Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Congressional research reportMay 5, 2011

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Summary

Historically, the U.S. military’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) have had primary responsibility

for training, advising, and assisting foreign military forces. Today, although this mission has not

been completely relegated to conventional forces, the National Security Strategies of the current

and previous administrations direct the U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines)

to organize, train, and equip themselves to carry out these activities on a larger scale with

conventional (non-SOF) forces. This responsibility in its broad sense of building the capacity of

partner states has been termed “security force assistance” (SFA).

SFA ties into several interests of Congress, including security assistance, security cooperation,

foreign military financing, foreign military sales, foreign affairs, foreign aid, overseas

contingency operations, and legislative authorities associated with training foreign forces

(Foreign Assistance Act, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151).

Of significant interest to Congress in the near term is the ability of U.S. military forces to train

their counterparts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Obama Administration position, endorsed for the

most part by Congress, is that developing competent forces in these countries is pivotal to

coalition mission success and to protecting U.S. national interests. SFA is part of the U.S.

strategic goal of having Iraq and Afghanistan responsible for their own security. Congress has

supported the Department of Defense’s agenda for training Afghani forces; however, some

Members are skeptical of the new Iraqi government’s commitment to developing its own security

forces.

Each of the military services has undertaken to organize, train, and equip themselves for SFA.

However, while SOF have units specifically dedicated to a long-term role in SFA, the

conventional forces services do not. Each of the services does have Security Cooperation and

Security Assistance organizations that are dedicated to SFA activities, although they do not have

SFA in their titles. The services also standardize training for deploying forces to support

combatant commanders in their SFA mission. This effort to “train the trainers,” although an object

of consistent inquiry in congressional hearings, has been endorsed in testimony by combatant

commanders.

Along with its role in the current Afghanistan and Iraq wars, SFA is directly linked to

counterterrorism strategy and is key to engaging underdeveloped and undergoverned nations

(often referred to as “weak or fragile states”) in a preventive national security strategy. Regional

combatant commanders apply this preventive strategy through authorities provided in the

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The SFA authorizations in the NDAA are often

criticized as being disjointed and cumbersome, creating significant challenges to effective SFA

employment. The Departments of Defense and State have presented a proposal for pooled

funding to alleviate some of these challenges. The proposed Global Security Contingency Fund

would be a shared resource requiring authorization by both departments. This would be similar to

the temporary authorization known as “1206 global train and equip” authorization.

The training, organizing, and equipping of U.S. forces to conduct SFA competes for scarce fiscal

and personnel resources among the services. Some critics of SFA attest that committing to this

capability within the services detracts from their ability to conduct traditional combat roles.

Others suggest that building the security capacity of weak and failed states is a misguided effort.

This report provides the following elements:



An overview of the SFA rationale, focused primarily on Department of Defense

support for and relations with foreign security forces.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance



Description of the possible employment of U.S. conventional forces and

platforms in support of the SFA mission (see “SFA in Current and Previous

National Security Strategies”).

Exploration of current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (see “SFA Linkage to

Iraq and Afghanistan Strategies”).

Resident training capability in U.S. forces as a tool for geographic combatant

commanders.

Issues Congress may consider (“Do Legislative Authorities Restrict Conducting

SFA?”)

The report summarizes congressional reaction to SFA proposals and provides a detailed account

of the issues raised by SFA concepts and programs.

A glossary is also provided (see Glossary, page 57).

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Issues for Congress .......................................................................................................................... 1

Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2

What Is Security Force Assistance (SFA)?................................................................................ 2

Who Conducts SFA? ................................................................................................................. 3

Strategic Level: Interagency Coordination for SFA............................................................ 3

Operational Level: The U.S. Diplomatic Mission and Country Team ................................ 5

Tactical Level: The Trainers ............................................................................................... 7

How SFA Fits into U.S. Strategy and Administration Policy .......................................................... 8

Historical Evolution of Training Foreign Forces ...................................................................... 8

SFA in Current and Previous National Security Strategies ....................................................... 9

DOD Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006...................................................................... 11

SFA and Irregular Warfare ................................................................................................. 11

SFA in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review ................................................................. 12

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel .................................................... 14

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68 ..................................................................... 15

FY2012 DOD Budget Request ......................................................................................... 16

SFA Linkage to Iraq and Afghanistan Strategies..................................................................... 17

Afghanistan Security Force Assistance ............................................................................. 18

Iraqi Security Force Assistance ......................................................................................... 23

Security Sector Legislation Beyond ASFF and ISFF........................................................ 25

SFA and Counterterrorism ............................................................................................................. 28

Department of Defense’s Means to Conduct SFA ......................................................................... 29

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Security Force Assistance ................................... 30

SOF Responsibility for Conducting Foreign Training ...................................................... 30

SOF’s Unique Expertise in Conducting Foreign Training / SFA ...................................... 30

SOF Limitations in Conducting SFA ................................................................................ 31

Prominent SOF Training Activities ................................................................................... 32

SOF Components Conducting SFA .................................................................................. 33

U.S. Army Conventional Forces and Security Force Assistance ............................................ 37

Organizing for an Enduring Requirement ......................................................................... 38

Advise-and-Assist Brigade Combat Team ........................................................................ 38

Component Staff Expanded Responsibilities .................................................................... 38

Training ............................................................................................................................. 39

U.S Navy Conventional Forces and Security Force Assistance .............................................. 39

Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training (MCAST) Command ................................ 39

Navy SFA Employment .................................................................................................... 40

U.S Marine Corps Conventional Forces and Security Force Assistance................................. 40

The Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Security Cooperation .................... 41

Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group .................................................................... 42

U.S. Air Force Conventional Forces and Security Force Assistance ...................................... 42

Aviation Capacity and SFA ............................................................................................... 42

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Vision Statement ................................................ 44

Air Force International Affairs .......................................................................................... 44

Air Advisor Academy ....................................................................................................... 45

Contingency Response Groups ......................................................................................... 46

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Light Mobility Aircraft and Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft ...................... 46

Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) and Defense Language Institute

(DLI) .............................................................................................................................. 47

Services Training in Non-Standard Rotary Wing Assets......................................................... 48

Do Legislative Authorities Restrict Conducting SFA? .................................................................. 49

Global Security Contingency Fund: A DOD/DOS Proposal for Pooled Funds ...................... 52

GSCF and the State Department Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development

Review ........................................................................................................................... 53

Aspects of the GSCF Plan................................................................................................. 53

Where Congressional Action Would Be Required ............................................................ 54

Endorsements and Criticism of the GSCF Proposal ......................................................... 55

Critical Questions for Congress .............................................................................................. 55

Figures

Figure 1. Security Force Assistance Relationships .......................................................................... 3

Figure 2. Department of State and Department of Defense Strategic Planning Documents ........... 5

Figure 3. U.S. Embassy Coordination for SFA ............................................................................... 7

Figure 4. Historical U.S. Security Force Assistance........................................................................ 9

Figure 5. SFA as the Indirect Approach to Irregular Warfare ........................................................ 12

Figure 6. Programs, Tasks, Missions, and Purposes within SFA................................................... 14

Figure 7. Relationship of Security Force Assistance with Security Cooperation, Security

Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense .................................................................................. 16

Figure 8. Afghan National Army Totals (October 2009-September 2010).................................... 20

Figure 9. FY2011 Afghan Security Forces Fund Request ............................................................. 22

Figure 10. FY2012 Afghan Security Forces Fund Request ........................................................... 23

Figure 11. FY2011 Iraq Security Forces Fund .............................................................................. 25

Figure 12. SOCOM Strategic Campaign Framework: Direct and Indirect Approaches for

Countering Terrorism ................................................................................................................. 29

Figure 13. Major Security Assistance Authorization Acts Since 1954 .......................................... 52

Tables

Table 1. Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Student Figures ........................................ 40

Table 2. Air Advisor Training Students ......................................................................................... 45

Appendixes

Appendix A. Combatant Commanders’ Testimonies: Authorities to Conduct SFA ...................... 59

Appendix B. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 1204

Report on Authorities to Build Partner Capacity........................................................................ 61

Appendix C. State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,

Referral to Pooled Funding ........................................................................................................ 62

Appendix D. Defense Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, SFA References .......... 63

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Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 64

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Introduction

The most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not

the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and

govern themselves.

National Defense Strategy 2008

The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan—that is, forced

regime change followed by nation building under fire—anytime soon. But that does not

mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales. Where possible, U.S.

strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of

partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from

turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In

this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as

important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more

so than, the fighting the United States does itself.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, January 20091

Security force assistance (SFA) is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as department

activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of

the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.2 It

encompasses all activities formerly consolidated under the term “military training and advisory

assistance.” SFA is intended to be a U.S. means to develop, within a host nation, an enduring

capability to establish and maintain security, provide legitimate governance, and foster

development programs that address root grievances.3

Issues for Congress

Security force assistance is an overarching concept that ties into several interests of Congress,

including security assistance, security cooperation, foreign military financing, foreign military

sales, foreign affairs, foreign aid, overseas contingency operations, and legislative authorities

associated with training foreign forces (Foreign Assistance Act, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151).

(see Figure 6).

Security force assistance relates to several significant issues in which Congress may have interest

and oversight.



SFA is considered key to engaging underdeveloped, undergoverned nations in a

preventive context linked to counterterrorism strategy. Its basic premise, widely

endorsed by analysts and within DOD, is that developing nascent military and

governance capabilities in nations that could either stabilize or tip into anarchy

prevents the conditions that would devolve into nesting grounds for terrorists.

SFA is central to U.S. strategy for ensuring that Afghanistan and Iraq will be

responsible for their own future stability and security. The services’ ability to

provide trainers/advisors to Central Command (CENTCOM) is at the nexus of

Robert Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009), pp. 29-30.

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, October 27, 2010, p. 18.

Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0, 17

May 2010, p. D-3. http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc2_0.pdf.

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

reconstruction and stability operations in those countries. Congress may want to

further consider policies to ensure that allies and coalition forces are contributing

to this requirement. Congress may also consider the extent to which the

capability that these nations attain through coalition SFA is sustainable and how

it will impact future years’ budgets.

SFA is linked to security cooperation and security assistance efforts through a

diverse portfolio of legislative authorities, reporting requirements, and

congressional oversight functions. While these authorities provide for significant

oversight from several committees, Congress might decide to consolidate these

authorities into pooled or multiyear funding intended to expedite a

comprehensive and transparent approach.

Background

What Is Security Force Assistance (SFA)?

Security force assistance (SFA), in general terms, supports the development of foreign security

forces (usually military and law enforcement) so as to meet U.S. national security objectives. SFA

spans many types of operations. It can be a component of conventional operations or it can

support or be conducted in conjunction with irregular warfare operations, stability operations,

security cooperation, and security assistance.4 Through SFA, foreign forces are trained to operate

across the spectrum of conflict—combating internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, and

lawlessness, defending against external threats, or serving as coalition partners/peacekeepers in

other areas (see Figure 1). The resulting forces must possess the capability to accomplish the

variety of required missions, with sufficient capacity to succeed and sustain themselves as long as

required.5 SFA may be understood as the security forces equivalent of “teaching a man to fish.”6

Its ultimate goal is to develop security forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the

host nation population. This is done by developing foreign security forces that are competent,

capable, committed, and confident, not only in the eyes of U.S. (and potentially coalition) forces

and the host nation government, but more critically, in the eyes of that nation’s population, as

well as in the eyes of prospective opponents.7

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Information Brief, October 13, 2010, available at

https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance,14

July 2008, p 1, at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/SFA.pdf.

Kevin Baron, Pentagon Sees Training Allies as its Greatest Hope, Stars and Stripes, July 30, 2010,

http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/pentagon-sees-training-allies-as-its-greatest-hope-1.112875.

JCIFSA Commander’s Handbook, p. 5.

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Figure 1. Security Force Assistance Relationships

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

Who Conducts SFA?

The conduct of SFA is not limited to the Department of Defense. It includes coordinated efforts

across the multi-service, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational spectrum. This is

significant in that, while SFA is an overarching approach to meeting the nation’s security needs,

legislation and oversight for its implementation span several different government agencies and

congressional committees (see “How SFA Fits into U.S. Strategy and Administration Policy”).

Strategic Level: Interagency Coordination for SFA8

The National Security Council (NSC) will generally provide the initial guidance and clarification

of national-level decisions pertaining to SFA. The Department of State (DOS) is generally the

lead government agency and assists the NSC in building and carrying out national policies and

priorities. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) carries out

nonmilitary assistance programs designed to assist certain less developed nations to increase their

productive capacities and improve their quality of life. The Director of National Intelligence

(DNI) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support the mission in both a

For purposed of this discussion, joint doctrine for foreign internal defense (FID) is referenced. Joint SFA Doctrine is

still in draft form. For interagency purposes, SFA is closely aligned with the national actors associated with FID.

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national-level advisory capacity and at the regional and country levels through direct support of

SFA activities.9

Although SFA is considered a “whole-of-government” activity, this report focuses primarily on

the military aspect of training, advising, and assisting. The Department of Defense is the largest

agency with the most resources available to conduct SFA missions. Still, while there have been

specific instances (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) in which Congress has given DOD authority to

train and equip forces of a specified country, it is important to emphasize that DOD generally

trains and equips foreign military forces under State Department Title 22 authority and through

State Department programs. Additionally, DOD has frequently encouraged Congress to increase

DOS’s capacity to conduct the nonmilitary aspects of engagement and capacity building (SFA).

(See Figure 2.)

Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation Plans10

As described earlier, while the U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) organize,

train, and equip to meet SFA mission requirements, it is the combatant commanders who carry

out the operations in their respective theaters. The National Security Strategy11 outlines the

overarching approach for the nation. This is articulated to the regional combatant commanders,

who, in turn, develop theater-specific security cooperation plans.12 Included in these plans are

“critical partners,” a select group of countries or organizations that directly receive U.S. security

cooperation resources because their collaboration or assistance is essential to achieving regional

or functional objectives. Additionally, “key supporting partners” are countries or organizations

that assist a command in working with critical partners to achieve one or more of the

command’s strategic end states. They are key supporting partners because they are militarily

competent and can complement or supplement U.S. capabilities.

Strategic and Intermediate Military Objectives13

National security strategy objectives are overarching in nature and are designed to support

broader U.S. government foreign policy. They usually reflect longer-term goals that cannot be

achieved in the near or mid-term, and many may exceed the combatant commander’s capability to

achieve alone. Thus combatant commanders are tasked with establishing achievable, intermediate

military objectives that directly and materially contribute to the achievement of the longer-term

campaign end states provided in national security objectives. The guidance provided to combatant

Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010, Chapter 3, pages III-2, 3,

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_22.pdf.

Information for this section is derived primarily from “Defense Security Cooperation Agency/Campaign Support

Plan 2010,” http://www.dsca.mil/programs/Program_Support/DSCA%20CSP%20no%20names.pdf.

The National Security Strategy (NSS), is mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433) section 603. It signed by the President, addresses the tasks that, as a nation, are necessary to

shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people. It provides a broad strategic

context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. See CRS Report

RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by

(name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).

The term “theater security cooperation plans” is being phased out and is considered a subset of the combatant

commander’s overarching “theater campaign plan.” Yet, for the sake of its inherently obvious relationship to security

cooperation and security force assistance, the former term is used here.

DSCA Campaign Support Plan. While the DSCA CSP goes into extensive description of the Guidance for the

Employment of the Force (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), in this section of this report they are

abbreviated as “national security objectives” for clarity and simplicity.

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commanders allows great latitude in how they may construct their campaign plans to achieve

these objectives. The initial campaign plans reflect varied approaches, particularly in terms of

intermediate military objectives, which range from broad theater objectives to country-specific

ones.

Figure 2. Department of State and Department of Defense Strategic Planning

Documents

Source: Government Accountability Office analysis of strategic planning documents.

Notes: GAO Report 05-793., Southeast Asia; Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for

Assistance to Foreign Security Forces, July 2010, http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05793high.pdf.

Operational Level: The U.S. Diplomatic Mission and Country Team

The U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation is the coordinator of SFA activities in that country.

The diplomatic mission includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically

present in the country. The President gives the chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an

ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive

branch employees within the mission and host country, except for employees under the command

of a U.S. military commander (22 U.S.C. Section 3927). Close coordination by the chief of

mission and military counterparts at the respective regional combatant command are a

prerequisite for SFA operations that support the host nation’s internal defense and development

(IDAD)14 program and U.S. regional goals and objectives.15

IDAD refers to the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.

JP 3-22, page 3-10.

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Country teams develop the agenda and objectives for developing the capacity of a host nation’s

security forces. Before any military training teams set foot in country, their activities are vetted

and scrutinized by the embassy. SFA missions are crafted by DOS and DOD counterparts so that

the capabilities developed in the host nation are commensurate with the diplomatic goals of the

U.S. government. Embassy country teams also ensure that such efforts are coordinated with the

security objectives of the host nation receiving the training. (See Figure 3.)

However, some analysts recognize a disconnect in interagency coordination for SFA in the State

Department’s lack of regional coordination equivalent to that of a military regional combatant

commander. Regional bureaus at DOS in Washington, DC, provide policy guidance to embassies

but usually do not operate major programs. Nor are regional bureaus in DOS geographically

aligned with military combatant commanders. Although guidance to a particular embassy is

coordinated within the State Department, it goes directly from Washington to the affected country

rather than through a Regional Combatant Command-equivalent organization.16

Terrence K. Kelly, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Cathryn Quantic-Thurston, et al., Security Cooperation Organizations

in the Country Team, Options for Success, RAND Corporation, Technical Report TR-734, 2010, p. 7,

http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR734.html.

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Figure 3. U.S. Embassy Coordination for SFA

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, July 2010, Page 3-11.

Tactical Level: The Trainers

The military services provide technical and operational expertise through scaled-to-need groups

known as mobile training teams (MTTs). The size of an MTT may range from a half-dozen

subject matter experts teaching, for example, Nigerian counterparts how to do C-130 engine

maintenance17 to an Armored Cavalry Regiment of nearly 5000 soldiers deploying under the

auspices of an Advise and Assist Brigade (AAB) to work with Iraqi Army counterparts.18

Jennifer H. Svan. "U.S. helping get Nigeria’s C-130s back off the ground," Stars and Stripes, January 5, 2010.

U.S. Army News Release, "First U.S. Advise and Assist Brigade Arrives Under New Dawn," September 8, 2010.

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How SFA Fits into U.S. Strategy and Administration

Policy

Historical Evolution of Training Foreign Forces

Historically, responsibility for training, advising, and assisting foreign forces has rested with the

U.S. military’s Special Operations Forces (SOF). Yet, more recently, the Secretary of Defense,

Robert Gates, has said that the organization, training, and mentoring of indigenous armies and

police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.19

The practice of assisting militaries of friendly nations has a long history (see Figure 4). The Lend

Lease Program increased the capacity of the Soviet Union and other Allied countries in the

struggle against the Axis in World War II. Simultaneously, allied troops were training Chinese and

French North African forces.20 After the war, the Marshall Plan included establishing a West

German professional military. Economic, equipment, training, and advisory support was provided

to Greece and Turkey to help stabilize their governments. Although the term “security force

assistance” did not yet exist, training, advising, assisting, and equipping post-war South Korea,

Japan, and Taiwan were also concrete examples of SFA used with weak post-war states.

Supporting weak and failed states through military assistance has been endorsed by Republican

and Democratic administrations alike. Efforts to train, advise, and equip foreign forces shifted

toward Vietnam and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s. It was during this time that the

special operations community was given primary responsibility for conducting the training

portion of the mission. Eventually, arms transfers, economic aid, and collective security began to

merge under a program known as “security assistance.” Following Vietnam, the United States

shifted to a policy of assisting friendly nations, but requiring them to provide the manpower and

be ultimately responsible for their own national defense. Such was the case with Lebanon and

Panama in the 1980s.

Security force assistance played a part in the first Iraq war. U.S. Special Forces teams worked

with the Saudi military to train them on the effective and efficient use of modern weaponry and in

other technical areas. SOF also trained Saudi naval forces in special warfare. SOF eventually

trained about 30,000 coalition troops in 44 subject areas.21

In the 1990s, the United States provided SFA assistance to former Warsaw Pact nations under the

NATO “Partnership for Peace” initiative. Assistance was also given to Colombia under “Plan

Colombia” to help stabilize the country during its campaign against the revolutionary Marxist

group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).22

Gates, Robert M. (Remarks delivered during the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting,

Washington DC, October 10, 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181.

Wuestner, Scott G. Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm, Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2009, p. 4,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=880.

USSOCOM History, 6th ed., March 31, 2008, pp. 49-50, at

http://www.socom.mil/socomhome/documents/history6thedition.pdf.

Better known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army or FARC.

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Figure 4. Historical U.S. Security Force Assistance

Source: Adapted from Scott G. Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural

Paradigm, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2009, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/.

SFA in Current and Previous National Security Strategies

The premise that weak and failing states pose a national security threat is supported by many

audiences. The rationale is that lawlessness, instability, and lack of security or governance in

these areas creates conditions ripe for terrorist organizations to function. The conditions in the

Mindanao region of the southern Philippines could be considered an example of this. Here

terrorist organizations such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Jemaah Islamiyah, and

Abu Sayyaf have sought refuge and sanctuary for their operations in an area of the country where

the military and the government have little or limited capability. (See CRS Report RL34194,

Terrorism in Southeast Asia, coordinated by (name redacted)

, and CRS Report RL33233, The

Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests, by (name redacted)

Also, supporters of SFA argue that the security condition of a destitute populace, disconnected

from their subpar security apparatus or government in weak and failing states, could easily evolve

into regional security threats. The application of SFA through “the indirect approach” is meant to

“to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct

military intervention.”23 Some analysts have gone so far as to say that the conditions in weak and

failing states pose “the single most critical threat to US national security.”24 The inability of weak

Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," Foreign Affairs,

January/February 2009.

Francis Fukuyama, comment on Center for Global Development task force’s report, On the Brink: Weak States and

US National Security, http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_archive/ weakstates.

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and failed states to carry out basic functions—securing their own borders and populations,

providing essential civil services and public goods, and maintaining rule of law and governing

legitimacy—can spark a range of crises that might undermine U.S. strategic interests involving

terrorism, international crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, limiting U.S.

access to vital natural resources, and regional stability. Several regions in Africa, particularly the

Sahel and the Horn of Africa, could become such risks in pre-conflict conditions. Here Al Qaeda

in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) seeks sanctuary in outlying regions such as northern Mali and is

making inroads with the Nigerian Taliban.25 (See CRS Report R41473, Countering Terrorism in

East Africa: The U.S. Response, by Lauren Ploch.)

Risks of regional instability, terrorism, and other forces can also exist in post-conflict conditions,

as characterized by the deteriorated conditions in Iraq that followed major combat in Operation

Iraqi Freedom. Following the 2003 invasion by the United States, security forces of the Iraqi

government dissolved. The inability of Iraq's government to provide security, equitably

administer justice, or deliver services led in part to a violent Sunni Arab-led insurgency, SunniShiite sectarian violence, and violent competition among Shiite groups (see CRS Report

RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name redacted)).

Supporters of a broad SFA strategy emphasize that neutralizing threats posed by state failure is

becoming a top national security priority.26 The National Security Strategies (NSS) put forth by

the last three presidential administrations have emphasized this premise.27 Most recently, the

Obama Administration reiterated that “diplomacy and development capabilities must strengthen

weak and failing states,” that “failing states breed conflict and endanger regional and global

security,” and that “our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign

counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad

range of governments.”28

There is an opposing view to the assumption that weak and failed states pose a threat to U.S.

national security interests. This view points to the ambiguity of defining a “weak state” or a

“failed state.” It further suggests that these states almost never produce threats to national security

and that efforts to strengthen them squander resources on threats that exist primarily in the minds

of policymakers.29

Other critics are concerned that the oversight and use of a failed state’s security forces are much

more critical than their capabilities. How a weak or failed state's security force is used—as an

instrument to provide security or as a repressive instrument linked to human rights violations—is

a more driving concern. That is to say, aside from the fiscal and material resources, building

partner capacity “is a human and institutional development activity, with the training of forces

and the development of competent command, control, and governance institutions at its core.”30

In this understanding, the investment in building foreign security forces for at-risk states is of

Steven L. Katz, "Al Qaeda's Emerging Africa Enterprise," Washington Times, February 11, 2011.

Bipartisan Policy Center, National Security Initiative, Stabilizing Fragile States project,

http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/projects/stabilizing-fragile-states/about.

See CRS Report RL34253, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun

Wyler.

U.S. National Security Strategy, May 2010, at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

Logan, Justin and Preble, Christopher. Washington’s Newest Bogeyman, Debunking the Fear of Failed States,

Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2010, , http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/summer/loganpreble.pdf.

Fragility and Extremism in Yemen, Staff Paper, Stabilizing Fragile States Project, Bipartisan Policy Center, February

2010, p. 52, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Yemen%20Fragility%20and%20Extremism.pdf.

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limited return without equivalent commitment to reinforcing other necessary government

functions.

DOD Quadrennial Defense Review of 200631

The DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 called for a transformation of military

approaches to meet the new strategic environment. Part of this transformation was a shift “from

major conventional combat operations—to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations” and further

“from the U.S. military performing tasks—to a focus on building partner capabilities.”32 The

QDR stated that “[b]uilding partnership capacity and strengthening alliances to defeat terrorist

networks is an example of how the United States can strengthen freedom of action at the strategic

level.” It further stated:

Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where U.S.

forces do not traditionally operate will be required. Building and leveraging partner

capacity will also be an absolutely essential part of this approach, and the employment of

surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many goals. Working indirectly with

and through others, and thereby denying popular support to the enemy, will help to

transform the character of the conflict. In many cases, U.S. partners will have greater

local knowledge and legitimacy with their own people and can thereby more effectively

fight terrorist networks. Setting security conditions for the expansion of civil society and

the rule of law is a related element of this approach.33

In the years that followed the 2006 QDR, the services’ efforts to develop resident capabilities to

train foreign faced confusing terminology34 and were exacerbated by a lack of clarity and

conceptual agreement regarding policy.35 The lexicon of terms surrounding security force

assistance has been called confusing, duplicative, contradictory, or completely lacking. It

includes, among other terms, “train advise assist” (TAA), “security assistance” (SA), “security

cooperation” (SC), “irregular warfare” (IW), “building partnerships” (BP), “building partnership

capacity” (BPC), and “foreign internal defense” (FID), none of which are synonymous or

mutually exclusive. The lexicon has been characterized as an “[u]nnecessarily created confusion

within the DOD by ignoring more than fifty years of experience and doctrine related to the

challenges faced by the post-Cold War world and after the events of September 11, 2001.”36

SFA and Irregular Warfare

For the most part, training, advising, and assisting partner nations’ military forces (SFA) have

been a subset of policy related to irregular warfare. However, following the release of the 2006

QDR, DOD policy on the subject has been disjointed in its presentation as to what specifically

constitutes irregular warfare. For example, in describing policy priorities, Secretary Gates has

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislatively mandated assessment of defense strategy, force structure,

weapons programs, and operations designed to guide defense programming, operational planning, and budgets

projected as far as twenty years ahead. See CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and

Implications for National Security Planning, by (name redacted).

Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006, pp. vi-vii.

Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006, pp. 18, 23i.

Christopher J. Castelli, “Irregular Warfare Term Stirs Debate as DOD Prepares QDR,” Inside Defense, April 16,

2009.

US Air Force Irregular Warfare Tiger Team, Observations and Recommendations, May 22, 2009, pp. 1-9.

William Stevenson et al., Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing, December 16, 2008, at

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/12/irregular-warfare-everything-y/.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

described the DOD commitment as “10 percent for irregular warfare, about 50 percent for

traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and about 40 percent dual-purpose capabilities.”37

This statement did not clarify what was considered an irregular warfare resource (budgetary

program, organization, or military unit).

More recently, OSD has described irregular warfare primarily by two lines of effort: (1) to

prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat non-state actors, as well as state actors who pose irregular

threats, and (2) to enhance a local partner’s legitimacy and influence over a population by

addressing the causes of conflict and building the partner’s capacity to provide security, good

governance, and economic development38 (see Figure 5). The term “irregular warfare” has tended

to limit congressional discussion and understanding to those kinetic activities associated with

counterinsurgency.

Figure 5. SFA as the Indirect Approach to Irregular Warfare

Irregular Warfare Approaches

Indirect

Counter

Counter Irregular

Irregular Threats

Threats

Build

Build Partner

Partner Capacity

Capacity

Security Force Assistance

Across the Spectrum,

“By, Through, and With” Partner Nations

Peacetime - Combat Ops – Stability Ops

Direct

Disrupt

Disrupt and

and Defeat

Defeat

Combat the adversary leveraging the

full spectrum of military capabilities

Source: CRS.

SFA in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

The policy of emphasizing training, advice, and assistance to foreign forces was reiterated and

endorsed by the incoming Obama administration and Secretary of Defense Gates in the 2010

QDR. However, the 2010 QDR tried to remove some of the confusion over terminology in that it

did not use the term “irregular warfare.” Rather, it underscored the indirect approach by making

“Build the security capacity of partner states” a priority qualifier for rebalancing U.S. defense

forces and security force assistance the vehicle by which capacity building would be

accomplished. It identified SFA as “the most dynamic” of security cooperation activities in

upcoming years and described SFA missions as “‘hands on’ efforts, conducted primarily in host

countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at

Department of Defense, News Briefing with Secretary Gates From The Pentagon, April 6, 2009,

http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4396.

Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0, 17 May 2010, p. 4.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories.” 39 (See

Appendix D.)

The QDR also directly linked SFA training activities to partner nations’ ability to participate in

peacekeeping operations, stability operations, and counterterrorism operations. It stated, “SFA

activities can help enable host-country participation in coalition stability operations and

multilateral peacekeeping operations that improve regional security. Working in conjunction with

other U.S. government agencies and allied military forces to strengthen the security institutions of

partner nations will be a crucial part of U.S. and allied efforts to defeat terrorist groups around the

world.”40

Although the review is intended to address DOD issues beyond current operations, the QDR

spoke to SFA as the mechanism for success in current contingency operations. When referring to

training Afghan and Iraqi security forces, it said, “U.S. forces have been training, advising, and

assisting Afghan and Iraqi security forces so that they can more effectively uphold the rule of law

and control and defend their territories against violent non-state actors. In these contested

environments, partnered counter insurgency (COIN), in which Afghan and Iraqi units operate in

tandem with U.S. forces, is an effective way to train and advise forces while conducting combat

operations against insurgents.”41

The QDR also instructed the services to strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force

capabilities for security force assistance. Specifically, it cited the need to add personnel to trainthe-trainer units. 42 It called for several distinctive areas of training: “enhancing language,

regional, and cultural abilities; strengthening and expanding capabilities for training partner

aviation forces, as well as capacities for ministerial-level training; and creating mechanisms to

facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel.”43

Regarding the interagency process, the QDR indicated how DOD and DOS would further

integrate coordinated efforts to cross-functional authorities (e.g 1206 funding, see “Section 1206

(Global Train and Equip) Authorities”, page 38) and mutually supporting roles.44 “Working with

interagency partners and with Congress, DOD is also exploring how to improve the ways in

which security assistance funds are authorized and overseen within the executive branch to

enhance their effectiveness in supporting national security goals.”45

Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 26.

Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 27.

Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 28-29.

Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 91.

See “Global Security Contingency Fund: A DOD/DOS Proposal for Pooled Funds”.

Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 91.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Figure 6. Programs, Tasks, Missions, and Purposes within SFA

Source: Joint Center for Security Force Assistance.

Notes: Current as of 5 April 2011 Acronyms: FMS-Foreign Military Sales, IMET-International Military Education

and Training, FMF-Foreign Military Financing, FSF-Foreign Security Forces, MCO-Major Combat Operations, FIDForeign Internal Defense, COIN-Counterinsurgency, CT-Counterterrorism, UW-Unconventional Warfare, Stab

Ops-Stability Operations, HA-Humanitarian Assistance, PKO-Peacekeeping Operations, OGA-Other

Government Agencies, DOJ-Department of Justice, FBI-Federal Bureau of Investigation, PFP-Partnership for

Peace, PEP-Personnel Exchange Program, & JCET-Joint Combined Exchange Training.

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel

The priority to continue training, advising, and assisting partner nations (i.e., SFA) is also

reflected in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (QDRIP). The panel made

a number of recommendations for structural and cultural changes in both the executive and

legislative branches, which it considered necessary for each branch to play its role in protecting

enduring U.S. interests. Included in the QDRIP’s report was the following finding regarding

security force assistance.46

The realities of today‘s security challenges have revealed the institutional weaknesses of

the existing security assistance programs and framework. If unchanged, the United States

The report of the panel did not use the term “Security Force Assistance” but rather “International Security Assistance

and Cooperation programs,” which , as this report attempts to illustrate, are inextricably linked.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

will fail in its efforts to shape and sustain an international environment supportive of its

interests.47 [emphasis added]

As a result, the panel made the following recommendation to increase the efficiency of security

force assistance / building partner capacity:

Seek authority to establish pooled funding mechanisms for selected national security

missions that would benefit from the Comprehensive Approach, including security

capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention.48 [emphasis added]

Under the section entitled “International Security and Assistance Reform,” the QDRIP endorsed

the policy of SFA. Yet it did not focus only on fragile and weak states. It went further to identify

the second-order effects of training near-peer nations and allies, so as to have synergistic coalition

capability for training, advising, and assisting on the lower end of SFA engagement:

vii. Continue efforts at Building Partnership Capacity, recognizing that these efforts have

several complementary aspects. [emphasis added]

1. Low-end institution building in post-conflict/failing states

2. Developing high-end capacity of our traditional allies [which entails not only security

assistance reform but also, as part of acquisition reform, to build in sharing our defense

products with our allies from the outset (requiring export control reform and national

disclosure policy reform)]. Put another way, we need a “build to share” policy from the

outset.

3. Viewing rising powers as potential partners that offer us opportunities for collaboration

as well as potential challenges.49

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68

On October 27, 2010, the Department of Defense released Department of Defense Instruction

(DODI) 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance.” It established policy and assigned responsibilities

for SFA across the Department of Defense, including preparation of DOD personnel, operational

planning for SFA, and conduct of SFA.50 The DODI attempted to provide some clarity to the

aforementioned conflicting terminology. A significant portfolio of authorities is associated with

SFA. Most notably, the DODI differentiates SFA from Security Cooperation (SC) and Security

Assistance (SA) which are codified in legislation, primarily in the Foreign Assistance Act and the

Arms Export Control Act.51

Security force assistance, the instruction states, is an overarching policy approach to building the

capacity of partner states. Unlike other restrictive terms such as SA (Title 22 programs only) or

SC (DOD only), SFA is intended to enable all the agencies and organizations involved in security

capability and capacity development to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate all their foreign

security force developmental activities to avoid gaps and to increase efficiency and effectiveness

The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the

Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, July 29, 2010, pp. xi.

The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the

Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, July 29, 2010, pp. xi-xii.

The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the

Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, July 29 ,2010, pp. 45-46.

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, October 27, 2010, p. 18.

Title 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151. and Title 22 U.S.C. § 2778 respectively.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

of those efforts.52 The DODI also attempts to described the relationships between existing

legislation and the overarching SFA policy. Specifically, it says:



SFA contributes to the DOD role in USG [U.S. government] security sector reform

(SSR) initiatives.



SFA is a subset of DOD overall security cooperation (SC) initiatives. Other SC

activities, such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs activities dedicated to the nonsecurity sector, provide valuable engagement opportunities between the United

States and its partners, but fall outside the scope of SFA.



Security assistance programs are critical tools to fund and enable SFA activities,

which contribute to a host country’s defense.



The portion of SFA oriented towards supporting a host country’s efforts to counter

threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, is a subset of foreign internal

defense.53 [emphasis added]

Figure 7. Relationship of Security Force Assistance with Security Cooperation,

Security Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense

Source: FM 3-07.1,Security Force Assistance, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 May 2009.

FY2012 DOD Budget Request

In February 2011, the Obama Administration provided to Congress the 2012 budget request.

Included in the Defense section of the request was the following segment, which reiterated the

premise of building partner capacity.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, SFA Planner’s Guide, FSF Force Development, JCISFA,

Final Draft, December 1, 2009, p. 10.

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, October 27, 2010, p. 2.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Providing assistance to develop foreign countries’ security capabilities is an essential

element of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan and of the overall national security

strategy. The Administration is committed to funding these security sector assistance

programs in an effort to maintain and develop allies’ capability to prevent terrorist

threats, to the United States and other countries, which originate from abroad. Further, by

assisting the development of other countries’ abilities to combat terrorism, these

investments reduce the need for greater U.S. involvement in the future. 54

SFA Linkage to Iraq and Afghanistan Strategies

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the strategy of the United States is to create conditions for

withdrawal from these countries and leave an environment wherein these nations can provide for

their own security. Critical to this strategy is the degree to which U.S. and allied forces can train

and equip Iraqi and Afghan security forces to a point where they are self-sufficient. While there

are many notable examples of SFA by troops serving across the globe, the immediate focus for

developing the force is to meet the pressing needs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In February 2009, President Obama announced that a National Security Council review had been

completed. As result of this review, the Administration decided to pursue a new strategy to end

the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility. The first part of this strategy

included a removal of combat forces from Iraq. The resulting contingent left in Iraq would carry

out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi security forces, conducting

targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting ongoing civilian and military efforts within

Iraq.55

Similarly, on March 27, 2009, the President outlined a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In it, he emphasized the policy of training Afghan forces so as to have them eventually maintain

their own security.

[W]e will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan

security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country. That's

how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will

ultimately be able to bring our own troops home.

For three years, our commanders have been clear about the resources they need for

training. And those resources have been denied because of the war in Iraq. Now, that will

change. The additional troops that we deployed have already increased our training

capacity. And later this spring we will deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train

Afghan security forces. For the first time, this will truly resource our effort to train and

support the Afghan army and police. Every American unit in Afghanistan will be

partnered with an Afghan unit, and we will seek additional trainers from our NATO allies

to ensure that every Afghan unit has a coalition partner. We will accelerate our efforts to

build an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these

goals by 2011—and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to

turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward.56

The White House, "Fiscal Year 2012 Budget of the U.S. Government," press release, February 2011, p. 61,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/budget.pdf.

The White House, "Remarks of President Barack Obama, Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq," press release,

February 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/.

The White House, "Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," press release, March

27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistanand-Pakistan/.

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Afghanistan Security Force Assistance

The core goal of the U.S. strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda.57 SFA is a means

to the President’s objective of transitioning to Afghan responsibility.58 International forces are

predominantly focused on ensuring the security of the indigenous population as they build the

capacity within the Afghan forces and government to transition.59 NATO Training Mission

Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established to plan and implement authorized and resourced capacity

building of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), in recognition of the full scope of the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and importance of ANSF growth.60

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, commander of NTM-A, told a collective audience of

ISAF allies that if the training mission in Afghanistan is not resourced with adequate trainers,

transition will be delayed. Stating that “[t]actical gains on the battlefield will not be enduring

without a self-sustaining Afghan Security Force,” Caldwell urged his NATO counterparts to

provide additional trainers to conduct the capacity-building mission. He made the analogy that

“developing the Afghan National Security Force is transition.”61 Subsequently, the Armed

Services Committees have urged the highest levels of DOD to push NATO to continue to provide

trainers.62 In correspondence with the Armed Services Committees, Caldwell highlighted the

recent accomplishments of and need for an “Afghan surge.” This refers to a dramatic increase in

the size and capability of the ANSF, in contrast to a surge of coalition ISAF forces. Both, the

majority and minority parties in Congress endorsed this point.63

In terms of measuring the success of security force assistance in Afghanistan, NATO aims to

increase the number of Afghan security forces from 256,000 to 306,000 by October of this year.64

In the past year, the Afghan army and police have more than doubled in size compared to any

previous year’s average, reaching almost 64,000 personnel.65 The administration is considering a

proposal to grow the Afghan army by 35,000, which would bring total Afghan security force

levels to 378,000 by the end of 2012. These additional forces are meant to add important

enablers--logistics, engineering, and intelligence and others--to reinforce and sustain the

transition of responsibility to the Afghan security forces.66 Yet General James Mattis, the

commander of U.S. Central Command, raised the question of whether an ANSF of this proposed

The White House, "Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," press release, March

27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistanand-Pakistan/.

