Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars,
FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential
Issues
-name redactedSpecialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
July 2, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R40682
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Summary
In February and March 2009, the Obama Administration announced its plans to increase troop
levels in Afghanistan and decrease troop levels in Iraq. In Afghanistan, 30,000 more troops are
deploying this year while in Iraq, troops will gradually decline to 35,000 to 50,000 by August 31,
2011 with all troops to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. The most commonly cited measure
of troop strength is “Boots on the Ground” or the number of troops located in Afghanistan and in
Iraq. Based on average monthly Boots on the Ground figures, the number of troops in
Afghanistan and Iraq increased from 5,200 in FY2002 to a peak of 187,900 in FY2008 primarily
because of increases in Iraq beginning with the invasion in March 2003. In FY2009, total troop
strength is expected to remain the same as planned increases in Afghanistan offset declines in
Iraq. By FY2012, overall troop strength for the two wars is likely to decline to 67,500 when the
withdrawal from Iraq is expected to be complete.
For Afghanistan, troops in-country grew gradually from 5,200 in FY2002 to 20,400 in FY2006.
Between FY2006 and FY2008, average strength there jumped by another 10,000 to 30,100.
Under the Administration’s plans, CRS estimates that average monthly Boots on the Ground in
Afghanistan may increase to 50,700 in FY2009 with a further increase to 63,500 the following
year once all new units are in place. Currently, additional increases have not been approved.
For Iraq, troops in-country nearly doubled between FY2003 and FY2004 reaching 130,600. By
the following year, average strength grew by another 13,000 to 143,800, with that level
maintained in FY2006. During the surge in troops initiated by President Bush, average troop
strength in Iraq grew by 7,000 or 6% in FY2007 and another 9,500 or 9% in FY2008, reaching a
peak of 157,800. CRS estimates that average troop strength in Iraq will decline to 135,600 in
FY2009, 88,300 in FY2010, 42,800 in FY2011, and 4,100 in FY2012. While it is not clear
whether war costs will change precisely in tandem with troop levels, these changes can provide a
benchmark to assess requests. Based on changes in troop levels and other adjustments, CRS
estimates that war costs could be about $8 billion less than the Department of Defense (DOD)
$141 billion request for FY2009, and about $13 billion below its $130 billion request for
FY2010. For the next year, FY2011, CRS estimates that DOD’s requests could be $42 billion
more than the current planning figure of $50 billion. And in FY2012, CRS estimates war costs
could be $20 billion higher than the Administration’s estimate of $50 billion.
Although Boots on the Ground is the most commonly cited measure of troop strength, that
measure does not include over 100,000 other troops deployed in the region providing theaterwide support for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Afghan War, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF), the Iraq War. Before the 9/11 attacks, the United States had deployed about
26,000 troops in the Central Command region, which includes Afghanistan and Iraq. Based on the
most comprehensive DOD measure of troop strength, 294,000 troops were deployed for OEF and
OIF as of December 2008, a tenfold increase since 2001.This more inclusive measure may more
accurately capture the overall demand for troops. The Administration has not indicated how its
plans would affect troops providing support in the region. Using five DOD sources, this report
describes, analyzes, and estimates the number of troops deployed for each war from the 9/11
attacks to FY2012 to help Congress assess upcoming DOD war funding requests as well as the
implications for the long-term U.S. presence in the region.
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Contents
Introduction: Obama Administration Plans for Afghanistan and Iraq............................................1
Wide Range in Deployed Troop Strengths in DOD Sources .........................................................3
In-Country Troop Strength: FY2002-FY2012 ..............................................................................8
Overall Changes in Troop Strength........................................................................................8
Overall Troop Strength Rises from FY2002-FY2008 .......................................................8
Likely Overall Declines: FY2008-FY2012 ......................................................................9
Cost Implications of Changes in Troop Strength: FY2009-FY2012............................................ 10
The Effects of Timing ......................................................................................................... 11
Changes in Afghanistan and Iraq ......................................................................................... 13
Estimated Troop Levels in Afghanistan in FY2009 ........................................................ 14
Estimated Troop Levels in Iraq in FY2009 .................................................................... 14
The FY2009 Supplemental and FY2010 War Request ......................................................... 15
Adjustments Affecting FY2009 ..................................................................................... 16
Potential Changes to DOD’s FY2010-FY2012 Requests................................................ 18
Potential Costs of Withdrawal ....................................................................................... 19
Potential Questions About Troop Strength and Cost....................................................... 20
Ways to Measure Troop Levels for the Afghan and Iraq Wars .................................................... 21
Policy Issues Raised by Differences in Troop Counts .......................................................... 22
Trends in Troop Levels From FY2002-FY2008 Using Five Alternative Sources ........................ 22
Trends for both the Afghan and Iraq Wars ........................................................................... 24
Allocating Troops Between the Afghan and Iraq Wars ......................................................... 26
Troop Levels for the Afghan War Since October 2001 ......................................................... 28
Initial Combat Operations ............................................................................................. 28
Troop Levels Grow Steadily From FY2003-FY2006 ..................................................... 30
Further Increases As Violence Rises After 2006............................................................. 31
Seasonal Variations ....................................................................................................... 32
Troops from Other Countries......................................................................................... 34
Troop Levels for the Iraq War Since the March 2003 Invasion............................................. 34
Initial Combat Operations ............................................................................................. 35
Troop Levels Plateau From FY2004-FY2006 ................................................................ 36
Troop Surge in FY2007 and FY2008............................................................................. 38
Changes from Month-to-Month..................................................................................... 39
Using Different Troop Strength Figures............................................................................... 40
