Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportDec 4, 2025
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic
Missile Submarine Program: Background and
Issues for Congress
Updated December 4, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R41129
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Summary
The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) aims to design and
build a class of 12 new SSBNs to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs.
Since 2013, the Navy has consistently identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy’s top
priority program. The Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021 and the second in
FY2024. The Navy wants to procure the third boat in FY2026.
The first and second Columbia-class boats were funded with incremental funding, a funding
approach in which the procurement cost of each boat is divided into multiple annual increments,
with the first increment occurring in the year in which the boat was procured. The first Columbiaclass boat was funded with three-year incremental funding in FY2021-FY2023, and the second
boat was funded with two-year incremental funding (also called split funding) in FY2024FY2025. The Navy wants to use three-year incremental funding for procuring the third and
subsequent boats in the program.
The procurement dates of the first, second and third Columbia-class boats were spaced years
apart from one another to provide time for fixing any design issues that might be discovered in
building the first boat before construction proceeds on subsequent boats, and to help ease the
submarine construction industrial base into the situation of building Columbia-class submarines
while continuing to build Virginia-class attack submarines. During the period FY2021-FY2025,
the Columbia-class procurement rate was 0.4 boats per year (i.e., the first two boats were
procured during that five-year period).
Starting with the third boat in FY2026, the Navy wants to shift Columbia-class procurement to a
higher rate of one boat per year, so that the final 10 ships in the program (i.e., boats 3 through 12)
would be procured over the 10-year period FY2026-FY2035. To reduce Columbia-class
procurement costs and mitigate risks from shifting Columbia-class procurement to the higher rate
of one boat per year, the Navy wants to use a block buy contract to procure the five Columbiaclass boats that are scheduled to be procured in FY2026-FY2030 (i.e., boats 3 through 7).
The Navy’s FY2026 budget submission requests
•
•
•
the procurement of the third boat in the class;
authority to use three-year incremental funding for procuring each of the
remaining 10 boats in the program (i.e., boats 3 through 12); and
authority for using a block buy contract to procure the five Columbia-class boats
that are scheduled to be procured in FY2026-FY2030 (i.e., boats 3 through 7).
Issues for Congress for the Columbia-class program include
•
•
the impact of an estimated 17-month delay in the delivery of the first Columbiaclass boat on the Navy’s plans for replacing Ohio-class SSBNs on a timely basis,
and
the potential impact of the Columbia-class construction workload on the ability
of the submarine construction industrial base to build Virginia-class submarines
in desired numbers in coming years.
Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. military capabilities
and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
Congressional Research Service
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Navy SSBNs in General .................................................................................................... 1
Mission of SSBNs ............................................................................................................... 1
Current Ohio-Class SSBNs ................................................................................................. 3
U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN ................................................ 4
Submarine Construction Industrial Base ................................................................................... 4
Columbia-Class Program .......................................................................................................... 5
Navy’s Top Priority Program .............................................................................................. 5
Program Name, Origin, and Milestones.............................................................................. 5
Design and Production ........................................................................................................ 6
Procurement Quantity ......................................................................................................... 8
Procurement Schedule, Lead Boat Schedule, Lead Boat Delivery Delay .......................... 9
Program Cost and Funding ................................................................................................11
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 16
Impact of 17-Month Delay in Delivery of Lead Boat ............................................................. 16
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 16
Navy Perspective .............................................................................................................. 16
GAO Perspective .............................................................................................................. 17
Potential Impact on Virginia-Class Construction .................................................................... 19
FY2026 Legislative Request ................................................................................................... 19
Figures
Figure 1. Ohio (SSBN-726) Class SSBN ........................................................................................ 3
Figure 2. Columbia (SSBN-826) Class SSBN ................................................................................ 6
Figure 3. Columbia (SSBN-826) Class SSBN ................................................................................ 6
Tables
Table 1. Estimated Procurement Costs for First Three Boats ........................................................ 12
Table 2. Procurement Funding Profiles for First Three Boats in FY2026 Budget ........................ 15
Table A-1. U.S. SSBN Classes ...................................................................................................... 20
Appendixes
Appendix A. Summary of Past U.S. SSBN Designs ..................................................................... 20
Appendix B. U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN ..................................... 22
Appendix C. Columbia-Class Program Origin and Milestones .................................................... 25
Appendix D. Design of Columbia-Class Boats ............................................................................. 28
Appendix E. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) ...................................................... 37
Congressional Research Service
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 43
Congressional Research Service
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Introduction
This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class program, which aims to design and build a class of 12 new
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 aging Ohio-class
SSBNs. Since 2013, the Navy has consistently identified the Columbia-class program as the
Navy’s top priority program. The Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021 and the
second in FY2024. Navy plans call for procuring the remaining 10 boats in the class at a rate of
one boat per year in FY2026-FY2035.
The Navy’s FY2026 budget submission requests
•
•
•
the procurement of the third boat in the class;
authority to use three-year incremental funding for procuring each of the
remaining 10 boats in the program (i.e., boats 3 through 12); and
authority for using a block buy contract to procure the five Columbia-class boats
that are scheduled to be procured in FY2026-FY2030 (i.e., boats 3 through 7).
Issues for Congress for the Columbia-class program include
•
•
the impact of an estimated 17-month delay in the delivery of the first Columbiaclass boat on the Navy’s plans for replacing Ohio-class SSBNs on a timely basis,
and
the potential impact of the Columbia-class construction workload on the ability
of the submarine construction industrial base to build Virginia-class submarines
in desired numbers in coming years.
Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. military capabilities
and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
This report focuses on the Columbia-class program as a Navy shipbuilding program. Another
CRS product—CRS In Focus IF10519, Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces, by Anya L.
Fink—discusses the Columbia class as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the
context of strategic nuclear arms modernization efforts.1 Another CRS report—CRS Report
RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke—discusses the Navy’s Virginia-class
attack submarine program.
Background
U.S. Navy SSBNs in General
Mission of SSBNs
The U.S. Navy operates three kinds of submarines—nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs),
nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile
1 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and
Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
Congressional Research Service
1
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
submarines (SSBNs).2 The SSNs and SSGNs are multi-mission ships that perform a variety of
peacetime and wartime missions.3 Since the early 1990s, they have not carried nuclear weapons,
but the United States has reserved a right to rearm SSNs with nuclear-armed cruise missiles at
some point in the future should conditions warrant, and the Navy is currently developing a new
nuclear weapon called the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) that could be
placed on Navy SSNs at some point in the future.4
In contrast to the multi-mission SSNs and SSGNs, the SSBNs perform a single mission of
strategic nuclear deterrence. To perform this mission, SSBNs are armed with submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are large, long-range missiles that can be armed with multiple
nuclear warheads. SSBNs launch their SLBMs from large-diameter vertical launch tubes located
in the middle section of the boat.5 The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their
SLBMs, so as to deter a nuclear attack on the United States by another country by demonstrating
to other countries that the United States has an assured second-strike capability, meaning a
survivable system for carrying out a retaliatory nuclear attack.
Navy SSBNs, which are sometimes referred to informally as “boomers,”6 form one of three legs
of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force, or “triad,” which also includes land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and land-based long-range bombers. At any given
moment, some of the Navy’s SSBNs are conducting nuclear deterrent patrols. The Department of
Defense’s (DOD’s) report on the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released on February 2,
2018, states the following:
Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the triad. When on patrol,
SSBNs are, at present, virtually undetectable, and there are no known, near-term credible
threats to the survivability of the SSBN force. Nevertheless, we will continue to hedge
against the possibility that advances in anti-submarine warfare could make the SSBN force
less survivable in the future.7
2 In the designations SSN, SSGN, and SSBN, the SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered (meaning the
ship is powered by a nuclear reactor), G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile), B stands for ballistic
missile. As shown by the “Ns” in SSN, SSGN, and SSBN, all U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-powered. Other navies
operate nonnuclear powered submarines, which are powered by energy sources such as diesel engines. A submarine’s
use of nuclear or nonnuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is armed with nuclear
weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a nonnuclear-powered submarine can be armed
with nuclear weapons.
3 For more on the Navy’s SSNs and SSGNs, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and
AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report
RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
4 The Navy’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons—meaning all of the service’s nuclear weapons other than submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—were removed from Navy surface ships and submarines under a unilateral U.S.
nuclear initiative announced by President George H. W. Bush in September 1991. The initiative reserved a right to
rearm SSNs with nuclear-armed cruise missiles at some point in the future should conditions warrant. The Navy is
currently developing a new nonstrategic nuclear weapon—the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N).
For more on the SLCM-N program, see CRS In Focus IF12084, Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCMN), by Anya L. Fink.
5 SSBNs, like other Navy submarines, are also equipped with horizontal torpedo tubes in the bow for firing torpedoes
or other torpedo-sized weapons.
6 This informal name is a reference to the large boom that would be made by the detonation of an SLBM nuclear
warhead.
7 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, released February 2, 2018, pp. 44-45.
Congressional Research Service
2
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Current Ohio-Class SSBNs
The Navy currently operates 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs (see Figure 1). The boats are
commonly called Trident SSBNs or simply Tridents because they carry Trident D-5 SLBMs.
They were procured in FY1977-FY1991 and entered service in 1984-1997. They were designed
and built by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset
Point, RI. They were originally designed for 30-year service lives but were later certified for 42year service lives, consisting of two approximately 19-year periods of operation separated by an
approximately four-year midlife nuclear refueling overhaul, called an engineered refueling
overhaul (ERO). The nuclear refueling overhaul includes a nuclear refueling and additional
overhaul work that is not related to the nuclear refueling.8
Figure 1. Ohio (SSBN-726) Class SSBN
With the hatches to some of its SLBM launch tubes open
Source: Cropped version of U.S. Navy photograph.
The Ohio-class boats were originally designed to each carry 24 SLBMs. As part of the U.S. plan
for complying with U.S.-Russia strategic nuclear arms control limits, four SLBM launch tubes on
each boat were deactivated, reducing to 20 the number of SLBMs they can each carry. Section
20008(a)(8) of the FY2025 reconciliation act (aka One Big Beautiful Bill Act, or OBBBA) (H.R.
1/P.L. 119-21 of July 4, 2025) provides $62.0 million in FY2025 funding “to convert Ohio-class
submarine tubes to accept additional missiles, not to be obligated before March 1, 2026.”
Eight of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs are homeported at Bangor, WA, in Puget Sound; the other six
are homeported at Kings Bay, GA, close to the Florida border. Unlike most Navy ships, which are
operated by single crews, Navy SSBNs are operated by alternating crews (called the Blue and
Gold crews) so as to maximize the percentage of time that they spend at sea in deployed status.
8 A total of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs were procured in FY1974-FY1991. The ships entered service in 1981-1997. The first
8 boats in the class were originally armed with Trident I C-4 SLBMs; the final 10 were armed with larger and morecapable Trident II D-5 SLBMs. The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended a
strategic nuclear force for the START II strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty that included 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, all
armed with D-5s. This recommendation prompted interest in the idea of converting the first four Ohio-class boats
(SSBNs 726-729) into SSGNs, so as to make good use of the 20 years of potential operational life remaining in these
four boats, and to bolster the U.S. SSN fleet. The first 4 Ohio-class boats were converted into SSGNs in 2002-2008,
and the next 4 (SSBNs 730-733) were backfitted with D-5 SLBMs in 2000-2005, producing the current force of 14
Ohio-class SSBNs, all of which are armed with D-5 SLBMs. For more on the SSGN conversion program, see CRS
Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
3
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
The first of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs (SSBN-730) will reach the end of its 42-year service life in
2027. The remaining 13 will reach the ends of their service lives at a rate of roughly one ship per
year thereafter, with the 14th reaching the end of its service life in 2040.
The Navy has initiated a program to refurbish and extend the service lives of D-5 SLBMs to
about 2040. As Columbia-class SSBNs begin to replace Ohio-class boats, refurbished D-5s
carried by retiring Ohio-class boats will be transferred to new Columbia-class boats. Columbiaclass boats will continue to be armed with these refurbished D-5s until about 2040, at which time
the D-5s are to be replaced by a successor SLBM.
Including the Ohio class, the Navy has operated four classes of SSBNs since 1959. For a table
summarizing these four classes, see Appendix A.
U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN
As one expression of U.S.-UK cooperation on nuclear weapon matters that dates back to World
War II, the UK’s four Vanguard-class SSBNs, which entered service in 1993-1999, each carry 16
Trident II D-5 SLBMs, and previous classes of UK SSBNs similarly carried earlier-generation
U.S. SLBMs.9 The UK plans to replace the four Vanguard-class boats with three or four
Dreadnought-class next-generation SSBNs. Dreadnought-class boats are to be equipped with 12
SLBM missile launch tubes, but current UK plans call for each boat to carry eight D-5 SLBMs,
with the other four tubes not being used for SLBMs. The United States is providing technical
assistance to the United Kingdom for the Dreadnought-class program, as it has over the years for
some other UK submarine programs; for additional discussion, see Appendix B.
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
U.S. Navy submarines are built at two shipyards—General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division
(GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport
News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. GD/EB and HII/NNS are the only two
shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-powered ships, and the only two capable of
performing final assembly of submarines. GD/EB builds submarines only, while HII/NNS also
builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships.
The two yards currently are jointly building Virginia-class attack submarines.10
In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes 20 or
more strategic outsources (facilities for building submarine structures), hundreds of material and
component supplier firms, and laboratories and research facilities. These additional elements of
the submarine construction industrial base are located in numerous U.S. states. About 70% of the
critical suppliers for the construction of submarines are sole-source suppliers.11 For nuclearpropulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclearpowered aircraft carrier construction program.12
9 Although the SLBMs on UK SSBNs are U.S.-made, the nuclear warheads on the missiles are of UK design and
manufacture.
10 For more on the arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy VirginiaClass Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
11 Source for figure of about 70%: Email to CRS and CBO from navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 31, 2024.
