International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

International Climate Change:

A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Jane A. Leggett

Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy

November 18, 2010

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R41494

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Summary

Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed in

1992, gather for their 16th annual meeting in Cancun, Mexico, from November 29 to December

10, 2010. Several formal and informal negotiating sessions in 2010, intended to resuscitate the

global negotiations to address climate change beyond the year 2012, have followed the 2009

meeting in Copenhagen, with which many countries and observers were disappointed.

Under the UNFCCC, 194 governments, including the United States, have taken on obligations to

address climate change through enhanced scientific and technological cooperation, assessment of

sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and removals, and policies and measures to mitigate

GHG and to promote adaptation to climate changes. By the time the UNFCCC entered into force

in 1994, countries agreed that these obligations were inadequate to achieve the objective of

“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent

dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” By 1995, a Berlin Mandate called

for negotiation of a new agreement for deeper abatement, but with no new obligations for

developing countries. The resulting Kyoto Protocol established emission reduction targets in

aggregate of at least 5% below 1990 levels during 2008-2012 for the “Annex I” (developed)

Parties. It also established GHG reduction targets (“assigned amounts”) for all Annex I Parties.

For the European Union, Japan, and the United States, the assigned amounts were 8%, 7%, and

6%, respectively, below their 1990 levels of GHG emissions. The Kyoto Protocol allowed some

credits for enhanced sequestration by forests, and for three new emissions trading mechanisms.

President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. In 2001, President George W. Bush

indicated that the United States would not become a Party to that agreement, citing its omission

of GHG commitments for all major emitters, and possible adverse effects on the U.S. economy.

U.S. policy continues to reject becoming a Party to the Kyoto Protocol.

The Kyoto Protocol had always been viewed as a first step toward deeper and longer-term

reductions of GHG emissions. In 2007, the Parties established an Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) to negotiate GHG reductions after 2012,

when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends. Also in 2007, Parties to the UNFCCC

agreed to the Bali Action Plan, which set a mandate for negotiations among all Parties for future

commitments on a “shared vision” for the long term, climate change mitigation, adaptation,

technology, and financing. This second track, under the Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA), proceeds in parallel, with conflicting views among Parties as to how

the two possible agreements may relate to each other or converge into one.

In 2009, many observers and Parties hoped that the hard-negotiated Copenhagen Accord might

serve as the vehicle to bridge deep divides between the two negotiating tracks and various

regional and economic groupings of countries. During formal and informal meetings in 2010,

some Parties seemed to back away from their pledges under the Copenhagen Accord, although

some progress was made on several technical issues. Some Parties seek to codify that progress in

decisions by the Cancun Conference of the Parties. Others, including the United States, insist that

all major issues be resolved in a “balanced package” of agreement(s).

Few expect much progress at the Cancun talks, although many seek a decision to extend the

negotiating mandates with a deadline of 2011 for comprehensive, legally binding agreements on

further GHG mitigation, financing, technology cooperation, and adaptation.

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Contents

Upcoming Negotiations Seek Future GHG Commitments ...........................................................1

United Nations Negotiations Run on Two Tracks.........................................................................3

Questions About the Efficacy of the U.N. Forum.........................................................................5

Not Just Carbon from Energy ......................................................................................................6

Congressional Interests ...............................................................................................................7

Tables

Table 1. Comparison of International Issues by Agreement or Negotiating Forum........................9

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 20

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Upcoming Negotiations Seek Future GHG

Commitments

From November 29 to December 10, 2010, the Parties to the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to its subsidiary Kyoto Protocol plan to meet in

Cancun, Mexico. While the political agreement enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord1 of 2009

hangs in the background, ad hoc processes under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol proceed

separately.2 There is no common view on how to make further progress on these two tracks, or on

how to produce one or two comprehensive and consistent agreements to govern commitments

after 2012, except on a handful of limited topics (described further below and in Table 1).

The United States, along with a few other countries, insists that all elements under negotiation be

agreed simultaneously, as a package that carefully balances the interests of different Parties. 3

Other Parties, including China and many developing countries, seek decisions on those elements

where Parties concur (such as on provision of financial assistance, preventing deforestation, and

promoting technological advance), without requiring agreement on the more controversial

elements (such as binding GHG reductions by Non-Annex I4 Parties).

Many Parties, particularly those least developed and perceived as most vulnerable to climate

change, are calling for the Cancun meeting to set a mandate to negotiate a “comprehensive and

ambitious” agreement by the subsequent meetings of the Parties in late 2011, to be held in South

Africa.5 Other countries (e.g., Yemen, Cuba, and sometimes China, India, and Brazil) use

procedural tactics arguably acting to prevent such an agreement. To the extent that there might be

a consensus in favor of a new agreement, the Parties appear to have different conceptions of what

it should include. Nevertheless, many Parties are promoting one or two agreements, together, that

•

are legally binding;

•

establish a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol to begin in 2012;

•

include deeper emission cuts from the wealthiest countries than those pledged

under the Copenhagen Accord (see next section);

1

Official text available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.

For background on the international negotiations on climate change, see CRS Report R40001, A U.S.-centric

Chronology of the International Climate Change Negotiations, by Jane A. Leggett; CRS Report RL34260, Climate

Change: Issues Underlying Negotiations at the Bali Conference of Parties, by Susan R. Fletcher, Larry Parker, and

Jane A. Leggett; and CRS Report R41175, International Agreements on Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions, by

Emily C. Barbour.