Service Roles and Readiness Concerns...................................................................................... 41
Measuring the Burden of Deployment ................................................................................. 42
Figures
Figure 1. Location of U.S. Troops Deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2008 ......................................................................6
Figure 2. Average Monthly Troop Levels for the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2002FY2008: Five DOD Sources................................................................................................... 25
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Figure 3. Share of Deployed Troops for Iraq in Boots on the Ground and Operations
Reports, FY2003-FY2008 ...................................................................................................... 26
Figure 4. Share of Deployed Troops for Afghanistan in Boots on the Ground and
Operations Reports, FY2002-FY2008 .................................................................................... 27
Figure 5. Average Monthly Troop Levels for the Afghan War, FY2002-FY2008: Five
DOD Sources......................................................................................................................... 30
Figure 6. Monthly Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan and Troops Deployed for OEF
Operations, September 2001-November 2008......................................................................... 33
Figure 7. Average Monthly Troop Levels for the Iraq War, FY2002-FY2008: Five DOD
Sources .................................................................................................................................. 37
Figure 8. Monthly Boots on the Ground (BOG) in Iraq and Troops Deployed for OIF
Operations, March 2003-November 2008............................................................................... 39
Figure 9. Service and Component Shares of OEF and OIF Troops in FY2008............................ 41
Tables
Table 1. Average Monthly Boots On the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq: FY2002FY2012....................................................................................................................................9
Table 2. Average Monthly Troop Levels by War, FY2006-FY2012 ............................................ 12
Table 3. Actual and Estimated DOD War Funding, FY2008-FY2012 ......................................... 17
Table 4. Average Monthly Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, FY2002-FY2008: Five
DOD Sources......................................................................................................................... 23
Table 5. Average Monthly Troop Levels in the Afghan War, FY2002-FY2008: Five DOD
Sources .................................................................................................................................. 29
Table 6. Average Monthly Troop Levels in the Iraq War, FY2002-FY2008: Five DOD
Sources .................................................................................................................................. 35
Table 7. Percent of Each Service Deployed for OEF or OIF in FY2008 ..................................... 42
Table A-1. Estimating Troop Strength in Afghanistan and Iraq, FY2007-FY2012 ...................... 45
Table B-1. Average Cost per Brigade Combat Team- Equivalent in Afghanistan and Iraq,
FY2005 and FY2008.............................................................................................................. 54
Table D-1. Monthly Headcounts for Boots on the Ground in Iraq and Operation Enduring
Freedom: 2001-2009 .............................................................................................................. 62
Table D-2. Monthly Headcounts for Boots on the Ground in Iraq and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, 2001-2009 .............................................................................................................. 64
Appendixes
Appendix A. Actual and Estimated Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, FY2007FY2012.................................................................................................................................. 44
Appendix B. The Cost of an Average Brigade Combat Team: FY2005 and FY2008 ................... 52
Appendix C. CBO’s Projections of War Costs, FY2009-FY2018 ............................................... 59
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Appendix D. Headcounts in Boots on the Ground and Operations Reports................................. 61
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 67
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I
n February and March 2009, the Obama Administration announced its overall plans to
increase troop levels in Afghanistan and decrease troop levels in Iraq for 2009 through 2011.
Using several Department of Defense (DOD) data reports, this report describes, analyzes, and
estimates deployed troop strength from the 9/11 attacks to FY2012 to provide Congress with a
tool to assess
•
current and future DOD war funding requests;
•
implications for the U.S. military presence in the region; and
•
deployment burdens on individual service members and each of the services.
Introduction: Obama Administration Plans for
Afghanistan and Iraq
In February and March 2009, President Obama approved the deployment of an additional 21,000
service members to Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 2009, meeting most of the request
from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and General David McKiernan, former Commanding
General of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in charge of the Afghan theater of
operations. According to the President, these additional troops are intended to “stabilize a
deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.”1 In the winter of 2008 before leaving office, President
Bush approved deploying an additional Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of about 9,000 to
Afghanistan in January 2009. Still pending is a DOD request for an additional 9,000 troops that
could be deployed in Afghanistan sometime in the winter of 2009.
Last October, General David McKiernan requested about 35,000 more combat troops for
Afghanistan composed of four Brigade Combat Teams with support.2 Later, 4,000 trainers were
added, bringing the total request to 39,000. About 30,000 of that request has been approved by
either former President Bush or President Obama. With these increases, CRS estimates the
number of U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan is expected to reach about 63,450 by the end of
FY2009, double that of the prior year; this estimate is somewhat lower than the Administration’s
estimate of 68,000.
If some 31,000 coalition troops from NATO nations serving in the International Security
Assistance Force are included, average monthly foreign troop strength in Afghanistan would be
about 81,000 in FY2009, and 93,450 in FY2010.3 These figures do not include from 10,000 to
17,000 more U.S. troops dedicated to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), most of whom
1
White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” February 17, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/;
White House, “What’s New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan;” March 27, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Whats-New-in-the-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan.
2
DOD, Transcript, “News Briefing by Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan Gen. David
McKiernan,” October 1, 2008; DOD, Transcript, “News Briefing with Gen. McKiernan from the Pentagon;” February
18, 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4354.
