North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874

Congressional research reportApr 15, 2010

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test:

Implications of U.N. Security Council

Resolution 1874

Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator

Analyst in Nonproliferation

(name redacted), Coordinator

Specialist in Asian Affairs

(name redacted)

Specialist in Asian Affairs

(name redacted)

Specialist in Industry and Trade

April 15, 2010

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R40684

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Summary

The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Res. 1874 on June 12, 2009, in

response to North Korea’s second nuclear test. The resolution puts in place a series of sanctions

on North Korea’s arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons

programs, and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such

shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. As was the

case with an earlier U.N. resolution, 1718, that was passed in October 2006 after North Korea’s

first nuclear test, Resolution 1874 seeks to curb financial benefits that go to North Korea’s regime

and its weapons program. This report summarizes and analyzes Resolution 1874. In summary, the

economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless China cooperates extensively

and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a

ripple effect that causes financial institutions to avoid being “tainted” by handling any DPRK

transaction.

On the surface, sanctions aimed solely at the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, the

official name of North Korea) and its prohibited activities are not likely to have a large monetary

effect. Governments will have to interpret the financial sanctions ban of the resolution liberally in

order to apply sanctions to the bank accounts of North Korean trading corporations. A key to its

success will be the extent to which China, North Korea’s most important economic partner,

implements the resolution. A ban on luxury goods will only be effective if China begins to deny

North Korea lucrative trade credits.

Provisions for inspection of banned cargo on aircraft and sea vessels rely on the acquiescence of

the shipping state. In the case of North Korean vessels, it is highly unlikely that they would

submit to searches. Resolution 1874 is vague about how its air cargo provisions are to be

implemented, in contrast to the specific procedures set forth regarding inspecting sea-borne cargo.

While procedures are specified for sea interdictions, the authority given is ambiguous and

optional. Further, DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant, and

therefore the ban on those exports is unlikely to have a great impact.

Other CRS Reports may be useful in conducting research on this issue: CRS Report RL30613,

North Korea: Terrorism List Removal, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s

Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by (name redacted); CRS Report R40095,

Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by (name redacted) and Mary Beth NikitinCRS Report

RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by (name redacted) and (name

redacted); CRS Report RL33324,

North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by (name

redacted); CRS Report RL34256,North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary

Beth Nikitin; and CRS Report RL32097, Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation:

Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft, by (name redacted).

Congressional Research Service

North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

Main Provisions of Resolution 1874......................................................................................2

Interdiction Procedures ...................................................................................................2

Designations ...................................................................................................................3

Reporting Requirements and Panel of Experts .................................................................3

Cases of Noncompliance.................................................................................................4

Implementation of Sanctions .......................................................................................................4

1. The Ban on Financial Transactions Related to North Korea’s Trade in Weapons

of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology................5

2. Search of Sea-Borne Traffic ........................................................................................6

3. Inspecting North Korea’s Air Cargo.............................................................................7

4. The Ban on Financial Support for Trade with North Korea Except for

Humanitarian Goods ....................................................................................................8

Implications of Resolution 1874..................................................................................................9

Trade, Aid, and Finance ........................................................................................................9

Aid ............................................................................................................................... 10

Financial Support.......................................................................................................... 11

Trade in Arms ............................................................................................................... 14

Import and Export Trade ............................................................................................... 14

North Korea’s Proliferation, Nuclear and Missile Programs ................................................. 17

North Korea’s Policies and Internal Situation ...................................................................... 18

Assessments of UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) ......................................................................... 19

Figures

Figure 1. China’s Exports of Luxury Goods under U.N. Sanctions to the DPRK ........................ 16

Tables

Table 1. China’s Major Imports from the DPRK ........................................................................ 14

Table 2. China’s Major Exports to the DPRK ............................................................................ 15

Appendixes

Appendix. China’s Exports of Luxury Goods to the DPRK........................................................ 21

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 23

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 23

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Introduction1

Since the breakdown of the Six-Party Talks over verification issues in December 2008, North

Korea has carried out a series of increasingly provocative acts that have challenged the Obama

Administration and the world community. In January and February, North Korea presented the

newly inaugurated Obama Administration with a tough set of negotiating positions. North Korea

reportedly did not respond to subsequent overtures by the United States to restart talks. On April

5, 2009, North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile, the Taepo Dong 2, over Japan, but

failed to achieve a complete test of the system or place a satellite into orbit. This test led to United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemnation. In response, North Korea said it would abandon

the Six-Party Talks, restart its nuclear facilities and conduct a nuclear test. It asked international

and U.S. inspectors to leave the country.

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion.2 In response, the

UNSC on June 12 unanimously passed Res. 1874,3 which puts in place a series of sanctions on

North Korea’s arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions related to its weapons

programs and calls upon states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying such

shipments. The resolution does allow for shipments of food and nonmilitary goods. As was the

case with an earlier resolution, 1718, that was passed in October 2006 after North Korea’s first

nuclear test, Res. 1874 seeks to curb financial benefits that go to North Korea’s regime and its

weapons program. This report summarizes and analyzes Resolution 1874. In summary, the

economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless China cooperates extensively

and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution and/or the specific financial sanctions cause a

ripple effect that causes financial institutions to avoid being “tainted” by handling any DPRK

transaction.

In June 2009, the Obama Administration formed an interagency team to coordinate sanctions

efforts against North Korea with other nations. The team is led by Philip S. Goldberg, a former

ambassador to Bolivia, and consists of representatives from the State Department, the White

House, the National Security Agency, the Treasury Department, and others.4 (See

“Implementation of Sanctions” below.) Many observers cited the designation of a high-level

coordinator as a way the United States could produce more success in implementing Res. 1874

than was had in implementing its predecessor. In February 2010, Ambassador Goldberg also took

over as Assistant Secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

He will continue in his role as Coordinator for Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1874 on

North Korea.

Larry Niksch, a longtime Specialist in Asian Affairs who retired from CRS in early 2010, was a co-author of this

report.

http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20090615_release.pdf.

For full text, see http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions09.htm.

Michael D. Shear, “U.S. Interagency Team to Focus On Sanctions Against N. Korea ,” The Washington Post, June

27, 2009, p. A7.

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Main Provisions of Resolution 1874

Resolution 1874 condemns the May 25 nuclear test, demands that North Korea not conduct

additional nuclear tests or ballistic missile tests, says North Korea should suspend its ballistic

missile program and re-establish the missile launch moratorium, calls on the DPRK to abandon

all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a “complete, verifiable and irreversible

manner” and calls on North Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the SixParty Talks.

The resolution includes a ban on all arms transfers from the DPRK and all arms except exports of

small arms or light weapons to the DPRK. As with past UNSC resolutions, this ban includes

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or missile-related technology. The resolution also provides

for new economic and financial sanctions on the DPRK. It calls on states not to provide grants,

assistance, loans, or public financial support for trade if such assistance could contribute to North

Korea’s proliferation efforts. It also calls on states to deny financial services, including freezing

assets, where such assets could contribute to prohibited DPRK programs. The resolution is not an

embargo, however, and explicit exclusions are made for humanitarian and denuclearization aid.

These are broad and far-reaching sanctions, if effective, but several problems arise in

implementation (discussed below).

Interdiction Procedures

Due to concerns over North Korea’s past track record on proliferation of nuclear and missile

technology, the Security Council deliberations focused on ways to interdict North Korean

shipments of banned items. Past Security Council resolutions (1718 (2006) and 1695 (2006))

have tackled this issue, but the new resolution includes specific guidelines for inspecting and

interdicting ships that transport banned materials. Resolution 1874 calls on all states to “inspect,

in accordance with their national legal authorities and consistent with international law, all cargo

to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports,” if that state has

information that the cargo is prohibited by UNSC Resolutions. Res. 1874 does not, however,

provide the authority to do so without the flag state’s consent.5 Reportedly due to objections by

Russia and China, the resolution does not authorize the use of force if the inspection is refused. 6

In that case, the requesting state is asked to report the matter to the Security Council.