3

Formalizing agreement on only some elements where consensus is near, such as financing, technology, and others—

and which developing countries seek—arguably would give away elements of leverage to gain agreement on other

issues, such as Non-Annex I GHG commitments, and reporting, monitoring and verification of actions, which many

developing countries resist. Many developing countries are unhappy with the stance that “nothing is agreed until

everything is agreed.”

4

“Annex I Parties” are those countries and regional economic integration organizations (i.e., the European Union)

listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC. This list includes the high income, industrialized countries, including those of the

former Soviet Union. “Non-Annex I Parties” are those Parties to the UNFCCC not listed in its Annex I. These are often

referred to as developing countries, although income levels overlap across some Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties. A

divisive element of negotiation is when and under what conditions a Non-Annex I Party may “graduate” to Annex I.

5

Discussions are under way possibly to hold the 2012 meeting in Qatar.

2

Congressional Research Service

1

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

•

include comparable but differentiated GHG emission reductions (below businessas-usual) from countries that do not already have targets, including the United

States (which is not a Party to the Kyoto Protocol), China, and other major GHG

emitters;

•

lock in specific amounts and mechanisms for international financing;6,7

•

ensure transparency of pledges, actions taken, and finance provided; and

•

provide for review of the implementation, objectives, and/or adequacy of the

agreement.

Whether to establish a quantitative objective for international cooperation is among the

contentious issues. Many, claiming support from the scientific literature, promote obligations

sufficient to contain future global temperature increases to 2o Celsius (C) or less. (Some, also

claiming scientific support, advocate for a temperature ceiling of 1.5oC or less.) Such temperature

objectives are associated with GHG reductions globally by 2050 of 50% or more below 1990

levels; many expect that GHG reductions of 80% or more from 1990 or 2005 levels should be

made by the United States and other high- to moderate-income countries, which have GHG

emissions per capita several times higher than the low-income countries.8 Most of the lowincome, large-emitting countries (such as China, India, and South Africa) oppose global targets,

presumably because of the implications for developing country shares of GHG reductions

necessary to achieve the global targets.

Different views on which countries should take on binding GHG emission commitments, and

when, are among the most challenging obstacles to the current negotiations. The United States,

the European Union (EU), the Small Island States,9 and other countries seek agreement on

differentiated and fair emission cuts simultaneously from all the world’s largest emitters, not only

those currently included in Annex I of the UNFCCC. China and others of these largest developing

country emitters, however, contend that the current Annex I Parties must make deeper GHG

reductions and provide funding to developing countries before the Non-Annex I Parties

“graduate” to legally binding obligations. These countries thus far have procedurally postponed

discussion of graduation to Annex I and binding GHG commitments. Russia and other economies

in transition (EITs) seek special treatment they received under the Kyoto Protocol to continue

under any new agreement, which many other Parties oppose.

6

The Copenhagen Accord included “Fast-Start” financial pledges of $30 billion during 2010-2012, and a long-term

goal of $100 billion annually by 2020 “in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on

implementation.” Funding was agreed to flow from public and private, bilateral and multilateral, and alternative

sources. While most Annex I Parties have indicated, and begun to provide, Fast-Start financial assistance, it is unclear

what the status of these agreements will be as the Copenhagen Accord was not adopted by the Parties. Still, a large

majority of stakeholders believe that follow-through on these financial pledges is essential to rebuilding trust of the

Annex I Parties (which have not fully met past pledges) and constructive engagement of developing countries.

7

On financial arrangements, see also CRS Report R41165, Global Environment Facility (GEF): An Overview, by

Richard K. Lattanzio and CRS Report R41302, Climate Investment Funds (CIFs): An Overview, by Richard K.

Lattanzio.

8

For comparison of GHG emissions across major countries, see CRS Report RL32721, Greenhouse Gas Emissions:

Perspectives on the Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations, by Larry Parker and John Blodgett.

9

Formally, the AOSIS group of 42 countries represents the Alliance of Small Island States and low-lying coastal

countries, and includes such diverse members as the Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Guinea-Bissau, the Marshall Islands,

Palau, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Saint Lucia.

Congressional Research Service

2

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Closely coupled with commitments to address GHG emissions are questions of how to increase

transparency and encourage compliance by Parties with those commitments. For Annex I Parties,

“monitoring, reporting, and verification” (MRV) already proceeds under guidelines and

procedures under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, although several issues and

enhancements are under negotiation. The Copenhagen Accord also provides for MRV of

financing provided by Annex I Parties and of the actions so financed in developing country

Parties. Because of objections by China and others of “intrusive” international processes, and

concerns about giving up sovereignty, the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)

that Non-Annex I Parties have pledged under the Copenhagen Accord would be subject to

International Consultation and Analysis (ICA)—yet to be defined. Most Parties see MRV and

ICA as supporting transparency and capacity-building, not punitive. Since 2009, however, China

and some other Non-Annex I Parties may have fallen back to pre-Copenhagen positions, that only

self-verification should be expected of developing countries. Some of the countries most

vulnerable to climate change have voiced more loudly that all major emitters must provide

transparency regarding their actions and impacts on GHG trajectories.

Many participants in the negotiations and observers have noted that, although some technical

progress has been made since 2009, recent meetings have included repetition of well-known and

intransigent positions. Many have pointed to these divisions, and the extreme difficulty of

reaching unanimous consent among 194 Parties in the best of circumstances, and suggest that the

United Nations may no longer be the sole or most productive forum for achieving international

cooperation to address climate change. (Discussed further below.)