3
NATO coalition troops serve in the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, but are not part
of the U.S. designated OEF operation. CRS counts U.S. forces who serve in ISAF as part of the Afghan War or OEF.
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provide support in the region. Because all but the 2,000 troops in the Philippines are linked to the
Afghan War, CRS uses OEF and the Afghan War interchangeably in this report.
In a speech to U.S. Marines at Camp Lejeune on February 27, 2009, President Obama announced
that the Administration’s review of U.S. strategy in Iraq was complete and that the U.S. mission
in Iraq would shift from combat to supporting and training Iraqi security forces, and that U.S.
troops would decline from the February 2009 level of about 140,000 in-country to 35,000 to
50,000 troops by August 31, 2010. In addition, the policy would meet the deadlines set in the
January 1, 2009 Security Agreement with Iraq that requires all U.S. combat troops to move
outside of cities by the end of June 2009, as recently took place, and that all U.S. troops leave
Iraq by December 31, 2011.4
The Administration has not explained the effect of these withdrawals on other troops deployed for
OIF, or the Iraq War, which includes not only U.S. troops located in Iraq but also some 80,000 to
90,000 troops providing theater-wide support in neighboring areas. CRS uses OIF and the Iraq
War interchangeably in this report.
The President reportedly considered options ranging from the 16-month withdrawal proposed
during the campaign to a 23-month alternative reportedly favored by some in the military.
Ultimately, the President adopted a 19-month plan.5
DOD spokesmen have suggested that increasing troop levels in Afghanistan depends, at least in
part, on decreasing troop levels in Iraq if the services are to continue current 12-month tours.
During the surge in troops in 2007 and 2009, tours grew to 15 months, a move that proved very
unpopular.6
These two decisions about troop levels are reflected in the FY2009 Supplemental request sent to
Congress in early April and the FY2010 war request submitted in early May 2009 with the regular
budget. The FY2009 Supplemental covers DOD’s war costs for the rest of this fiscal year that
ends September 30, 2009 because DOD received only part of its war funding in the FY2009
bridge fund enacted last summer.7 According to statute, the Administration is to include a full
year of war costs with the regular budget in FY2010, and provide separate budget displays for
each war, and troop strength levels as well as the underlying assumptions. DOD provided general
4
White House, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
February 27, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/. Department of Defense, Transcript, Robert M. Gates,
Media Roundtable," December 2, 2008; Some U.S. trainers, advisors, and support staff continue to be embedded with
Iraqi units in cities and towns, see http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4325; CNN,
Interview with Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell, June 29, 2009.
5
Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Challenges Facing the Defense Department,” January 27, 2009, p.
16.
6
Although Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell has suggested that the decisions are linked, Secretary Gates implied that
troops for Afghanistan were available in his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January
27, 2009 (see note 3). See Armed Forces Press Service, “Gates Pledges More Resources to Fight Protracted War in
Afghanistan,” December 11, 2008; and Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the
Pentagon, July 23, 2008.
7
DOD received $65.9 billion in P.L. 110-161, the FY2009 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
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information about troop levels but not the underlying assumptions or separate budget displays for
each operation in its FY2010 request.8
The Administration’s decisions to reduce the number of troops in Iraq reflects declining levels of
violence and peacefully conducted provincial elections that took place in January 31, 2009, while
its decision to increase troop levels in Afghanistan reflects rising levels of violence and elections
slated for August of 2009. Another important element in decisions about troop levels is the
effectiveness of Afghan and Iraqi security forces, where the U.S. has invested $38.9 billion thus
far to train and equip these forces. 9
To identify the implications of troop levels for these and other policy issues, this report
•
explains how and why measures of troop levels in five different DOD data
sources differ;
•
estimates future troop strength in Afghanistan and Iraq for FY2009-FY2012
under the Obama Administration plan using “Boots on the Ground,” the most
commonly cited measure;
•
discusses the potential cost implications of these changes in troop levels along
with other adjustments;
•
analyzes and explains past trends in troop levels for the Afghan and Iraq Wars
under the different measures; and
•
measures contributions and burdens of deployment for the four services.
For detailed description and analysis of the political and military context for changes in
troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, see the following CRS Reports: CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy and CRS
Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name redacted);
and CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues
for Congress and CRS Report RL34387, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies,
Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
Wide Range in Deployed Troop Strengths in DOD
Sources
When discussing deployed troop levels, it is important to be clear about which troops are included
and which troops are not included. CRS analyzed five different sources for DOD troop strength
for the Afghan and Iraq Wars ranging from including only those troops deployed in-country to
including not only troops deployed in-country but also those providing theater-wide support in
the region.
8
See Section 1008, P.L. 109-364; a detailed justification of all funding is also required; see also Section 1502, P.L.
110-17.
9
See Table 5, CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations
Since 9/11, by (name redacted).