For a detailed analysis of the Afghanistan campaign, see CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy,

Operations, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

This approach had been given the moniker “shape-clear-hold-build” by the International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF).

Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 28, 2010, pp. 12, 13.

Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, "No Trainers, No Transition. Address to the NATO Training Committee," NTM-A,

September 27, 2010, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/03%20March/Mattis%2003-01-11.pdf.

Transcript of questioning during Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2012, February 17, 2011

http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2011/02%20February/11-04%20-%202-17-11.pdf.

Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, during Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony, February 17,

2011, http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2011/02%20February/11-04%20-%202-17-11.pdf.

“Top NATO Officer Sees Echoes of WWII in Afghanistan,” Agence France-Presse, January 27, 2011,

http://www.france24.com/en/20110127-top-nato-officer-sees-echoes-wwii-afghanistan.

Caldwell, September 27, 2010.

Levin, p. 4.

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size would sustain enduring capabilities over time.67 However, he did indicate that the quality of

the Afghan forces has increased, thus helping to reduce attrition, enhance recruitment, and

contribute to sustainability.68 (See Figure 8.)

The increase in the size of the ANSF is not without its critics. According to one report by the

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a “chronic failure” of U.S. training efforts

is:

the inability to properly structure efforts to create true partners once new units complete

the formal training process and provide the proper quality and number of mentors, partner

units, enablers, and efforts to integrate higher level command structures. Far too often the

US has also sought to rush new battalion sized combat elements into service to meet its

own short term needs without considering the resulting problems in quality, force

retention, and host country perceptions of the result. Expediency has led to fundamentally

misleading ratings of unit war-fighting capability like the CM rating system, using up

half prepared forces in combat, and major leadership and retention problems. 69

This analysis emphasizes quality over quantity and cautions against ignoring the impact of

Afghan cultural needs, regional and ethnic differences, family and tribal structures, and the realworld “friction” that affects force development.

Another analysis by the International Crisis Group underscores the strategic importance of

developing the ANSF. Yet it describes the SFA attempt to develop a unified national military in

service of a civilian government as a quixotic effort hampered by the tendency to create militias

in a bid to insulate the state from internal and external threats. The ANSF is depicted as seeped in

Soviet-style, over-centralized and top-heavy command and control structures, with army combat

readiness undermined by weak recruitment and retention policies, inadequate logistics,

insufficient training and equipment, and inconsistent leadership.70

Megan Scully, "Mattis Cautious About Boosting Afghan Security Forces," National Journal, March 1, 2011.

Statement of General James N. Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central Command, before the Senate Armed Services

Committee, March 1, 2011.

Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghan National Security: Shaping Host Country Forces as Part of Armed Nation Building,

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 30, 2009, p. iii,

http://csis.org/files/publication/091030_ANSFDraft.pdf.

International Crisis Group, A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army, Asia Report No. 190,

Kabul/Brussels, May 12, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/southasia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments%20%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.ashx.

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Figure 8. Afghan National Army Totals (October 2009-September 2010)

Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010,

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf.

Notes: Figure depicts growth of the Afghan National Army only. Report to Congress in accordance with

Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), as amended.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

One of the primary tools Congress has approved and funded to conduct SFA in Afghanistan is the

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). The ASFF allows the Secretary of Defense, with the

concurrence of the Secretary of State, to transfer DOD operations and maintenance funds to the

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A), to provide

equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, construction,

and funding to the security forces of Afghanistan. Congress requires the Secretary of Defense to

submit to the congressional defense committees a report summarizing the details of any

obligation or transfer of funds from the ASFF during a fiscal year quarter.71

DOD considers the ASFF critical to the building of the ANSF’s capabilities and to the ANSF’s

eventual assumption of security responsibilities.72 General Mattis, the CENTCOM commander,

has said, “Above all, we rely on the ASFF to enable the eventual full transition of security tasks to

a robust, trained ANSF capable of preventing the resurgence of insurgent safe havens in

Afghanistan.”73

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA Campaign Support Plan, January 1 2010, p. C-1-4.

Posture Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, U.S. Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 112 th

Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2011, p. 6, http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/02%20February/Mullen%2002-17-11.pdf.

Statement of General James N. Mattis, USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command, before the Senate Armed

Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command, March 1, 2011, pp. 21-22, http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/03%20March/Mattis%2003-01-11.pdf.

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The Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) budget directly supports funding to grow, train, equip,

and sustain the ANSF. In December 2009, Congress appropriated $6.6 billion for the ASFF. An

additional $2.6 billion was appropriated in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year

(FY) 2010.74 The 2011 NDAA75 approved $11.6 billion for train-and-equip programs in

Afghanistan, which is equivalent to the Administration’s request (see Figure 9). Congress stated

that funding is “critical for to (sic) help bring stability to Afghanistan and will allow the U.S. and

our allies to transition the responsibility for security to the ANSF so we can bring our troops

home.”76

President Obama’s budget request for FY2012 includes substantial resources to continue

supporting the training of Afghan forces to ideally bring closer the point where Afghan troops

will bear the major responsibility for their nation’s security (see Figure 10). The FY2012

Administration budget request for ASFF, presented in February 2011, totaled $12.8 billion.77

Sustaining the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)

The security force assistance effort in Afghanistan addresses a significant disparity between the

cost to sustain the Afghan security forces and the cost of the continued deployment of U.S. forces

to the area. Estimates to sustain an autonomous ANSF range from $2 billion78 to $6 billion

annually, compared to an estimated $8 billion a month ($96 billion annually) to maintain 98,000

American troops in Afghanistan along with the rest of the 30,000-40,000 coalition forces that cost

several billion dollars per month.79 Yet analysis also estimates total Afghan GDP at $29.8 billion80

and total Afghan government revenue at $1 billion. NATO has estimated that that the Afghan state

may not be able to sustain the overall cost of maintaining the ANSF until 2040 or later.81 Despite

SFA efforts to create an autonomous Afghan security force, some analysts see a requirement to

have to fund half the Afghan budget with long-term military aid, similar to the relationships the

United States has with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. 82

Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 18,

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf.

As of the creation of this report, Congress had yet to pass a Defense appropriations bill for FY2011; hence figures

quoted herein only represent H.R. 6523 / P.L. 111-383, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2011 (current as of April 5, 2011).

See http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=f07c8d52-88b0-4dc8-ac99c979330b544d.

Department of Defense, FY 2012 President's Budget, Exhibit O-1 (page 10A), section 2091A,

http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/fy2012_o1.pdf.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, AFGHANISTAN SECURITY: Further Congressional Action May Be

Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces,

GAO-08-661, June 2008, p. 2, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf.

Pincus, Walter "Gauging the price tag for Afghanistan's security," Washington Post, December 20, 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/20/AR2010122004829.html. Also see CRS Report

RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by (name redacted)

2010 estimate, CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 211 DSC 10 E bis, Preparing the Afghan National Security Forces for Transition,

http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2084.

Walter Pincus, "Gauging the Price Tag for Afghanistan's Security," Washington Post, December 20, 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/20/AR2010122004829.html.

Congressional Research Service

Figure 9. FY2011 Afghan Security Forces Fund Request

($ in thousands)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2011/army/021710-asff.pdf.

Note: Submitted as part of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request.

CRS-22

Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Figure 10. FY2012 Afghan Security Forces Fund Request

($ in thousands)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense,

http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY12/OCO//asff.pdf.

OSD-provided Notes: FY2010 reflects changes made subsequent to September 30, 2010, and will match the

Appendix to the Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2012. FY2011 reflects the FY2011 President’s budget

request with an undistributed adjustment to match the annualized continuing resolution funding level by

appropriation. Submitted as part of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request.

Iraqi Security Force Assistance

In Iraq, on August 31, 2010, the U.S. transitioned from combat and counterinsurgency activities

to a more limited focus on training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces, conducting targeted

counterterrorism operations, and providing force protection for U.S. military and civilian

personnel and facilities. Central to this strategy is that coalition forces are building the capacity of

indigenous forces, forging relationships with local leaders, and preventing attempts by the Taliban

to reintroduce themselves into the area. According to the DOD justification for the FY2011

Overseas Contingency Operations Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF):

The Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) is required to enable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to

reach minimum essential capabilities (MEC). MEC will allow the ISF to maintain

internal security with police forces in the lead and defense forces in support while

building foundational capabilities for the Iraqi military forces to provide external defense

prior to US forces departure 31 December 2011.

Revenue shortfalls due to low oil prices caused severe challenges in equipping forces

across the Government of Iraq (GoI). The tightening fiscal environment has forced Iraq to

pass a 2009 budget that set spending 25% below its original proposal and sacrificed

numerous initiatives. The GoI budget has negatively affected equipping, sustaining and

training the ISF throughout 2009. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) has improved training

capacity, but still suffers from poor facilities and recruiting shortage. The Ministry of

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Defense (MoD) faces significant logistical and sustainment challenges in addition to the

recruiting shortfall. Although oil prices have risen slightly since the final 2009 budget

was passed, Iraq has exhausted a significant portion of its available fiscal reserves in

2009 and is projected to have greater financial shortages into the foreseeable future.83

The total FY2011 budget request for ISFF was $2.0 billion (see Figure 11). The FY2011 NDAA84

approved $1.5 billion for programs in Iraq, $500 million less than the request. Yet, the difference

is still an increase over the initial Senate mark of $1.0 billion as Congress displayed skepticism

toward Iraq’s contribution to its own security efforts. The final bill requires that the Iraqi

government pay 20 percent of the cost of many types of equipment. The NDAA also fences $500

million of ISFF authorized funds until the Secretary of Defense certifies “that the Iraqi Security

Forces are committed to sustaining and maintaining their forces.”85

Transition to Traditional Security Assistance Relationship

The FY2012 Administration budget request, presented in February 2011, did not include any

request to fund the ISFF.86 Rather, the priority for the administration is shifting to the

establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). OSC-I is anticipated to begin

operating in June of this year and to be fully operational by this October.87 OSC-I would become

the cornerstone of the long-term mission to build partner capacity with the ISF.88 Additionally, the

OSC-I would ensure the continuation of the military-to-military relationships that advise, train,

and assist Iraqi Security Forces.89 The Iraqi Security Forces Fund and equipment transfer

provisions are envisioned to operate through FY2011, with follow-on increasing emphasis on

International Military Education and Training (IMET; see Glossary) and other traditional security

Office of the Secretary of Defense FY 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request Iraq Security Forces

Fund, February 2010, p. 46.

As of the creation of this report, Congress had yet to pass a Defense appropriations bill for FY2011; hence figures

quoted herein only represent H.R. 6523 / P.L. 111-383, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2011 (current as of April 5, 2011).

Rebecca Williams, “Summary of Foreign and Security Assistance Programs,” The Stimson Center, Budgeting for

Foreign Affairs and Defense program, January 10, 2011, at http://thewillandthewallet.org/.

Department of Defense, FY 2012 President's Budget, Exhibit O-1, section 2092A, p. 13A,

http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/fy2012_o1.pdf.

Much of the work previously done by the military in Iraq is expected to become the responsibility of State and

USAID. State Department base funding includes $593 million to support Iraq operations, with the intention of leaving a

robust civilian presence after the departure of military forces in early FY2012.The shift from military to civilian

responsibility in Iraq is projected to decrease the Defense Department‘s total Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)

funding by $45 billion in the coming fiscal year. The work done in Iraq would shift more towards strategic and

operational levels of SFA than the tactical military to military training. The total Diplomatic and Consular Programs

request for Iraq Operations is $3.725 billion, consisting of $3.229 billion identified as OCO funding. See Secretary of

State, Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 1: Department of State Operations Fiscal Year 2012, pp. vii, 2, 9,

60, 764-769, http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2011cbj/pdf/index.htm.

While testifying in support of the DOD budget request, Admiral Mullen stated, “State Department has taken the lead

for U.S. efforts in Iraq, and our diplomats and other civilians are increasingly the face of our partnership with the Iraqi

people and their government. Sustained funding for our civilian efforts, commensurate with the State Department’s

growing responsibilities—particularly our development assistance and police training programs is needed to ensure we

are able to successfully turn our military accomplishments into political ones.” Posture Statement of Admiral Michael

G. Mullen, U.S. Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 112th Congress, Senate Armed Services

Committee February 17, 2011, p. 8, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/02%20February/Mullen%2002-1711.pdf.

Mattis CENTCOM posture statement, p. 30.

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force assistance programs, as well as authority to transfer equipment from Department of Defense

stocks.90

Figure 11. FY2011 Iraq Security Forces Fund

($ in thousands)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2011/army/031010-isff.pdf.

Security Sector Legislation Beyond ASFF and ISFF91

The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP)

Although it is not typically considered to be directly affiliated with SFA, Security Cooperation, or

Security Assistance, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) is another resource

approved by Congress to provide military assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. It enables local U.S.

commanders in the two countries to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction

requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately

assist the indigenous population.92 CERP has been described as an invaluable tool for

commanders to influence local populations and to counter Taliban propaganda and influence.93

CERP was originally funded with seized Iraqi assets, but Congress later appropriated U.S. funds

Mullen 17 February testimony, p. 9.

As of the creation of this report, Congress had yet to pass a Defense appropriations bill for FY2011, hence figures

quoted herein only represent H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2011 (current as of March 18, 2011). For further analysis of all foreign aid programs in Afghanistan, see CRS

Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by (name redacted)

Commander’s Handbook 09-27, Chapter 4, Center for Army Lessons Learned, United States Army Combined Arms

Center, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/ch-4.asp.