12 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. In terms of work provided to nuclear-propulsion
component suppliers, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
Congressional Research Service
4
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Much of the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base is
resident at GD/EB. Additional portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the component
makers.
Columbia-Class Program
Navy’s Top Priority Program
Navy officials have stated consistently since September 2013 that the Columbia-class program is
the Navy’s top priority program, and that this means, among other things, that from the Navy’s
perspective, the Columbia-class program will be funded, even if that comes at the expense of
funding for other Navy programs, and that in a situation of industrial base constraints, the
Columbia-class program will have first call on resources to minimize the chances of schedule
delays in building the boats.13 The status of the Columbia-class program as the Navy’s top
priority program reflects the importance of the SSBNs’ strategic nuclear deterrence mission.
Program Name, Origin, and Milestones
Until 2016, the Columbia-class program was known as the Ohio replacement program (ORP) or
SSBN(X) program,14 and boats in the class were referred to as Ohio replacement boats or
SSBNXs.
As discussed in the CRS report on Navy ship names, on December 14, 2016, the Navy announced
that SSBN-826, the first boat (aka lead boat) in the class, would be named Columbia, in honor of
the District of Columbia. Consequently, since December 2016, the 12 or more planned boats have
been referred to as Columbia (SSBN-826) class boats. On June 3, 2022, the Navy announced that
it was modifying SSBN-826’s name from Columbia to District of Columbia, so as to avoid an
overlap in names with USS Columbia (SSN-771), a Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack
submarine that was named for Columbia, SC; Columbia, IL; and Columbia, MO. The Navy states
that notwithstanding the modification to SSBN-826’s name, the 12 or more planned new SSBNs
will continue to be referred to as Columbia (SSBN-826) class boats.15
For information on the Columbia-class program’s origin and milestones, see Appendix C.
13 On September 18, 2013, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, then-Chief of Naval Operations, testified that the Columbia-
class program “is the top priority program for the Navy.” (Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief
of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services Committee on Planning for Sequestration in FY2014 and
Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, p. 10.)
Navy officials since then have reiterated this statement on numerous occasions. At a September 12, 2013, hearing
before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on undersea
warfare, a Navy official stated the following:
The CNO has stated, his number one priority as the chief of Naval operations, is our—our strategic
deterrent—our nuclear strategic deterrent. That will trump all other vitally important requirements
within our Navy, but if there’s only one thing that we do with our ship building account, we—we
are committed to sustaining a two ocean national strategic deterrent that protects our homeland
from nuclear attack, from other major war aggression and also access and extended deterrent for
our allies.
(Transcript of hearing. (Spoken remarks of Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge. The other witness
at the hearing was Rear Admiral David Johnson.)
14 In the designation SSBN(X), the (X) meant that the design of the boat had not yet been determined.
15 See CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
5
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Design and Production
Design
The Columbia-class design (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) includes 16 SLBM tubes, as opposed to
24 SLBM tubes (of which 20 are currently used for SLBMs) on Ohio-class SSBNs. Although the
Columbia-class design has fewer SLBM tubes than the Ohio-class design, it is larger than the
Ohio-class design in terms of submerged displacement. The Columbia-class design, like the
Ohio-class design before it, will be the largest submarine ever built by the United States.
Figure 2. Columbia (SSBN-826) Class SSBN
Artist’s rendering
Source: Cropped version of illustration accompanying David B. Larter, “US Navy Inks $9.4B Contract for two
Columbia-class Nuclear Missile Submarines,” Defense News, November 5, 2020. A caption to the image credits
it to the U.S. Navy.
Figure 3. Columbia (SSBN-826) Class SSBN
Notional cutaway illustration
Source: Detail of slide 2, entitled “OHIO Replacement Program System Description,” in Navy briefing on
Columbia-class program presented by Captain William J. Brougham, Program Manager of PMS 397 (i.e., Project
Manager Shipbuilding, Office Code 397, the office for the Columbia-class program), at the Sea, Air, and Space
Symposium, April 8, 2014, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), April 9, 2014.
Current U.S. and UK plans call for the Columbia-class and the UK’s Dreadnought-class SSBN to
use a missile compartment—the middle section of the boat with the SLBM launch tubes—of the
Congressional Research Service
6
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
same general design called the Common Missile Compartment (CMC).16 As Dreadnought-class
boats are to be equipped with 12 SLBM missile launch tubes, but current UK plans call for each
boat to carry eight D-5 SLBMs, with the other four tubes not being used for SLBMs. The
modular design of the CMC will accommodate the difference in the number of SLBM missile
launch tubes between the Columbia-class design and the Dreadnaught-class design. The UK
provided some of the funding for the design of the CMC, including a large portion of the initial
funding.17
For additional background information on the Columbia-class design, see Appendix D.
Production: Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP)
The Navy, under a plan it calls the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP), plans to build Columbia-class
boats jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of the work going to GD/EB. (The IEP was
previously called the Submarine Unified Build Strategy, or SUBS.) As part of this plan, the Navy
is adjusting the division of work on the Virginia-class attack submarine program (in which boats
are jointly built at GD/EB and HII/NNS),18 so that HII/NNS will receive a larger share of the
final-assembly work for that program than it has received in the past.19
16 Statement of Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, Before the Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee [on] FY2011 Strategic Systems, March 17, 2010, p. 6,
which states the following: “The OHIO Replacement programs includes the development of a common missile
compartment that will support both the OHIO Class Replacement and the successor to the UK Vanguard Class.”
17 See Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO10-388SP, March 2010, p. 152; Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected
Weapon Programs, GAO-11-233SP, March 2011, p. 147; Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Deterrent Decisions: US
and UK Wait on Next Steps for SSBN Replacements,” Jane’s Navy International, May 2010, pp. 10-11.
18 For more on the arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy VirginiaClass Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
19 Key elements of the Navy’s IEP plan include the following:
•
GD/EB is to be the prime contractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
•
HII/NNS is to be a subcontractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
•
GD/EB is to build certain parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the
parts that GD/EB builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
•
HII/NNS is to build certain other parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to
the parts that HII/NNS builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
•
GD/EB is to perform the final assembly on all 12 Columbia-class boats;
•
as a result of the three previous points, the Navy estimates that GD/EB would receive an estimated 77%-78%
of the shipyard work building Columbia-class boats, and HII/NNS would receive 22%-23%;
•
GD/EB is to continue as prime contractor for the Virginia-class program, but to help balance out projected
submarine-construction workloads at GD/EB and HII/NNS, the division of work between the two yards for
building Virginia-class boats is to be adjusted so that HII/NNS would perform the final assembly on a greater
number of Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current Virginia-class division
of work (in which final assemblies are divided more or less evenly between the two shipyards); as a
consequence, HII/NNS would receive a greater share of the total work in building Virginia-class boats than it
would have under a continuation of the current division of work.
See Julia Bergman, “Congressmen Visit EB A Day After It Is Named Prime Contractor for Ohio Replacement
Program,” The Day (New London), March 29, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Ohio Replacement Plan Is Good News
For Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, March 29, 2016; Robert McCabe, “Newport News Shipbuilding’s Share of
Virginia-Class Submarine Deliveries to Grow,” Virginian-Pilot (Newport News), March 29, 2016; Valerie Insinna,
“GD Electric Boat Chosen To Take Lead Role for Ohio Replacement Sub,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2016: 1-3; Hugh
Lessig, “Navy: More Submarine Work Coming to Newport News Shipyard,” Military.com, March 30, 2016; Lee
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
7
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Procurement Quantity
Planned Quantity of 12
Current Navy plans call for procuring 12 Columbia-class boats to replace the current force of 14
Ohio-class SSBNs. In explaining the planned procurement quantity of 12 boats, the Navy states
the following:
•
•
•
Ten operational SSBNs—meaning boats not encumbered by lengthy maintenance
actions such as a midlife overhaul—are needed to meet strategic nuclear
deterrence requirements for having a certain number of SSBNs at sea at any
given moment.
Fourteen Ohio-class boats were needed to meet the requirement for 10
operational boats because, during the middle years of the Ohio class life cycle,
three and sometimes four of the boats were nonoperational at any given moment
on account of being in the midst of lengthy midlife nuclear refueling overhauls or
other extended maintenance actions.
Twelve (rather than 14) Columbia-class boats will be needed to meet the
requirement for 10 operational boats because the midlife overhauls of Columbiaclass boats, which will not include a nuclear refueling, will require less time
(about two years) than the midlife refueling overhauls of Ohio-class boats (which
require about four years from contract award to delivery), the result being that
only two Columbia-class boats (rather than three or sometimes four) will be in
the midst of midlife overhauls or other extended maintenance actions at any
given moment during the middle years of the Columbia-class life cycle.20
Potential for Increase to Something More than 12
The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in February 2018, states
the following: “The COLUMBIA-class program will deliver a minimum of 12 SSBNs to replace
the current OHIO fleet and is designed to provide required capabilities for decades.”21 The use of
the word “minimum” in that sentence can be viewed as signaling a possibility that the required
number of Columbia-class boats might at some point be increased to something more than 12
boats.22 An October 2023 report by a congressional commission on U.S. strategic posture
Hudson, “Work on Ohio-Class Replacement Will Be 80-20 Split Between GDEB, HII-NNS,” Inside the Navy, April 4,
2016. See also Richard R. Burgess, “Submarine Admirals: ‘Unified Build Strategy’ Seeks Affordability for Future Sub
Fleet,” Seapower, July 8, 2016. See also Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development and Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Integration of Capabilities and Resources, and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat
Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the
Navy Seapower and Projection Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2016, p. 12.
20 For additional discussion, see “Navy Responds to Debate Over the Size of the SSBN Force,” Navy Live, May 16,
2013, accessed July 26, 2013, at http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/05/16/navy-responds-to-debate-over-the-size-of-thessbn-force/, and Richard Breckenridge, “SSBN Force Level Requirements: It’s Simply a Matter of Geography,” Navy
Live, July 19, 2013, accessed July 26, 2013, at http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/07/19/ssbn-force-level-requirementsits-simply-a-matter-of-geography/.
21 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, released February 2, 2018, p. 49. A similar statement (which
differs only in saying “COLUMBIA program” rather than “COLUMBIA-class program”) appears on p. x.
22 See, for example, Marc Selinger, “Navy Might Someday Consider Buying More Than 12 Columbia-Class
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
8
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
recommended increasing the total planned number of Columbia-class boats to something more
than 12.23
Procurement Schedule, Lead Boat Schedule, Lead Boat Delivery Delay
Procurement Schedule
As noted earlier, the Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021 and the second
Columbia-class boat in FY2024. The Navy wants to procure the remaining 10 boats in the
program—boats 3 through 12—at a rate of one per year in FY2026-FY2035. After being
delivered to the Navy, the lead boat is to undergo substantial testing prior to serving on its first
deterrent patrol.
Taking into account both projected delivery dates for Columbia-class boats and projected
retirement dates for Ohio-class boats, the Navy’s FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054)
shipbuilding plan projects that the SSBN force will include 14 boats in FY2025-FY2026, 13
boats in FY2027-FY2029, and 12 boats for the remainder of the 30-year period (except for
FY2040-FY2041, when it is projected to include 13 boats). (The Navy did not submit an FY2026
30-year shipbuilding plan.) The Navy is planning to extend the service lives of up to five Ohioclass SSBNs to hedge against potential delays in the deliveries of Columbia-class boats.24
Lead Boat Schedule
The schedule for designing and building the lead Columbia-class boat and having it ready for an
intended scheduled first deterrent patrol in late 2030 or 2031 includes little margin for absorbing
design or construction delays. The tightness in the lead boat’s design and construction schedule
has been a principal feature of the program (along with the program’s high priority) for several
years. Much of the management time and attention that the Navy devotes to the program is
Submarines,” Defense Daily, April 12, 2018: 2-3; Jason Sherman, “Navy Keeping Options Open to ‘Tack On’
Additional Submarines to 12-Boat Columbia Buy,” Inside Defense, November 18, 2020. See also Richard R. Burgess,
“Navy SSBN PEO: Data Clearly Supports Building More than 12 Columbia Subs,” Seapower, June 9, 2022.
23 Madelyn R. Creedon, chair, et al., America’s Strategic Posture, The Final Report of the Congressional Commission
on the Strategic Posture of the United States, October 2023, pp. 48, 99.
24 Source: Navy information paper on the FY2022 Fiscal Planning Framework and submarine service life extensions,
February 5, 2021, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and CRS on
February 5, 2021. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Confirms Extending Five SSBNs Starting In 2029,” Defense Daily,
November 8, 2023; Sam LaGrone and Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Mulling Large Diameter Sub Hulls After 12
Columbias, SSN(X) Requirements Due Next Year,” USNI News, November 8 (updated November 9), 2023; Nick
Wilson, “Navy Planning Ohio Service Life Extension to Mitigate Risk as Columbia Construction Continues,” Inside
Defense, November 8, 2023; Justin Katz, “Navy Planning to Execute 3-Year Ohio-Class Sub Life Extensions,”
Breaking Defense, November 7, 2023; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy May Accelerate Investments to Extend Some Ohio
Subs’ Lives,” Defense News, May 19, 2023; Rich Abott, “Navy Eyes 2026 Decision On First Ohio-Class SSBN
Extension,” Defense Daily, November 2, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Wants to Avoid Shortfall of Nuke-Armed
Subs in 2030s,” Defense News, November 2, 2022; Justin Katz, “Navy ‘Scoping Study’ to Examine Shipyard Capacity,
Potential for a New Yard,” Breaking Defense, November 2, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “A Handful of Ohio Subs Could
Get Yet Another Service Life Extension,” Defense One, November 1, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Could Extend Life
of Five Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Boats to Hedge Against Columbia Program Delays,” USNI News, November 1,
2022; Nick Wilson, “Navy to Consider Service Extensions for Select Ohio-Class Subs,” Inside Defense, November 1,
2022; Emma Helfrich, “Navy Eyeing Life Extension Of Nine Ohio Class [SSBN and SSGN] Submarines,” The Drive,
May 18, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Navy May Extend Life of Ohio SSBNs to Provide Cushion for Introduction of
Columbia-class,” USNI News, November 16 (updated December 24), 2020; Aidan Quigley, “Navy Considering
Expanding Life Cycles of Some Ohio-class Submarines to Ease Columbia Transition,” Inside Defense, July 7, 2021;
Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Reorganizes Submarine Enterprise to Address Challenges in Construction, Maintenance,”
Defense News, September 27, 2021.
