Unintended Acceleration in Passenger Vehicles

Congressional research reportApr 26, 2010

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Unintended Acceleration in

Passenger Vehicles

Suzanne M. Kirchhoff

Analyst in Industrial Organization and Business

David Randall Peterman

Analyst in Transportation Policy

April 26, 2010

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

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CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Unintended Acceleration in Passenger Vehicles

Summary

Congress is considering legislation to strengthen federal regulation of auto safety, in response to

hundreds of reported accidents, and more than 50 fatalities, that may be linked to sudden

acceleration in certain makes of Toyota and Lexus vehicles. Toyota, under pressure from the

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), has recalled more than 6 million

autos in the United States, and for a time stopped production of certain new-model vehicles in an

effort to address the problems—one of the largest such efforts in recent history. But lawmakers

and consumer advocates say federal oversight has been inadequate, given that NHTSA began

investigating reports of sudden acceleration in certain Toyotas in 2002. Internal corporate

documents indicate that Toyota was slow to address other vehicle quality concerns. NHTSA in

April 2010 fined Toyota $16.375 million, the maximum allowed by law, for failing to quickly

notify the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) of an accelerator pedal defect in some cars.

Adding to the complexity of the situation is continuing uncertainty about the cause of the Toyota

incidents. Despite the recalls, a series of NHTSA investigations, and internal tests by Toyota

engineers since 2002, there is not a consensus as to whether reported incidents of sudden

acceleration have been caused by sticking accelerator pedals, poorly designed floor mats, driver

error, glitches in the electronic throttle systems, or some combination of factors. DOT officials

have expanded their investigation into Toyota operations, are taking a broad look at the

increasingly complex electronics in all U.S. automobiles, and may recommend tougher standards

for vehicles with electronic accelerators. At the same time, Toyota has announced its own

stepped-up safety initiatives, including installing brake-override software (a system that gives

priority to braking when the brake and accelerator are depressed at the same time) in some

recalled and new-model cars, setting up an outside investigative panel headed by former

Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater, and changing its corporate structure.

Lawmakers are considering a variety of issues as they craft a possible legislative response to the

problems. Some Members of Congress are concerned that NHTSA did not conduct timely,

thorough investigations of consumer complaints about Toyota vehicles and are examining

whether the agency has sufficient staff and expertise, particularly in electrical and software

engineering, to keep pace with the increasing complexity of autos. NHTSA has two electrical

engineers on staff. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood has enlisted NASA engineers to

assist NHTSA with its review.

Another issue is whether the 2000 TREAD Act, enacted in response to deaths and accidents

linked to Firestone tires, has been effective. The act was designed to spur early warning of safety

concerns, compel auto manufacturers to expeditiously address problems, and improve consumer

information. The number of automotive recalls has increased since the TREAD Act was passed,

but most of the recalls are voluntary, in part due to the lengthy legal process required in

mandating a recall. Further, the DOT’s $16.375 million fine against Toyota is based on the DOT’s

determination that the company did not comply with the TREAD Act requirements to quickly

report defects. Congress is also examining whether Toyota problems are signs of broader issues in

the automobile industry. Electronics and software in automobiles account for as much as 40% of

the cost of producing a car, and the systems are advancing to the point that they are used to

control more essential safety features. U.S. and foreign automakers carry out extensive testing of

software and electronics based on industry guidelines and their own, internal standards. The

quality control system is less rigorous than for other areas of the transportation sector, however,

such as aviation.

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Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

NHTSA ................................................................................................................................2

Federal Oversight of Auto Safety ................................................................................................3

Sudden Acceleration Complaints...........................................................................................5

Audi Historical Precedents ....................................................................................................5

Toyota-Related Complaints Since 2000 .................................................................................7

NHTSA Response to Toyota Complaints ...............................................................................8

Toyota Overview.........................................................................................................................9

Toyota Corporate Structure ................................................................................................. 10

Black Box Availability ........................................................................................................ 12

Recall Impact on Toyota Sales............................................................................................. 12

Toyota Lobbying................................................................................................................. 13

Policy Issues and the Congressional Response........................................................................... 14

Does NHTSA Have Enough Resources for Defects Investigation?....................................... 14

Is the Toyota Issue a Sign of Broader Problems Within the Auto Industry? .......................... 16

Are Electronics and Software Testing Stringent Enough?..................................................... 17

Electronics .................................................................................................................... 17

Software ....................................................................................................................... 18

Electronic Throttle Problems ......................................................................................... 20

Congressional Options .............................................................................................................. 22

Figures

Figure 1. Toyota U.S. Auto Market Growth ............................................................................... 10

Figure A-1. ARTEMIS Information Inputs................................................................................. 25

Figure B-1. ODI Defects Investigation Process.......................................................................... 27

Tables

Table 1. Complaints of Unintended Acceleration in Selected Brands............................................7

Table 2. Scale of Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration Incidents.......................................... 16

Table 3. Motor Vehicles and Equipment Defect Recall Trends ................................................... 17

Table B-1. Average Number of Issues Evaluated and Presented Per ODI Staff Member ............. 28

Appendixes

Appendix A. NHTSA and the TREAD Act ................................................................................ 23

Appendix B. NHTSA’s Defects Investigation Process................................................................ 26

Appendix C. Toyota Sudden Acceleration Timeline ................................................................... 31

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Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 33

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Introduction

In August 2009, a California Highway Patrol officer was driving family members in a 2009 Lexus

ES350 rental car when it accelerated to a high speed. The driver was not able to slow the car; it

clipped another vehicle and careened off the road into a ravine, killing all four occupants. A

passenger called 9-1-1 prior to the crash; the resulting recording captured the harrowing final

seconds of the incident. The combination of the 9-1-1 audio and the driver’s presumed driving

expertise focused a great deal of attention on the accident and the broader issue of sudden

unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), an operating agency within the

Department of Transportation (DOT) with chief responsibility for ensuring automobile safety, has

received hundreds of consumer complaints about unintended acceleration in Toyotas going back

at least to 2000. These complaints are not all the same; included within the general

characterization of “sudden unintended acceleration” are instances where (1) a vehicle suddenly

accelerates without any initiative by the driver, (2) a vehicle maintains its speed or continues to

accelerate after a driver has released the accelerator pedal, and (3) a vehicle accelerates and the

driver is unable to stop the vehicle by braking.

NHTSA has conducted eight examinations, including three investigations, of unexpected

acceleration in Toyotas1 during the past eight years. Toyota also has carried out its own internal

studies. It was not until recently, however, that the NHTSA and Toyota investigations spurred

major action. Toyota in 2007 issued a recall to address a body trim issue in Toyota Siennas that

could interfere with the accelerator pedal. Since October 2009, Toyota has recalled more than 6

million Corolla, Camry, and Lexus ES model vehicles in the United States in an effort to remedy

two defects identified as causing acceleration incidents: entrapment of the accelerator pedal by

floor mats, and “sticking” accelerator pedals (i.e., a tendency for some accelerator pedals to return

slowly after being released).2 Toyota also temporarily stopped production of eight types of

vehicles. 3 Still, the recalls have not resolved all the reported cases of unexpected acceleration.

Further, some vehicle owners have complained of problems even after Toyota has reworked their

accelerators as part of its recalls. Starting in February 2010, Congress began a series of hearings

to look into the issue, Toyota’s actions, and NHTSA’s authority, resources, and response to this

issue.

The probe has expanded beyond potential problems in Toyota vehicles. Secretary of

Transportation Ray LaHood announced on March 30, 2010, that the DOT had asked the National

Academy of Sciences (NAS) to investigate unintended acceleration and electronic vehicle

Ray LaHood, Secretary of Transportation, Testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and

Transportation, March 2, 2010, http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=4dc57b2f-bd10-475d84d7-d7f3759f1978.

Toyota Motor Sales, “Customer FAQS Regarding the Sticking Accelerator Pedal and Floor Mat Pedal Entrapment

Recalls,” Press Release, February 3, 2010, http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/customer-faqs-regarding-the-sticking153495.aspx. Toyota initially recalled 3.8 million vehicles in October, 2009 for issues relating to brake pedal

entrapment, but expanded the recall to another 1.1 million vehicles in January 2010. Toyota on January 21 recalled 2.3

million vehicles to repair potentially sticky accelerator pedals. A number of cars were recalled for both pedal

entrapment and sticky pedal issues.

Toyota Motor Sales, “Toyota Temporarily Suspends Sales of Selected Vehicles,” Press Release, January 26, 2010,

http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota/toyota-temporarily-suspends-sales-153126.aspx.

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controls “across the entire automotive industry.” In addition, NHTSA has enlisted National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) engineers who are experts in software and

electronics to examine the potential for problems with computer hardware or software or

electronic systems in increasingly complex automobiles.4

NHTSA

To ensure that federal regulators receive early notification of potentially dangerous flaws in motor

vehicles, and that auto manufacturers quickly take corrective action, Congress in 2000 passed the

Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act (P.L. 106414).5 The TREAD Act, developed in response to deaths stemming from flawed Firestone tires,

created an “Early Warning” system requiring automobile vehicle and equipment manufacturers to

promptly report data to NHTSA regarding defects, injuries, or deaths from auto vehicles or

equipment. The law also required companies to report to NHTSA any recalls of its products in

other countries within five days and imposed tougher penalties for manufacturers that did not

comply with the act. The TREAD law was also designed to give consumers more timely and

complete information about possible automotive safety issues.6

One of Congress’s intentions in passing the TREAD Act was to provide NHTSA with tools to

identify potential defects more quickly. Some consumer groups and industry experts say NHTSA

is still underfunded and does not have enough power to quickly force recalls, forcing it to instead

negotiate with auto companies on less-sweeping sanctions. Critics, such as former NHTSA

Administrator Joan Claybrook, also say that Toyota and NHTSA have not responded aggressively

to reports of sudden acceleration. NHTSA officials reply that they acted promptly and repeatedly

in response to information at hand. But, nonetheless, NHTSA in April 2010 levied a $16.375

million fine against Toyota—the largest allowed under law—charging that the company did not

comply with the TREAD Act requirement to promptly report safety problems to the agency.7

The most pressing issue, however, is that NHTSA8 inspectors have been unable to identify a

cause or causes that would explain all the incidents of sudden or unintended acceleration. Toyota

officials also say they have not found a mechanical or electrical problem that would account for

complaints that do not seem to arise from defective floor mats or sticky accelerator pedals, which

have been the subject of recalls. The net result is that there is currently no solution, or even

explanation, for many of the reported incidents.

The DOT and Toyota officials are working to address the sudden acceleration complaints. Toyota

has announced the creation of a special panel, headed by former Secretary of Transportation

Rodney Slater, to examine quality and safety issues. Toyota will appoint, as part of this response,

a safety officer in every country in which it has operations, and will open technical offices in

some U.S. cities. The company has also said it will make brake override systems (software that

U.S. Department of Transportation, “U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood Announces Major Investigations to

Resolve Issue of Sudden Acceleration,” Press Release, March 30, 2010.