If a suspect ship is on the high seas, U.N. member states are “called upon” to request the right to

board and inspect. If refused, the resolution obligates the flag state to direct their vessel to port for

inspection. The resolution “authorizes” seizure of banned items. The resolution prohibits

“bunkering services” such as refueling or servicing of a ship with suspected cargo. This is

significant because North Korea reportedly ships most goods under its own flag and typically

uses small vessels that would need refueling.

“Flag state” refers to the country that exercises regulatory control over a commercial ship that has registered under its

flag. Some states may allow foreign vessels to register under their flag, known as “flag of convenience.”

Blaine Harden, “North Korea Says It Will Start Enriching Uranium,” Washington Post, June 14, 2009. The resolution

is under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, and does not authorize use of force during interdiction attempts. The

full text of Article 41 follows: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force

are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such

measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,

telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Designations

The sanctions committee under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 first designated three

North Korean companies at the end of April 2009. Resolution 1874 required designations to be

reviewed within 30 days, and the Security Council sanctions committee on July 16, 2009,

designated for sanctions three North Korean trading companies, an Iran-based company, and

North Korea’s General Bureau of Atomic Energy. It also designated five North Korean officials,

including the director of another North Korean trading company.7 (For a full discussion see

“Implementation of Sanctions” below.) No additional designations have been made since July

2009.

Reporting Requirements and Panel of Experts

Resolution 1874 also established reporting mechanisms on the implementation of the resolution.

Within 45 days of the resolution’s adoption, all U.N. member states were to report to the Security

Council on “concrete measures” they have taken to implement the arms embargo and financial

measures. The Sanctions Committee, originally established by UNSC Res. 1718, submitted a

proposed agenda for its work covering “compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance

and cooperation.” The newly established Panel of Experts is to contribute expertise to the

Committee’s work, particularly in evaluating cases of noncompliance.8

The resolution also asks the U.N. Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts, with a

maximum of seven experts to analyze reports and make recommendations regarding

implementation of Res. 1874 and 1718 for an initial one-year period ending with a report to the

Security Council in spring 2010. The Secretary General appointed a panel with members from the

United States, China, France, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. 9 Victor

Comras is the panel’s U.S. expert. According to the resolution, the panel is to “gather, examine

and analyze information from States, relevant U.N. bodies, and other interested parties regarding

implementation” and make recommendations to the Council, Committee, or member states on

improved implementation. It is also tasked with producing an interim and final report

summarizing its findings and recommendations. Despite this mandate, it is still unclear the extent

to which the panel will make judgments about U.N. member states’ compliance with the

resolution. However, the panel is playing a role in investigating seized shipments and

noncompliance cases.

The panel provided an interim report to the Security Council in November 2009, as required by

the resolution. According to press reports, the experts panel noted that the sanctions have had an

impact on North Korea’s trading activity. However, the reports also said the panel assessed that

North Korea was actively circumventing the sanctions through masking of transactions by use of

“U.N. Expands Sanctions Imposed on North Korea,” Wall Street Journal Asia, July 17, 2009, p. 13.

Other U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committees have appointed a panel of experts to help the committee monitor

implementation of sanctions, i.e., related to arms embargoes on the Sudan, Sierre Leone, Somalia, Liberia, etc. U.N.

Security Council Resolution 1540 also established a panel of experts, but that panel focuses on reporting and

encouraging states to develop national infrastructure to prevent illicit trade in WMD, as opposed to sanctions

violations.

http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/S2009416%20E.pdf. Please note that the Chinese expert on this original

list was later replaced with another expert.

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

intermediaries, false manifests, and false description of cargo. 10 It also reportedly said that North

Korea’s use of trading companies continued.

Cases of Noncompliance

Several cases of alleged noncompliance with UNSC Resolution 1874 sanctions surfaced in press

reports in 2009. Each shipment involved multiple countries and other evasion techniques. Only

one publicized interdiction to date involved an air shipment. In July 2009, Italian authorities

seized yachts, banned luxury items under UNSC Resolution 1874, bound for North Korea. In

August 2009, the ANL Australia’s cargo of conventional weapons was seized in the UAE. 11 In

September 2009, a shipment of protective clothing was intercepted in South Korea on its way to

North Korea.12 An Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane was seized at an airport in Thailand in December

2009. The cargo included conventional weapons allegedly exported from North Korea. In

November 2009, South Africa interdicted a shipment of tank components from North Korea en

route to the Republic of Congo.13 (Detailed discussion of these cases is below.)

Implementation of Sanctions14

The Obama Administration faces several key decisions regarding the U.S. role in enforcing

Resolution 1874 and applying new U.S. sanctions against North Korea. The Administration faces

a decision on how assertive to be in confronting North Korean ship traffic to attempt searches. It

also faces a decision on the U.S. role in enforcing the ban on WMD-related North Korean

financial transactions. U.S. officials have said that the Obama Administration is emphasizing the

Resolution’s call on states to deny financial services to North Korea, especially access to foreign

banks by North Korean trading companies.15 Administration officials also have said that they are

considering reinstating North Korea on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; the Bush

Administration removed North Korea from the list in October 2008.16 Finally, the Administration

may have to calculate the degree of pressure to apply to China if Beijing does little to enforce the

Security Council sanctions, as was the case following Resolution 1718.

The Hyundai Economic Research Institute of South Korea has estimated that if U.N. members

enforce the sanctions in Resolution 1874 against North Korea, North Korea could lose between

$1.5 billion and $3.7 billion. Other estimates place the loss close to $4 billion.17 However,

Resolution 1874 does not make enforcement of sanctions mandatory but instead “calls on” U.N.

members to take enforcement steps. If sanctions are to have this kind of impact, several key

“Sanctioned N. Korean firms operating via dummies: U.N. report,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 19, 2009.

“Cargo of North Korea materiel is seized en route to Iran,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2009.

There is some dispute as to whether protective clothing is prohibited under the resolution. This type of clothing could

be used to protect against chemical attacks. “S. Korea searched suspicious N.K. containers: sources,” Yonhap News,

October 6, 2009

“South Africa reports NKorea sanctions violation,” Associated Press, February 26, 2010.

This section was originally prepared by Larry Niksch.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Briefing on North Korea, July 15, 2009.

“U.S. Mulls Relisting N. Korea As State Sponsor of Terrorism,” Asia Pulse, June 8, 2009. See CRS Report

RL30613, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal, by (name redacted).

“North Korea to Face Huge Losses from U.N. Sanctions: Report,” Asia Pulse, June 11, 2009. Yun Deok-min,

“China’s Nuclear Headache,” JoongAng Daily Online, June 16, 2009.

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countries will have act forcefully and will have to interpret the sanctions language of the

resolution liberally.

There appear to be four key areas of sanctions enforcement:

1. The Ban on Financial Transactions Related to North Korea’s Trade in

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Technology

North Korea’s state trading companies are key vehicles for transferring WMD and WMD

technology to other countries and for transmitting the foreign exchange earnings back to

Pyongyang. The trading companies conduct these transactions through accounts maintained in

banks in numerous countries around the world. The trading companies are particularly active in

China and undoubtedly have accounts throughout the Chinese banking system. 18 In order to shut

down these financial transactions, governments and banks in a number of countries will have to

freeze these bank accounts. However, they face the dilemma that the trading companies conduct

other transactions through the same accounts. These include the financing of legitimate

commerce but also laundering money acquired through North Korea’s smuggling of counterfeit

products, including counterfeit U.S. dollars and U.S. products. Neither of these activities are

banned by Resolution 1874. Governments will have to interpret the financial sanctions ban of the

resolution liberally in order to apply sanctions to the bank accounts of the trading corporations.