Congressional Research Service
9
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
focused on anticipating, monitoring, and mitigating risks to the lead boat’s design and
construction schedule.
Lead Boat Delivery Delay
On April 2, 2024, the Navy announced that several of its shipbuilding programs were
experiencing significant delays due to shipyard workforce challenges, supply chain challenges,
and other issues. As part of this announcement, the Navy announced an estimated 12- to 16month delay in the delivery of the first Columbia-class boat. An April 2, 2024, press report stated,
The vessel’s new projected delay can’t be attributed to one factor or a new technical issue,
Navy officials told reporters Tuesday [April 2]. Instead, the delays are “related to the whole
of the ship,” in terms of assembling its modules correctly, “getting them all buttoned up,”
said Navy assistant secretary for acquisition Nickolas Guertin.
And although some components are late, the projected delays don’t appear related to
technology performance issue, said Naval Sea Systems Command head Vice Admiral Jim
Downey.25
An April 10, 2024, press report states,
Late delivery of steam turbines for the under-construction District of Columbia (SSBN826) is one of the main obstacles the Navy faces in delivering the nuclear ballistic missile
submarine on time, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro told a House panel on
Wednesday [April 10].
“One of the most significant challenges that we have with Columbia … is actually the late
delivery of the turbine generator to Columbia by subcontractor Northrop Grumman,” Del
Toro the House Appropriations subcommittee on defense.
“That has had a major impact on the Columbia.”…
In addition to the turbines, sources familiar with the slip in schedule have also pointed to
the delay in completing the bow dome of District of Columbia. The dome, the same design
as the Ohio-class, is getting cast at forge at HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia.26
An April 17, 2024, press report states,
A delay of as much as 16 months in delivering the first of the US’s first Columbia-class
nuclear-missile submarines—the Navy’s top weapons priority—stems from contractor
delays in delivering the vessel’s bow section and power generators, according to an internal
assessment by the service….
… HII was to ship the bow in May 2025 from its Newport News, Virginia, yard to the
General Dynamics facility in Groton, Connecticut. That’s now estimated for June 2026, or
13 months late, according to internal service figures….
In addition, Northrop Grumman Corp. was contracted by the Navy to deliver the first ship’s
turbine generators by November 2021, which would have provided months of margin
before they’d be needed.
25 Anthony Capaccio, “US Navy Sees Delays of a Year or More for New ICBM Submarine,” Bloomberg, April 2,
2024. See also Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, “First Columbia Nuclear Missile Sub At Risk of 1-Year Delay
Due to Supplier Problems,” USNI News, March 11, 2024; “Absent General Dynamics Improvements, Pentagon
Forecasts Year-Long Delay to Columbia-class Nuclear Submarine Program,” Capitol Forum, March 11, 2024.
26 Sam LaGrone, “Late Turbines Have ‘Major Impact’ on Columbia Sub Delivery Schedule, Says SECNAV,” USNI
News, April 10, 2024. See also Rich Abott, “Del Toro Says Turbine Generator A Major Issue In Columbia Delay,”
Defense Daily, April 10, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
10
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Instead, the turbine generators are projected to be delivered in early 2025, according to a
Navy statement.27
The Navy’s FY2026 budget submission updated the estimated delay in the delivery of the first
Columbia-class boat to 17 months.
Program Cost and Funding
Program Acquisition Cost
Estimates of the procurement cost and acquisition cost (i.e., the research and development cost
plus procurement cost) of the Columbia-class program include the following:
•
•
•
The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of
the 12-ship class at $126.4 billion in then-year dollars, an increase of 15.2% over
the figure in the FY2021 budget submission of $109.8 billion in then-year
dollars. (The Navy’s FY2026 budget submission does not include an updated
estimate of the total procurement cost of the 12-ship class.)
A December 31, 2023, DOD Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR)
for the Columbia-class program estimates the program’s total acquisition cost at
$139,716.8 million (about $139.7 billion) in then-year dollars, including
$13,938.2 million (about $13.9 billion) in research and development costs,
$125,320.2 million (about $125.3 billion) in procurement costs, and $458.4
million in military construction costs.28
A June 2025 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected
major weapon acquisition programs being pursued by the Department of Defense
(DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under
Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025, stated that the estimated total
acquisition cost of the Columbia-class program as of August 2024 was $126,495
million (about $126.5 billion) in constant FY2025 dollars, an increase of about
6% from the cost as estimated in August 2023, including $16,651 million (about
$16.7 billion) in research and development costs, $109,408 million (about $109.4
billion) in procurement costs, and $436 million for military construction and
acquisition-related operation and maintenance costs.29
The above estimates do not include estimated costs for refurbishing D-5 SLBMs so as to extend
their service lives to about 2040.
Unit Procurement Cost
Table 1 shows the estimated procurement costs of the first three boats in the program, as shown
in the Navy’s FY2026 budget submission. The lead boat’s procurement cost is much higher than
that of subsequent boats in the class because the lead boat includes most of the detail
design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the class. (It is a long-standing Navy
budgetary practice to incorporate the much or all of the DD/NRE costs for a new class of ship
27 Anthony Capaccio, “US Nuclear-Missile Sub Delayed Up to 16 Months Over Bow, Generators,” Bloomberg, April
17, 2024.
28 Department of Defense, Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR), SSBN 826 COLUMBIA Class Submarine
(SSBN 826), FY 2025 President’s Budget, December 31, 2023, p. 16.
29 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] DOD Leaders Should Ensure That
Newer Programs Are Structured for Speed and Innovation, GAO-25-107569, June 2025, p. 147.
Congressional Research Service
11
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
into the total procurement cost of the first ship in the class.) In the table, the category shown as
“Plans” is similar to DD/NRE, while the category shown as “Other,” which includes all other
procurement costs, can be viewed as the hands-on construction cost of the boat. As can be seen in
the table, the first three boats in the program have estimated hands-on construction costs of more
than $9 billion each.
Table 1. Estimated Procurement Costs for First Three Boats
In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
First boat
(SSBN-826)
Second boat
(SSBN-827)
Third boat
(SSBN-828)
Plans
6,946.3
1,443.3
969.6
Other
9,175.0
9,245.2
9,574.2
Total
16,121.3
10,688.5
10,543.7
Source: Table prepared by CRS using data from Navy’s FY2026 budget submission. Totals may not add due to
rounding.
Notes: “Other” category includes basic construction/conversion; change orders; electronics; propulsion
equipment; hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) equipment; ordnance-related equipment (but not the
weapons themselves, which are procured separately); and other costs.
CBO and GAO Perspectives on Risk of Cost Growth
Regarding the risk of cost growth in the Columbia-class program, a January 2025 CBO report on
the cost of the Navy’s shipbuilding programs states,
The cost of the 10 Columbia class submarines included in the [Navy’s FY]2025
shipbuilding plan is one of the most significant uncertainties in the Navy’s and CBO’s
analyses of future shipbuilding costs….
The Navy currently estimates that construction of the first Columbia class ship, the District
of Columbia, will be complete in 2029 at a cost of $16.1 billion (in 2024 dollars). As of
November 2024, the ship was 51 percent complete (measured in terms of the number of
labor hours the Navy estimates it will need to build the ship). The second ship, authorized
in 2024, would cost about $9.0 billion. Subsequent ships in the class would cost $7.9
billion, on average, according to the Navy. The total procurement cost for the 12
submarines would be $106 billion (which includes appropriations totaling $27.4 billion
from 2017 to 2024), or $8.8 billion per ship, on average.
According to the Navy’s estimate, the cost per thousand tons of displacement for the first
Columbia class ship would be 13 percent less than that of the first Virginia class attack
submarine. But the costs of lead ships of new classes of submarines built in the 1970s and
1980s provide little evidence that ballistic missile submarines are cheaper to build, per ton,
than attack submarines. In a February 2024 report to the Congress on the Columbia
program, the Navy stated that there was a 68 percent chance that the cost of the first
Columbia class submarine would exceed its estimates and a 32 percent chance that it would
cost less than estimated. The likelihood that subsequent ships in the class would cost more
or less than estimated was similar—67 percent and 33 percent, respectively. Those
estimates of the probability of cost growth were substantially higher than the estimates that
the service provided the year before. When CBO analyzed the 2024 shipbuilding plan, the
Navy had stated that the likelihood that cost growth would affect the lead ship was 54
percent; the probability of subsequent ships’ being affected was 49 percent.
CBO’s estimate for a program of 12 ships is 16 percent higher than the Navy’s. CBO
estimates that the first Columbia class submarine will cost $18.1 billion—$2.0 billion more
Congressional Research Service
12
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
than the Navy estimates it will cost. The second submarine would cost $11.4 billion.
Including appropriations from 2017 to 2024, CBO estimates that, all told, 12 Columbia
class submarines would cost $123 billion ($95 billion of which would be appropriated from
2025 to 2036). The 10 submarines set to follow the first two ships would cost an average
of $9.4 billion each—$1.5 billion more per submarine than the Navy estimates they would
cost.
Costs for the Columbia class submarines could, however, exceed both the Navy’s and
CBO’s estimates. The new SSBN will be the largest, most technologically complex
submarine that the United States has ever built. It is expected to reuse some technology
and components from the Virginia class submarine, but it would also include many new
elements, such as an all-electric drive system, an X-stern ship control system (in which the
rear rudders and dive planes are shaped like an “x” rather than a “+” as they are on the
Ohio class submarines), a new missile compartment, and a nuclear reactor designed to last
the entire 42-year service life of the submarine. Furthermore, the Navy has repeatedly
stated that the Columbia is its first acquisition priority and that the program must stay on
schedule to meet its strategic deterrence mission. Thus, if the program encounters problems
in construction, the Navy and the shipbuilders are likely to invest more resources and assign
more people to the program to meet the schedule, all of which would increase costs.
Conversely, costs for the Columbia class ships could be less than CBO estimates if the
Navy and the shipbuilders are successful in their ongoing efforts to increase the speed and
efficiency of construction and to improve the performance of the supplier base.30
A September 2024 GAO report on the Columbia-class program states,
According to GAO’s analysis of program data from January 2022 through May 2023, cost
and schedule performance for lead submarine construction has consistently fallen short of
targets. Through early 2024, those trends had not improved, and future risks will likely add
to current cost and schedule growth. The program has reported that the shipbuilder needs
to take swift and significant actions to address the causes of poor construction performance.
However, as GAO has previously reported, the program has tried to mitigate some of these
causes—such as late materials and detailed design products—for years….
Based on data through May 2023, GAO estimated that lead submarine construction costs
at completion could be hundreds of millions of dollars more than the Navy’s planned costs.
Although the shipbuilder is also expecting cost increases, its estimated overrun is smaller
and assumes significant future improvement that GAO’s past work suggests is unrealistic.
Further, program reporting on submarine construction progress did not always include a
thorough analysis of why the program missed cost and schedule goals. Without realistic
cost estimates and adequate analysis, the program will struggle to address continuing and
future risks that could further degrade construction performance.
The Navy has not consistently defined information needed to determine whether
investments made in the supplier base have increased supplier production or generated cost
savings and how those results support the program’s goals. Since 2018, the Navy reported
receiving more than $2.6 billion to invest in the submarine supplier base and help achieve
Columbia class construction goals. Without identifying consistent information, the Navy
is not well positioned to ensure that these investments will effectively spur their intended
benefits for the program.31
30 CBO, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2025 Shipbuilding Plan, January 2025, pp. 28-29.
31 Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Overcoming Persistent Challenges Requires Yet
Undemonstrated Performance and Better-Informed Supplier Investments, GAO-24-107732, September 2024,
highlights page.
Congressional Research Service
13
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Use of Incremental Funding
The first and second Columbia-class boats were funded with incremental funding, a funding
approach in which the procurement cost of each boat is divided into multiple annual increments,
with the first increment occurring in the year in which the boat was procured.32 The first
Columbia-class boat was funded with three-year incremental funding in FY2021-FY2023, and the
second boat was funded with two-year incremental funding (also called split funding) in FY2024FY2025. The Navy wants to use three-year incremental funding for procuring the third and
subsequent boats in the program.
National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF)
The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) is a fund in DOD’s budget separate from the
Navy’s shipbuilding account for holding and executing procurement funding for the construction
of new SSBNs. It was created by Congress in 2014 with an original the aim of helping to
financially insulate other Navy shipbuilding programs from the potential cost impact of the
Columbia-class program, and to encourage U.S. policymakers to finance the procurement of
Columbia-class boats from across DOD’s budget rather than solely from the Navy’s budget.
In subsequent years, the statute establishing and governing the fund (10 U.S.C. 2218a) has been
amended to give the NSBDF an additional function of acting as a vehicle or repository for certain
special acquisition authorities that have the potential for reducing at the margin procurement costs
of Columbia-class boats and other Navy nuclear-powered ships (i.e., aircraft carriers and attack
submarines). The Navy has stated that it is using the special acquisition authorities in 10 U.S.C.
2218a, and that doing so has marginally reduced the estimated combined procurement cost of the
12 Columbia-class boats.33 For additional background information on the NSBDF, see Appendix
E.
Procurement Funding Profiles for First Three Boats
Table 2 shows the funding profiles for the first three boats in the Navy’s FY2026 budget
submission. Note that this table does not show procurement or advance procurement (AP)
funding for the fourth and subsequent boats in the class.