P.L. 106-414; H.Rept. 106-954, p. 7.

Ibid.

Department of Transportation, “Secretary LaHood Announces DOT is Seeking Maximum Civil Penalty from

Toyota,” Press Release, April 5, 2010, http://www.nhtsa.gov/.

Although there has been some criticism of NHTSA for not responding sooner, NHTSA initiated eight examinations,

including three formal investigations, of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyotas between 2003 and 2009.

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gives priority to braking when the brake and accelerator are depressed at the same time) standard

on new model cars.9 The company is installing brake override systems in recalled models, when

possible.

Consumer groups are pressing Toyota and NHTSA to look more closely at the possibility that the

incidents may have been caused by defects in the vehicles’ electronic systems. 10 Both NHTSA

and Toyota officials say their research has, so far, not detected software or electronic issues,

particularly with electronic throttle controls. In addition to LaHood’s announcement that the DOT

has asked for studies from the NAS and help from NASA engineers, the Transportation Secretary

has asked the DOT Inspector General (DOTIG) to determine whether NHTSA conducted an

adequate review of alleged unintended acceleration and has the necessary staff. He has also

indicated that the Obama Administration is considering requiring all auto manufacturers that

produce cars with electronic throttle controls to install an emergency brake override on their

vehicles. Such systems are already standard on certain makes of automobiles.

Congress is now considering amending the TREAD Act or taking other steps to enhance

NHTSA’s power and, as a result, public safety. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation Chairman Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia said during a March 2, 2010, hearing

that he wants to proceed expeditiously with legislation. In the House, the Committee on Energy

and Commerce and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform have launched their

own investigations into the sudden acceleration cases, and the response of Toyota and NHTSA.

Lawmakers are also considering the FY2011 budget for DOT, including NHTSA. Secretary of

Transportation Ray LaHood told Congress that President Obama’s FY2011 budget includes

authority for an additional 66 full-time equivalent positions at NHTSA.11 There are currently 57

full-time NHTSA employees devoted to safety investigations. DOT officials have said they will

determine how many of the new positions will be used for safety investigations.

Federal Oversight of Auto Safety

NHTSA is the federal agency with primary responsibility for regulating motor vehicle safety,

including setting motor vehicle safety standards. It is also the main agency charged with

identifying motor vehicle safety defects through its Office of Defects Investigation (ODI). The

ODI receives complaints from consumers and certain information from manufacturers, assesses

the information to determine whether there appear to be trends indicating potential safety defects,

and conducts investigations to determine whether the evidence indicates the presence of

problems. When a safety defect is identified, manufacturers are required to provide owners of the

affected vehicles with a remedy at no cost to the owners.

Yoshimi Inaba, President and COO Toyota North America and Chairman and CEO of Toyota Motor Sales, testimony

to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, March 2, 2010, http://commerce.senate.gov/

public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=551444b7-8cd8-4999-8735-ec29431aa3fe.

Joan Claybrook, President Emeritus, Public Citizen, testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on

Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Toyota Gas Pedals: Is the Public at Risk?, February 24, 2010.

Ray LaHood, Secretary of Transportation, Testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government

Reform, February 24, 2010, http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/2010/

022410_Toyota/TESTIMONY-LaHood.pdf.

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Congress, over the years, has attempted to strengthen NHTSA’s authority, most recently with the

October 2000 passage of the TREAD Act. The measure was drafted out of concern that NHTSA

did not respond quickly enough to a number of crashes and deaths that ultimately led to the recall

of millions of Firestone tires.12 The TREAD Act included provisions to increase the amount of

data available to NHTSA regarding potential safety defects, and authorized more funding to

improve NHTSA’s capacity to more quickly analyze data. (See Appendix A for additional

context and more details.)

The TREAD Act obligates manufacturers to notify NHTSA within five days of determining that a

safety defect exists. A key provision is an Early Warning Reporting (EWR) requirement (section

3(b)). The EWR requires manufacturers to regularly share with NHTSA certain information they

receive about their vehicles or equipment. Specifically, manufacturers are required to report on a

quarterly basis:

1. The number of vehicles, tires, and child restraint systems, by make, model, and

model (production) year, that were produced;

2. The number of claims and notices involving death (including those in foreign

countries), personal injury, and property damage by make, model, model year,

and vehicle identification number;

3. The number of paid warranty claims in the United States that involve specified

components and systems;

4. The number of field reports received from the manufacturer’s employees,

representatives, dealers, and fleets, related to problems with specified

components and systems, and copies of all field reports (except those from

dealers); and

5. All consumer complaints received regarding a product.

Other provisions require manufacturers to inform NHTSA of safety recalls or other safety

campaigns conducted in foreign countries on motor vehicles or equipment similar to those sold in

the United States.

The average number of annual automotive defect recalls in the United States has increased from

486 during 2000-2004 to 524 during 2005-2009. (See Table 3.) About 22% of all recalls from

2005-2009 were ordered by NHTSA; the rest were voluntary actions announced by auto

companies—including the most recent Toyota recalls.13 Consumer groups say the percentage of

government-ordered recalls is small, indicating that NHTSA is not tough enough, and that auto

companies can negotiate less onerous penalties. NHTSA Administrator David Strickland told

Congress in March 2010 that voluntary recalls are often preferable, since NHTSA-ordered actions

can be subject to lengthy delays. For example, if a manufacturer resists a NHTSA recall order, the

agency must go to court to prove that a defect exists that creates an “unreasonable safety risk.”14

United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, p. 1, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2002071.pdf.

Greiling Keane, Angela and Jeff Plungis, “Toyota Acceleration Tied to 43 Fatal Crashes,” Bloomberg, March 2,

2010.

David Strickland, NHTSA Administrator, Testimony to the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on

Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, March 11, 2010, http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100311/

Strickland.Testimony.pdf.

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NHTSA estimates that about half the investigations it opens result in a safety recall or other

manufacturer action.15 (For further information on NHTSA’s Defects Investigation Process, see

Appendix B.)

Sudden Acceleration Complaints

Since 2000, NHTSA has received about 30,000 to 50,000 complaints annually about a wide array

of potential problems and defects in automobiles. About 2% to 5% of the overall complaints each

year have involved reports of possible unintended acceleration. 16 Since 1980, NHTSA has carried

out 141 investigations into consumer throttle-control complaints in a variety of automobiles,

involving both electronic and mechanical throttles. 17

Determining the cause of sudden acceleration is often difficult. A problem may occur rarely, for

example, or NHTSA may not be able to reproduce a specific incident reported by a consumer.

Further, there are several potential causes for sudden acceleration: driver error; design defects that

may induce driver error (such as poor pedal placement); the absence of a shift interlock (a shift

system designed to make it more difficult for a person to accidentally shift a car into drive);

interference from floor mats; mechanical or electromechanical defects; and electronic defects.18

Several studies conducted by NHTSA and vehicle safety agencies in other countries have

concluded that driver error—inadvertently pressing the accelerator when intending to press the

brake—is generally the cause of unintended acceleration.19 Critics of this explanation in the

Toyota case observe that these studies were done on 1980s-era vehicles, and thus are of uncertain

value in examining contemporary vehicles that use new technologies. 20

Audi Historical Precedents

One of the most prominent studies linking driver error to unintended acceleration arose from a

1980s federal investigation into reported problems in Audi automobiles. In the mid-1980s,

NHTSA received a number of complaints from vehicle owners who alleged that their Audi 5000

automobiles had suddenly accelerated as they shifted their automatic transmission from park to

drive or reverse. The New York Attorney General and consumer groups requested an

investigation.21 The television program 60 Minutes aired a segment that purported to show an out15

United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, FY 2011

Congressional Budget Justification, p. 55, http://www.dot.gov/budget/2011/budgetestimates/nhtsa.pdf.

NHTSA, “Toyota Sudden Acceleration, Background & Timeline of NHTSA Actions,” Fact Sheet.

Ray LaHood, Secretary of Transportation, Testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and

Transportation, March 2, 2010, p. 7.

Safety Research and Strategies, Inc., “Sudden Unintended Acceleration Redux: The Unresolved Issue,” The Safety

Record, v. 6, 13, June-July 2009, http://www.safetyresearch.net/2009/07/20/sudden-acceleration/.

These studies include John Pollard and E. Donald Sussman, An Examination of Sudden Acceleration, NHTSA, 1989,

DOT-HS-8007-367; Transport Canada, Investigation of Sudden Acceleration Incidents, December 1988; Japanese

Ministry of Transport, An Investigation on Sudden Starting and/or Acceleration of Vehicles with Automatic

Transmission, April 1989.

Clarence Ditlow, Executive Director, Center for Auto Safety, testimony to the Senate Commerce, Science and

Transportation Committee, March 2, 2010, http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=1c6bb8668a96-4f79-b6ac-84a6a0e805f5.

Hearit, Keith Michael, and Jeffrey L. Courtright, “A Social Constructionist Approach to Crisis Management:

(continued...)

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of-control Audi.22 Audi in 1986 announced a recall and installed a gear shift lock that required

consumers to depress the brake pedal in order to shift into gear. Still, U.S. Audi sales plummeted

from 74,000 vehicles in 1985 to a low of 12,000 in 1991, before beginning a slow rebound.23 The

resale value of Audi makes, including those not involved in the recall, declined substantially.24 In

1989, NHTSA released a comprehensive study it had commissioned from an outside research

group that examined the Audi incidents, as well as other makes of automobiles, to look for a

potential cause of the sudden acceleration. The study concluded that the reported sudden

acceleration was caused by driver error.25

NHTSA officials have referred to the Audi case as they have looked into recent reports of sudden

acceleration in Toyotas and other vehicles. For example, NHTSA in 2003 denied a petition for an

investigation into reports that Toyota’s Lexus 300 and 400 model autos were prone to unexpected

acceleration. In announcing its decision, NHTSA said the data did not provide a “reasonable

possibility” that an investigation would result in an order of a safety-related defect and remedy. 26

To reach that conclusion, NHTSA officials examined 182 consumer complaints for three models

of vehicles in five NHTSA categories related to issues of speed control including throttle linkages

and cruise control systems. The review covered the period from 1997 to 2000. Based on the data,

NHTSA officials determined that Lincoln-make automobiles had a higher complaint rate, 10.6 per

100,000, than the Lexus, 10.0 per 100,000. Cadillac had 8.7 complaints per 100,000 vehicles.27

NHTSA did a second review limited to just one speed control category. That turned up similar

results with 1.2 complaints per 100,000 for Lexus, 1.8 for Lincoln and .76 for Cadillac. In

deciding not to proceed with an investigation, NHTSA also referred extensively to the 1989 Audi

study linking unintended acceleration to human error.

(...continued)

Allegations of Sudden Acceleration in the Audi 5000,” Communications Studies, vol. 54, Issue 1, Spring 2003.

Huber, Peter, Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, Perseus Book Group, 1991, p. 57.

White, Joseph B. and Dionne Searcey, “Audi Case Set Template for Toyota’s Troubles,” Wall Street Journal, March

12, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704349304575115952186305536.html.

