Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy

Congressional research reportJan 25, 2011

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Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical

Perspective, Global Presence, and

Implications for U.S. Policy

John Rollins, Coordinator

Specialist in Terrorism and National Security

January 25, 2011

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R41070

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Al Qaeda and Affiliates

Summary

Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that

perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a

core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union, with a centralized

leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization’s plots either

emanated from the top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al

Qaeda as akin to a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile chief executive officer

issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates.

Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Out of necessity, due to

pressures from the security community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse

global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees

of independence. The core leadership, headed by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, is thought to

live in the mountainous tribal belt of northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, where it

continues to train operatives, recruit, and disseminate propaganda. But Al Qaeda franchises or

affiliated groups active in countries such as Yemen and Somalia now represent critical power

centers in the larger movement. Some affiliates receive money, training, and weapons; others look

to the core leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a larger

narrative of global struggle. Over the past year senior government officials have assessed the

trajectory of Al Qaeda to be “less centralized command and control, (with) no clear center of

gravity, and likely rising and falling centers of gravity, depending on where the U.S. and the

international focus is for that period.” While a degraded corporate Al Qaeda may be welcome

news to many, a trend has emerged over the past few years that some view as more difficult to

detect, if not potentially more lethal.

The Al Qaeda network today also comprises semi-autonomous or self radicalized actors, who

often have only peripheral or ephemeral ties to either the core cadre in Pakistan or affiliated

groups elsewhere. According to U.S. officials Al Qaeda cells and associates are located in over 70

countries. Sometimes these individuals never leave their home country but are radicalized with

the assistance of others who have traveled abroad for training and indoctrination through the use

of modern technologies. In many ways, the dispersion of Al Qaeda affiliates fits into the larger

strategy of Bin Laden and his associates. They have sought to serve as the vanguard of a religious

movement that inspires Muslims and other individuals aspiring to join a jihadi movement to help

defend and purify Islam through violent means. The name “Qaeda” means “base” or

“foundation,” upon which its members hope to build a robust, geographically diverse network.

Understanding the origins of Al Qaeda, its goals, current activities, and prospective future

pursuits is key to developing sound U.S. strategies, policies, and programs. Appreciating the

adaptive nature of Al Qaeda as a movement and the ongoing threat it projects onto U.S. global

security interests assists in many facets of the national security enterprise, including securing the

homeland; congressional legislative process and oversight; alignment of executive branch

resources and coordination efforts; and prioritization of foreign assistance.

The focus of this report is on the history of Al Qaeda, known (or attributed) actions and suspected

capabilities of the organization and non-aligned entities, and an analysis of select regional Al

Qaeda affiliates. This report may be updated as events warrant.

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Contents

Background ................................................................................................................................1

Origins of Al Qaeda ....................................................................................................................5

The Threat Unfolds ...............................................................................................................6

Afghanistan ................................................................................................................................8

Background and Threat Assessment ......................................................................................8

Implications for U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................9

Pakistan .................................................................................................................................... 10

Background and Threat Assessment .................................................................................... 10

Implications for U.S. Policy ................................................................................................ 13

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) .............................................................................. 14

Background and Threat Assessment .................................................................................... 14

Implications for U.S. Policy ................................................................................................ 18

North Africa/Sahel: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).................................................. 19

Background and Threat Assessment .................................................................................... 19

Algeria.......................................................................................................................... 20

The Sahel...................................................................................................................... 21

Implications for U.S. Policy ................................................................................................ 22

East Africa ................................................................................................................................ 23

Background and Threat Assessment .................................................................................... 23

Al Shabaab and the Islamist Movements in Somalia ...................................................... 24

The Evolution of Al Shabaab......................................................................................... 25

Al Shabaab and Other Somali Terrorist Groups in Somalia ............................................ 25

Implications for U.S. Policy ................................................................................................ 26

Al Qaeda and Radical Islamist Extremists in Southeast Asia...................................................... 27

Background and Threat Assessment .................................................................................... 27

Implications for U.S. Policy ................................................................................................ 29

Al Qaeda’s Global Strategy and Implications for U.S. Policy..................................................... 29

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 32

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Background1

The Al Qaeda movement has transformed in recent years: some of the strategic objectives of the

original, or core, organization have remained consistent while the views and goals of new

affiliates, leaders, and recruits have evolved and become more diverse. Osama Bin Laden’s Al

Qaeda and the affiliated organizations that ascribe their actions to his violence-based philosophy

continue to desire to attack the United States and its global interests. In a June 2010 speech, the

Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the Department of State stated that “while

(core) Al Qaeda is now struggling in some areas the threat it poses is becoming more widely

distributed, more geographically diverse. The rise of affiliated groups such as Al Qaeda the

Arabian Peninsula and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a new and important development and

is also a troubling development.”2 In addressing threats to global security interests before the

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in September 2010, the U.S.

intelligence community assessed that “the range of Al Qaeda’s core, affiliated, allied, and inspired

U.S. citizens and residents plotting against the homeland during the past year suggests the threat

against the West has become more complex and underscores the challenges of identifying and

countering a more diverse array of homeland plotting.”3

Due in large part to the actions of the U.S. government, core Al Qaeda, reportedly located in

Pakistan, is under tremendous pressure. U.S. and coalition forces’ military and intelligence

operations appear to have degraded the core’s capacity for conducting large catastrophic

operations similar to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The core organization’s apparent inability

to commit large-scale attacks in recent years has led some analysts to question the relevancy,

capabilities, and competency of the group. 4 However, during the 2010 Annual Threat Assessment

hearing in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dennis C. Blair, Director of

National Intelligence (DNI), observed that while “important progress has been made against the

threat to the U.S. homeland over the past few years, I cannot reassure you that the danger is gone.

We face a persistent terrorist threat from Al Qaeda and potentially others who share its antiWestern ideology. A major terrorist attack may emanate from either outside or inside the United

States.”5 In addressing how the U.S. might assess whether the organization remains a viable entity

the DNI further stated, “until counterterrorism pressure on Al Qaeda’s place of refuge, key

lieutenants, and operative cadre outpaces the group’s ability to recover, Al Qaeda will retain its

capability to mount an attack.”6

While pressure from the international community on core Al Qaeda appears to have limited the

group’s ability to undertake a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. interests, many terrorist groups

and cells located throughout the world are affiliating their actions with the organization. Al Qaeda

Prepared by John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security, ext. 7-.....

“U.S. Counterterrorism Policy,” Remarks by Robert F. Godec, Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism,

State Department, speech at the Global Young Leaders Conference, June 30, 2010.

“Testimony of Michael Leiter, Director of National Counterterrorism Center, hearing “NineYears After 9/11:

Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,” before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental

Affairs Committee, September 22, 2010.

See comments of Brynjar Lia, an al Qaeda expert, in Ian Black and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Al-Qaida Faces

Recruitment Crisis, Anti-terrorism Experts Say,” The Guardian, September 10, 2009.

“Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” Dennis

C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.

Ibid.

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continues to attract potential recruits and possess an ability to influence and support global

organizations with similar goals and philosophical objectives. The often-termed jihadi movement7

has increasingly become an issue of concern for senior members of the U.S. national security

community. During the 2010 Annual Threat Assessment hearing DNI Blair noted the following:

Al Qaeda will continue its efforts to encourage key regional affiliates and jihadist networks

to pursue a global agenda. A few Al Qaeda regional affiliates and jihadist networks have

exhibited an intent or capability to attack inside the homeland. Some regional nodes and

allies have grown in strength and independence over the last two years and have begun to

project operationally outside their regions.8

Though Al Qaeda affiliated entities have attempted numerous deadly terrorist attacks in recent

years, 9 some analysts view these operations as evidence of desperation signifying that the core

organization and its affiliates are no longer capable of launching a large-scale catastrophic

terrorist attack directed at U.S. interests. These analysts suggest that recent attempted acts are an

acknowledgment that the destructive capabilities of corporate Al Qaeda and those individuals

with similar philosophical goals are actually on the decline and are indicative of an organization

desperate to prove its continued viability. Others, however, suggest that this recent trend may be

indicative of an organization becoming more selective and sophisticated in the operations it

pursues and adopting a model of encouraging affiliates and sympathizers to undertake smallerscale acts to divert international attention and resources away from planning and preparations for

larger, more catastrophic, attacks.

Recognition of a more resilient enemy may have been enunciated in a September 22, 2010,

statement by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) before the Senate

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:

the level of cooperation among Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups has changed in the past

year suggesting that this collaboration and resulting threat to the homeland will increase. By

sharing financial resources, training, tactical and operations expertise, and recruits, these

groups have been able to withstand significant counterterrorism pressure from the United

States, coalition, and local government forces.10

Similarly, in acknowledging the government’s challenge of transitioning from an almost exclusive

focus on core Al Qaeda to also attempting to assess the capabilities of numerous smaller groups

that are more opaque, the Secretary of Homeland Security stated “the terrorist threat changes

quickly and we have observed important changes in the threat even since this Committee

convened a similar hearing last year. The threat is evolving in several ways that make it more

difficult for law enforcement or the intelligence community to detect and disrupt plots.”11

See the text box on page 4 for a discussion of the use of the term jihad.

“Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” Dennis

C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.

For information on attempted terrorist attacks occurring in the homeland in 2009 and 2010 see CRS Report R41416,

American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

Testimony of Robert Mueller, “Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland” before the

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, September 22, 2010.

Testimony of Janet Napolitano, “Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland” before

the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, September 22, 2010.

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Notwithstanding the challenges associated with continuing to limit core Al Qaeda’s planning and

destructive capabilities while also attempting to thwart potential attacks by lesser-known

affiliated entities, some in the counterterrorism community suggest that the organization and the

philosophical following it has spawned are significantly degraded. A December 2010 report

issued by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center noted the following:

More than twenty years after its creation, Al Qaeda shows clear signs of decline. The group

has lost many of its key operational leaders to arrest or assassination; a number of Al Qaeda

franchises—including in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Algeria—have been substantially weakened

or defeated; and a host of ideological challenges, including recantations from prominent

jihadis themselves, have compelled Al Qaeda to spend valuable time defending its reputation

and actions. These setbacks and others suggest that Al Qaeda is not any closer to achieving

its long-term goals than it was on 10 September 2001.12

Likewise, others in the national security community have offered observations that help explain

why Al Qaeda may be an organization on the decline and possibly in jeopardy of losing its appeal

to potential followers. According to the non-governmental Bipartisan Policy Center four key

strategic issues are contributing to the demise of Al Qaeda: indiscriminate killing of Muslims, the

lack of a political movement to represent the organization’s interests, an ever-growing list of

enemies, and the lack of a desirable vision that sustains interest in the group and its ideology (see

“Al Qaeda’s Global Strategy and Implications for U.S. Policy” below). 13

Given recent discussions regarding the potential demise of Al Qaeda, some counterterrorism

observers suggest that such assessments may be premature. In an article published in the

December 2010 edition of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, the authors argue that the

organization’s infrastructure and ideology are resilient and have the ability to endure external

pressures from the international security community. The authors find that “although in recent

years Al Qaeda has adopted more ideological and inspirational characteristics, it still exists as a

group, and possesses, first and foremost, operational characteristics of guerilla and terrorist

organization.”14

Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds.), Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within Al Qaeda and its

Periphery, U.S. Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center, December 2010.

Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s

National Security Preparedness Group, September, 2010.

Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution,” Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism, vol. 33, no. 12 (December 2010).

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Jihad, Al Qaeda, and other Violent Islamist Groups

The Arabic word jihad is derived from a verb that means “to struggle, strive, or exert oneself.” It appears in the

Quran in the context of calls to strive for the advancement of Islam and to make a personal commitment to struggle

“in the cause of God.” At its most general level, jihad denotes taking action on behalf of Islam and fellow Muslims, and

thereby improving one’s standing as a pious member of the religious community. The concept has been understood

by Muslims in various ways over time to include fighting (qital) against those who oppose the advancement of Islam or

who harm Muslims, fundraising for Islamic causes, proselytizing, doing charitable work, and struggling against personal

desires. Historically, key Sunni and Shi’a religious texts such as collections of sayings and deeds of the prophet

Mohammed (hadith) most often referred to jihad in terms of religiously approved fighting on behalf of Islam and

Muslims. Some Muslims have emphasized nonviolent social and personal means of jihad or have sought to shape the

modern meaning of the term to refer to fighting only under defensive circumstances.

The term Islamist refers to groups and individuals who support a formal political role for Islam through the

implementation of Islamic law (sharia) by the state, political action through a religious party, or the creation of a

religious system of governance. Islamists differ in their theological views and political priorities. Islamists may use

nonviolent or violent tactics in pursuit of local, national, or transnational agendas.