United Nations Negotiations Run on Two Tracks

Negotiations on further cooperation to address climate change internationally have proceeded on

two official tracks since 2007.

•

The first track is under the Kyoto Protocol, which is subsidiary to the

Convention. Pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol, (developed) Parties listed in Annex I

made commitments to reduce GHG during 2008 to 2012. Now, all Parties are

negotiating to consider a second commitment period for the post-2012 era. The

United States does not participate in these negotiations because it is not a Party to

the Kyoto Protocol, and has consistently opposed becoming a Party to the Kyoto

Protocol.

•

The second track proceeds directly under the Convention, under the Bali Action

Plan.10 Negotiations pursuant to the Bali Action Plan focus on five primary

elements:

1. a “shared vision” for reducing global GHG emissions by around 2050;

2. mitigation of GHG emissions by developed and developing countries;

3. adaptation to impacts of climate change;

10

For more detail on the Bali Action Plan (and the Kyoto Protocol), see CRS Report RL33826, Climate Change: The

Kyoto Protocol, Bali “Action Plan,” and International Actions, by Jane A. Leggett.

Congressional Research Service

3

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

4. financial assistance to low-income countries; and

5. technology development and diffusion.

Requirements for reporting, monitoring, and verification (MRV) of GHG emissions, mitigation

actions, and other national policies to achieve commitments are a theme through several of these

five elements of negotiation.

The topics of negotiation overlap between the two tracks, and there is disagreement among

Parties as to whether agreement must be reached under one track before agreement can be

reached under the other. Many Parties express concern about potential incoherence between the

two tracks, and some urge that the two tracks converge into a single agreement. Many NonAnnex I Parties insist that, before they engage in discussion of their own GHG commitments, the

GHG reduction “numbers” be committed by Annex I Parties under an extension of the Kyoto

Protocol.

In 2009 and early 2010, many countries and observers anticipated that the Copenhagen Accord

had broken that impasse, by providing that all countries would pledge GHG reductions to be

compiled in non-binding documentation. However, a few Parties (e.g., Cuba, Peru, Venezuela)

blocked adoption of the Copenhagen Accord, 11 with the result that it has no legal status under the

UNFCCC. Further, many Non-Annex I Parties (including China) have since insisted that

negotiations proceed under the terms of the Bali Action Plan, rather than building from the

agreements reached in the Copenhagen Accord, thereby undermining the progress that many

Parties thought had been achieved in Copenhagen.

Table 1 identifies the major issues covered by the Kyoto Protocol, the Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), the Ad Hoc Group on

Long-Term Cooperation (AWG-LCA), and the Copenhagen Accord. The table summarizes the

status and major positions for each major topic of negotiation. Necessarily, the table provides a

simplified overview of the issues.

For two decades, the UNFCCC has been the formally agreed channel for addressing climate

change among sovereign states. Many analysts consider that it provides a common framework for

multi-national action while leaving implementation to those sovereign states. Within that

framework, nations and other Parties (i.e., the European Union) decide, establish the means,

monitor, and report on how they fulfill their obligations. The reporting with review by experts and

the multi-national forum helps to support compliance by the Parties, along with dispute resolution

and other non-compliance mechanisms. Nonetheless, China, Egypt, and a few other countries

have protested proposals to set new reporting, monitoring, and verification (MRV) guidelines for

them, guidelines that would approach those for the Annex I Parties, on the grounds that these

could undermine their national sovereignty. However, the current impasse on MRV and several

additional key issues, especially regarding how a global effort should be distributed and how

transparency of efforts and results should be ensured, has raised questions about the efficacy of

the UNFCCC over the coming years.

11

A summary of the Copenhagen Accord and the meeting in Copenhagen is available in CRS Report R40001, A U.S.centric Chronology of the International Climate Change Negotiations, by Jane A. Leggett.

Congressional Research Service

4

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Simultaneously, many observers underscore that most actions to mitigate climate change and to

reduce vulnerability must be taken by local entities and private sector organizations.

Representatives and advocates for the rights of indigenous populations and local communities had

pressed for greater voice in how climate change will be addressed. Certain sectoral

representatives, for example, of agricultural producers in developing countries, have also become

more engaged in seeking special provisions under any new agreement, while the international

aviation and maritime sectors gained provisions in the Kyoto Protocol that leave accord on their

GHG mitigation to their own international fora, the International Civilian Aviation Organization

and the International Maritime Organization, respectively (without reaching agreement on

appropriate obligations). Governments of many municipalities around the world have formed

their own organizations to commit to and support GHG mitigation and adaptation efforts. These

are a few examples of the multiplicity of formal efforts now being pursued internationally. If the

UNFCCC processes remain at virtual impasse, the array of distributed efforts may expand.

Questions About the Efficacy of the U.N. Forum

Some observers of the negotiations under the United Nations, including some government

officials, question whether the U.N. process will be able to support future progress on cooperation

to address climate change. These observers note the procedural and substantive difficulties

encountered in the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties in 2009, as well as the broader

challenge of reaching consensus among the 194 Parties to the UNFCCC, in the absence of agreed

rules that would allow agreement by qualified majority. 12

The flagging of progress under the United Nations is partly due to an apparent stalemate among

key Parties and groups of Parties on major elements of cooperation. For example, in meetings in

Tianjin, China, in October 2010, a number of delegates noted that much discussion has devolved

into repeated restatement of well-known positions, although minor movements were also visible.

The challenges have been apparent since the mid-1990s, however, as Parties were unable to agree

on rules for reaching agreement other than unanimous consensus. Consequently, it has been

possible for only one or a few countries to obstruct formal agreement on many issues in the

negotiations.

