Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Congressional research reportMay 24, 2012
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
(name redacted)
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
May 24, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41832
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Summary
In a security alliance since 2004 and “strategic partners” since 2006, the United States and
Pakistan for decades experienced major shifts in the nature and tone of their relations. In the post9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan
actively combating religious militancy has been among the most important U.S. foreign policy
efforts. Vital U.S. interests are seen to be at stake in its engagement with Pakistan related to
regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons
proliferation; links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism; Pakistan-India tensions
and conflict; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. As a
haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and as the world’s most rapid
proliferator of nuclear weapons, Pakistan presents a combination that places it at the top of many
governments’ international security agendas.
The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently yearslong and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny
of the bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of
providing significant U.S. foreign assistance to a government and nation that may not have the
intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Although Obama Administration officials
and most senior congressional leaders spent most of 2011 consistently recognizing Pakistan as a
crucial ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, long-held doubts about
Islamabad’s commitment to core U.S. interests deepened over the course of the year. The
Pakistani military and intelligence services are seen to be too willing to distinguish among
Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to Afghan insurgent and anti-India militant
organizations operating from Pakistani territory as a means of forwarding Pakistani’s perceived
security interests.
U.S.-Pakistan relations are fluid at present, but running a clearly negative course: still based on
several national interests shared by both countries, yet marked by levels of mutual distrust and
resentment that are likely to catalyze a new set of assumptions for future ties. The tenor of
interactions has been increasingly negative in a slide predating a series of crises in 2011. These
included a CIA operative shooting dead two Pakistanis in Lahore, bin Laden’s killing, suspension
of most bilateral security cooperation, a spike in Haqqani Network attacks in Afghanistan, and an
incident in which two dozen Pakistani soldiers were inadvertently killed by NATO aircraft. The
latter calamity led Pakistan to shut down NATO’s road access to Afghanistan and demand an
apology that has not been forthcoming in intervening months. Access remains closed to date.
Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid in the post-9/11 period, having been
appropriated about $24 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. FY2013
legislation in the 112th Congress would cut U.S. assistance funding significantly from both the
levels requested by the Administration and from those Congress approved for FY2012. Provisions
also would introduce more rigorous restrictions and certification requirements on such aid. With
anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among ordinary Pakistanis,
persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious
challenges to U.S. decision makers. This report will be updated periodically. See also CRS Report
R41856, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, and CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid
Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, both by (name redacted) and (name re
dacted); and CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
Issues, by (name redacted) and Mary Beth Nikitin.
Congressional Research Service
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Policy Discussion............................................................................................................................. 3
Pre-2012 Setting ........................................................................................................................ 3
Debate Over Future Policy Options........................................................................................... 5
Notable Developments in 2011 ........................................................................................................ 7
High-Profile Political Assassinations ........................................................................................ 7
The Raymond Davis Affair........................................................................................................ 7
Death of Osama bin Laden ........................................................................................................ 8
Attack on Pakistan’s Mehran Naval Station ............................................................................ 10
Torture and Killing of Journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad ......................................................... 11
Partial Suspension of U.S. Security Assistance ....................................................................... 11
“Memogate” and Domestic Civil-Military Tensions ............................................................... 12
Salala Border Incident ............................................................................................................. 13
Notable Developments in 2012...................................................................................................... 14
U.S. Congressional Hearing and Legislation on Baluchistan .................................................. 14
Pakistan’s Parliamentary Review of the Bilateral Relationship .............................................. 14
NATO Summit in Chicago ...................................................................................................... 16
Conviction and Sentencing of Doctor Shakil Afridi ................................................................ 16
Administration Assessments and Bilateral Diplomacy .................................................................. 17
March 2011 Assessment and FY2011 Certification ................................................................ 17
September 2011 Assessment.................................................................................................... 18
April 2012 Pentagon Report to Congress ................................................................................ 19
Recent Bilateral Diplomacy..................................................................................................... 19
Controversy and Furor Over UAV Strikes ..................................................................................... 21
The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation............. 23
Acute Questions About the ISI’s Role ..................................................................................... 23
Continuing Intelligence Cooperation....................................................................................... 25
Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency .............................................................................................. 26
Ongoing Turmoil in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations .............................................................. 27
Afghan Reconciliation and Pakistan’s Role ............................................................................ 28
Haqqani Network Attacks and U.S. Frustrations ..................................................................... 29
A Haqqani Role in Afghan Reconciliation or FTO Designation? ........................................... 31
Pakistan and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan....................................... 32
U.S./NATO Ground Lines of Communication ........................................................................ 33
Indigenous Islamist Militancy and Pakistani Military Operations................................................. 34
Indigenous Militancy ............................................................................................................... 34
Text Box: Islamist Militant Groups in Pakistan ................................................................ 36
Domestic Military Operations ................................................................................................. 37
FATA Militancy Dynamics and Possible Negotiations ............................................................ 38
New Counterterrorism Pressure on Islamabad ........................................................................ 39
Pakistan, Terrorism, and U.S. Nationals ........................................................................................ 39
Progress in Pakistan-India Relations ............................................................................................. 41
Background and Resumption of the Composite Dialogue ...................................................... 41
Congressional Research Service
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Positive Recent Developments ................................................................................................ 42
Pakistan-China Relations ............................................................................................................... 43
Pakistan-Iran Relations and U.S. Sanctions................................................................................... 45
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Security ................................................................................. 45
Deteriorated Economic Circumstances .......................................................................................... 46
Overview and IMF Bailout ...................................................................................................... 46
Current Status and IFI Assessments ........................................................................................ 49
Domestic Political Setting and Instability...................................................................................... 50
Overview ................................................................................................................................. 50
Recent Political Developments................................................................................................ 52
Prime Minister’s Conviction for Contempt of Court ........................................................ 52
The Rise of Imran Khan .................................................................................................... 52
An Islamist Rightwing Resurgence ................................................................................... 53
Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................................... 53
U.S. Foreign Assistance and Coalition Support Reimbursements ................................................. 54
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Pakistan ................................................................................................................ 9
Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally North West Frontier)
Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas .................................................................... 18
Figure 3. Indian and Pakistani Gross National Product at PPP, 1980-2011 ................................... 47
Figure 4. Indian and Pakistani Gross National Product per Capita, 1980-2011 ............................ 47
Figure 5. Current Representation in Pakistan’s National Assembly by Party ................................ 51
Tables
Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan,
FY2002-FY2013 ......................................................................................................................... 56
Appendixes
Appendix. Notable Related Provisions in FY2013 Legislation ..................................................... 58
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 60
Congressional Research Service
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Overview
A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered
vital to U.S. interests. Pakistan is at the locus of several top-tier policy areas of urgent concern,
including regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear
weapons proliferation; the Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; democratization and
human rights protection; and economic development. Today Pakistan is identified as a haven for
numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and is the world’s most rapid proliferator of
nuclear weapons, a combination that places it at the top of the international security agenda.
Pakistan has been praised by U.S. leaders for its post-2001 cooperation with U.S.-led
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, although long-held doubts about Islamabad’s
commitment to some core U.S. interests deepened dramatically in 2011 and may be altering the
nature of the relationship in 2012. A mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes
ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgents and anti-India militants operating from its
territory. Pakistan’s troubled economic conditions and precarious political setting combine with
perilous security circumstances and a history of difficult relations with neighbors to present
serious challenges to U.S. decision makers.
The Pakistani people have paid a heavy price as Islamist radicalism has spread in the country and
as its border region near Afghanistan has become a haven for local insurgents, as well as Arab and
Uzbek jihadists. Islamabad claims that the “war on extremism” has cost the country more than
37,000 civilian lives, nearly 6,300 security forces, and $78 billion in financial losses.1 The U.S.
National Counterterrorism Center reports there was an average of more than 26 terrorist attacks
each week in Pakistan in 2011; only Afghanistan and Iraq suffered a higher number of incidents.2
Pakistani officials regularly seek to remind the American audience of the country’s sacrifices.3
May 2011 revelations that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden (OBL) had found apparently
years-long refuge inside Pakistan marked a new era of intensive U.S. government scrutiny of a
now tense and even adversarial relationship. In September that year, the then-top U.S. military
officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, issued unprecedentedly strong and public accusations that Pakistan
was providing support to Afghan insurgents who attack U.S. interests. Given Mullen’s strenuous
efforts to develop a close working relationship with his Pakistan counterpart, General Ashfaq
Pervez Kayani, the pronouncement was taken as a supreme expression of U.S. frustration.
To bookend 2011’s bilateral turbulence of historic scale, in late November NATO troops in
Afghanistan came under fire from two Pakistani army outposts just across the shared border at
Salala. Retaliatory airstrikes left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. A Pentagon investigation determined
poor coordination and miscommunication were to blame, and that NATO troops had responded
appropriately. Pakistan’s government and people alike have expressed fury at what some suspect
was an intentional strike. Following the incident, Pakistani officials moved to scrap and
renegotiate all existing bilateral agreements with the United States related to supply lines into
1
Sherry Rehman, “Pakistan and the U.S.: A New Beginning?” (op-ed), Chicago Tribune, May 20, 2012.
See the National Counterterrorism Center database at http://www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.html.
3
Some analysts view Pakistan’s “narrative of victimhood” as being at least partly disingenuous, given the distinctions
its government seems to make between terrorists who attack Pakistan and all others (see, for example, Sadanand
Dhume, “Pakistan: Victim of Terrorism?” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2011).
2
Congressional Research Service
1
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Afghanistan and any covert American activities inside (or over) Pakistani territory, primarily
those generated early in the 2000s by the governments of President George W. Bush and
President-General Pervez Musharraf. Islamabad has continuously demanded a full apology from
Washington as requisite for restored cooperation.
Yet of the several ways Islamabad’s anger was expressed, the most contentious has been its
closure of the Pakistani ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that allow NATO supplies to
transit into Afghanistan. Despite much anticipation of an imminent deal to reopen them, the
GLOCs remain closed to date and the issue was blamed for overshadowing a May 2012 NATO
summit in Chicago. Media reports have the Pakistani negotiators seeking as much as $5,000 per
truck, or what would be a 20-30-fold increase over last year—and senior U.S. officials refusing to
entertain such a fee hike while railing at perceived “extortion” and “price gouging.”4
Only days after the failure to strike a deal on the GLOCs in Chicago, a Pakistani doctor who
reportedly had participated in a CIA operation to identify bin Laden family DNA received a 33year prison sentence for treason, perplexing an American audience and angering many, including
senior Members of Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee responded within hours by
attaching a unanimously approved provision to dock $1 million from U.S. aid funding in the
FY2013 State and Foreign Operations appropriation for each year of the sentence unless the
doctor is freed. The Administration has stated that it saw no reason for the conviction.
In many practical respects, the cooperative aspects of bilateral relations have remained frozen in
2012, even before this most mutual exasperation in May. The two governments—and, at a lower
level, the diplomatic and security agencies within them—seem at loggerheads after a grueling
series of crises. Anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories remain rife among
ordinary Pakistanis; opinion surveys find that the United States has of late replaced India as the
nation least favored by Pakistanis (a significant development, given the visceral, decades-old
Pakistan-India rivalry). Meanwhile, Americans tend to have increasingly poor views of Pakistan.5
The State Department warns Americans on the high risks of travel in Pakistan, and its own
diplomats face travel restrictions there. American civilians have been abducted in Pakistan over
the past decade. One, Daniel Pearl, was executed.6
Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy concern. Its arguably
growing influence hinders progress toward key U.S. goals, including the defeat of Al Qaeda and
other anti-U.S. terrorist groups, Afghan stabilization, and resolution of the historic Pakistan-India
4
“Levin and McCain: Don’t Pay Pakistan Exorbitant Trucking Fees,” Foreign Policy Cable (online), May 22, 2012.
A May 2011 survey found only 2% of the American sample identifying Pakistan as a U.S. “ally.” Another 11% called
Pakistan “friendly,” while 38% called it “unfriendly” and fully 23% identified Pakistan as “an enemy of the United
States.” A February 2012 Gallup survey similarly found only 15% of Americans holding a favorable attitude toward
Pakistan (as compared with 75% for India), down three points from the same period in 2011 (see
http://today.yougov.com/news/2011/05/23/2-call-pakistan-ally-us; Gallup results at http://www.gallup.com/poll/
152735/americans-give-record-high-ratings-several-allies.aspx.
6
See the February 2012 Travel Warning at http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5661.html. The August 2011
kidnaping of Warren Weinstein, a 70-year-old American development expert, from his Lahore home alarmed
observers, especially because Weinstein had lived in Pakistan for seven years and appeared to have been an active
friend of Pakistani economic growth. Five months later, Weinstein was reported to be in the custody of Al Qaeda-allied
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants in North Waziristan and has since appeared in a video in which he pleads for his life and
conveys his captors’ demands that the U.S. government free convicted terrorists imprisoned in the United States. The
White House has condemned the kidnaping but rules out any negotiations with Al Qaeda (“Warren Weinstein,
Maryland Man Kidnapped in Pakistan, Pleads for His Life in Video,” Washington Post, May 7, 2012).
5
Congressional Research Service
2
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
rivalry that threatens the entire region’s stability and that has a nuclear dimension. Long-standing
worries that American citizens have been recruited and employed in Islamist terrorism by
Pakistan-based elements have become more acute. Several most-wanted enemies of the United
States are widely believed to reside in Pakistan, among them Al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri,
Taliban chief Mullah Omar, and Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani. Some American
intelligence officials reportedly suspect that Zawahiri may be receiving protection from elements
of the Pakistani government.7
Over the past year, increasing numbers in Congress have more forcefully questioned the
effectiveness of current U.S. policy and the wisdom of large-scale U.S. aid. Some openly call for
the curtailment of all U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan, and legislation significantly
undercutting the Administration’s FY2013 aid request, as well as placing new conditionality on
both aid and military reimbursements, is moving through Congress in May 2012 (see Appendix).
Congress appropriated about $2 billion in direct aid for Pakistan in FY2012, placing it among the
world’s leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance (see Table 1). Pakistan’s Ambassador to the
United States has told U.S. lawmakers that “onerous” restrictions being placed on U.S. aid will be
counterproductive to the goal of restoring cooperation and trust.8
It seems clear that the closure of Pakistani GLOCs to Afghanistan has not been the logistical
catastrophe that many pundits in both the United States and Pakistan had expected. In this
respect, by keeping the routes closed, Islamabad has “played its trump card” in relations with
Washington and not realized the hoped-for gains. Pakistan now risks finding itself increasingly
isolated diplomatically, and working positively with the United States and NATO may be the only
way to change this course. By bowing to domestic political pressures, the civilian government’s
negotiating strategy could see the country lose billions of dollars in foreign assistance, as well as
its ability to influence post-war Afghanistan.9
Policy Discussion
Pre-2012 Setting
In his June 2011 announcement of a U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014, President
Obama said the United States “will continue to press Pakistan to expand its participation in
securing a more peaceful future for this war-torn region” and “will insist that it keep its
commitments” to neutralize terrorist safe havens in its territory. In August, Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta openly acknowledged the complicating factors of Pakistan’s ties to anti-Afghan and
anti-India terrorist groups, but still insisted that the United States “has no choice but to maintain a
relationship with Pakistan.”10 Until the potential bilateral breakdown in 2012, many, if not most,
independent observers concurred that continued engagement with Pakistan is the only realistic
7
“America’s Next Most Wanted,” Newsweek, May 7, 2012.
“Sherry Says Strict Congressional Curbs Won’t Help US-Pak Ties,” Nation (Lahore), May 20, 2012.
9
Najam Sethi, “Terms of Reengagement” (editorial), Friday Times (Lahore), May 18, 2012; “Pakistanis Fear Being
Left Too Isolated,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 2012.
10
White House transcript at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forwardafghanistan; “We Must Keep Pakistan Ties: Panetta,” Agence France Presse, August 16, 2011.