Mattis, CENTCOM, posture statement, p. 22.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

for the purpose. Authorized and appropriated annually, CERP is not applicable to missions

outside Iraq and Afghanistan.

The FY2011 NDAA authorized a total of $500 million for CERP: $100 million for CERP in Iraq,

half of the Administration’s request, and $400 million for CERP in Afghanistan, $700 million less

than the Administration’s request. The reduction in Afghan CERP is offset by a new $400 million

Afghan Infrastructure Fund. Additionally, the FY2011 NDAA prohibits using Afghan “CERP

funds in excess of $20 million to fund any project, including any ancillary or related elements of

the project.”94

A 2008 GAO report95 called attention to CERP’s ambiguity in defining “small-scale” and

“urgent” projects, the difficulty in monitoring projects to see that they are completed to

specification, and the need for greater visibility with command and DOD leadership as to the

scale and extent of work being undertaken. Subsequently, the FY2009 National Defense

Authorization Act included enhanced approval and reporting requirements for the program.96

Recently, however, legislators have highlighted the “continuing practice of using CERP to fund

large-scale projects, particularly in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with CERP’s purpose of

enabling commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian

relief and reconstruction requirements that directly benefit the local people.”97 Congress has also

reiterated that it wants Iraq to shoulder more of the rebuilding costs.98

CERP is not used for the training, equipping, or operating costs of Afghan and Iraqi security

forces. Yet, used in parallel with SFA, CERP provides military commanders a bridge between the

development of indigenous civilian and military capabilities.

Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) Authorities99

Another means to conduct security force assistance with specific relevance outside of Iraq and

Afghanistan are the Global Train and Equip / Section 1206 authorities. This mechanism is widely

endorsed by regional combatant commanders for conducting security force assistance effectively

within the legislative restrictions for training foreign forces (see page 61 “Do Legislative

Authorities Restrict Conducting SFA?”). One combatant commander has said, “Congressional

1206 authority is the only partner capability/capacity building tool that we have to address urgent

or emergent needs in the region.”100

Section 1206 of the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides the Secretary of

Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to

Accompany H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2010, p. 511.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection For

Commander's Emergency Response Program and Oversight in Iraq, GAO-08-736R, Military Operations, June 23,

2008, pp. 35-37, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08736r.pdf.

Detailed description available in DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 12, ch. 27, pp. 1-14.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to

Accompany H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2010, p. 490.

Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, "Money as a Weapon," Washington Post, August 11, 2088, p. A1,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/08/10/ST2008081002653.html.

For detailed analysis of the 1206 program, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”

Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) .

100

Admiral Robert F. Willard, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, testimony before the Senate Armed Services

Committee, March 24, 2010, http://www.pacom.mil/web/pacom_resources/pdf/Willard_Statement_SASC_032610.pdf.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

The Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to train and equip

military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

Thus far, DOD has used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism (CT)

support. These funds may also be used to train and equip foreign military forces for military and

stability operations in which U.S. forces participate.101

The 2011 NDAA authorizes Section 1206 for one year through FY2012. The authorization bill

provided $350 million, compared to an Administration request of $500 million. It also included a

provision that raises the ceiling to $100 million (up from $75 million) of Section 1206 funds

available for “building the capacity of foreign military forces to participate in or support

stabilization operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant”102 (e.g.,

training coalition partners—Polish, Romanian, Ukrainian, etc—that participate in Iraq and

Afghanistan).103

In February 2011, the Obama Administration’s 2012 budget request included continuation of the

1206 authority and reiterated the $500 million level of funding:

In addition to these programs, which are directly related to completing the mission in Iraq

and combat operations in Afghanistan, the Budget provides $500 million for DOD’s

global military “train and equip” assistance programs. DOD uses these programs to fund

counterterrorism training in a variety of countries. DOD also uses these programs to

develop the internal counterterrorism capability of Yemen, which is critical to the

Administration’s goal of defeating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 104

Congress has not yet codified Section 1206 into permanent authority. One issue is whether this

capability should be placed with other train and equip authorities under the State Department. In

recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, DOD suggested that the 1206

authority “money should probably be in the State Department to start with.”105 Congress requires

an annual report to provide oversight and visibility of 1206 activities to preclude the potential

misuse of security assistance by nations targeted for assistance.106

In July 2010, the Government Accountability Office reported that the 1206 program was being

employed in a manner commensurate with the intent of Congress and was generally consistent

with U.S. strategic priorities related to combating terrorism and addressing instability. However,

GAO noted that “the long-term viability of Section 1206 projects is threatened by (1) the limited

ability or willingness of partner nations to support new capabilities, as 76 percent of Section 1206

projects are in low- or lower-middle-income countries, and, (2) U.S. legal and policy restrictions

101

CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by (name

redacted) .

102

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to

Accompany H.R. 6523, P.L. 111-383, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2010, p. 489.

103

This is not a new authority; rather, the conference report indicated agreement that the existing authority permitted

such assistance.

104

The White House, "Fiscal Year 2012 Budget of the U.S. Government," press release, February 2011, p. 61,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/budget.pdf.

105

Comment during questioning by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in testimony before the House Armed Services

Committee, February 16, 2011: “on 1206, for example, we have dual-key arrangements. We—we basically leave the

initiative up to the State Department in terms of what we should do on some of those, and then we fund it and we

partner with them. By rights, that money should probably be in the State Department to start with.”

106

As highlighted by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in their January 2, 2010, report Following the Money

in Yemen and Lebanon: Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance and International Financial

Institution Lending, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

on using FMF (foreign military financing) and additional Section 1206 resources for

sustainment.”107 GAO recommended that DOD estimate sustainment costs and seek funding

commitments from partner nations, and that it seek guidance from Congress on how to sustain

projects. DOD concurred.108

SFA and Counterterrorism

The most recognizable counterterrorism efforts are direct action missions against Al Qaeda

leadership, as seen in the reporting of drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is not the

intent of this report to discuss these kinetic operations.109 Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense

has stated, “Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the

fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and

govern their own countries.”110

The inability of weak or failed states to provide for their own internal security potentially creates

within them a sanctuary for terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda to operate, if not with

impunity, then at least with greater freedom and less scrutiny. The U.S. military focus is

increasingly on the search for small cells of terrorists and on building the capacity of U.S.

partners. DOD’s emphasis in SFA is, in part, to give partner countries capabilities to deter and

prevent terrorist activities and training.

Counterterrorism includes actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to

influence global and regional environments and render them inhospitable to terrorist networks.

The framework for the U.S. Special Operations Command Concept Plan 7500, Department of

Defense Global War on Terrorism Campaign Plan, identifies two approaches consisting of efforts

applied directly against the enemy and actions applied indirectly to influence the global

environment. These are referred to as direct and indirect approaches. SFA is a primary piece of

the indirect approach. Through training partner nations to be capable of their own security, the

United States “enables partners to combat violent extremist organizations (VEOs)” (see Figure

12). SFA enables partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations as well

as to shape and stabilize their environments in order to erode the capabilities of terrorist

organizations and degrade their ability to acquire support and sanctuary.111

107

U.S. Government Accountability Office, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment

Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431, April 2010,

p. 3, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10431.pdf.

108

U.S. Government Accountability Office, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment

Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431, April 2010,

executive summary, p. 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10431.pdf.

109

As of this writing, the Congressional Research Service has 61 active and 121 archived reports with linkages to

counterterrorism topics. For further information on counterterrorism with regard to military aviation, see CRS Report

RL32737, Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency, by (name redact

ed) and (name redacted)

110

Robert M. Gates, remarks delivered during the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting,

Washington DC, October 10, 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181.

111

Joint Publication 3-26, Counterterrorism, 13 November 2009, p. III-5.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Figure 12. SOCOM Strategic Campaign Framework: Direct and Indirect Approaches

for Countering Terrorism

Source: US Special Operations Command.

Notes: “VEO”= Violent Extremist Organization.

The premise of weak/failed state linkage to terrorism has its skeptics. Some analysts believe the

common denominator for terrorist activity is not state failure. Rather, they argue, terrorist attacks

are carried out by extremists claiming social or religious affiliations that have no linkage to

geography. Thus, safe havens are not necessarily geographical but social. This argument points

out that several regions identified in the upper tier of state weakness112 (such as Haiti, Congo,

Burundi, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar) are not havens for terrorists. This position further holds that

the biggest terrorist threat to the homeland is posed by European radicals, who are able to travel

to America more freely than those that reside in weak or failed state.113

Department of Defense’s Means to Conduct SFA

In testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Secretary of Defense

Gates, service chiefs, and regional combatant commanders have been asked what steps are being

112

As identified by the Brookings Institute’s 2008 Index of State Weakness in the Developing World.

http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx.

113

“Fixing a Broken World,” The Economist, January 29, 2009.

http://www.economist.com/node/13035718?story_id=13035718.

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taken to build a larger pool of SFA-oriented trainers within the services. The challenge for the

services has been to facilitate the organizing, training, and equipping of their own forces to meet

this demand. The special operations community has historically organized, trained, and equipped

forces for this mission, and the conventional services are still standardizing their training methods

and supporting organizations. There have been increases in training, in the number of individuals

trained, and in organizational commitment. Still, a significant challenge for the services will be

providing continuity of effort, because their task-organized training is for a limited time, as

compared to the long-term commitment of SOF. For example, a service member individual

assigned to a conventional unit may be tasked to deploy as a trainer in his or her area of expertise

(e.g. a logistician, an air traffic controller, a civil engineer or a helicopter pilot).114 Then he or she

will attend the training provided by the service before deployment. Afterward, the individual will

return to his or her own unit and resume functioning in a traditional capacity. The “training” skill

is not a permanent characteristic the soldier maintains proficiency in. A reason for this is the

degree of resources that would be required to maintain a standing capability. SOF personnel train

for years in this field, and it is the mission for which they are inherently responsible (see “U.S.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Security Force Assistance”). To develop the same degree of

fidelity in the conventional forces could require a significant increase in time and money.

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Security Force Assistance

SOF Responsibility for Conducting Foreign Training

The responsibility for conducting security force assistance has long resided with the special

operations community. The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in

1987, and the U.S. Code (Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 6, Section 167) identified foreign

internal defense (FID) as a special operations activity.115 SOF receive extensive training to

conduct this mission and are the most highly qualified to do so.

Under DOD, SOCOM has been given the responsibility of being the overall “joint proponent” for

SFA. In this capacity, they serve as lead for the development of joint doctrine, training, and

education relevant to SFA activities conducted within a host country from the individual to the

service level. SOCOM recommends the most appropriate forces for meeting SFA requirements

validated by geographic combatant commanders.116

SOF’s Unique Expertise in Conducting Foreign Training / SFA

U.S. SOF are uniquely appropriate to conduct SFA for several reasons. They are extensively

trained, well led, flexible, and adaptable. They can adjust quickly to meet the needs of the country

they are assisting. In addition to expert proficiency in their military combat skills, SOF are trained

114

In the Army and Marines, this is usually called a Military Operational Specialty (MOS), in the Air Force it is known

as an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), in the Navy as Naval Enlisted Classification (NEC) or Naval Officer

Designator (NOD).

115

The term “security force assistance” did not exist when SOCOM was established. Nevertheless, “foreign internal

defense” refers to activities that support a host nation’s internal defense and development strategy and most closely

mirror what is considered SFA today.

116

The methodology for determining what military units will conduct missions for the global combatant commanders is

known as the global force management (GFM) process. It is designed to continuously manage the process that provides

forces to conduct operational missions (called “sourcing”), using analytically based availability and readiness

management methodologies. GFM provides comprehensive insight into U.S. force postures worldwide, and accounts

for ongoing operations and constantly changing unit availability.

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to have a regional area of expertise. SOF not only participate in the host nation’s military training

activities. They excel at SFA because they have also learned to respect the customs, may speak

the language, and often participate in a host nation’s special cultural activities and functions. SOF

units may find themselves spending the majority of their careers in the same geographic theater.

In conducting SFA, SOF provide continuity with their counterparts in host nation militaries

because of long-standing relationships between individuals and units.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the SOCOM commander, Admiral

Eric Olson, emphasized the importance of SFA and the indirect approach.

Direct and indirect approaches must be carefully balanced. While the direct approach is

often necessary and has immediate impact, it essentially creates time for the indirect

approach to achieve lasting outcomes through other means.

Security Force Assistance (SFA) remains a highlight of USSOF indirect action. SFA is a

collaboration engine for the Command to include: security cooperation, security

assistance, foreign internal defense, internal defense and development, and security sector

reform.

SFA enhances the military capabilities and capacities of our allies and partners via

training, advising, assistance, and—as authorized—equipping and supporting foreign

military and security forces.117

Further in the testimony, Admiral Olson presents SFA as an element of the command’s

mechanism for counterterrorism.

Through direct action, we deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist threats across the globe. In

tandem, indirect action creates and sustains environments to empower longer term

success.... As we remain prepared for urgent, bold and decisive action, we recognize that

it is high-quality, low-profile, long-term engagement that fosters trust and enables

essential partnerships. In this regard, we should measure success by how well we have

prepared others to face their security challenges, not by what we do for them.