32 For background information on the use of incremental funding in procuring Navy ships, see CRS Report RL32776,
Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
33 Navy briefing, “COLUMBIA Class National Sea Based Deterrence Fund Procurement Authorities & Initiatives,”
March 2022, provided to CRS and CBO by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 1, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
14
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Table 2. Procurement Funding Profiles for First Three Boats in FY2026 Budget
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; does not include funding for fourth and subsequent boats
Fiscal year
First boat
(SSBN-826)
Second boat
(SSBN-827)
FY17
773.1 (AP)
FY18
802.3 (AP)
59.5 (AP)
FY19
3,016.0 (AP)
139.1 (AP)
0.8 (AP)
FY20
1,636.4 (AP)
148.5 (AP)
20.0 (AP)
FY21
2,869.0 (FF)
1,110.7 (AP)
93.0 (AP)
FY22
3,003.0 (FF)
1,271.4 (AP)
149.9 (AP)
FY23
3,079.2 (FF)
769.1 (AP)
1,090.1 (AP)
FY24
2,443.6 (FF)
949.7 (AP)
FY25
3,364.8 (FF)
1,183.1 (AP)
FY26 requested
Third boast
(SSBN-828)
3,928.8 (FF)
FY27 programmed
566.6 (CC)
19.4 (CC)
995.8 (FF)
FY28 programmed
375.6 (CC)
716.4 (CC)
2,132.7 (FF)
FY29 programmed
377.0 (CC)
FY30 programmed
269.08 (CC)
Total
16,121.3
10.688.5
10,543.7
Source: CRS table based on Navy’s FY2026 budget submission.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. Table does not show funding for fourth and subsequent boats in
the class. AP is advance procurement funding, which is funding provided prior to the boat’s year of
procurement, to be used for procuring long leadtime components that need to be procured ahead of the rest of
the boat to ensure that the components will be ready for incorporation into the boat at the right point during
the boat’s construction sequence. FF is full funding, meaning procurement funding increments provided in the
boat’s year of procurement and in one or more subsequent years, so as to fully fund (i.e., complete the
procurement cost of) the boat. CC, also abbreviated CTC, is cost-to-complete funding, also known as
completion of prior year shipbuilding funding (i.e., PY completion funding), which is funding that is added in years
after the nominal completion of a ship’s full funding to cover cost growth beyond the ship’s originally estimated
total procurement cost.
FY2026 Procurement Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2026 budget requests $3,928.8 million (i.e., about $3.9 billion) in
procurement funding for the third Columbia-class boat, and $6,991.7 million (i.e., about $7.0
billion) in advance procurement (AP) funding for the fourth and subsequent boats in the program,
for a total FY2026 request of $10,920.5 million (i.e., about $10.9 billion) for the program.
Congressional Research Service
15
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Issues for Congress
Impact of 17-Month Delay in Delivery of Lead Boat
Overview
One oversight issue for Congress concerns the impact of the estimated 17-month delay in the
delivery of the first Columbia-class boat on the Navy’s plans for replacing Ohio-class SSBNs on
a timely basis. As mentioned earlier, this estimated delay is part of a larger situation of delivery
delays on multiple Navy shipbuilding programs due to shipyard workforce challenges, supply
chain challenges, and other issues.
As mentioned earlier, much of the management time and attention that the Navy devotes to the
Columbia-class program is focused on anticipating, monitoring, and mitigating risks to the lead
boat’s design and construction schedule. The emergence of an estimated 17-month delivery delay
in spite of these efforts is a reflection of the depth of the challenges the Navy and industry
currently face in executing Navy shipbuilding programs. The situation of delays in Navy
shipbuilding programs discussed more generally in another CRS report.34
Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding the estimated 17-month delivery delay on
the first Columbia-class boat include the following:
•
•
•
At this stage in the lead boat’s construction process, how much potential is there
for reducing the lead boat’s estimated delivery delay to something less than 17
months? Conversely, how likely is it that the estimated delivery delay will grow
to something greater than 17 months as construction of the boat continues? What
steps is the Navy taking to reduce the estimated delivery delay to something less
than 17 months or, failing that, prevent the estimated delivery delay from
growing to something greater than 17 months?
What impact might a 17-month delay in delivering the lead boat have on the
delivery dates of subsequent boats in the class?
To what degree can the delay in delivering the lead boat (and possibly some of
the subsequent boats) be offset by extending the service lives of up to five of the
Ohio-class SSBNs? What will be the net impact on the size of the SSBN force?
What are the estimated costs of extending the service lives of these five boats?
Navy Perspective
At an April 8, 2025, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Navy’s
programs for building nuclear-powered ships, Rear Admiral Todd Weeks, the Navy’s program
executive officer (PEO) for strategic submarines (i.e., SSBNs) stated that “right now, we are
projecting it [the lead boat] to be 12 to 18 months late to contract. However, we are—we’re
taking action, right now, to—to accelerate and recover as much schedule as we possibly can. The
second ship [in the class], Wisconsin, is currently on schedule, so we are on—on schedule to
deliver that ship at the 80-month contract.”35
34 See CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
35 Source: CQ transcript of hearing. For a press report about the hearing, see, for example, Hope Hodge Seck, “First
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
16
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
A November 15, 2024, press report stated,
The lead ship in the Navy’s new class of nuclear ballistic missile submarines will deploy
in 2030, a service official said Thursday [November 14].
Speaking at the annual Naval Submarine Symposium, Matt Sermon emphasized the Navy’s
commitment to delivering the future USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826) on time.
“Shipbuilders out there, supply chain, major mechanical equipment out there, stakeholders
out there, we’re going to have District of Columbia on patrol in 2030,” Sermon, the
executive director of the strategic submarines program executive office at Naval Sea
Systems Command, told the audience.
Sermon acknowledged the ongoing trouble with the lead ship’s schedule, which is currently
tracking to a 96-month build instead of the 84-month contract timeline.
“We are clawing back every single day, those earnings, and how we pave that critical path,”
Sermon said. “We will not give up.”36
GAO Perspective
A June 2025 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the
following regarding the Columbia-class program:
Program Performance
In November 2024, the Navy declared a schedule breach for SSBN 826. As a result, the
Navy is planning to update the acquisition program baseline by September 2025. The Navy
is also developing plans to meet a delivery date of October 2028 for SSBN 826—a 12month delay from the program’s contract delivery date. However, the Navy estimated that
delivery may be delayed to as late as March 2029 if planned construction improvements
do not materialize. Moreover, we previously reported that the Navy lacked schedule insight
that would better position the program to mitigate risks to achieving key dates, including
independent analysis and data to easily validate the schedule’s quality.
Program officials stated that, while construction performance was stable during much of
2024, it was not good enough to recover from existing delays. The program attributed
particularly slow periods of construction to out-of-sequence work that significantly
disrupted planned construction events and led to large amounts of rework. According to
program officials, the out-of-sequence work resulted from missing instructions in some
design products that detail how to build the submarine. For example, some areas of the
submarine were missing electrical work and holes for pipe installation. Officials added that
while the shipbuilders are taking steps to correct these design products, there remains a
backlog of design changes that the shipbuilders need to address. This could further affect
the program’s schedule.
In an attempt to improve schedule performance, the program resequenced some work to
optimize the order of construction events. For example, delivery of the turbine
generators—a major propulsion system component—is delayed over 2 years due to design
challenges. According to program officials, these delays forced modifications to the order
of work on the engine room, one of the submarine’s six large hull modules. Other
resequencing involved moving selected work among shipyards to ensure the shipbuilders
deliver modules as planned. However, we previously reported that resequencing can
introduce additional schedule risks. Moreover, program officials stated that the volume of
Columbia-class Sub, Two Aircraft Carriers Face Delivery Delays, Navy Officials Tell Senate,” USNI News, April 9
(updated April 10), 2025.
36 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Promises First Columbia-class Boat Will ‘Be on Patrol in 2030,’” USNI News,
November 15, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
17
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
work yet to be completed is substantial, and their ability to further optimize the schedule
by resequencing it is limited.
According to program officials, costs for SSBN 826 and the second submarine, SSBN 827,
each significantly exceed their respective cost to complete due to poor construction
performance, inflation, and higher material costs. Program officials stated that increases in
the total acquisition cost estimate from last year reflect inflation and higher labor and
material costs. Increases do not yet reflect recent construction trends. Officials stated that
a future estimate will reflect higher costs due to further inflation and poor construction
performance through July 2024.
Leading Product Development Practices
The program reported implementing some elements of leading product development
practices. For example, it provided high-level operational needs to stakeholders that were
subsequently refined prior to beginning detail design, and officials said that they
incorporated end user feedback throughout the design process. The program also reported
implementing a modular approach for certain architecture and software components.
However, it reported no plans for a digital twin of key subsystems or a digital thread. Our
prior work found that these tools are key to anticipating potential design flaws and
incorporating changes. Program officials stated that a 3D model was developed for some
of the submarine for use by the shipbuilders and maintainers.
Other Program Issues
The program continues to face challenges across the submarine industrial base such as a
lack of workers trained in the necessary trades like welding and metal fabrication. There is
also limited workforce and industrial capacity at suppliers that manufacture Columbia class
components. According to program officials, while the Navy is working to identify
additional suppliers to help increase capacity, it can take years for potential suppliers to
complete the qualification process.
After more than a year of formal construction, SSBN 827 is about 12 percent behind
schedule. According to program officials, material availability issues, among others,
hindered construction progress. SSBN 827’s planned construction schedule is 4 months
shorter than the lead submarine’s now-unachievable contract schedule, and the program
will need to significantly accelerate construction to meet planned delivery.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. It
provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. According to the
program, the Columbia class remains positioned to provide the capability needed to meet
national strategic deterrence requirements. The program stated that to reduce risk, it
ensured stable requirements, executed manufacturing readiness and supplier base efforts,
and continued cost reduction efforts.
According to the program, the Navy continues to address industrial base challenges with
oversight, workforce development pipelines, and supplier development funding. The
program added that the Navy is pursuing additive manufacturing, robotics, automation, and
digital technologies to increase efficiency, capacity, and quality. It also stated that the Navy
is working to minimize SSBN 826 delays, mitigate the effect of late delivery on planned
initial capability, and incorporate lessons learned for SSBN 827 and future submarine
construction.37
37 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] DOD Leaders Should Ensure That
Newer Programs Are Structured for Speed and Innovation, GAO-25-107569, June 2025, p. 148.
Congressional Research Service
18
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Potential Impact on Virginia-Class Construction
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential impact of the Columbia-class
construction workload on the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to build
Virginia-class submarines in desired numbers in coming years. As mentioned earlier, the
Columbia-class program is the Navy’s top program priority, and that this means, among other
things, that in a situation of industrial base constraints, the Columbia-class program will have first
call on resources to minimize the chances of schedule delays in building Columbia-class boats. In
light of constraints on the capacity of the submarine construction industrial base, some observers
are concerned that giving priority to the Columbia-class program could add to challenges
currently faced by the Navy and industry in increasing the Virginia-class attack submarine
construction rate to a desired rate of at least 2.0 Virginia-class boats per year. The increase in the
planned Columbia-class procurement to a rate of one boat per year starting in FY2026 could
reinforce these concerns. The situation is discussed in further detail in the CRS report on the
Virginia-class program.38
FY2026 Legislative Request
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s FY2026 budget submission requests
•
•
•
$3,928.8 million (i.e., about $3.9 billion) in procurement funding for the third
Columbia-class boat, and $6,991.7 million (i.e., about $7.0 billion) in advance
procurement (AP) funding for the fourth and subsequent boats in the program,
for a total FY2026 request of $10,920.5 million (i.e., about $10.9 billion) for the
program;
authority to use three-year incremental funding for procuring each of the
remaining 10 boats in the program (i.e., boats 3 through 12); and
authority for using a block buy contract to procure the five Columbia-class boats
that are scheduled to be procured in FY2026-FY2030 (i.e., boats 3 through 7).39
38 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
39 For a press report about the request for the block buy contract, see, for example, Abby Shepherd, “DOD Submits
Proposal to Allow Contract for up to Five Columbia Subs, Mirroring House and Senate Provisions,” Inside Defense,
August 4, 2025.
Congressional Research Service
19
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Appendix A. Summary of Past U.S. SSBN Designs
This appendix provides background information on the four SSBN classes that the United States
has operated since 1959. The four classes are summarized in Table A-1. As shown in the table,
the size of U.S. SSBNs has grown over time, reflecting in part a growth in the size and number of
SLBMs carried on each boat. The Ohio class carries an SLBM (the D-5) that is much larger than
the SLBMs carried by earlier U.S. SSBNs, and it carries 24 SLBMs, compared to the 16 on
earlier U.S. SSBNs.40 In part for these reasons, the Ohio-class design, with a submerged
displacement of 18,750 tons, is more than twice the size of earlier U.S. SSBNs.
Table A-1. U.S. SSBN Classes
George
Washington
(SSBN-598) class
Ethan Allen
(SSBN-608) class
Lafayette/Benjamin
Franklin (SSBN616/640) class
Ohio (SSBN-726)
class
5
5
31
18/14
Fiscal years
procured
FY1958-FY1959
FY1959 and FY1961
FY1961-FY1964
FY1974/FY1977FY1991
Years in
commission
1959-1985
1961-1992
1963-2002
1981/1984-present
Length
381.7 feet
410.5 feet
425 feet
560 feet
Beam
33 feet
33 feet
33 feet
42 feet
6,700 tons
7,900 tons
8,250 tons
18,750 tons
Number of SLBM
launch tubes
16
16
16
24 (to be reduced
to 20 by 2018)
Final type(s) of
SLBM carried
Polaris A-3
Polaris A-3
Poseidon C-3/
Trident I C-4
Trident II D-5
Diameter of those
SLBMs
54 inches
54 inches
74 inches
83 inches
Length of those
SLBMs
32.3 feet
32.3 feet
34 feet
44 feet
Weight of each
SLBM (pounds)
36,000 pounds
36,000 pounds
65,000/73,000 pounds
~130,000 pounds
Range of SLBMs
~2,500 nm
~2,500 nm
~2,500 nm/~4,000 nm
~4,000 nm
Number in class
Submerged
displacement
Sources: Prepared by CRS based on data in Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, Annapolis,
Naval Institute Press, various editions, and (for SSBN decommissioning dates) U.S. Naval Vessel Register.