The early years of the Islamic faith in 7th century Arabia were marked by conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims

and among Muslims themselves. The positive connotations early Muslims attached to jihad on behalf of their new

community make the concept an attractive ideological tool for contemporary violent Sunni Islamist groups. In

attempting to mobilize Muslims for collective action, many of these groups seek to cloak themselves in legitimacy by

associating themselves with Mohammed and the first three generations of Muslims (al salaf al saalih).

Most Al Qaeda-produced ideological material reflects the group’s shared view of jihad as, first and foremost, an

individual duty to fight on behalf of Islam and Muslims, and, in some cases, to offensively attack Muslims or nonMuslims who are deemed insufficiently pious or who oppose enforcement of Islamic principles and religious law. Al

Qaeda and other violent Islamist groups seek to convince fellow Muslims that the use of violence as a tactic and

support for violent groups is religiously justified and required. To do so, they draw on the Quran and other Islamic

religious texts and adapt historical events—especially the experiences of Mohammed and the early Islamic

community—to current circumstances.

Al Qaeda’s uncompromising approach to the practice of Islam, its use of violence against Muslims, and its views about

the illegitimacy of democracy often put them at odds with other Muslims. Some conservative Sunni Muslim clerics

also reject some violent Islamist interpretations of Islamic principles, including jihad. Since the 1980s, groups

advocating violent jihad have differed over the relative importance of targeting local governments and societies or

targeting the United States and other entities believed to be hostile to Muslims or supportive of hostile local

governments. Al Qaeda’s transnational appeals to Muslims in Europe and North America often blend rhetoric about

foreign conflicts and occupation with calls to join insurgencies or carry out terrorist attacks.

Overall, jihad remains a contested concept among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Some observers resist referring to

the actions of Al Qaeda and other violent groups in terms of jihad because they believe that such usage unfairly links

violence to an important concept in Islam and implies that violent groups are acting on behalf of Islam in a legitimate

or praiseworthy manner. Others believe that references to jihad and jihadists in discussions of political violence and

Islam are justified because Muslims historically have linked jihad to conflict and, at present, some violent individuals or

groups that claim to be acting on behalf of Islam or Muslims self-identify as jihadis or mujahidin. As such, these

observers argue that directly addressing differing views on jihad is critical for counteracting the messages and agendas

of violent Islamist groups.

This report uses the term “jihad” to denote violent Sunni Islamists’ understanding of the concept as a religious call to

arms and uses the terms “jihadi” and “jihadist” to refer to groups and individuals whose statements indicate that they

share such an understanding of jihad and who advocate or use violence against the United States or in support of

transnational Islamist agendas. Alternative terms include “violent Islamist” or “militant Islamist.”

For further discussion of jihad in the context of Al Qaeda and other violent Islamist organizations, see Thomas

Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism,” in Roel

Meijer, ed., Global Salafism, Hurst/Columbia University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 244-266; Steven Brooke, “Jihadist

Strategic Debates before 9/11,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31, 2008, pp. 201–226; and, Assaf Moghadam and Brian

Fishman (eds.), Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa’ida and its Periphery, United States Military

Academy Combating Terrorism Center, December 2010. For background on the concept of jihad in Islam, see

Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, Markus Weiner Publishers, 2008; David Cook, Understanding Jihad,

University of California Press, 2005; Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History, Princeton University Press, 2006; and

Reuven Firestone, Jihad, Oxford University Press, 1999.

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Origins of Al Qaeda15

The primary founder of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, was born in July 1957, the 17th of 20 sons

of a Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin. Most Saudis are conservative Sunni Muslims,

and Bin Laden, conservative from a young age, appears to have adopted militant Islamist views

while studying at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There he attended lectures

by Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb, the key ideologue of a major Sunni Islamist

movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. 16 Another of Bin Laden’s inspirations was Abdullah al

Azzam, a major figure in the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Azzam is identified

by some experts as the intellectual architect of the jihad against the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation

of Afghanistan, and ultimately of Al Qaeda itself; he cast the Soviet invasion as an attempted

conquest by a non-Muslim power of sacred Muslim territory and people. 17

Bin Laden made his first visit to Afghanistan a few years after the December 1979 Soviet

invasion, and then relocated to areas of Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan by 1986. He

reportedly used some of his personal funds to establish himself as a donor to the Afghan

mujahedin and a recruiter of Arab and other Islamic volunteers for the war.18 In 1984, Azzam and

bin Laden structured this assistance by establishing a network of recruiting and fund-raising

offices in the Arab world, Europe, and the United States. That network was called the Maktab al

Khidamat (Services Office), also known as Al Khifah; many experts consider the Maktab to be

the organizational forerunner of Al Qaeda. Another major figure who utilized the Maktab network

to recruit for the anti-Soviet jihad was Umar Abd al Rahman (also known as “the blind shaykh”),

the spiritual leader of radical Egyptian Islamist group Al Jihad. Bin Laden apparently also made

occasional forays across the border into Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war; he reportedly

participated in a 1986 battle in Jalalabad and an April 1987 frontal assault by foreign volunteers

against Afghan forces equipped with Soviet armor. According to some experts, Bin Laden has

said he was exposed to a Soviet chemical attack and slightly injured in the latter battle.19

During this period, most U.S. officials perceived the volunteers as positive contributors to the

effort to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and U.S. officials made no apparent effort to stop

the recruitment of the non-Afghan volunteers for the war. U.S. officials have repeatedly denied

that the United States directly supported the non-Afghan volunteers.20 The United States did

covertly finance (about $3 billion during 1981-1991) and arm (via Pakistan) the Afghan

mujahedin factions, particularly the Islamic fundamentalist Afghan factions, fighting Soviet

forces. By almost all accounts, it was the Afghan mujahedin factions, not the Arab volunteer

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt, and it has since spawned numerous Islamist movements

throughout the region, some as branches of the Brotherhood, others with new names. For example, the Palestinian

Islamist group Hamas traces its roots to the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1966, Sayyid Qutb was

tried and executed for treason for his opposition to the government of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al Nasser.

Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. Columbia University Press, 2002; Wright, Lawrance. The Looming Tower: Al

Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. New York, Knopf, 2006. pp. 60-144.

The September 11 Commission report says that U.S. officials obtained information in 2000 indicating that bin Laden

received $1 million per year from his family from 1970 (two years after his father’s death) until 1994, when his

citizenship was revoked by the Saudi government. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon

the United States. July 22, 2004. p. 170.

Gunaratna, p. 21.

Author conversations with officials in the public affairs office of the Central Intelligence Agency. 1993.

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fighters, that were decisive in persuading the Soviet Union to pull out of Afghanistan. During this

period, Bin Laden, Azzam, and Abd al Rahman were not known to have openly advocated,

undertaken, or planned any direct attacks against the United States, although they all were critical

of U.S. support for Israel in the Middle East.

In 1988, toward the end of the Soviet occupation, Bin Laden, Azzam, and other associates began

contemplating how, and to what end, the Islamist volunteer network they had organized could be

utilized. U.S. intelligence estimates of the size of that network were between 10,000 and 20,000;

however, not all of these necessarily supported or participated in Al Qaeda terrorist activities.21

Azzam apparently wanted this “Al Qaeda” (Arabic for “the base”) organization—as they began

terming the organization in 1988—to become an Islamic “rapid reaction force,” available to

intervene wherever Muslims were perceived to be threatened. Bin Laden differed with Azzam,

hoping instead to dispatch the Al Qaeda activists to their home countries to try to topple secular,

pro-Western Arab leaders, such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s royal

family.

Some attribute the Bin Laden-Azzam differences to the growing influence on Bin Laden of the

Egyptians in his inner circle, such as Abd al Rahman, who wanted to use Al Qaeda’s resources to

install an Islamic state in Egypt. Another close Egyptian confidant was Ayman al-Zawahiri,

operational leader of Al Jihad in Egypt. Like Abd al Rahman, Zawahiri had been imprisoned but

ultimately acquitted for the October 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and

he permanently left Egypt in 1985 and arrived in the Afghanistan theater in 1986 after an

intervening period in Saudi Arabia. In the Afghanistan conflict, he used his medical training to

tend to fighters wounded in the war. In November 1989, Azzam was assassinated, and some

allege that Bin Laden might have been responsible for the killing to resolve this power struggle.

Following Azzam’s death, Bin Laden gained control of the Maktab’s funds and organizational

mechanisms. Abd al Rahman came to the United States in 1990 from Sudan and was convicted in

October 1995 for terrorist plots related to the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center

in New York. Zawahiri stayed with Bin Laden and remains Bin Laden’s main strategist today.

The Threat Unfolds

The August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait apparently reinforced Bin Laden’s turn from a defacto U.S. ally against the Soviet Union into one of its most active adversaries. Bin Laden had

returned home to Saudi Arabia in 1989, after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan that February. While back home, he lobbied Saudi officials not to host U.S. combat

troops to defend Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi invasion, arguing instead for the raising of a

“mujahedin” army to oust Iraq from Kuwait. His idea was rebuffed by the Saudi leadership as

impractical, causing Bin Laden’s falling out with the royal family, and 500,000 U.S. troops

deployed to Saudi Arabia to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait in “Operation Desert Storm” (January

16-February 28, 1991). About 6,000 U.S. forces, mainly Air Force, remained in the kingdom

during 1991-2003 to conduct operations to contain Iraq. Although the post-1991 U.S. force in

Saudi Arabia was relatively small and confined to Saudi military facilities, bin Laden and his

followers painted the U.S. forces as occupiers of sacred Islamic ground and the Saudi royal

family as facilitator of that “occupation.”

Report of the 9/11 Commission. p. 67.

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In 1991, after his rift with the Saudi leadership, Bin Laden relocated to Sudan, buying property

there which he used to host and train Al Qaeda militants—this time, for use against the United

States and its interests, as well as for jihad operations in the Balkans, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the

Philippines. During the early 1990s, he also reportedly funded Saudi Islamist dissidents in

London, including Saad Faqih, organized as the “Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia

(MIRA).”22 Bin Laden himself remained in Sudan until the Sudanese government, under U.S. and

Egyptian pressure, expelled him in May 1996; he then returned to Afghanistan and helped the

Taliban gain and maintain control of Afghanistan. (The Taliban captured Kabul in September

1996.)

Bin Laden and Zawahiri apparently believed that the only way to bring Islamic regimes to power

was to oust from the region the perceived backer of secular regional regimes, the United States.

During the 1990s, bin Laden and Zawahiri transformed Al Qaeda into a global threat to U.S.

national security, culminating in the September 11, 2001, attacks. By this time, Al Qaeda had

become a coalition of factions of radical Islamic groups operating throughout the Muslim world,

mostly groups opposing their governments. Cells and associates have been located in over 70

countries, according to U.S. officials.

The pre-September 11 roster of attacks against the United States and U.S. interests that are widely

attributed to Al Qaeda included the following:

•

In 1992, Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for bombing a hotel in Yemen where

100 U.S. military personnel were awaiting deployment to Somalia for Operation

Restore Hope. No one was killed.

•

A growing body of information about central figures in the February 1993

bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, particularly the reputed key

bomb maker Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, suggests possible Al Qaeda involvement. As

noted above, Abd al Rahman was convicted for plots related to this attack.

•

Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for arming Somali factions who battled U.S.

forces there in October 1993, and who killed 18 U.S. special operations forces in

Mogadishu in October 1993.

•

In June 1995, in Ethiopia, members of Al Qaeda allegedly aided the Egyptian

militant Islamic Group in a nearly successful assassination attempt against the

visiting Mubarak.

•

The four Saudi nationals who confessed to a November 1995 bombing of a U.S.

military advisory facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, claimed on Saudi television to

have been inspired by bin Laden and other radical Islamist leaders. Five

Americans were killed in that attack. Saudi leaders do not attribute the attacks

directly to Bin Laden or Al Qaeda.

•

The September 11 Commission report indicated that Al Qaeda might have had a

hand in the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex near Dhahran,

Saudi Arabia. However, then-director of the FBI Louis Freeh previously

attributed that attack primarily to Saudi Shiite dissidents working with Iranian

agents. Nineteen U.S. airmen were killed.

On December 21, 2004, the Treasury Department designated Faqih as a provider of material support to Al Qaeda and

Bin Laden, under Executive Order 13324.

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•

Al Qaeda allegedly was responsible for the August 1998 bombings of U.S.

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed about 300. On August 20, 1998,

the United States launched a cruise missile strike against bin Laden’s training

camps in Afghanistan, reportedly missing him by a few hours.

•

In December 1999, U.S. and Jordanian authorities separately thwarted related Al

Qaeda plots against religious sites in Jordan and apparently against the Los

Angeles international airport.

•

In October 2000, Al Qaeda activists attacked the U.S.S. Cole in a ship-borne

suicide bombing while the Cole was docked the harbor of Aden, Yemen. The ship

was damaged and 17 sailors were killed.