SOF Limitations in Conducting SFA

SOCOM has expressed concern over its ability to adequately resource the SFA mission. SOF

have a unique capability to conduct SFA. Yet, despite their enhanced skills, SOF are “lowdensity/high-demand” assets. Their skills are in high demand and there are not enough of them to

accomplish all the SFA missions. About 85% of deployed SOF are directly engaged in operations

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Admiral Olson emphasized the limitations of the mission due to limited

numbers and a high operations tempo within SOF, despite recent growth in the overall personnel

for the command.118 Even with a charge to grow the SOF force quickly, demands have exceeded

resources. “As we have essentially doubled our force over the last nine years [and] tripled our

budget over the last nine years, we have quadrupled our overseas deployments over the last nine

years,”119 Admiral Olson said. He cautioned about the “frayed edges” of the force given current

117

Special Operations Command Posture Statement, presented by Admiral Eric Olson to the Senate Armed Services

Committee, March 4, 2010, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Olson%2003-16-10.pdf.

118

For further details, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for

Congress, by (name re dacted) and (name redacted)

119

Karen Parrish, “Special Operations Faces Soaring Demands, Commander Says,” American Forces Press Service,

February 8, 2011.

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commitments. The Armed Services Committees have concurred that the demand for such forces

and their unique skills will continue to outpace supply for the foreseeable future.120

Olson gave the following details about increased SOF operations tempo:121

We saw 100,000 American troops come out of Iraq; we only saw about 500 special

operations [members] as part of that....

We grew a battalion in the 5th Special Forces Group in 2008, and it’s deployed. We

grew a battalion in 3rd Special Forces Group in 2009, and it’s deployed....

We grew a battalion in the 10th Special Forces Group, and it is preparing to deploy.

Over the next two years, we’ll grow battalions in 1st Group and 7th Group....

We’ve been able to deploy 36 additional [operational detachments A, or “A-teams”], and

frankly, if you’re on a 1-to-1 deployment ratio, which is the very most that you can

sustain ... as you grow 36 ODAs, you should deploy no more than 18. But the demand

has gone up close to 50 in that time.

Though SOF are considered the “gold standard” for conducting SFA, the time, talent, and funding

required to develop this level of capability cannot easily be afforded to conventional forces that

carry out similar missions. Nevertheless, the growing appetite for SFA missions cannot be met

using only SOF forces. This is why conventional forces (also referred to as general purpose forces

or GPF) are assuming responsibility for more SFA activities. GPF have been in the SFA business

for a long time, especially in technical training (i.e., security assistance missions and Technical

Assistance Field Teams (TAFT)). What is new in recent years is using GPF to do basic training

and advisory duties in the current large numbers. There is historical precedence, however, for

large GPF advisory missions (e.g., there were nearly 10,000 conventional advisors in South

Vietnam in 1964). Additionally, the SOCOM commander has expressed the importance that U.S.

SOF be used primarily to train partner nations’ SOF and that they refrain from training in basic

military skills in which conventional forces can instruct.

I’d like to see special operations get in the business of training foreign special operations

forces a little bit more, and in the business of training new recruits in a foreign country

how to march in straight lines and shoot on seven-meter ranges a little bit less. But I think

the reality is that, given the skills to which special operations trains, the global demand

will still be mostly for us. I can’t predict a balance, but I do think that the demand for

special operations, globally, will continue to go up.122

Prominent SOF Training Activities

Some notable recent SFA missions by U.S. SOF that have elicited congressional interest include

the training of counterterrorism forces in Yemen, development of indigenous SOF forces in Iraq

and Afghanistan, training of the Frontier Corps in Pakistan, training of forces in Mali against the

illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people, and training of armed forces of the Philippines to

counter Muslim insurgent groups in Mindanao.123

120

Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command,

March 1, 2011, http://levin.senate.gov/senate/statement.cfm?id=331480; and “House Armed Services Committee Holds

Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal 2012 Budget for the Defense Department's U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special

Operations Command,” CQ (Congressional Quarterly) transcripts, March 3, 2011.

121

Parrish, “Special Operations.”

122

Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, “Directing, Supporting and Maintaining the

World’s Best SOF”, Interview, Special Operations Technology, http://www.sotech-kmi.com.

123

James Kitfield, “Warriors, Trainers, and Mentors, Special Forces’ Focus on Training and Local Partnerships Pays

(continued...)

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

SOF Components Conducting SFA

Marine Special Operations Advisor Group / Marine Special Operations

Regiment

With the establishment of a Marine Corps component within SOCOM in 2006, the Marines’

foreign military training units (FMTUs), which had been formed to conduct foreign internal

defense, were transferred and then designated as the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group

(MSOAG). In April 2009, MSOAG was redesignated as the Marine Special Operations Regiment

with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOB) as subordinate units. The

newly designated 3rd MSOB incorporated the structure and personnel from MSOAG’s former

companies.124 Marines and sailors of the MSOR train, advise, and assist friendly host nation

forces—including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces—to enable them to

support their governments’ internal security and stability, counter subversion and reduce the risk

of violence from internal and external threats.125

The 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion was activated on October 26, 2006, and is

headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California. When fully manned, it consists of four Marine

Special Operations Companies (MSOCs). The 2nd and 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalions

are headquartered at Camp Lejeune, NC. Each MSOC is to be task-organized126 with personnel

uniquely skilled in special equipment support, intelligence, and fire support.127 The Marine Corps

special operations community is the newest of SOCOM’s components, and SFA is still considered

an evolving capability for them.128

Navy Special Warfare Forces

Naval Special Warfare Command conducts training of foreign forces through its foreign internal

defense program. According to SOCOM, however, Naval Special Warfare Forces are primarily

organized, trained, and equipped for direct action129 and special reconnaissance missions. As

such, Naval Special Warfare Forces do not have units specifically dedicated to training foreign

forces. However, in addition to providing basic and advanced instruction and training in maritime

special operations to U.S. military and government personnel, the Naval Special Warfare Center

provides the same training to members of select foreign armed forces.130

(...continued)

Deep Dividends,” Defense Standard, summer edition 2010, vol. 10; and Lolita C. Baldor, “U.S. Terror Training in

Yemen Reflects Wider Program,” Washington Times, September 8, 2010.

124

See http://www.socom.mil/socomhome/pages/marsoc.aspx.

125

See http://www.marines.mil/unit/marsoc/MSOR/Pages/Main-Page.aspx.

126

“Task-organized” refers to disparate units or personnel brought together for the purpose of conducting a specific

mission.

127

See http://www.marines.mil/unit/marsoc/1stMSOB/Pages/About.aspx.

128

Jeanette Steele, “Pendleton Marines Take on Training Role,” December 16, 2009,

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2009/dec/16/marines-take-training-role-afghanistan/.

129

Direct action is described as short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions that are conducted as a

special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and that employ specialized military

capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from

conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of

discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.

130

See http://www.socom.mil/socomhome/pages/navspecwarcom.aspx.

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In 2006, the commander of SOCOM assigned Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical

Training School (NAVSCIATTS) the following new mission:

NAVSCIATTS conducts Foreign Internal Defense (FID) in support of Combatant

Commanders in accordance with Commander, United States Special Operations

Command, priorities using Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and in-residence training to

prepare partner nation forces to conduct small craft operations in riverine or littoral

environments.131 [emphasis added]

On December 19, 2008, Naval Special Warfare Command shifted NAVSCIATTS from the Naval

Special Warfare Center to Naval Special Warfare Group-4 (NSWG-4) for its SFA component.132

NAVSCIATTS is located in the riverine and littoral training areas of the John C. Stennis Space

Center near Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. NAVSCIATTS has trained more than 6,000 students from

over 55 partner nations.133 According to NSWG-4, NAVSCIATTS has been conducting security

force assistance since 1963 to prepare partner nation forces to conduct small craft operations in

riverine and littoral environments, as well as to develop and sustain professional and personal

relationships.134

Army Special Forces

U.S. Army Special Forces Command identifies foreign internal defense operations (a component

of security force assistance—see Figure 7) as Special Forces’ main peacetime mission. These

activities are designed to help friendly developing nations by working with indigenous military

and police forces to improve their technical skills, increase understanding of human rights issues,

and help with humanitarian and civic action projects.135

Each of the seven Special Forces Groups is regionally oriented to support one of the war-fighting

regional combatant commanders. Special Forces Groups are currently located at Fort Bragg, NC;

Fort Campbell, KY; Fort Carson, CO; and Fort Lewis, WA. Additional Special Forces battalions

are in Okinawa, Japan, and Panzer Kaserne, Stuttgart, Germany. In 2011, the 7th Special Forces

Group (currently at Fort Bragg) will relocate to Eglin Air Force Base, FL. There are also two

National Guard Special Forces Groups located in Alabama and Utah, with subordinate units based

in 19 states.136 Approximately 1,400 soldiers are assigned to each group. The 12-man ODA

(Operational Detachment Alpha), or “A” Team, is the basic operating element of a Special Forces

group. It is largely made up of noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Each team member has a

specific function, ranging from operations and intelligence to weapons, engineering, medical

duties, and communications. The advanced training for each specialty can take six months or

longer and includes small-unit tactics; languages; and survival, evasion, resistance and escape.

The ODA itself may specialize in an infiltration skill or a particular mission-set, such as military

freefall, combat diving, mountain warfare, maritime operations, or urban operations.137

131

See http://www.navsoc.socom.mil/navsciatts/mission.htm.

Francisco Melara, “The United States Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School,” The DISAM

Journal of International Security Assistance Management, vol. 31, no. 4 (March 2010), pp. 1-2.

133

See http://www.navsoc.socom.mil/navsciatts/history.htm.

134

Naval Special Warfare Group 4 Public Affairs, “Naval Special Warfare Group 4 Assumes Command of the United

States Naval Small Craft Instruction & Technical Training School,” DISAM Journal, vol. 31, no. 4 (March 2010), p. 4.

135

See http://www.soc.mil/USASFC/USASFC.html.

136

U.S. Army Special Operations Command press release, Special Forces—Shooters and Thinkers, October 26, 2009,

http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/10/26/29315-special-forces---shooters-and-thinkers/.

137

U.S. Army Special Operations Command press release, Special Forces—Shooters and Thinkers, October 26, 2009,

(continued...)

132

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Air Force Combat Aviation Advisors

Within Air Force Special Operations Command, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (6th SOS)

is a combat aviation advisory (CAA) unit. Its mission is to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign

aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration. Squadron advisors

help friendly and allied forces employ and sustain their own airpower resources and, when

necessary, integrate those resources into joint and combined (multinational) operations. Squadron

training and advisory capabilities in the employment arena include airpower applications, tactical

employment, and mission planning. Tactical flying activities include fixed and rotary-wing

operations for combat search and rescue, close air support and airlift/aerial delivery (infiltration,

exfiltration, resupply, and air drop). Assistance in the sustainment arena includes aviation

maintenance, supply, munitions, ground safety, life support, personal survival, air base defense,

command and control, and other sustainment functions supporting combat air operations.

Assistance to the theater combatant commands includes assessments of foreign aviation

capabilities, liaison with foreign aviation forces, and assistance in theater air campaign planning

for combined operations.138

The 6th SOS currently has 218 personnel assigned, which includes 12 Operational Aviation

Detachment (OAD) Teams. Currently, it takes 12-18 months to train and mission-qualify a 6th

SOS member. The training starts at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School and transitions

to training within the unit. The squadron has seen significant growth and is projected to double in

size to approximately 500 people. The squadron conducts SFA139 operations by working “with,

through, and by” host nation aviation forces from the ministerial to the tactical unit level. “With,

through, and by” describes the process of interaction with foreign security forces that initially

involves training and interacting “with” the host nation forces. The next step is advising, which

may include advising in combat situations (acting “through” the forces). The final phase is

achieved when foreign security forces operate independently (act “by” themselves).140

Joint Combined Exchange Training141

A popular and efficient method for SOF to conduct SFA has been through the Joint Combined

Exchange Training (JCET) program. JCETs are unique to SOF and allow U.S. forces to train side

by side with counterparts from a partner nation. Title 10 of the U.S. Code describes142 special

operations forces training with friendly foreign forces. It says that the purpose of the training

“shall be to train the special operations forces of the combatant command.” Hence, training for

foreign forces is a lower priority than training for U.S. forces.

The SFA skill sets taught to partner nations’ forces through the JCET program are tailored to

tactical-level combat readiness. Combat commanders convey that the JCET program is a means

to support regional stability throughout the theater. Other than combat skills, training that could

occur in JCETs might include humanitarian assistance operations, disaster assistance/relief

(...continued)

http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/10/26/29315-special-forces---shooters-and-thinkers/.

138 th

6 Special Operations Squadron fact sheet, http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3496

139

In Air Force vernacular, this activity is referred to “Aviation Foreign Internal Defense” or “AvFID.”

140

Presentation by Air Force Legislative Liaison, January 24, 2011.

141

For further information regarding history and scrutiny of the JCET program, see CRS Report RL30034, Joint

Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) .

142

U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part III, Chapter 101, § 2011.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

operations, and civic assistance projects. These projects are touted as constructive interactions

among foreign military and civilians and U.S. SOF.143

Congress has scrutinized SOF’s conduct of SFA via the JCET program. This resulted primarily

from some high-profile instances during the 1990s, particularly in Indonesia. In these cases, the

partner nation forces that had been trained by U.S. SOF counterparts were shown to have

employed the skills they learned in repressive or brutal fashion in suppressing internal and civil

disturbances.144 The program was also criticized for conflicting senses of purpose within the

executive branch. In some instances, the State Department made evaluations of nations’ human

rights record. However, these inspections, and subsequent vetting or condemnation, were not

commensurate with the list of nations that were being trained. As a result, Congress enacted

legislation to bring JCET more into alignment with policies and to establish more stringent

oversight. The Leahy Amendment to the Department of Defense FY1999 Appropriations Act

(P.L. 105-262) prohibited the U.S. military from training with human rights abusers (unless the

prohibition is waived by the Secretary of Defense). Since then, federal law has barred U.S. forces

from offering assistance to foreign military units if there is evidence that they have gone

unpunished after committing human rights violations.145 (See section below on “Leahy

Amendment.”)