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In the June preceding the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States had about 26,000 troops
stationed in the U.S. Central Command region, which encompasses Afghanistan and Iraq and
neighboring areas. Most troops were located in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and on ships in the region,
including some conducting over flight operations for Northern and Southern Watch to contain
Saddam Hussein after the first Gulf War.10
Based on the most comprehensive measure of troop strength, DOD’s Defense Manpower Data
Center’s Location Report, capturing all troops deployed for both wars, there were 294,000 U.S.
troops in the region for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom in December
2008, more than ten times the level seven years ago (see Figure 1 and Box 1).11 Figure 1 shows
the number and location of these U.S. troops in December 2008, with an allocation between OEF
or OIF based on where personnel are located that generally reflects guidelines developed by the
Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Command. These allocations may or may not match
distributions of war costs, which are collected separately by each service. 12
This figure of 294,000 troops is over 100,000 higher than the December 2008 total of 181,000
reported in DOD’s oft-cited Boots on the Ground,” (BOG) report.13 Military leaders, DOD press
spokesmen and Members of Congress use the monthly BOG figures to give a snapshot of the
number of troops deployed in-country in Afghanistan and in Iraq. For example, Admiral Mullen,
Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said there were 150,000 troops in Iraq “right now” on
November 17, 2008, and Pentagon press secretary, Geoff Morrell said in January 2009 that the
proposal to add 30,000 troops in Afghanistan would double the number there.14
DOD has reported these Boots on the Ground figures to Congress each month since 2008.15 As of
the most recent data for April 1, 2009, DOD reported that there were 178,400 Boots on the
Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, slightly lower than in December 2008 reflecting the withdrawal
of some troops from Iraq offset by the deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan.16
Part of the difference between DOD’s Boots-on-the-Ground figures and the Location Report is
definitional. Boots on the Ground reports only personnel in Afghanistan or in Iraq while the
10
CRS calculation of country totals based on figures reported in Department of Defense, “MO-5 Worldwide Military
Distribution, Active-Duty Military Personnel by Regional Area and By Country (309A),” June 30, 2001;
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/M05/hst0601.pdf.
11
Defense Manpower Data Center, Report DRS 11280, “Modified Stinson Country Report,” as of December 2008; this
Location Report was modified in April 2009 to eliminate double-counting of personnel en route to assignments, e.g.
moving through Kuwait to Iraq or Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan or who go through the same country more than once in a
month.
12
See Box 1 for an explanation of CRS methodology.
13
Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “Boots on the Ground,” December 1, 2008. In late January, DOD cited lower
figures because troops sent to Afghanistan had not yet arrived; see Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript,
“Challenges Facing the Defense Department,” January 27, 2009, p.2. Admiral Mullen was quoted saying that there are
140,000 troops in Iraq and 31,000 in Afghanistan.
14
Department of Defense, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen,” November 17, 2008,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4318; Department of Defense,”Pentagon Press
Secretary Geoff Morrell,” January 29, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4345.
15
H.Rept. 110-279, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2008, July 30, 2007, p. 27.
16
Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “Boots on the Ground,” April 1, 2008.
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Location Report counts deployments of all military personnel tracked as part of OEF and OIF,
including primarily personnel providing support in neighboring countries, as well as about 2,000
OEF personnel engaged in counter-terror operations in the Philippines.17 Relying primarily on
guidelines developed by staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Command, CRS allocated
troops to each operation based on their location (see Figure 1 and Box 1).
CRS uses the Iraq War interchangeably with OIF and the Afghan War interchangeably with OEF
to include not only troops in-country, but also those providing theater-wide support primarily in
the region. (All but the 2,000 troops in the Philippines are part of OEF or the Afghan War.)
For example, in addition to the 38,000 troops in Afghanistan in December 2008, OEF includes:
•
2,300 troops in Kyrgyzstan supporting Afghan operations;
•
2,100 troops in Djibouti where there are groups connected to Osama Bin Laden;
•
2,200 in the Philippines conducting other counter-terror operations; and
•
a scattering of other military personnel in the region (see Figure 1).
17
OEF also includes about 2,000 military personnel in Djibouti, which CRS considers part of the Afghan War because
of its Al Qaeda connections.
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Figure 1. Location of U.S.Troops Deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2008
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Report DRS 11280, Modified Location Country Report, December 2008.
Notes: Reflects all deployed troops in December 2008. File has been ‘scrubbed’ to eliminate duplications when
an individual was in more than one country or entered the same country more than once in the same month;
individuals en-route are allocated to their likely deployment; only 400 duplications remain. Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) totals reflect primarily Joint Staff and Central Command
designations (see Box 1).
a.
“Other” includes deployed troops whose location has not been reported by the services including some in
classified locations.
Similarly, while there are 161,000 troops for OIF in Iraq, the operation also includes:
•
46,000 troops in Kuwait providing a wide range of support;
•
15,000 Navy personnel on ships in the region; and
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several thousand troops deployed to regional headquarters (4,800 Navy personnel
in Bahrain, 2,000 Air Force (AF) personnel in the United Arab Emirates, and
8,000 AF personnel in Qatar for the Air Force (see Figure 1 and Box 1).18
Box 1. Using Location to Allocate Military Personnel to OEF or OIF
Figure 1 reflects allocations of military personnel to OEF or OIF based on the country where they are deployed that
were primarily developed by the Joint Staff and Central Command. For the countries below, the Joint Staff and
Central Command allocations were the same.
OEF: Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan;
OIF: Iraq, Turkey, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Ships Afloat.
For several countries that are not part of Central Command, CRS used the Joint Staff allocations:
OEF: Djibouti, Oman, Ethiopia, Kenya, Philippines;
OIF: Israel.
In three countries affecting 770 military personnel where the Joint Staff and Central Command estimates differed –
Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt – CRS chose the operation most closely associated with that country:
OIF: Jordan;
OEF: Egypt and Yemen.