Afghanistan23

Background and Threat Assessment

Afghanistan was Al Qaeda’s main base of operations during Osama bin Laden’s residence there in

1996-2001. Al Qaeda operatives—and their protectors in the Taliban regime that ruled those same

years—were captured or mostly driven out of Afghanistan during the major combat phase of

Operation Enduring Freedom, which began on October 7, 2001, and continues today. As

reiterated by the December 16, 2010, summary of a late 2010 Administration review on

Afghanistan, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, now carried out by 98,000 U.S. forces plus about

41,000 forces from partner countries, is to deny Al Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan and to deny

the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government. 24

U.S. commanders say that Al Qaeda militants are more facilitators of militant incursions into

Afghanistan than active fighters in the Afghan insurgency. Small numbers of Al Qaeda

members—including Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens—have been captured or killed in battles in

Afghanistan itself over the past few years, according to U.S. commanders. Some of these fighters

apparently belong to Al Qaeda affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In

the most direct Administration statement on the strength of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan itself,

Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta said on June 27, 2010, that Al Qaeda fighters in

Afghanistan itself might number 50-100.25 However, since that statement, some NATO/ISAF

officials said in October 2010 that Al Qaeda cells may be moving back into remote areas of

Kunar and Nuristan provinces.26

Al Qaeda’s top leadership has eluded U.S. forces in Afghanistan and other efforts in Pakistan. In

December 2001, in the course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special

Operations Forces and Central Intelligence Agency operatives reportedly narrowed Osama bin

Laden’s location to the Tora Bora mountains in Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

For text of the summary of the review, see http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=

overview+of+the+afghanistan+and+pakistan+annual+review&aq=0&aqi=g1&aql=&oq=overview+of+the+afgha&

gs_rfai=.

Text of the Panetta interview with ABC News is at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=11025299.

Dreazen, Yochi. “Al Qaida Returning to Afghanistan for New Attacks.” Nationaljournal.com. October 18, 2010.

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Pass crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan), but the Afghan militia fighters who were the

bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape. Some U.S. military and intelligence officers

(such as Gary Berntsen and Dalton Fury, who have written books on the battle)27 have questioned

the U.S. decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this engagement, asserting that Afghan

factions may have accepted funds or tribal and clan overtures to permit the escape of the Al

Qaeda leaders.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Bin Laden and his close ally, Egyptian militant leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, are presumed to be on

the Pakistani side of the border. After years in which U.S. and regional officials said there was

virtually no information on their whereabouts, CNN quoted a NATO official on October 18, 2010,

that assessments from the U.S.-led coalition now say the two are likely in a settled area near the

border with Afghanistan, and not living in a very remote uninhabited area.28 A U.S. strike

reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006,

suggesting that there has sometimes been actionable intelligence on his movements. 29 From their

redoubt, these leaders continue to occasionally issue audiotapes and statements inspiring

supporters and operatives to continue to be looking for ways to attack the U.S. homeland or U.S.

allies and to threaten such attacks. On the ninth anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks on

the United States, some U.S. observers said it was still significant to try to capture bin Laden if

for no other reason than for symbolic value.

Among other efforts that have targeted senior Al Qaeda leadership, a strike in late January 2008,

in an area near Damadola, killed Abu Laith al-Libi, a reported senior Al Qaeda figure who

purportedly masterminded, among other operations, the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February

2007 when Vice President Cheney was visiting. In August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to

have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri, and two senior operatives

allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa reportedly were killed by a Predator

strike in January 2009. Press reports in early September 2010 say that Al Qaeda’s former

spokesman, Kuwait-born Sulayman Abu Ghaith, may have been released from house arrest by

Iran and allowed to proceed to Pakistan.

These types of strikes have become more frequent under President Obama, indicating that the

Administration sees the tactic as effective in preventing attacks. Unmanned vehicle strikes are

also increasingly used on the Afghanistan battlefield itself and against Al Qaeda affiliated

militants in such countries as Yemen.

See for example, Berntsen, Gary. Jawbreaker, New York: Crown Publishers, 2005.

Starr, Barbara: “NATO Official: Bin Laden, Deputy Hiding in Northwest Pakistan.” CNN, October 18, 2010.

http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-18/world/afghanistan.bin.laden_1_tribal-areas-al-qaeda-leadership-chitral?_s=

PM:WORLD.

Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,

2006.

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Pakistan

Background and Threat Assessment

U.S. officials remain concerned that senior Al Qaeda terrorists operate on Pakistani territory,

perhaps with some level of impunity, and that the group appears to have increased its influence

among the myriad Islamist militant groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as

well as in the densely populated Punjab province. Al Qaeda forces that fled Afghanistan with their

Taliban supporters remain active in Pakistan and reportedly have extensive, mutually supportive

links with indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups that conduct anti-Western and anti-India attacks,

including the November 2008 assault on Mumbai, India, that left some 173 people dead and was

perpetrated by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group considered closely linked with Al

Qaeda.31 Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, Egyptian Islamist radical Ayman alZawahiri, are widely believed to be hiding in northwestern Pakistan, along with most other senior

operatives. 32 Al Qaeda leaders have issued statements encouraging Pakistani Muslims to “resist”

the American “occupiers” in Pakistan (and Afghanistan), and to fight against Pakistan’s “U.S.allied politicians and officers.”33 Recent unclassified assessments place more than 300 Al Qaeda

operatives in Pakistan’s tribal areas.34

Al Qaeda is widely believed to maintain camps in western Pakistan where foreign extremists

receive training in terrorist operations. At least 150 Westerners reportedly have attended these

camps since 2008. As military pressure has mounted on Al Qaeda, these camps may have become

smaller and more mobile. In 2010, the flow of aspiring Western terrorist recruits continued, and

the consensus view of analysts is that Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered

Tribal Areas (FATA) remains a crucial threat.35 Recent U.S. attention has focused on the threat

posed by Yemen-based Al Qaeda elements who are likely to be receiving strategic and

philosophical support from their Pakistan-based allies. 36

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in South Asian Affairs.

During a late 2009 visit to Islamabad, U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen asserted that over the past 1224 months Pakistan-based terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-eTaiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed were “working much more closely together.” Michael Leiter , Director of the National

Counterterrorism Center, more recently called this “diversification” of the threat “most difficult for the

counterterrorism community” (see the Pentagon’s December 16, 2009, transcript at http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?

ID=1298; Aspen Security Forum 2010, “Counterterrorism Strategy with the Hon. Michael E Leiter, Director, National

Counterterrorism Center,” June 30, 2010).

“NATO Official: Bin Laden, Deputy Hiding in Northwest Pakistan,” CNN.com (online), October 18, 2010; “‘Heart’

of Al Qaeda in Afghan-Pakistani Border Area: Gates,” Agence France Presse, November 9, 2010.

See, for example, “Qaeda’s Zawahri Urges Pakistanis to Join Jihad,” Reuters, July 15, 2009. More recently, Al

Qaeda figures criticized the Islamabad government for its allegedly corrupt and inept response to the major flood

disaster (“Bin Laden Criticizes Pakistani Relief Mission,” Reuters, October 1, 2010).

“New Estimate of Strength of Al Qaeda is Offered,” New York Times, July 1, 2010.

“Qaeda’s Training Areas in Pakistan Notorious,” New York Daily News, September 21, 2009; “Terror Training

Camps Smaller, Harder to Target,” Associated Press, November 9, 2009; Barbara Sude, “Al Qaeda Central,” New

American Foundation Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, February 2010; “Pakistan Retains Allure for

Terror Trainees,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2010.

“Pakistan Al Qaeda Aids Yemen Plots,” Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2010.

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A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland concluded that Al

Qaeda “has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including a

safehaven in [Pakistan’s FATA], operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.”37 In early 2009,

the Obama Administration declared that the “core goal” of the United States should be to

“disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their

return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”38 The President continues to assert that Al Qaeda represents

the top-most threat to U.S. security, and the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism

2009 (released August 2010) flatly stated that “In 2009, Al Qaeda’s core in Pakistan remained the

most formidable terrorist organization targeting the U.S. homeland.”39

It appears that Al Qaeda’s South Asia regional strategy has in recent years shifted toward greater

emphasis on combating its Pakistani enemies. As articulated by one analyst,

Al Qaeda has utilized its media prowess and ideological authority to discredit the Pakistani

state and promote cooperation among a variety of Pakistani militants to challenge the state’s

authority and undermine its support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.40

By justifying and rallying support for the Pakistani jihad, providing “force multiplier” facilitation

of attacks inside Pakistan, and acting as a mediator and coalition-builder among Pakistan’s

myriad Islamist militant groups, Al Qaeda’s leadership has sought to both preserve its geographic

base and mitigate the negative effects of militarized U.S. and Pakistani actions against it.41

While taking questions from senior Pakistani journalists during a late 2009 visit to Pakistan,

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered a pointed expression of U.S. concerns that some

elements of official Pakistan maintain sympathy for most-wanted Islamist terrorists:

Al Qaeda has had safe haven in Pakistan since 2002. I find it hard to believe that nobody in

[the Pakistani] government knows where they are and couldn’t get them if they really wanted

to. And maybe that’s the case. Maybe they’re not gettable.... I don’t know what the reasons

are that Al Qaeda has safe haven in your country, but let’s explore it and let’s try to be

honest about it and figure out what we can do.42

Pakistani officials are resentful of such suggestions. Islamabad reportedly has remanded to U.S.

custody roughly 500 Al Qaeda fugitives since 2001, including several senior alleged operatives.

U.S. officials have lauded Pakistani military operations against Al Qaeda- and Taliban-allied

militants in western tribal areas beginning in late 2009 and continuing at a limited pace to date;

Islamabad has devoted up to 200,000 regular and paramilitary troops to this effort. They also

claim that drone-launched U.S. missile attacks and Pakistan’s pressing of military offensives

against extremist groups in the border areas have meaningfully disrupted Al Qaeda activities there

while inflicting heavy losses on their cadre. 43 The Obama Administration has significantly

See http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf.

See http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf.

See the State Department report at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm.

Don Rassler, “Al-Qa’ida’s Pakistan Strategy,” CTC Sentinel, June 2009.

Ibid.

See the State Department’s October 30, 2009, transcript at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/131103.htm.

The CIA Director repeatedly has asserted that increased Pakistani government coordination and what he called “the

most aggressive operation that CIA has been involved in in our history” has driven Al Qaeda leaders into deeper hiding

and disrupted their ability to operate (“CIA Director Says Attacks Have Hobbled Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, March

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accelerated the pace of unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) strikes in western Pakistan, with the

reported number of such strikes rising from 34 in 2008 and 53 in 2009 to more than 110 in

2010.44 In addition, a years-long effort by Western intelligence agencies to penetrate Al Qaeda

with moles and informants may be paying off, despite the fact that dozens of such infiltrators

have been executed in western Pakistan since 2001.45

The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP or “Pakistani Taliban”) is an umbrella organization of

Islamist militant groups in western Pakistan that has more closely allied itself with Al Qaeda in

recent years.46 The August 2009 death of TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud was a notable success for

U.S. strategy, as were the May 2010 death of Al Qaeda’s third-ranking operative, Egyptian

national Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, and that of his successor, Egyptian national Sheikh Fateh, four

months later. All three deaths were assumed caused by U.S.-launched missiles. Yet a flurry of

lethal suicide bomb attacks on urban Pakistani targets in late 2009 continued (at a significantly

reduced pace) in 2010 and demonstrates the resiliency of regional militant groups. New Al

Qaeda-allied militant leaders have arisen to pose major threats beyond the region. Among the

most notable is Ilyas Kashmiri, the commander of the Pakistan-based Harakat-ul Jihad Islami

(HuJI, or Movement for an Islamic Holy War), a militant group formed in the 1980s and now

closely aligned with Al Qaeda.47

Some analysts worry that successful drone operations are driving Al Qaeda fighters into Pakistani

cities where they will be harder to target, while also exacerbating already significant antiAmerican sentiments among the Pakistani people. Senior Al Qaeda figures have become more

active in the Pakistani megacity of Karachi, about 500 miles south of the FATA; some have been

captured there through joint U.S.-Pakistani intelligence operations. Al Qaeda may increasingly be

focused on provoking conflict in both Karachi and in Pakistan’s “cultural capital” of Lahore as a

means of diverting the Pakistani Army and establishing new safe havens.48

(...continued)

18, 2010; “Stepped-Up U.S. Operations in Pakistan Taking Serious Toll on Al Qaeda, CIA Chief Says,” Los Angeles

Times, October 19, 2010).

See data at the New American Foundation’s “The Year of the Drone” at http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/

drones. Since 2004, drone strikes reportedly have killed at least 15 senior and 15 mid-level Al Qaeda leaders. At least

80 members of the terrorist group were killed in drone strikes in 2010 (“Drones Take Toll on Al Qaeda Leaders,” USA

Today, June 3, 2010; “Inside Al Qaeda,” Newsweek, September 13, 2010).