8
Congressional Research Service
3
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
option for the United States, although some high-visibility analysts counsel taking an increasingly
confrontational posture toward Islamabad.
As part of the Administration’s strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan, its Pakistan policy has
included a tripling of nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, as well as the
conditioning of U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that government’s progress in combating
militancy and in further fostering democratic institutions. However, in July 2011, the
Administration suspended up to $800 million in planned security assistance to Pakistan and
appears to be more rigorously evaluating Pakistan’s cooperation and progress before releasing
further aid. At least $1 billion in approved “coalition support fund” (CSF) reimbursements to
Pakistan also remains undisbursed due to bilateral disagreements and acrimony.
Developments in 2011 have seemed to validate a preexisting view of many observers that
Pakistani behavior is unlikely to change given the long-held geostrategic perspectives of decision
makers in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, home of the Pakistan Army’s GHQ. If true, this means
Pakistan will continue to tolerate safe havens for “friendly” militant groups regardless of U.S. aid
levels or overt threats.11 By many accounts, Pakistan’s apparently schizophrenic foreign policy
behavior is a direct outcome of the Pakistan military’s perceived strategic interests. This leads
analysts to encourage full-throated U.S. support for Pakistan’s civilian authorities as the only
viable means of reducing conflict both inside Pakistan and between Pakistan and its neighbors.
The current U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, is among those who has insisted that
Pakistan requires a strong civilian government and that common U.S.-Pakistan successes can be
achieved only “with a strong partner in Pakistan’s democratically elected government.”12
Still, now four years after their seating, there are few signs that Pakistan’s civilian leaders are
willing and able to seriously address the outcomes of their country’s security policies and move
them in the direction of moderation. Even in domestic discussions these leaders continue to shirk
responsibility for increased rates of extremism there, and to place the bulk of blame on the United
States. This perspective—apparently widespread among the Pakistani public, as well—arguably
omits enthusiastic official Pakistani participation in supporting Islamist militancy in the region
(including the provision of vital support to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime throughout most of the
1990s). By nearly all accounts, this support continues, albeit selectively, to date.
President Obama has not visited Pakistan while in office, and his decision to travel to India in
2010 without any stops in Pakistan exacerbated anxiety among Pakistani officials who see signs
of a “pro-India” tilt in Washington as destabilizing for the region. By refraining from engagement
in the Kashmir dispute, moving forward with U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation without any
similar offer to Pakistan, and seeming to sympathize with New Delhi’s perspective on the root
sources of regional terrorism, the Administration’s India policies are viewed suspiciously and
even as threatening by Pakistani leaders and citizens, alike. Moreover, Afghanistan’s October
2011 choice to establish closer and more overt ties with India, Pakistan’s primary rival, and the
ensuing May 2012 U.S.-Afghanistan tie-up, is grist for those figures—most especially within
Pakistan’s security institutions—who argue that Pakistan increasingly is under threat of strategic
encirclement by external forces that seek to weaken and perhaps dismember the country.
11
Timothy Hoyt, “Pakistan, an Ally by Any Other Name,” Proceedings, July 2011; “Pakistan Unlikely to Help the US
in War,” Associated Press, September 23, 2011.
12
“Sen. John Kerry Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Cameron Munter to be Ambassador to Pakistan,” CQ
Transcriptions, September 23, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
4
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Debate Over Future Policy Options
The tumultuous events of 2011, peaking as they did with the Salala incident and resulting
Pakistani fury, may combine to mark the end of the “post-9/11 period” of bilateral relations. For
2012 and beyond, many analysts foresee a far more narrow, issue-based engagement—often
referred to as “transactional ties”—and a setting aside of the kind of broad strategic partnership
envisioned by the late Amb. Richard Holbrooke, President Obama’s original Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the January 2012 words of Pakistan’s top military
spokesman, “From here on in we want a very formal, business-like relationship. The lines will be
drawn. There will be no more of the free run of the past, no more interpretation of rules. We want
it very formal with agreed-upon limits.”13 Movement of FY2013 congressional legislation
suggests such limits will include new restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan.
Many analysts appear to foresee a “transactional” relationship as the best realistic alternative to a
potential slide into noncooperation on both sides. A more focused, issues-based engagement
might better address and serve the interests of both governments, in part by bringing greater
transparency and credibility to the alliance.
Ambassador Sherry Rehman, Pakistan’s latest envoy to the United States, was appointed in late
November 2011.14 In an opinion piece published just before the Chicago summit opened, Amb.
Rehman set forth Islamabad’s prerequisites for “resetting” the bilateral relationship to include (1)
apologizing for the Salala incident; (2) releasing suspended CSF reimbursements; (3) increasing
counterterrorism intelligence sharing; (4) halting drone strikes; and (5) shifting to a policy of
“trade not aid” by enhancing Pakistan’s access to U.S. markets.15
Two former U.S. diplomats—agreeing that the outlook is poor for any “strategic bond” as sought
over the past decade—counsel the forging of a more normal, but constructive relationship by
reducing mutual expectations; reducing, but better targeting, U.S. economic aid programs;
fostering more substantive business ties between the two countries; and offering more energetic,
if discreet, U.S. support for initiatives that could promote regional stability, including those
between Pakistan and India, and perhaps even to include dropping U.S. opposition to the IranPakistan gas pipeline project.16
Another South Asia expert and former advisor to Amb. Holbrooke finds reason for optimism in
the more humble domestic status of the Pakistani military (and the corresponding benefits this
entails for democratization), and improvements in Pakistan-India relations. He urges the Obama
Administration to take account of these factors and not overemphasize a purely security-oriented
13
Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas quoted in “Pakistan, US Assume Less Cooperation in Future,” Associated Press, January 2,
2012.
14
Rehman was appointed in late November 2011 after the essentially forced resignation of Husain Haqqani. Rehman, a
prominent former journalist and human rights advocate, was close to Benazir Bhutto and is among the government’s
few vocal proponents of moderation. As a parliamentarian, she authored key legislation such as the Women’s
Empowerment Bill, the Anti-Honor Killings Bill, the Domestic Violence Prevention Bill, and the Hudood Repeal Bill.
She was also at the forefront of (thus far failed) efforts to reform the country’s controversial blasphemy laws.
15
Sherry Rehman, “Pakistan and the U.S.: A New Beginning?” (op-ed), Chicago Tribune, May 20, 2012.
16
Teresita and Howard Schaffer, “Resetting the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship,” Foreign Policy (online), March 19, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
5
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
approach that could risk derailing such positive trends by eliciting even stronger anti-American
nationalism among the Pakistani people and thus restoring credibility to the military.17
In the view of many U.S. analysts, Pakistan’s May 2012 intransigence on the issues of GLOCs
and insistence on an apology for Salala may prove costly and represent a missed opportunity to
work cooperatively with the United States in the region. One commentator who argues this urges
the U.S. government to stay firm in pressuring Islamabad on counterterrorism, especially with
Pakistan’s leverage reduced. Another sees Pakistan’s unrelenting stance being “a catastrophic
mistake” and “a triumph of short-term thinking over long-term, of scheming over strategy.”18
Even before the post-Salala breakdown of relations, some high-profile analysts were calling for a
new U.S. policy to shift to a more adversarial posture toward Pakistan on the assumption that
President Obama’s (and President George W. Bush’s) engagement policies have failed. One
senior commentator suggests “focused hostility” toward Pakistan that would hold its military and
intelligence services accountable while not harming the Pakistani people more generally. This
could entail targeting individuals for sanction, as well as sharply cutting military aid. Another
goes further, contending that Pakistan should be considered an enemy of the United States, at
least as far as Afghanistan policy is concerned, the logic being that open admission of core
disagreement on this issue would benefit both countries. A third argues that only credible threats
to end all assistance to Islamabad and “retaliate” if Pakistan fails to comply with U.S. demands
will convince Pakistani leaders that genuine cooperation is in their best interests.19
Another former Holbrooke advisor is among those who reject any such U.S. shift to a more
adversarial approach as counterproductive and likely to put the entire U.S.-led project in
Afghanistan at risk of failure. A Washington-based Pakistani analyst likewise views a “two
Pakistans” approach as unworkable and misguided, contending that U.S. policies aimed at
exploiting an internal Pakistani disconnect would likely strengthen that country’s conservative
Islamist elements and further fuel anti-American sentiments. Instead, this observer asserts that a
more “passive” U.S. approach rooted in the provision to Islamabad of security assurances and
targeted efforts to bolster Pakistan’s civilian governance institutions would be most prudent.20
It remains to be seen whether the Pakistani military’s willingness to abide the current, largely
economic rapprochement with India is a tactical choice to ease security and international
diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, or if it represents a more strategic shift in Rawalpindi’s
perspective. Even if Pakistan is well positioned to enjoy the tactical “victory” that (it believes)
would come through realization of a pliable, heavily Pashtun-influenced post-NATO government
in Kabul, the country’s geostrategic status could well suffer from the international isolation that
might ensue. Many commentators offer that a rapidly changing South and Central Asian calculus
should propel the Pakistani state to favor energy and trade cooperation with its neighbors over its
traditional focus on conflict with India, “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and the status of
Kashmir. In this way, Pakistan might transcend the perpetual insecurity that has marked most of
17
Vali Nasr, “Pakistan Spring Emerging From Winter of Discontent” (op-ed), Bloomberg News, April 15, 2012.
Lisa Curtis, “Pakistan Missed Opportunity to Repair Ties With U.S.,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief #3613, May
22, 2012; David Ignatius, “Pakistan’s Blown Chance” (op-ed), Washington Post, May 17, 2012.
19
Bruce Riedel, “A New Pakistan Policy: Containment” (op-ed), New York Times, October 15, 2011; Anatol Lieven,
“With A Friend Like This” (op-ed), New York Times, November 1, 2011; Stephen Krasner, “Talking Tough to
Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs (online), November 29, 2011.
20
Alexander Evans, “Tough Talk is Cheap,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012; Moeed Yusuf, “Fixing Pakistan’s CivilMilitary Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation,” U.S. Institute of Peace Peace Brief 125, May 3, 2012.
18
Congressional Research Service
6
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
its existence.21 The worldview of Pakistan’s security services and, to some extent, domestic
public are hindrances to a more robust pursuit of such policies by the country’s civilian leaders.
Notable Developments in 2011
High-Profile Political Assassinations
On January 4, 2011, Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, was assassinated by a
member of his own security team. A senior figure in the national coalition-leading Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP), Taseer was among the country’s most liberal politicians, and he had
incurred the wrath of Islamists and other conservatives with vocal criticisms of the country’s
controversial blasphemy laws. His killer, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, was since lauded as a hero by
significant sections of Pakistani society, and even leaders of the country’s majority Barelvi
Muslim sect, usually considered to hold moderate interpretations of Islam, were vocal supporters
of the assassin. Taseer’s assassination, strongly condemned by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
was a major blow to liberal forces in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, on March 2, 2011, gunmen ambushed the car of Minorities Minister Shabaz Bhatti—
the federal cabinet’s only Christian member—and shot him to death. Bhatti had long campaigned
for tolerance toward Pakistan’s religious minorities and had, like Governor Taseer, openly called
for reform of the blasphemy laws. Secretary Clinton expressed being “shocked and outraged” by
Bhatti’s killing, calling it “an attack on the values of tolerance and respect for people of all faiths
and backgrounds championed by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father.”22 Prime
Minister Yousef Raza Gilani was the only senior government official to attend Bhatti’s funeral.
President Zardari addressed the two assassinations with an English-language op-ed in which he
contended that, “A small but increasingly belligerent minority is intent on undoing the very
principles of tolerance upon which [Pakistan] was founded.”23 Despite such claims, the Taseer
and Bhatti assassinations and subsequent events were widely seen as evidence that Islamist
radicalism is increasing in Pakistan.24
The Raymond Davis Affair
On January 27, 2011, Raymond Davis, an American working at the U.S. Consulate in Lahore,
shot and killed two men who approached his vehicle in urban traffic. Davis contends he acted in
self-defense when the men tried to rob him at gunpoint. However, Pakistani authorities accused
Davis of murder and a court barred the government from releasing him despite insistence from
top U.S. officials that diplomatic immunity shielded him from prosecution. President Obama
21
A representative example of this argument is Sunil Datta, “Pakistan Stands Isolated in South Asia” (op-ed), Daily
Times (Lahore), April 21, 2012.
22
See the U.S. Embassy’s March 2, 2011, release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-11030205.html.
23
Asif Ali Zardari, “In Pakistan, Standing Up to Extremists” (op-ed), Washington Post, March 6, 2011.
24
In a sign that the Pakistani public largely supports “Islamization” more generally, a May 2011 poll found fully twothirds of respondents answering “yes” to the question, “Should the government take steps to ‘Islamize’ society?”
Nearly 30% thought the government should take steps toward Islamization “all at once” (see
http://www.gallup.com.pk/pollsshow.php?id=2011-05-31).
Congressional Research Service
7
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
described Davis as being “our diplomat.”25 Only more than three weeks after the incident did the
U.S. government admit that Davis was in fact a CIA contractor and member of a covert team that
was tracking militant groups inside Pakistan.
The controversy around Davis’s legal status led some in Congress to openly suggest that U.S.
assistance to Pakistan might be reduced or curtailed if the case was not resolved in a satisfactory
manner.26 In mid-February, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Kerry
traveled to Islamabad in an effort to reduce escalating tensions, taking the opportunity to express
the “deepest sorrow” felt by top U.S. leaders at the loss of life.27
In late February, the CIA opened direct negotiations with the ISI in an effort to secure Davis’s
release. On March 16, 2011, after weeks of closed-door negotiations, political pressure by
Pakistani officials on the courts, and, finally, a pledge of $2.3 million in diyat, or “blood money,”
for the victims’ families, Davis was freed and flown out of the country.28 Top U.S. officials denied
there had been any quid pro quo arrangement related to Davis’s release or that the United States
had provided the financial compensation.
Death of Osama bin Laden29
On May 2, 2011, Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden was located and killed in the mid-sized
Pakistani city of Abbottabad, a military cantonment in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
province, in a compound one-half mile from the country’s premier military academy and just 35
miles north of the capital of Islamabad (see Figure 1). The location and circumstances of OBL’s
death exacerbated Washington’s long-held doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to the ostensibly
shared goals of defeating religious extremism, and brought calls to curtail U.S. assistance to
Pakistan. The news of OBL’s whereabouts led to immediate questioning of Pakistan’s role and
potential complicity in his refuge. President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, John
Brennan, told reporters it was “inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support
system” in Pakistan.30
For a wide array of observers, the outcome of the years-long hunt for OBL left only two realistic
conclusions: either Pakistani officials were at some level complicit in hiding the fugitive, or the
country’s military and intelligence services were grossly incompetent in their search for top Al
Qaeda leaders. In either case, after many years of claims by senior Pakistani officials—both
civilian and military—that most-wanted extremist figures were finding no refuge in their country,
Pakistan’s credibility suffered a serious blow.31
25
“Press Conference by the President,” White House transcript, February 15, 2011.
H.Res. 145 called for a “freeze” on all monetary assistance to Pakistan until such time Davis was released (the
resolution did not emerge from committee).
27
See the U.S. Embassy’s February 16, 2011, release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-110216004.html.
28
Diyat is a tenet of Islamic law sanctioned by Pakistani jurisprudence and reportedly used in at least half of homicide
cases there (“‘Blood Money’ Tradition Might Help Resolve U.S.-Pakistani Row,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2011).
29
For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41809, Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations,
coordinated by John Rollins.
30
Quoted in “Osama Bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea,” Washington Post, May 2, 2011.
31
A listing of some of the oftentimes categorical, high-profile Pakistani denials about OBL specifically are in “Osama
bin Who?,” Foreign Policy (online), May 2, 2011.