Obama Administration officials have indicated that they are urging other governments to apply

such a liberal interpretation to the activities of the trading companies.19 In early July 2009,

Ambassador Philip Goldberg and Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey visited China and

Malaysia. Goldberg was appointed as a special envoy to coordinate sanctions against North

Korea. They emphasized to Chinese and Malaysian officials the need to restrict activities of North

Korean trading companies. They reportedly raised with Malaysian officials the use of a

Malaysian bank by North Korea to facilitate the sale of North Korean arms to Burma.20

Ambassador Goldberg and his delegation also visited South Korea, Japan, Thailand, and

Singapore. U.S. officials have said that the Obama Administration is emphasizing the

Resolution’s call on states to deny financial services to North Korea, especially access to foreign

banks by North Korean trading companies.21 Ambassador Goldberg and an interagency team also

visited Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in October 2009, to urge compliance with 1874

provisions.

The U.N. Security Council’s sanctions committee designated three North Korean companies at

the end of April 2009. Japan and the United States had recommended 10 and 14 trading

companies to be sanctioned at points in the sanctions committee’s deliberation, but China and

Russia reportedly objected. The number finally was scaled back to three, two trading companies

and one North Korean bank.22 In line with Resolution 1874, the Security Council sanctions

committee on July 16, 2009, designated for sanctions three North Korean trading companies, an

John S. Park, North Korea, Inc., Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial

Activities, U.S. Institute of Peace, USIP Working Paper, Washington, DC, April 22, 2009.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Background Briefing on North Korea,” July 15, 2009.

“U.S. Seeks Malaysia’s Help to Block N. Korea’s Access to Banks,” Kyodo News, July 6, 2009.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Background Briefing on North Korea,” July 15, 2009.

“3 Entities Subject to Asset Freeze Over N. Korea Nuke, Missile Program,” Kyodo News, April 24, 2009.

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Iran-based company, and North Korea’s General Bureau of Atomic Energy. It also designated five

North Korean officials, including the director of another North Korean trading company.23 The

U.S. Treasury Department previously had imposed U.S. sanctions on one of these North Korean

trading companies, the Namchongang Trading Corporation, and the Iran-based Hong Kong

Electronics. Treasury Department officials disclosed in late June 2009 that the Department was

targeting 17 North Korean trading companies and banks for U.S. and international sanctions.24

In its interim report, the UNSCR Panel of Experts reportedly discussed North Korea’s continued

use of trading companies. For example, one news report said the experts had found that “The

Korea Mining Development Trading Corp, sanctioned for involvement in ballistic missile sales,

continued to operate through subsidiaries. The Kwangson Banking Corp and Amroggang

Development Bank had been determined to be acting for the listed Tanchon Commercial Bank

and Korea Hyoskin Trading Corp.”25

2. Search of Sea-Borne Traffic

The specific provisions set out in Resolution 1874 appear to give the United States and allies the

means to gain access to North Korean ships and thus shut down WMD-related ship traffic.26 This

will be dependent on a number of countries cooperating with the United States, particularly in

applying the resolution’s provision for searching North Korean ships in their ports and denying

provisions of fuel and supplies to North Korean ships that refuse to be searched. China is

particularly important, since North Korean ships frequently visit Chinese ports. Singapore,

Indonesia, and Malaysia would be important with respect to North Korean ships that seek to pass

through the Singapore and Malacca Straits that connect the Pacific and Indian Ocean, the route to

the Middle East and Burma. Middle East-bound ships also stop at ports in India and Pakistan.

India has searched North Korean ships in the past. Pakistan’s cooperation may be more uncertain,

since it has had close relations with North Korea in past years, including purchases of North

Korean missiles and missile technology.27

The first test case of sea-borne traffic was the North Korean ship, the Kang Nam. The Kang Nam

was shadowed by the U.S. Navy as it headed south from North Korea, hugging the coast of China

as it approached the South China Sea. South Korean officials believed that the Kang Nam was

bound for Burma with a shipment of arms. However, before reaching the international waters of

the South China Sea, the Kang Nam turned back and returned to North Korea on July 7, 2009.28

While attending a regional meeting in Thailand in late July, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as

well as Japanese officials stated that Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win had pledged that

Burma would abide by U.N. sanctions on North Korea.29

“U.N. Expands Sanctions Imposed on North Korea,” Wall Street Journal Asia, July 17, 2009, p. 13.

Jay Solomon, “U.S. goes after North Korea’s Finances,” Wall Street Journal Asia, July 1, 2009, p. 8.

“N.Korea maneuvers to evade UN sanctions,” Reuters, November 18, 2009.

David E. Sanger, “U.S. to confront, not board, North Korean ships,” New York Times (internet), June 17, 2009.

Paul Kerr, “Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2007,

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/IranNK

Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Says Freighter from North Turns Back,” New York Times, July 7, 2009, p. 5.

State Department, “Remarks at the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Hillary Rodham Clinton, July 23, 2009; “Japan

Officials Say Burma FM Pledges Nation to Oblige by UN Sanctions on DPRK,” Agence France Presse, July 23, 2009.

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An important application of sanctions against sea-borne traffic came in the form of several

intercepted shipments of North Koreans bound for Iran in the second half of 2009. Three vessels

were intercepted, which contained North Korean weapons that Western intelligence and Israeli

intelligence officials and non-government experts believe were bound for Hezbollah and Hamas,

terrorist groups on the official U.S. list of international terrorist organizations.30 The largest of

these shipments was aboard a ship that was searched in Dubai before departing for Iran in July

2009. All three ships reportedly contained North Korean components for 122 mm Grad rockets

and rocket launchers. The shipment intercepted in Dubai contained 2,030 detonators for the Grad

rockets and related electric circuits and solid fuel propellant for rockets. The Iranian

Revolutionary Guards is known to have supplied significant quantities of these rockets and rocket

launchers to Hezbollah and Hamas, which have frequently fired them into Israel. 31

In addition, the South African government seized a shipment of large tank components bound for

the Republic of Congo in November 2009. Press reports have said that the shipment originated in

North Korea and passed through the Chinese port of Dallan.

3. Inspecting North Korea’s Air Cargo

Resolution 1874 is vague in how its air cargo provisions are to be implemented, in contrast to the

specific procedures set forth regarding inspecting sea-borne cargo. However, many experts

believe that North Korea uses air traffic much more than sea traffic in order to transfer and

exchange WMDs, WMD technology, and WMD scientists and technicians.32 The key to

inspections of North Korea’s air cargo is the air traffic between North Korea and Iran. North

Korea and Iran have extensive collaboration in the development of ballistic missiles. 33 The U.S.based Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis estimated in 2009 that North Korea earns about $1.5

billion annually from sales of missiles to other countries.34 It appears that much of this comes

from missile sales and collaboration with Iran.35 Iran and North Korea reportedly use the

Pyongyang-Tehran air route for the transfer of missiles and weapons of mass destruction

technology and for mutual visits of nuclear and missile officials, scientists, and technicians. North

Korea and Iran reportedly emphasized air travel and traffic after 2002 in response to the Bush

Administration’s announcement of a Proliferation Security Initiative. Aircraft use Chinese air

space and reportedly refuel at Chinese airports.36 A weakness of Resolution 1874 is that it does

not specify procedures for the inspection of North Korea-related air cargo similar to the

procedures outlined for sea-borne cargo.

Joby Warrick, “Arms smuggling heightens Iran fears,” Washington Port, December 3, 2009, p. A14. “Iran bought

masses of N Korean arms,” Chosun Ilbo Online, December 4, 2009.

Ibid.

Paul Eckert, “Anti-proliferation Group Only Symbolic Without China,” Reuters News, May 27, 2009.

There also are numerous reports that the two countries may be cooperating in the nuclear field. Two CRS Reports lay

out extensive information on North Korean-Iranian collaboration: CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear

Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by (name redacted) and CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Terrorism List

Removal, by (name redacted).

Jon Herskovitz, “How North Korea Earns Money from Arms Sales,” Reuters News, July 4, 2009.

“What’s Behind the New U.N. sanctions on N.Korea?” Reuters News, June 12, 2009.