Some suggest that further development of international climate change cooperation may be more

successful, at least over the next few years, through bilateral agreements (e.g., the U.S.-China

Strategic and Economic Dialogue), regional arrangements, alternative and smaller multilateral

processes (e.g., the G-20), and private actions. For example, the Group of 20 (G-20) Finance

Ministers agreed in 2009 to end subsidies to fossil fuels (although independent observers assert

that no significant reductions have been achieved). In addition, the European Union, Japan,

Norway, and many other countries have well-established arrangements with China. These nations

anticipate bilateral activities to help generate emissions trade that will enhance their technological

competitiveness, while also helping those Annex I Parties to comply with their commitments

under the Kyoto Protocol.

12

See also CRS Report R41175, International Agreements on Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions, by Emily C.

Barbour, which summarizes, “Unlike the adoption of amendments and annexes, the UNFCCC does not provide a rule

for the adoption of protocols. The parties have, moreover, failed to reach an agreement on a voting rule in this context

despite years of trying. In the absence of an agreed upon rule for the number of votes necessary to adopt a protocol,

protocols are adopted by consensus.”

Congressional Research Service

5

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Interest in pursuing alternative vehicles for cooperation may be, in part, because of doubts that

some countries (including the United States, China, Japan, and Australia) will follow through

with their official pledges under the UNFCCC for GHG mitigation and financing. Certainly, the

U.S. decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol has encouraged such skepticism.

Some observers, including businesses that seek greater certainty in their investment

environments, now propose that an agreement among three to four countries, including the United

States, the European Union, and China, would be the most productive next step. A growing

number of observers suggest that using a greater multiplicity of avenues to address climate

change could be most productive, with a variety of organizations taking charge in the domain to

which it is best suited. Such a strategy could include such efforts as the Group of 20 Finance

Ministers’ commitment to end subsidies for fossil fuels,13 or the International Energy Agency’s

Implementing Agreement to support multi-national technology research. 14 (There is little

evidence to suggest that the commitment to phase out subsidies is being achieved, however,

leaving open the question of whether using more channels to address climate change will increase

efficacy.)

Some observers are skeptical that anthropogenic15 emissions of GHG are leading to significantly

adverse climate change. 16 Others are unconvinced that global agreement can be reached and

carried out. Still others object to giving greater authority to a supra-national (or national)

organization, even to address global issues, or suspect that the United Nations and other

institutions may be more concerned with enhancing their own influence and resources than with

reducing the risks of climate change.17

The outcome of the next meeting of the Conference of the Parties may corral greater cooperation

under the UNFCCC, or incite greater diffusion of efforts to alternative fora. While the prospects

for cooperative action may increase by diversifying the multilateral vehicles, achieving

comprehensive and least-cost arrangements may be diminished.

Not Just Carbon from Energy

While the UNFCCC emphasized carbon dioxide and its relationship to climate change, it

identified a broader range of “greenhouse gases (GHG).” Under the Kyoto Protocol, the set of

gases to be counted in Parties’ emissions, and for compliance with the targets, included carbon

dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),

perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)—sometimes referred to as the “basket of

six” greenhouse gases. The HFC, PFC and SF6 are almost entirely synthetically produced, not

13

The initial agreement can be found at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm. Two progress

reports can be found at http://priceofoil.org/2010/11/08/g20-fossil-fuel-report/, from two environmentally oriented

groups, and at http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33713_45233017_1_1_1_1,00.html, from the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

14

For an index of IEA’s multilateral technology Initiatives, see http://www.iea.org/techno/index.asp.

15

Human-generated.

16

China Daily has reported, for example, about views of skeptics in China: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/201002/03/content_9418037.htm.

17

See, for example, Michael Levi, “The UN Doesn’t Understand Climate Change,” Council on Foreign Relations,

September 17, 2010.

Congressional Research Service

6

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

occurring naturally in significant quantities. Some were created as substitutes for other

compounds phased out by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and

subsequent amendments to it. Additional new chemicals are manufactured today that, although

present in minute quantities, could have important effects on the atmosphere and climate,

especially because many stay in the atmosphere for thousands to tens of thousands of years.

In the current negotiations, proposals include an expanded set of GHG, particularly new

synthetically produced compounds.18 Currently listed for potential inclusion in an amendment to

the Kyoto Protocol are

•

perfluorinated compounds, including SF6, nitrogen trifluoride(NF3), and

trifluoromethyl sulfur pentafluoride (SF5CF3);

•

fluorinated ethers (HFEs); and

•

perfluoropolyethers, such as perfluoropolymethylisopropyl ether (PFPMIE).

Despite controversy and concerns for unreliable accounting, the Kyoto Protocol allowed credit

for reducing emissions from deforestation and other land use changes, and for removals of carbon

from the atmosphere due to enhanced photosynthesis. However, the language was limited and

challenging to implement without creating perverse incentives. Since then, technical analysis and

negotiations have sought to improve methods and technologies for accounting for “land use, land

use change, and forestry” (LULUCF) and to build new international partnerships and programs to

“reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” and to improve conservation

(REDD+). While technical issues remain to be resolved, LULUCF and REDD+ negotiations have

made progress, and a decision to codify those agreements could be decided as early as the Cancun

meeting or, more likely, as part of a more comprehensive and “balanced package” of agreements,

possibly at the South Africa Conference of the Parties in 2011.