26
Congressional Research Service
8
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Figure 1. Map of Pakistan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Pakistan’s military and intelligence services came under rare domestic criticism for being unable
to detect and intercept a foreign military raid deep inside Pakistani territory, and for ostensible
incompetence in detecting the presence there of the world’s most-wanted terrorist. Army Chief
Gen. Kayani warned that Pakistan would not tolerate any future incursions. Parliament
subsequently issued a strong condemnation of the U.S. raid and again called for a halt to U.S.launched drone strikes in western Pakistan. It also threatened to close land lines of
communication through Pakistan that were considered vital to supplying NATO troops in
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, public demonstrations took a bellicose, anti-American cast.32
32
A May 2011 Gallup survey found that more than eight in ten Pakistanis who were aware of the U.S. operation
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
9
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
The developments fueled bilateral distrust and acrimony unseen in the post-2001 period.
Congress pointedly questioned the wisdom of continued engagement with a national government
that may at some levels have had knowledge of OBL’s whereabouts; figures from both major
parties expressed disbelief at Pakistan’s allegations of ignorance and called for greater oversight
and accountability for future U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Still, senior Members tended to take a
more measured view, with the House Speaker voicing the opinion that circumstances called for
“more engagement [with Pakistan], not less.”33 Such sentiments tracked well with the view of
many independent observers that—despite ample reasons for discouragement and distrust—the
United States has had no choice but to continue to engage Pakistan in “a bad marriage.”
President Obama and other top U.S. officials maintained a generally positive posture toward
Pakistan in the weeks following the Abbottabad raid, while also noting that serious questions had
arisen over the circumstances of OBL’s refuge. The U.S. government reportedly has no
conclusive evidence indicating that official Pakistan was aware of bin Laden’s whereabouts.
Privately, senior Administration officials reportedly became divided over the future of the
bilateral relationship, with some at an apparent loss for patience and advocating strong reprisals
for perceived Pakistani intransigence.
Attack on Pakistan’s Mehran Naval Station
On May 22, 2011, a team of heavily armed militants penetrated security barriers and stormed
Pakistan’s premier naval base, the Mehran Naval Station near Karachi. Ten security personnel and
four militants were killed in the ensuing 16-hour-long gun battle; two other militants are believed
to have escaped before Pakistani commandos regained control of the base. The militants were
able to destroy two U.S.-supplied P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft in their hangar.
The attack, which the Pakistani Taliban claimed was revenge for the killing of bin Laden, was the
second major embarrassment of the month for the beleaguered Pakistani military, which seemed
at a loss to explain how such a damaging breach could occur. The ability of a handful of attackers
to wreak such havoc left the security services open to scathing criticism from the generally promilitary Pakistani media, and also brought into question the safety and security of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons and materials.34 Suspicions quickly arose that the base’s attackers had inside
help, given especially their ability to carefully avoid detection and take effective cover once
inside. Within days a former navy commando was arrested in connection with the case. Three
navy officers, the base commander among them, are to be court-martialed on charges of
negligence in connection with the attack, an unusual disciplinary action for the Pakistani military
demonstrating the seriousness of the breach.35
(...continued)
disapproved of it; only 13% approved. A majority opined that OBL should have been captured alive. The unaffiliated
Gallup Pakistan found 51% of Pakistanis saying they were “sad” about OBL’s death (Gallup data at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/147611/pakistanis-criticize-action-killed-osama-bin-laden.aspx; Gallup Pakistan data at
http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/16-05-11.pdf).
33
Quoted in “Boehner: US Should Not Back Away From Pakistan,” Associated Press, May 3, 2011.
34
“Pakistan Military Faces New Questions After Raid,” New York Times, May 24, 2011; “Pakistan Media Ridicules
Military After Attack,” Reuters, May 24, 2011. The growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and infrastructure only
increases the potential threat posed by determined militants (see Shaun Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten
Nuclear Weapons Safety,” CTC Sentinel, June 2011).
35
“Three Pakistani Naval Officers to Be Court Martialed Over Base Attack,” New York Times, August 4, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
10
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Torture and Killing of Journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, is accused of ordering the
torture and murder of investigative journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, who disappeared in May
2011 just after penning an article suggesting that the Mehran attack was carried out because the
Pakistan Navy was trying to crack down on Al Qaeda cells that had infiltrated the service.
Shahzad, whose writing had riled the Pakistani establishment repeatedly in the past, reportedly
had received numerous threats from the ISI. In a rare public statement, the ISI denied playing any
role in Shahzad’s fate. A closed government inquiry into the death began in June; unnamed U.S.
officials later said there was sufficient classified intelligence to conclude that senior ISI officials
had directed the brutal attack on Shahzad in an effort to silence critics. Soon after, then-Joint
Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen went on record with the claim that Shahzad’s killing “was
sanctioned by the [Pakistani] government.”36
In January 2012, an official Commission of Inquiry reported to the Pakistani government that it
was unable to identify the culprits behind Shahzad’s murder while also recommending that the
country’s intelligence agencies “be made more law-abiding through a statutory framework
carefully outlining their respective mandates and roles” and that they be made “more accountable
through effective and suitably tailored mechanisms of internal administrative review,
Parliamentary oversight, and judicial redressal of citizens’ grievances against them.”37
Partial Suspension of U.S. Security Assistance
In July 2011, the Obama Administration made some significant changes in its security-related aid
policy toward Pakistan. According to congressional and State Department sources, $440-$500
million worth of scheduled counterinsurgency (COIN) training and equipment for Pakistan was
put under suspension due to the recently reduced U.S. military trainer presence there, along with
obstacles to fulfilling other agreements between the two countries. In addition, Islamabad’s delays
in processing U.S. visa requests led to the suspension of $300 million in planned FY2011
Coalition Support Fund reimbursements. Although the Administration presented the move as
being necessitated by technical factors, observers saw it as a message and warning to Islamabad
that key assistance spigots could close in the absence of improved cooperation.
A Pakistani military spokesman dismissed the development as having no effect on his
organization’s ability to conduct future combat operations, and he repeated the Army Chief’s
suggestion that more U.S. security assistance be reprogrammed toward development projects in
Pakistan.38 In the view of some observers, the Administration’s decision was more likely to elicit
greater resentment than greater cooperation from Pakistani leaders, and could be taken as
validation by ordinary Pakistanis who see the United States as a fickle and unreliable ally.39
36
“U.S. Admiral Ties Pakistan to Killing of Journalist,” New York Times, July 8, 2011.
“Report of the Commission of Inquiry Concerning the Gruesome Incident of the Abduction and Murder of Syed
Saleem Shahzad,” January 10, 2012, at http://app.com.pk/en_/images/pdf/report.pdf. A Human Rights Watch response
accused the Commission of failing to interview key military intelligence officials in the course of its investigation, and
of appearing “fearful of confronting the ISI” over the issue. The Pakistan military in turn reiterated a firm denial of ISI
involvement and accused HRW of “choking under heaps of bias (Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan: Shahzad
Commission Results Marred By Free Ride for ISI,” January 30, 2012; ISPR release, February 16, 2012).
38
“Pakistan Says It Doesn’t Need US Military Aid,” Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 2011.
39
“In Pakistan, Many Say Aid ‘Snub’ Dims US Sway,” Associated Press, July 11, 2011.
37
Congressional Research Service
11
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
“Memogate” and Domestic Civil-Military Tensions
In October 2011, Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz penned a high-visibility op-ed
piece that made passing reference to a memorandum allegedly “dictated” to him in May 2011—
only days after bin Laden’s death—by then-Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Husain
Haqqani.40 The unsigned memo was meant for the eyes of J.C.S. Chief Adm. Mullen, and it
bluntly requested U.S. assistance in averting an allegedly imminent military coup, as well as U.S.
support for Islamabad’s civilian government to install friendly new leaders for the country’s
military and intelligence services, leaders who would fully cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism
efforts. Once uncovered, the Pakistani Supreme Court, with the military’s prodding, launched an
investigation to reveal the actual author and purpose of the document, and the resulting
“Memogate” scandal cost Haqqani his job and brought immense pressure on President Asif
Zardari.41 Both Zardari and Haqqani deny any involvement in the memo’s authorship.
Ijaz was shown to be a less-than-credible witness and, while it is still incomplete, the
investigation largely fizzled out when testimony did not appear to find evidence of wrongdoing
by the civilians.42 Amb. Haqqani was subsequently allowed to leave Pakistan. Yet the civilmilitary clash brought substantive concerns that President Zardari might face overthrow by the
military. In mid-December, Pakistan’s senior-most army and intelligence officers submitted to the
Supreme Court statements that the memo was genuine and represented evidence of a conspiracy
against the army. Prime Minister Gilani responded with an open warning that “conspiracies are
being hatched to pack up the elected government” and said that the military “cannot be a state
within a state” and is “answerable to parliament.”43
Rumors of an impending military coup were so ubiquitous in December that the army publically
pledged to continue supporting democracy; Gen. Kayani was quoted as saying all such rumors
were “speculation.” Still, during the final week of 2011, the civilian government remained
infuriated that both the army and intelligence chiefs had circumvented them in engaging the
court. Prime Minister Gilani again called the move unconstitutional and illegal, a claim denied by
the equally infuriated military.44
Despite widespread alarm about the status of Pakistan’s democratic government, the Pakistani
public appears increasingly averse to another round of direct military rule and, unlike in the past,
opposition politicians are not seeking the military’s help. Add to this an assertive judiciary and a
vocal watchdog media, and the odds of Pakistan seeing a military coup in the foreseeable future
40
Mansoor Ijaz, “Time to Take On Pakistan’s Jihadist Spies” (op-ed), Financial Times (London), October 10, 2011;
“Pakistani Businessman Says ‘Coup’ Memo Was Dictated,” Reuters, November 18, 2011. The document itself is at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/111117_Ijaz%20memo%20Foreign%20Policy.PDF.
41
Amb. Haqqani was for a period prohibited from leaving Pakistan. The alleged “ongoing harassment and
mistreatment” he suffered was decried by at least three U.S. Senators, who called on Islamabad authorities to resolve
the matter in ways consistent with civilian rule of law (see their January 5, 2012 statement at
http://lieberman.senate.gov/index.cfm/news-events/news/2012/1/statement-of-senators-lieberman-mccain-kirk-onhusain-haqqanis-mistreatment-in-pakistan.
42
“The Fizzling Out of Memogate” (editorial), Express Tribune (Karachi), February 1, 2012.
43
“Pakistan’s Memo Scandal Pits Military Against Zardari Government,” Washington Post, December 16, 2011; Gilani
quoted in “Pakistani Premier Warns of Plotting by Military,” New York Times, December 22, 2011.
44
See the ISPR’s January 11, 2012, release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2012/1/
11.
Congressional Research Service
12
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
are considered quite low.45 By January’s end, Parliament passed a resolution reaffirming its own
supremacy and calling on the army and Supreme Court to remain within their constitutional
limits. Gilani subsequently softened his criticisms of the military and the crisis atmosphere faded.
Salala Border Incident
In the early, moonless morning hours of November 26, 2011, U.S. ground forces on a mission
very near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border reportedly came under heavy machine gun and then
mortar fire from hilltop positions just inside Pakistan. According to the Pentagon, U.S.
commanders on the ground had no awareness that two small Pakistan army outposts were in the
area and thus believed they were being attacked by Afghan insurgents. NATO air assets were
called in as a “show of force,” but the incoming fire did not cease, so an AC-130 gunship, two F15 jets, and two AH-64 Apache helicopters were ordered to neutralize the hilltop positions. By
this time, Pakistani liaison officers were telling their American counterparts that Pakistani
soldiers were coming under fire, but 24 of these soldiers were killed before the air assault ended.
Pakistanis both official and otherwise were infuriated; some openly accused NATO forces of
intentionally killing Pakistanis. Prime Minister Gilani described the attacks as being “a grave
breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty” and “a flagrant violation of international law.”46
Pakistani anger, which has not subsided to date, was reflected in the immediate closure of
NATO’s ground logistics routes through Pakistan, the eviction of U.S. personnel from the Shamsi
airfield in Baluchistan, and a boycott of a December Bonn conference on Afghanistan. At the time
of this writing, the supply routes have been closed for more that five months, despite Islamabad’s
stated intention to allow them to reopen (see “U.S./NATO Ground Lines of Communication”
section below).The Pakistani government has rejected U.S. expressions of “deep regret” and
“sincere condolences,” and demands a formal and unconditional apology from Washington.47
The Pentagon quickly launched an investigation in which the Pakistani side refused to participate.
That investigation was completed in late December, when the U.S. general heading it announced
that, “U.S. forces, given what information they had available to them at the time, acted in selfdefense and with appropriate force after being fired upon” and “there was no intentional effort” to
target Pakistanis. It was conceded that serious miscommunication and poor coordination were
central factors, but no NATO personnel were found to have acted improperly.48
Pakistan’s military called the “affixing of partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan ...
unjustified and unacceptable.” A document detailing the Pakistani perspective was released in
January 2012. It conceded that Pakistani forces fired first, but legitimately so in the
circumstances. It excoriated the NATO investigators for the “inconceivable” claim that no
Pakistani posts were known to be in the area and found the “fundamental cause” of the incident
was “the failure of US/ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] to share its near-border
45
Shuja Nawaz, “Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces?,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 297, December
2011; “Pakistan Crisis Shows Army’s Limits,” Associated Press, January 17, 2012; George Fulton, “Why Pakistan’s
Zardari Will Not Fall to a Military Coup,” Foreign Affairs (online), January 22, 2012.
46
See the November 26, 2011, release at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article.aspx?id=1013&type=1.
47
Expressions of “deepest condolences” came from both Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta. See
http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-112611b.html.
48
“DOD News Briefing With Brig. Gen. Clark Via Teleconference From Hubert Field, Fla.,” Pentagon transcript,
December 22, 2011, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4952.
Congressional Research Service
13
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
operation with Pakistan at any level.” It also laid out a timeline suggesting that the incident was
“deliberate at some level.”49
Press reporting indicates the Obama Administration came very close to issuing an apology for
Salala on several occasions over ensuing months. Advocates, especially within the State
Department, have believed an apology would facilitate a reopening of the GLOCs and a mending
of relations more generally. Opponents argued that the United States could not give any
appearance of weakness given a compulsion to pressure Pakistan on counterinsurgency. Pentagon
figures are said to believe an apology would amount to an admission of fault. In late February,
Secretary Clinton reportedly was set to apologize to Foreign Minister Khar in London, but that
plan was aborted after U.S. military personnel inadvertently burned Korans in Afghanistan. Later,
with coordinated insurgent attacks across Afghanistan in April blamed on the Pakistan-based
Haqqani Network, those in the Administration arguing for an apology apparently fell silent.50
Notable Developments in 2012
U.S. Congressional Hearing and Legislation on Baluchistan
U.S.-Pakistan relations were further riled in February 2012 when the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing on Baluchistan, a Pakistani
province that is the site of a long-running violent separatist conflict. At least one witness called
for the “partition” of Pakistan into substates, Baluchistan among them. Subcommittee Chairman
Representative Dana Rohrabacher subsequently offered H.Con.Res. 104 to express the sense of
Congress that the people of Baluchistan had a right to self-determination and to their own
sovereign country. Although the resolution has only two co-sponsors and has not emerged from
committee to date, congressional attention to the issue infuriated the Islamabad government and
sparked a storm of criticism from the Pakistani media. Prime Minister Gilani called it an attack on
Pakistani sovereignty and Pakistan’s Ambassador in Washington warned it “would seriously
impact bilateral relations.” The Obama Administration distanced itself from the resolution by
declaring that it has no policy to support Baluchistan’s independence.51
Pakistan’s Parliamentary Review of the Bilateral Relationship
The Salala incident spurred the Islamabad government to essentially freeze relations with the
United States pending a broad review of the engagement by its Parliament. This review, originally
slated to be complete in the opening months of 2012, was not finalized until April. Some
observers were encouraged by the review process as representing an unusual foreign policy
assertiveness by a Pakistani civilian government typically subservient to the military. More
cynical analysts saw the review process as merely a civilian face being put upon what is
fundamentally a reflection of army policy making. The unanimously approved, 14-point
49
“Pakistan’s Perspective on Investigation Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark Into 26th November 2011 US Led
ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency,” January 23, 2012, at
http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf.