Some concerns were raised about the fact that some personnel in, for example, headquarters locations such as Qatar,
could support either or both OEF and OIF as could Navy personnel at sea. Notwithstanding these concerns,
“CENTCOM acknowledges that while generally an operation can be aligned with a country, this is not a hard and fast
rule.” The Joint Staff opted not to set a common set of guidelines because “each Service has its own personnel
accountability systems that track OEF and OIF differently . . .” 19
There are also some 15,000 troops whose location is unknown or was not provided to the Defense
Manpower Data Center, probably reflecting either data collection problems in the services or
some personnel whose location is classified (see Figure 1).20
The gap between Boots on the Ground figures and the Location Report reflects differences in
both who is counted and how personnel are counted. At one end of the spectrum, Boots on the
Ground figures reflect once-a-month headcounts collected from the services by the Joint Staff that
include only troops located in-country in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the other end of the spectrum,
the Defense Manpower Data Center data captures all deployments during each month for those in
the 28 countries, plus Navy members aboard ships in the region who are deemed part of OEF and
OIF. These figures include short and long-term deployments.21
18
Email communication to CRS from Joint Staff, September 5, 2008.
Email communication from Joint Staff to CRS, April 20, 2009.
20
CRS discussions with Defense Manpower Data Center staff. CRS does not allocate these troops in tables and figures
in this report.
21
In response to a CRS request, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) “scrubbed” the data to eliminate doublecounting of personnel who deployed to a country or countries more than once in the same month. DMDC identifies
(continued...)
19
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Another inclusive measure is “average strength,” which captures “person years” for all deployed
OEF and OIF personnel taking into account the length of deployments. For example, an Army
member deployed for 15-months would count as 1.25 in average strength while an Air Force
member flying missions for six months of the fiscal year would count as .5 in average strength.
The most appropriate figure to capture troop strength for the Afghan and Iraq wars may depend
on the purpose. For example, Boots on the Ground counts may be the best measure for those
troops most likely to face combat situations. On the other hand, Location Reports capture all
troops deployed in the region for the two operations. Finally, Average Strength may be the best
measure for looking at the total demand for troops as well as the cost of both operations.
In-Country Troop Strength: FY2002-FY2012
The Obama administration outlined its plans for troop strength in the next several years only in
terms of the number of troops in-country, also referred to as “Boots on the Ground” in
Afghanistan and Iraq. For this reason, CRS estimates of future troop levels are also expressed in
terms of troops in-country. These figures do not include over 100,000 other deployed troops who
provide theater-wide support in the region and are dedicated to Operation Enduring Freedom, the
Afghan War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (see Figure 1 and later discussion). Nevertheless,
Boots on the Ground figures captures those troops most likely to face combat and can provide an
overall sense of the direction and scope of change.
Overall Changes in Troop Strength
To better capture strength levels in each fiscal year, CRS uses monthly averages rather than the
once-a-month snapshots commonly cited by DOD spokesman. 22 These figures smooth out monthto-month variations and reflect overall demands for troops each year and are more closely related
to the likely cost to deploy, conduct operations, and support troops in-theater.
Overall Troop Strength Rises from FY2002-FY2008
Between FY2002 and FY2008, the number of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq increased from
5,200 troops to a peak of 172,000. Troop levels first jumped in FY2003 with the invasion of Iraq
when troop strength in-country reached 78,000 for both wars (see Table 1). This figure does not
include troops on ships or deployed in the region.
Between FY2003 and FY2005, average monthly troop levels doubled from 78,100 to 162,900,
reflecting increases in both Afghanistan and Iraq. There was little change in FY2006. Then in
January 2007, President Bush announced his decision to send five more Brigade Combat Teams
(...continued)
where military personnel reported in the Contingency Tracking System for OEF and OIF, but does not allocate
personnel between the two operations. The Location Report lists 28 countries that are tracked as part of OEF or OIF,
some of which are not shown as having any U.S. troops.
22
CRS calculated monthly averages from DOD’s reported headcounts taken once a month.
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to Iraq for a temporary surge in troop levels to quell rising violence. Average strength rose in
FY2007 and FY2008 because of these additional troops as well as additional increases in
Afghanistan. Average strength for both wars peaked at 187,900 in FY2008.
During the surge, average troop strength for both wars grew from 161,500 in FY2006 to 172,000
in FY2007, an increase of 10,500 or 7%. The following year, in FY2008, when the peak was
reached, troop levels were 187,900, an increase of another 15,900 or 9%. These increases reflect
growth in troop levels in Afghanistan as well as the surge in Iraq.
Table 1. Average Monthly Boots On the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq:
FY2002-FY2012
Reported FY02-FY08, Estimated FY09-FY12, Rounded to Hundreds
Fiscal
Year/Country
Afghanistan
Iraq
Total
Percentage Change
Annual
Since
FY2003
Since
FY2008
NA
NA
FY2002
5,200
0
5,200
NA
FY2003
10,400
67,700
78,100
1402%
FY2004
15,200
130,600
145,800
87%
87%
NA
FY2005
19,100
143,800
162,900
12%
109%
NA
FY2006
20,400
141,100
161,500
-1%
107%
NA
FY2007
23,700
148,300
172,000
7%
120%
NA
FY2008
30,100
157,800
187,900
9%
141%
NA
FY2009
50,700
135,600
186,300
-1%
139%
-1%
FY2010
63,500
88,300
151,800
-19%
94%
-19%
FY2011
63,500
42,800
106,200
-30%
36%
-43%
FY2012
63,500
4,100
67,500
-36%
-14%
-64%
NA
NA
Sources: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground,” monthly reports; White House, “Responsibly
Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/; White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” February
17, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/; Joint Staff,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground Reports.”