Congressional Interests

Some Members of Congress do not consider climate change science to be sound or sufficiently

advanced to merit the costs of GHG mitigation actions, domestically or internationally. Even

among Members who view human-induced climate change as a significant risk, many are

concerned with the goals and obligations that a treaty or other form of agreement might embody.

Under the Copenhagen Accord, which is a political (not legal) commitment, President Obama

pledged to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 “in conformity with

anticipated U.S. energy and climate legislation, recognizing that the final target will be reported

to the Secretariat in light of enacted legislation.” The Copenhagen Accord also included pledges

of financing from the developed countries in aggregate of $30 billion during 2010 to 2012, and

aiming at $100 billion annually by 2020, with funds to come from both public and private

sources.

18

See, for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global

Climate System: Issues Related to Hydrofluorocarbons and Perfluorocarbons, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Congressional Research Service

7

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Some Members promote ambitious U.S. leadership internationally: beyond diplomatic

advantages, they view the United States as bearing exceptional responsibility for climate change,

having contributed more emissions than any other nation to the enhanced GHG concentrations in

the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution. In 2005, U.S. GHG emissions per capita were

more than three times the world average, and almost fives times that of developing countries. 19

Some may also note that the United States is wealthier and hence better able to bear the costs of

GHG mitigation than most other countries, and/or that there could be commercial and trade

advantages to leading technological changes. Among the Members who might support concerted

international action to address climate change, particular concerns regard parity of actions across

Parties, and potential effects on trade competitiveness among countries.

For U.S. legislators, related issues include

•

the compatibility of any international agreement with U.S. domestic policies and

laws;

•

consistency and potential reinforcement of other major policy goals (e.g., energy

security, development assistance);

•

the adequacy of appropriations, fiscal measures, and programs to achieve any

commitments under the agreement;

•

implications for employment, technological advance, and trade; and

•

the desirable form of the agreement and related requirements.

While the Constitution gives authority to negotiate treaties to the President, any treaty would need

the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification before it could be legally binding on the

United States.

While the 111th Congress held many hearings and debated bills addressing aspects of climate

change internationally, it remains to be seen the level of priority and specific questions to be

raised by the 112th Congress.

19

According to data in the World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, extracted November 16, 2010.

http://cait.wri.org/.

Congressional Research Service

8

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Table 1. Comparison of International Issues by Agreement or Negotiating Forum

(as of November 2010)

Topic of

Negotiation

Nature of

Agreement

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

Political, not legally binding. “Noted,”

not accepted, by the UNFCCC

Parties, so no formal status under the

UNFCCC.

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Intended to be legally binding.

Intended to be legally binding.

Many developed countries seek to

coordinate both LCA and KP

negotiating tracks, and some

developing countries would possibly

support a “common space” or limited

joint discussions. United States says

this is inappropriate as it is not a KP

Party.

Many developed countries seek to

coordinate both LCA and KP

negotiating tracks, and some

developing countries would

possibly support a “common space”

or limited joint discussions. United

States says this is inappropriate as it

is not a KP Party. Small Island

States advocate using KP as

foundation for a single agreement

with global commitments.

Some Parties wish to formalize

decisions on those issues with

general agreement (technology,

financing, REDD+c). United States

and others seek “balanced package”

across all issues, especially to include

NA1g commitments and MRV.h

Share

Vision/LongTerm Objective

“Deep cuts” in global emissions are

required “with a view to ... hold the

increase in global temperature below

2o C.”

Parties do not agree on the purpose

or scope. Some conceive it as setting

a long-term ceiling on global

temperature rise (i.e., <2oC or

<1.5oC) or common GHG reduction

goal (e.g., 50% below 1990 levels).

Some such “visions” quantitatively

require GHG reductions by NAIg

Parties.

Some developing country proposals

would expand scope to cover almost

all topics under negotiation.

China and Bolivia propose language

to allocate a global carbon cap, which

United States and others oppose.

CRS-9

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

Not proposed.

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

Became legally binding on

Parties when it entered into

force in 2005. (United States is

not a Party.)

“In order to promote

sustainable development.”

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Mitigation by

Developed

Countries

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

Annex I Partiesd report GHG

mitigation targets for 2020 or

mitigation actions. Deadline was

February 1, 2010. Reports compiled

in non-binding documentation.

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Proposals for QELROSe for

developed countries range from

levels of Copenhagen Accord

pledges, to at least 45% below 1990

levels by 2020. Overlap with

discussion in AWG-KP poses

problems.

Some Parties propose to inscribe all

Parties’ pledges under the

Copenhagen Accord in a decision by

the Conference of the Parties in

2010. Others, notably some NAI

Parties, would have only pledges by

AI Parties included in any such

decision, or only that of the United

States, which is not a Party to the

Kyoto Protocol. Still others are

concerned that including pledges in a

decision in 2010 could make a later,

binding agreement redundant and

undermine further work under the

AWG-LCA.

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

One option is a “top-down”

aggregate target to be allocated

among AI Parties. The “bottom-up”

option would transform pledges

made under the Copenhagen

Accord into new QELROS,e though

assumptions and rules need

clarification, especially on

accounting of forest-related carbon

and use of market mechanisms.

Most NAI Parties consider AI

Parties’ pledges inadequate, seeking

greater “ambition”—as much as

45% below 1990 levels by 2020.

Yemen (G-77), China, India,

Venezuela, and others block

“graduation” of additional Parties

into abatement commitments.

Japan and others insist NAI Parties

step up to commitments as pledged

by leaders in Copenhagen.