50
“U.S. Agonizes Over Apology to Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2012.
51
“Fury in Pakistan After U.S. Congressman Suggests That a Province Leave,” New York Times, February 22, 2012;
Embassy release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-021912.html.
Congressional Research Service
14
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
“Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement with the United States” was issued on April 13,
2012. Among the points/demands most relevant for U.S. policy makers were the following:
•
“Immediate cessation of [U.S.-launched] drone attacks inside the territory of
Pakistan”;
•
“Cessation of infiltration into Pakistani territory on any pretext, including ‘hot
pursuit’”;
•
“Pakistani territory including its air space shall not be used for transportation of
arms and ammunition to Afghanistan”;
•
“The condemnable and unprovoked NATO/ISAF attack ... represents a breach of
international law and constitutes a blatant violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity,” and “the government of Pakistan should seek an
unconditional apology from the United States”;
•
“Those held responsible for the [Salala incident] should be brought to justice”;
•
“No verbal agreement regarding national security shall be entered into by the
government” and “all such agreements or understandings shall cease to have
effect forthwith”;
•
“No overt or covert operations inside Pakistan shall be permitted”;
•
“No private security contractors and/or intelligence operatives shall be allowed”;
and
•
“Pakistan’s territory will not be provided for the establishment of any foreign
bases.”52
The review’s authors surprisingly added a request that the United States offer a civil nuclear deal
to Pakistan similar to the one offered to India in 2005.
Throughout the review process and following its completion, the Obama Administration has
issued repeated and emphatic expressions of respect for Pakistani democracy and sovereignty,
even as drone strikes have continued (albeit at a notably reduced rate). U.S. Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Marc Grossman was in Islamabad in late
April for the 6th Trilateral Core Group Meeting of the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
His visit marked the first focused, high-level talks since the Salala incident and included
substantive discussion of the Parliament’s 14 points. Yet hopes that the bilateral relationship
would finally be “reset” and in working order were quickly dashed as Grossman departed without
any breakthrough.
Pakistan’s demands for a cessation of drone strikes remain a major point of contention—most
analysts believe the CIA will be unwilling to relinquish an ability to strike so-called “high-value
targets” whenever and wherever the opportunity arises. A continuation of “signature strikes”
targeting suspected low-level militants based on “pattern of life” surveillance is also in question.
These types of strikes are considered more likely to result in civilian deaths. Some reports suggest
that Pakistani leaders will refuse to open NATO’s ground supply lines to Afghanistan via the
Karachi port until drone strikes are ended, but no government officials have stated this is the case.
52
Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, April 13, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
15
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
However, the greater sticking point may be Pakistan’s demands for an unconditional apology for
the inadvertent deaths of Pakistani soldiers at Salala. At the time of this writing, none of these
major issues are resolved and the U.S. government reportedly is withholding at least $1 billion in
military reimbursements and counterterrorism funding pending an agreement on bilateral
reengagement. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry continues to insist that Islamabad “will
abide by the recommendations of the Parliament both in letter and spirit.”53
NATO Summit in Chicago
A May 21-22 NATO summit in Chicago—the first ever held in an American city outside of
Washington, DC—formally was focused on making decisions about the alliance’s future
engagement in Afghanistan. Pakistan had boycotted a December 2011 NATO conference in
Germany following the Salala incident and it remained unclear for months whether the Islamabad
government would be invited to the Chicago meeting, or even participate if invited. Only days
before the opening session, President Zardari received a personal call to attend from the NATO
Secretary-General. Yet, when the time came, the numerous heads of government in attendance
met under the shadow of U.S.-Pakistan tensions and the unresolved GLOCs issue. During the
session, President Obama apparently refused to meet in person with President Zardari, a snub that
combined with an absence of any apology for Salala to seriously chasten the Pakistanis. Indeed,
one unnamed senior U.S. official was quoted as saying there was an intent to make Zardari “feel
uncomfortable.”54 Some observers in Pakistan, opposition political figures among them, declared
that President Zardari’s participation in the summit had been an embarrassment. However,
Foreign Minister Khar sounded an upbeat note, arguing that Pakistan was a vital participant and
had received an unconditional invitation; Urdu-language editorials were nearly uniform in their
(unusual) praise of Zardari for appearing to stand up to international pressure and assert
Pakistan’s national interests.55
Conviction and Sentencing of Doctor Shakil Afridi
On May 23, 2012, a tribal court in northwestern Pakistan convicted Shakil Afridi of treason and
sentenced him to 33 years in prison. Afridi, a doctor who had worked with the CIA in an
apparently unsuccessful attempt to collect DNA samples from Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad
compound previous to the May 2011 U.S. commando raid, had been charged under the colonialera Frontier Crimes Regulations and was tried outside of the Abbottabad jurisdiction.
The sentence was met with widespread outrage in the United States; the Obama Administration
contends there is no reason for Afridi to be held, and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Senate Armed Services Committee called the sentence “shocking and outrageous,” contending
that Afridi “should be praised and rewarded for his actions, not punished and slandered.” A
statement from the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the irony that “the
only person being punished is the person who helped the United States achieve justice for the
murder of thousands of Americans,” and concluded that the development will make efforts to
53
Foreign Ministry press release, May 17, 2012.
“U.S.-Pakistan Rift Clouds NATO Summit,” Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2012.
55
“NATO Summit: It Was a Very, Very Successful Visit, Says Khar,” and “Zardari’s Chicago Visit Brought Nothing
But Disgrace: Imran,” both in Express Tribune (Karachi), May 22, 2012.
54
Congressional Research Service
16
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
maintain a strategic relationship more difficult.56 Islamabad insists the process was in accordance
with Pakistani law and should be respected. However, even some Pakistani commentators are
questioning the conviction, in particular because he was convicted in a court outside the original
jurisdiction, without legal representation, and it is unclear if he has a right to appeal.57
Administration Assessments and
Bilateral Diplomacy
March 2011 Assessment and FY2011 Certification
The Administration’s biannual March 2011 assessment of Afghanistan and Pakistan policy
determined that most indicators and metrics against key U.S. objectives had remained static
during the reporting period (the latter half of 2010), notably excepting “significant progress” in
combating Al Qaeda in the region. On counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, it noted improved
cooperation both within the Pakistani armed forces and between those forces and NATO, but
found that the last quarter of 2010 “saw no progress on effectively executing the COIN cycle in
KPk [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province] and the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]” (see
Figure 2): “[W]hat remains vexing is the lack of any indication of ‘hold’ and ‘build’ planning or
staging efforts to compliment ongoing clearing operations. As such, there remains no clear path
toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan” [emphasis added].58
In apparent conflict with such problematic U.S. government reporting on Pakistan’s progress was
a March 2011 certification by Secretary Clinton required under Section 203 of the Enhanced
Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73). This certification, which allowed the release
of security-related FY2011 aid to Pakistan, included the Secretary’s confirmation that Islamabad
was demonstrating “a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts toward
combating terrorist groups” and had “made progress” on ceasing support to extremist and terrorist
groups, as well as on preventing Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from operating on Pakistani
territory, and in “dismantling terrorist bases” in the country. In the wake of revelations about
Osama bin Laden, and persistent complaints from U.S. military commanders that Pakistan was
taking action against the Haqqani Network in the FATA, the certification met with considerable
skepticism and appeared driven primarily by political considerations rather than by ground
realities. When pressed to further explain the certification at an October 2011 House Foreign
Affairs Committee hearing, the Secretary offered, “[A]t the time I made the certification, I closely
considered the requirements set forth in the statue and I determined that on balance Pakistan met
the legal threshold.”59 To date, there has been no similar certification for FY2012.
56
“Statement By Senators McCain and Levin on Sentencing of Pakistani Doctor Who Assisted in Bin Laden Search,”
CQ Transcriptions, May 23, 2012; SFRC press release, May 24, 2012.
57
“Dr Afridi’s Conviction: Some Questions” (editorial), Express Tribune (Karachi), May 24, 2012.
58
See “Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2011” at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/afpak-0311.pdf.
59
“Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Holds Hearing on Afghanistan and Pakistan Transition,” CQ Transcriptions, October 27,
2011.
Congressional Research Service
17
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally North West
Frontier) Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
September 2011 Assessment
The Administration’s September 2011 assessment—covering January-June with preliminary
comment on July and August—brought little positive news beyond reporting “significant
successes” against Al Qaeda, a key aspect of the first of several objectives related to Pakistan: On
enhancing civilian control and stable government in Pakistan, indicators and metrics “remained
static” for the entire reporting period. On developing Pakistan’s COIN capabilities, indicators and
metrics remained static through the first quarter of 2011, then began to decline, with “continued
negative trends” into the summer. This was attributed in large degree to the “Pakistan-directed”
decrease in bilateral security cooperation. On involving the international community in efforts to
Congressional Research Service
18
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
assist in stabilizing Pakistan, the indicators and metrics were reported to have remained static,
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-By Arrangement remaining on hold since
August 2010 and only limited progress in funding the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund and
the U.N. Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan.60
April 2012 Pentagon Report to Congress
The Pentagon’s most recent biannual report to Congress on progress toward security and stability
in Afghanistan (for the six-month period ending March 31, 2012) noted some positive trends, but
flatly stated that, “The Taliban insurgency and its al Qaeda affiliates still operate with impunity
from sanctuaries in Pakistan” which “remain the most critical threat” to the U.S.-led effort in
Afghanistan. The report contended that the security situation in eastern Afghanistan “remains
volatile” and that the city of Kabul continues to face persistent security threats, many of which
are “planned in and controlled from Pakistan”:
Pakistan’s selective counterinsurgency operations, passive acceptance—and in some cases,
provision—of insurgent safe havens, and unwillingness to interdict material such as
[improvised explosive device] components, continue to undermine security in Afghanistan
and threaten ISAF’s campaign.
Pentagon leaders, and U.S. government leaders in general, believe that Pakistan’s desire to see an
Afghan government “with primacy for the Pashtuns, and limited Indian influence,” motivates its
leadership to allow insurgent sanctuaries to persist on its soil.61
Recent Bilateral Diplomacy
In addition to the several destabilizing developments of 2011 discussed above, U.S.-Pakistan
relations have been negatively affected by two other notable issues. One area of contention has
been freedom of travel for U.S. diplomats in Pakistan. Incidents in which such diplomats have
been prevented from moving between cities reportedly have amounted to “official harassment”
from a U.S. perspective, but Pakistani officials insist that requiring “No Objection Certificates”
for Americans leaving Islamabad is neither new nor U.S.-specific.62 Another irritant was the July
2011 revelation that two U.S. citizens of Pakistani origin had for many years been working
illicitly on behalf of the ISI in an effort to influence U.S. Kashmir policy.63
60
White House Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, September 2011.
U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2012, at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf.
62
“American Diplomats in Pakistan Under Pressure,” BBC News, September 8, 2011.
63
The men came under federal indictment for failure to register as foreign agents. One of the accused remains at large
in Pakistan, but the other, Virginia resident Ghulam Nabi Fai, was arrested for lobbying U.S. lawmakers and funneling
campaign contributions to some in Congress over a 10-year period with at least $4 million in funds provided by the ISI.
Fai, longtime director of the Kashmiri American Council—a Washington-based nonprofit group ostensibly dedicated to
the cause of Kashmir self-determination—admitted to receiving funds from the ISI but insisted his group maintained
independence from its viewpoint. The timing of his arrest, coming on the heels of Pakistan’s arrest of a doctor charged
with aiding the CIA operation against Osama bin Laden, led some to conclude that Washington was sending a message
to Islamabad. Fai subsequently pled guilty to conspiracy charges and was sentenced to two years in federal prison.
61
Congressional Research Service
19
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
President Obama has not traveled to Pakistan since taking office, and the bilateral Strategic
Dialogue has not had a formal session since October 2010. However, high-level interactions,
especially among military and intelligence officials, have continued to be frequent, albeit with a
notable late 2011/early 2012 lapse. In October 2011, the Obama Administration made a major
show of diplomatic force when Secretary Clinton led a large, high-level delegation to Islamabad.
Accompanied by CIA Director David Petraeus, new Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin
Dempsey, Deputy National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. Doug Lute, SRAP Grossman, and other
senior officials, Clinton sought to impress upon the entire Pakistani civilian and military
leadership that the United States will not tolerate the continued existence of militant safe havens
in western Pakistan and will take action against them if the Pakistanis do not.64
At the ministerial level, the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue appears to have been postponed
indefinitely; formal talks including Secretary Clinton, originally slated for March 2011, have not
occurred to date. Yet engagement has continued at other levels:
•
In February 2012, Secretary Clinton met with Foreign Minister Khar in London,
where she conveyed U.S. respect for Parliament’s right to review bilateral
relations and take its time in doing so. Yet the Secretary also conveyed U.S.
eagerness to “get back to business,” especially on crucial areas such as
counterterrorism and Afghanistan. Khar told Clinton that Islamabad needed first
to deal with upcoming Senate elections and would soon after deal with
Parliament’s recommendations.65
•
In March, Amb. Grossman met with President Zardari in Dushanbe, Tajikistan,
and emphasized that the United States “wants an honest, constructive, and
mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan and remains committed to
continued engagement.”66
•
Days after the Grossman-Zardari meet, President Obama sat down with Prime
Minister Gilani on the sidelines of a nuclear security summit in Seoul, South
Korea, where the President reasserted the U.S. desire to see the two countries
“move forward on important shared interests, including counterterrorism and
fostering a stable Afghanistan.” Like Secretary Clinton, he welcomed Pakistan’s
parliamentary review process, and also said the United States would welcome
Pakistan’s potential participation in the upcoming Chicago NATO summit.67
•
Also in March, senior U.S. and Pakistani military commanders held their first
formal talks since the Salala incident when Central Command chief Gen.
James Mattis and NATO-ISAF commander Gen. John Allen discussed border
coordination issues with Gen. Kayani in Rawalpindi.
•
In April, Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides met with Foreign Minister
Khar in Islamabad in an effort to build upon the March conversations. Nides
64
“[Clinton] Interview With Nick Schifrin of ABC News,” State Department transcript, October 20, 2011; “Clinton
Issues Blunt Warning to Pakistan,” New York Times, October 20, 2011.
65
“Senior State Department Official on Bilateral Meeting With Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Khar of
Pakistan,” State Department transcript, February 23, 2012.
66
“Ambassador Grossman’s Meeting With President Zardari in Dushanbe,” U.S. Embassy release, March 25, 2012.
67
“Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication Ben Rhodes on President
Obama’s Bilateral Meeting With Prime Minister Gilani of Pakistan,” White House transcript, March 27, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
20
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
expressed optimism that the two countries could “achieve a balanced approach
that respects Pakistan’s sovereignty and interests but also represents our concerns
about our national security.”68
•
Later in April, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah visited Pakistan to express a
strong U.S. commitment to building and improving ties with Pakistan through
civilian assistance and development support.69
•
In late April, Amb. Grossman was in Islamabad for the 6th Trilateral Core Group
meeting between the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It was also the
first high-level U.S. visit following the release of the parliamentary review. He
and interlocutor Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani made no breakthroughs on
major points of disagreement: Grossman focused on the U.S. desire to see
GLOCs quickly reopened, while Jilali reiterated Pakistan’s adamant opposition to
further drone strikes. By some accounts, it was Washington’s refusal to apologize
for the Salala incident that ultimately torpedoed the session.70
•
The U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission—established in 2003 to
bring together military commanders for regular discussions on Afghan stability
and border security—met for the 35th time in Rawalpindi in mid-May.