Notes: CRS calculations of monthly averages for FY2002-FY2008, and estimates for FY2009-FY2012 based on
Table A-1 in Appendix A.
Likely Overall Declines: FY2008-FY2012
Based on the plans announced by the Obama Administration described above, CRS estimates that
average monthly troop strength in Afghanistan and Iraq will decline from 187,900 in FY2008 to
67,500 in FY2012, a drop of 64%. These estimates reflect announcements made this spring by the
Obama Administration. If these plans change — with more rapid increases in Afghanistan or
slower decreases in Iraq — these estimates would, of course, change.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Under the current plan, overall troop strength in Afghanistan and Iraq in FY2009 will remain
essentially the same between FY2008 and FY2009 as declines in troop levels in Iraq are offset by
increases in Afghanistan (see Table 1). In FY2010, assuming troop levels remain the same in
Afghanistan and the pace of withdrawals in Iraq picks up, average troop strength for both wars
would fall to 151,800 or by 19%. By that year, troop levels in Afghanistan would be about 25,000
less than those in Iraq.
In FY2011, the pace of withdrawal in Iraq would quicken to meet the deadline of withdrawing all
but 35,000 to 50,000 troops in Iraq by August 31, 2009 announced by the President. CRS
estimates this would reduce overall average troop levels to 106,200 in FY2011, a decline of 30%,
assuming no change in Afghanistan. This would decrease overall deployed strength by another
30%, still above the FY2003 level when operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were both underway.
By FY2011, the balance of troops between the two operations would shift with 20,000 more
troops in Afghanistan than deployed in Iraq.
By FY2012, when the withdrawal from Iraq is slated to be complete to meet the Security
Agreement with Iraq, overall troop levels would fall by another 36% to 67,500 as all but the last
three Brigade Combat Teams leave Iraq, and some 7 BCTs would be in Afghanistan (see Table
A-1). DOD did not include troop estimates for these years in its budget submissions.
By showing average troop strength both in the past and estimating troop strength in the future,
CRS hopes to provide a tool that can help Congress assess the pacing cost implications in current
plans to increase troop levels in Afghanistan and decrease troop levels in Iraq including:
•
Are the planned increases in Afghanistan too much, too little or about right and
how long are higher levels likely to be maintained?
•
Is the pace of withdrawal in Iraq too fast, too slow, or about right and what are
the implications if current plans change?
•
What are the likely implications for war costs in FY2009-FY2012?
Cost Implications of Changes in Troop Strength:
FY2009-FY2012
The Administration’s FY2009 supplemental, submitted on April 9, 2009, and the FY2010 war
budget, submitted on May 7, 2009, presumably incorporate the recent decisions to increase troop
levels in Afghanistan by 30,000 by the summer of 2009 and to reduce troop levels in Iraq
gradually in FY2009 and then more rapidly in FY2010 and FY2011. Thus far, the Administration
has not indicated how these decisions will affect the other 100,000 troops in the region.
These planned adjustments in troop levels are likely to be a key variable in how DOD’s war costs
change. War costs cover the additional or incremental costs to deploy and support troops (e.g.
combat pay, upgrading overseas bases, meals), conduct operations, and to repair, replace and
sometimes upgrade equipment (see Appendix B). The cost of the regular salaries of military
personnel, conducting normal training and maintaining equipment or running military
installations at home are all covered in DOD’s regular budget. CRS estimated the cost
implications for FY2009-FY2012 war costs of changes in average strength in Afghanistan and in
Iraq along with other changes.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
The Effects of Timing
The timing of proposed increases and decreases in troop levels is important in estimating current
and future war costs. In addition to the 33,450 troops deployed in Afghanistan at the beginning of
this fiscal year, an additional 30,000 troops are scheduled to deploy during the remainder of
FY2009. The increases in troop levels in Afghanistan include the following:
•
one additional Brigade Combat Team of about 9,000 including support deployed
in January 2009 as directed by then-President Bush;
•
21,000 more troops including a brigade of 8,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel
deployed in March 2009, and about 9,000 Army troops in June 2009 as directed
by President Obama; and 4,000 additional trainers deployed this summer as
directed by President Obama.
The war cost implications of these decisions depend on the amount of time that these personnel
will be in-country: for example, 9 months for the brigade deployed in January, seven months for
the Marine Corps personnel, four months for the additional Army brigade and five months for the
trainers. 23 Not until FY2010 would a full year’s cost for all 30,000 additional troops be needed.
Similarly, for Iraq, the savings from the withdrawal in June 2009 of two Brigade Combat Teams
that will not be replaced will reflect the three months that those roughly 18,000 troops will no
longer be in-country in FY2009.
To estimate the effect of these troop plans on average troop strength and cost, CRS developed a
schedule of the movement of units in and out of Afghanistan and Iraq based on Presidential and
DOD announcements (see Appendix A and Table A-1). To simplify the metric, CRS assumes that
9,000 troops make up a BCT-equivalent including both combat and support troops. This reflects
the Army’s assumption that 10,000 troops is the average for a BCT including support forces,
adjusted for the fact that Marine Corps units tend to be smaller. 24
CRS uses this metric to estimate the cost of maintaining a certain number of weighted average
BCT-equivalents in country that reflect both the number of units and the amount of time that they
are in Afghanistan or Iraq in each fiscal year. While this metric has the advantage that it can be
tied to Administration and DOD plans to move units into or out of Afghanistan and Iraq, it
implicitly assumes that the more than 100,000 other troops in the region rise or fall in proportion
to troop changes in-country.