Notes: Beam is the maximum width of a ship. For the submarines here, which have cylindrical hulls, beam is the
diameter of the hull.
The range of an SLBM can vary, depending on the number and weight of nuclear warheads it carries; actual
ranges can be lesser or greater than those shown.
The George Washington-class boats were procured as modifications of SSNs that were already under
construction. Three of the boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives and were
40 The larger size of the Ohio-class design also reflects a growth in size over time in U.S. submarine designs due to
other reasons, such as providing increased interior volume for measures to quiet the submarine acoustically, so as to
make it harder to detect.
Congressional Research Service
20
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
decommissioned in 1983-1985. The two boats that remained SSBNs throughout their lives were
decommissioned in 1981.
All five Ethan Allen-class boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives. The boats were
decommissioned in 1983 (two boats), 1985, 1991, and 1992.
Two of the Lafayette/Benjamin Franklin-class boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives and
were decommissioned in 1999 and 2002. The 29 that remained SSBNs throughout their lives were
decommissioned in 1986-1995. For 19 of the boats, the Poseidon C-3 was the final type of SLBM carried; for the
other 12, the Trident I C-4 SLBM was the final type of SLBM carried.
A total of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs were built. The first four, which entered service in 1981-1984, were converted
into SSGNs in 2002-2008. The remaining 14 boats entered service in 1984-1997. Although Ohio-class SSBNs are
designed to each carry 24 SLBMs, by 2018, four SLBM launch tubes on each boat are to be deactivated, and the
number of SLBMs that can be carried by each boat consequently is to be reduced to 20, so that the number of
operational launchers and warheads in the U.S. force will comply with strategic nuclear arms control limits.
Congressional Research Service
21
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Appendix B. U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and
the New UK SSBN
This appendix provides background information on U.S.-UK cooperation on SLBMs and the
UK’s next-generation SSBN, previously called the Successor-class SSBN and now called the
Dreadnought-class SSBN.
The UK’s four Vanguard-class SSBNs, which entered service in 1993-1999, each carry 16 Trident
II D-5 SLBMs. Previous classes of UK SSBNs similarly carried earlier-generation U.S. SLBMs.41
The UK’s use of U.S.-made SLBMs on its SSBNs is one element of a long-standing close
cooperation between the two countries on nuclear-related issues that is carried out under the 1958
Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes (also
known as the Mutual Defense Agreement).42 Within the framework established by the 1958
agreement, cooperation on SLBMs in particular is carried out under the 1963 Polaris Sales
Agreement and a 1982 Exchange of Letters between the two governments.43 The Navy testified in
41 Although the SLBMs on UK SSBNs are U.S.-made, the nuclear warheads on the missiles are of UK design and
manufacture.
42 For additional discussion of U.S.-UK cooperation on nuclear-related issues since 1958, see CRS In Focus IF11999,
AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
43 A March 18, 2010, report by the UK Parliament’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee stated the
following:
During the Cold War, the UK’s nuclear co-operation with the United States was considered to be at
the heart of the [UK-U.S.] ‘special relationship’. This included the 1958 Mutual Defence
Agreement, the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) (subsequently amended for Trident), and the
UK’s use of the US nuclear test site in Nevada from 1962 to 1992. The co-operation also
encompassed agreements for the United States to use bases in Britain, with the right to store
nuclear weapons, and agreements for two bases in Yorkshire (Fylingdales and Menwith Hill) to be
upgraded to support US missile defence plans.
In 1958, the UK and US signed the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA). Although some of the
appendices, amendments and Memoranda of Understanding remain classified, it is known that the
agreement provides for extensive co-operation on nuclear warhead and reactor technologies, in
particular the exchange of classified information concerning nuclear weapons to improve design,
development and fabrication capability. The agreement also provides for the transfer of nuclear
warhead-related materials. The agreement was renewed in 2004 for another ten years.
The other major UK-US agreement in this field is the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) which
allows the UK to acquire, support and operate the US Trident missile system. Originally signed to
allow the UK to acquire the Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system in the
1960s, it was amended in 1980 to facilitate purchase of the Trident I (C4) missile and again in 1982
to authorise purchase of the more advanced Trident II (D5) in place of the C4. In return, the UK
agreed to formally assign its nuclear forces to the defence of NATO, except in an extreme national
emergency, under the terms of the 1962 Nassau Agreement reached between President John F.
Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to facilitate negotiation of the PSA.
Current nuclear co-operation takes the form of leasing arrangements of around 60 Trident II D5
missiles from the US for the UK’s independent deterrent, and long-standing collaboration on the
design of the W76 nuclear warhead carried on UK missiles. In 2006 it was revealed that the US and
the UK had been working jointly on a new ‘Reliable Replacement Warhead’ (RRW) that would
modernise existing W76-style designs. In 2009 it emerged that simulation testing at Aldermaston
on dual axis hydrodynamics experiments had provided the US with scientific data it did not
otherwise possess on this RRW programme.
The level of co-operation between the two countries on highly sensitive military technology is,
according to the written submission from Ian Kearns, “well above the norm, even for a close
alliance relationship”. He quoted Admiral William Crowe, the former US Ambassador to London,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
22
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
March 2010 that “the United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a shared
commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April 1963. The
U.S. will continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the UK for our respective
follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement.”44
The first Vanguard-class SSBN was originally projected to reach the end of its service life in
2024, but an October 2010 UK defense and security review report states that the lives of the
Vanguard class ships will now be extended by a few years, so that the four boats will remain in
service into the late 2020s and early 2030s.45
The UK plans to replace the four Vanguard-class boats with three or four next-generation
Dreadnought-class boats are to be equipped with 12 missile launch tubes, but current UK plans
call for each boat to carry eight D-5 SLBMs, with the other four tubes not being used for SLBMs.
The report states that “‘Main Gate’—the decision to start building the submarines—is required
around 2016.”46 The first new boat is to be delivered by 2028, or about four years later than
previously planned.47
The United States is assisting the UK with certain aspects of the Dreadnought SSBN program. In
addition to the modular Common Missile Compartment (CMC), the United States is assisting the
UK with the new PWR-3 reactor plant48 to be used by the Dreadnought SSBN. A December 2011
press report states that “there has been strong [UK] collaboration with the US [on the
Dreadnought program], particularly with regard to the CMC, the PWR, and other propulsion
technology,” and that the design concept selected for the Dreadnought class employs “a new
propulsion plant based on a US design, but using next-generation UK reactor technology
(PWR-3) and modern secondary propulsion systems.”49 The U.S. Navy states that
Naval Reactors, a joint Department of Energy/Department of Navy organization
responsible for all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion, has an ongoing technical exchange
who likened the UK-US nuclear relationship to that of an iceberg, “with a small tip of it sticking
out, but beneath the water there is quite a bit of everyday business that goes on between our two
governments in a fashion that’s unprecedented in the world.” Dr Kearns also commented that the
personal bonds between the US/UK scientific and technical establishments were deeply rooted.
(House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report Global Security: UK-US Relations,
March 18, 2010, paragraphs 131-135; http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/
cmselect/cmfaff/114/11402.htm; paragraphs 131-135 are included in the section of the report
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/11406.htm.)
See also “U.K. Stays Silent on Nuclear-Arms Pact Extension with United States,” Global Security Newswire, July 30,
2014.
44 Statement of Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, Before the Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee [on] FY2011 Strategic Systems, March 17, 2010, p. 6.
45 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Presented to Parliament by
the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010, p. 39.
46 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Presented to Parliament by
the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010, pp. 5, 38-39. For more on the UK’s Dreadnought
SSBN program as it existed prior to the October 2010 UK defense and security review report, see Richard Scott,
“Deterrence At A Discount?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 23, 2009: 26-31.
47 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Presented to Parliament by
the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010, p. 39.
48 PWR3 means pressurized water reactor, design number 3. U.S. and UK nuclear-powered submarines employ
pressurized water reactors. Earlier UK nuclear-powered submarines are powered by reactor designs that the UK
designated PWR-2 and PWR-1. For an article discussing the PWR3 plant, see Richard Scott, “Critical Mass: ReEnergising the UK’s Naval Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s International Defence Review, July 2014: 42-45, 47.
49 Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets: Deterrent Plans Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy
International, December 2011: 17 and 18.
Congressional Research Service
23
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
with the UK Ministry of Defence under the US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. The
US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement is a Government to Government Atomic Energy
Act agreement that allows the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion technology between
the US and UK.
Under this agreement, Naval Reactors is providing the UK Ministry of Defence with US
naval nuclear propulsion technology to facilitate development of the naval nuclear
propulsion plant for the UK’s next generation SUCCESSOR ballistic missile submarine.
The technology exchange is managed and led by the US and UK Governments, with
participation from Naval Reactors prime contractors, private nuclear capable shipbuilders,
and several suppliers. A UK based office comprised of about 40 US personnel provide fulltime engineering support for the exchange, with additional support from key US suppliers
and other US based program personnel as needed.
The relationship between the US and UK under the 1958 mutual defence agreement is an
ongoing relationship and the level of support varies depending on the nature of the support
being provided. Naval Reactors work supporting the SUCCESSOR submarine is
reimbursed by the UK Ministry of Defence.50
U.S. assistance to the UK on naval nuclear propulsion technology first occurred many years ago:
To help jumpstart the UK’s nuclear-powered submarine program, the United States transferred to
the UK a complete nuclear propulsion plant (plus technical data, spares, and training) of the kind
installed on the U.S. Navy’s six Skipjack (SSN-585) class nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs), which entered service between 1959 and 1961. The plant was installed on the UK Navy’s
first nuclear-powered ship, the attack submarine Dreadnought, which entered service in 1963.
The December 2011 press report states that “the UK is also looking at other areas of cooperation
between Dreadnought and the Ohio Replacement Programme. For example, a collaboration
agreement has been signed off regarding the platform integration of sonar arrays with the
respective combat systems.”51
A June 24, 2016, press report states the following:
The [U.S. Navy] admiral responsible for the nuclear weapons component of ballistic
missile submarines today praised the “truly unique” relationship with the British naval
officers who have similar responsibilities, and said that historic cooperation would not be
affected by Thursday’s vote to have the United Kingdom leave the European Union.
Vice Adm. Terry Benedict, director of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs, said that
based on a telephone exchange Thursday morning with his Royal Navy counterpart, “I
have no concern.” The so-called Brexit vote—for British exit—“was a decision based on
its relationship with Europe, not with us. I see yesterday’s vote having no effect.”52
50 Source: Email to CRS from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, June 25, 2012. See also Jon Rosamond, “Next
Generation U.K. Boomers Benefit from U.S. Relationship,” USNI News (http://news.usni.org), December 17, 2014.
51 Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets: Deterrent Plans Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy
International, December 2011: 19. See also Jake Wallis Simons, “Brits Keep Mum on US Involvement in Trident
Nuclear Program,” Politico, April 30, 2015.
52 Otto Kreisher, “Benedict: UK Exit From European Union Won’t Hinder Nuclear Sub Collaboration,” USNI News,
June 24, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
24
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Appendix C. Columbia-Class Program Origin and
Milestones
This appendix provides background information on the Columbia-class program’s origin and
milestones.
Program Origin and Early Milestones
Although the eventual need to replace the Ohio-class SSBNs has been known for many years, the
Columbia-class program can be traced more specifically to an exchange of letters in December
2006 between President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair concerning the UK’s
desire to participate in a program to extend the service life of the Trident II D-5 SLBM into the
2040s, and to have its next-generation SSBNs carry D-5s. Following this exchange of letters, and
with an awareness of the projected retirement dates of the Ohio-class SSBNs and the time that
would likely be needed to develop and field a replacement for them, DOD in 2007 began studies
on a next-generation sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD).53 The studies used the term sea-based
strategic deterrent (SBSD) to signal the possibility that the new system would not necessarily be a
submarine.
An Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for a new SBSD was developed in early 200854 and
approved by DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) on June 20, 2008.55 In July
2008, DOD issued a Concept Decision providing guidance for an analysis of alternatives (AOA)
for the program; an acquisition decision memorandum from John Young, DOD’s acquisition
executive, stated the new system would, barring some discovery, be a submarine.56 The Navy
established an Columbia-class program office at about this same time.57
The AOA reportedly began in the summer or fall of 2008.58 The AOA was completed, with final
brief to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), on May 20, 2009. The final AOA report
was completed in September 2009. An AOA Sufficiency Review Letter was signed by OSD’s
Director, Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE) on December 8, 2009.59 The AOA
concluded that a new-design SSBN was the best option for replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs. (For
53 In February 2007, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commissioned a task force to support
an anticipated Underwater Launched Missile Study (ULMS). On June 8, 2007, the Secretary of the Navy initiated the
ULMS. Six days later, the commander of STRATCOM directed that a Sea Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD)
capability-based assessment (CBA) be performed. In July 2007, the task force established by the commander of
STRATCOM provided its recommendations regarding capabilities and characteristics for a new SBSD. (Source: Navy
list of key events relating to the ULMS and SBSD provided to CRS and the CBO on July 7, 2008.)
54 On February 14, 2008, the SBSD ICD was approved for joint staffing by the Navy’s Resources and Requirements
Review Board (R3B). On April 29, 2008, the SBSD was approved by DOD’s Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) to
proceed to DOD’s Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). (Source: Navy list of key events relating to the ULMS and SBSD
provided to CRS and CBO on July 7, 2008.)
55 Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the SBSD program, July 6, 2009.
56 Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the SBSD program, July 6, 2009.
57 An August 2008 press report states that the program office, called PMS-397, “was established within the last two
months.” (Dan Taylor, “Navy Stands Up Program Office To Manage Next-Generation SSBN,” Inside the Navy, August
17, 2008.