“N.Korea’s Arms Export Routes Getting Harder To Track,” Chosun Ilbo Online, June 29, 2009. Yi Chol-hui,

“North’s Air Cargo: Missiles,” Chungang Ilbo (internet), June 16, 2003. “N.K. Exported Weapons Via Overland

Routes in China, Russia,” Korea Herald Online, July 2, 2009. William Triplett, “Gaps at the G-8 Gates,” Washington

Times, July 13, 2006, p. A16. Paul Eckert, “Anti-proliferation Group Only Symbolic without China,” Reuters News,

May 27, 2009.

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China would have the prime responsibility for searches of aircraft on the Pyongyang-Tehran air

route. The Obama Administration indicated that Ambassador Goldberg raised the air traffic issue

with Chinese officials during his visit to China in early July 2009, but they did not indicate how

Chinese officials responded. 37 Chinese officials have not spoken publicly about the air traffic

issue, but they have urged caution regarding searches of North Korean ships.

The seizure of an Ilyushin-T76 transport aircraft filled with North Korean arms in Bangkok,

Thailand, in December 2009 was another successful application of sanctions but also pointed up

the apparent lack of Chinese cooperation in intercepting North Korea-Iran air traffic. The Ilyushin

had flown from Pyongyang to Bangkok through hundreds of miles of Chinese air space with no

Chinese effort to direct the aircraft to land and be searched. 38 The Ilyushin reportedly had been

leased a few days before the flight, on December 2, 2009, by Union Top Management, a firm

based in Chinese Hong Kong. The sea-borne cargo of North Korean arms seized in Dubai in July

2009 had visited several Chinese ports and was transported from Dalian, China, to Shanghai

aboard a Chinese ship, again without a Chinese effort to conduct a search.39

The flight plan of the Ilyushin reportedly showed that its ultimate destination was Iran.40 The

weapons reportedly included two 1958 multiple 240 mm rocket launchers, rocket launching

tubes, 24,240 mm rockets, shoulder-launched missiles, and components of surface-to-air

missiles.41 Israeli and Lebanese newspapers quoted Western intelligence sources as concluding

that most of these weapons likely were bound for Hezbollah.42 Charles Vick, a noted expert on

arms and the arms trade, observed that the rocket-related weapons in the shipment are used often

by Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel.

It is unknown how much income North Korea lost from Iran by the interception of the Ilyushin

and the three earlier seizures at sea. The value no doubt is in the tens of millions of dollars,

perhaps more.

4. The Ban on Financial Support for Trade with North Korea Except for

Humanitarian Goods

Resolution 1874 reaffirmed Resolution 1718 of October 2006, including the ban on the export of

luxury goods to North Korea. Luxury consumer goods are a key benefit to North Korea’s elite,

the core support group of the Kim Jong-il regime. In the past, the major sources of luxury goods

have been Europe and China. Chinese traders report a high demand for Chinese consumer goods

by the North Korean elite. 43 An analysis of Chinese trade statistics for 2008 indicates that Chinese

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Background Briefing on North Korea,” July 15, 2009.

Nicholas Kralev, “Illegal N. Korean arms fly in Chinese airspace,” Washington Times, December 17, 2009, p. A1.

“City firm linked to N Korean arms shipment,” The Standard Online (Hong Kong), December 23, 2009. “Iran bought

masses of N Korean arms,” Chosun Ilbo Online, December 4, 2009.

Daniel Michaels and Margaret Coker, “Seized arms Iran-bound, report says,” Wall Street Journal Asia, December

21, 2009.

“Details of mysterious weapons—authorities stunned to find RPG rocket launchers,” Krungthep Thurakit (Bangkok,

internet), December 16, 2009. “Rocket launchers, but no nuclear components,” The Nation Online (Bangkok),

December 16, 2009.

“Korean arms cache caught en route to Mideast,” Daily Star Online (Beirut), December 15, 2009.

Robert J. Saiget, “China, DPRK Trade Said Booming Despite Rocket Tensions,” Agence France Presse, April 6,

2009.

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

exports of luxury consumer goods to North Korea was between $100 million and $160 million,

about 5%-8% of China’s total 2008 exports of $2 billion to North Korea.44 Moreover, most of

China’s exports are reportedly financed by Chinese trade credits to North Korea, which have

generous long-term repayment provisions.45 In short, there is evidence that a sizeable portion of

Chinese goods come into North Korea largely cost-free to the North Korean government. Thus,

this sanction will not be enforced unless China’s begins to deny North Korea these lucrative trade

credits.

Implications of Resolution 1874

Trade, Aid, and Finance46

The DPRK is really two economies. 47 The first is that of the military, the Korean Workers Party,

and the governing elite. This economy has considerable industrial capacity and first priority for

resources. This part of the economy appears to be growing as the military reportedly has taken

over some trading companies that previously were private. In many products, particularly food,

the first economy tends to be parasitic. It lives off the production from the second economy, the

rest of the country. This second economy consists mostly of agriculture, services, light

manufacturing, and the range of economic activity typical of a less developed nation. As a whole,

the DPRK economy is one of the world’s most isolated and moribund. It is in dire straits with a

considerable share of its population on the edge of starvation and in need of outside food aid.

Without humanitarian aid and trade with China, many of its people would starve. For 2009, the

Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program estimated that the DPRK faced a

cereal deficit of about 836,000 tons—enough to leave 8.7 million people in need of food

assistance. 48 The industrial side of the economy also faces problems with antiquated equipment,

lack of raw materials, and unreliable electrical supply.

The challenge in implementing the new U.N. economic and financial sanctions lies in separating

funds and transactions that are related to the military from the normal economic and financial

transactions of the country. Even though the economy as a whole is in shambles, the military and

ruling elite are able to command sufficient resources to pursue their nuclear and ballistic missile

programs. For example, officials from the Korean Peoples Army (KPA) reportedly have been

authorized to acquire any material, resource or item from other commercial projects for use in

North Koreas’ nuclear programs.49 A broad interpretation of the sanctions would apply to any

transaction that could be interpreted to assist the military.

The irony of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile program is that its 2009 nuclear test and series of

missile launches likely cost the government enough to cover much of its need for fertilizer and

For details on Chinese exports of luxury goods, see the Appendix to this report.

Ibid.

This section was prepared by Dick Nanto.

For details, see CRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by (name redacted) and

(name redacted)

World Food Programme, “8.7 Million North Koreans Need Food Assistance,” December 10, 2008.

John S. Park, North Korea, Inc., Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial

Activities, U.S. Institute of Peace, USIP Working Paper, Washington, DC, April 22, 2009.

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

basic food imports for the year.50 What seems clear is that if providing an essential level of food

to the country’s population were a priority goal for the regime, it would have the economic

resources to do so.51 North Korea finds itself in a stereotypical “guns and butter” dilemma. By

diverting scarce resources to pay for “guns” it is robbing the greater economy of “butter” (or in

North Korea’s case, rice) and, in the process, creating a humanitarian disaster.

The additional sanctions in U.N. Resolution 1874 target outside resources flowing into the DPRK

that are associated with its prohibited activities. Outside resources include development

assistance, loans, finance, and certain exports and imports. Since most official development

assistance is to meet basic human needs, countries and international organizations may continue

to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea should they desire to do so. 52

Aid

In the 1990s, Pyongyang’s policies (along with bad weather) pushed as many as 2 million of its

citizens into death by starvation. In more recent years, other countries have stepped in to provide

humanitarian aid even though the ruling regime arguably caused the humanitarian crisis in the

first place. This time it appears that Pyongyang’s gamble may not work. The Western world

seems to be suffering from a combination of “aid fatigue,” the effects of the global financial

crisis, declining budgetary resources, plus a reluctance to “buy the same horse twice” (i.e., to

provide food and fuel aid in exchange for denuclearization steps that are later reversed). Even

though Resolution 1874 does not preclude humanitarian aid, this confluence of events, history,

and negative responses to the DPRK’s attempt to become a nuclear power could cut into inflows

of essential food and fuel for the large segment of the population living on the edge of starvation.