Hearit, Keith Michael and Jeffrey L. Courtright, “A Social Constructionist Approach to Crisis Management:

Allegations of Sudden Acceleration in the Audi 5000,” Communications Studies, vol. 54, Issue 1, Spring 2003.

Pollard, John and E. Donald Sussman, An Examination of Sudden Acceleration, Transportation Systems Center,

Cambridge, MA,: NHTSA, 1989, DOT-HS-807-367.

U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Denial of Motor Defect

Petition,” DP03-003, Federal Register, vol. 68. No. 183, September 22, 2003, p. 55076.

Ibid. According to NHTSA, there is no set benchmark figure of complaints per 100,000 that indicates problems with

a vehicle. The rate of consumer complaints bears on both the question of whether there is a defect and whether the

defect is related to motor vehicle safety. Under case law, in assessing whether there is a defect, relevant considerations

include the failure rate of the components in question, failure rates of comparable components, and the importance of

the component to the safe operation of a vehicle. NHTSA uses a risk analysis approach when examining consumer

complaints, weighing for potential safety risks and frequency. In some cases it is sufficient to look at complaint rates,

according to NHTSA. In other instances it is important to look at rates normalized by the number of vehicles or miles

driven. In other instances, such as early in the life of a vehicle where the consequences of a problem could be deadly,

but there may not be sufficient numbers of incidents to determine a rate, the issue could, nonetheless, merit opening an

investigation. Further, a defect that results in a loss of vehicle control presumptively presents an unreasonable risk of a

crash. But to complete a recall, NHTSA would have to prove that the loss of control was related to a defect, and could

not simply rely on complaints alleging a loss of control.

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Toyota-Related Complaints Since 2000

NHTSA data indicate that the agency has received a range of 1,200 to 2,000 complaints annually

since 2000 specifically regarding sudden or unintended acceleration in a range of vehicles. Toyota

vehicles accounted for about 4% of all such reports in 2000, a share that rose to 17% in 2008 and

33% in 2009. The increased incidence of complaints occurred as domestic sales of Toyota

vehicles climbed substantially, meaning Toyota cars made up a larger proportion of all U.S.

autos.28 Of the Toyota complaints involving sudden unintended acceleration during the period

2000 to 2010, 43 involved fatal crashes; these 43 crashes resulted in 52 deaths. Thirty-three of the

43 crashes involved vehicles equipped with electronic throttle controls; fully three-quarters of the

reports were received since November 2009, following increased media attention to the sudden

acceleration issue (some of the reports apparently referred to crashes that occurred months or

years before). 29

Another way to break down the data is to look at the number of complaints per 100,000

automobiles. According to an analysis by auto industry publisher Edmunds.com, based on 20052009 data, Toyota had 4.81 complaints per 100,000 vehicles sold, compared to Ford with 3.12

complaints. (See Table 1.) Toyota has had more complaints of unintended acceleration on its

newer-model vehicles—autos sold from marketing year 2005 through September 30, 2009—than

any of the other so-called Big 6 auto manufacturers, according to Edmunds.com. 30

Table 1. Complaints of Unintended Acceleration in Selected Brands

Data for cars sold in United States from 2005 through September 2009

Complaints

Sales

Complaints Per 100,000

Vehicles Sold

Chrysler

156

9,082,757

1.72

Ford

339

10,864,479

3.12

134

16,542,608

0.81

Honda

7,059,784

1.26

Nissan

4,657,974

1.07

Toyota

532

11,049,513

4.81

Manufacturer

Source: Edmunds.com (http://www.edmunds.com/).

Notes: Data is for sales of vehicles MY2005 and Newer. Complaints are for MY2005 and newer received by

NHTSA through September 30, 2009.

State Farm Insurance Co. reported to NHTSA in 2004 that it had seen an increase in insurance

claims related to unintended acceleration in Camry and Corolla vehicles. State Farm noted that

the claims surged beginning with the model year 2002 Camrys, in which Toyota had introduced

an electronic throttle. State Farm claims relating to Toyota Corollas also increased after the

NHTSA, “Toyota Sudden Acceleration Timeline.”

Keane, Angela Greiling and Jeff Plungis, “Toyota Sudden Acceleration Tied to 43 Fatal Crashes,” Bloomberg.com,

March 2, 2010.

Edmunds AutoObserver, “Question Congress’ Hearings Won’t Answer: Are Cars Safe?” February 25, 2010,

http://www.autoobserver.com/2010/02/question-congress-hearings-wont-answer-are-cars-safe.html. The Big 6

manufacturers are Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota.

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introduction of the electronic throttle in those vehicles in model year 2005. After an initial spike,

claims decreased, though Corolla complaints in 2009 were still generally higher than in the years

preceding the change. 31

Consumer Reports in 2009 performed its own breakdown of NHTSA data, finding that more than

40% of sudden acceleration complaints filed with the federal agency on model year 2008 vehicles

involved Toyota or Lexus vehicles. The magazine said that Ford Motor Co. also had a significant

number of complaints relating to acceleration issues. Consumer Reports’ Auto Test Center and

Statistics Department examined 5,916 reports dealing with 2008 models and found 166 cases of

unintended acceleration. The complaints ranged across 22 brands, however, including 47

complaints about Toyota and five about Lexus vehicles, and 36 complaints about the Ford F-150

pickup.32

NHTSA Response to Toyota Complaints

Since 2002, NHTSA has conducted eight examinations, including three investigations, into

complaints of unintended acceleration in Toyotas. It closed most of these examinations after it

was not able to identify a safety defect that could have caused the complaint. (See Toyota recall

timeline, Appendix C.) An investigation led to a Toyota recall in 2007 to address a body trim

issue in Toyota Siennas that could interfere with the accelerator pedal. More recently, two

NHTSA examinations led to Toyota recalls in 2009 and 2010 covering floor mats and potentially

sticky accelerator pedals. NHTSA’s acting administrator traveled to Japan in December 2009 to

meet with Toyota officials and impress on them the need to quickly address reported problems.

According to press reports, some owners of Toyota vehicles have complained that their vehicles

exhibited sudden unintended acceleration after being recalled and repaired.33

The DOTIG is also conducting an audit of NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation. The audit

will examine both ODI’s process for identifying and investigating potential defects, as well as the

office’s actions in regard to the Toyota recalls. 34 The last audit of the ODI was published in 2004,

examining NHTSA’s implementation of the TREAD Act.

The DOT on April 5, 2010, announced that it had determined that Toyota did not comply with

legal requirements to notify NHTSA within five days of discovering a safety flaw in its products.

Transportation Secretary LaHood announced that officials would seek a $16.375 million penalty

against Toyota, the maximum possible, for what it said was a failure to notify NHTSA, for at least

four months, of sticky accelerator pedals in some Toyota models. 35 NHTSA said internal Toyota

“State Farm UIA Claims (Pre-ETC v. Post ETC), NTHSA Document Produced to [House Energy and Commerce]

Committee on February 19, 2010,” http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=ddacce41-aed1-4e478c5c-4384bd7522ac.

Limbach, James, “Toyota, Lexus Lead the Pack for Sudden Acceleration Problems,” ConsumerAffairs.com,

December 9, 2009, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2009/12/cr_sudden_acceleration.html.

Associated Press, “Toyota Will Replace Pedals, If Asked,” Boston Globe, March 24, 2010,

ttp://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/03/24/toyota_will_replace_pedals_if_asked/.

Office of the Inspector General, United States Department of Transportation, “Audit Initiated of NHTSA’s Office of

Defects Investigation,” February 19, 2010, http://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/5271.

Ray LaHood, Secretary of Transportation, Testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government

Reform, February 24, 2010. Department of Transportation, “Secretary LaHood Announces DOT is Seeking Maximum

Civil Penalty from Toyota,” Press Release, April 5, 2010, http://www.nhtsa.gov/.

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documents showed that the company knew of the problems with the pedals since at least

September 29, 2009, when it issued repair procedures to distributors in 31 European countries and

Canada. About 2.3 million Toyota vehicles were recalled in the United States in late February for

sticky pedal issues. Toyota on April 19, 2010, agreed to pay the penalty. Toyota said in a

statement that the company acted to avoid prolonged litigation and to move forward on quality

improvements. 36 Toyota on April 19, 2010, also announced it would recall 2010 model Lexus GX

460 vehicles to update their Vehicle Stability Control system.

Toyota Overview

Japan-based Toyota Motor Co. has grown into an international powerhouse since its founding in

1937, and now manufactures cars and trucks, motors, air conditioning units, factory equipment,

and other machinery.37 Toyota has undergone a particularly rapid period of expansion during the

past two decades. Toyota’s share of the U.S. auto market nearly doubled between 1998 and

2009.38 (See Figure 1.) In 2008, Toyota moved ahead of General Motors as the world’s largest

auto company, in terms of annual sales.39 Toyota has long been known for its “lean”

manufacturing process, and the company’s ability to produce cars more efficiently than its

competitors has given it a competitive edge. Toyota has managed to maintain its productivity

during the past several decades even as automobiles have become more complex to design and

produce, though the gap between Toyota and U.S. auto firms appears to have narrowed. 40

Toyota has a major U.S. presence, measured in both sales and production. Toyota began selling its

vehicles in the United States in 1957, with the founding of Toyota Motor Sales.41 It also sells its

Lexus brand. In 1984 the firm started domestic U.S. production as part of a joint venture with

General Motors. Toyota now has 13 manufacturing locations in North America (including Mexico

and Canada) that produce vehicles including the Sequoia, Tacoma, Venza, and Avalon. 42 Toyota

employs about 29,000 U.S. workers, and its direct U.S. investment has grown to more than

$18 billion. The firm spent more than $22 billion on parts, materials, and components from U.S.

suppliers in 2009. Toyota sold 1.77 million cars and light trucks in the United States in 2009. Of

that total, about 1.1 million were made in this country and 663,844 were imported.43

Toyota Motor Corporation, “Toyota Motor Corporation Agrees to Settle NTHSA Civil Penalty,” Press Release, April

19, 2010, http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-motor-corporation-agrees-157093.aspx.

Toyota, History of Toyota, Timeline, http://www2.toyota.co.jp/en/history/.

Wards Automotive Group, U.S. Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company, 1961-2009, http://wardsauto.com/keydata/.

Bunkley, Nick, “Toyota Ahead of G.M. in 2008 Sales,” New York Times, January 21, 2009,

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/business/22auto.html.

Oliver Wyman Harbour Report, “Lean Improvements, Worker Buyouts Bring Detroit Three Productivity Closer to

Asian Rivals, Says Oliver Wyman’s Harbour Report 2008,” Press Release, June 5, 2009,

http://www.oliverwyman.com/content_images/OW_EN_Automotive_Press_2008_HarbourReport08.pdf.

Center for Automotive Research, Contribution of Toyota Motor North America to the Economies of Sixteen States

and the United States in 2006, October 2007, p. iii, http://www.cargroup.org/documents/Toyota_16_State_Final.pdf.