Controversy and Furor Over UAV Strikes
Missile strikes in Pakistan reportedly launched by armed American Predator and Reaper
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been a controversial, but arguably effective tactic against
Islamist militants in remote regions of western Pakistan. The nominally covert program is
overseen by the CIA, but reports indicate that President Obama personally approves the targeting
“kill list.”71 By one assessment, 118 drone strikes occurred in 2010 alone, more than during the
preceding six years combined. Seventy more strikes were reported in 2011.72 The missile strikes
in western Pakistan reportedly have taken a significant toll on Al Qaeda and other Islamist
extremist militants, but are also criticized as an extrajudicial measure that kills civilians and may
also contribute to militant recruitment.
The Pakistani government regularly issues protests over the strikes—and the perception that they
violate Pakistani sovereignty fuels considerable anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani
public. As per a May 2012 Foreign Ministry statement: “We strongly condemn these drone
attacks. We regard them as a violation of our territorial integrity. They are in contravention of
international law. They are illegal, counterproductive, and totally unacceptable.”73
68
“Deputy Secretary Nides: U.S. Supports People of Pakistan,” U.S. Embassy transcript, April 4, 2012.
“USAID Administrator Shah: U.S. Committed to Improving U.S.-Pakistan Ties,” U.S. Embassy release, April 13,
2012.
70
“Transcript of the Joint Press Stakeout by Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani and Ambassador Marc Grossman,”
Foreign Ministry release, April 26, 2012; “Lack of a U.S. Apology is Sticking Point for Pakistan,” New York Times
(online), April 30, 2012.
71
“Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” New York Times, May 29, 2012.
72
See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones.
73
Foreign Ministry transcript, May 24, 2012.
69
Congressional Research Service
21
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Still, most observers believe official Pakistan has tacitly allowed the strikes and at times provided
intelligence for them.74 Despite Islamabad’s persistent and sweeping rejection of drone strikes on
Pakistani territory, informed domestic debate exists, with some analysts welcoming the tactic as
necessary and the best of several bad options.75 There is no shortage of accounts suggesting that,
as a tactic, the drone campaign has been effective against Al Qaeda and its FATA-based allies.76
Messaging to Pakistan appears to continue to be part of the program’s intent: major strikes closely
followed both Raymond Davis’s March 2011 release and the Administration’s July 2011
announcement on partial suspension of U.S. military aid to Islamabad. Most recently, a series of
drone strikes came immediately after the May 2012 NATO summit where President Obama
refused to meet with his Pakistani counterpart.77
Top Administration figures reportedly differ on the wisdom of continuing UAV strikes in
Pakistan, with some State Department and Pentagon figures urging the CIA to reduce the pace of
its strikes. While there is said to be widespread agreement on the tactical effectiveness of UAV
attacks, proponents of their more judicious use reportedly worry that any intense pace aggravates
an already troubled relationship with Pakistan and may risk destabilizing that country.78 A mid2011 White House review of the program ultimately reaffirmed support for the CIA campaign
while also instituting some changes: the State Department would play a greater role in strike
decisions, Pakistani officials would get more advanced notice, and strikes would be suspended
when Pakistani officials were visiting the United States. the changes appear to have reduced the
number of “signature strikes” undertaken against large groups of suspected militants.79
In June 2011, the President’s top counterterrorism advisor, in referring to the armed drone
program, claimed “there hasn’t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional
proficiency, precision of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop.” Three years after taking
office, President Obama publically acknowledged and defended the program’s existence, saying it
“had not caused a huge number of civilian casualties” and is “kept on a very tight leash.”80 These
claims are hotly disputed by independent analysts who track the strikes and estimate that 145-535
civilians have indeed been killed, including scores of children.81
74
Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables reportedly describe Army Chief Gen. Kayani as having requested “continuous
Predator coverage” over South Waziristan during Pakistan’s early 2008 military operations there. The Pakistani
military denied having made any requests for armed drone support (“Army Chief Wanted More Drone Support,” Dawn
(Karachi), May 20, 2011).
75
See, for example, the several related articles in the May 18, 2012, issue of Lahore’s Friday Times.
76
See, for example, Pir Zubair Shah, “My Drone War,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2012.
77
“Drone Strikes Continue in Pakistan As Tension Increases and Senate Panel Cuts Aid,” New York Times, May 24,
2012.
78
“Drone Attacks Split U.S. Officials,” Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2011.
79
“Signature strike” decisions are based on “pattern of life” surveillance while “personality strikes” target known
leaders. In a March 2012 meeting in London with Lt. Gen. Pasha, CIA Director Petraeus reportedly made a personal
offer to refrain from undertaking “signature strikes” and to provide the ISI chief with advanced notice on others, but the
concessions apparently were rejected out of hand (“U.S. Tightens Drone Rules,” Wall Street Journal, November 4,
2011; “Officials: White House Offers to Curtail Drones,” Associated Press, March 27, 2012).
80
John Brennan quoted in “C.I.A. Claim of No Civilian Deaths From Drone Strikes is Disputed,” New York Times,
August 11, 2011; President Obama quoted in “Obama Admits ‘Worst-Kept Secret:’ US Flies Drones Over Pakistan,”
Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 2012.
81
“Covert CIA Drones Kill Hundreds of Civilians,” London Sunday Times, February 5, 2012. An Associated Press
assessment found that roughly 70% of those killed by drone strikes are militants, but the New America Foundation
finds a success rate of 83% (“New Light on Drone War’s Death Toll,” Associated Press, February 25, 2012; “CIA
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
22
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Despite the killing of many hundreds of militants and dozens of their commanders, violence in
western Pakistan has hardly subsided as a result of missile strikes. Yet, in present circumstances,
and with a coming drawdown of NATO troops in neighboring Afghanistan, many commentators
believe the U.S. government may have no better option than to continue employing the tactic.
The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and
Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation
Acute Questions About the ISI’s Role
Close U.S. links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) date back to the 1980s, when
American and Pakistani intelligence officers oversaw cooperative efforts to train and supply
Afghan “freedom fighters” who were battling the Soviet Army. Yet mutual mistrust has been
ever-present and, in 2008, long-standing doubts about the activities and aims of the ISI
compounded. Along with international concerns about the ISI’s assumed decades-long strategy of
making use of Islamist militant proxies to forward Pakistan’s perceived interests, the service is
also implicated in extralegal abductions and manipulation of domestic politics.82
The agency comes under the direct control of the army and its Director-General, a three-star
general, is widely viewed as deputy to the Chief of Army Staff.83 Lt. Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam was
appointed DG-ISI in March 2012, replacing the retiring Lt. Gen. Pasha. Islam, previously
commander of the army’s V Corp based in Karachi, received military training in the United States
in 2002-2003. Press reports have called him more open and moderate than his predecessors; he
may be a candidate for the COAS position after Kayani’s scheduled 2012 retirement.84
U.S. officials repeatedly have fingered the ISI for actively supporting Afghan insurgents with
money, supplies, and planning guidance. There is ongoing conviction among U.S. officials that
sanctuaries in Pakistan have allowed Afghan militants to sustain their insurgency and that
elements of the ISI continue to support them. Some reporting has cited Afghan insurgent
commanders claiming that in the latter months of 2011 the ISI increased its direct contacts with
the Taliban, vigorously encouraging more violence, and even supplying them with new highpowered explosives manufactured in Pakistan.85
A classified NATO report detailing information gathered through thousands of interrogations of
captured Taliban and Al Qaeda militants was leaked in January 2012 and reportedly indicates that
(...continued)
Drone War in Pakistan in Sharp Decline,” CNN.com, March 27, 2012).
82
The ISI has come under unprecedented judicial scrutiny related to disappearances and, in 2012, the revival of a 15year-old vote-rigging scandal involving $6.5 million in alleged covert political donations by the ISI that likely helped
unseat Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1990 (“Court Challenges Put Unusual Spotlight on Pakistani Spy Agency,”
New York Times, February 7, 2012).
83
The State Department reports that Pakistan’s military and intelligence services nominally report to civilian
authorities, but essentially operate without effective civilian oversight (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2011, released May 2012).
84
“Kayani’s New Soldier Spy,” India Today (Delhi), April 2, 2012.
85
“Afghan Taliban on Night Raids, New Explosives, the ISI, and Peace,” Newsweek, December 26, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
23
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Afghan insurgents continue to receive direct support from the ISI. The report offers that,
“Pakistan’s manipulation of the Taliban senior leadership continues unabatedly,” and “Senior
Taliban leaders meet regularly with ISI personnel, who advise on strategy and relay any pertinent
concerns of the government of Pakistan.” NATO officials played down the report’s significance,
and Pakistan’s foreign minister called its content “old wine in an even older bottle.”86
The ISI is also regularly linked to anti-India terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba,
responsible for the November 2008 attack on Mumbai in which some 165 people were killed, 6
Americans among them. During a February 2012 House hearing, Secretary of State Clinton
asserted, “[T]here is no doubt in my mind that certain elements of the Pakistani government are
more ambivalent about cracking down on terrorism.... [T]here have been relationships between
terrorist groups and the military and intelligence services for many decades.”87
Pakistani officials regularly provide assurances that no elements of the ISI are cooperating with
militants or extremists. However, to many independent observers, Pakistan’s security services
increasingly appear to be penetrated by Islamist extremists.88 Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables
reportedly contained claims that Pakistani military officers receive training biased against the
United States.89 Some analysts argue that, just as Pakistan’s national identity has continued to be
fractured along the lines dividing nationalism from Islamism, Pakistan’s security services can be
conceived of as comprising two groups: one, led by Gen. Kayani, is fundamentally nationalist and
seeks to maintain the status quo; the other, currently leaderless, is driven by a revisionist Islamist
ideology, sometimes with a violent cast.90
Even before the Raymond Davis episode began, reports indicated that CIA-ISI relations were at a
nadir, with American officials frustrated at the lack of expanded Pakistani military operations and
at signs that elements within the ISI continue to provide backing to certain militant groups. The
Davis affair sharpened Pakistani attention to—and acrimony toward—the presence of U.S.
security officials and contractors in Pakistan. Revelation of Davis’s status as a CIA contractor led
the ISI to demand an accounting of all such operatives working in Pakistan, but most intelligence
cooperation may have been frozen immediately upon the January shooting.91
The circumstances of OBL’s death brought more focus on purported ISI links with Islamist
extremism.92 Following the May 2011 raid, Pakistan sought to crack down on its own citizens
86
“Pakistan is Helping Afghan Taliban, Says Nato Report,” BBC News, January 31, 2012; “Pakistan Denies Claims in
NATO Report of Spy Service Still Aiding Taliban,” Washington Post, February 1, 2012.
87
“House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal 2013 Budget Proposal for the State
Department and Foreign Operations,” CQ Transcripts, February 29, 2012.
88
“Infiltrators Worry Pakistani Military,” Washington Post, May 28, 2011. In June 2011, a Pakistani brigadier general
was arrested and four majors questioned due to their links with the Hizb-ul-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), a nonviolent,
but outlawed Islamist group that seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The general, whose brother may be a
senior intelligence officer, is the most senior officer to face such allegations since 1995 (“Arrest of Pakistani Officer
Revives Fears of Extremism Within Military,” CNN.com, June 22, 2011).
89
“Anti-Americanism Rife in Pakistan Army Institution – Wikileaks,” Reuters, May 25, 2011.
90
Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Pakistan’s Army: Divided It Stands,” Viewpoint Online (undated), at
http://www.viewpointonline.net/pakistans-army-divided-it-stands.html.
91
“U.S.-Pakistan Intelligence Operations Frozen Since January,” Reuters, April 9, 2011.
92
The mobile phone of bin Laden’s most trusted courier reportedly contained contacts in the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, a
Kashmir-oriented terrorist group with close ties to the ISI and deep roots in the Abbottabad area. Its leader, Maulana
Fazlur Rehman Khalil, a sometime ally of OBL, continues to live openly in Islamabad (“Seized Phone Offers Clues to
Bin Laden’s Pakistani Links,” New York Times, June 24, 2011).
Congressional Research Service
24
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
who were found to be working with the CIA.93 Pressure was increased to allow American
investigators access to bin Laden’s three widows in Pakistani custody. Such access was
subsequently granted. One week after OBL’s death, a Pakistani newspaper seen as close to the
country’s military and intelligence services published the purported name of the CIA’s Islamabad
station chief. This was the second time in six months that the top covert American operative in
Pakistan had been outed, and U.S. officials reportedly believed such disclosures were deliberate
as a means for the ISI to demonstrate its leverage and to express anger at U.S. policies.94
After the OBL raid, the ISI leadership was confronted more frequently—and more publically—
with U.S. evidence of collusion between Pakistani officials and Afghan insurgents. Such evidence
notably included instances in which the CIA alerted Islamabad about the existence of two bombmaking facilities in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), only to have
Pakistani army units find the sites abandoned by the time they arrived. This led U.S. officials to
assume that the targets had been tipped off about upcoming raids, a charge called “totally false
and malicious” by the Pakistani military, which declared that some of the intelligence provided
“proved to be incorrect.” Still, U.S. officials repeated the accusations after militants fled two
other bomb-making facilities; these officials reportedly believed that Pakistan’s insistence on
gaining permission from local tribal elders before entering the area allowed militants to escape.95
Continuing Intelligence Cooperation
Concurrent with interagency discord, effective joint intelligence work has continued. Just days
after the OBL raid, a Yemeni national described as a “senior” or “midlevel” Al Qaeda operative
was arrested in Karachi with the help of U.S.-provided intelligence. Mohammed Ali Qasim Yaqub
reportedly had been a key courier between Al Qaeda’s top leaders, and his capture was seen as a
good-faith Pakistani effort to mend relations with Washington. In another apparent effort to
rebuild confidence, Pakistan pledged in June to grant more than three dozen visas to CIA officers.
Most-wanted terrorist Ilyas Kashmiri was reported killed in a June 2011 drone strike in South
Waziristan, and the new Al Qaeda chief’s deputy and operational commander, Libyan explosives
expert Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, was reported killed in an August strike in North Waziristan
(successes in targeting militants in the FATA with unmanned drones likely come with intelligence
from Pakistan). In September, Pakistan announced having arrested three allegedly senior Al
Qaeda operatives near Quetta with help from technical assistance provided by the CIA.
Bilateral intelligence cooperation, especially that targeting Al Qaeda and the “Pakistani Taliban,”
has quietly continued even as government-to-government relations have worsened.96 Some
reports indicate that the CIA has undertaken a years-long, multibillion dollar effort to establish
inside Pakistan a network of “secret friends” of the United States—security officials, intelligence
93
“Arrest Indicates Pakistan Leaders Face Rising Pressure to Curb U.S. Role,” Washington Post, June 15, 2011.
“Pakistanis Disclose Name of CIA Operative,” Washington Post, May 9, 2011.
95
“C.I.A. Director Warns Pakistan on Collusion With Militants,” New York Times, June 12, 2011, ISPR press release,
June 17, 2011; “Pakistan Still Tipping Off Militants, U.S. Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2011.
96
For example, drone strikes were temporarily halted after the November 2011 Salala border incident, by some
accounts providing respite to FATA-based militants. However—and despite Islamabad’s official opposition—they
resumed with a mid-January strike that reportedly killed a senior Al Qaeda figure. That attack was taken as evidence
that Pakistanis were at some level continuing to assist in targeting (“How Pakistan Helps the U.S. Drone Campaign,”
Reuters, January 22, 2012).