Data on total aid to North Korea for 2008 has not been reported yet, but for 2007, the DPRK

received $97.6 million in official development assistance (mostly humanitarian aid) from major

aid donors that report to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (excludes

South Korea, China, and Russia). Of this, $32.5 million came from the United States; $16.6

million from the European Community; $26.7 million bilaterally from Germany, France,

Australia, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland; and $10.4 million from the United Nations and

other multilateral agencies. U.S. assistance has now stopped. The European Community has

limited its funds to humanitarian aid and food security assistance and has progressively shifted

from relief and emergency response to providing support to and/or rehabilitation of agriculture in

two North Korean provinces.53 The United Nations World Food Programme has scaled back its

humanitarian food assistance for the DPRK after several months of funding shortfalls. In March

2009 (before the nuclear test), it reported that operations were at 15% of planned levels.

Approximately 2 million out of the 6.2 million people targeted by their operation were receiving

rations (incomplete) of fortified foods.54

“N. Korea ‘Squandered $700 Million to Create Tensions’,” The Chosun Ilbo, July 6, 2009, Online Digital Chosun.

Balbina Hwang, “Shattering Myths and Assumptions: The Implications of North Korea’s Strategic Culture for U.S.

Policy,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, vol. 18, no. 1 (2009), p. 42.

For more on assistance to North Korea, including details of U.S. aid, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to

North Korea, by (name redacted) and Mary Beth Nikitin.

European Commission, North Korea - Food Security Programme 2007 (LRRD Component),

EuropeAid/126276/C/ACT/KP, Brussels, Belgium, 2008, p. 3.

United Nations World Food Programme, WFP Does What Little It Can for North Koreans, March 5, 2009.

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South Korea provided $54.1 million in humanitarian aid to North Korea in 2008, down from

$395.7 million in 2007. Virtually all ($50.2 million) of the aid in 2008 was through nongovernmental organizations. How much of this NGO assistance may continue is problematic.55

Given the declines in humanitarian aid to the DPRK, Pyongyang may be counting on increased

production from its agricultural sector to feed its people. Prospects for this, however, are not

favorable. According to estimates by the Bank of Korea, in 2008, the North Korean economy

grew at 3.7% following two years of negative growth of -1.1% in 2006 and -2.3% in 2007. The

economy as a whole is regaining some of the ground lost during the past two years. Agricultural

output grew by an estimated 8.2% in 2008 attributable mainly to better weather, but this did not

offset the disastrous declines in farm production that amounted to -9.4% in 2007 and -2.6% in

2006.56 In short, the agricultural sector in the DPRK has recovered somewhat, but the adequacy

of basic nutrition still is questionable for millions of people.

Financial Support

U.N. Resolution 1874 called upon all member states not to provide public financial support for

trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their

nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the

DPRK’s nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programs or activities.

In 2008, China exported $2.0 billion in goods to the DPRK (see Table 2). With respect to the

U.N. sanctions, only a small proportion of this total would seem to be associated with prohibited

activities. Other links between exports of “dual use” items such as food, fuel, machinery, and

electronics would be difficult to trace. Nevertheless, the $100 million to $160 million in Chinese

exports of “luxury” goods57 to North Korea may be essential to help maintain elite loyalty to the

regime and to the military policies that have led to the nuclear and missile programs.

The amount of China’s financial support for trade with the DPRK is not reported. In most of the

world, except for cash transactions, most international trade is financed through trade credits

issued by banks or other financial institutions. A news report from along the Sino-DPRK border

indicates that much of the trade is financed by credits from Beijing.58 Since North Korea’s nuclear

and missile programs have such a high priority in Pyongyang, it does not seem likely that the

military would finance specific inputs into such programs with Chinese trade credits. After U.N.

Resolution 1874, this seems even more unlikely. Imports not specific to the nuclear or missile

programs (“dual use items”) probably enter as general imports and are subsumed into standard

non-prohibited categories of purchases that would go primarily for civilian uses. Without

cooperation from Chinese officials, attempting to ferret out Chinese trade finance supporting

exports of prohibited items only would be nearly futile. As for concessionary finance by Beijing,

most of the $1.3 billion deficit in the DPRK’s trade with China in 2008 must have been financed

by long-term credits or loans (presumably from Beijing), though other sources of financing

presumably would include rising Chinese foreign direct investment in North Korea, DPRK export

CRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, by (name redacted) and (name

redacted), p. 34.

Bank of Korea, Income Statistics Team, Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2008, Seoul, Korea, June 26,

2009, http://eng.bok.or.kr/contents/total/eng/boardView.action.

For details on Chinese exports of luxury goods, see the Appendix to this report.

Robert J. Saiget, “China, DPRK Trade Said Booming Despite Rocket Tensions,” Agence France-Presse, Hong Kong

AFP, April 6, 2009.

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

earnings, illicit activities, or from foreign exchange generated from activities such as the Kaesong

Industrial Complex. Note also that in 2008, North Korea’s deficit in trade with Russia was $83

million. 59

Since the DPRK is not a member of the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, it is not eligible

to borrow for trade finance from these international financial institutions. National Export-Import

banks also do not fund trade in prohibited items. Over the period 2005-2007, the 21 industrialized

nations that form the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic

Cooperation and Development reported no bank credits for trade for the DPRK. Gross non-bank

trade credits, however, amounted to $6 million in 2005, $110 million in 2006, and $17 million in

2007.60 These data also do not include credits from China or Russia.

As for loans, the extent of borrowing from western commercial banks by the DPRK is relatively

small. In December 2008, consolidated claims on the DPRK by banks that report to the Bank for

International Settlements totaled $2.0 billion, down from a peak of $4.2 billion in June 2008. All

reporting banks with claims on North Korean entities were from Europe, with France accounting

for nearly half of the total. 61 These figures, however, do not include Russia or China. How much

of this lending activity is purely commercial and how much went to North Korea’s prohibited

activities is unknown. Also, funds are fungible. A loan to a commercial activity in one sector may

free up resources that then can be used for military purposes. The potential impact of the U.N.

sanctions on this activity, therefore, is also unknown, but its upper limit would be around $2

billion in lending from Western nations.

On the surface, therefore, financial sanctions aimed solely at the DPRK’s prohibited activities are

not likely to have a large monetary effect. The total amounts of such activity are not large, and

what can be attributed to nuclear or missile activity would be even smaller. Still, as can be

deduced from the 2005 Banco Delta Asia sanctions (see text box below), if financial institutions

are put in a position in which they have to choose between dealing with the United States or

dealing with the DPRK, they often will close the North Korean accounts, even if those accounts

are for legitimate purposes. The BDA sanctions also showed that even amounts as relatively small

as $25 million are important to Pyongyang. A BDA-type strategy, therefore, might be to let

financial institutions know that any prohibited financial activity related to the U.N. sanctions

could bring their whole institution under scrutiny and possible sanctions similar to those imposed

on the BDA. The financial institution may then terminate all transactions with the DPRK because

it feels unable to separate out the legitimate and prohibited transactions.

Ibid., p. 42.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Statistics, DAC Private Flows to the

DPRK, Non-bank gross export credits, http://stats.oecd.org.

Bank for International Settlements, Consolidated banking statistics, Table 9D: Consolidated foreign claims of

reporting banks - ultimate risk basis, accessed June 17, 2009.

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The Banco Delta Asia Sanctions

On September 15, 2005, the U.S. Treasury imposed USA PATRIOT Act Section 311 designations

against Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macau. In the action, Treasury stated that the bank was a

“primary money laundering concern” because, among other findings, sources indicated that

senior officials in Banco Delta Asia were working with DPRK officials to accept large deposits of

cash, including counterfeit U.S. currency, and agreeing to place that currency into circulation. On

September 20, 2005, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of Treasury imposed special

measures against Banco Delta Asia that prohibited U.S. institutions or agencies from opening or

maintaining correspondent accounts on behalf of BDA and required covered financial institutions

to exercise due diligence to ensure that no correspondent account was being used indirectly to

provide services to BDA. Some $25 million in North Korean assets were frozen.

