Judiciary,

Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and

Enforcement

May 31,

2012

Hearing on H.R. 2831, To amend Public Law

89-732 to modify the requirement for a

Cuban national to qualify for and maintain

status as a permanent resident.

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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Congress in 2012

Committee and Subcommitteea

Date

Title

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and

Human Rights

June 6,

2012

The U.S. State Department’s Inadequate

Response to Human Rights Concerns in

Bolivia: The Case of American Jacob

Ostreicher

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,

Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics

June 7,

2012

The Path to Freedom: Countering

Repression and Strengthening Civil Society in

Cuba

House Homeland Security Committee,

Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,

and Management

June 21,

2012

U.S. Caribbean Border: Open Road for

Drug Traffickers and Terrorists

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and

Human Rights

July 19,

2012

Poison Harvest: Deadly U.S. Mine Pollution

in Peru

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,

Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs

July 31,

2012

Doing Business in Latin America: Positive

Trends but Serious Challenges

House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and

Human Rights

August 1,

2012

Seeking Freedom for American Trapped in

Bolivian Prison

House Homeland Security Committee,

Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,

and Management

November

16, 2012

A Line in the Sand: Assessing Dangerous

Threats to Our Nation’s Borders

Source: Prepared by /name redacted), Information Research Specialist, CRS.

a.

House Committee websites available at http://www.house.gov/committees/. Senate Committee websites

available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/committees/d_three_sections_with_teasers/

committees_home.htm.

Author Contact Information

(name redacted), Coordinator

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Analyst in Latin American Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Analyst in Latin American Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Information Research Specialist

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

25

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