Toyota, Toyota in the United States, http://www.toyota.com/about/our_business/our_numbers/.

Automotive News Data Center.

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Figure 1.Toyota U.S. Auto Market Growth

Percentage share of U.S. vehicle sales from 1961-2009

18.00

Percentage Share

16.00

14.00

12.00

10.00

8.00

6.00

4.00

2.00

0.00

Year

Source: Ward’s Automotive Group, U.S. Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company, 1961-2009.

North America is the largest market for Toyota vehicles. In February 2010, Toyota forecast it

would sell 2.05 million cars in North America during its 2010 fiscal year (April-March) out of

total forecast global sales of 7.2 million.44

Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing, headquartered in Erlanger, KY, carries out design

and development for U.S. manufacturing operations. Toyota Financial Services provides loans for

car buyers, so-called floor-plan loans that provide dealers needed financing to stock inventory,

and handles lease coverage and vehicle service/warranty agreements and other financial services

for Toyota, Lexus, and Scion dealers, Toyota forklift and Hino dealers, and Toyota Material

Handling dealers and affiliates. Toyota Financial Services employs 3,000 U.S. workers with

managed assets in excess of $65 billion.45

Toyota Corporate Structure

As Toyota has expanded, the company has increased its range of products and built

manufacturing plants in a number of countries, including the United States. There have been

suggestions that Toyota put too much emphasis on expansion at the expense of quality. Further,

there have been criticisms that management, which remained centralized in Japan, was slow to

respond to problems in its U.S. operations. In a September 2006 internal Toyota presentation

entitled “A New Era for Toyota and TMA in North America,” then-Toyota Motors North America

Toyota Motor Corporation, FY 2010 Third Quarter Financial Results, February 4, 2010, p. 20.

http://www.toyota.co.jp/en/ir/financial_results/2010/q3/presentation.pdf.

Toyota Financial Services, Company Background, http://www.toyotafinancial.com/consumer/tfs.portal?_nfpb=true&

_pageLabel=pg_CompanyBackground.

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President Jim Press noted increasing recall activity and federal investigations. Press said that

quality problems affected customer loyalty and suggested that the company’s credibility with

NHTSA was slipping. Notes accompanying the slides in Press’s Power Point presentation

included this entreaty to corporate managers: “We ask TMC to trust our judgment when we need

your urgent help in getting issues resolved. We need faster information flow, and more technical

support when hot issues arise.”46

James Lentz, president and COO of Toyota Motor Sales, USA, in February 23, 2010, testimony

before the House Energy and Commerce Committee said that Japanese officials had been making

the key decisions on recalls, but said the process was changing.47 Toyota CEO Akio Toyoda, a

grandson of Toyota’s founder who became CEO in 2009, has personally apologized to customers,

saying the corporation may have grown too big, too fast and, in the process, lost its focus on

quality and customer response. Toyoda has proposed changes in Toyota’s corporate structure to

ensure it responds more quickly and openly to safety and quality questions in the future.48

Toyota officials have laid out a series of steps that they say should improve product quality and

consumer satisfaction:

•

Establish a Special Committee for Global Quality, to be led by the president of

Toyota. The panel will review operations and suggest needed changes.

•

Create an outside panel of industry experts to evaluate any new quality controls

within Toyota. The panel will be headed by former U.S. Secretary of

Transportation Rodney Slater.

•

Create a global system to better share information within the company and with

regulators, including NHTSA.

•

Set up teams of technicians in select U.S. cities to quickly respond to reports of

unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles and make on-site inspections.

•

Create a new U.S. position of regional product safety executive. Corporate

officials have also said they will give North American Toyota managers more

autonomy to make decisions about safety and defect issues.

•

Establish an Automotive Center of Quality Excellence in the United States.49

Press, Jim, President of Toyota North America, A New Era for Toyota and TMA in North America, September 20,

2006, http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=983799ea-1bdb-493c-8a47-a3401be4d3e3.

James Lentz, President and Chief Operating Officer, Toyota Motor Sales USA, testimony to the House Committee

on Energy and Commerce, February 23, 2010, http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100223/

Lentz.Testimony.pdf.

Akio Toyoda, President, Toyota Motor Corporation, testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform, February 24, 2010, http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/

2010/022410_Toyota/TESTIMONY-Toyoda.pdf.

Yoshimi Inaba, President and COO Toyota North American and Chairman and CEO of Toyota Motor Sales,

Testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, March 2, 2010,

http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=5a15bd95-d0c7-4171-9aeecc8420e9265f&Statement_id=7628d978-89f5-420a-872a-bd21f22056c0&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d3556cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=3&YearDisplay=2010.

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Black Box Availability

Toyota is also pledging to become more open in another area. The company has been faulted for

making it difficult for U.S. investigators and drivers to gain access to electronic “black box” data

for its vehicles that might help to determine the causes of some of the incidents.

In many automobiles, an event data recorder (EDR), commonly referred to as a “black box,”

records information related to a vehicle crash. An automobile “black box” is different from a

commercial aircraft’s flight recorder (also popularly referred to as a “black box”), which records

both equipment data and audio transmissions. An automobile “black box” continually records

information from a vehicle’s brakes, seat belts, and air bags; the recording is of short duration,

and the recorded information is continuously overwritten by new information, so that at any time

there is usually only a few seconds of data recorded. The EDR will store information about the

condition of the brakes, seat belts, and air bags for a few seconds before and during a crash. Some

EDRs also record data such as engine throttle status and vehicle speed. 50 EDRs began to appear in

cars as early as 1991; most cars now have an EDR. NHTSA has been collecting EDR data since

1991 because of its value in helping investigators reconstruct vehicle crashes. In 2006, NHTSA

issued a regulation to standardize the data collected by EDRs. The regulation takes effect in 2012,

affecting model year 2013 cars.51 While the rule will require that EDRs record 15 types of data,

including throttle status and vehicle speed, it applies only to cars that have EDRs; the regulation

does not require that cars be equipped with EDRs.

Toyota engineers describe their EDRs as essentially prototype parts that were designed as event

recorders. “There have been times—there have been occurrences where we have been able to

download some information regarding throttle angles, steering angle, brake application, et cetera,

that does give us some information. But that’s very, very limited, and hasn’t really occurred that

often,” John Hanson, national environmental safety and quality communications manager for

Toyota said in a recent presentation.52

Toyota until recently had just one device in the United States capable of reading its vehicles’

proprietary black box data. By contrast, other automobile companies make their black box data

more accessible to consumers and investigators. In hearings before Congress, Toyota executives

pledged that they would provide 100 such devices. Toyota is also stepping up efforts to improve

black box technology on its upcoming models of automobiles. 53

Recall Impact on Toyota Sales

Even before the recent recalls Toyota, like other automobile companies, had been hurt by the

economic downturn and credit crunch. Toyota officials reacted with aggressive marketing in the

wake of the bad publicity surrounding the sudden acceleration incidents. On March 2, 2010,

NHTSA and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, “Q&As: Event Data Recorders,” November 2009,

http://www.iihs.org/research/qanda/edr.html.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of Transportation, “Event Data Recorders; Final Rule,”

71 Federal Register 50998, August 28, 2006.

Toyota Motor Sales, 2010 Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Webinar, February 22, 2010,

http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/2010-toyota-electronic-throttle-154266.aspx.

Reuters, “Factbox—What has Toyota pledged to change?” February 23, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/

idUSN2312046420100224.

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Toyota announced a series of financial incentives through April 5, 2010, designed to lure buyers

into its dealer showrooms. The company offered 0% financing or lower monthly lease rates on

some popular models, as well as a complimentary two-year maintenance program for customers

who buy or lease a new car and provide proof that they already own a Toyota make of vehicle.54

Toyota Motor Sales, USA reported on April 1, 2010, that it sold 186,863 automobiles in March, a

35.3% increase compared to the same period in 2009.55 For the first quarter of 2010, sales were

up 8.7% from year-ago levels, measured in sales per day. Sales rose 7.2% on an unadjusted

volume basis—the difference comes from the fact that there were 74 selling days in the first

quarter of 2010 compared to 75 in the first quarter of 2009. Still, some analysts have estimated

that Toyota could face billions of dollars in losses from the sudden acceleration cases.56

Toyota Lobbying

In addition to technical issues, lawmakers have questioned whether Toyota lobbyists were able to

persuade NHTSA officials not to order recalls in certain instances.

In 2009, Toyota had a larger lobbying force in Washington, DC, than any other foreign

automobile company. According to the nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics, Toyota and its

subsidiary organizations spent more than $5 million and employed 31 lobbyists in 2009.57 By

comparison, Nissan Motors, another large foreign auto firm, spent $3.67 million and employed 19

lobbyists, while Honda had nine lobbyists and spent $2.56 million during the period.58 Honda, for

example, also has a major U.S. presence. The company opened its first U.S. plant in 1979 and

now directly employs more than 25,000 Americans.59

Lawmakers have focused on a July 6, 2009, document prepared by Toyota’s Washington office

for Toyota Motors COO Yoshi Inaba. In that document, the office claimed a number of “wins”

including delaying final safety rules by NHTSA, and persuading NHTSA officials to impose

lesser defect sanctions, including a negotiated equipment recall on Camrys that saved the

company $100 million. Inaba told lawmakers during congressional hearings that the document

does not reflect official Toyota policy and that he does not know where the $100 million figure

came from.

A number of former DOT employees now work for Toyota and other auto companies.60 Secretary

of Transportation Ray LaHood told Congress that a review of internal records indicates that the

Toyota Motor Sales, “Toyota Announces March Sales Event,” Press Release, March 2, 2010,

http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-announces-march-sales-event-154598.aspx.

Toyota Motor Sales, “Toyota Announces March and First Quarter Sales,” Press Release, April 1, 2010,

http://www.toyota.com/about/news/corporate/2010/04/01-1-sales.html.

Sanchanta, Mariko and Yoshio Takahashi, “Toyota Recall Losses Could Top $5 Billion,” Wall Street Journal, March

9, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704145904575111341893725992.html?KEYWORDS=

toyota.

Levinthal, Dave, “Toyota’s Lobbying Power Primed for Test as Congressional Scrutiny Mounts,” OpenSecrets.org,

Center for Responsive Politics, February 8, 2010, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/02/toyotas-lobbying-powerprimed.html.

Ibid.

Honda, Operations Overview, http://corporate.honda.com/america/overview.aspx.

Bloomberg, “Regulators Hired by Toyota Helped Halt Acceleration Probes,” February 13, 2010,

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=atXvi2msqPOM.

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former officials have complied with laws that limit their ability to lobby their former colleagues.

The Transportation Secretary has suggested tightening the lobbying laws, however.

Policy Issues and the Congressional Response

The increase in consumer complaints regarding sudden acceleration in Toyota vehicles, and the

government and industry response, has led some Members of Congress, and consumer and

industry groups to examine a number of issues regarding the specific cases at hand—and the

broader issue of government regulation of automotive safety.

Does NHTSA Have Enough Resources for Defects Investigation?