58 “Going Ballistic,” Defense Daily, September 22, 2008, p. 1.
59 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 2, Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy Budget Activity 4, entry for PE0603561N, Project 3220 (PDF page 345 of 888).
Congressional Research Service
25
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
a June 26, 2013, Navy blog post discussing options that were examined for replacing the Ohioclass SSBNs, see Appendix D.)
The program’s Milestone A review meeting was held on December 9, 2010. On February 3, 2011,
the Navy provided the following statement to CRS concerning the outcome of the December 9
meeting:
The OHIO Replacement Program achieved Milestone A and has been approved to enter
the Technology Development Phase of the Dept. of Defense Life Cycle Management
System as of Jan. 10, 2011.
This milestone comes following the endorsement of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB),
chaired by Dr. Carter (USD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) who has signed
the program’s Milestone A Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).
The DAB endorsed replacing the current 14 Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarines
(SSBNs) as they reach the end of their service life with 12 Ohio Replacement Submarines,
each comprising 16, 87-inch diameter missile tubes utilizing TRIDENT II D5 Life
Extended missiles (initial loadout). The decision came after the program was presented to
the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) on Dec. 9, 2010.
The ADM validates the program’s Technology Development Strategy and allows entry into the
Technology Development Phase during which warfighting requirements will be refined to meet
operational and affordability goals. Design, prototyping, and technology development efforts will
continue to ensure sufficient technological maturity for lead ship procurement in 2019.60
January 2017 Milestone B Approval
On January 4, 2017, DOD gave Milestone B approval to the Columbia-class program. Milestone
B approval, which permits a program to enter the engineering and manufacturing development
(EMD) phase, is generally considered a major milestone for a defense acquisition program,
permitting the program to transition, in effect, from a research and development effort into a
procurement program of record. A January 6, 2017, Navy notification to Congress on the
Milestone B approval for the Columbia-class program states the following:
On 4 November 2016, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics Frank Kendall chaired the Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board, and on 4
January, 2017 signed the acquisition decision memorandum approving COLUMBIA Class
program’s Milestone B and designating the program as an Acquisition Category ID major
defense acquisition program. Milestone B also establishes the Acquisition Program
Baseline against which the program’s performance will be assessed. Additionally, this
decision formally authorizes entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Phase of an acquisition program, permitting the transition from preliminary design to detail
design, using Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds. Cost estimates for this
program have been rebaselined from CY2010 dollars to CY2017 dollars in accordance with
DoDI 5000.02, Rev p, dated 7 January 2015.
The MS B Navy Cost Estimate for Average Follow Ship End Cost (hulls 2-12) in 2010$
using specific shipbuilding indices is $5.0 billion, a $600 million reduction from the MS A
estimate, which nearly achieves the affordability target of $4.9 billion set at MS A. To
continue cost control, the Navy will focus on
• Stable operational and technical requirements
• High design maturity at construction start
60 Source: Email from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS, February 3, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
26
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
• Detailed plans to ensure manufacturing readiness including robust prototyping efforts and
synergies with other nuclear shipbuilding programs
• Aggressive cost reduction actions
Affordability caps have been assigned that are consistent with current cost estimates and
reasonable margins for cost growth. Relative to Milestone A, these estimates have been
updated to adjust Base Year from 2010 to 2017, a standard practice to match Base Year
with the year of Milestone B approval. The MS A unit cost affordability target ($4.9 billion
in CY2010$ using Navy indices) used a unique metric, “Average Follow-on Ship End
Cost,” which accounted for hulls 2-12. From Milestone B forward, the affordability cap for
the unit cost will be measured by using the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), which
includes all 12 hulls. The Affordability Cap of $8.0 billion in CY2017$ is based upon the
approved APUC estimate of $7.3 billion plus 10%....
The Navy and industry are currently negotiating the detail design and construction
(DD&C) contract, which is expected to award in early 2017. With negotiations continuing
on the DD&C contract, the Navy has ensured the COLUMBIA Program design effort will
continue without interruption. The Navy issued a contract modification to allow execution
of SCN for detail design on the existing R&D contract. With this modification in place,
detail design efforts that had initially planned to transition to the DD&C contract, will
continue on the current R&D contract to ensure continued design progress. With the
Milestone B approval and the appropriation of $773M in FY17 SCN under the second
Continuing Resolution, funding is now available to execute detail design. In accordance
with 10 U.S.C. §2218a and the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy
deposited the FY17 SCN into the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF). The first
installment of funding will be executed on the existing R&D contract, which allows
transition into detail design and continued design progress until the award of the DD&C
contract.61
61 Columbia Class MS [Milestone] B, Congressional Notification, January 6, 2017, pp. 1-2. See also Megan Eckstein,
“Columbia-class Submarine Program Passess Milestone B Decision, Can Begin Detail Design,” USNI News, January 4,
2017.
Congressional Research Service
27
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Appendix D. Design of Columbia-Class Boats
This appendix provides additional background information on the design for the Columbia-class
boats.
Some Key Design Features
The Columbia-class design will reflect the following:
•
•
•
•
•
The Columbia class is being designed for a 42-year expected service life.62
Unlike the Ohio-class design, which requires a midlife nuclear refueling,63 the
Columbia class is to be equipped with a life-of-the-ship nuclear fuel core (a
nuclear fuel core that is sufficient to power the ship for its entire expected service
life).64 Although the Columbia class will not need a midlife nuclear refueling, it
will still need a midlife nonrefueling overhaul (i.e., an overhaul that does not
include a nuclear refueling) to operate over its full 42-year life.
The Columbia class is to be equipped with an electric-drive propulsion train, as
opposed to the mechanical-drive propulsion train used on other Navy
submarines. The electric-drive system is expected to be quieter (i.e., stealthier)
than a mechanical-drive system.65
The Columbia class is to have SLBM launch tubes that are the same size as those
on the Ohio class (i.e., tubes with a diameter of 87 inches and a length sufficient
to accommodate a D-5 SLBM).
The Columbia class will have a beam (i.e., diameter)66 of 43 feet, compared to 42
feet on the Ohio-class design,67 and a length of 560 feet, the same as that of the
Ohio-class design.68
62 Rear Admiral David Johnson, briefing to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium [on] Expanding Undersea
Dominance, October 23, 2014, briefing slide 19. See also William Baker et al., “Design for Sustainment: The Ohio
Replacement Submarine,” Naval Engineers Journal, September 2015: 89-96.
63 As mentioned earlier (see “Current Ohio-Class SSBNs”), the Ohio-class boats receive a midlife nuclear refueling
overhaul, called an Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO), which includes both a nuclear refueling and overhaul work
on the ship that is not related to the nuclear refueling.
64 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, p. 5.
65 Source: Rear Admiral David Johnson, briefing to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium [on] Expanding
Undersea Dominance, October 23, 2014, briefing slide 19. See also the spoken testimony of Admiral Kirkland Donald,
Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors, and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National Nuclear Security
Administration, at a March 30, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, as shown in the transcript of the hearing, and Dave Bishop, “What Will Follow the Ohio Class?” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2012: 31; and Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets: Deterrent Plans
Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2011: 16. For more on electric drive propulsion, see
CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
66 Beam is the maximum width of a ship. For Navy submarines, which have cylindrical hulls, beam is the diameter of
the hull.
67 Dave Bishop, “What Will Follow the Ohio Class?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2012: 31. (Bishop was
program manager for the Columbia-class program.) See also Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets:
Deterrent Plans Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2011: 15 and 16.
68 Sydney J. Freedberg, “Navy Seeks Sub Replacement Savings: From NASA Rocket Boosters To Reused Access
Doors,” Breaking Defense (http://breakingdefense.com), April 7, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
28
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
•
•
•
Instead of 24 SLBM launch tubes, as on the Ohio-class design, the Columbia
class is to have 16 SLBM launch tubes.
As noted earlier, although the Columbia-class design has fewer SLBM tubes than
the Ohio-class design, it is larger than the Ohio-class design in terms of
submerged displacement. The Columbia-class design has a reported submerged
displacement of 20,815 tons (as of August 2014), compared to 18,750 tons for the
Ohio-class design.69 The Columbia-class design, like the Ohio-class design
before it, will be the largest submarine ever built by the United States.
The Navy states that “owing to the unique demands of strategic relevance,
[Columbia-class boats] must be fitted with the most up-to-date capabilities and
stealth to ensure they are survivable throughout their full 40-year life span.”70
June 2013 Navy Blog Post Regarding Ohio Replacement Options
A June 26, 2013, blog post by Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge, the Navy’s Director for
Undersea Warfare (N97), discussing options that were examined for replacing the Ohio-class
SSBNs, stated the following:
Over the last five years, the Navy–working with U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense–has formally examined various options to
replace the Ohio ballistic missile submarines as they retire beginning in 2027. This analysis
included a variety of replacement platform options, including designs based on the highly
successful Virginia-class attack submarine program and the current Ohio-class ballistic
missile submarine. In the end, the Navy elected to pursue a new design that leverages the
lessons from the Ohio, the Virginia advances in shipbuilding and improvements in costefficiency.
Recently, a variety of writers have speculated that the required survivable deterrence could
be achieved more cost effectively with the Virginia-based option or by restarting the Ohioclass SSBN production line. Both of these ideas make sense at face value–which is why
they were included among the alternatives assessed–but the devil is in the details. When
we examined the particulars, each of these options came up short in both military
effectiveness and cost efficiency.
Virginia-based SSBN design with a Trident II D5 missile. An SSBN design based on a
Virginia-class attack submarine with a large-diameter missile compartment was rejected
due to a wide range of shortfalls. It would
69 Navy information paper on Columbia-class program dated August 11, 2014, provided to CBO and CRS on August
11, 2014.
70 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, p. 24. See also Mike McCarthy, “Navy Striving To Reduce Detectability Of Next Boomers,” Defense
Daily, February 6, 2015: 1. In an article published in June 2012, the program manager for the Columbia-class program
stated that “the current configuration of the Ohio replacement is an SSBN with 16 87-inch-diameter missile tubes, a 43foot-diamater hull, electric-drive propulsion, [an] X-stern, accommodations for 155 personnel, and a common
submarine radio room tailored to the SSBN mission.” (Dave Bishop, “What Will Follow the Ohio Class?” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 2012: 31. See also Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Strategic Assets: Deterrent Plans
Confront Cost Challenges,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2011: 15 and 16. The X-stern is also shown in Rear
Admiral David Johnson, briefing to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium [on] Expanding Undersea
Dominance, October 23, 2014, briefing slide 19.) The term X-stern means that the steering and diving fins at the stern
of the ship are, when viewed from the rear, in the diagonal pattern of the letter X, rather than the vertical-and horizontal
pattern of a plus sign (which is referred to as a cruciform stern). The common submarine radio room is a standardized
(i.e., common) suite of submarine radio room equipment that is being installed on other U.S. Navy submarines.
Congressional Research Service
29
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
• Not meet survivability (stealth) requirements due to poor hull streamlining and lack of a
drive train able to quietly propel a much larger ship
• Not meet at-sea availability requirements due to longer refit times (since equipment is
packed more tightly within the hull, it requires more time to replace, repair and retest)
• Not meet availability requirements due to a longer mid-life overhaul (refueling needed)
• Require a larger number of submarines to meet the same operational requirement
• Reduce the deterrent value needed to protect the country (fewer missiles, warheads atsea)
• Be more expensive than other alternatives due to extensive redesign of Virginia systems
to work with the large missile compartment (for example, a taller sail, larger control
surfaces and more robust support systems)
We would be spending more money (on more ships) to deliver less deterrence (reduced atsea warhead presence) with less survivability (platforms that are less stealthy).
Virginia-based SSBN design with a smaller missile. Some have encouraged the
development of a new, smaller missile to go with a Virginia-based SSBN. This would carry
forward many of the shortfalls of a Virginia-based SSBN we just discussed, and add to it
a long list of new issues. Developing a new nuclear missile from scratch with an industrial
base that last produced a new design more than 20 years ago would be challenging, costly
and require extensive testing. We deliberately decided to extend the life of the current
missile to decouple and de-risk the complex (and costly) missile development program
from the new replacement submarine program. Additionally, a smaller missile means a
shorter employment range requiring longer SSBN patrol transits. This would compromise
survivability, require more submarines at sea and ultimately weaken our deterrence
effectiveness. With significant cost, technical and schedule risks, there is little about this
option that is attractive.
Ohio-based SSBN design. Some have argued that we should re-open the Ohio production
line and resume building the Ohio design SSBNs. This simply cannot be done because
there is no Ohio production line. It has long since been re-tooled and modernized to build
state-of-the-art Virginia-class SSNs using computerized designs and modular, automated
construction techniques. Is it desirable to redesign the Ohio so that a ship with its legacy
performance could be built using the new production facilities? No, since an Ohio-based
SSBN would
• Not provide the required quieting due to Ohio design constraints and use of a propeller
instead of a propulsor (which is the standard for virtually all new submarines)
• Require 14 instead of 12 SSBNs by reverting to Ohio class operational availability
standards (incidentally creating other issues with the New START treaty limits)
• Suffer from reduced reliability and costs associated with the obsolescence of legacy Ohio
system components
Once again, the end result would necessitate procuring more submarines (14) to provide
the required at-sea presence and each of them would be less stealthy and less survivable
against foreseeable 21st century threats.
The Right Answer: A new design SSBN that improves on Ohio: What has emerged
from the Navy’s exhaustive analysis is an Ohio replacement submarine that starts with the
foundation of the proven performance of the Ohio SSBN, its Trident II D5 strategic
weapons system and its operating cycle. To this it adds:
• Enhanced stealth as necessary to pace emerging threats expected over its service life
Congressional Research Service
30
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
• Systems commonality with Virginia (pumps, valves, sonars, etc.) wherever possible,
enabling cost savings in design, procurement, maintenance and logistics
• Modular construction and use of COTS equipment consistent with those used in today’s
submarines to reduce the cost of fabrication, maintenance and modernization. Total
ownership cost reduction (for example, investing in a life-of-the-ship reactor core enables
providing the same at-sea presence with fewer platforms).