94
Congressional Research Service
25
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
operatives, counterterrorism fighters, and the like, who could offer an alternative to less
trustworthy army and ISI officials.97
Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency98
Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and “strategic depth” with regard to
India through friendly relations with neighboring Afghanistan. Such policy contributed to
President-General Zia ul-Haq’s support for Afghan mujahideen “freedom fighters” who were
battling Soviet invaders during the 1980s and to Islamabad’s later support for the Afghan Taliban
regime from 1996 to 2001.99 British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes
inhabiting the mountainous northwestern reaches of their South Asian empire with the 1893
“Durand Line.” This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders, who have at
times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.100 Both Pakistan and Afghanistan
play central roles as U.S. allies in global efforts to combat Islamic militancy. Ongoing acrimony
between Islamabad and Kabul is thus deleterious to U.S. interests.
American and Pakistani goals in Afghanistan are far from fully compatible; there is very little
agreement beyond the shared interest in a negotiated settlement that leaves Afghanistan relatively
stable and secure. Pakistan—and especially its military and intelligence services—is widely
believed to be seeking a post-NATO Afghanistan that is deferential to and perhaps even
dependent upon Islamabad, with Kabul setting foreign policies that do not run counter to
Pakistani interests. In contrast, the U.S.-led coalition endeavors to leave behind a capable and
independent Afghanistan. Such a result would almost certainly see the Kabul government
increase its cooperation with India. If within this dynamic Pakistan makes use of the Quetta Shura
and Haqqani Network as proxies in its dealings with Kabul (as is widely assumed to have been
the case for several years now), the Administration’s continued reliance on Islamabad in creating
and shaping the reconciliation process is likely to increase Pakistan’s leverage.101
Washington has continued to seek Islamabad’s support for Afghan reconciliation talks, ideally by
winning ISI pressure on Afghan insurgency leaders to negotiate. Yet tensions between the two
governments’ respective approaches are evident in the fact that Americans want to “fight, talk,
97
See Eli Lake, “America’s Shadow State in Pakistan,” The DailyBeast.com, December 5, 2011.
See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name re
dacted).
99
Documentary evidence indicates that Islamabad provided military and economic support, perhaps including the
combat troops, to the Afghan Taliban during the latter half of the 1990s (see “Pakistan: ‘The Taliban’s Godfather’?,”
National Security Archive Briefing Book 227, August 14, 2007).
100
Pakistan is home to more than 30 million Pashto-speaking people, most of them living near the border with
Afghanistan, which is home to perhaps 15 million ethnic Pashtuns (also known as Pakhtuns or Pathans). A hardy
people with a proud martial history (they are disproportionately represented in the Pakistani military), Pashtuns played
an important role in the anti-Soviet resistance of the 1980s.
101
See Ashley Tellis, “Gambling on Reconciliation to Save a Transition: Perils and Possibilities in Afghanistan,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, December 2011. Many analysts contend that American
and Pakistan objectives in Afghanistan are “fundamentally at odds,” meaning a U.S. reliance on Pakistan to forge
Afghan reconciliation is a “dangerous gamble” given the apparent failure of a “decade-long policy of seeking to
appease Pakistan and induce its cooperation through large-scale economic and military assistance (first two quotes
from Ashley Tellis, third from Christine Fair, in “Rep. Steve Chabot Holds a Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward
Afghanistan and Pakistan,” CQ Transcripts, November 3, 2011. For a detailed argument of why “Pakistan is the
problem,” see Tellis’s prepared statement at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/tel110311.pdf).
98
Congressional Research Service
26
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
build,” while Pakistanis are seen to be taking a “cease-fire, talk, wait for the Americans to leave”
tack. Pakistani officials have been confused by a perceived lack of clarity in U.S. goals for
Afghanistan and in pressure from Washington to employ force against anti-Kabul militants in
North Waziristan even as the U.S. government seeks to talk with other insurgent groups.102 Some
argue that Washington risks rewarding Pakistani intransigence by giving that country’s security
services a key role in brokering peace with the same insurgent forces they have fostered. Some
even contend that the ISI has spent the past decade trying to reinstate the Taliban regime
overthrown by the ISAF coalition in 2001.103
Ongoing Turmoil in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
Senior U.S. officials and nearly all independent observers continue to contend that Pakistani
cooperation is necessary for reconciliation and long-term stability in Afghanistan. Islamabad’s
relations with Kabul remain troubled, and it is widely understood that Afghan insurgents continue
to find safe havens in the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Karachi, as well as in western Pakistan’s
tribal agencies. U.S. military commanders identify these havens as central obstacles to successful
pacification of southern and eastern Afghanistan. Declassified U.S. government documents
indicate that the Taliban’s resurgence in the mid-2000s could not have been possible in the
absence of FATA sanctuaries.104
Despite some warming of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in 2010 and early 2011, Afghan officials
continue to openly accuse Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan. There are
signs that Afghan’s historic wariness of Pakistani influence in their country is not abating.105
Many analysts have grown cynical given perceptions of Islamabad’s consistent use of “Pashtun
jihadi proxies” to forward its perceived interests and the Pakistani military’s aim to exert
dominance of its Afghan neighbors.106
Islamabad can be discomfited by signs that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is not long-term or
that the international community may “abandon” the region in ways damaging to Pakistani
interests, as was the case during the 1990s.107 Many analysts saw President Obama’s June 2011
announcement of an impending U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan as yet another signal
to stakeholder governments and Taliban elements, alike, that the U.S. focus is on an exit strategy
and that the United States may not make a long-term commitment to stabilizing the region.
102
“U.S. Seeks Aid From Pakistan in Peace Effort,” New York Times, October 31, 2011.
See, for example, Sarah Chayes, “Denying Pakistan” (op-ed), Los Angeles Times, November 23, 2011.
104
“‘No-Go’ Tribal Areas Became Basis for Afghanistan Insurgency, Documents Show,” National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No. 325, posted September 13, 2010.
105
See, for example, “Ordinary Afghans Voicing Increasing Distrust of Pakistan’s Intentions,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (online), November 6, 2011.
106
“Talking About Talks: Toward Political Settlement in Afghanistan,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No.
221, March 20, 2012.
107
Members of Pakistan’s nongovernmental foreign policy “elite” are reported to maintain that Pakistan’s key
objective is to see a pacific Afghanistan with an inclusive government and a limited Indian presence, even in the area of
economic and social development. From this perspective, only significant power-sharing with Afghan Pashtuns will
ensure a future Kabul government sensitive to Pakistani interests,(see Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf, and Salman Zaidi,
“Pakistan, the United States, and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite,” U.S.
Institute of Peace, July 25, 2011).
103
Congressional Research Service
27
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Pakistani leaders insist that Afghan stability is a vital Pakistani interest. In April 2011, Prime
Minister Gilani, Army Chief Kayani, and ISI Director Pasha all traveled to Kabul as part of an
effort to upgrade the Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Commission earlier that year and so accelerate
the peace process. American observers were disturbed by reports that Gilani had used the
meetings as an opportunity to wean Kabul away from its strategic partnership with the United
States, and instead move closer to Islamabad and seek greater support from China. According to
the reports, Gilani criticized America’s “imperial designs” and contended that ending the Afghan
war required Kabul and Islamabad to take “ownership” of the peace process.108 The new Joint
Commission met in June 2011, with Gilani and President Karzai expressing their commitment to
an “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” process. The two sides also produced a 23-point “Islamabad
Declaration” pledging improved and deepened ties in a wide range of issue-areas.109
However, in the summer of 2011, increased incidence of “reverse infiltration” caused friction
between Islamabad and Kabul, especially after more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers were
killed in a June cross-border raid by up to 400 militants from Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Later
that month Afghan officials accused Pakistan of firing more than 760 rockets into the Kunar,
Nangarhar, and Khost provinces over a period of six weeks, killing at least 60 people, including
women and children. Pakistan rejected charges that its forces had been involved in any crossborder attacks. Some in Afghanistan see the barrages as part of an orchestrated and official
Pakistani effort to “reshape Afghanistan as a Pakistani colony” after International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) troops draw down.110
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations reached a new nadir in September 2011 when Afghan High Peace
Council chairman and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in his
Kabul home by a suicide bomber, dealing a major blow to hopes for reconciliation talks. Afghan
officials suspect the ISI played a role in the murder, saying the attacker was Pakistani and the
attack had been planned in Quetta. They also criticized Islamabad for its alleged failure to
cooperate in the related investigation. Pakistani officials denied playing any part in the
assassination, but the Afghan president has continued to accuse Pakistan of “using terrorism” as
official policy. In October, Afghan intelligence officials claimed to have halted a plot to
assassinate Karzai himself and said the alleged culprits were based in the FATA and affiliated
with both Al Qaeda and the Haqqanis.111
Afghan Reconciliation and Pakistan’s Role
Islamabad strongly endorses current efforts to make peace with the Afghan Taliban and insists
that the parameters for such a process should be set by the Kabul government. Pakistan considers
itself to be indispensible to successful Afghan peace talks, and Islamabad’s leaders are in large
part motivated by a desire to deny India significant influence in a post-conflict Afghanistan.
Pakistan has sought to exert control over which Taliban figures can negotiate on this account. In
early 2010, the Afghan Taliban’s top military commander and key aide to Mullah Omar, Mullah
108
“Karzai Told to Dump U.S.-Pakistan Urges Afghanistan to Ally With Islamabad, Beijing,” Wall Street Journal,
April 27, 2011.
109
See the June 12, 2011, text at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2011/June/Pr_200.htm.
110
“Pakistan Launching Military Intervention to Subjugate Afghanistan,” MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report
No. 703, July 6, 2011.
111
“Karzai Says Pakistan is Supporting Terrorists,” Washington Post, October 4, 2011; “Afghans Say Plot Aimed to
Kill Karzai,” Los Angeles Times, October 6, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
28
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Abdul Ghani Baradar, was captured in a joint ISI-CIA operation in Karachi. By some accounts,
Pakistani elements “orchestrated” the Baradar arrest to facilitate talks with “willing” Taliban
commanders and pave the way for reconciliation negotiations. Cynics contend that the ISI’s
motives may simply have been to thwart any anticipated negotiations.
In mid-2010, Pakistan launched an effort to broker a reconciliation between the Kabul
government and the Haqqani Network. This initiative sparked concerns that Islamabad would
seek to exploit the political situation—both in the region and in Washington—to mold a
settlement giving Pakistan maximal influence in a post-conflict Kabul. Later that year NATO
facilitated the secret travel of at least three QST figures and a representative of the Haqqani
Network from Pakistan to Kabul for meetings with senior Afghan government officials. It is
unclear whether Pakistani officials were included in this process; some reports indicated they
were not, others described ISI officials as having participated directly.
In another clear indication that Islamabad has substantive influence over top Afghan insurgents,
in the fall of 2011 the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan suggested that Pakistan is hesitant to
allow Taliban leaders to travel to Kabul for reconciliation talks. He asks that Pakistan support the
process by allowing those willing to talk to be given the opportunity to do so. Afghan President
Karzai has echoed these complaints, saying insurgent leaders inside Pakistan are not sufficiently
independent of Pakistani control to enter into negotiations on their own.112
By early 2012, the Islamabad government appeared to at least be allowing the U.S.-Taliban
negotiating initiative to proceed. Then, on an April visit to Islamabad, Afghan President Karzai
reportedly asked Pakistani leaders to “use their influence” to prod the Taliban into negotiations, a
request that Foreign Minister Khar called “not only unrealistic, but preposterous.” Yet, just a
week later, Prime Minister Gilani issued an unprecedented open appeal to the Afghan Taliban
leadership and other militant commanders to “participate in an intra-Afghan process for national
reconciliation and peace.”113 The Obama Administration welcomed the message, even as there
remain pervasive concerns that Pakistan’s security services are maintaining ties with and possibly
supporting certain Afghan insurgent groups as a means of increasing their leverage in the
reconciliation process. To many observers in Pakistan and the region more widely, current U.S.
transition planning for Afghanistan appears to be cover for a hasty exit strategy.
Haqqani Network Attacks and U.S. Frustrations
The terrorist network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, based in the FATA, is
commonly identified as the most dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups battling U.S.-led forces
in eastern Afghanistan. In the words of one expert,
The Haqqani Network represents a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan
state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently
Afghanistan’s most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close
operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates.
112
“Envoy: Pakistan Should Aid Talks,” USA Today, September 8, 2011; “Karzai Lashes Out at Pakistan,” Financial
Times (London), October 3, 2011.
113
“Meeting in Pakistan Reveals Tensions Over Afghan Talks,” New York Times, February 18, 2012; “Statement of
Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Gilani on Afghanistan,” Foreign Ministry transcript, February 24, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
29
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
This analyst is among many who contend that the group is not reconcilable and must be dealt
with through sustained military offensives by ISAF and Afghan forces beyond 2012.114
Islamabad officials have consistently deferred on urgent and long-standing U.S. requests that the
Pakistani military launch operations against the Haqqanis’ North Waziristan haven, saying their
forces are already stretched too thin. Most observers believe the underlying cause of Pakistan’s
inaction is the country’s decades-long relationship with Jalaluddin Haqqani and a belief held in
the army and ISI that his group represents perhaps the best chance for Islamabad to exert Pashtunbased influence in post-ISAF Afghanistan.
Over the past year, the Haqqanis have undertaken numerous high-visibility attacks in Afghanistan
that infuriated top U.S. and Afghan officials. First, a June 2011 assault on Kabul’s
Intercontinental Hotel by Haqqani gunmen and suicide bombers left 18 people dead. Then, in
September, a truck bomb attack on a U.S. military base by Haqqani fighters in the Wardak
province injured 77 American troops and killed 5 Afghans. But it was a September 13, 2011,
attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul that appears to have substantively changed the
nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations, a well-planned and -executed 20-hour-long assault that left 16
Afghans dead, 5 police officers and at least 6 children among them. Although U.S. officials
dismissed the attack as a sign of the insurgents’ weakness, the ability of militants to undertake a
complex raid in the heart of Kabul’s most protected area was seen by many as a clear blow to the
narrative of Afghanistan becoming more secure.
Days after this attack, Admiral Mullen called on General Kayani to again press for Pakistani
military action against Haqqani bases. Apparently unsatisfied with his counterpart’s response,
Mullen returned to Washington, D.C., and began ramping up rhetorical pressure to previously
unseen levels, accusing the ISI of using the Haqqanis to conduct a “proxy war” in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, Secretary Panetta issued what was taken by many to be an ultimatum to Pakistan
when he told reporters that the United States would “take whatever steps are necessary to protect
our forces” in Afghanistan from future attacks by the Haqqanis.115 Then, during September 22
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mullen issued the strongest and most
direct U.S. government statement on Pakistani malfeasance of the post-2001 era, saying,
The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence agency. With ISI support, Haqqani operatives plan and conducted that
[September 13] truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy. We also have
credible evidence they were behind the June 28th attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in
Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations. [emphasis added]116
114
Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat,” Institute for the Study of War Middle East Security
Report 9, March 2012. Another overview describes the network as interdependent with Al Qaeda, an enabler for other
jihadi groups, and “the fountainhead of local, regional, and global militancy.” It is also called the “primary conduit” for
Pakistani Taliban fighters to transit into Afghanistan and as the “central diplomatic interface” between the TTP and the
Pakistani government. The report is pessimistic on the network’s potential to disengage itself from Al Qaeda (Dan
Rassler and Vahid Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of Al-Qa’ida,” Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point Harmony Program, July 13, 2011).
115
“Joint Chiefs Chairman Presses Pakistan on Militant Havens,” New York Times, September 17, 2011; U.S. Says
Pakistani Spies Using Group for ‘Proxy War,’” Reuters, September 21, 2011; “U.S. Issues Sharp Warning on Militant
Ties,” Washington Post, September 21, 2011.
116
“Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Iraq and Afghanistan,” CQ Transcripts, September 22, 2011.