Russia and other economies in

transition (EITs) seek to carry over

unused Assigned Amount Units

from first commitment period, and

to continue special status with less

strenuous QELROS than other AI

Parties.

Negotiations are pressured to

avoid a gap between the end of the

first commitment period in 2012

and the beginning of any new

commitment period. However,

New Zealand and Russia oppose a

second commitment period

without global participation.

CRS-10

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

UNFCCC AI Parties agreed

collectively to reduce their

GHG emissions by at least 5%

below 1990 levels during the

period 2008-2012, and specific

“assigned amounts” are listed

for each Party in Annex B.

Russia and some other

economies in transition have

targets higher than their

projected (and current)

emissions.

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Monitoring,

Reporting, and

Verification

(MRV) for

Developed

Parties

Under UNFCCC, AI Parties report

GHG inventories annually and

National Communications every five

years, using agreed reporting

guidelines.f

Many Parties support using and

enhancing existing KP provisions for

MRV, and to apply to United States.

Mitigation by

Developing

Countries

Non-Annex I Partiesg report

Nationally Appropriate Mitigation

Actions (NAMA) before February 1,

2010, compiled in non-binding

documentation. Least Developed

Countries and small island developing

states become a new mitigation

grouping that may identify actions

voluntarily and with financial support.

Most Annex I Parties insist that GHG

abatement commitments expand to

be “common” to all major emitters

and moderate income countries.

They advocate compiling

Copenhagen pledges into new

agreement.

CRS-11

United States stresses that MRV for

developed country Parties must exist

in tandem with ICAi for developing

country Parties.

China, India, Brazil, and others argue

this contradicts the “differentiated

responsibilities” principle in the

UNFCCC.

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

MRV developed and applied under

the KP would be enhanced,

especially for reporting on

emissions and sequestration related

to Land Use, Land Use Change, and

Forestry (LULUCF).

Requires national systems for

GHG emission and removal

estimation, according to

agreed methods. Annual GHG

inventories and supplemental

information must demonstrate

compliance with

commitments. Verification by

expert review teams and

review of National

Communications, which

periodically are in-country.

Many AI Parties seek progress on

GHG abatement commitments

under the AWG-LCA before

agreeing on a second commitment

period for AI Parties under this

track.

None specified, although all

Parties to the UNFCCC share

general obligations under Art.

4, paragraph 1, with “common

but differentiated

responsibilities,” taking into

account their specific national

and regional development

priorities, objectives, and

circumstances.

Many NAI Parties have blocked any

discussion of NAI abatement

commitments until they are

satisfied with the AI commitments.

This divide has led to procedural

obstacles for both tracks of

negotiation. As a result, some

Parties (New Zealand, Australia,

Small Island States, South Africa)

have begun to seek convergence of

the two negotiating tracks under a

single agreement, or as two

agreements under a single umbrella

agreement.

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Monitoring,

Reporting, and

Verification

(MRV) for

Developing

Country Parties

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

Non-Annex I Parties submit National

Communications bi-annually,

including reports on domestic MRV

of implementation of their mitigation

actions. National Communications

will be subject to international

consultations and analysis (ICA)i with

respect for national sovereignty.

Mitigation actions (as well as

technology, financing and capacitybuilding) supported by international

finance are subject to international

MRV.

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Some propose a registry of

developing countries’ Nationally

Appropriate Mitigation Actions

(NAMAs); India and others support a

NAMA Registry and review only for

actions supported by international

funding.

China and many NAI Parties state

that international scrutiny of their

domestic actions is counter to the

UNFCCC and unacceptable. China

claims no need for an overall MRV

framework or new MRV institutions.

Saudi Arabia argues for self-review.

South Africa, Korea, United States,

and others emphasize facilitative

process, building transparency and

capacity through multi-lateral

reviews.

United States and Australia

emphasize need to operationalize

MRV in 2010. United States, Norway,

Japan, Turkey, and others propose

that the 2006 GHG guidelines

adopted by the Parties apply to all

Parties, but recognizing differences in

capabilities, and possibly adjusting

frequencies of reporting.

Brazil, G-77, and others stress close

linkage between MRV of mitigation

actions and MRV of financial support

by developed countries.

CRS-12

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

Not under discussion.

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

None specified. (Under the

UNFCCC, all Parties must

report GHG inventories. But

some Non-Annex I Parties

have blocked agreement on

the periodicity of reporting

and terms of review for NonAnnex I Parties.)

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Market

Mechanisms

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

Agreement to use multiple

approaches, including markets, to

promote mitigation actions.

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Many countries want use of

international market mechanisms to

be smaller than domestic GHGj

mitigation.

United States and Japan seek language

to allow emission offsets not

generated under the CDM, while

China and others try to block this.

EU proposes to allow new market

mechanisms; opposed by Bolivia,

Egypt, and others.

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

Many Parties want to continue the

KP architecture of market

mechanisms established. Reforms

are sought since mechanisms have

not been used as much as

anticipated, and have not engaged

most of the Non-Annex I Parties.

Parties expect to use mechanisms

to meet QELROS,e and want rules

defined before finalizing

commitments. Some Parties fear

market mechanisms demotivate

domestic GHG reductions or shift

abatement responsibilities to

developing countries.

Proposals include sectoral

emissions trading between AI and

NAI Parties. (See Sectoral

Approaches.)

CRS-13

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

Establishes three market

mechanisms for crediting

GHG reductions: (1)

Emissions Trading allows

transfer of “assigned amounts”

among Annex I Parties; (2)

Joint Implementation allows

transfer of project-based GHG

“emission reduction units”

across Annex I Parties; (3) the

Clean Development

Mechanism allows crediting of

“certified emission reductions”

created in non-Annex I

countries if approved by the

Executive Board.