23
White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” February 17, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/. White House,” What’s New
in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan;” March 27, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/WhatsNew-in-the-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan; DOD, Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with General David
McKiernan,” October 1, 2008; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspz?transcriptid=4297.
24
For this purpose, CRS also assumes that Navy and Air Force troops deployed in-country provide ground support for
Army and Marine Corps units.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Table 2. Average Monthly Troop Levels by War, FY2006-FY2012
Actuals through FY2008, Estimates for FY2009-FY2012 in Italics
Troop Levels and Estimated Costs
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
AFGHAN WAR
In-Country Average Troop Levelsa
20,417
23,658
30,142
50,700
63,400
63,450
63,350
Average BCTs In-Country/a/
2.3
2.6
3.3
5.6
7.1
7.1
7.0
Percent Annual Change
7%
16%
27%
68%
25%
0%
0%
Share of Total
13%
14%
16%
27%
42%
60%
94%
IRAQ WAR
In-Country Average Troop Levels
141,100
148,292
157,775
135,600
88,300
42,750
4,050
Average BCTs In-Country/a/
15.7
16.5
17.5
15.1
9.8
4.8
0.5
Percent Annual Change
-2%
5%
6%
-14%
-35%
-52%
-91%
Share of Total
87%
86%
84%
73%
58%
40%
6%
AFGHAN AND IRAQ WARS
In-Country Average Troop Levels
161,517
171,950
187,917
186,300
151,750
106,200
67,500
Average BCTs In-Country
17.9
19.1
20.9
20.7
16.9
11.8
7.5
Percent Annual Change
12%
6%
9%
-1%
-19%
-30%
-36%
Share of Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Sources: White House, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, February 27, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/; White House, “Statement by the
President on Afghanistan,” February 17, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-thePresident-on-Afghanistan/; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground Reports.” For methodology,
see Table A-1.
Notes: Italics indicate CRS estimates. CRS calculated annual averages, year-to-year changes and average Brigade
Combat Team (BCT) equivalents, assuming 9,000 troops for each BCT including support elements. CRS modified
the standard Army planning factor of 10,000 troops per BCT with support to reflect the generally smaller size of
Marine Corps units; this approach also assumes that Navy and Air Force troops in-country are providing support
to ground units. For specific schedule of BCT-equivalents deployed to and from Afghanistan and Iraq that
underlie these estimates, see Table A-1.
a.
Assumes no additional troops are deployed in FY2010.
While many of the Navy and Air Force personnel conducting operations at sea or outside the
country who support ground operations are likely to rise or fall proportionately, other personnel,
such as headquarters personnel in Bahrain or Qatar, may adjust gradually or not at all. Army
support troops in Kuwait who provide maintenance services may face reduced workload as troops
leave partly offset by higher workload as equipment that has not rotated with troops is prepared to
be re-deployed.
DOD has not provided any information about the likely effect of the planned increases and
withdrawals on these additional 100,000 troops providing theater-wide support. For example,
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
troop levels outlined in the FY2009 Supplemental and the FY2010 war request only include
strength levels in-country. 25
Between FY2006 and FY2012, the balance of troops dedicated to Afghanistan and Iraq would
gradually shift from the 88% for Iraq and 12% for Afghanistan that was typical for FY2006FY2008 to 73% for Iraq and 27% for Afghanistan in FY2009 (see Table 2).
By FY2010, troops in Iraq would make up about 58% and those in Afghanistan about 42% of the
total. The following year, Afghanistan would become the predominant mission with 60% of the
troops, and by FY2012, Afghanistan would have 93% of all troops in-country.
These estimates reflect the Administration’s plans as currently outlined. If plans change with
different pacing of increases and decreases, then troop strength and costs would rise or fall as
would the balance between the two operations.
Changes in Afghanistan and Iraq
For Afghanistan, troops in-country grew gradually from 5,200 in FY2002 to 20,400 in FY2006.
Between FY2006 and FY2008, average strength there jumped by another 10,000 to 30,100.
Under the Administration’s plans, CRS estimates that average monthly Boots on the Ground in
Afghanistan may increase to 50,700 in FY2009 with a further increase to 63,500 the following
year once all new units are in-place (see Table 2).
Currently, additional increases have not been approved. Including some 31,000 coalition troops,
the total number of foreign troops in Afghanistan could rise to about 95,000. Secretary Gates has
suggested that going beyond that level could become “a hindrance rather than a help because we
begin to look like occupiers to the Afghans,” as did the Soviets with their 110,000 to 120,000
troops.26
For Iraq, troops in-country nearly doubled between FY2003 and FY2004 reaching an average of
130,600. By the following year, average strength grew by another 13,000 to 143,800, with that
level maintained in FY2006. During the surge in troops initiated by President Bush, average troop
strength in Iraq initially grew by 7,000 or 6% in FY2007, less than the increase between FY2005
and FY2004. By the next year with another 9,500 troops, troops or another 9%, reaching a peak
of 157,800 even as the additional combat brigades began to be withdrawn.