The U.S. action against BDA generated an avalanche of responses both in financial and political

circles. It caused such a run on accounts at the bank that the government of Macau had to take

over BDA’s operations and place a temporary halt on withdrawals. According to press reports, the

Macau government shut down all North Korea-related accounts including those belonging to nine

DPRK banks and 23 DPRK trading companies. These reportedly included accounts from the core

organs of the North Korean Regime.

The financial effects of the BDA action were larger than expected. The crackdown also spread

around the region. In Macau, the North Korean trading firm used by Pyongyang as a de facto

consulate rolled up its operations as the Macau government placed BDA into receivership. Not

only did the action deprive major DPRK companies of an international financial base and cut into

the secret personal accounts of the Pyongyang leadership, but it appears to have obstructed some

legitimate North Korean trade.

On February 13, 2007, a new Six-Party Talks agreement on North Korea’s nuclear program and

energy needs was concluded. In announcing this agreement, Assistant Secretary of State

Christopher Hill pledged to settle with North Korea the issue of U.S. financial sanctions against

BDA and the freezing of North Korean accounts of $25 million. After several failed attempts to

transfer the $25 million, the DPRK recovered its funds in June 2007 when the New York Federal

Reserve Bank agreed to transfer them through its facilities to a bank in Russia.62

On June 18, 2009, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the U.S. Treasury

Department issued an advisory for all U.S. financial institutions to take risk mitigation measures

against the possibility that the DPRK would use deceptive financial practices to hide illicit

conduct. Specifically, FinCEN noted that with respect to correspondent accounts held for North

Korean financial institutions, as well as their foreign branches and subsidiaries, there is now an

increased likelihood that such vehicles may be used to hide illicit conduct and related financial

proceeds in an attempt to circumvent existing sanctions, particularly those of U.N. Resolution

1874. FinCEN advised financial institutions to apply enhanced scrutiny to any such

correspondent accounts and to avoid providing financial services for North Korea’s procurement

of luxury goods. In order to assist in applying enhanced scrutiny, FinCEN supplied a list of North

Korean banks. It also encouraged financial institutions worldwide to take similar precautions. 63

CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency, by (name redacted).

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Department of the Treasury, North Korea Government Agencies’ and

(continued...)

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Trade in Arms

The U.N. sanctions also ban exports of North Korean arms, including small arms and light

weapons. Stopping exports of large armaments will depend on the effectiveness of interdictions

and threats of interdictions of shipments by cooperating countries discussed elsewhere in this

memorandum. DPRK trade in small arms and ammunition is relatively insignificant. Recently

reported purchases of such items from the DPRK included imports of $45.5 thousand by Brazil in

2007, of $3.1 million by the United Arab Emirates in 2006, and $364.4 thousand by Ethiopia and

$121.4 thousand by Mexico in 2005.64 The small arms export ban, therefore, is not likely to have

a large effect on the economy of the DPRK, but it could affect the ability of certain militaryowned factories to buy needed raw materials and technology.

Import and Export Trade

Between one-half and three-quarters of the DPRK’s imports and exports are with China. More

than one-half of North Korea's exports and one-third of its imports have been with South Korea,

primarily through activities in the Kaesong Industrial Complex located in North Korea just north

of the DMZ. The United States and Japan have virtually no trade with North Korea. The vast

majority of China’s imports from the DPRK is in non-prohibited items such as ores, coal,

iron/steel, apparel, fish, and minerals. The top six imports in Table 1 account for about 85% of

China’s total imports from North Korea. The ores, coal, and fish/seafood originate primarily from

Chinese investments in enterprises in the DPRK.

Table 1. China’s Major Imports from the DPRK

($million)

Commodity

Description

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Total

395.5

582.2

496.5

467.7

581.5

754.0

Ores, Slag, Ash

15.0

58.9

92.3

118.4

164.0

212.7

Mineral Fuel, Oil

17.2

53.0

112.2

102.3

170.0

207.6

Iron and Steel

46.8

75.0

72.2

35.2

45.2

78.4

Woven Apparel

52.2

49.1

58.3

63.3

60.4

77.3

Fish and Seafood

207.0

261.2

92.4

43.3

29.9

40.0

Salt; Sulfur; Earths

and Stone

0.7

1.1

1.3

4.2

7.5

19.3

Source: Congressional Research Service with Data from Global Trade Atlas.

Notes: Commodity numbers are 2-digit Harmonized Tariff System Codes.

As shown in Table 2, China’s major exports to the DPRK include mineral fuels (petroleum),

machinery/boilers, electrical machinery, knit apparel, plastic, vehicles, man-made filaments, and

cereals. With the exception of knit apparel, these exports are essential to the functioning of the

(...continued)

Front Companies’ Involvement in Illicit Financial Activities, Advisory FIN 2009-A002, Washington, DC, June 18,

2009, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/fin-2009-a002.html.

United Nations COMTRADE database.

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

North Korean economy. It is noteworthy that China exports less in cereals to North Korea than it

imports in fish and seafood, contradicting the general impression that trade in food is primarily

one-way from China to the DPRK.

China recognizes the leverage it wields through its exports of petroleum to the DPRK. According

to a news report from Japan, following the DPRK’s second nuclear test, China imposed its own

“sanctions” on the DPRK by reducing crude oil shipments through its pipeline with North Korea.

Previously, following the DPRK’s missile test on April 5, 2009, China had tightened inspections

of weapons-related exports to North Korea.65 China also cancelled a joint venture with North

Korea to produce vanadium (used to toughen steel alloys used in missile casings) and has

intercepted a shipment of 70 kg of vanadium hidden in a truckload of fruit crossing the border

into North Korea.66

Table 2. China’s Major Exports to the DPRK

($million)

Commodity

Description

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Total

628.0

794.5

1,084.7

1,231.9

1,392.4

2,033.2

Mineral Fuel,

Oil

180.7

204.4

285.7

347.5

402.0

586.0

Machinery;

Reactors,

Boilers

27.0

39.6

77.1

83.0

103.8

145.5

Electrical

Machinery, Etc.

39.6

45.8

56.6

97.6

69.3

100.6

Knit Apparel

3.6

4.8

6.2

10.1

23.8

87.0

Plastic

24.6

32.0

52.2

52.0

54.6

80.0

Vehicles,

Not Railway

8.4

18.3

28.3

28.0

53.7

67.3

Manmade

Filaments

14.6

18.0

28.9

38.6

52.3

55.0

Cereals

50.0

15.3

50.3

16.9

36.5

34.9

Source: Congressional Research Service with Data from Global Trade Atlas

Notes: Commodity numbers are 2-digit Harmonized Tariff System Codes.

Since the sanctions under Resolution 1874 are narrowly focused on items related to the North

Korean nuclear and missile programs, pressure from China would entail using broader trade tools.

The U.N. sanctions also include exports of luxury goods. Figure 1 shows China’s exports of

luxury goods to the DPRK by month from July 2005 to November 2009 using international trade

categories corresponding closely to the lists of banned goods. As indicated in the figure, there

seems to be little change in Chinese exports of luxury goods following either of the two U.N.

“China Imposes Own ‘Sanctions’ on DPRK by Reducing Crude Oil Shipment, Stepping Up Customs Inspection on

Exports to the DPRK,” Asahi Shimbun (in Japanese), June 13, 2009, Translation in U.S. Forces Korea J2, Korea, Open

Source Digest, Volume II, Issue 114, June 16, 2009 .

“China foils smuggling of missile-use material to North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, July 25, 2009, Internet edition.

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

resolutions. Figure 1 also shows that in December of each year, Pyongyang seems to go on a

buying spree in China. There was a surge in imports of luxury items in that month, particularly in

2006 ($15.1 million) and in 2008 ($50.4 million). In 2008, the imports included $16.6 million in

articles of leather, $6.3 million in articles of fur, $5.7 million in crustaceans and shell fish, $4.6

million in exercise and pool equipment, and $4.5 million in motor vehicles. In December 2009,

there was a smaller spike in purchases of luxury goods followed by a drop in January 2010 and a

slight recovery in February. Whether this decline in 2010 is due to a lack of foreign exchange or

the U.N. sanctions is not determinable at this time.