Additionally, in an effort to increase congressional oversight of the program, the relevant section

of the U.S. Code was amended to add a reporting requirement to Congress:

Reports.— Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to

Congress a report regarding training during the preceding fiscal year for which expenses

were paid under this section. Each report shall specify the following:

(1) All countries in which that training was conducted.

(2) The type of training conducted, including whether such training was related to

counter-narcotics or counter-terrorism activities, the duration of that training, the number

of members of the armed forces involved, and expenses paid.

(3) The extent of participation by foreign military forces, including the number and

service affiliation of foreign military personnel involved and physical and financial

contribution of each host nation to the training effort.

(4) The relationship of that training to other overseas training programs conducted by the

armed forces, such as military exercise programs sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

military exercise programs sponsored by a combatant command, and military training

activities sponsored by a military department (including deployments for training, short

duration exercises, and other similar unit training events).

(5) A summary of the expenditures under this section resulting from the training for

which expenses were paid under this section.

143

Ralph E. Saner and Dan J. Poulos, “Special Operations Forces—JCETS in the Pacific,” http://forum.apaninfo.net/spring_98/JCETS98r.html.

144

Dana Priest, "U.S. Military Trains Foreign Troops," Washington Post, July 12, 1998, p. A1,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/overseas/overseas1a.htm.

145

Douglas Gillison, “Is U.S. Training Cambodian Troops Linked to Abuses?” Time magazine, November 19, 2010,

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2030767,00.html#ixzz1Ar0VTFFh.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

(6) A discussion of the unique military training benefit to United States special operations

forces derived from the training activities for which expenses were paid under this

section.146

The Obama Administration is trying to achieve a diplomatic balance with regard to using JCETs

for SFA. Training with Western-leaning Muslim nations such as Indonesia is linked to U.S. efforts

to counter terrorism (see “SFA and Counterterrorism”). Radical groups linked to al Qaeda, such

as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf, have targeted Indonesia and used its territory as a staging

ground for attacks elsewhere. Jemaah Islamiyah's October 2002 attack in Bali killed 202,

including American tourists.147 Furthermore, engaging with Indonesia is seen by some analysts as

an effort to counter China’s rise. Yet members of the Senate continue to express concern

regarding Indonesian human rights abuses.148

Leahy Amendment

The “Leahy Amendment” was first enacted as part of the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations

Act (FOAA). The amendment, sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, prohibited

provision of Foreign Operations appropriations assistance to foreign security force units

implicated in gross human rights violations, unless the Secretary of State determines that the host

government is taking effective measures to bring those responsible to justice. Initially the law was

narrowly focused on the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control and Law

Enforcement program, but it was expanded in 1998 to include all security assistance programs

using FOAA funds. Additionally, recurring language in the annual National Defense

Appropriations Act (NDAA) applies Leahy requirements to NDAA-funded training.149 (For more

information, see CRS Report RL30034, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human

Rights: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).)

U.S. Army Conventional Forces and Security Force Assistance150

The Army has identified SFA as one of four primary activities for which the service is

responsible. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, has highlighted this responsibility in

testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. He has stated:

[T]he Army must engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure our friends

and allies. Through security force assistance, we can increase the capacity of other

nations’ military and police to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, and deny

sanctuary to terrorists—thereby helping avoid future conflicts that might otherwise

develop. American Soldiers are currently deployed to Central America and the Balkans,

building the capacity of indigenous security forces. Additionally, the Army has

established an Army Service Component Command for U.S. Africa Command to assist

partner nations and humanitarian organizations in Africa. 151

146

10 U.S.C. § 2011.

“Obama's Indonesia Test,” Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2008.

148

John Pomfret, "U.S. Floats Plan to Lift Ban on Training Indonesia's Kopassus Unit," Washington Post, March 3,

2010, p. A08, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/02/AR2010030204053_pf.html.

149

See http://www.disam.dsca.mil/DR/14%20Chapter.pdf.

150

Information is this section is based primarily on a presentation provided by the Army Legislative Liaison on January

12, 2011, and on Edward Donnelly, Mike Redmond, and Bill Torrey, “The U.S. Army Approach to Security Force

Assistance,” Military Review, November-December 2010.

151

U.S. Army posture statement submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 19, 2010.

147

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Organizing for an Enduring Requirement

Over the past two years, the Army has reconfigured itself to conduct SFA. The 2010 posture

statement (previous paragraph) of outgoing Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General George W.

Casey contrasts with his 2008 position, when he said; “I’m just not convinced that anytime in the

near future we’re going to decide to build someone else’s army from the ground up,” and further,

“to me, the ‘advisory corps’ is our Army Special Forces—that’s what they do.”152 Additionally,

during his confirmation testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the presumptive

new CSA, General Martin Dempsey,153 said he anticipated that there will be a future ongoing

requirement for SFA-tasked brigades to carry the role of building partner capacity beyond Iraq

and Afghanistan. Yet, he indicated, it is too early to tell if general purpose force brigades will be

regionally aligned to carry out future advise-and-assist missions.154

Advise-and-Assist Brigade Combat Team

The Army has organized to conduct SFA via the modular design of the brigade combat team

(BCT). Army forces are task-organized, trained, and equipped for the SFA mission through the

cyclical process of force generation.155 Elements are organized from within the brigade with the

required size and skill sets for each mission. Each BCT has over 250 commissioned officers and

over 1,000 NCOs of sergeant rank and above, providing a large base of trainers and advisors.

Afghanistan and Iraq are examples where the army uses modular brigades augmented and

adapted for SFA as the base organization for providing SFA. Instead of trying to design exactly

the right unit for every situation, the versatility of Army modular organizations is leveraged by

tailoring them for the mission. According to the Army, lessons from these deployments so far

indicate that the brigade is a viable basis for large-scale SFA to build capacity at the individual

and unit levels. Nevertheless, some analysts do not agree with the strategy of leveraging BCTs to

fulfill the training and advising role. These critics believe that the Army should have dedicated

training units to conduct the mission.156

Component Staff Expanded Responsibilities

Army service component command staffs have also expanded to include a 20-person section

responsible for coordination between the command, country teams, security cooperation

organizations, geographic combatant command staffs, Special Operations Command elements,

and Army headquarters. This staff is the nexus for assigning SFA missions and assessing their

effectiveness.

152

Yochi J. Dreazen, “U.S. Army Still Struggles With How to School Iraqi Security Forces,” Wall Street Journal,

February 29, 2008.

153

General Dempsey comes into this position having just recently served as the commanding general for U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command, the organization responsible for conducting Army SFA training.

154

Response to “Advance Policy Questions for General Martin E. Dempsey, USA Nominee for Chief of Staff of the

Army,” http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/03%20March/Dempsey%2003-03-11.pdf.

155

This process of reconstituting, training, and employing forces is described in the Army posture statement, at

https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2010/addenda/Addendum_FArmy%20Force%20Generation%20%28ARFORGEN%29.asp.

156

For further discussion regarding dedicated Army units, see CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need a FullSpectrum Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) .

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Training

Army training for SFA-type missions includes an emphasis on regional language expertise and

core cultural skills. Professional training and specific mission-tailored training are delivered by

various specialist organizations, notably 162 Brigade in Fort Polk, LA. Additionally, the Army

has established the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center at Fort Huachuca,

AZ, and a force modernization proponent for SFA at the Combined Arms Center at Fort

Leavenworth, KS, to further institutionalize its ability to deliver SFA.

U.S Navy Conventional Forces and Security Force Assistance157

According to the Navy, SFA plays a key role in support of the Navy’s strategic imperatives by

fostering and sustaining cooperative relationships through increased capacity-building, thus

preventing or containing local disruptions before they have a larger impact.

According to some analysts, this preemptive SFA engagement strategy implies a focus on smaller,

frailer nations, consistent with “emphasis on building partnership capacity and security

cooperation to minimize emerging transnational challenges.”158 The Cooperative Seapower

Strategy159 presses U.S. naval forces past merely being deployed forward to engaging forward, in

a proactive sense, to enhance and minimize the conditions that generate conflict and instability in

the first place. One analysis of the Navy’s indirect approach highlights that a proactive

engagement will increase dependence on maritime assets, but foresees a continued reliance on the

special operations community for SFA as the Navy begins to train for this mission.160

Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training (MCAST) Command

According to the Navy, the Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training (MCAST) Command

SFA Detachment mans, trains, equips, and deploys sailors to establish and enhance relations

between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the civilian

populace. MCAST defines its mission as follows:

In support of the Combatant Commander (COCOM) Theater Security Cooperation Plan

(TSCP), MCAST Command, Security Force Assistance Detachment (SFA Det) will

deliver maritime expeditionary core capability training and instruction in the areas of

small boat operations, maritime interception, weapons, maritime expeditionary security,

maintenance, professional development, and skill sets external to NECC. This mission

will be carried out by teams of SFA Det personnel with the subject matter expertise to

train foreign audiences at a basic to intermediate level. 161

157

Information is this section is based primarily on a presentation provided by the Navy Legislative Liaison on January

6, 2011, and on Statement of Admiral Gary Roughhead, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services

Committee, February 25, 2010, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Testimony/Roughead%2002-2510.pdf.

158

Frank Hoffman, CNAS Report, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21 st Century,

November 2008.

159

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Department of the Navy, October 2007,

http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf.

160

Frank Hoffman, , CNAS Report, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21 st

Century, November 2008.

161

Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training course catalog, version 3.0, at

http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/mcast/Documents/SFA_Catalog.pdf.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Navy general purpose forces (GPF) are allocated to SFA activities through the Global Force

Management (GFM) process. These forces receive pre-deployment training designed to support

their assigned task. GPF conduct the full range of military operations, including maritime

security, counter-proliferation, security cooperation, security force assistance, stability, maritime

interdiction, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions.

Navy SFA Employment

The Navy conducts SFA using three methods: (1) fleet and regional training and exercises, (2)

enduring rotational deployments, and (3) fleet and expeditionary operations. The cooperative

engagements include topics such as small boat operations and tactics, maritime combat

operations, weapons handling, antiterrorism and force protection, maintenance and construction,

and officer and non-commissioned officer professional development and leadership.162

While no single command is dedicated specifically to SFA, the following Navy commands are

heavily engaged in SC and SFA activities:



Naval Expeditionary Combat Command

Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command

Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity

Navy International Programs Office

Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School

Navy Reserve Maritime Partnership Program

Table 1. Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Student Figures

(sailors trained by MCAST to participate in SFA mobile training teams)

2007/2008

2009

2010

2011 (to date)

Active

Reserve

Total

Source: Provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, March 11, 2011,

U.S Marine Corps Conventional Forces and Security Force

Assistance163

The Marines measure the appetite for how many building partnership capacity activities (i.e.,

SFA) are needed as it is communicated to them from regional combatant commanders (e.g.,

CENTCOM and European Command (EUCOM) commanders). They want a forward presence

engaging partner nations and allies in order to shape relationships and deter violence. General

162

Lieutenant Zachary Harrell, AFRICOM press release, “MCAST Security Force Assistance Mobile Team

Collaborates on Small Boat Operations with the Cameroon Navy,” August 5, 2010, available at

http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4979&lang=0.

163

Information from this section is primarily from General James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps,

posture statement and testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 2010, and from “Send in

the Marines, A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept to Meet an Uncertain Security Environment,” January

2008, at http://www.usmc.mil/news/publications/Documents/The%20Long%20War_1.pdf.

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Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance

Michael W. Hagee (Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, 2003–2006) has said, “If we

can do much better in ‘phase zero,’164 better prepare foreign militaries to handle their own

situations, maybe we won’t have to do phases one, two and three.”165

The Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Security Cooperation166

Operating on General Hagee’s premise, the Marines created a Security Cooperation Marine AirGround Task Force (SC-MAGTF).167 This is built around a Marine infantry battalion. It includes

personnel and materiel specifically tailored for SFA operations and allows them to build a force to

meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. If the requirement is to go into a specific

country to train its military, provide humanitarian support, dig wells, provide medical and dental

support, or just engage to develop a relationship, the Marines will organize for the task.168

Some aspects of the SC-MAGTF training missions are similar to those of special operations

forces, such as the Army’s Special Forces detachments (Green Berets) and the Marine Special

Operations Advisor Group. They will help advise foreign militaries, but the advisory missions

conducted by special operations forces tend to be more complex, reflecting capabilities that

exceed the capacity of general-purpose forces. Yet the current deployment commitments in Iraq

and Afghanistan will limit the Marines from meeting their goal of training a wider contingent of

the Corps to conduct SFA. The approach is dependent upon the drawdowns in the Middle East

because they draw resources away from the SC-MAGTF effort.169

Recently, underscoring that the SC-MAGTF concept has evolved to reflect the organizational,

mission, and doctrinal characteristics of a special purpose MAGTF,170 the Marines decided that

the “Security Cooperation MAGTF” would be renamed “Special Purpose Marine Air Ground

Task Force-Security Cooperation (SPMAGTF-(Security Cooperation)).” Hence, the moniker

“SPMAGTF-(Security Cooperation)” now describes MAGTFs stood up specifically to engage in

theater security cooperation activities. Additionally, units other than MAGTFs that conduct

theater security cooperation will be called security cooperation task forces/detachments/teams as

appropriate.

164

Military operations are usually described in pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict “phases.” “Phase Zero”

operations refers to pre-conflict “shaping activities” that are meant to address conditions that lead to instability.