Some Members of Congress and consumer groups have suggested that NHTSA lacks the

resources to effectively carry out its responsibility to detect automotive defects. Joan Claybrook,

a former head of NHTSA, says the agency’s budget and staffing were reduced by almost onethird during the 1980s, and have never been restored to earlier levels.61 However, while that may

be true of NHTSA as a whole, it does not necessarily apply to the defects investigation work of

NHTSA. NHTSA’s budget for defects investigation, adjusted for inflation, was larger in FY2010

(at $9.8 million) than in FY1981 ($4.7 million). 62 The number of staff dedicated to defects

investigation has increased to 57 in FY2010 from 45 in FY2000, following passage of the

TREAD Act.63

Whether NHTSA’s budget for defects investigation is sufficient for protecting the public from

unreasonable safety defects is another question. No specific evidence has been cited in support or

in contradiction of the claim that NHTSA lacks sufficient staff resources to conduct needed

investigations. Some have pointed to NHTSA’s repeated reference, in declining to open defect

investigations after examining defect petitions, or in terminating defect investigations without

having identified a safety defect, to its “need to make effective use of limited resources,”

suggesting that language indicates that NHTSA does not have sufficient resources.64 But the

reference to making effective use of limited resources is an acknowledgement that, at some point

during an investigation, if no defect has been identified, the investigation needs to be concluded

so that investigators can turn to other investigations.65

Joan Claybrook, President Emeritus, Public Citizen, testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on

Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Toyota Gas Pedals: Is the Public at Risk?, February 24, 2010.

NHTSA’s operations & research budget (i.e., its budget for activities other than safety grants to states) for the period

FY1976-1989 peaked, in real terms, in FY1981, so the defects investigation budget for that year was used as the basis

for comparison. The 1981 figure was taken from NHTSA’s FY1982 budget estimate, and was converted to 2010

constant dollars using the GDP chained price index figures in Table 10.1—Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used

in the Historical Tables: 1940-2015, in Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government

FY2011: Historical Tables, pp. 210-211.

FY2000 staffing: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Transportation, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, p. 34.

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearing, “Toyota Gas Pedals: Is The Public at Risk,”

February 24, 2010.

To demonstrate that a suspected safety defect exists in a vehicle, an investigation need only find an instance of that

defect. It is impossible to prove that a suspected defect does not exist in a vehicle, since to do so an investigation would

have to explore every possibility under which that defect might appear. In a machine as complex as a car, the number

(continued...)

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The DOT Inspector General, in a 2002 review, questioned the limited amount of time staff had to

assess consumer complaints. In its review, the DOTIG estimated that the staff responsible for

reviewing the roughly more than 34,000 annual complaints had “an average of about 12 minutes

per complaint to review the information, search the defect database for similar complaints, related

investigations, and recalls, and decide whether to recommend an investigation.”66 The DOTIG

report also noted that the complaint database was filled with errors. This problem appears to

persist: one group that reviewed NHTSA’s complaints found the complaint database “a mess.

After reading each complaint since model-year 2005, we found that 30 percent of the original

complaints were miscategorized; more than 26 percent were duplicates.”67 NHTSA reports that

currently all complaints are initially screened and entered into NHTSA’s complaints database by a

pair of screeners. These two screeners’ responsibilities include categorizing the complaints for

further review by a group of six screeners with various areas of expertise who review complaints

that fall into their specialties.

DOT officials have testified that the Administration’s FY2011 budget requests 66 additional

positions for NHTSA.68 They have not indicated how many of these new positions might be

dedicated to defects investigations, saying that the allocation of the positions within NHTSA will

be based on need. NHTSA’s FY2011 Budget Estimate shows that the requested FY2011 funding

for Safety Defects Investigations is the same amount enacted for FY2010: $9.829 million. 69 The

total FY2011 budget request for NHTSA was $878 million, $5 million more than the FY2010

enacted level. Most of NHTSA’s funding (71%—$620 million of the $873 million total for

FY2010) is distributed to states in the form of grants to support traffic safety activities. Driver

behavior programs are implemented by the states, not the federal government, which is why most

of NHTSA’s funding goes to states’ efforts to change driver behavior.

NHTSA’s mandate is the promotion of auto safety, usually measured by the reduction of traffic

deaths and injuries. The vast majority of traffic deaths and injuries result not from vehicle safety

defects, but from driver behavior: driving while intoxicated, driving while distracted, speeding,

vehicle occupants not wearing seat belts, motorcyclists not wearing helmets.70 Table 2 indicates

the relative scale of crashes and fatalities possibly attributed to reports of sudden acceleration in

Toyotas in the context of traffic deaths from all causes. Some people contend that NHTSA’s

defects investigation resources should be increased in order to promote traffic safety; other

observers contend that any additional resources would have a greater impact on safety if applied

toward driver behavior programs.

(...continued)

of combinations of variables that would have to be explored is vast, and the circumstances under which a defect might

appear could be extremely rare; consequently, investigations could continue interminably.

United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, p. 11, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2002071.pdf.

Jeremy Anwyl, chief executive of Edmunds.com, “No easy answer for the Toyota problem,” Washington Post,

March 16, 2010, p. A19.

John D. Pocari, Deputy Secretary of Transportation, testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science and

Transportation Committee, March 4, 2010, http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=82413f202420-4463-a663-72ed299bf55a.

United States Department of Transportation, NHTSA, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, p. 54,

http://www.dot.gov/budget/2011/budgetestimates/nhtsa.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Highway Safety: Research Continues on a Variety of Factors that Contribute to

Motor Vehicle Crashes, GAO-03-436, March 2003, p. 7, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03436.pdf.

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Table 2. Scale of Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration Incidents

Data for Toyota, 2000-2010; Totals 2000-2008

Attributed to Sudden

Unintended Acceleration in

Toyota Vehicles

Total from All Causes

Crashes involving Fatalities

340,152

Resulting Fatalities

377,604

Resulting Injuries

Source: Toyota data: NHTSA, cited in “Toyota Sudden Acceleration Tied to 43 Fatal Crashes,” by Angela

Greiling Keane and Jeff Plungis, Bloomberg.com, March 2, 2010; Total crashes and fatalities: NHTSA, Traffic Safety

Facts 2008, Tables 1 and 2.

Notes: The Traffic Safety Facts report has figures for both deaths and injuries that result from crashes, but does

not report a number for the subcategory of injuries that resulted only from those crashes that also involved

fatalities.

Another point raised in connection with the Toyota issue is that NHTSA may not have the right

mix of investigative expertise. Specifically, in view of the increasing role of electronics and

computer software in automobiles, the question has been raised as to whether NHTSA has

sufficient numbers of electrical and software engineers for its investigations. NHTSA officials

have testified that they have five electrical engineers on staff, plus another electrical engineer and

a software engineer at the Vehicle Research and Test Center in East Liberty, OH.71 Subsequent

information from NHTSA indicates that two of the electrical engineers work in the Office of

Defects Investigation, whose staff includes a total of 26 engineers.72

Is the Toyota Issue a Sign of Broader Problems Within the Auto

Industry?

In general, contemporary cars are safer and more reliable than ever before. 73 But as a result of

these improvements, cars are also more complex than ever. As Table 3 indicates, the number of

automotive recalls per year has generally been increasing, although the number of vehicles, tires,

and equipment affected by these recalls has been declining. Most recalls are initiated by

manufacturers, not in response to NHTSA action.

David Strickland, NHTSA Administrator, Testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, Hearing on the Government Response to the Toyota Recalls, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March

2, 2010.

Personal communication from NHTSA, March 16, 2010.

Simanaitis, Dennis, “Add More Lightness—Technical Report,” Road & Track, February 11, 2010, p. 2,

http://www.roadandtrack.com/auto_news/tech/add-more-lightness/page_2_-_add_more_lightness_page_2; and “R&T

Safety Glossary—Technical Report,” Road & Track, March 15, 2010, http://www.roadandtrack.com/auto_news/tech/rt-safety-glossary.

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Table 3. Motor Vehicles and Equipment Defect Recall Trends

Total Defect Recalls and NHTSA-Influenced Defect Recalls

Total Defect Recalls

Period

Average

Annual # of

Recalls

Average

Annual # of

Items

Affected

1995-1999

306.8

23,605,522

2000-2004

485.8

2005-2009

524.4

NHTSA-Influenced Defect Recalls

Average

Annual # of

Items

Affected

% of

Recalls

% of Items

Affected

80.4

12,249,817

26.2%

51.9%

25,739,544

95.6

15,765,715

19.7%

61.3%

17,078,418

118.6

8,627,948

22.6%

50.5%

Average

Annual # of

Recalls

Source: Data from NHTSA, Recall Management Division, updated as of January 11, 2010.

Notes: “Items Affected” includes vehicles, auto equipment (e.g., tires), and child safety seats.

The trend of increasing numbers of recalls is seen in other countries as well. For example, a study

of recall actions in the United Kingdom found that the number of recalls per year rose between

1992 and 2002.74 The reason(s) for the increasing number of recalls is not clear. Among the

explanations that have been proposed are, for example, that (1) the increasing complexity of

automobiles, combined with a quicker product development cycle in the automotive industry, are

resulting in cars coming to market with more safety-related problems than in the past; and (2) that

safety-related defects are no more frequent than in the past, but concerns about lawsuits and

greater scrutiny have made manufacturers more inclined to recall vehicles for issues that earlier

might have been ignored.

Are Electronics and Software Testing Stringent Enough?

An emerging issue for lawmakers and investigators is the possibility of problems arising from (1)

glitches with software used to run onboard systems, (2) problems in computer hardware, or (3)

issues regarding internal electronic compatibility and outside electromagnetic interference that

can impede the performance of automobiles.

Electronics

Automobile manufacturers perform multiple tests of their products to ensure that the electronic

systems in their vehicles work as intended. In general, automotive companies have developed

standards, equipment, and techniques to test whether electronic systems are vulnerable to a range

of possible forces that could impair their operation:

•

The inner workings of the automobile—each vehicle has internal electronic

components that have their own circuitry and could potentially create

interference. The auto ignition system is one major energy source.75

Bates, Hilary, Matthias Holweg, Michael Lewis, Nick Oliver, “Motor Vehicle Recalls: Trends, Patterns, and

Emerging Issues,” Omega, 35 (2) (April 2007), pp. 202-212.

Yi Sun and Chaoqun Jiao, The Current State of Automotive Electromagnetic Compatibility Research, Department of

Electrical Engineering, Jinging Jiatong University, China., Progress in Electromagnetics Research Symposium, Beijing,

China, March 27-29, 2009, http://piers.mit.edu/piers2k9beijing/programfinal.php.

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•

Static interference—as an automobile moves down the road, for example, it

experiences high-speed friction with the surrounding air that can produce static

electricity.