Figure 1. China’s Exports of Luxury Goods under U.N. Sanctions to the DPRK

$Millions

UN Resolution

1718

UN Resolution

1874

$50.4 million in Dec. 2008

Includes:

Leather Goods

$16.6 million

Articles of Fur

6.3 million

Crustaceans,Shellfish 5.7 million

Exercise/Pool Equip. 4.6 million

Motor Vehicles

4.5 million

Tobacco

3.0 million

Fountain Pens

2.0 million

Precious Stones

1.8 million

TVs, Proj ectors

1.5 million

Other

Motor Vehicles

Computers,Video

& TV Equip.

Leather & Apparel

Tobacco

Luxury Food &

Bev erages

Month/Year

Source: Underlying data accessed through Global Trade Atlas.

Notes: Computers include only those less than 10 kg (laptops). From August to November 2009, China

reported trade with the DPRK as trade with “Other Asia, not elsewhere specified.” These “Other Asia” data are

used in this chart for the August to November period. The list of luxury items are from the U.S. Department of

Commerce and from Marcus Noland, “The (Non) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea,” Peterson Institute

for International Economics, Working Paper Series, December 2008, pp. 14-16, The lists of banned products are

not specific and are not accompanied by HTS (Harmonized Tariff System) codes. The actual HTS codes used are

listed in Appendix to this report.

In summary, the economic effect of Resolution 1874 is not likely to be great unless

•

China cooperates extensively and goes beyond the requirements of the resolution

and/or

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

•

the specific financial sanctions create a ripple effect that causes financial

institutions to avoid being “tainted” by handling any DPRK transaction.

North Korea’s Proliferation, Nuclear and Missile Programs67

At a press conference on June 16, President Obama stated that “North Korea also has a track

record of proliferation that makes it unacceptable for them to be accepted as a nuclear power.

They have not shown in the past any restraint in terms of exporting weapons to not only state

actors but also non-state actors.”68 North Korea is known to have sold ballistic missiles and

associated materials to “several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, and, in our assessment,

assisted Syria with the construction of a nuclear reactor,” according to DNI Admiral Dennis

Blair’s testimony to Congress.69 North Korea appears not to simply export missile technology, but

to collaborate with Iran and perhaps others in missile development.70 Resolution 1874 may

bolster the ability of the international community to prevent North Korea from proliferating its

WMD and missile technologies to other countries and to halt supply of North Korea’s programs

only to the extent that countries are willing to sanction relevant entities, share sensitive

information and stop suspicious shipments.

Some analysts point out that the measures authorized under the resolution will not prevent the

proliferation of nuclear material or sensitive information such as test data or weapons design due

to their portability. However, other analysts and the Obama Administration contend that if all

countries implement what is called for in the resolution, at the minimum North Korea would be

discouraged from attempting to ship or procure sensitive goods. Others point out that, generally,

increased monitoring and sharing of information about North Koreans’ activities abroad may

improve U.S. intelligence related to WMD programs.

As evidenced in the reports to the UNSC Sanctions Committee for Res. 1718, many countries

have existing laws or participate in multilateral export control regimes that prohibit trade in

WMD and missile-related technology. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has facilitated

international cooperation on WMD interdiction issues.71 However, the extent to which countries

are now willing to sanction their own companies involved in such transactions by placing them

on the UNSC sanctions list (as discussed above) will be a key determinant.

Pyongyang has had an active procurement network for its nuclear program for decades.72

Pyongyang may need to procure items from abroad for further advances. Therefore, increased

international vigilance, stopping of shipments and financial pressures combined may have a

limiting effect on North Korea’s own programs as well as on its proliferation to others. This may

This section was prepared by Mary Beth Nikitin.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/President-Obama-and-President-Lee-of-the-Republic-of-Korea-Talk-to-the-Press/

http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf

“North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs,” International Crisis Group, June 18, 2009.

China does not participate in PSI. South Korea announced its participation shortly after the May 2009 North Korean

nuclear test. See also CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth Nikitin.

“Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks,” IISS Strategic Dossier, 2007.

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North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

largely depend on China’s willingness to curb traffic, as discussed in the “Implementation of

Sanctions” section above.

North Korea’s Policies and Internal Situation73

As with all analysis that involves the secretive regime in Pyongyang, the impact of the resolution

on North Korea’s domestic situation is nearly impossible to gauge with any degree of precision.

However, North Korea’s actions surrounding the nuclear test have provided observers with some

clues about the internal dynamics of Kim’s government. In the past, North Korea’s provocations

tended to be viewed by the majority of analysts as ploys to strengthen its negotiating position at

the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang’s more recent behavior, however, has generally shifted the

predominant view among Korea-watchers: it now seems that North Korea is determined to be a

nuclear state, even at the price of angering its closest allies.

Financial sanctions were designed to target the country’s elite and military enterprises. Most

analysts suggest that the regime has proven quite resourceful at remaining firmly in power despite

a bevy of sanctions in past years. Even at the expense of large swathes of the general population,

the inner circle of elites has been kept happy with limited resources. However, some argue that if

sanctions are carried out effectively, they may have an impact on internal power struggles as

elites vie for resources. Some suggest that the sanctions levied against Banco Delta Asia in 2005

appeared to be effective at targeting the regime, and that the pain inflicted by those sanctions led

to North Korea’s return to the nuclear negotiations. Others point out, however, that this return was

preceded by North Korea’s first nuclear test, indicating that effective sanctions may simply

strengthen the hardliners’ resolve.

Further complicating assessments of how the resolution may affect North Korea’s internal

policies is the assumption that officials in Pyongyang are contemplating a transfer of power. Kim

Jong-il’s reported stroke in August 2008 elevated attention among international observers to the

question of succession in the North Korean regime. Pyongyang’s behavior while Kim was ill was

characterized as provocative and aggressive, suggesting that hardline elements held sway in

decisions such as the missile launch, nuclear test, and withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks. Kim

has apparently recovered and re-asserted his authority over the regime. Now back in power, Kim

himself is thought to be overseeing the anticipated succession. The strengthening of the National

Defense Commission and suspected constitutional adjustments, together with stepped-up

propaganda in praise of his third son Kim Jong Eun, suggest that Pyongyang is attempting to

manage a transition to a new leader.

Because decision-making within the regime remains opaque, it is not clear how elites in

Pyongyang may be considering Beijing’s reaction in their calculations. In the past, it seems that

North Korean elites were able to depend on China ultimately to ensure their survival. If North

Korea has actually alienated some influential players in Beijing with this round of provocations,

enhanced Chinese enforcement of the sanctions regime could inflict more pain than earlier

attempts. However, some analysts believe that China, recognizing that different parties within

North Korea are competing for influence, may feel even more restrained from pressuring North

Korea for fear of alienating a future power base.

This section was prepared by (name redacted).

Congressional Research Service

North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Assessments of UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006)74

UNSC Resolution 1874 tightens, expands, and adds to many of the existing restrictions that were

included in UNSC Resolution 1718, which the Security Council unanimously passed on October

14, 2006, five days after North Korea’s first nuclear test.75 As with Resolution 1874, Resolution

1718 was passed in the hope that it would curb financial inflows that went to North Korea’s

regime and its weapons programs, while imposing minimal humanitarian hardships on the

broader North Korean population.

Less than three weeks after the UNSC passed Resolution 1718, North Korea announced it would

return to the Six-Party Talks that it had been boycotting for nearly a year. The announcement

came after secret meetings with U.S. and Chinese officials. While it is possible that Kim Jong-il’s

government planned to quickly return to the talks after its nuclear test, it is also possible that the

speedy passage and unanimous support of 1718 spurred the regime’s decision.