“Spy Agencies Infiltrate Al Qaeda,” Associated Press, November 5, 2010.

The TTP was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Terrorist Organization under

U.S. law in September 2010. A senior Obama Administration counterterrorism official describes the group as having a

“symbiotic relationship” with Al Qaeda, offering safe havens in the FATA in return for “ideological guidance” and

“force multiplier” assistance (see the September 1, 2010, comments of Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism

Daniel Benjamin at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/146597.htm).

Originally from Pakistani Kashmir, Kashmiri is identified as a rising Al Qaeda figure—the most senior non-Arab in

the organization—with the experience, connections, and determination to make him a highly dangerous operative. In

August 2010, the U.S. Treasury Department designated HuJI as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under U.S. law and

named Kashmiri as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Today he is believed to be plotting fedayeen (suicide

commando) attacks in western Europe and perhaps the United States similar to that in Mumbai, India, in late 2008 that

left 165 people dead. Kashmiri is a veteran of both the 1980s insurgency against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and of

the 1990s insurgency against the Indian Army in Kashmir. He has been linked to an effort to assassinate then-Pakistani

leader Pervez Musharraf in 2003 and may have abetted the 2008 Mumbai attack (“Lashkar-e-Taiba Cadres Sucked Into

Al Qaeda Orbit,” Reuters, November 7, 2010; Treasury Department’s August 6, 2010, notification at

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg818.htm; “The New Bin Laden,” Newsweek, November 1, 2010; “Ilyas Kashmiri:

Most Dangerous Man on Earth?,” CNN.com (online), November 10, 2010).

“Key Osama Aide Among 9 Terrorists Held in Karachi,” Daily Times (Lahore), February 9, 2010; “Qaeda Operative

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Despite Al Qaeda enduring some disruptions in its operations in Pakistan, the organization has

been resurgent with anti-U.S. terrorists appearing to have benefitted from what some analysts

have called a Pakistani policy of appeasement in western tribal areas near the Afghan border.

Some Pakistani and Western security officials have seen Islamabad losing its war against

religious militancy and Al Qaeda forces enjoying new areas in which to operate, due in part to the

Pakistan Army’s poor counterinsurgency capabilities and to the central government’s eroded

legitimacy. At the same time, the Pakistan Army appears hesitant to expand its ground offensive

operations into western tribal agencies to which Al Qaeda and other militant leaders are believed

to have fled (North Waziristan perhaps primary among these), and which may allow Al Qaeda to

continue using the rugged region as a base of operations.

Implications for U.S. Policy

In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush launched

major military operations in South and Southwest Asia as part of the global U.S.-led antiterrorism effort. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan has seen substantive success with

the vital assistance of neighboring Pakistan. President Obama has bolstered the U.S. military

presence in Afghanistan with a central goal of neutralizing the Al Qaeda threat emanating from

the region. Yet neighboring Pakistan continues to be an “epicenter of terrorism” from which

threats to the United States and other western countries continue to emanate. Recently uncovered

evidence suggests that the 9/11 hijackers were themselves based in western Pakistan in early 2001

and, by one account, Al Qaeda and its Pakistani affiliates provided operational direction in 38%

of the serious terrorist plots against Western countries since 2004.49 As tensions between Pakistan

and India remain tense more than two years after the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai,

India, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has warned that groups under Al Qaeda’s Pakistan

“syndicate” are actively seeking to destabilize the entire South Asia region, perhaps through

another successful major terrorist attack in India that could provoke all-out war between the

region’s two largest and nuclear-armed states.50

U.S. policy options to address the Al Qaeda threat in Pakistan are limited. While Al Qaeda

remains widely unpopular among the Pakistani public, there exists a significant segment that

views the terrorist group favorably. Anti-American sentiment is seen to be at peak levels within

all spectra of Pakistani society, fueled by perceptions that the United States is fighting a war

against Islam, that it is insufficiently attentive to the process of democratization in Pakistan, and

that drone strikes and other U.S. operations on Pakistani territory are a violation of national

sovereignty. A Pew Center public opinion survey released in July 2010 found the percentage of

Pakistanis holding a favorable view of Al Qaeda doubling from 9% in 2009 to 18% in 2010. The

poll also found only 17% of Pakistanis holding a favorable view of the United States; nearly three

in five described the United States as “an enemy,” while only 11% saw it as “a partner.”51

(...continued)

Arrested in Pakistan,” New York Times, March 8, 2010; Ali Chishti, “Terror Report Card: Pakistan” (op-ed), Daily

Times (Lahore), November 14, 2010.

“In Military Campaign, Pakistan Finds Hint of 9/11,” New York Times, October 30, 2009; Paul Cruickshank, “The

Militant Pipeline,” New American Foundation Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, February 2010.

“Al Qaeda Could Provoke New India-Pakistan War: Gates,” Agence France Presse, January 20, 2010.

See the survey results at http://pewglobal.org/files/pdf/Pew-Global-Attitudes-2010-Pakistan-Report.pdf).

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A significant and long-term increase in economic and development assistance to Pakistan is a key

aspect of the Obama Administration’s effort to reduce the bilateral “trust deficit”—the Enhanced

Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73) authorized $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary

aid through FY2014. Moreover, the United States plans to continue devoting considerable

resources toward bolstering Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities (a

new “Pakistan Counterterrorism Capability Fund” provided $1.1 billion for this cause in FY2009FY2010). Yet U.S. troops are officially prohibited from operating on Pakistani territory, and the

combination of distrust of Americans and a dire security environment makes it extremely difficult

for U.S. officials to operate effectively there.

For the near and middle term, then, it appears that U.S. strategy likely will continue to rely on

large-scale economic and development aid, redoubled efforts to build Pakistan’s relevant military

capacity, accelerated drone attacks on militant targets, and admonitions that Pakistani leaders

consolidate what progress they have made and endeavor to keep pressure on Al Qaeda and its

allies on their territory.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)52

Background and Threat Assessment

In January 2009, Al Qaeda-affiliated militants based in Yemen announced that Saudi militants had

pledged allegiance to their leader and that the group would now operate under the banner of Al

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).53 A previous Saudi Arabia-based version of AQAP was

largely dismantled and destroyed by Saudi security forces after a long and costly counterterrorism

campaign from 2003 through 2007.54 Some Saudi militants fled to Yemen to avoid death or

capture, helping to lay the groundwork for a reemergence of the organization there in recent years

alongside Al Qaeda figures who escaped from Yemeni custody and former Saudi detainees from

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the Saudi terrorism rehabilitation program.

The emergence of Yemen as a safe haven for a reconstituted Al Qaeda threat has left Saudi

officials working to prevent “inspiration and re-infiltration” by the new incarnation of AQAP.

Continuing terrorism arrests have sustained concerns, particularly because of an apparent shift in

attackers’ objectives toward targeting critical energy infrastructure and Saudi government

officials. 55 The arrest in Saudi Arabia of over 110 terrorist suspects in March 2010, along with

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, and (name redacted), Analyst in

Middle Eastern Affairs. For more information on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170,

Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), and CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background

and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted).

See OSC Feature FEA20090124809516, “Video Shows Saudi, Yemeni Al-Qa’ida Leaders Announcing Merger,”

January 24, 2009; and, OSC Report GMP20090128666004, “Al-Qa’ida Amir in Arabian Peninsula Urges Targeting

‘Crusader’ Interests,” Al-Jazirah.net (Doha) January 26, 2009.

Saudi counterterrorism officials appear confident that they have killed or captured most of the leaders and operatives

that made up the original AQAP organization. King Abdullah echoed this sentiment in June 2006, when he stated that

AQAP had been “defeated.” “Saudi King Says Al Qaeda Militants Defeated,” Reuters, June 7, 2006.

The attack in February 2006 on the oil processing facility at Abqaiq was in some ways the most serious of Al

Qaeda’s attacks inside the kingdom. Accounts suggest that the attack came dangerously close to disrupting operations

at one of the world’s most critical oil facilities. Then-U.S. Ambassador James Oberwetter has stated that, “The Saudis

fortunately deterred damage to the Abqaiq facilities, but al-Qaeda penetrated the plant site. This assault was evidence to

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reports that some of the suspects planned to target energy installations, highlighted these

concerns. The attempted assassination of Assistant Interior Minister for Security Affairs Prince

Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz Al Saud in August 2009 underscored the threat to the royal

family.56 In 2010, AQAP leaders released an direct appeal to Saudi security and military

personnel to turn their weapons on government officials and royal family members.57 The

recruitment of Saudis who have passed through the kingdom’s terrorist rehabilitation program has

raised new questions about the tactics employed in the program and underlying assumptions

about the rehabilitation prospects for committed, violent Al Qaeda supporters.

Yemen is an attractive base of operations for AQAP. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s much poorer

population is more dispersed, rural, and geographically isolated than its neighbors. The central

government, which is widely vilified for its poor governance and corruption, cannot exercise

direct control in several of its own governorates without first seeking tribal support. President Ali

Abdullah Saleh has ruled Yemen since its unification in 1990. Before that, Saleh ruled North

Yemen from 1978 onward. He has a long history of allying himself with Sunni Islamist militants

against Communist or Shiite58 (revivalist Zaydi59) domestic opponents. These ties have led in the

past to his government’s somewhat complacent attitude toward Al Qaeda sympathizers,60

particularly when faced with other, more pressing security challenges in the north (Houthi

conflict) and south (secessionist movement) that are perceived as more of a direct threat to

Saleh’s rule. As Yemen’s oil production drops precipitously, its population rises, its water tables

drop, and its government coffers dwindle, the country only becomes more ripe for instability and

extremist activity.

AQAP operates both within the Arabian Peninsula and internationally. Some analysts also suggest

that, with the encouragement of Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the group is

expanding its ties with Al Shabaab in Somalia, though the extent of those ties is unknown. AQAP

also may be working with other AQ affiliates. The Washington Post reported that France, with

(...continued)

the leadership of Saudi Arabia that much more needed to be done to protect vital installations of all kinds.” Jim

Landers, “Saudi Arabia Works to Protect Oil Fields from Terrorism,” Dallas Morning News, December 5, 2007. In late

April 2007, Saudi authorities arrested 170 terrorism suspects, citing charges of planning to target critical oil facilities in

the Eastern Province. Dan Murphy, “New Saudi Tack on Al Qaeda,” Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 2007.

The Prince counts four Al Qaeda attempts on his life and emphasizes the personal sacrifices made by Saudi security

officers and their families in meetings with U.S. officials. OSC Document GMP20100816614007, “Saudi Paper

Reveals Fourth Attempt To Assassinate Deputy Interior Prince Muhammad,” Ukaz, August 16, 2010.

Saudi national Sa’id al Shihri delivered an audio message entitled “”Together to Overthrow Al Sa’ud,” posted online

on August 9, 2010. Transcript in OSC Document GMP20100810535004.

In November 2010, AQAP carried out a suicide bomb attack against a religious procession of Shiite rebels observing

the festival of Al Ghadeer, a holiday which commemorates the appointment of Ali ibn Abi Talib by the prophet

Muhammad as his immediate successor. The bombing killed 23 people.

The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, divided between Zaydis, found in much of the north (and a

majority in the northwest), and Shafi’is, found mainly in the south and east. Zaydis belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam,

while Shafi’is follow one of several Sunni Muslim legal schools. Yemen’s Zaydis take their name from their fifth

Imam, Zayd ibn Ali. They are doctrinally distinct from the Twelvers, the dominant branch of Shi’a Islam in Iran and

Lebanon. Twelver Shiites believe that the 12th Imam, Muhammad al Mahdi, has been hidden by Allah and will

reappear on Earth as the savior of mankind.

Several of AQAP’s Yemeni leaders were among those freed in a now infamous jailbreak in 2006, in which 23

convicted terrorists escaped from a supposedly high-security prison in the capital of Sana’a.

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help from Saudi intelligence, recently broke up a joint AQAP-AQIM terrorist cell planning to

carry out attacks inside France.61

Overall, AQAP seeks to:

•

Attack the U.S. homeland: Most

counterterrorism analysts believe that

of all of Al Qaeda’s regional affiliates,

AQAP is the most active organization

seeking to carry out a successful

attack inside the United States.62 As it

has demonstrated both through Anwar

al Awlaki’s indoctrination of

American citizens and the

sophisticated bomb-making of

Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri63 and others,

AQAP is trying to radicalize U.S.

citizens and carry out an attentiongrabbing terrorist bombing on U.S.

soil. In the third edition of its online

Inspire magazine released in

November 2010, AQAP claims that

the October 2010 air cargo bomb plot

was part of a long-term strategy to

launch many small-scale attacks

against the United States. The group

states that “This strategy of attacking

the enemy with smaller but more

frequent operations is what some may

refer to as the strategy of a thousand

cuts. The aim is to bleed the enemy to

death…. It is such a good bargain for

us to spread fear amongst the enemy

and keep him on his toes in exchange

of a few months of work and a few

thousand bucks…. In such an

environment of security phobia that is

A Profile of Yemeni-American Terrorist

Anwar Al Awlaki

Yemeni-American Anwar Al Awlaki (alt. sp. Aulaqi) was

born in New Mexico in 1971, and he hails from a

prominent tribal family in the southern governorate of

Shabwa. Awlaki lived in Britain and in the United States,

where he worked as an imam and lecturer at several

mosques, including in Falls Church, VA. He traveled to

Yemen in 2004, where he became a lecturer at Al Iman

University. He was arrested by Yemeni authorities in

2006 and interrogated by the FBI in September 2007 for

his possible contacts with some of the 9/11 hijackers.