Recently retired Defense Secretary Robert Gates later offered, “There’s little question in my mind that [the Haqqanis]
receive support and protection from the ISI.” Mullen’s strong language may have come as a result of his
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
30
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Secretary Panetta, testifying alongside Mullen, took the opportunity to add, “I think the first order
of business right now is to, frankly, put as much pressure on Pakistan as we can to deal with this
issue from their side.”117 The statements of America’s two top military officials were widely seen
to signal a new and more strident level of U.S. intolerance for Pakistan’s regional “double-game.”
Publically, the Obama Administration did not fully align itself with Admiral Mullen’s charges.
President Obama himself later stated, “I think the intelligence is not as clear as we might like in
terms of what exactly the [ISI-Haqqani] relationship is,” but he still insisted that the Pakistanis
“have got to take care of this problem” in any case.”118 Later reporting called the Wardak truck
bombing a “turning point” in hardening Secretary Clinton’s attitude toward the Haqqanis.119 In
ensuing months, Haqqani fighters have been implicated in numerous further attacks on coalition
targets in Afghanistan, including coordinated, country-wide attacks launched in mid-April, 2012.
Islamabad rejects claims that Pakistan is responsible for spates of violence in Afghanistan or that
it supports or has control over the Haqqanis. The Pakistani military called Mullen’s statements
“very unfortunate and not based on fact,” and categorically denied conducting a proxy war or
supporting the Haqqanis. A stern Foreign Minister Khar warned that, with such allegations, the
United States could “lose an ally.” President Zardari, in an op-ed response, said that “verbal
assaults” against Pakistan are damaging the bilateral relationship”120
A Haqqani Role in Afghan Reconciliation or FTO Designation?
As noted above, Pakistani officials have for nearly two years sought to facilitate a rapprochement
between the Haqqanis and the Kabul government, but close Haqqani links with Al Qaeda have
been a major sticking point (Al Qaeda figures are widely believed to enjoy sanctuary in Haqqanicontrolled areas). Pakistan—especially through its military and intelligence agencies—is seen to
wield considerable clout with the Haqqanis and may be the only actor able to prod them toward
negotiations. Unnamed Pakistani military officials have claimed they can “deliver” the Haqqanis
to a negotiating table and that this is the only viable policy option (on the assumption that a
military assault on Haqqani bases would only engulf the region in a conflict the Pakistani military
would likely be unable to win). However, by bringing the insurgent group into negotiations,
Islamabad would be guaranteed a central role in the ensuing process, a development some in
Washington and other interested capitals wish to avoid.
The Obama Administration has been considering formally designating the Haqqani Network as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under U.S. law, especially with pressure to do so coming
from some senior Senators, Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Carl Levin and
Intelligence Committee Co-Chair Senator Dianne Feinstein among them.121 Seven Haqqani
(...continued)
disappointment that a planned Pakistani offensive against the Haqqanis—reportedly worked out between himself and
Kayani earlier this year—did not materialize (“Gates: Pakistan Spy Agency Tied to Militant Group,” Wall Street
Journal, October 6, 2011; “How Pakistan Lost Its Top U.S. Friend,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2011).
117
“Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Iraq and Afghanistan,” CQ Transcripts, September 22, 2011.
118
Quoted in “Obama: Pakistan Must Sort Out Haqqani ‘Problem,’” Agence France Presse, September 30, 2011.
119
“Top US Delegation to Enlist Pakistan’s Help,” Associated Press, October 19, 2011.
120
ISPR press release, September 23, 2011; “Pakistan Warns US It Could ‘Lose an Ally,’” Financial Times (London),
September 23, 2011; Asif Ali Zardari, “Talk To, Not At, Pakistan” (op-ed), Washington Post, October 2, 2011.
121
“US Weighs Blacklisting Haqqani Network,” Agence France Presse, September 26, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
31
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
leaders have been under U.S. sanctions since 2008 and, in 2011, Secretary Clinton designated
operational commander Badruddin Haqqani under Executive Order 13224. However, the
potential decision on an FTO designation is complicated by the Administration’s apparent
willingness to negotiate with the Haqqani leadership, something that has occurred at least once in
the recent past (without result), and that Secretary Clinton has indicated may be necessary again
in order to establish sustainable peace in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network Terrorist
Designation Act of 2011 (S. 1959) was passed out of the Senate by unanimous consent in
December 2011, but has not emerged from House committee to date. U.S. congressional
frustration with the Administration’s now overdue “formal review” on the question of FTO
designation has only increased in 2012.122
Pakistan and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan
Ammonium nitrate (AN) is widely used fertilizer that also has commercial uses as a chemical
explosives precursor. The great majority of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by Islamist
insurgents fighting in Afghanistan employ AN and, since the Kabul government’s January 2010
ban on the substance, nearly all illicit AN in Afghanistan is believed to arrive via transshipments
from neighboring Pakistan.123 According to data from the Pentagon’s Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the summer of 2011 saw historic peaks in total IED
“events” in Afghanistan. However, with improved detection and clearing capabilities—and a
major increase in cache finds—the “effective” IED attack rate has declined.124 Section 503 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act of FY2012 (became P.L. 112-87 in January 2012) required the
Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on a
coordinated strategy for countering IED-related networks in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This
reporting requirement would be renewed by pending FY2103 legislation.
The U.S. government is urging Islamabad to adjust Pakistani national laws to restrict access to
AN there or, short of that, to encourage Pakistani law enforcement and border security agencies to
be more active and effective in efforts to prevent its movement into Afghanistan. Washington’s
relevant efforts fall into three main categories: (1) diplomatic initiatives; (2) law enforcement
initiatives; and (3) science and technology efforts. JIEDDO, the State Department’s SRAP staff,
and staff of the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement
office are engaged in these efforts. In addition, Operation Global Shield (also known as Project
Global Shield) is an unprecedented multilateral law enforcement operation launched in late 2010
to combat the illicit cross-border diversion and trafficking of 11 chemical explosives precursors
(including AN) by monitoring their cross-border movements. A U.S.-proposed collaborative
effort of the World Customs Organization, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, and Interpol, the
program has realized some notable successes to date.125 Adding urea fertilizer granules to AN can
122
“US Secretly Met Afghan Militants,” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2011; “U.S. Open to Afghan Peace Deal
Including Haqqani,” Reuters, October 11, 2011; “U.S. Lawmakers Want Pakistan Network to be Dubbed Terrorists,”
Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2012.
123
Pentagon officials have said that 85% of Afghan IEDs use AN manufactured in Pakistan (“Tensions With Pakistan
Rise Over Bomb Ingredient,” National Journal Daily, July 6, 2011).
124
Author interview with JIEDDO official, August 4, 2011.
125
Since 2010, 89 participating nations and international organizations have been sharing information about the export
of 14 precursor chemicals used IEDs. As of January 2012, Program Global Shield had accounted for seizures of
chemical precursors totaling over 62 metric tons and 31 arrests related to the illicit diversion of these chemicals.
(Homeland Security Department release, January 25, 2012; see also http://m.ice.gov/news/releases/1111/
111121washingtondc.htm).
Congressional Research Service
32
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
make processing the mixture for explosives more complicated and is recommended by experts.
Other options include adding colored dyes to the AN fertilizer to make it easier to spot at
checkpoints or adding radio frequency identification tags so as to track AN shipments.126
Pakarab Fertilizers Ltd., in the central Pakistani city of Multan, is the country’s largest fertilizer
complex and has been in operation since 1979 (it was privatized in 2005). As reported by the
Pakistani Ministry of Industries and Production, the Multan facility has produced well over
300,000 metric tons of AN annually since 2004.127 There is pending legislation in Islamabad that
would adjust relevant Pakistani national laws to further restrict AN and other precursors.
However, this “Explosives Ordinance” has remained in draft stage only, meaning that near-term
changes are unlikely. The Islamabad government has established a National Counter-IED Forum
in which all relevant Pakistani agencies can work together to develop an action plan. In the
absence of an outright ban, the United States has had to rely on Pakistani police and border
authorities who are vulnerable to corruption.
U.S./NATO Ground Lines of Communication
NATO has been dependent upon ground and air lines of communication (GLOCs and ALOCs)
through and over Pakistan to supply its forces in landlocked Afghanistan. To date, the logistics
routes used by NATO to supply the Afghanistan effort have been closed for six months as a result
of Pakistan’s anger over the Salala incident and broader pique about the state of its relationship
with Washington. The surface routes had regularly come under attack by militants, and were
temporarily closed in the past in apparent efforts to convey Islamabad’s leverage. In 2008,
insurgents began more focused attempts to interdict these supply lines, especially near the historic
Khyber Pass connecting Peshawar with Jalalabad, Afghanistan, but also to include the route from
Karachi to Kandahar, which runs through Quetta and the Chaman border crossing. Such efforts
left thousands of transport and fuel trucks destroyed, and numerous Pakistani drivers dead. To
reach the Afghan border from Karachi, truck drivers typically must pay bribes to police and other
government officials, and in some instances the trucks destroyed en route have first been emptied
of their fuel and other cargo, which can end up for sale at Peshawar markets.128
In response to interdiction attacks and to reduce reliance on Pakistan, the U.S. military began
testing alternative routes, concentrating especially on lines from Central Asia and Russia. By mid2010, this “Northern Distribution Network” (NDN) was carrying well over half of NATO’s total
supplies, but only “nonlethal” cargo moves via the NDN. While senior U.S. defense officials
prefer Pakistan as a faster and less expensive logistics route, they have continued to expand aerial
and NDN routes, even if the former is up to ten times as costly and the latter entails greater U.S.
reliance on authoritarian regimes in Central Asia.
Loss of the Pakistani GLOCs has proven to be less damaging to Afghan operations than many
expected. In early May, the British deputy commander of ISAF forces said they were “managing
very well” without the Pakistani GLOCs, but that reopening them would by “extremely helpful”
and also provide financial benefits to Pakistanis. Later in the month, Gen. Allen offered that
closure of the GLOCs “has not, in fact, negatively affected ... our prosecution of the
126
“To Stop Afghan Bombs, A Focus On Pakistani Fertilizer,” Washington Post, November 25, 2011.
See http://www.moip.gov.pk/fertilizerProduction.htm.
128
“Route of Death: Nato Supply Tankers Bribe Their Way to the Border,” Express Tribune (Karachi), July 11, 2011.
127
Congressional Research Service
33
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
campaign.”129 However, the Pentagon’s April report on Afghanistan and Pakistan called the
continued closure of the GLOCs a “strategic concern” that has hampered Afghan security forces
by backlogging thousands of tons of equipment for them. It counted more than 4,100 vehicles
“stranded” in Pakistan due to the closure while noting that airlift capabilities have limited the
closure’s effect on the movement of communications equipment and weapons. In withdrawing
from Afghanistan, NATO will need to remove at least 100,000 thousand shipping containers and
70,000 vehicles worth at least $30 billion.130
As the spring “fighting season” in Afghanistan approached in early 2012, U.S. commanders
became more insistent about the need to have Pakistani GLOCs reopened. In mid-March, all
major Pakistani political and military principles met and agreed “in principle” to reopen the
GLOCs and, as noted above, the Pakistani parliamentary review finalized in mid-April called for
same. By mid-May, senior Pakistani officials were indicating that reopening was imminent:
Foreign Minister Khar offered that, “Pakistan has made a point and now we can move on.”131
Statements from both governments suggested a deal had already been struck well before the
Chicago summit, with one report saying Islamabad was seeking a fee of $1,500-1,800 per truck.
Yet—only days before the Chicago summit—Pakistani negotiators reportedly proposed a fee of
$5,000 per truck, which would represent a 20-fold increase from previous levels. Such a drastic
price hike is seen to be especially hard for the Pentagon to accept, given that for many years use
of Pakistani GLOCs was considered to be “free” in exchange for billion of dollars in CSF
reimbursements paid to Islamabad.132 The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee said the $5,000 fee was unacceptable; the latter Member reportedly called it
“extortion.”133 To date, negotiations on the issue have not reached a resolution.
Indigenous Islamist Militancy and Pakistani
Military Operations
Indigenous Militancy
Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post2001 period, becoming especially prevalent since 2007, but the rate of attacks and number of
victims may have peaked in 2009. In addition to widespread Islamist violence, Pakistan currently
suffers from a serious and worsening separatist insurgency in its southwestern Baluchistan
province,134 as well as rampant politically motivated violence in the megacity and business capital
of Karachi.135
129
“DOD New Briefing With British Army Lt. Gen. Adrian Bradshaw Via Teleconference From Afghanistan,”
Pentagon transcript, May 9, 2012; “Briefing by General John Allen, General Doug Lute, and Deputy National Security
Advisor Ben Rhodes,” Pentagon transcript, May 20, 2012.
130
“Pakistan Hints It Will Soon Reopen NATO Supply Routes,” McClatchy News, May 15, 2012.
131
Quoted in “Pakistan Hints It Will Soon Reopen NATO Supply Routes,” McClatchy News, May 15, 2012.
132
“Pakistan Agrees to Reopen Supply Route,” McClatchy News, May 16, 2012; “Pakistan Asks $5,000 For Each
NATO Truck,” Washington Post, May 17, 2012.
133
“Levin and McCain: Don’t Pay Pakistan Exorbitant Trucking Fees,” Foreign Policy Cable (online), May 22, 2012.
134
Baluchistan is in the throes of its fourth full-blown separatist rebellion since 1948. This current round of simmering
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
34
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reports significant declines in terrorist
incidents and related deaths in Pakistan since 2009. Nevertheless, its figures place the country
third in the world on both measures, after Afghanistan and Iraq. Suicide bombing is a relatively
new scourge in Pakistan. Only two such bombings were recorded there in 2002; that number rose
to 84 in 2009, before dropping to 51 in 2010 and 41 in 2010. Still, Pakistan accounted for nearly
half of all suicide bombing deaths worldwide in those years.136 In recent years, militants have
made sometimes spectacular attacks targeting the country’s own military and intelligence
institutions.137 A nearly 20% drop in rates of Islamist attacks in 2011 as compared to the previous
year generally was attributed to a combination of Pakistani military operations and U.S. drone
strikes in the FATA, along with some improvement in law enforcement in major cities such as
Islamabad and Lahore.138 Still, some observers view the Islamabad government as sometimes
being cowed by terrorists.139
The myriad and sometimes disparate Islamist militant groups operating in Pakistan, many of
which have displayed mutual animosity in the past, became more intermingled and mutually
supportive after 2009 (see text box below). U.S. leaders remain concerned that Al Qaeda terrorists
operate with impunity on Pakistani territory, although the group apparently was weakened in
recent years through the loss of key leaders and experienced operatives. The Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) emerged as a coherent grouping in late 2007. This “Pakistani Taliban” is said to
have representatives from each of Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies, as well as from many of the
“settled” districts abutting the FATA. The Quetta Shura Taliban of Mullah Omar is believed in
that city, as well as Karachi. The Haqqani Network of Afghan insurgents is based in the North
Waziristan and Kurram agencies of the FATA.
(...continued)
insurgency began in 2004 and is marked by serious human rights abuses on both sides. A new spike of violence caused
more than 600 deaths in 2011. Over the decades of Pakistani independence, many of the ethnic Baluch who inhabit this
relatively poor and underdeveloped province have engaged in armed conflict with federal government forces, variously
seeking more equitable returns on the region’s rich natural resources, greater autonomy under the country’s federal
system, or even outright independence and formation of a Baluch state. A largely incoherent insurgency is to date
unable (and perhaps unwilling) to take on the Pakistani army directly, preferring instead sabotage missions against
infrastructure targets. Faction leaders live in exile in several countries and have refrained from forming a united front,
in part because of the province’s strong tribal identities (“Baluchistan Separatists in Pakistan Beset by Divisions,”
McClatchy News, March 29, 2012).