165

Erwin, Sandra I. “Marines to Take Over Responsibilities For Training Foreign Forces, national defense magazine,

April 2005” available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2005/April/Pages/SB-Marines_to5822.aspx.

166

Renaming of SC-MAGTF, MARADMIN Active Number 011/11, signed January 5, 2011, available at

http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/MARADMIN011-11.aspx.

167

MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) refers to the unique four-part structure that organizes Marine Corps

operating forces. This framework brings together aviation, ground, and logistics combat elements under one command

element. The result is a flexible, combined-arms unit with the capabilities to conduct the Marine Corps’ full range of

operations. The size of a MAGTF can be tailored to meet the needs of a mission. The smallest MAGTF to deploy is a

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a rapid response force of 2,200 Marines. See

http://www.marines.com/main/index/winning_battles/roles_in_the_corps.

168

Lt. General Richard F. Natonski, presentation to IFPA-Fletcher Conference, September 26, 2007, available at

http://www.ifpafletcherconference.com/oldtranscripts/2007/Natonski.pdf.

169

Kimberly Johnson, “New Units to Assume Special Forces Mission,” Marine Corps Times, February 29, 2008.

170

According to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 (Marine Corps Operations), a special purpose MAGTF is

organized to accomplish a specific mission, operation, or exercise.

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Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group

The Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) coordinates Marine Corps security

force assistance (SFA) and security cooperation (SC) efforts; provides conventional training and

advisor support to host nation security forces (HNSF), or to U.S. general purpose forces (GPF)

partnering with HNSF; and provides planning assistance to Marine forces in developing and

executing partner nation training programs in order to build partner capacity in support of

combatant commander SFA/SC objectives.171 The MCTAG was developed to fill the gap in

standardizing advisor training that occurred when the Corps’ foreign military training units

(FMTUs), later designated Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG), moved to the

Marine component of Special Operations Command.172

U.S. Air Force Conventional Forces and Security Force Assistance

A subset of SFA in developing indigenous forces is the building of a partner nation’s aviation

capacity. The recent establishment in 2010 of the U.S Air Force’s Air Advisor Academy is

designed to train airmen to carry out these missions effectively in a manner similar to that of the

6th Special Operations Squadron, a unit dedicated to conducting foreign internal defense (see

previous section on special operations forces “Air Force Combat Aviation Advisors”). Training at

this academy includes language and cultural awareness courses, along with combat survival

training. Additionally, the Air Force is investing in a small inventory of light mobility and light

attack aircraft to use in training partner nations.

Aviation Capacity173 and SFA

A study chartered by Air Force headquarters stated that “[t]he security, stability, and economic

development of a nation in the early 21st century are inextricably linked to its aviation resource

capacity and capability.”174 A common characteristic of underdeveloped and undergoverned

regions is a lack of transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc). For example, although it is

nearly the size of Texas, Afghanistan has only 1/12 the miles of roads (approximately 13, 000

miles), and of these, only 13% are paved surfaces.175 This, combined with rugged, mountainous

terrain, makes aviation capacity essential to projecting influence and establishing legitimacy for

government services.

A partner nation’s aviation capacity, developed through SFA, can project the influence of that

nation’s government through such high-payoff learned skills as medical evacuation and search

and rescue. Additionally, aviation allows nascent military forces, such as the Afghan National

Army and its ISAF allies, to avoid maneuvering with trepidation in and around improvised

171

See http://www.marines.mil/unit/mctag/Pages/default.aspx.

Thomas Grattan, “Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group, the Way Ahead,” Marine Corps Gazette, April

2008, http://www.marinecorpsgazette-digital.com/marinecorpsgazette/200804/?pg=36#pg36.

173

Rather than “airpower” or “air force,” the broader term “aviation capacity” is used to signify that aviation resources

of a partner nation may not be military assets. For example, Costa Rica uses a national police force with aircraft. Also,

aircraft are used to conduct border patrols, humanitarian resupply, and evacuations, which may not be military in

nature. Aviation capacity also refers to the supporting personnel, infrastructure, and logistics accompanying flight

operations.

174

Operating premise of US Air Force Irregular Warfare Tiger Team, Observations and Recommendations, May 22,

2009, page ii.

175

See http://www.aaroads.com/texas/ and http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/AfghanistanTRANSPORTATION.html.

172

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explosive devices (IEDs). A partner nation’s military aviation capacity also includes supporting

activities that contribute to economic development and trade that may not include a partner nation

owning any aircraft. Again using Afghanistan as an example, aviation capacity provides

transportation and economic flexibility to a landlocked country.

Yet there are constraints to developing aviation capacity. Because fragile states are also typically

characterized by lower literacy and education rates, training in aviation skills can be challenging,

as this technically centered enterprise may require a greater education level than exists in the

forces receiving the training. Additionally, aviation resources can be expensive to acquire,

operate, and maintain. The cost to own, operate, and maintain a single C-130 could be more than

the gross national product of some lower-tier partner nations.176 DOD uses the term “right tech”

to underscore the importance of training, advising, and assisting partner nations in aircraft that are

transferable,177 affordable, modular, and interoperable within the absorptive capacity178 of that

nation.

The Air Force goal is to help partner nations develop an aviation enterprise that contributes to the

partner nation’s security and to its government’s legitimacy and stability, to thwart terrorist

networks, drug cartels, and criminal organizations and prevent lethal threats emanating from

fractured or failing states.179

General Norton Schwartz, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, gave examples in his 2010 posture

statement of the Air Force’s SFA strategy:

The Air Force continues to seek opportunities to develop partnerships around the world,

and to enhance long-term capabilities through security cooperation. In the USCENTCOM

AOR, deployed Airmen are working with our Afghan and Iraqi partners to build a new

Afghan National Army Air Corps and Iraqi Air Force to strengthen the ability of these

nations to uphold the rule of law and defend their territories against violent, non-state

actors.... In FY11, we will expand our capabilities to conduct building partner capacity

(BPC) operations with partner air forces. Past experience has shown us that we are more

effective trainers when we operate the same platforms as our partners.

176

Mike Lydon, “Right Tech Solutions for USAF Security Force Assistance,” Small Wars Journal, September 29,

2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/560-lydon.pdf.

177

The transfer of military technologies is legislated by the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. Chapter 39,

Subchapter III, § 2778). It gives the President of the United States the authority to control the import and export of

defense articles and defense services. It also places certain restrictions on U.S. arms traders and manufacturers,

prohibiting them from the sale of certain sensitive technologies to certain parties and requiring thorough documentation

of such trades to trusted parties. For further information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review

Process, by (name redacted)

178

The term “absorptive capacity” refers to the ability of a nation to recognize the value of new, external capabilities,

assimilate them, and apply them to successful ends. See Dr David J. Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,”

Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C., 28 September 2006,

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf.

179

Information in this section is primarily from a presentation provided by the Air Force Legislative Liaison on January

20, 2011, and from Michael B. Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of

the Air Force, posture statement and testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2010,

http://www.posturestatement.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100223-010.pdf.

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Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Vision Statement

Additionally, in a message delivered to all of the members of the U.S. Air Force, General

Schwartz listed “Partner with the Joint and Coalition Team to Win Today’s Fight” as one of five

priorities to guide the direction of the Air Force.180

The Air Force will always be an integral part of Joint and Coalition operations. As we

look ahead, we are likely to encounter more sophisticated hybrid adversaries and

situations requiring enhanced integration across multiple domains. In irregular warfare

and anti-access / area denial environments, the Air Force must continue to build

partnerships with other air forces to bolster international cooperation, sustain powerful,

global forces for stability, and ensure access to the global commons.

Included in the areas for executing this agenda were these activities directly linked to training

partner nations:



Enhance our ability to train, advise, assist and integrate partner air forces,

institutionalize Air Advisor training, and stand up an Air Advisor Academy.

Develop and field the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LAAR) and

Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) to allow training with a broader array of aviation

partners.

Build stronger international air force cooperation, interoperability, and mutual

support.

Air Force International Affairs

In February 2010, Secretary Gates highlighted that an institutional challenge within the Pentagon

is that DOD’s various partner capacity and security assistance functions are scattered among

different staff and headquarters elements of the military. Yet he singled out the Air Force, where

“most of these functions—from foreign military sales to training exchanges—are grouped under

one civilian executive—the equivalent of a three-star general—to better coordinate and integrate

them with larger goals and national strategy. This more integrated and consolidated approach

makes better sense for the department, and for the government as a whole.”181

The Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) is the Air Force

proponent for SFA. SAF/IA has outlined its role in support of the Air Force’s strategic

engagement imperatives, as described in its Global Partnership Strategy:182

This strategy utilizes a capabilities-based approach to identify the specific ways and

means to utilize in relations with a specific country in support of the CCDR objectives.

This strategy establishes ends necessary to organize, train, and equip the USAF to

address the importance of building partnerships. These ends are for the USAF to:



Establish, sustain, and expand Global Partnerships that are mutually beneficial.

180

General Norton A. Schwartz, “CSAF Vector,” July 4, 2008. The other four priorities were: “Continue to Strengthen

the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise,” “Develop and Care for Airmen and their Families,” “Modernize our Air and Space

Inventories, Organizations, and Training,” and “Recapture Acquisition Excellence.” See

http://www.af.mil/information/viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=603.

181

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, The Nixon Center, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 24,

2010, http://www.nixoncenter.org/index.cfm?action=showpage&page=2009-Robert-Gates-Transcript.

182

Air Force Global Partnership Strategy, “Building Partnerships for the 21st Century,” January 2009, page ii.

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

Provide global partners the capability and capacity necessary to provide for their

own national security.



Establish the capacity to train, advise, and assist foreign air forces, while conducting

partnership activities using USAF Airmen with the appropriate language and cultural

skills.



Develop and enhance partnership capabilities to ensure interoperability, integration,

and interdependence, as appropriate.

Air Advisor Academy

The Air Force has emphasized that success in SFA occurs through people, not equipment. In

2007, with an increase in the requirement183 for U.S. trainers in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CSAF

directed Air Education and Training Command (AETC) to conduct pre-deployment training for

airmen (referred to as “air advisors”) en route to Iraq and Afghanistan. The number of students

went from 136 in the first year of operation to 675 students per year in 2010. The air advisor

course supporting current CENTCOM SFA requirements through the 321st and 438th Air

Expeditionary Wings has transitioned into a permanent capability providing advisor training for

global SFA requirements. Training is conducted at Joint Base McGuire/Dix/Lakehurst, NJ, and

includes (1) core knowledge, (2) language, region, and culture skills, and (3) field craft (survival

training, convoy training, etc). Many of those deploying with this training are not aviators but

rather “Agile Combat Support” (ACS).184 To increase assistance to less-developed nations,

specific Air Force ACS and aviation experts are trained in basic and advanced training

techniques. Those training partner nation counterparts in a flying capacity receive air advisor

training and may go on to specified flight training (depending on the aircraft in which they will

instruct) at one of seven flight training locations (five stateside, two overseas). Currently the New

Jersey training facility is used on a temporary basis for the Air Advisor Academy. A permanent

basing facility has yet to be determined through the Air Force basing process. Initial operating

capacity is expected in 2011, with full operating capacity in 2014. Moreover, the number of

students is expected to increase to between 1,500 and 2,000 students per year.

Table 2. Air Advisor185 Training Students

Year

Total Students

Iraq Specialists

Afghanistan Specialists

2007

136

2008

551

394

157

2009

606

340

266

183

The requirement for trainers is conveyed through the combatant commander’s Combined Joint Statement of

Requirements, which is incorporated into the congressionally mandated recurring Report on Progress Toward Security

and Stability in Afghanistan, in accordance with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), as amended. See http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf.

184

The Air Force uses the term “Agile Combat Support” (ACS) to identify non-flying roles such as military police,

aircraft maintenance, logistics, civil engineers, communications, etc. The majority of airmen that receive this training

fall into this category.

185

An air advisor is defined as an airman “specially trained and educated to apply Air Force expertise to assess, train,

advise, and assist, foreign personnel in the development and application of their aviation resources to meet their

national needs, in support of US interests,” Air Advisor Academy Charter, April 19, 2010.

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Year

2010

Total Students

Iraq Specialists

Afghanistan Specialists

675

307

368

Source: Air Education and Training Command.

Notes: Figures depict U.S. servicemen qualified through Air Advisor curriculum

Contingency Response Groups

Given force structure constraints, the Air Force intends to take advantage of existing

organizations (for somewhat different purposes) by slightly altering their procedures.

Contingency response groups, originally organized to open airfields as an expeditionary

capability, represent an example of this opportunity. With a focus on increased language skills and

regional orientation, these groups could relate very easily to nascent Air Force partners.186 Air

Force contingency response forces (two stateside wings and two overseas groups) include a wide

variety of skill sets, from civil engineers, to medics, to air traffic controllers. The Air Force has

regionally aligned its GPF contingency response forces and assigned a secondary mission

supporting SFA.

The leadership within contingency response forces has unanimously lauded the decision to assign

them a formal role within the broad Air Force SFA portfolio. They described their core airfield

opening functions (aerial port, mobile command and control, and maintenance) as perfect

building blocks for the nascent air infrastructures of many nations with whom the United States

desires closer relationships. Yet they have expressed concerns over their ability to support

traditional (air base opening) missions and engagement missions concurrently, given historically

low manning rates (near 70%).187

Light Mobility Aircraft and Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft

According to the Air Force, the Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) and the Light Attack Armed

Reconnaissance Aircraft (LAAR) are two new programs intended to provide specific SFA

capabilities. They would allow the United States

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