According to various reports, he began openly

supporting the use of violence against the United States

after his release from prison.

For the past several years, Awlaki has been one of the

most deadly terrorist masterminds confronting the

United States. He has been either directly or indirectly

linked to radicalizing Major Nidal M. Hasan (allegedly

committed the November 2009 mass shooting at Fort

Hood Army Base in Texas), Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab

(the Nigerian suspect accused of trying to ignite

explosive chemicals to destroy Northwest/Delta Airlines

Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day

2009), and Faisal Shahzad (alleged Times Square failed car

bomb), who allegedly told U.S. investigators that Awlaki’s

online lectures urging jihad helped inspire him to act.

According to several reports, the Obama Administration

has added Awlaki, an American citizen, to the CIA’s list

of suspected terrorists who may be captured or killed.

To date, Yemen has refused to extradite Awlaki (Article

44 of the Yemeni constitution states that a Yemeni

national may not be extradited to a foreign authority),

and his tribe has vowed to protect him. In January 2011,

a Yemeni court sentenced Awlaki in absentia to 10 years

in prison on charges of incitement to murder and

belonging to a terrorist group.

“Al-Qaeda’s Yemen affiliate widens search for recruits and targets,” Washington Post, November 30, 2010.

It is worth noting that until the failed bomb attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009,

most non-governmental observers believed that AQAP’s influence and ability to threaten U.S. and Western interests

from Yemen remained limited. In assessing the AQAP threat to the American homeland, a May 2010 Senate

Intelligence Committee report concluded that U.S. intelligence agencies previously saw AQAP (before the December

25, 2009, attempted airline bombing) as a threat to American targets in Yemen, not to the United States itself. See, U.S.

Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK ON NORTHWEST

AIRLINES FLIGHT 253, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 24, 2010, 111-199 (Washington: GPO, 2010).

Twenty-nine-year-old Saudi citizen Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri is believed to have created the explosive devices used in

last year’s Christmas Day attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, in a 2009 attack against Saudi Arabia’s

intelligence chief Mohammed bin Nayef, and the October 2010 air cargo packages destined for Jewish sites in Chicago.

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sweeping America it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less

players and less time to launch and thus we may circumvent the security barriers

American worked so hard to erect.”64

•

Attack U.S. and Western Interests in Yemen: Even before the Saudi-Yemeni

merger, militants in Yemen have targeted Western embassies in Sana’a, foreign

oil companies and their facilities, and tourists. Two attacks on the U.S. Embassy

in Sana’a in 2008 killed 17 people, including one U.S. citizen, and injured dozens

of Yemenis. On April 26, 2010, AQAP carried out an unsuccessful assassination

attempt against British Ambassador to Yemen Timothy Torlot, an operation that

many experts believe was designed to demonstrate the group’s resilience in the

face of a government crackdown following the Christmas Day attempted

bombing. In October 2010, AQAP gunmen attacked a vehicle carrying five

British embassy workers in Sana’a. The attack injured one British worker and

two Yemeni bystanders. Britain’s second- ranking diplomat in Yemen, Fionna

Gibb, was in the car, but escaped uninjured.

•

Destabilize the Yemeni Government: Unlike previous generations of Islamist

fighters in Yemen who fought elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan, many of

AQAP’s footsoldiers are more inclined to target the Yemeni government itself.

Throughout much of 2010, AQAP’s activities inside Yemen have resembled the

kind of insurgent warfare witnessed most recently in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and

Iraq. It appears that one of the group’s goals is to use the popular hatred of the

central government, particularly in the former areas of Southern Yemen, to fuel a

popular insurgency that is capable of holding territory. To date, this strategy has

succeeded in sowing a certain degree of chaos and violence in the provinces of

Abyan and Shabwah, though many observers remain skeptical of AQAP’s ability

to evolve into a mass movement such as the Taliban. There is no indication that

large numbers of Yemeni tribesmen are open to Al Qaeda’s ideological appeal,

and many tribal leaders may be using AQAP as a temporary lever to pressure the

government for benefits, settle scores with rival, neighboring tribes, or to strike

back against the government to avenge some perceived historical injustice.

•

Assassinate Members of the Saudi Royal Family: Several of AQAP’s top

leaders are Saudi veterans combatants from conflicts involving Muslims in other

regions or graduates of terrorist training camps based in Afghanistan who, upon

returning home nearly a decade ago, turned inward against the Saudi royal

family. Since their expulsion from the kingdom, they have used their positions

within AQAP to strike back against the Saudi royal family, as was vividly

illustrated by a failed assassination attempt in August 2009 against Assistant

Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz Al Saud, the

director of the kingdom’s counterterrorism campaign. According to one report,

two of Saudi Arabia’s most powerful intelligence agencies, the Saudi General

Intelligence Presidency (GIP), headed since October 2005 by Prince Muqrin bin

Abdulaziz, and the General Security Services (GSS), which is attached to the

Saudi Interior Ministry, have been working with Yemen’s military and special

forces units. In the lead up to the October 2010 failed air cargo bombing, Bin

Nayef reportedly provided John Brennan, the Deputy National Security Advisor

“FACTBOX: Qaeda Unveils “Strategy of a Thousands Cuts”,” Reuters, November 21, 2010.

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for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, and Assistant to the President with

critical information on the plot reportedly derived from a Saudi informant or an

AQAP member who had recently turned himself in to Saudi authorities.65

Implications for U.S. Policy

For the past several months, numerous reports have indicated the Obama Administration is

contemplating how to properly increase assistance and intelligence cooperation with Yemen

without overly militarizing the U.S. presence there and causing a backlash from the local

population. Based on numerous reports, it appears that the Administration is simultaneously

pursuing a short term decapitation strategy to capture or eliminate the top echelons of AQAP’s

leadership while also enacting policies over the long run to address the growing instability in

Yemen that permits AQAP to grow.

In the short term, some reports suggest that the CIA may increase its use of drones inside Yemen

or place military units overseen by the Defense Department (JSOC) under its control. 66

Anonymous U.S. officials have said that Predator drones (possibly launched from either Djibouti,

Qatar, or the Seychelles Islands) have been patrolling the skies over Yemen in search of AQAP

leaders, but many of these leaders have gone into hiding. One report suggests that a major buildup

of U.S. assets is occurring in Yemen with the arrival of additional CIA teams and up to 100

Special Operations force trainers, and the deployment of sophisticated surveillance and electronic

eavesdropping systems operated by spy services including the National Security Agency. 67 The

U.S. military historically has maintained only a limited presence in Yemen, and as such, U.S.

intelligence agencies may have limited knowledge of the local terrain and may need time before

they are able to effectively employ all assets to their maximum capacity. On November 8, an

anonymous senior Administration official said that the White House was pushing the Yemeni

government for more collaboration and intelligence sharing.68

In the long term, the Administration has significantly increased U.S. economic and military aid,

although Yemen’s socioeconomic challenges far exceed current U.S. and international

development efforts. In FY2010, the United States is providing an estimated $290 million in total

aid and that figure is expected to increase in FY2011. The Defense Department also has proposed

increasing its Section 1206 security assistance to Yemen to $1.2 billion over a five- or six-year

period. 69 In the past, the Yemeni government has cautioned the United States against overreacting

to the terrorist threat there, though in recent months, Yemeni forces have launched several largescale campaigns against suspected AQAP strongholds in the Abyan and Shabwah governorates.

It is unclear whether the information was derived from Saudi national and former Guantanamo Bay detainee Jabir al

Fayfi, who turned himself in to authorities in Yemen in October 2010. A man appeared on Saudi state television in late

December 2010 and early January 2011 under that name to offer an account of his time as an Al Qaeda operative and

his surrender to Yemeni and Saudi authorities. See OSC Report GMP20101223877001, “Saudi TV Hosts Former

Wanted Person Al-Fayfi To Speak About Personal Experience,” December 21, 2010.

“Yemen Covert Role Pushed ,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2010.

“U.S. deploying drones in Yemen to hunt for Al-Qaeda, has yet to fire missiles,” Washington Post, November 7,

2010.

“White House to Yemen: Share more now,” Washington Post, November 8, 2010.

“More U.S. Funds Sought for Yemen’s Forces,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2010.

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Whether U.S.-Yemeni security cooperation can be sustained over the long term is the key

question for U.S. lawmakers and policymakers. Inevitably, at some point, disagreements arise

over Yemen’s tendency to release alleged terrorists from prison in order to placate tribal leaders

and domestic Islamist politicians who oppose U.S. “interference” in Yemen and U.S. policy in the

region in general. One report suggests that in the fall of 2009, U.S. officials met with President

Saleh and showed him “irrefutable evidence that Al Qaeda was aiming at him and his relatives,”

and “that seems to have abruptly changed Saleh’s attitude.”70 At times, the United States

government itself shares the blame for limiting its bilateral cooperation with Yemen. In the past,

high-level U.S. policymakers have shifted focus to what have appeared to be more pressing

counterterrorism fronts or areas of the Middle East. Yemeni leaders have grown adept at sensing

U.S. interest and have adjusted their level of cooperation accordingly. According to Abdel-Karim

al Iryani, a former prime minister, “The trust between the U.S. and Yemen comes and goes….

Everyone has his own calculations on what they want from this relationship.”71

North Africa/Sahel: Al Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM)72

Background and Threat Assessment

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, also known as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic

Maghreb or AQLIM) and its offshoots or autonomous cells pose the main terrorist threat in North

Africa and the Sahel. Under pressure from Algerian security forces, AQIM has increasingly

moved its operations out of the Algerian capital of Algiers. The vast area of Algeria’s six Saharan

provinces and of its sparsely populated Sahelian neighbors affords AQIM optimal terrain in

which to move and conduct training as well as to advance its regional ambitions. Algeria’s North

African neighbors, Tunisia and Morocco, have prevented AQIM from penetrating their territories,

except for some recruitment of individuals; both governments fear that AQIM will transfer

operational capabilities to indigenous groups. Neither has experienced a major terrorism attack

for several years, but both governments and that of Mauritania continue to unearth alleged Al

Qaeda cells and affiliated terrorists.

It is not clear what AQIM’s “unity” with or “allegiance” to Al Qaeda means in practice as the

group does not appear to take directions from leaders in Afghanistan/Pakistan. A nominal link is

probably mutually beneficial, burnishing Al Qaeda’s international credentials as it enhances

AQIM’s legitimacy among radicals to facilitate recruitment. Since “uniting” with Al Qaeda in

2006, AQIM’s rhetoric against the West and governments in the region and beyond (e.g., to

Nigeria) as well as its calls for jihad against the United States, France, and Spain have increased.

Yet, its operations remain geographically limited to Algeria and the Sahel, and public information

available does not suggest a direct AQIM threat to the U.S. homeland. In mid-2010, French

“Is Yemen the Next Afghanistan?,” New York Times, July 6, 2010.

“Yemen Walks Fine Line in Aiding U.S,” Washington Post, January 5, 2010.

This section was prepared by (name redacted), former Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, (name redacted),

Specialist in African Affairs, and Lauren Ploch, Analyst in African Affairs. For additional background and information

on AQIM in North Africa, please contact (name redacted), Analyst in African Affairs. See CRS Report RS21532,

Algeria:

Current Issues; CRS Report RS21579, Morocco: Current Issues; and CRS Report RS21666, Tunisia: Recent

Developments and Policy Issues, all by (name redacted), for additional background and information.

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officials declared that France is “at war Al Qaeda” following AQIM’s murder of a French hostage

and AQIM issued several calls for attacks on France. A French national critical terrorism threat

alert in September 2010 was attributed, in part, to a rise in AQIM threats, and in October, a

message attributed to Osama Bin Laden justified AQIM and other Al Qaeda attacks on France. 73

Algeria

AQIM’s origins date to the 1990s, when Islamist extremists and security forces engaged in a

conflict sparked by a 1992 military coup that prevented an Islamist political party from winning a

national election in Algeria. The terrorists sought (and seek) to replace the Algerian regime with

an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was then the main terrorist threat.74 In 1998,

the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) split from GIA, claiming to oppose the

GIA’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians. In 2003, under new leader Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka

Abu Musab Abdulwadood), GSPC declared “allegiance” to Al Qaeda. In 2006, it announced

“unity” with Al Qaeda, changing its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM raises

funds by kidnapping for ransom and by trafficking arms, drugs, vehicles, cigarettes, and persons,

and receives small-scale funding from cells in Europe. 75 AQIM communicates via sophisticated

online videos.