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Response

Measures

(referring to

provisions

concerning impacts

of GHG mitigation

response measures

on other

countries)

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

No mention.

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Options might prohibit border

measures against goods from any

developing country Parties or only if

measures are arbitrary or unjustified

discrimination in trade. Other

options echo existing UNFCCC

language.

Brazil and China propose language

that would require international

consensus for any Party to set GHG

mitigation measures that might have

any impact on developing country

exports or global trade. United States

and EU oppose.

Some propose a new forum for

identifying and addressing adverse

impacts on other Parties. Others

consider existing fora to suffice.

CRS-14

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

Debate continues over the means

and extent to which to Annex I

Parties should address potential

economic, social, and

environmental consequences of

their climate change policies on

other Parties. Argentina, Saudi

Arabia, Sudan, China and others

push for a new forum to address

compliance by AI Parties, while

most A1 Parties point out that

existing mechanisms already

perform that function.

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

Annex I Parties strive to

implement policies in such a

way as to minimize adverse

effects, including adverse

effects of climate change, on

international trade, and social,

environmental and economic

impacts on other Parties,

especially developing country

Parties.

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Financing

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

“Fast-Start” pledges of $30 billion

during 2010-2012, and a long-term

goal of $100 billion annually by 2020

“in the context of meaningful

mitigation actions and transparency

on implementation.” Funding will

come from public and private,

bilateral and multilateral, and

alternative sources. Some developing

countries do not want to count

financing that flows through

emissions trading markets, however.

Calls for financing to support

mitigation, adaptation, REDD-plus,

technology development and transfer,

and capacity building.

Establishment of the Copenhagen

Green Climate Fund under the

Global Environment Facility (GEF),

managed by the World Bank to

support international financing.

A Secretary-General’s High Level

Advisory Group on Climate Change

Financing (AGF) released in

November 2010 a report identifying

options to raise the $100 billion of

long-term financing sought under the

Copenhagen Accord. It concludes

raising $100 billion is feasible and

emphasizes putting a price on carbon,

such as carbon taxes on international

bunker fuels, carbon trading markets,

and public sources, such as a shift

away from fossil fuel subsidies.

CRS-15

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

General agreement exists to establish

a new fund with a board, trustee, and

secretariat. The fund should be

accountable to the COP.

G-77 wants a new mechanism

managed by the COP, giving more

weight to developing country votes

than if managed by the World Bank

or other options preferred by the AI

Parties.

Most AI Parties expect most financing

to come from private sector via

some kinds of market mechanisms,

with a minor portion via foreign aid

and other public funds. G-77 seek

public funding, believing it is more

reliable and easier to direct than

private investment. Some consider

funding through private markets to

be a transfer of responsibility from

developed to developing countries.

Many seek equal financing attention

to adaptation and GHG mitigation.

Some would direct financing to Least

Developed Countries and those most

vulnerable to climate change. Others

want all developing countries treated

equally.

Some Parties propose quantity of

financing should be 1.5% of each

Annex I Party’s GDP.

Options for MRV of financing include

use of current mechanisms, new

guidelines.

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

No specific provisions for financing.

The market mechanisms, however,

constitute incentives for the private

sector to finance least-cost GHG

abatement to sell as credits, such as

under the Clean Development

Mechanism.

Flows of financing under the KP

market mechanisms have been

much smaller than anticipated.

They have been associated with

investments in only a few

developing countries, primarily

China.

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

The Protocol’s “mechanisms”

result in financing for GHG

reductions through sale (or

other terms of transfer) of

assigned amounts, emission

reduction units, or certified

emission reductions. The

generated financing has been

lower than anticipated for

several reasons, including nonparticipation of the United

States in the Kyoto Protocol,

and high transaction costs

under the Clean Development

Mechanism.

A share of the proceeds of

GHG credits under the Clean

Development Mechanism are

earmarked to support

adaptation in low-income

countries.

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Adaptation

Technology

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Developed countries shall provide

adequate, predictable and sustainable

financial resources, technology and

capacity-building to support

adaptation action in developing

countries.

Attention to needs for adaptation is

higher than in other negotiations, and

all Parties support it generally.

Disagreement over institutional

arrangements to support it.

Establishment of a Technology

Mechanism to “accelerate technology

development and transfer ... ” and to

be “guided by a country-driven

approach.”

Near consensus to establish a

Climate Technology Centre (CTC)

and Technology Executive

Committee (TEC), with options for

relationships with, inter alia, existing

regional technology centers. The

Copenhagen Green Climate Fund

would be one source of funding.

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

Not under negotiation.

General commitments by all

Parties to support adaptation

to climate change.

Not under negotiation.

General commitments only.

G-77 and China advocate an

Adaptation Committee, to develop

guidelines, review implementation,

and ensure equitable funding for

developing countries. Other

countries propose to identify

adaptation functions that could be

met by existing institutions and

possibly a new entity.

Views are divided on treatment of

Intellectual Property and on links to

market mechanisms and other

financing mechanisms.

CRS-16

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

CapacityBuilding

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

Included at target for financing.

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Some NAI Parties seek separate

mechanisms and funding to support

capacity-building; many AI Parties

advocate that capacity-building be

treated as a component of mitigation,

adaptation, and technology support.

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

Not under negotiation.

General commitments only.