•

Outside interference—a traveling car or truck passes a variety of outside

electromagnetic forces such as high-voltage transmission lines or television and

radio communication equipment.76

According to Todd Huber, professor of vehicle electronics at the Clemson University

International Center for Automotive Research, most automobile manufacturers carry out

component- and vehicle-level testing of electronic systems. Most of the relevant tests are based

on international standards, many of which began as standards created by the SAE International,

an association of engineers and technical experts in aerospace, automotive, and commercialvehicle industries. The electronics standards are usually voluntary and are not legal requirements.

Manufacturers often have their own standards, which Huber says may differ from the

international standards.77 Clemson has compiled a list of relevant automotive electronics

standards.78

Toyota has eight special test chambers for electronics in Japan. The company began building a

testing chamber in Michigan two years ago, though it will not be completed for another two

years. Toyota engineers say they test their components based on European Union, Society of

Automotive Engineers, or international standards. For example, for testing potential interference

from low-frequency electronic devices, the company uses EU standards.79 The company also has

its own standards.

Software

Software applications were first introduced into car ignition systems 30 years ago. Today,

electronics and software can account for 40% or more of the production cost of a car, and a highend automobile can require more than 10 million lines of computer code to run hundreds or

thousands of individual functions and dozens of electronic components.80 Some cars, with global

positioning systems, wireless communications, cruise control, automatic parking control, and a

slew of engine-related functions, have software code that begins to rival that of more

sophisticated equipment, like aircraft.

Automobile manufacturers procure parts from outside suppliers, and then create finished vehicles

assembly-line style. Some experts say that such a system may not be optimal for vehicles that

Ibid.

Information from Professor Todd Huber, March 10, 2010.

The Clemson University Vehicular Electronics Laboratory, Automotive Electronic Compatibility (EMC) Standards,

CISPR (Automotive Emissions Requirements), http://www.cvel.clemson.edu/auto/auto_emc_standards.html.

According to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, which represents major U.S. and foreign auto companies,

three of the most important electronic guidelines include International Organization for Standardization standards

11451, 11452, and 7637. The European Union also has some mandatory directives.

Toyota Motor Sales, 2010 Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Webinar, February 22, 2010,

http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/2010-toyota-electronic-throttle-154266.aspx.

Broy, Manfred, Challenges in Automotive Software Engineering, Institut fur Informatik, Technische Universitat

Munchen, 2006. International Conference on Software Engineering, Shanghai, China, May 20-28, 2006,

http://www.irisa.fr/lande/lande/icse-proceedings/icse/p33.pdf.

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now contain dozens of data processors that control thousands of software functions and where

phenomena like unintentional interaction between different software and hardware components

can become issues.81 Long-term reliability data may not be available for some software. 82 Owners

may not service their cars as frequently and rigorously as recommended, though software is

designed to alert drivers to needed tuneups or unexpected problems with the automobile.83 Auto

companies try to design their products to account for tough driving conditions.

Auto manufacturers have experienced glitches with software. For example, Toyota in February

2010 announced it was recalling certain models of its Prius-make vehicles to update software

controlling the anti-lock braking system. 84 Other auto companies have recalled millions of cars

for software flaws ranging from problems with air bag deployment to the failure of software

controlling onboard music and other entertainment systems.85 Some experts point out that while

there have been high-profile cases of automobiles recalled for software problems, mechanical

flaws remain a much larger problem for the industry.86

Software development is becoming an increasingly expensive area for auto manufacturers, which

is leading to expanded efforts to increase standardization. Another factor influencing industry

moves to systematize elements of software design is heightened safety concern as onboard

computers begin to carry out functions that more directly affect the control of an automobile. 87

Vehicles have advanced from single-control devices like airbags, to braking systems where

several components are linked into a network to systems that use several computer networks and

also are also linked to systems outside the car through a radio, for example. 88

Automobile manufacturers use a variety of standards in developing software, including guidelines

developed by the Motor Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA), an international

automotive industry association based in the United Kingdom. 89 The MISRA guidelines are

designed to ensure that software code is standardized and dependable and also offers guidance on

safety analysis.90 The MISRA guidelines are widely used in other transportation systems,

including aviation and railroads.

Ibid.

Ibid. Broy noted data indicating that as many as half of the Electronic Control Units that mechanics replace in cars

are technically error free—they are removed because mechanics could not find a better way to fix the problem.

Personal communication with the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, April 7, 2010.

Toyota Motor Sales, “Toyota Announces Voluntary Recall on 2010 Model-Year Prius to Update ABS Software,”

Press Release, February 8, 2010.

Wharton School of Business, “Car Trouble: Should We Recall the U.S. Auto Industry?” Knowledge@Wharton, May

4, 2005, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/printer_friendly.cfm?articleid=1183.

Ellims, Michael, Pi Technology, “On Wheels, Nuts and Software,” 2004, Conferences in Research and Practice in

Information Technology, Vol. 47. Paper prepared for 9th Australian Workshop on Safety-Related Programmable

Systems.

Ibid. Grimm, Klaus, “Software Technology in an Automotive Company—Major Challenges,” 25th International

Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE’03), May 2003, p. 498.

Grimm, Klaus, “Software Technology in an Automotive Company—Major Challenges,” 25th International

Conference on Software Engineering (ISCE’03), May 2003, p. 498.

Hill, Chris, “Making the Most of MISRA C++,” embeddednews.co.uk, http://www.embeddednews.co.uk/

ArticleItem.aspx?Cont_Title=Making+the+most+of+MISRA.

Tapp, Chris, Keylevel Consultants Ltd., “An Introduction to MISRA,” Presentation at University of Warwick, June

2007.

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The Society of Automotive Engineers recently announced enhanced software guidelines,

including the creation of a repository for information about the industry, best practices for

software design, and criteria for evaluating industry compliance with best practices.91

Manufacturers will be able to access the repository, when it is up and running, for information on

the credentials of designers working in various areas. The repository will also allow companies to

share data.

Another industry effort is Autosar, or Automotive Open System Architecture, which was formed

in 2003. Autosar is a global coalition of automobile manufacturers, suppliers and electronics,

semiconductor, and software firms working to develop standardized software for the auto

industry. The group’s “core partners” include BMW Group, Bosch, Daimler, Ford, General

Motors, Toyota, and Volkswagen. Autosar describes its mission as “simplifying the exchange and

update options for software and hardware” to control the complexity of electrical and electronic

systems in motor vehicles.92 The industry group says increased standardization should reduce

costs over the long run, allow companies to focus more on specific high-end applications and

make it easier for suppliers to create products that can be used across the industry.

Electronic Throttle Problems

While Toyota and NTHSA have identified two mechanical causes for the sudden acceleration—

improperly designed floor mats and “sticky” accelerator pedals—some automotive experts and

lawmakers say officials have been too quick to dismiss the possibility that the cars’ electronics

systems could be a factor.

Electronic throttle control, often described as drive-by-wire, is a system where sensors, rather

than a mechanical cable or rods attached to an accelerator, are used to control the throttle. In such

systems, the sensors send signals to onboard computers that determine how far to open the

throttle, which determines air flow and fuel usage. The system, by improving efficiency, can

increase mileage and reduce emissions and provide faster response time and better

maneuverability.93

Electronic throttles are engineered with redundant components in an effort to create a reliable,

fail-safe system and prevent unintended acceleration or other potential problems. Toyota says its

system is designed with multiple layers of technology that should protect a driver in case of

unanticipated difficulties. For example, Toyota accelerators and throttles each have two sensors

that must work together for the car to operate. In the case of a serious malfunction, the vehicle is

engineered to revert to idle mode. 94 Automakers install indicator lights that illuminate in the event

of a potential malfunction, alerting a driver of a potential problem. In many cases, according to

automakers, the onboard computer controlling the throttle also receives a diagnostic trouble code

Information from the Society of Automotive Engineers. The guidelines create a SAE Software Assessment

Repository, which is a Web-based system that allows organizations that develop embedded automotive software to

pose and share data. The repository does not mandate using one assessment other over another.

Autosar, FAQ, http://www.autosar.org/index.php?p=1&up=6&uup=0.

Mauser, Hans and Erwin Thurmer, Electronic Throttle Control—A Dependability Case Study, Journal of Universal

Computer Science, vo. 5. No. 10, November 28, 1999, http://www.jucs.org/jucs_5_10/electronic_throttle_control_a/

Mauser_H.pdf.

Toyota Motor Sales, 2010 Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Webinar, February 22, 2010,

http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/2010-toyota-electronic-throttle-154266.aspx.

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when a problem is detected. The code is stored in the computer memory, aiding in repair of the

vehicles or in reconstruction of events leading up to an incident.

Some automobiles include a brake override system that essentially halts power to the car if the

accelerator and brake pedal are both depressed at the same time. Toyota is installing the brake

override software in autos brought back on recall, if the particular vehicle is equipped to receive

the update. Toyota will start installing the equipment as a standard feature on 2011 model year

vehicles. 95

While NHTSA and Toyota have not to date discovered a problem with the electronics in the cars

they have tested for sudden acceleration, they are expanding their investigations. Specifically, the

DOT has asked the National Research Council (NRC) to spend 15 months looking at both

instances of unintended acceleration and to examine electronic vehicle controls across the entire

automotive industry. The effort will include a review of previous industry and government efforts

to identify possible sources of unintended acceleration as well as automotive software and

computer hardware design, electromagnetic compatibility, and potential electromagnetic

interference. The panel is to make recommendations on how to improve auto safety in these

areas.96

NHTSA’s separate review of electronic throttle controls in Toyotas, aided by NASA engineers, is

expected to be completed by late summer 2010. The DOT has announced that nine NASA experts

will aid NHTSA, and more could join the effort if necessary. Some outside experts have already

performed their own analysis of Toyota engineering. Toyota is pushing back, for example, against

a study by Southern Illinois Professor David Gilbert in which he said he had discovered a flaw in

the electronics of a Toyota vehicle that could lead to unintended acceleration.97 Toyota on March

8, 2010, charged that Gilbert had rewired and re-engineered the car in ways that were “virtually

impossible to occur in real-world conditions.” Toyota officials announced that they had been able

to produce similar results on automobiles manufactured by other companies, using Gilbert’s

techniques.98

Yoshimi Inaba, President and COO Toyota North America and Chairman and CEO of Toyota Motor Sales,

testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, March 2, 2010.

U.S. Department of Transportation, “U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood Announces Major Investigations to

Resolve Issue of Sudden Acceleration,” Press Release, March 30, 2010.

Gilbert, David W., Toyota Electronic Throttle Control Investigation: Preliminary Report, February 21, 2010,

http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100223/Gilbert.Testimony.pdf.

Toyota Motor Sales, “Comprehensive Analysis Raises Concerns about Gilbert Testimony, ABC News Segment,”

March 8, 2010, Web cast.

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Congressional Options

Congress in February 2010 began a series of hearings on the issue of unintended acceleration in

Toyota vehicles. Lawmakers have requested thousands of pages of documents from Toyota and

NHTSA, and have indicated that they plan to hold additional hearings. As part of the

congressional examination, lawmakers are examining the actions of Toyota and NHTSA in the

period leading up to the recent, extensive recalls.

Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia has laid out possible

steps for Congress and the DOT, including taking a fresh look at the TREAD Act, requiring brake

override technology on all new automobiles, requiring auto makers to provide the necessary

equipment for investigators to read electronic data recorders and forcing senior executives of auto

companies to personally certify that information their firms provide to NHTSA is complete and

accurate.99

Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood also has raised the possibility of requiring brake

override systems in all new cars, and has suggested that Congress tighten lobbying laws and

regulations to make it more difficult for former officials to lobby their former agencies. The DOT

has pulled in NASA engineers to take a closer look at potential issues with electronics and is

continuing to assess whether Toyota has reported possible product defects in an expeditious

manner, as required by law.

Consumer advocates have suggested broader changes including new standards for accelerators

and electronics testing; mandatory installation of event data recorders and the collection of more

information; more public disclosure of Early Warning Reports under the TREAD Act; higher

fines for violations of the TREAD law; and enhanced funding for NHTSA.100

Statement of Sen. Rockefeller at March 2, 2010, Senate Commerce, Science and Industry Committee hearing on

Toyota recalls.

100

Testimony of Clarence Ditlow, Executive Director of the Center for Automotive Safety, before the Senate

Commerce, Science and Industry Committee, March 2, 2010. Joan Claybrook, President Emeritus, Public Citizen,

testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Toyota Gas

Pedals: Is the Public at Risk?, February 24, 2010.

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Appendix A. NHTSA and the TREAD Act

In October 2000, Congress passed the TREAD Act (P.L. 106-414). The act was passed in

response to a safety problem involving certain Firestone tires, which were linked to a number of

crashes and deaths, and which led to a recall of millions of tires. During hearings on this issue,

Congress examined why NHTSA had not spotted the tire problems sooner, and whether there

were changes that could help NHTSA more quickly identify possible safety defects. Congress

concluded that NHTSA did not have sufficient information to identify the problem with the tires,

but also that NHTSA had not made effective use of the limited information it did have. 101 In the

TREAD Act, Congress authorized provisions to increase both the amount of data available to

NHTSA to help it to identify potential safety defects, and resources to improve NHTSA’s capacity

to analyze data to more quickly identify possible defects.

Increasing Potential Defect Information Available to ODI

Section 3 of the TREAD Act included new reporting requirements for motor vehicle and

equipment manufacturers. One provision required manufacturers to inform NHTSA of safety

recalls or other safety campaigns conducted in foreign countries on motor vehicles or equipment

similar to those sold in the United States. The law also gave manufacturers an obligation to notify

NHTSA within five days of determining whether a defect exists. A key provision was the Early

Warning Reporting (EWR) requirement (section 3(b)). The EWR requires manufacturers to

regularly share with NHTSA certain information they receive about their vehicles or equipment.

Specifically, manufacturers are required to report on a quarterly basis

1. The number of vehicles, tires, and child restraint systems, by make, model, and

model (production) year, that were produced;

2. The number of claims and notices involving death (including those in foreign

countries), personal injury, and property damage by make, model, model year,

and vehicle identification number;

3. The number of paid warranty claims in the United States that involve specified

components and systems;

4. The number of field reports received from the manufacturer’s employees,

representatives, dealers, and fleets, related to problems with specified

components and systems, and copies of all field reports (except those from

dealers); and

5. All consumer complaints received regarding a product.

Prior to the implementation of the EWR requirement, NHTSA’s primary information sources for

potential vehicle safety defects were technical service bulletins from manufacturers, recalls

conducted by manufacturers, and complaints by consumers directly to NHTSA, as well as

NHTSA’s own defect investigations. While NHTSA was receiving 40,000 to 50,000 consumer

101

United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, p. 1, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2002071.pdf.

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complaints each year, that was a small fraction—on the order of 10%—of the number of

complaints that were received by manufacturers themselves.102

One issue that arose during implementation of the EWR provision was the question of to what

extent NHTSA would make public the data provided by manufacturers. An auto equipment

industry group sued to require NHTSA to withhold all manufacturer data except when an

investigation was initiated, on the grounds that the information could subject companies to

competitive harm, and that it was not the intention of Congress that such data should be made

public. Conversely, a public safety group sued to require NHTSA to make all of the data

available, on the grounds that safety defects could be more effectively identified if the public was

also able to view all the information. NHTSA took a middle course. It makes certain data it

receives from the manufacturers publicly available (light vehicle production numbers and death,

injury, and property damage incidents by make, model, model year, and reported components

involved), while keeping other data confidential (e.g., warranty claims, consumer complaints to

the manufacturer, field reports).103 NHTSA’s reasoning was that too much disclosure could create

a competitive disadvantage for manufacturers (by providing certain information to competitors),

and could impair NHTSA’s ability to obtain similar information in the future (since manufacturers

might limit their information-gathering efforts if they were required to disclose all that

information).104

Increasing ODI’s Capacity to Analyze Potential Defect Information

After passage of the TREAD Act, NHTSA replaced the ODI’s defects information system with a

new system, ARTEMIS (Advanced Retrieval (Tire, Equipment, Motor Vehicle) Information

System). ARTEMIS was conceived as an information system that could both compile the greatly

increased amounts of information NHTSA would receive as a result of the EWR requirement and

provide sophisticated data-mining capacities for analysis of this information.

ARTEMIS’s initial 21-month completion schedule stretched to 42 months; its budget nearly

doubled (from $5.35 million to $9.4 million); and when it was fully deployed in July 2004, it

lacked some of the “more advanced trend and predictive analyses [capabilities] that were

originally envisioned as being needed to identify defects warranting investigation.”105 One

example of a missing feature in ARTEMIS was the system’s lack of ability to automatically

highlight trends such as increases in the number of complaints and warranty claims related to a

specific motor vehicle component. 106

102

United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, p. 11, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2002071.pdf.

103

United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Public Release of

EWR Data, (no date, but cites a change beginning September 10, 2008), http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/qb/

documents/NHTSA-ODI-EWR-Facts.pdf.

104

United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-Up Audit of the Office of

Defects Investigation, MH-2004-088, September 23, 2004, pp. 16-17, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/

mh2004088.pdf.

105

United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-Up Audit of the Office of

Defects Investigation, MH-2004-088, September 23, 2004, p. 14, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/

mh2004088.pdf.

106

United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-Up Audit of the Office of

Defects Investigation, MH-2004-088, September 23, 2004, pp. 16-17, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/

(continued...)

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In its 2004 audit, the DOT IG was told by NHTSA that it was considering the use of other

software to supplement the analytical capacities of ARTEMIS, and also that NHTSA had signed

an agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the effect that the FAA would

help NHTSA develop a system to review EWR reports from manufacturers and to identify

advanced data analytical options that might be employed.107 CRS has been unable to obtain

updated information about the status of these efforts.

Elements of ARTEMIS are available to the public for searching some EWR information (see

http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/). According to NHTSA, there are over 9,500 unique visitors to

the ARTEMIS site each day. 108 See Figure A-1 for an illustration of the information inputs for

ARTEMIS.

Figure A-1. ARTEMIS Information Inputs

Source: United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-Up Audit of the

Office of Defects Investigation, MH-2004-088, September 23, 2004, p. 28, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/

pdfdocs/mh2004088.pdf.

(...continued)

mh2004088.pdf.

107

United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-Up Audit of the Office of

Defects Investigation, MH-2004-088, September 23, 2004, p. 14, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/

mh2004088.pdf.

108

United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, FY 2011

Congressional Budget Justification, p. 292, http://www.dot.gov/budget/2011/budgetestimates/nhtsa.pdf.

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Appendix B. NHTSA’s Defects Investigation Process

NHTSA’s defects investigation process has several stages, with points where a decision to begin

or continue an investigation is made (see Figure B-1 and the summary below). In a 2002 review

the DOTIG examined a random sample of 59 defect cases that were either recommended for, or

led to, investigation. Of those 59 cases, 21 began immediately as investigations, bypassing the

defect analysis/investigation recommendation stage. The remaining 38 cases were recommended

for investigation. Investigations were opened for 28 of the cases. At the time those decisions were

made, there was no process for recording the reasons why investigations were not undertaken.

ODI officials were able to provide reasons why at least some of the cases did not lead to

investigations. But the DOTIG found no consistent differences between the cases that led to

investigations and those that did not.109

The DOTIG noted that ODI defect cases for which defects analysts recommended an

investigation be started but for which investigations were not started remain open for monitoring.

However, the DOTIG observed that there was no system for tracking whether such cases were in

fact continuing to be monitored (e.g., no status or progress reports were required). As a result,

ODI managers did not know whether staff continued to search for new complaints related to those

cases, or whether new information suggested that a case should be re-evaluated for investigation.

The DOTIG review identified subsequent complaints in 7 of 10 cases randomly sampled, and

found significant increases in the number of complaints received in two of those cases. ODI had

not opened an investigation for any of the 10 cases. 110

Receiving Information About Potential Defects

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) receives information about possible defects through

several channels. It maintains a toll-free hotline (888-327-4236) and an online site

(http://www.safercar.gov) through which consumers can report complaints about motor vehicles.

Consumers can also mail a letter or fax information to the ODI. NHTSA has a form on its website

to help elicit information from complainants. NHTSA’s website tells visitors that there are four

categories for safety complaints: motor vehicles, tires, non-original vehicle equipment (e.g.,

lights, jacks, wipers, etc.), and child restraint equipment. NHTSA also receives EWR information

from manufacturers. This information is entered into the ARTEMIS information system for

analysis.

109

United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, pp. 14-16, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/

mh2002071.pdf.

110

United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, p. 17, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2002071.pdf.

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Figure B-1. ODI Defects Investigation Process

Source: United States Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-Up Audit of the

Office of Defects Investigation, MH-2004-088, September 23, 2004, p. 38, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/

pdfdocs/mh2004088.pdf.

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Defects Analysis and Identification

Complaints are assessed by NHTSA’s Defects and Recall Information Analysis Division. In 2004,

the DOTIG reported that the process of analyzing information for evidence of safety defects can

take one to three months. This may include field investigations, surveys, and testing. When a

pattern suggesting the possible existence of a safety defect is found, an analyst is to assemble an

initial evaluation (IE) package containing pertinent information about the suspected defect. The

IE is to be reviewed by the chief of the Defects and Recall Information Analysis Division. The IE

is then to be sent to members of a peer review panel two weeks before a regularly scheduled

review panel meeting to consider the evaluation. According to NHTSA, on average each analyst

evaluates and presents 35 cases of potential defects each year; this number has been increasing

over time. (See Table B-1.)111

Table B-1. Average Number of Issues Evaluated and Presented

Per ODI Staff Member

Calendar Year

Average Number of Issues Per Staff Member

2000

2002

2003

2006

2007

Source: United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Budget

Estimates for FY2004 (p. 1045-1046), FY2005 (p. 1742, VS-14), FY2006 (1380, III-23), FY2011 (p. 294)

One issue raised by the DOTIG review was the limited amount of time staff had to assess

consumer complaints. In its 2002 review the DOTIG estimated that, as ODI was receiving an

average of over 34,000 complaints each year, the staff responsible for reviewing those complaints

had “an average of about 12 minutes per complaint to review the information, search the defect

database for similar complaints, related investigations, and recalls, and decide whether to

recommend an investigation.”112

The relatively limited amount of time each screener has to process each complaint, combined

with the number of complaints processed each year and the undoubted variety of the information

in each complaint, contributes to another challenge identified by the DOTIG that appears to

persist. The DOTIG noted in 2002 that the previous version of NHTSA’s defects database

contained incorrectly recorded information and that the problems identified in complaints in the

database did not always reflect all of the information relevant to the potential defect that was

included in the complaint. 113

111

United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, FY 2011

Congressional Budget Justification, p. 294, http://www.dot.gov/budget/2011/budgetestimates/nhtsa.pdf.