In 2006, AQIM increased its attacks against the government, security forces, and foreign workers

in Algeria. In 2007, it shifted tactics to “Iraqi-style,” suicide attacks, with simultaneous bombings

of the Government Palace (the prime and interior ministries) and a suburban police station in

April, and of the Constitutional Council and the U.N. headquarters in December, among other

attacks. An AQIM suicide bomber failed to assassinate President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in

September. After a relative lull, terrorist attacks on security forces escalated in summer 2008,

when suicide bombers perpetrated a particularly bloody attack at a police academy, resulting in

more than 40 deaths. In 2009, perhaps because security forces had made it difficult to conduct

operations in the capital, AQIM mounted attacks elsewhere, notably in the Berber region of the

Kabylie in northeastern Algeria, where the security presence had been reduced to pacify civil

unrest, although it also shifted its attacks elsewhere.76 In June, gunmen killed 24 gendarmes

(paramilitary police) in an ambush more than 200 miles east of Algiers. In July, they ambushed a

military convoy 90 miles west of Algiers, killing at least 14 soldiers.77 In 2010, AQIM continued

carry out attacks on police, including in areas outside the northeast.78

Paul Taylor, “PM Says France “at War” with Al Qaeda Over Hostage,” Reuters, July, 2010; Voice of America,

“French Police: Al-Qaida Could Hit France,” September 22, 2010; Erika Solomon, “Bin Laden Blames French

“Injustice” for Abductions-TV,” Reuters, October 27, 2010, among other sources.

GIA remains on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO’s), although its heyday ended in

2001and it has not perpetrated an attack since 2006.

Michael Jonson and Christian Nils Larson, “Illegal Tender: Funding Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Janes

Intelligence Review, October 2008.

U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2008, April 30, 2009; and Lamine Chikhi, “Algerian

Insurgents Seeking Out New Targets,” August 17, 2009.

Some attributed the second ambush to the Protectors of Salafi Call, which reportedly had split from the GSPC and,

therefore, is not considered AQIM.77 Others attributed the attack to a regional command of AQIM and still others

suggested that AQIM is encroaching on the Protectors’ territory. BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Five Regions

Reportedly Designated for ‘Terrorist Deployment’ in Algeria,” El Khabar website, August 5, 2009; and, BBC

Monitoring Newsfile, “Retreating of the Salafi Call Protectors,” Echourouk el Youmi website, August 17, 2009.

See, e.g., Christian Lowe and Lamine Chikhi, “Ambush in Sahara Kills 11 Algerian Police - Report,” June 30, 2010.

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Several Al Qaeda-linked international terrorist plots have involved Algerians. In December 1999,

Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian trained in Afghanistan, was arrested after attempting to enter the

United States from Canada; he was convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot that planned

bombings in Los Angeles. His associates and other Algerians in Canada were linked to the GIA

and Al Qaeda. In January 2003, six Algerians were arrested in a London apartment with traces of

ricin, a deadly poison with no known antidote. In October 2009, two French brothers of Algerian

origin, one a worker at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, were

arrested in France after intelligence agencies came to suspect them of “criminal activities related

to a terror group” (i.e., AQIM).79 Algeria continues to be a major source of international terrorists,

and Algerians have been arrested on suspicion of belonging to or supporting AQIM in France,

Spain, Italy, Germany, and Britain.

The Sahel

AQIM has become increasingly active in the West African Sahel, where it “continues to

demonstrate its intent and ability to conduct attacks against U.S. citizens or other foreign

nationals,” according to the State Department.80 The Sahel stretches from Mauritania to Chad and

encompasses several poor, often politically unstable countries with large, sparsely populated

northern border areas and limited state capacity to monitor or secure them. AQIM reportedly

maintains mobile training camps along the Algeria-Mali border, and carries out smuggling

operations in countries across the Sahel, taking advantage of porous international borders. The

group has carried out raids on military and police targets, primarily in Mauritania and Mali;

kidnapped or assassinated tourists, diplomats, and private sector workers in these countries;

carried out kidnappings in Niger; attacked foreign embassies in Mauritania; and repeatedly

clashed with the militaries of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria.

In 2007, AQIM associates murdered four French tourists, prompting cancelation of the famous

Dakar Motor Rally. In 2008, AQIM assassinated 12 Mauritanian soldiers and kidnapped a U.N.

envoy to Niger and a Canadian colleague. The Canadians and several European tourists

kidnapped in early 2009 were held in Mali and released several months later. A Briton in the

group was beheaded after his government refused to meet AQIM demands to release a radical

cleric with alleged Al Qaeda ties. In June 2009, a U.S. aid worker in Mauritania was murdered in

an apparent kidnapping attempt for which AQIM claimed credit and, in August, AQIM carried out

a suicide bombing near the French embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania. In June 2009, it also

assassinated a Malian military official involved in the arrest of several AQIM members. That

killing was followed by a series of armed clashes between AQIM and Malian forces, which, with

Algerian military aid and French air intelligence support, vowed an “all-out war” on AQIM. The

threat of kidnapping is of growing concern. In November 2009, a heavily armed group attempted

unsuccessfully to kidnap U.S. embassy employees in Niger and, in June 2010, U.S. embassies in

the Sahel warned U.S. citizens of prospective AQIM kidnapping operation in the Mali-NigerBurkina Faso border region. In July 2010, a Mauritanian-French attempt to rescue a French

hostage in Mali resulted in AQIM fatalities, but the hostage was not secured and his death was

announced days later. In August 2010, two kidnapped Spanish aid workers were released. 81 In late

Emily Andrews, “Big Bang Scientist Admits Plotting Al Qaeda Atrocity,” Daily Mail, October 12, 2009.

U.S. Department of State, “Travel Warning: Mauritania,” December 2, 2009.

These and other hostage releases have reportedly been made possible by ransom payments, but such payments are

sensitive and have never been confirmed by governments involved in negotiations. There has also been controversy

over AQIM prisoner releases under release deals. Mauritania and Algeria have criticized Mali for releasing prisoners in

(continued...)

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August 2010, a suicide attack on a Mauritanian military post, attributed to AQIM, was thwarted.

In mid-September 2010, seven French uranium mine workers were kidnapped in Niger and then

moved into Mali. Days later, Mauritania launched “pre-emptive” air raids in Mali that reportedly

killed several AQIM combatants but also civilians.

AQIM’s presence in the Sahel is divided between two main groups, one led by Yahia Djouadi and

a second by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MBM). The groups’ members are primarily Algerian, but

include individuals from Mauritania, Niger, Mali as well as Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, and Benin. 82

The groups appear to cooperate operationally, but their roles and relations are not clear.

Differences between them may be reflected in the outcomes of the kidnappings noted above: in

two cases, hostages were executed, reportedly after AQIM political demands were not met, while

all other hostages were released, reportedly by MBM in return for ransom. 83 While terrorist

attacks are attributed to MBM’s group, its activities focus on criminal income-earning operations,

including kidnappings for ransom. It reportedly maintains a regional network of contacts,

including state officials, possibly marking it as relatively pragmatic compared to other AQIM

elements.

Implications for U.S. Policy

U.S. policy makers’ efforts to assist North African and Sahelian governments in countering AQIM

threats may need to take into account colonial history and regional power balances and navigate

them adroitly. Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and Mali are all former colonies of France and often

resist foreign involvement in their internal affairs and territories. Algeria, which waged a bloody

independence war against France, is particularly opposed to foreign interference. It has a stronger

military and is richer than its neighbors, thanks to its oil and gas wealth, and sees itself as a

dominant regional power. Relations between Algeria and other AQIM-affected Sahelian countries

have sometimes been strained due to Algeria’s regional aspirations and attempts to act as the key

U.S. regional interlocutor and prevent French interference in the region. However, efforts to

strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities are being pursued via a variety of U.S. and

European security cooperation programs and local initiatives. Algeria has hosted regional

counterterrorism meetings, provided air cover for some Sahelian counterterrorist operations, and

provided military aid to Mali and Niger. Under a 2010 agreement, the Tamanrasset Plan, Algeria,

Mali, Mauritania and Niger are establishing a joint military center to combat terrorism,

kidnappings, and trafficking. Under the plan, Algeria is to provide military materiel to other plan

participants, and the latter are to expand the size of their militaries.

(...continued)

response to AQIM demands in order to secure kidnapped hostage releases. However, in August 2010 Mauritania

extradited to Mali an AQIM prisoner who was then released in exchange for two kidnapped Spanish aid workers. The

deal also reportedly involved a ransom payment.

The group led by Djouadi and a key commander, Abid Hammadou (commonly known as Abu Zeid), is linked

closely to AQIM’s Algerian leadership. The MBM group operates semi-autonomously. MBM is a Mali-based former

GIA and GSPC member who reportedly split from the GSPC after opposing Droukdel’s accession to the GSPC

leadership. See U.S. Treasury, “Treasury Targets Al Qaida-Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria,” July 17, 2008;

Geoffrey York, “The Shadowy Negotiator Who Freed Fowler and Guay,” Globe and Mail, October 17, 2009;, Reuters,

“Mali Arrests Four Al Qaeda Members Near Algeria,” May 1, 2009; and Reuters, “The Main Players in Al Qaeda’s

Saharan Operations,” August 12, 2010, inter alia.

Andrew Black, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Jihad’s Southern Amir,” Terrorism Monitor, (7:12), May, 2009;

and U.N. Security Council (UNSC), Committee pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), and other sources.

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The U.S. government has conducted several initiatives to counter violent extremism in the region.

In 2002, the State Department launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) to increase border security,

and military and counterterrorism capacities of Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. PSI programs

focused solely on building security sector capacity. In 2005, the Bush Administration announced

a “follow-on” program known as the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). An

inter-agency, multi-faceted effort, TSCTP integrates counterterrorism and military training with

development assistance and public diplomacy. It aims to improve “individual country and

regional capabilities to defeat terrorist organizations [by ... ] disrupting efforts to recruit and train

new terrorists, particularly from the young and rural poor, and countering efforts to establish safe

havens for ... extremist groups.”84 TSCTP is led by the State Department, but other agencies,

including the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense (DOD),

implement components of the program, including DOD’s Operation Enduring Freedom—TransSahara (OEF-TS).85 Under OEF-TS, U.S. military forces work with African counterparts to

improve intelligence, command and control, logistics, and border control, and to execute joint

operations against terrorist groups.86

Governments in the Sahel, a region where democratic gains have often been limited, face diverse

security threats, including armed insurrection, banditry, illegal trafficking, and other criminal

activities that may threaten state stability more directly than Islamist terrorism. Some in the

development community question whether U.S. policy toward the region strikes an appropriate

balance between countering extremism and addressing basic challenges of governance, security,

and human development, which some view as contributing to the rise of extremism. Others

question whether the U.S. response employs the appropriate mix of civilian and military

resources or employs a counterproductive “militarization” of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

East Africa87

Background and Threat Assessment

The East Africa region has emerged over the past two decades as a region highly vulnerable to

terrorist attacks and is considered a safe haven for international terrorist groups. Africa’s porous

borders, lax security at airports and seaports, and weak law enforcement agencies are major

concerns. Political, ethnic, and religious conflicts in the region help create an environment

conducive to the growth of and recruitment capabilities of terrorist groups. The inability of

African security services to detect and intercept terrorist activities due to lack of technology and

sufficiently trained and motivated manpower are major impediments addressing the terrorist

threats in Africa.

State Department, FY2011 Congressional Budget Justification. TSCTP includes Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,

Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Libya has been invited to join. Countries nominated for

TSCTP membership by a USG agency are consulted and must agree on the designation.

For more information, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S.

Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.

TSCTP and OEF-TS capacity building activities with Chad, Mauritania, and Niger were limited in FY2009 due to

U.S. government restrictions. Sanctions on Mauritania, applied after the 2008 coup, were lifted in September 2009.

Programming in Chad and Niger has been restricted due to both political concerns and human rights vetting issues.

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in African Affairs.