Although the Ohio replacement is a “new design,” it is in effect an SSBN that takes the
best lessons from 50 years of undersea deterrence, from the Ohio, from the Virginia, from
advances in shipbuilding efficiency and maintenance, and from the stern realities of
needing to provide survivable nuclear deterrence. The result is a low-risk, cost-effective
platform capable of smoothly transitioning from the Ohio and delivering effective 21st
century undersea strategic deterrence.71
16 vs. 20 SLBM Tubes
Overview
The Navy’s decision to design Columbia-class boats with 16 SLBM tubes rather than 20 was one
of several decisions the Navy made to reduce the estimated average procurement cost of boats 2
through 12 in the program toward a Navy target cost of $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars.72 Some
observers were concerned that designing the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather than 20 would
create a risk that U.S. strategic nuclear forces might not have enough capability in the 2030s and
beyond to fully perform their deterrent role. These observers noted that to comply with the New
Start Treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons, DOD plans to operate in coming years a force of
14 Trident SSBNs, each with 20 operable SLBM tubes (4 of the 24 tubes on each boat are to be
rendered inoperable), for a total of 280 tubes, whereas the Navy in the Columbia-class program is
planning a force of 12 SSBNs each with 16 tubes, for a total of 192 tubes, or about 31% less than
71 “Facts We Can Agree Upon About Design of Ohio Replacement SSBN,” Navy Live, accessed July 3, 2013, at
http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/06/26/facts-we-can-agree-upon-about-design-of-ohio-replacement-ssbn/.
72 At a March 30, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Admiral Kirkland Donald, Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National
Nuclear Security Administration, when asked for examples cost efficiencies that are being pursued in his programs,
stated the following:
The—the Ohio replacement [program] has been one that we’ve obviously been focused on here
for—for several years now. But in the name of the efficiencies, and one of the issues as we work
through the Defense Department’s acquisition process, we were the first program through that new
process that Dr. [Aston] Carter [the DOD acquisition executive] headed up.
But we were challenged to—to drive the cost of that ship down, and as far as our part was
concerned, one of the key decisions that was made that—that helped us in that regard was a
decision to go from 20 missile tubes to 16 missile tubes, because what that allowed us to do was to
down rate the—the propulsion power that was needed, so obviously, it’s a–it’s a small[er] the
reactor that you would need.
But what it also allowed us to do was to go back [to the use of existing components]. The size [of
the ship] fell into the envelope where we could go back and use components that we had already
designed for the Virginia class [attack submarines] and bring those into this design, not have to do
it over again, but several of the mechanical components, to use those over again.
And it enabled us to drive the cost of that propulsion plant down and rely on proven technology
that’s—pumps and valves and things like that don’t change like electronics do.
So we’re pretty comfortable putting that in ship that’ll be around ‘til 2080. But we were allowed to
do that.
(Source: Transcript of hearing.)
Congressional Research Service
31
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
280. These observers also cited the uncertainties associated with projecting needs for strategic
deterrent forces out to the year 2080, when the final Columbia-class boat is scheduled to leave
service. These observers asked whether the plan to design the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather
than 20 was fully supported within all parts of DOD, including U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM).
In response, Navy and other DOD officials stated that the decision to design the Columbia class
with 16 tubes rather than 20 was carefully considered within DOD, and that they believe a boat
with 16 tubes will give U.S. strategic nuclear forces enough capability to fully perform their
deterrent role in the 2030s and beyond.
Testimony in 2011
At a March 1, 2011, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Gary
Roughead, then-Chief of Naval Operations, stated the following:
I’m very comfortable with where we're going with SSBN-X. The decision and the
recommendation that I made with regard to the number of tubes—launch tubes are
consistent with the new START treaty. They’re consistent with the missions that I see that
ship having to perform. And even though it may be characterized as a cost cutting measure,
I believe it sizes the ship for the missions it will perform.73
At a March 2, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE TURNER:
General Kehler, thank you so much for your continued thoughts and of course your
leadership. One item that we had a discussion on was the triad, of looking to—of the Navy
and the tube reductions of 20 to 16, as contained in other hearings on the Hill today. I would
like your thoughts on the reduction of the tubes and what you see driving that, how you see
it affecting our strategic posture and any other thoughts you have on that?
AIR FORCE GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, first of all, sir, let me say that the—in my mind anyway,
the discussion of Trident and Ohio-class replacement is really a discussion in the context
of the need to modernize the entire triad. And so, first of all, I think that it’s important for
us to recognize that that is one piece, an important piece, but a piece of the decision process
that we need to go through.
Second, the issue of the number of tubes is not a simple black-and-white answer. So let me
just comment here for a minute.
First of all, the issue in my mind is the overall number of tubes we wind up with at the end,
not so much as the number of tubes per submarine.
Second, the issue is, of course, we have flexibility and options with how many warheads
per missile per tube, so that’s another consideration that enters into this mixture.
Another consideration that is important to me is the overall number of boats and the
operational flexibility that we have with the overall number of boats, given that some
number will need to be in maintenance, some number will need to be in training, et cetera.
And so those and many other factors—to include a little bit of foresight here, in looking
ahead to 20 years from now in antisubmarine warfare environment that the Navy will have
73 Source: Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
32
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
to operate in, all of those bear on the ultimate sideways shape configuration of a follow-on
to the Ohio.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am not overly troubled by going to 16 tubes. As I look at
this, given that we have that kind of flexibility that I just laid out; given that this is an
element of the triad and given that we have some decision space here as we go forward to
decide on the ultimate number of submarines, nothing troubles me operationally here to
the extent that I would oppose a submarine with 16 tubes.
I understand the reasons for wanting to have 20. I understand the arguments that were made
ahead of me. But as I sit here today, given the totality of the discussion, I am—as I said, I
am not overly troubled by 16. Now, I don’t know that the gavel has been pounded on the
other side of the river yet with a final decision, but at this point, I am not overly troubled
by 16.74
At an April 5, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:
General Benedict, we have had this discussion, not you and I, I am sorry. But the
subcommittee has had a discussion in the past with regards to the Ohio-class replacement
program.
The new START, though, when it was negotiated, assumed a reduction from 24 missile
tubes per hole to, I think, a maximum a maximum of 20.
The current configuration [for the Columbia class], as I understand it, would move from
24 to 16.
Can you discuss, for the subcommittee here, the Navy’s rationale for that? For moving
from 24 to 16 as opposed to the max of 20?
NAVY REAR ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
PROGRAMS (SSP):
Sir, as part—excuse me, as part of the work-up for the milestone A [review for the
Columbia class program] with Dr. Carter in OSD, SSP supported the extensive analysis at
both the OSD level as well as STRATCOM’s analysis.
Throughout that process, we provided, from the SWS [strategic weapon system] capability,
our perspective. Ultimately that was rolled up into both STRATCOM and OSD and senior
Navy leadership and in previous testimony, the secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and
General Chilton have all expressed their confidence that the mission of the future, given
their perspectives, is they see the environment today can be met with 16.
And so, as the acquisition and the SWS provider, we are prepared to support that decision
by leadership, sir.
REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:
Yes.
And your analysis supports—did your analysis that fed into this, did you look at specific
numbers then?
REARD ADMIRAL BENEDICT:
Sir, we looked at the ability of the system, again, SSP does not look at specific targets
with...
74 Source: Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
33
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:
Right. Yes, yes, yes.
REAR ADMIRAL BENEDICT:
Our input was the capability of the missile, the number of re-entry bodies and the throw
weight that we can provide against those targets and based on that analysis, the leadership
decision was 16, sir.75
At an April 6, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR SESSIONS:
Admiral Benedict, according to recent press reports, the Navy rejected the
recommendations of Strategic Command to design the next generation of ballistic missile
submarines with 20 missile tubes instead of opting for only 16 per boat.
What is the basis for the Navy’s decision of 16? And I'm sure cost is a factor. In what ways
will that decision impact the overall nuclear force structure associated with the command?
NAVY REAR ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
PROGRAMS (SSP):
Yes, sir. SSP supported the Navy analysis, STRATCOM’s analysis, as well as the OSD
analysis, as we proceeded forward and towards the Milestone A decision [on the Columbia
class program] that Dr. Carter conducted.
Based on our input, which was the technical input as the—as the director of SSP, other
factors were considered, as you stated. Cost was one of them. But as the secretary, as the
CNO, and I think as General Kehler submitted in their testimony, that given the threats that
we see today, given the mission that we see today, given the upload capability of the D-5,
and given the environment as they saw today, all three of those leaders were comfortable
with the decision to proceed forward with 16 tubes, sir.
SENATOR SESSIONS:
And is that represent your judgment? To what extent were you involved—were you
involved in that?
REAR ADMIRAL BENEDICT:
Sir, we were involved from technical aspects in terms of the capability of the missile itself,
what we can throw, our range, our capability. And based on what we understand the
capability of the D-5 today, which will be the baseline missile for the Ohio Replacement
Program, as the director of SSP I’m comfortable with that decision.76
Section 242 Report
Section 242 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of
December 31, 2011) required DOD to submit a report on the Columbia-class program that
includes, among other things, an assessment of various combinations of boat quantities and
numbers of SLBM launch tubes per boat. The text of the section is as follows:
SEC. 242. REPORT AND COST ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS FOR OHIO-CLASS
REPLACEMENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE.
75 Source: Transcript of hearing.
76 Source: Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
34
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
(a) Report Required- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command shall
jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each of the options
described in subsection (b) to replace the Ohio-class ballistic submarine program. The
report shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the procurement cost and total life-cycle costs associated with each
option.
(2) An assessment of the ability for each option to meet—
(A) the at-sea requirements of the Commander that are in place as of the date of the
enactment of this Act; and
(B) any expected changes in such requirements.
(3) An assessment of the ability for each option to meet—
(A) the nuclear employment and planning guidance in place as of the date of the enactment
of this Act; and
(B) any expected changes in such guidance.
(4) A description of the postulated threat and strategic environment used to inform the
selection of a final option and how each option provides flexibility for responding to
changes in the threat and strategic environment.
(b) Options Considered- The options described in this subsection to replace the Ohio-class
ballistic submarine program are as follows:
(1) A fleet of 12 submarines with 16 missile tubes each.
(2) A fleet of 10 submarines with 20 missile tubes each.
(3) A fleet of 10 submarines with 16 missile tubes each.
(4) A fleet of eight submarines with 20 missile tubes each.
(5) Any other options the Secretary and the Commander consider appropriate.
(c) Form- The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
Subsection (c) above states the report “shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.”
The report as submitted was primarily the classified annex, with a one-page unclassified
summary, the text of which is as follows (underlining as in the original):
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) directed
the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) to jointly submit a report to the congressional defense committees
comparing four different options for the OHIO Replacement (OR) fleet ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) program. Our assessment considered the current operational
requirements and guidance. The four SSBN options analyzed were
1. 12 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each
2. 10 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each
3. 10 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each
4. 8 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each
The SSBN force continues to be an integral part of our nuclear Triad and contributes to
deterrence through an assured second strike capability that is survivable, reliable, and
Congressional Research Service
35
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
credible. The number of SSBNs and their combined missile tube capacity are important
factors in our flexibility to respond to changes in the threat and uncertainty in the strategic
environment.
We assessed each option against the ability to meet nuclear employment and planning
guidance, ability to satisfy at-sea requirements, flexibility to respond to future changes in
the postulated threat and strategic environment, and cost. In general, options with more
SSBNs can be adjusted downward in response to a diminished threat; however, options
with less SSBNs are more difficult to adjust upward in response to a growing threat.
Clearly, a smaller SSBN force would be less expensive than a larger force, but for the
reduced force options we assessed, they fail to meet current at-sea and nuclear employment
requirements, increase risk in force survivability, and limit flexibility in response to an
uncertain strategic future. Our assessment is the program of record, 12 SSBNs with 16
missile tubes each, provides the best balance of performance, flexibility, and cost meeting
commander’s requirements while supporting the Nation’s strategic deterrence mission
goals and objectives.
The classified annex contains detailed analysis that is not releasable to the public.77
77 Report and Cost Assessment of Options for OHIO-Class Replacement Ballistic Missile Submarine, Unclassified
Summary, received from Navy Legislative Affairs Office, August 24, 2012. See also Christopher J. Castelli,
“Classified Navy Assessment On SSBN(X) Endorses Program Of Record,” Inside the Navy, September 10, 2012.
For more recent discussions of this issue, see Patty-Jane Geller and Brent D. Sadler, “Faulty Assumptions About the
Global Nuclear Threat May Require Changes in U.S. SeaBased Nuclear Force,” Heritage Foundation, February 22,
2022, 11 pp.; Frank Miller, “Don’t Even Think About Redesigning the Columbia SSBN,” RealClearDefense, March
31, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
36
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Appendix E. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund
(NSBDF)
This appendix provides additional background information on the National Sea-Based Deterrence
Fund (NSBDF).
Created by P.L. 113-291
Section 1022 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 of December 19, 2014) created the National
Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), a fund in the DOD budget, codified at 10 U.S.C. 2218a,
that is separate from the Navy’s regular shipbuilding account (which is formally known as the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, or SCN, appropriation account).
Amended by Subsequent Legislation
Section 1022 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of
November 25, 2015), Section 1023 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (S.
2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016), Section 1022 of the FY2018 National Defense
Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017), and Section 1023 of the
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021)
amended 10 U.S.C. 2218a to provide additional acquisition authorities for the NSBDF.
Text as Amended
The text of 10 U.S.C. 2218a, as of September 24, 2025, is as follows:
§2218a. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund
(a) Establishment.-There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be
known as the "National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund".
(b) Administration of Fund.-The Secretary of Defense shall administer the Fund consistent
with the provisions of this section.