Parties debate treatment of

accounting for forest management,

harvested wood products, and

force majeure, as well as the

reference levels for measuring

sequestration or emissions.

Net changes in certain land

use emissions or removals are

counted with or offset GHG

emissions.

Many view capacity-building as

unlikely to draw much private

funding, and so a major target for

public financing.

Forest Carbon/

Reducing

Emissions from

Deforestation

and Forest

Degradation,

and Forest

Conservation

(REDD+)c

Immediate establishment of a

mechanism including REDD-plus, to

enable mobilization of international

financing.

United States proposes that all

credible GHG reductions be

countable.

Many Parties support fast-start

(public) funding to support

“readiness” capacity-building, and

market-type financing for high quality

emission reductions.

Resistance to address REDD+ comes

especially from Bolivia and Saudi

Arabia.

CRS-17

Whether to include emissions

impacts of net change in wetlands is

explored.

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Other Sectoral

Approaches

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

No mention.

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Bunker fuels: Addressing

international aviation and maritime

emissions (bunker fuels), and

agriculture. Some advocate global

sectoral targets for GHG reductions,

with EU proposing cuts of 10% for

aviation and 20% for shipping below

2005 levels. On bunker fuels, some

Non-Annex I Parties seek

“differentiated” treatment.

United States, Canada, Japan, Norway

call for medium- and long-term goals

to be set by ICAO and IMO, not to

be addressed under UNFCCC.

Proposals by some Parties include

setting taxes on emissions from

bunker fuels to motivate reductions

and to generate revenues for

international finance. (See Financing.)

Agriculture: With impetus from

some agricultural groups,

negotiations consider options to

account for reduction of agricultural

emissions, sequestration; research on

technologies and management

systems; funding for monitoring;

“innovative payment mechanisms”;

and funding to support mitigation and

adaptation in the context of “propoor development.”

CRS-18

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

Bunker Fuels: Emissions from

aviation and maritime bunker fuels

were excluded from the KP and

delegated to resolution by the

International Civil Aviation

Organization and the International

Maritime Organization. Neither

forum has reached agreement on

how to address bunker fuel

emissions, beyond aspirational

efficiency goals. Consequently, the

EU proposes to include these

emissions in its Emission Trading

Scheme, opposed by the United

States and other countries, the

vehicles of which would be subject

to the EU rules within its

territories.

Proposal for voluntary sectoral

“emission thresholds” in NAI

Parties; if a Party’s emissions are

below such threshold, it may trade

such units that may be used for

compliance by AI Parties (i.e.,

sectoral emissions trading).

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

Emissions from aviation and

marine bunker fuels are

excluded from national

targets, with abatement

measures to be pursued the

International Civil Aviation

Organization (ICAO) and the

International Maritime

Organization (IMO). No

binding agreements have been

reached.

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Topic of

Negotiation

Future Reviews

and Possible

Revisions of

Commitments

Copenhagen Accord (2010)a

Assessment of the Copenhagen

Accord, to be completed by 2015,

that would include consideration of

strengthening the “long-term goal” of

the Accord.

Ad Hoc Group on Long Term

Cooperation (AWG-LCA)

(Under the UNFCCC)

Ad Hoc Group on Further

Commitments for Annex I

Parties Under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under

the Kyoto Protocol - KP)

Kyoto Protocol (1997)b

Proposals for future reviews and

revisions include options for lowering

the target for long-term temperature

change; criteria for reviews; and

whether reviews should include

actions by NAI Parties in addition to

AI Party actions and financing.

Calls for comprehensive reviews of

the KP and ensuing “appropriate

action.” First review to begin by

2014 and conclude by 2016.

Further reviews periodically, with 4

years as the sole current proposal,

unless the Parties decide otherwise.

The first review took place at

the 2nd meeting of the

Conference of the Parties

serving as the Meeting of the

Parties to the Protocol, in

2006. To take place

periodically thereafter.

First review would begin by 2013 and

be conducted or concluded in 2015,

with subsequent reviews every five

years.

Source: CRS.

a.

The text of the Copenhagen Accord is available at http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php.

b.

The text of the Kyoto Protocol is available at http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33713_45233017_1_1_1_1,00.html.

c.

REDD+ is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Conservation, and refers to policies, measures, partnerships, and financing that are

intended to slow deforestation and land degradation and provide for financing through, inter alia, market-like mechanisms.

d.

“Annex I Parties” (AI Parties) are those countries and regional economic integration organizations (i.e., the European Union) listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC. This

list includes the high income, industrialized countries, including those of the former Soviet Union.

e.

QELROS are Quantitative Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives, or “the numbers” for Parties’ GHG reduction commitments embodied in the Kyoto Protocol

and any new agreement.

f.

These provisions exist under the UNFCCC and so are not included in the Copenhagen Accord, but are noted in this table because of their relevance to on-going

negotiations.

g.

“Non-Annex I Parties” (NAI Parties) are those Parties to the UNFCCC not listed in its Annex I. These are often referred to as developing countries, although income

levels overlap across some Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties. A divisive element of negotiation is when and under what conditions a Non-Annex I Party may

“graduate” to Annex I.

h.

MRV is Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification, and may apply to GHG abatement and/or financing.

i.

“International Consultation and Analysis” (ICA) is the phrase embodied in the Copenhagen Accord referring to international procedures for consideration of

developing countries’ mitigation actions that are not financed internationally.

j.

GHG are greenhouse gases.

CRS-19

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Author Contact Information

Jane A. Leggett

Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy

jaleggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-9525

Congressional Research Service

20