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The takeover of power in Sudan by the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1989 led to a significant

increase in the activities of international terror groups in Africa. The NIF government provided

safe haven for well known international terrorist organizations and individuals, and the

government’s security services also were directly engaged in facilitating and assisting domestic

and international terror groups. Sudan has also been a safe haven for major terrorist figures,

including the founder and leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden used Sudan as a base

of operations until he returned to Afghanistan in mid-1996, where he had previously been a major

financier of Arab volunteers in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Many observers contend that it was during his five-year stay in Sudan that Bin Laden laid down

the foundation for Al Qaeda. The penetration by Al Qaeda into East Africa is directly tied to

NIF’s early years of support to international terrorist organizations. The East Africa region is by

far the most impacted by international terrorist activities in Africa. The 1990s saw dramatic and

daring terrorist attacks against American interests in Africa. The U.S. Embassy bombings in

Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by Al Qaeda killed 229 people, 12 of whom were American citizens,

and injured over 5,000 people. In November, 2002, simultaneous terrorist attacks struck

Mombasa, Kenya. Al Qaeda suicide bombers drove a four-wheel drive vehicle packed with

explosives into the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, killing 10 Kenyans and three

Israelis. In June 1995, members of Gama’a Islamiya, an Egyptian extremist group, tried to

assassinate President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

On July 11, 2010, the Somali terrorist group Al Shabaab carried out multiple suicide bombings in

Kampala, Uganda. An estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than

80 injured. The United Nations, the African Union, and the United States condemned the terrorist

attacks. The attacks took place at a rugby club and Ethiopian restaurant while people were

watching the final match of the World Cup. The following day, an Al Shabaab official, Ali

Mohamud Rage, stated that “we are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not

take out their AMISOM troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in

Bujumbura (Burundi’s capital).”88

Al Shabaab and the Islamist Movements in Somalia

The United States, Somalia’s neighbors, and some Somali groups have expressed concern over

the years about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia. In the mid-1990s, Islamic

courts emerged in parts of the country, especially in the capital of Mogadishu. These courts

functioned as local governments and often enforced decisions by using their own militia.

Members of the Al Ittihad Al Islami89 militia reportedly provided the bulk of the security forces

for these courts in the 1990s. The absence of central authority in Somalia created an environment

conducive to the proliferation of armed factions throughout the country. Somali factions,

including the so-called Islamist groups, often go through realignments or simply disappear from

the scene. In late September 2001, the Bush Administration added Al Ittihad to a list of terrorismrelated entities whose assets were frozen by an Executive Order 13224. Bush Administration

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10602791.

The 2005 U.S. State Department Country Report on Terrorism described Al Ittihad Al Islami as “a Somali extremist

group that was formed in the 1980s and reached its peak in the early 1990s, failed to obtain its objective of establishing

a Salafist emirate in Somalia and steadily declined following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and

Somalia’s subsequent collapse into anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive, lacked central leadership, and suffered

divisions between factions.”

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officials accused Al Ittihad Al Islami of links with Al Qaeda. The leader of Hizbul Islam, Sheikh

Hassan Aweys, who is on the U.S. terrorist list, was a leader in Al Ittihad Al Islami. In the late

1990s, after Ethiopia and its Somali allies attacked and crushed Al Ittihad, a number of its

fighters, the current leadership of Al Shabaab, went to Afghanistan and others went underground.

The Evolution of Al Shabaab90

In 2003, the leadership of Al Ittihad, including Sheik Ali Warsame, brother in law of Sheik

Hassan Aweys and a number of other top leaders, decided to form a new political front. The

young members of Al Ittihad disagreed with the decision of the older leadership in 2003 and

decided to form their own movement. These young leaders, some of whom had fought in

Afghanistan, met in Laasa aanood, a town in northern Somalia, and later formed a group known

then as Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahedeen, currently known as Al Shabaab. The current leader

of Al Shabaab, Ahmed Abdi Godane, the late Aden Hashi Ayrow, Ibrahim Haji Jama, Mukhtar

Robow, helped form the new movement. The primary objective of this group was irredentism and

to establish a “Greater Somalia” under Sharia. But Al Shabaab was not active and did not control

any territory in Somalia until 2007-2008.

The Ethiopian invasion and the ouster of the Courts from power in December 2006 contributed to

the emergence of a strong resistance movement. The leadership of the Islamic Courts moved to

Eritrea, while the Al Shabaab secretive leadership slowly took control over the resistance

movement. Many Somalis joined the fight against the Ethiopian forces. Some of these volunteers

did not know or had only limited knowledge of the intent and objectives of Al Shabaab. By mid2007, the true leaders of Al Shabaab emerged and the ties with Al-Qaeda became clear. In

February 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign

Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

Al Shabaab and Other Somali Terrorist Groups in Somalia

On February 1, 2010, Al Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni group, led by Hassan Al Turki, reportedly

agreed to merge under one name: Al Shabaab Mujahidin Movement. Both Al Shabaab and the

Ras Kamboni group have been coordinating their attacks against Somalia’s Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) and working closely with Al Qaeda leaders in East Africa and foreign fighters

over the past three years. Senior TFG officials consider the merger a reaffirmation of a preexisting informal alliance between the two groups.91 The merger is also triggered in part due to

defections and the reported illness of Hassan Al Turki, the leader of Ras Kamboni. Al Turki, an

Ethiopian from the Ogaden clan, was designated as a terrorist by the United States in 2004. In

December 2010, Hizbul Islam merged with Al Shabaab. The merger is seen by some observers as

a surrender after a string of defeats on the ground.

For more on Al-Shabaab and other terror groups, see CRS Report RL33911, Somalia: Current Conditions and

Prospects for a Lasting Peace, by (name redacted).

(name redacted) interviewed President Sheik Sharif Ahmad of Somalia and other senior officials, January 29 and February

1, 2010.

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Implications for U.S. Policy92

Al Qaeda poses a direct threat against U.S. interests and allies in East Africa. Al Shabaab, on the

other hand, appears more focused on carrying out attacks against Somali citizens, the TFG, and

African Union peacekeeping forces (AMISOM). According to the 2010 State Department

Country Reports on Terrorism, “Al-Shabaab’s leadership was supportive of al-Qa’ida (AQ), and

both groups continued to present a serious terrorist threat to American and allied interests

throughout the Horn of Africa.” On February 2, 2010, Director of National Intelligence Dennis

Blair at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing stated:

We judge most Al Shabaab and East Africa-based Al Qaeda members will remain focused

on regional objectives in the near-term. Nevertheless, East Africa-based Al Qaeda leaders or

Al Shabaab may elect to redirect to the Homeland some of the Westerners, including North

Americans, now training and fighting in Somalia.93

Reportedly, over a dozen Somali youth from Minneapolis and other parts of the United States

have left the country, and some community leaders believe they went to Somalia to join the

insurgency. There is no clear evidence of how many and for what purpose these Somalis left

Minneapolis, although some U.S. counterterrorism officials have expressed concern to Congress

that some of these individuals could be recruited by Al Qaeda to perform attacks in Somalia or

the United States.94 U.S. officials stressed in early 2009 that they did not possess “credible

reporting” that suggested such an operation targeting the U.S. homeland was planned or

imminent.95 The concerns appear based in part on the fact that one of the suicide bombers in the

October 2008 attacks in Puntland and Somaliland was a Somali-American from Minneapolis,

although broader concerns exist about the participation of U.S. citizens in Al Shabaab activities

and potential U.S.-based financing for terrorist groups in Somalia. Over the past decade, many

Somalis have returned to Somalia to work as journalists, humanitarian workers, and teachers. A

number of these Somalis have been killed in the past two years by insurgents and security forces.

On August 5, 2010, more than a dozen Somali-Americans/permanent residents were indicted in

California, Alabama, and Minnesota. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 14 people are

being charged with providing support to Al Shabaab. Two indictments unsealed in Minnesota

state that Amina Farah Ali and Hawo Mohamed Hassan raised funds for Al Shabaab. The

indictments state that 12 money transfers were made in 2008 and 2009. Holder stated at a press

conference that “the indictments unsealed today shed further light on a deadly pipeline that has

routed funding and fighters to the Al Shabaab terror organization from cities across the United

States. These arrests and charges should serve as an unmistakable warning to others considering

For more information on U.S. counterterrorism programs in the region, see CRS Report R41473, Countering

Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response, by Lauren Ploch.

Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010.

See “Young Somali Men Missing from Minneapolis,” International Herald Tribune, November 27, 2008. In March

2009, an NCTC official expressed “concern… over the travel by some tens of Somali-American young men back to

Somalia, some of whom have trained and fought with Al Shabaab.” Testimony of Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director,

Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Committee, March 11, 2009.

Testimony of Andrew Liepman, op cit. “Let me stress we don't have a body of reporting that indicates U.S. persons

who have traveled to Somalia are planning to execute attacks in the United States. We don't have that credible

reporting. But we do worry that there is the potential that these individuals could be indoctrinated by al Qaeda while

they're in Somalia and then returned to the United States with the intention to conduct attacks.”

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joining terrorist groups like Al Shabaab—if you choose this route, you can expect to find yourself

in a U.S. jail cell or a casualty on the battlefield in Somalia.”

Al Qaeda and Radical Islamist Extremists in

Southeast Asia96

Background and Threat Assessment

The United States and Indonesia have a common interest in addressing the threat of militant

Islamists in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. The syncretic nature of Islam in Indonesia, which has

overlaid earlier animist, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions, is more moderate in character than Islam

is in the Middle East or Pakistan. Further, the main political parties in Indonesia are secularnationalist in their outlook. However, radical or militant Islamists are a threat to the largely

secular state and moderate Muslim society of Indonesia. Terrorist activity is not limited to

attacking Western targets in Indonesia. In June 2010, one militant was sentenced for his role in a

plan to assassinate President Yudhoyono as well as for his involvement in two hotel bombings in

Jakarta in 2009.97

Indonesian views of the nature of the threat from militant Islamists have evolved over time.

Islamists were generally suppressed under the New Order regime of former President Suharto.

The reformasi period that followed Suharto’s fall allowed an opening up of society that gave such

views space that was absent under the New Order. After the 2002 Bali bombing that killed over

200 people, Indonesia moved from seeing local militant Islamist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya

(JI), as threats not only to Western and American interests in Indonesia but also as direct threats to

the Indonesian government and the Indonesian people. (For background information on JI and

militant Islam in Indonesia see CRS Report RL34194, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, coordinated

by (name redacted).) Key terrorist attacks in Indonesia include the Bali bombing of 2002, the 2003

bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy, and

bombing attacks against Western hotels in Jakarta in 2009.

While for most of the 2000s, JI was the key terrorist organization in Indonesia, this now appears

to be shifting. According to Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group, it now appears that

militant Islamists can be identified with one of three groups: JI; the remaining members of the

network of Noordin Top, a militant killed in 2009; and a new alliance of various Jihadists that had

set up a training camp in Aceh. JI is evidently now focused on rebuilding its organization after

having been effectively pursued by the Indonesian government. JI is also focused on establishing

an Islamist state in Indonesia and possibly the region, as opposed to the Noordin Top network that

is more focused on attacking Western targets in Indonesia.

The raid on the new alliance of Jihadists in Aceh, which began on February 22, 2010, has

uncovered a group which according to Sydney Jones “is a composite of people from a number of

different militant groups like Jemaah Islamiya, Kompak and Darul Islam, who are frustrated with

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Asian Affairs, ext. 7-..... For more, see CRS Report RL34194, Terrorism

in Southeast Asia, coordinated by (name redacted).

“Indonesia Jails Driver Over Jakarta Hotel Bomb,” BBC News, June 14, 2010.

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what they see as a lack of action within these groups. They’re more radical, and apparently see

themselves as Indonesia’s Al Qaeda.”98 The February Aceh raid apparently led to the March 2010

raid that killed a militant named Dulmatin, who is thought to be one of the planners and executers

of the 2002 Bali bombing. It is thought that a militant named Saptono took over the Aceh cell

after Dulmatin was killed. Saptono was in turn killed during a raid in May 2010.99 Some experts

have observed that the capture, rather than the killing, of such leaders could yield valuable

intelligence.

In May 2010, it was reported that a plot to assassinate President Yudhoyono and other national

leaders in a rifle/grenade attack on Indonesia’s Independence day (August 17, 2010) was

disrupted. It was also reported that the plotters were considering moving the attack up to coincide

with President Obama’s now canceled June 2010 visit.100 A leader of the Aceh cell that was

reportedly planning to assassinate President Yudhoyono, Abdullah Sunata, was captured in June,

2010. He was previously released from prison after having been imprisoned for his role in the

Australian embassy bombing.101

The government’s response to militant Islamists has been largely effective, though there are some

problem areas. Rivalry between the Indonesian military (TNI), the police, and the state

intelligence agency BIN probably keeps the state’s response from being as effective as it could

be. Lax standards at prisons have reportedly allowed militants to communicate with their

organizations while in prison. Government-run deradicalization programs, which are more

cooptative than ideological in nature, have reportedly allowed some militants to rejoin their

organizations after their release from prison. 102 Indonesia has reportedly arrested 400 terror

suspects and released 242.103

In September 2010, General Ansyaad Mbai was appointed head of Indonesia’s new National

Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) that was formed by presidential decree. The BNPT will carry

out its functions under the Coordinating Minister of Security, Political and Legal Affairs and is

tasked with formulating policies and programmes and coordinating the implementation of

policies.104 Some fears have been voiced that the BNPT will act in ways similar to former

President Suharto’s New Order regime. Others are concerned that BNPT may find it difficult to

effectively coordinate the counter terror efforts of the police, TNI, and BIN.105 Security Affairs

Minister Djoko Suyanto stated that there was no room for complacency during his remarks to a

BNPT organized conference on Counter Terrorism in October 2010.106 Another new development

“Are Indonesian Terror Networks Regrouping?” BBC News, March 10, 2010. Sydney Jones, Remarks with Ernest

Bower, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2010.