112

United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, p. 11, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2002071.pdf.

113

United States Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Office of Defects

Investigation, MH-2002-071, January 3, 2002, p. 11, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2002071.pdf.

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Edmunds Automotive in early 2010 did an independent review of the sudden acceleration

complaints for all manufacturers contained in NHTSA’s current complaints database, and noted

that many complaints in the database were miscategorized and many were duplicates. 114

NHTSA reports that now all complaints are initially screened and entered into NHTSA’s

complaints database by a pair of screeners. These two screeners’ responsibilities include

categorizing the complaints for further review by a group of six screeners with various areas of

expertise who review complaints that fall into their specialties. The fact that only two screeners

are responsible for the initial handling the 35,000 or more complaints submitted annually may

help explain the problems with the quality of the data in the complaints database.

Starting an Investigation

The NHTSA peer review panel is composed of representatives from the defects analysis and

vehicle investigation divisions. The panel meets once every two weeks to consider the IEs, which

propose that an investigation should be opened. If the review panel decides to proceed with an

investigation, analysts in the appropriate vehicle investigation division conduct a preliminary

evaluation (PE). If the panel decides not to proceed to an investigation, the reasons why are

recorded. On average, around 100 investigations are opened each year.

Stages of Investigation

There are two stages to an investigation: the preliminary evaluation and the engineering analysis.

Preliminary Evaluation (PE)

The PE is based on analysis of additional data obtained from the manufacturer about the potential

defect, and may include testing, field investigations, and surveys to determine the number of

similar complaints. A PE typically takes four months. A PE may be terminated because the

manufacturer initiates a voluntary recall while the PE is underway. At the conclusion of a PE the

vehicle investigation division chief and the director of ODI may decide to end the investigation if

there does not appear to be evidence of a safety defect, or to proceed to the next stage.

Engineering Analysis (EA)

During the EA, further technical information may be requested from a manufacturer, and further

testing, additional field investigations, and more surveys may be done to help determine whether

a safety defect exists. An EA can take up to one year.

Given the timing of the elements of a defect identification and investigation, the total defect

identification and investigation process can take over a year. NHTSA reports that the average

completion time for a defect investigation is eight months.115 That has been the reported average

completion time since at least calendar year 2000.116

114

Jeremy Anwyl, Chief Executive, Edmunds.com, “No Easy Answer for the Toyota Problem,” Washington Post,

March 16, 2010, p. A19.

115

United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, FY 2011

(continued...)

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Unintended Acceleration in Passenger Vehicles

Recalls

At the conclusion of an EA, the vehicle investigative division chief and the director of ODI may

decide to close the investigation, or they may decide that the evidence warrants a safety recall. In

that case, NHTSA is to send a letter to a manufacturer requesting that the manufacturer conduct a

recall. NHTSA’s Defects and Recall Information Analysis Division monitors recalls. However, as

noted above, manufacturers may decide to initiate a recall before NHTSA concludes a defect

investigation.

As Table 3 above shows, the average annual number of defect recalls has been increasing over

the past 15 years, though the average annual number of items affected117 has decreased in recent

years. NHTSA reports that it influences around one-quarter of defect recalls, though the average

annual percentage has declined somewhat. Though NHTSA-influenced recalls represent around a

quarter or less of the number of recalls, those recalls involve a disproportionate number of items,

representing half or more of items affected by defect recalls. A primary mechanism of influence is

the opening of a defect investigation; NHTSA reports that approximately 50% of all opened

investigations result in a safety recall or other manufacturer action to correct a safety problem. 118

(...continued)

Congressional Budget Justification, p. 55, http://www.dot.gov/budget/2011/budgetestimates/nhtsa.pdf.

116

This eight-month average figure for calendar year 2000 is referenced in NHTSA’s FY2004 budget estimate; the

figure is repeated in subsequent budget estimates up through the one for FY2011.

117

“Items affected” includes vehicles, auto equipment (such as tires), and child safety seats.

118

United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, FY 2011

Congressional Budget Justification, p. 55, http://www.dot.gov/budget/2011/budgetestimates/nhtsa.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Unintended Acceleration in Passenger Vehicles

Appendix C. Toyota Sudden Acceleration Timeline

A timeline of actions related to unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles.119

•

September 2000—Toyota recalls Lexus models in the United Kingdom to

prevent floor mats from interfering with gas pedals.

•

December 2000—NHTSA received 49,000 consumer complaints for all reasons

in 2000, of which about 1,200 or 2% may have claimed unintended acceleration.

Of that total, Toyota accounted for 4% of unintended acceleration complaints.

•

May, 2003—NHTSA is petitioned to examine unintended, sudden acceleration in

the 1997-2000 Lexus LS and GS 4000. After a review, NHTSA denies the

petition on the basis that it has found no evidence of a safety defect trend.

•

February 2004—NHTSA opens review of electronic throttle control malfunction

complaints in 2002 and 2003 models of the Lexus ES300. The investigation is

closed in July 2004 after NHTSA identified 20 unique vehicles and two crashes

that may have been related to a loss of throttle control, but could not find a

vehicle-based cause.

•

February/March 2004—State Farm Insurance Co. notifies NHTSA of a trend of

rising claims relating to sudden acceleration in the 2002 and 2003 Lexus ES300

and Toyota Camrys.

•

August 2005—NHTSA begins investigation of possible uncontrollable

acceleration in 2002-2005 model year Camry, Solara, and Lexus ES vehicles.

The agency closes the investigation in January 2006 without a determination of a

defect.

•

July 2006—Toyota tells NHTSA it will conduct a recall of 367,000 Highlander,

Lexus RX330, and Lexus RX400h vehicles to fix floor mat retaining clips that

may prevent the accelerator pedal from returning to idle.

•

September 2006—NHTSA opens investigation of 2002-2006 model year Camrys

and Solaras following reports of sudden acceleration. The investigation is

concluded without a defect finding.

•

2006—Toyota CEO Katsuaki Watanabe apologies to consumers for quality

problems and the company delays some new models by up to a half year.

•

March 2007—NHTSA begins investigation into possible pedal entrapment in

2007 Lexus ES350 based on five complaints alleging three crashes and seven

injuries. The agency upgrades the investigation in August 2007 following a fatal

crash involving a 2007 Camry. NHTSA in September determines that floor mat

entrapment caused the accident and orders a Toyota recall. Toyota recalls 55,000

all-weather floor mats for 2007 and 2008 model year Camry and Lexus ES350

vehicles. NHTSA issues Consumer Advisory warning about the need to properly

secure or remove floor mats.

119

Timeline compiled from Reuters News Service and Automotive News, “Events Leading to Toyota’s Crisis,”

February 24, 2010; Toyota Corporate Press Releases; congressional testimony and NHTSA documents.

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Unintended Acceleration in Passenger Vehicles

•

April 2008—NHTSA begins investigation into unintended acceleration, due to

trim interference, in the 2004 model Sienna minivan. In January 2009 Toyota

recalls 26,501 Sienna minivans to fix the carpet.

•

August 2009—California Highway Patrolman Mark Saylor and family members

are killed in a Santee, Calif. crash of a rental 2009 Lexus ES350. Investigators

determine that pedal entrapment by a floor mat may have contributed to the crash

and also raise concerns about accelerator pedal design.

•

September 2009—NHTSA tells Toyota it expects a recall to address possible

defects in pedal design.

•

October 2009—Toyota recalls 3.8 million vehicles in the United States to address

the possibility that floor mats could trap accelerator pedals in an open position.

The recall later is expanded to more than 5 million vehicles in January 2010.

•

November 4, 2009—NHTSA issues press release to correct what it terms

inaccurate and misleading information by Toyota regarding the recall of the 3.8

million vehicles. Toyota apologizes for having stated that NHTSA had found that

“no defect exists.”

•

December 15, 2009—NHTSA officials fly to Japan to meet with top Toyota

executives to underscore Toyota’s obligations under U.S. law and to prod for

faster action on safety issues.

•

January 16, 2010—Toyota informs NHTSA that accelerator pedals made by

supplier CTS Corp may have a “sticking” defect.

•

January 21, 2010—Toyota announces it will recall about 2.3 million Toyota

vehicles to fix sticky pedals.

•

January 25, 2010—NHTSA tells Toyota it must stop selling vehicles that have

acknowledged defects, even if it does not have a remedy.

•

January 26, 2010—Toyota announces it will suspend sales and production of

eights of its models due to concerns regarding sticking accelerator pedals. The

Toyota announcement included the 2009-2010 RAV4, 2009-2010 Corolla, 20092010 Matrix, 2005-2010 Avalon, 2010 Highlander, 2007-2010 Tundra, 20082010 Sequoia, and some 2007-2010 Camrys. The move did not affect Lexus or

Scion vehicles. The decision to cease production affected Toyota plants in

Canada, Indiana, Kentucky, and Texas.

•

January 29, 2010—NHTSA opens investigation into CTS pedals.

•

February 2, 2010—NHTSA renews investigation into Toyota’s electronic throttle

system.

•

February 4, 2010—NHTSA opens investigation into at least 124 consumer

complaints about brakes on Toyota Prius hybrids.

•

February 8, 2010—Toyota announced a voluntary recall of about 133,000 model

year 2010 Prius vehicles, as well as 14,500 Lexus vehicles in order to update

software in the auto braking systems. The company said some owners of the

Toyota models in question had reported “experiencing inconsistent brake feel

during slow and steady application of the brakes on rough or slick road surfaces.”

The company also says it had made changes in the Prius production.

Congressional Research Service

Unintended Acceleration in Passenger Vehicles

•

February 22, 2010—Toyota says it received a federal grand jury subpoena from

the Southern District of New York for documents related to unintended

acceleration of its vehicles and the Prius braking system. It also disclosed a

similar document request from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

•

March 2, 2010—Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood tells the Senate

Commerce Committee that the Obama Administration is considering requiring

brake override systems on all vehicles with electronic throttle controls.

Author Contact Information

Suzanne M. Kirchhoff

Analyst in Industrial Organization and Business

skirchhoff@crs.loc.gov, 7-0658

Congressional Research Service

David Randall Peterman

Analyst in Transportation Policy

dpeterman@crs.loc.gov, 7-3267

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.