However, most analysts consider Resolution 1718 ineffective in economically penalizing North

Korea. The coverage of the provisions was relatively limited, provisions enforcing transparency

on sanctioning countries were relatively weak, military enforcement options were not included in

the resolution, and there was no defined list of the prohibited products. Instead, creating the lists

was left to individual countries, who then reported them to the U.N. Sanctions Committee. This

administrative feature of the sanctions regime allowed countries to avoid or soften

implementation of the resolution. China and South Korea appeared to soften implementation with

North Korea’s decision to return to the Six-Party Talks. Neither country, for instance, published

detailed lists of the luxury goods they planned to sanction. Together, the two accounted for 61%

and 75% of DPRK trade in 2006 and 2007, respectively.

There is strong evidence that China did not rigorously implement the resolution’s provisions.76

According to an analysis by the Peterson Institute’s Marcus Noland, for instance, it appears that

exports from China increased after 2006.77 In 2007, North Korea-China trade in general increased

by 13%, followed by a 41% increase in 2008. In those years, Chinese exports to North Korea rose

by 13% and 46%, respectively.78 While this rise in overall trade is not necessarily indicative of an

increase in luxury goods shipments, it appears to indicate that the sanctions either had no or little

deterrent effect on Chinese enterprises’ normal commerce with their North Korean counterparts.79

Even more damaging, informed sources have told CRS that most of the North Korean trading

companies and banks sanctioned by the Security Council continued to operate in China at the end

of 2009.

This section was prepared by Mark Manyin.

Resolution 1718 called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs and imposed sanctions on

several types of activities. The resolution banned trade with North Korea in materials related to ballistic missiles or

weapons of mass destruction, and barred exports of luxury goods to the DPRK. It also banned trading with North Korea

in large weapons systems. It also froze funds and other financial assets owned by people connected with North Korea’s

unconventional weapons program and banned travel by such people.

Trade in heavy weapons systems such as missiles generally are not recorded, complicating any assessment of 1718’s

arms embargo.

Marcus Noland, “The (Non) Impact of U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” Peterson Institute for International

Economics, Working Paper 08-12, 2008.

Global Trade Atlas using Chinese data.

For more on this point, see Noland, “The (Non) Impact of U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” p. 5, 9-10.

Congressional Research Service

North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

As for South Korea, in the aftermath of North Korea’s test, it halted humanitarian assistance.

Food aid shipments from Seoul dropped from 400,000 in 2005 to 100,000 in 2006.80 However,

overall trade between the Koreas jumped by 33% in the calendar year after Resolution 1718 was

adopted. 81 Much of this increased trade was due to the expansion of the Kaesong Industrial

Complex (KIC), a facility in North Korea in which South Korean manufacturers employ North

Korean workers. The North Korean government derives tens of millions of dollars from the

complex, from rental fees and the portion of the workers’ wages it collects.82

South Korean Export-Import Bank’s “DPRK Support Fund,” provided via South Korean Ministry of Unification.

South Korean Ministry of Unification.

See CRS Report RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, by (name redacted) and (name re

dacted).

Congressional Research Service

North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Appendix. China’s Exports of Luxury Goods to the

DPRK

HTS

Number

Description

2006

2007

2008

Luxury Items Listed by the United States

Tobacco

14,117,739

12,950,218

16,952,464

Alcoholic Beverages

5,137,988

5,084,449

6,652,041

Perfumery, Cosmetic Products

1,322,454

1,672,327

1,688,481

Leather Art; Saddlery, Etc.

772,645

1,441,805

19,155,523

10,422

1,645

2,750

2203-2208

5007

621410

Woven Fabrics Of Silk Or Silk Waste

Shawls, Scarves Etc Of Silk Or Silk Waste

Not Knit

4303

Articles Of Apparel Etc. Of Furskin

823,388

2,454,154

485,978

4304

Artificial Fur And Articles Thereof

590,483

209,337

6,427,779

8703

Motor Cars & Vehicles For Transporting

Persons

9,087,018

7,179,104

10,981,707

870710

Bodies F Mtr Car/Vehicles For Transporting

Persons

38,627

18,296

871110

Motocycles (Incl Mopeds), Pist. Eng. Cyl,

Not, Exc 50Cc

7,625

49,633

19,863

871120

Motorcycles (Including

Mopeds),Cycl,Exc50Cc,Nt250C

152,403

205,782

187,336

871190

Motorcycles (Including Mopeds), Nesoi, Side

Cars

23,031

385,307

220,720

890310

Inflatable Yachts, Vessels, For Plesure,

Sports

400

1,300

100

890399

Yachts Etc For Pleas, Sport, Nesoi; Row Bts,

Canoes

21,620

4,200

21,845

Textile Floor Coverings

81,286

123,635

170,494

Precious Stones

49,118

23,837

3,916,863

8528

Tv Recvrs, Incl Video Monitors & Projectors

19,734,504

17,852,328

18,054,879

8521

Video Recrdng/Reproduc Appar Wheth/Nt

Video Tuner

6,455,725

6,144,654

6,167,653

8522

Parts And Accessories For Items 8519 To

8521

694

20,990

40,080

847130

Portable Digtl Automatic Data Process

Mach Not > 10 Kg

909,043

1,359,392

1,915,003

Clocks and Watches

309,593

536,805

959,410

Art and Antiques

2,188

1,180

1,770

Musical Instruments

884,475

1,025,490

1,861,885

Ceramic Tableware Etc. Of Porcelain Or

China

616,051

518,996

219,608

6911

Congressional Research Service

North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

HTS

Number

Description

2006

2007

2008

1,940

175,268

275,992

5,063,675

6912

Ceramic Tablewre, Kitchnwre Etc,

Earthenware Etc

9506

Artls & Equip F Genrl Physcl Exerc Etc;

Pools; Pts

701321

Drinking Glasses Other Than GlassCeramics, Of Lead Crystal

701331

Table/Kitchenware (Exc Drinking Glasses)

O/T Glass-Ceramics, Of Lead Crystal

701333

Other Drinking Glasses, O/T Of GlassCeramics, Of Lead Crystal

4,020

636

701341

Table/Kitchenware,Excl Drinking Glasses,

O/T Glass-Ceramics, Of Lead Crystal

195

756

701391

Glassware, Nes Of Lead Crystal, Other

Than That Of 70.10 Or 70.18

61,487

23,208

960839

Fountain Pens, Stylograph Pens And Other

Pens, O/T Indian Ink Drawing Pens

11,005

29,792

2,016,092

61,327,956

59,629,581

Total U.S

103,224,145

Additional Luxury Goods listed by the European Union, Australia, Canada, and Japan

9006

Photographic Cameras;Photographic FlashLight App O/T Discharge Lamps Of 85.39

6,795

33,656

17,992

9007

Cinematographic Cameras & Projectors,

W/N Incorp Sound Record Or Reprdc App

34,164

2,162

12,253,274

14,130,377

16,226,703

3494

89216

59504

784,372

937,967

2,286,515

8471less

Computers no portables

847130

160250

Prepared Or Preserved Bovine Meat Etc.

Nesoi

1604

Prep Or Pres Fish; Caviar & Caviar

Substitutes

1605

Crustaceans, Molluscs Etc. Prepared Or

Preserved

8,940,342

34,820,072

41,175,401

Total Additional Luxury Goods

22,022,441

50,011,288

59,768,277

Total U.S. Plus Additional Luxury Goods

83,350,397

109,640,869

162,992,422

Source: Congressional Research Service. List of luxury items from Marcus Noland, “The (Non) Impact of UN

Sanctions on North Korea,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Series, December

2008, pp. 14-16, and U.S. Department of Commerce. Data from Global Trade Atlas.

Note: The lists of banned products are not specific and are not accompanied by HTS (Harmonized Tariff

System) codes. The above totals differ somewhat from those by Marcus Noland for 2006 and 2007. Nesoi=not

elsewhere specified or indicated.

Congressional Research Service

North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1874

Author Contact Information

Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator

Analyst in Nonproliferation

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in Asian Affairs

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted), Coordinator

Specialist in Asian Affairs

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Specialist in Industry and Trade

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Acknowledgments

Larry Niksch, who is no longer with CRS, was a co-author of this report.

Congressional Research Service

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