Tom Allard, “Police Mount Terrorist Raids in Lead-up to Obama’s Visit,” The Sydney Morning Herald, May 14,

2010.

100

Ashish Kumar Sen, “”Terrorists Planned to Kill President During Obama Visit; Mumbai-Style Strike was Goal,”

The Washington Times, May 18, 2010.

101

Tom Allard, “Indonesia Terror Laws to Change,” The Age, June 5, 2010. “SBY Hopes Terrorist Arrest Cripples

Cell,” The Jakarta Post, June 24, 2010.

102

Sydney Jones, Remarks with Ernest Bower, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2010.

103

“Bali Bomber Dulmatin Confirmed Dead,” BBC News, March 10, 2010.

104

Fatima Astuti, “Indonesia’s National Counter Terrorism Agency,” International Centre for Political Violence and

Terrorism, October 2010.

105

“Indonesia’s National Counter Terrorism Agency,” Eurasia Review, October 11, 2010.

106

“Indonesia Seeks Renewed Anti-Terror Fight,” Sydney Morning Herald, October 18, 2010.

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in Indonesia’s counter-terror operations in 2010 includes the use of TNI troops, particularly

Kopassus troops, in counter-terror operations.107

There reportedly was an increase in low level terrorism activity in Indonesia in 2010 which

appears to be aimed at building up terrorist groups financial resources. In the Fall of 2010 there

were a number of robberies that were believed to be linked to efforts to fund radical

organizations. Three policemen were killed at the Hamparan Perak police station a few days after

police arrested robbers of a bank in Medan. Police killed three who robbed a bank in Padang.108

The Indonesian police reportedly believe that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir delivered sermons in Medan

which motivated the attacks on the Hamparan police station and the robbery of the Bank in

Medan. 109

Implications for U.S. Policy

The policy implications of developments in Indonesia are largely positive. Indonesia has moved

from a somewhat ambivalent counter terror partner in the immediate post 9-11 period to a now

effective, and increasingly close, partner. The evolving counter terror cooperation has also helped

foster the larger bilateral relationship. President Obama, who spent part of his childhood in

Indonesia, and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed a Comprehensive Partnership

agreement during President Obama’s visit to Indonesia in 2010. This marks a strengthening and

broadening of U.S. relations with Indonesia and opens the way for developing closer strategic

relations with Indonesia.

Al Qaeda’s Global Strategy and Implications for

U.S. Policy110

Overall, Al Qaeda leaders’ statements from the mid-1990s through the present suggest that they

see themselves and their followers as the armed vanguard of an international Islamist movement.

Nevertheless, some experts now argue that “al-Qa’ida has been a marginal actor in the larger

drama of international Islamist militancy,” and that believe that the group’s “quest for influence

has been in vain.”111 Al Qaeda and many of its affiliates state a commitment to ending nonMuslim “interference” in the affairs of Muslims and to recasting predominantly Muslim societies

according to narrow interpretations derived from the practices of Sunni Islam’s earliest

generations. Statements from some Al Qaeda leaders advocate for a phased struggle, in which the

initial goal is the expulsion of U.S. and foreign military forces from “Islamic lands” and

proximate goals include the overthrow of “corrupt” regional leaders and the creation of

governments that rule solely according sharia (Islamic law). References to the reestablishment of

an Islamic caliphate frequently appear in Al Qaeda propaganda but often lack detail and are rarely

107

Salim Osman, “Joint Terror Op Sparks Debate in Indonesia,” The Straits Times, October 12, 2010.

“Military Vows to Crush Terrorist Network,” The Jakareta Post, September 27, 2010.

109

“Ba’asyir Linked to Medan Group,” Koran Tempo, October 9, 2010.

110

Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.

108

111

Vahid Brown, “Al Qa’ida Central and Local Affiliates,” p. 69, in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman (eds.), SelfInflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within Al Qaeda and its Periphery, U.S. Military Academy Combating

Terrorism Center, December 2010.

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accompanied by practical political prescriptions for achieving such a goal. Some Al Qaeda

leaders also promote military confrontation with Israel and conflict with Shiite Muslims. The

varying appeal and compatibility of these different components of Al Qaeda’s ideology account

for the group’s successes and failures in attracting support.

In pursuit of their many goals, leaders of Al Qaeda and its regional affiliates frequently make

appeals for support based on a wide range of political positions and, at times, attempt to harness

nationalist sentiment or manipulate local grievances to generate support for their agendas. These

differing priorities, approaches, and contexts create challenges for those Al Qaeda figures who

have hoped to construct a unified narrative of Al Qaeda’s goals or implement a unified strategy to

achieve them. Some experts note that Al Qaeda’s “description of the enemy is confusing and

inconsistent” and suggest that, overall:

speaking of al-Qa’ida’s “strategy” is a misnomer. The jihadi movement’s various operational

units, whether named al-Qa’ida affiliates or small cells, cull through various ideological and

strategic documents to identify elements that they can achieve. Such strategic variation is

enhanced by jihadis’ inability to coordinate closely, which likely limits their ability to

achieve ultimate policy goals, but also complicates the processes to combat the movement

writ large.112

Although Osama Bin Laden’s self-professed goal has been to “move, incite, and mobilize the

[Islamic] nation” until it reaches a revolutionary “ignition point,” Al Qaeda leaders’ statements

and Al Qaeda attacks to date appear largely to have failed to mobilize broad support among

Muslims. 113 Some observers believe that Al Qaeda faces fundamental limits to its appeal because

its rhetoric and goals extend beyond what many Muslims view as religiously legitimate or

practically desirable. 114

While global public opinion polls and media monitoring indicate that dissatisfaction with U.S.

foreign policy has grown significantly in some predominantly Muslim societies, the sectarian

rhetoric of some Al Qaeda affiliates and the persistence of Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist attacks that

kill and maim Sunni and Shiite Muslim civilians have undermined Al Qaeda’s appeal among

some Muslim groups. Some experts also argue that the uncompromising, anti-democratic tone of

many of the statements released by Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, and their regional supporters may be

alienating Muslims who support the concept of secular or religious representative government.

Analysis of the statements issued by Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates since the mid-1990s suggests

that these groups and individuals believe that characterizing their actions as religiously

112

Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, “Debates and Divisions Within and Around Al Qa’ida,” pp. 11-2, in

Moghadam and Fishman, (eds.) Self-Inflicted Wounds, December 2010.

113

In December 2010, the Pew Global Attitudes Project released the findings of a survey of Muslims in Turkey,

Nigeria, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia and Lebanon that found, with the exception of the surveyed group in

Nigeria, “opinions of al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, are consistently negative.” The survey also suggests

that support for suicide bombing and confidence in Osama bin Laden among Muslims surveyed has declined steeply

since 2003. Pew Research Center “Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah: Most Embrace a Role for Islam

in Politics,” December 2, 2010.

114

Some analysts believe that violent Islamist appeals that fit a model of so-called “classical jihad” by calling for an

armed response to “the presence of foreigners on Muslim territory” have more popular resonance and are viewed as

more religiously legitimate than Al Qaeda’s appeals for “global jihad,” which seek to mobilize Muslims in response to

“a wider range of grievances, including perceived Western cultural imperialism and financial support for regimes [Al

Qaeda figures] deem unacceptable.” Fishman and Moghadam, “Do Jihadi and Islamist Divisions Matter? Implications

for Policy and Strategy,” p. 230, in Moghadam and Fishman, (eds.) Self-Inflicted Wounds, December 2010.

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sanctioned, defensive reactions to external threats will increase tolerance of and support for their

broader ideological program. Al Qaeda and its regional affiliates also appear to believe that the

identification of limited political objectives and the suggestion to non-Muslim audiences that the

fulfillment of those objectives will resolve their grievances may generate broader appeal than the

group’s underlying religious agenda. In fact, experts note that Al Qaeda and its affiliates “pursue

a variety of objectives that are rarely clearly defined” and point out that the group “advocates

everything from reestablishing the caliphate to the personal religious salvation of its members.”115

The practical political and operational realities facing many Al Qaeda affiliates in pursuit of their

discrete goals and needs have often led these groups to take actions that have undermined their

efforts to portray themselves as defenders of Muslims with limited objectives. For example:

•

In December 2004, Bin Laden identified the conflict in Iraq as “a golden and

unique opportunity” for jihadists to engage and defeat the United States, and he

characterized the insurgency in Iraq as the central battle in a “Third World War,

which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation.”

Nevertheless, several strategic choices made by Al Qaeda’s affiliates in Iraq

undermined their support among key groups, specifically their decisions to stoke

sectarian conflict, to rigidly enforce religious doctrine in some areas, and to

target the leaders and citizens of some Sunni Muslim communities. Each of these

decisions contributed to the significant attrition the group has suffered from 2007

onward at the hands of Iraqi security forces, the government’s Sunni allies among

the Awakening and Sons of Iraq movements, and the United States military.

•

Similarly, affiliates of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia initially oriented their attacks

against foreign interests in the kingdom during their 2003-2007 campaign, in line

with Al Qaeda leaders’ rhetoric that had long targeted the U.S. military presence

and other outside influences. Saudi security officials believe that once local Al

Qaeda affiliates shifted the focus of their attacks away from foreign targets and

onto local security forces, Al Qaeda created an opportunity for the government to

directly engage and eliminate the group. In addition to carrying out more robust

security operations, the government launched a campaign that used nationalist

sentiment to undermine popular support for the group by highlighting Al Qaeda

attacks against security officers. Deradicalization programs have successfully

demobilized some supporters of Al Qaeda, while other individuals have returned

to militancy and rejected pro-government clerics’ arguments about requiring

rulers’ and parents’ permission to participate in violent jihad.

•

Since 2006, Al Shabaab fighters in Somalia who affiliate themselves with Al

Qaeda have rallied support from some Somalis opposed to external intervention

in Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). However, Al

Shabaab threats against the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and

several other aid agencies have largely shut down humanitarian aid delivery in

southern Somalia, cutting access to almost half of WFP’s planned beneficiaries in

2010 and exacerbating food insecurity. Terror attacks against civilian targets,

including a medical school graduation ceremony in late 2009 and a Mogadishu

hotel in August 2010, also have served to alienate many Somalis. Amid recruiting

efforts that have drawn ethnic Somalis and other foreigners from the United

115

Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, “Debates and Divisions Within and Around Al Qa’ida,” pp. 8, in Moghadam

and Fishman, (eds.) Self-Inflicted Wounds, December 2010.

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States and Europe to Somalia, Al Shabaab nevertheless has sought to publicly

downplay the presence of foreign fighters within its ranks, given local

sensitivities to foreigners using Somalia for their own purposes.

•

In Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network’s 2002 bomb attack in Bali,

Indonesia that killed over 200 people led the Indonesian government to reverse

course and undertake a concerted effort to track, arrest, and kill JI leaders, as well

as to increase anti-terrorist cooperation with the United States and Australia. The

ensuing crackdown in Indonesia and other countries appears to have degraded

JI’s capabilities, particularly its more militant factions, which were most closely

associated with Al Qaeda. Since the mid-2000s, JI appears to be taking direction

from more “bureaucratic” elements that oppose the militants’ violent tactics, at

least in the short term.

Many observers argue that the success or failure of U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts are

tied to decisions made by regional governments and publics about the relative importance of

combating Al Qaeda operatives, affiliates, and ideologues within their own societies. Recent

events suggest that U.S. and allied counterterrorism policies can be successful when they

capitalize on Al Qaeda actions and messages that alienate current or potential supporters.

Similarly, events also suggest that Al Qaeda members seek to capitalize on U.S. and allied

policies and actions that are unpopular among Muslim audiences, such as military operations that

result in civilian casualties as well as broader policies such as the presence of foreign military

forces in Muslim countries. Action taken by the United States and its allies against Al Qaeda

affiliates has the potential to shape the global fortunes of the Al Qaeda brand and the appeal of

violent Islamism, and vice versa. Counterterrorism approaches that work in one theater of

operations or political context may prove counterproductive when applied elsewhere. These

complex dynamics and calculations are likely to continue to challenge decision makers and

require unique approaches in each of the regional contexts described above.

Author Contact Information

John Rollins, Coordinator

Specialist in Terrorism and National Security

[redacted]@crs.loc.g

ov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Analyst in African Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in South Asian Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Lauren Ploch

Analyst in African Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in African Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.g

ov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in African Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in Asian Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

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