(c) Fund Purposes.-(1) Funds in the Fund shall be available for obligation and expenditure
only for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of
national sea-based deterrence vessels.
(2) Funds in the Fund may not be used for a purpose or program unless the purpose or
program is authorized by law.
(d) Deposits.-There shall be deposited in the Fund all funds appropriated to the Department
of Defense for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and
conversion of national sea-based deterrence vessels.
(e) Expiration of Funds After 5 Years.-No part of an appropriation that is deposited in the
Fund pursuant to subsection (d) shall remain available for obligation more than five years
after the end of fiscal year for which appropriated except to the extent specifically provided
by law.
(f) Authority to Enter Into Economic Order Quantity Contracts.-(1) The Secretary of the
Navy may use funds deposited in the Fund to enter into contracts known as "economic
order quantity contracts" with private shipyards and other commercial or government
entities to achieve economic efficiencies based on production economies for major
Congressional Research Service
37
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
components or subsystems. The authority under this subsection extends to the procurement
of parts, components, and systems (including weapon systems) common with and required
for other nuclear powered vessels under joint economic order quantity contracts.
(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the
United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination
of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time
of termination.
(g) Authority to Begin Manufacturing and Fabrication Efforts Prior to Ship Authorization.(1) The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited into the Fund to enter into contracts
for advance construction of national sea-based deterrence vessels to support achieving cost
savings through workload management, manufacturing efficiencies, or workforce stability,
or to phase fabrication activities within shipyard and manage sub-tier manufacturer
capacity.
(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the
United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination
of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time
of termination.
(h) Authority to Use Incremental Funding to Enter Into Contracts for Certain Items.-(1)
The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited into the Fund to enter into
incrementally funded contracts for(A) advance procurement of high value, long lead time items for nuclear powered vessels
to better support construction schedules and achieve cost savings through schedule
reductions and properly phased installment payments; and
(B) construction of the first two Columbia class submarines.
(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the
United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination
of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time
of termination.
(i) Authority for Multiyear Procurement of Critical Components to Support Continuous
Production.-(1) To implement the continuous production of critical components, the
Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited in the Fund, in conjunction with funds
appropriated for the procurement of other nuclear-powered vessels, to enter into one or
more multiyear contracts (including economic ordering quantity contracts), for the
procurement of critical contractor-furnished and Government-furnished components for
critical components of national sea-based deterrence vessels. The authority under this
subsection extends to the procurement of equivalent critical components common with and
required for other nuclear-powered vessels.
(2) In each annual budget request submitted to Congress, the Secretary shall clearly identify
funds requested for critical components and the individual ships and programs for which
such funds are requested.
(3) Any contract entered into pursuant to paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of
the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of
appropriations for that purpose and that the total liability to the Government for the
termination of the contract shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated for the
contract as of the date of the termination.
Congressional Research Service
38
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
(j) Budget Requests.-Budget requests submitted to Congress for the Fund shall separately
identify the amount requested for programs, projects, and activities for construction
(including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of national sea-based
deterrence vessels.
(k) Definitions.-In this section:
(1) The term "Fund" means the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund established by
subsection (a).
(2) The term "national sea-based deterrence vessel" means any submersible vessel
constructed or purchased after fiscal year 2016 that is owned, operated, or controlled by
the Department of Defense and that carries operational intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(3) The term "critical component" means any of the following:
(A) A common missile compartment component.
(B) A spherical air flask.
(C) An air induction diesel exhaust valve.
(D) An auxiliary seawater valve.
(E) A hovering valve.
(F) A missile compensation valve.
(G) A main seawater valve.
(H) A launch tube.
(I) A trash disposal unit.
(J) A logistics escape trunk.
(K) A torpedo tube.
(L) A weapons shipping cradle weldment.
(M) A control surface.
(N) A launcher component.
(O) A propulsor.
(P) Major bulkheads and tanks.
(Q) All major pumps and motors.
(R) Large vertical array.
(S) Atmosphere control equipment.
(T) Diesel systems and components.
(U) Hydraulic valves and components.
(V) Bearings.
(W) Major air and blow valves and components.
(X) Decks and superstructure.
(Y) Castings, forgings, and tank structure.
(Z) Hatches and hull penetrators.
Congressional Research Service
39
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Precedents for Funding Navy Acquisition Programs Outside Navy
Appropriation Accounts
Prior to the establishment of the NSBDF, some observers had suggested funding the procurement
of Columbia-class boats outside the Navy’s shipbuilding budget so as to preserve Navy
shipbuilding funds for other Navy shipbuilding programs. There was some precedent for such an
arrangement.
•
•
Construction of certain DOD sealift ships and Navy auxiliary ships was funded in
past years in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), a part of DOD’s budget
that is outside the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
account, and also outside the procurement title of the DOD appropriations act.
Most spending for ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs (including
procurement-like activities) is funded through the Defense-Wide research and
development and procurement accounts rather than through the research and
development and procurement accounts of the individual military services.
A rationale for funding DOD sealift ships in the NDSF had been that DOD sealift ships perform a
transportation mission that primarily benefits services other than the Navy, and therefore should
not be forced to compete for funding in a Navy budget account that funds the procurement of
ships central to the Navy’s own missions. A rationale for funding BMD programs together in the
Defense-Wide research and development account is that this makes potential trade-offs in
spending among various BMD programs more visible and thereby helps to optimize the use of
BMD funding.
Potential Implications of NSBDF on Funding Available for
Other Programs
The NSBDF has at least two potential implications for the impact that the Columbia-class
program may have on funding available in coming years for other DOD acquisition programs:
•
•
A principal apparent intent in creating the NSBDF is to help preserve funding in
coming years for other Navy programs, and particularly Navy shipbuilding
programs other than the Columbia-class program, by placing funding for the
Columbia-class program in a location within the DOD budget that is separate
from the Navy’s shipbuilding account and the Navy’s budget in general.
Referring to the fund as a national fund and locating it outside the Navy’s budget
appears intended to encourage a view (consistent with an argument made by
supporters of the Columbia-class program that the program is intended to meet a
national military need rather than a Navy-specific need) that funding for the
Columbia-class program should be resourced from DOD’s budget as a whole,
rather than from the Navy’s budget in particular.
The acquisition authorities in subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i) of 10 U.S.C. 2218a,
which were added by P.L. 114-92 and P.L. 114-328, could marginally reduce the
procurement costs of not only Columbia-class boats, but also other nuclearpowered ships, such as Virginia-class attack submarines and Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78) class aircraft carriers, by increasing economies of scale in the
production of ship components and better optimizing ship construction schedules.
Congressional Research Service
40
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
The joint explanatory statement for the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L.
114-92 of November 25, 2015) directed DOD to submit a report on the “acquisition strategy to
build Ohio-class replacement submarines that will leverage the enhanced procurement authorities
provided in the [NSBDF] ... .” Among other things, the report was to identify “any additional
authorities the Secretary [of Defense] may need to make management of the Ohio-class
replacement more efficient....”78 The Navy submitted the report on April 18, 2016. The report
states in part that
the high cost for this unique, next generation strategic deterrent requires extraordinary
measures to ensure its affordability. Further, procuring the OHO Replacement (OR), the
next generation SSBN, within the current shipbuilding plan presents an extreme challenge
to the Navy’s shipbuilding budget. To minimize this challenge and reduce OR schedule
risk, the Navy proposes to leverage those authorities provided by the National Sea-Based
Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) in conjunction with the employment of best acquisition
practices on this critical program....
... the Navy is continuing to identify opportunities to further acquisition efficiency, reduce
schedule risk, and improve program affordability. Most notably in this regard, the Navy is
currently assessing [the concept of] Continuous Production [for producing components of
Columbia-class boats more efficiently than currently scheduled] and will keep Congress
informed as we quantify the benefits of this and other initiatives that promise substantial
savings....
... the Navy’s initial assessment is that the authorities and further initiatives described [in
this report] will be essential to achieving the reductions to acquisition cost and schedule
risk that are so critical to success on the OR program....
Section 1022 of the FY2016 NDAA authorized the use of funds in the NSBDF to enter into
contracts for EOQ [Economic Order Quantity purchases of materials and equipment] and
AC [advance construction activities in shipyards], and to incrementally fund contracts for
AP [advance procurement] of specific components. These authorities are essential to
successfully executing the OR acquisition strategy. The Navy is able to take advantage of
these authorities largely due to how its submarine shipbuilding plan is phased....
Economic Order Quantity contracts provide substantial cost savings to the Navy from
procuring materials and equipment in bulk quantities. In addition to the cost savings
typically associated with EOQ authority, the Navy has identified an opportunity to
implement EOQ procurements to achieve OR schedule efficiencies and commonality
contract actions with VCS [Virginia-class submarine] Block V [boats] and CVN [nuclearpowered aircraft carriers]....
Advance Construction is the authority to begin [shipyard] construction [work] in fiscal
years of AP [advance procurement] budget requests prior to the full funding/authorization
year of a hull. Early manufacturing activities help retire construction risk for first-of-a-kind
efforts, ease transition from design to production, and provide efficiencies in shipyard
construction workload. Advance Construction would allow the shipbuilders to begin
critical path construction activities earlier, thus reducing risk to the OR delivery schedule....
The FY2016 NDAA allows the Navy and shipbuilders to enter into incrementally funded
procurements for long lead components that employ both AP and Full Funding (FF) SCN
increments. This funding approach will provide significant schedule improvements and
cost savings by maximizing the utilization of limited funding....
78 Joint explanatory statement for H.R. 1735, p. 165 (PDF page 166 of 542). Following the veto of H.R. 1735, a
modified bill, S. 1356, was passed and enacted into law. Except for the parts of S. 1356 that differ from H.R. 1735, the
joint explanatory statement for H.R. 1735 in effect serves as the joint explanatory statement for S. 1356.
Congressional Research Service
41
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
Maximum economic advantage can be obtained through Continuous Production. Procuring
components and systems necessary for Continuous Production lines [as opposed to
production lines that experience periods during which they are without work] would
provide opportunities for savings through manufacturing efficiencies, increased
[production-line] learning and the retention of critical production skills. In addition to
lowering costs, Continuous Production would reduce schedule risk for both the U.S. and
UK SSBN construction programs and minimize year-to-year funding spikes. To execute
Continuous Production, the Navy requires authority to enter into contracts to procure
contractor furnished and government furnished components and systems for OR SSBNs.
OR Missile Tube and Missile Tube Module component procurement through Continuous
Production lines have been identified as the most efficient and affordable procurement
strategy.... Missile Tube Continuous Production could achieve an average reduction of 25
percent in Missile Tube procurement costs across the [Columbia] Class. These savings are
compared to [the] single shipset procurement costs [that are] included in the PB17 PoR
[the program of record reflected in the President’s (proposed) Budget for FY2017]....
The Navy estimates that procuring Missile Tube Modules in Continuous Production lines
would result in a cumulative one year schedule reduction in Missile Tube Module
manufacturing for the OR Class. This schedule reduction, on a potential critical path
assembly, would reduce ship delivery risk and increase schedule margin for follow ship
deliveries. In addition to improving schedule, Missile Tube Module Continuous Production
(including Strategic Weapon System (SWS) Government Furnished Equipment (GFE))
would produce savings as high as 20 percent compared to single shipset procurement costs
included in the PB17 PoR. Executing Continuous Production of Missile Tubes or Missile
Tube Modules requires re-phasing of funding from outside the PB17 Future Year’s
Defense Program (FYDP) [to years that are within the FYDP] but results in significant
overall program reductions. The Navy is evaluating additional Continuous Production
opportunities for nuclear and nonnuclear components with common vendors required for
VIRGINIA Class submarines and FORD Class aircraft carriers. Some examples include
spherical air flasks, hull valves, pressure hull hemi heads, bow domes, castings, and
torpedo tubes. The prerequisite to Continuous Production in each of these cases would be
an affirmation of design stability consistent with completion of first article testing, or its
equivalent....
The Navy’s position on the cost benefits of these authorities is not fully developed.
However, the Congressional Budget Office stated in its Analysis of the Navy’s FY2016
Shipbuilding Plan, “ ... the Navy could potentially save several hundred million dollars per
submarine by purchasing components and materials for several submarines at the same
time.”... The Navy’s initial cost analysis aligns with CBO’s projections, and the cost
reductions from employing these acquisition authorities will be further evaluated to support
the Navy’s updated OR Milestone B cost estimate in August 2016....
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L)
approved the OR Program Acquisition Strategy on January 4, 2016. This strategy
emphasizes using alternative acquisition tools and cross-platform contracting to reduce
schedule risk and lower costs in support of the Navy’s shipbuilding programs....
To reduce costs and help alleviate fiscal pressures, the Navy will work with Congress to
implement granted authorities and explore the additional initiatives identified in this
report.... The cost reductions from employing the granted and proposed acquisition
authorities will be further evaluated to support the Navy’s updated OR Milestone B cost
estimate in August 2016.... These authorities are needed with the National Sea-Based
Deterrence Fund, RDTEN [research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy], and SCN
appropriations accounts. Together, these acquisition tools will allow the Navy, and the
Congressional Research Service
42
Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
shipbuilders, to implement the procurement strategy which will reduce total OR acquisition
costs and shorten construction schedules for a program with no margin for delay.79
Navy Use of Acquisition Authorities
The Navy states that it is using the acquisition authorities in subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i) of 10
U.S.C. 2218a, and that doing so has marginally reduced the estimated combined procurement cost
of the 12 Columbia-class boats.80
Author Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
79 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Ohio Replacement Acquisition Strategy and National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund
Accountability, April 2016, with cover letters dated April 18, 2016, pp. 1-8.
80 Navy briefing, “COLUMBIA Class National Sea Based Deterrence Fund Procurement Authorities & Initiatives,”
March 2022, provided to CRS and CBO by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 1, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
R41129 · VERSION 283 · UPDATED
43
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.