135
Already alarming levels of political and ethnic violence in Karachi began to spike in July 2011, when four days of
mayhem left up to 95 people dead and prompted the Sindh government to issue “shoot on sight” orders to security
forces. Another spasm of violence in August brought the 2011 death toll to more than 1,000 and elicited calls for army
intervention. Targeted killings resumed in January 2012, and at least 800 people have been killed in politicallymotivated attacks so far in 2012. The interplay of the city’s ethnic-based political parties and heavily armed organized
crime networks has only worsened with a large Pashtun migration into Karachi from western Pakistan (“Violence
Escalates in Pakistan’s Karachi,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, May 18, 2012).
136
See the National Counterterrorism Center database at http://www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.html.
137
In February 2011, a suicide bomber killed at least 27 soldiers at a military training center outside Peshawar; in
March, a car bomb exploded near an ISI office in Faisalabad, Punjab, leaving some 32 people dead; in May, two
suicide bombers killed at least 80 paramilitary cadets in the northwestern town of Charsadda. Later that month,
militants raided Karachi’s Mehran Naval Station, killing 10 and destroying two U.S.-supplied aircraft.
138
“Pakistan: Militant Violence Down, But Fear Remains,” Associated Press, December 7, 2011.
139
Interior Minister Rehman Malik went so far as to thank Taliban militants for not undertaking anti-Shia attacks
during the late 2011 Shiite ritual of Ashoura (“Pakistani Minister Thanks Taliban for Not Bombing,” Associated Press,
December 6, 2011).
Congressional Research Service
35
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Text Box: Islamist Militant Groups in Pakistan
Islamist militant groups operating in and from Pakistani territory are of five broad types:
•
Globally oriented militants, especially Al Qaeda and its primarily Uzbek affiliates, operating out of the FATA and in
the megacity of Karachi;
•
Afghanistan-oriented militants, including the “Quetta shura” of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Umar, believed to
operate from the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta, as well as Karachi; the organization run by Jalaluddin
Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, in the North Waziristan and Kurram tribal agencies; and the Hizb-I Islami party
led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG), operating further north from the Bajaur tribal agency and Dir district;
•
India- and Kashmir-oriented militants, especially the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harakat
ul-Mujahadeen (HuM), based in both the Punjab province and in Pakistan-held Kashmir;
•
Sectarian militants, in particular the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LeJ), the latter closely associated with Al Qaeda, operating mainly in Punjab; and
•
Domestically oriented, largely Pashtun militants that in 2007 unified under the leadership of now-deceased Baitullah
Mehsud as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), then based in the South Waziristan tribal agency, with
representatives from each of Pakistan’s seven FATA agencies, later to incorporate the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-eShariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed in the northwestern Malakand and Swat districts
of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
Pakistan’s densely populated Punjab province is home to numerous Islamist militant groups with
regional and global jihadist aspirations. Notable among these is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a
U.S.-designated terrorist group with long-standing ties to the ISI. The U.S. government sees the
LeT posing a growing threat to U.S. national security. The Raymond Davis affair may have
exposed new and independent U.S. intelligence operations against the LeT in Pakistan.140 Many
analysts now identify the LeT as the most dangerous terrorist group operating in South Asia, one
that could grow into a global threat if left unchecked.141 LeT’s ostensible charity wing, Jamaatud-Dawa (JuD, also proscribed under U.S. and international law) has an expanding and
diversified infrastructure inside Pakistan.142
Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011, decries his
country’s apparent fixation on U.S. violations of its sovereignty while paying little or no heed to
combating the “jihadist ideology” that has cost tens of thousands of Pakistani lives in recent
years. He recently has upbraided the country’s Supreme Court for directing its energy toward
dislodging the civilian government rather than seeking to bring terrorist leaders to justice. In
Haqqani’s view, the misguided national mindset was encouraged by military dictators as a means
of redirecting public attention: “Anti-Western Sentiment and a sense of collective victimhood
were cultivated as a substitute for serious debate on social and economic policy.”143
140
“A Shooting in Pakistan Reveals Fraying Alliance,” New York Times, March 13, 2011.
See, for example, Ashley Tellis, “The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Policy Outlook, March 2012.
142
By one account, JuD operates more than 300 offices, mosques, and madrassas, 200 health centers and 7 hospitals,
along with hundreds of commercial ventures, and one of the country’s largest ambulance fleets (Muhammad Amir
Rana, “The Case of JuD” (op-ed), Dawn (Karachi), March 25, 2012).
143
Husain Haqqani, “How Pakistan Let Terrorism Fester” (op-ed), New York Times, May 11, 2012.
141
Congressional Research Service
36
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Domestic Military Operations
The Pakistan army has deployed at least 150,000 regular and paramilitary troops in western
Pakistan in response to the surge in militancy there, and the army has seen more than 3,000 of its
soldiers killed in combat. All seven FATA agencies and adjacent regions have been affected by
conflict; 2009 offensives in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan were notable. As noted above,
U.S. government assessments paint a discouraging picture of recent efforts. In most areas where
Pakistani military offensives have taken place, the “clearing” phase of operations has met with
some successes, but the “holding” phase has proven more difficult, and “building” is considered
impossible to initiate so long as the civilian administration’s capacity is severely limited.144
Independent analyses reach similar conclusions, saying Pakistani military offensives in Swat and
FATA from 2009 to 2011 had mixed results, at best. The army has seen major successes in at least
temporarily dislodging militants but, outside of Swat, military gains have not led to sustained
counterinsurgency progress, and no notable militant leaders have been killed or captured in
ground operations.145
The Pakistani air force claims to have flown more than 5,500 combat sorties over the FATA,
dropping more than 10,000 bombs—80% of them laser-guided—and destroying 4,600 targets.146
Sometimes bloody fighting has continued in the FATA as government forces press sporadic
offensives in the Kurram and Khyber agencies, in particular. Spring 2012 battles in Khyber—
home to the TTP-allied Lashkar-i-Islam (LI) led by Mangal Bagh—reportedly have driven more
than 500,000 civilians from their homes. After years of trying, the Pakistani army appears to be
having meaningful successes in degrading LI’s capabilities.147 Yet a simmering insurgency still
affects most FATA agencies. In January, TTP militants overran a Frontier Constabulary fort in
South Waziristan and executed 15 soldiers. Moreover, Bajaur suffered its worst militant attack in
more than a year when a TTP suicide bomber killed dozens of people in May 2012, the local
Bajaur Levies commander and his deputy among them, in apparent retaliation for the killing of an
Al Qaeda operative killed by those security forces in 2011.148
Yet, by many accounts the North Waziristan agency—home to the Al Qaeda- and Taliban-allied
Haqqani Network and the TTP forces of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, among others—is currently the most
important haven for both Afghan- and Pakistan-oriented militants. Pakistani officials have
continued to demur on urgent U.S. requests that their military move into what many consider the
“final” militant haven of North Waziristan, saying they need to consolidate the areas newly under
their control.149 Moreover, Pakistan’s military forces are new to counterinsurgency and
144
See the White House Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, September 2011.
See, for example, Daud Khattak, “Evaluating Pakistan’s Offensives in Swat and FATA,” CTC Sentinel, October
2011.
146
Pakistan’s Air Chief Marshall cited in “PAF Made 5,500 Strike Sorties Over FATA,” News (Karachi), November
15, 2011.
147
“Pakistan Fighting Uproots Hundreds of Thousands,” Agence France Presse, May 14, 2012; Daud Khattak, “Mangal
Bagh and LI Marginalized in Khyber Agency,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (online), April 23, 2012.
148
“Suicide Bomber Attacks Checkpoint in Pakistan,” New York Times, May 4, 2012.
149
When pressed by Senate Armed Services Committee members to explain why Pakistan was not going after the
Haqqani Network and Quetta Shura, Centcom Commander General Mattis offered three key reasons: (1) “their difficult
relationship with India” that compels them to maintain a hedge; (2) the difficult terrain of the FATA; and (3) the impact
of mid-2010 flooding, which diverted Pakistani military resources away from counterinsurgency efforts (“Senate
Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Fiscal 2012 Defense Authorization Request for the Special
Operations Command and the U.S. Central Command,” CQ Transcriptions, March 1, 2011).
145
Congressional Research Service
37
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
demonstrate only limited capacity to undertake effective nonconventional warfare. Pakistani
leaders have complained that the United States has been slow in providing the kind of hardware
needed for this effort, but Islamabad’s July 2011 ejection of U.S. military trainers has
dramatically hindered U.S. efforts to bolster Pakistan’s COIN capabilities.
FATA Militancy Dynamics and Possible Negotiations
Independent analysts assert that Pakistan’s military operations and “divide-and-conquer” political
approach, combined with drone strikes and internal militant power struggles, effectively
splintered the Pakistani Taliban in 2011, leaving scores of smaller and weaker factions, most of
which do not take orders from nominal TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud. This development may
explain the major decrease in suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan last year.150 The apparently
volatile Mehsud has longstanding feuds with militant commanders Maulvi Nazir of South
Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadar of North Waziristan, both of whom have struck truce deals
with the government.151 More recently, he is said to have been ordered killed by his own former
deputy, Wali-ur-Rehman, another senior South Waziristan militant commander who reportedly
feels Mehsud has made the TTP too close to Al Qaeda Arabs.152
Within this setting, Pakistani civilian officials suggested in late 2011 that they were open to new
negotiations with TTP militants, especially as the United States began to favor talks with the
Afghan Taliban. Deputy TTP chief Maulvi Faqir Muhammad claimed that meetings with
government representatives began in November. Rawalpindi remained silent on the alleged
initiative, however, and domestic and international concerns arose given the failure of similar
efforts in the FATA in 2005, 2006, and 2008 that appeared to leave the militants in a stronger
position. Weeks later, a TTP spokesman denied that any negotiations were underway and, in
March, Faqir reportedly was removed from his TTP position, likely for engaging in dialogue with
the government, a demotion that enraged his lieutenants in the Bajaur agency.153
Yet negotiations do appear to have taken place and may be continuing. By some accounts, Afghan
Taliban leader Mullah Omar has pressured Pakistani militants to make peace with the Pakistani
army as a means of reinforcing his own ranks. Al Qaeda and Haqqani group interlocutors are said
to have mediated an intra-militant pact to unify four major militant factions under Omar’s
leadership and based in the two Waziristan agencies. This “Shura-i-Muraqba”—comprised of the
Haqqanis and commanders Wali-ur-Rehman, Maulvi Nazir, and Gul Bahadar—is to direct its
hostility solely toward Afghanistan, unlike the TTP, which is at war with the Pakistani state.154
The Haqqanis are widely believed to be seeking to forward their own cause by ending the anti150
“Pak Taliban No Longer a Unified Group,” News (Karachi), November 15, 2011; “Pakistani Taliban Splintering
Into Factions,” Associated Press, December 4, 2011.
151
In mid- 2011, Nazir, who has been honoring a 2007 peace deal with the Pakistani government, vowed to escalate
attacks on American forces in Afghanistan in retaliation for intensified drone strikes on his region. Nazir is believed to
have more than 1,000 fighters at his disposal (“Pakistan Militant Group Vows to Escalate Fight in Afghanistan,”
Reuters, June 8, 2011).
152
“Pakistan Taliban Commanders ‘At Each Other’s Throats,’” Reuters, January 3, 2012.
153
“As Pakistan Eyes Peace Talks With the Taliban, Anxiety Builds,” Los Angeles Times, November 13, 2011;
“Taliban, Pakistan Said to Have Started Peace Talks,” Reuters, November 21, 2011; “Leadership Rift Emerges in
Pakistani Taliban,” New York Times, March 6, 2012.
154
“‘Mullah Omar is Pushing TTP to Reconcile With Govt,’” Express Tribune (Karachi), November 26, 2011; “In War
on NATO, Militants Call for Truce With Pakistan,” McClatchy News, January 3, 2012; “Militant Groups in Pakistan
Form United Front,” Washington Post, January 3, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
38
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Pakistan insurgency and so focusing FATA militants’ attention on Afghanistan, a shift that no
doubt would be welcomed by the Pakistani military.155
New Counterterrorism Pressure on Islamabad
Pakistan’s status as a site and source of terrorist international activity continues to be a central
concern of the U.S. and other world governments. In April 2012, the U.S. government offered a
$10 million reward for information leading to the conviction of Pakistani citizen Hafiz Saeed,
leader of the terrorist group that undertook the 2008 Mumbai attack. The news was welcomed by
India, but caused further animosity in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Prime Minister Gilani criticized the
move as a “negative message” that would “further widen the trust deficit” between the two
countries. Opposition lawmakers used even stronger language in their denunciation of the
“ridiculous” U.S. announcement.156
Also in April, scores of well-armed militants assaulted a prison in the northwestern town of
Bannu near the FATA and freed nearly 400 prisoners, including one terrorist sentenced to death
for a 2003 plot to kill then-President-General Pervez Musharraf. A subsequent government
inquiry concluded that local police, paramilitary forces, civil administrators, and the intelligence
agencies were “collectively responsible” for the lapse.157 The raid successfully bolstered Pakistani
Taliban force levels and was a major propaganda coup that fueled already acute concerns about
the effectiveness of the Pakistani state’s security apparatus.
During a May 2012 visit to New Delhi, India, Secretary of State Clinton made a point of once
again requesting that Pakistan “do more” to clear its territory of terrorist sanctuaries, and she
chastised the Islamabad government for taking insufficient action against Hafiz Saeed.158 U.S.
officials remain acutely concerned about the apparent impunity with which Pakistan-based
extremist and militant groups are able to act. The senior Afghan Taliban leadership believed to be
in Quetta and Karachi, the Haqqani Network based in the North Waziristan and Kurram tribal
agencies, and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations such as LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed,
and others in Pakistan’s Punjabi heartland appear to remain significant threats to the United States
and its allies, including those in Islamabad’s civilian government.159
Pakistan, Terrorism, and U.S. Nationals160
Long-standing worries that American citizens were being recruited and employed in Islamist
terrorism by Pakistan-based elements became more acute in 2010. In May of that year, Faisal
Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin, attempted to detonate a large, but crudely
155
See the comments of Daniel Markey in “Gauging Taliban Moves in Pakistan” (interview), Council on Foreign
Relations, March 8, 2012.
156
Quoted in “Pakistan Lawmakers Criticize U.S. Reward for Militant Leader,” New York Times, April 6, 2012.
157
“Bannu Jailbreak: Police, Civil Admin, and Spy Agencies Held Responsible,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 17, 2012.
158
“Pakistan Dragging Its Feet on Mumbai Mastermind: Clinton,” Reuters, May 7, 2012.
159
Earlier in 2012, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan reportedly sent a top-secret cable to Washington warning that
the persistence of Afghan insurgent havens in Pakistan was putting the entire U.S. strategy in Afghanistan at risk
(“Cable: Pakistan Havens a Threat,” Washington Post, February 25, 2012).
160
See also CRS Report R41416, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, by (name redacted).
Congressional Research Service
39
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
constructed car bomb in New York City’s Times Square. The Pakistani Taliban claimed
responsibility for the attempted bombing, and the culprit himself confessed to having received
bomb-making training in western Pakistan. Four months later, Shahzad received a mandatory life
sentence in prison. Other cases linking U.S. citizens and residents with Islamist extremism in
Pakistan and terrorist plots against American targets are abundant.161
At least one Pakistani-born American was complicit in the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai,
India. In 2009, federal prosecutors charged David Coleman Headley, a Chicagoan convert to
Islam, with traveling to Mumbai five times from 2006 to 2008 as scout for the attack by the
Pakistan-based LeT terrorist group; he subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges. His case was
perhaps the first in which a former Pakistani military officer was directly linked to terrorism
suspects in the United States. Headley and another Pakistan-born Chicagoan, Tahawwur Rana (a
Canadian national), are believed to have reported to a retired Pakistani major suspected of being
an LeT contact. Headley also interacted with Ilayas Kashmiri, a now-deceased former Pakistani
special forces commando with close ties to Al Qaeda. The India
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.