CRS estimates that troop strength in Iraq will average 135,600 in FY2009, 88,300 in FY2010,
42,800 in FY1011, and 4,100 in FY2012. Annual decreases range from 22,00 to 46,000 in these
years.
25
DOD, Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental: Summary Justification Material, April 2009, p. 13;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_200
9_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf [hereinafter, DOD, FY2009 Supplemental]; DOD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget
Request: Summary Justification, May 2009, p. 4-11;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_SSJ.pdf [hereinafter, DOD, FY2010 Request].
26
CBS, Transcript, “Interview with Defense Secretary Gates,” Sixty Minutes, May 17, 2009, p. 3.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Estimated Troop Levels in Afghanistan in FY2009
Based on the schedule outlined by the Administration, CRS estimates average annual U.S. troop
levels in Afghanistan would likely grow from an average of 30,100 in FY2008 to about 50,700 in
FY2009 or by 68% percent. The Administration plans to review troop levels at the end of this
year including a request by former Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, General
McKiernan, to deploy an additional combat brigade in the winter of 2009, partway through
FY2010. DOD estimates troops in Afghanistan would average 45,000 in FY2009.27
At a press conference in May 2009, Secretary Gates characterized the additional brigade as a
“hard sell.”28 If no additional troops are approved, troop levels in Afghanistan would be likely to
increase by another 25% to an average strength of 63,350 in FY2010, or close to DOD’s estimate
of 68,000 included in its war request.29 According to Pentagon spokesman, Geoffrey Morrell,
Secretary Gates has voiced concerns that “there is a tipping point in terms of the American
footprint . . . on the ground in Afghanistan.”30
With no further changes, CRS estimates that troop levels in FY2011 and FY2012 would remain at
that level. In this scenario, the number of BCT-equivalents would more than double from 3.3
BCT-equivalents in FY2008 to about 7.1 BCTs in FY2010 (see Table A-1).
If the additional brigade of 9,000 troops including support were added, troop levels would rise to
70,200 in FY2010 and peak at 72,450 or about 8 average BCTs in FY2011 and FY2012.31 Troop
levels could, of course, increase or decrease in these later years if current plans change.
Estimated Troop Levels in Iraq in FY2009
In FY2008, troop strength in Iraq declined from a peak of 170,000 in November 2007 to 147,000
by September 2008 as additional units sent for the surge were withdrawn. Administration plans
call for a gradual drawdown in FY2009 to be accomplished mainly by not replacing two of three
BCTs slated to re-deploy from Iraq in June 2009, as well as withdrawals of other smaller units,
and some downsizing of replacement units.32 This could bring monthly average troop strength to
27
DOD, FY2010 Request, p. 4-11.
DOD, Transcript, “Secretary of Defense Interview with CNN,” May 3, 2009;
http://www.defenselink.mil/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcri
ptid=4411.
29
DOD, FY2009 Supplemental, p. 19.
30
DOD, Transcript, “Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, March 29, 2009;
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4390. In a press conference on January 8, 2009,
Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell suggested that Secretary Gates was “very mindful of the fact that there is a
tipping point in terms of the American footprint – the coalition footprint, for that matter – on the ground in
Afghanistan. So he wants to be very careful beyond those – those –beyond the commander’s request as to how many
more troops we would ever consider putting in;” Department of Defense, Transcript, “Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff
Morrell,” January 8, 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4336.
31
CRS calculation used methodology in Appendix A and Table A-1.
32
See Table A-1 for likely schedule, including recent decrease in April 2009; See also, Los Angeles Times, “U.S. to
Pull 12,000 Troops from Iraq as Withdrawal Begins,” March 9, 2009.
28
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
about 135,600 in FY2009, a 14% decrease from the previous year, close to DOD’s estimate of
140,000 (see and Table A-1).33
CRS assumes that additional re-deployments would not resume until the end of January 2010
after the Iraqi elections slated for December 2009. In order to reach the target of 35,000 to 50,000
troops in Iraq by August 2010 announced by President Obama, an additional 8 average BCTs
would need to be withdrawn from Iraq.34 Reflecting this schedule, average troop levels in Iraq
would be about 88,300 in FY2010, a decrease of 35% that year (see Table 2 and Table A-1).
DOD estimates average troop strength in Iraq would be about 100,000 in FY2010, somewhat
higher than this CRS estimate. 35
In his speech to Marines at Camp Lejeune, President Obama announced that all troops would be
out of Iraq by the end of 2011 as required by the Security Agreement. 36 To meet that deadline,
CRS assumes, conservatively, that the last five remaining BCTs are withdrawn in the last five
months of 2011, spanning the end of FY2011 and the first quarter of FY2012. This also reflects
recent statements by Secretary Gates that the United States would have “a significant presence for
another 18 months.”37
To meet this schedule, two BCTs would need to be withdrawn in August and September 2011 —
the end of fiscal year — with the final three BCTs leaving between October and December 2011
during the first quarter of FY2012. This schedule would reduce average monthly troop strength
from 88,300 in FY2010 to 42,750 in FY2011, and 4,050 in FY2012 (Appendix A and Table A-1).
If troops were withdrawn sooner, or the agreement with the Iraq government was re-negotiated to
extend DOD troop presence, average troop levels and costs would be lower or higher.
The FY2009 Supplemental and FY2010 War Request
Changes in average troop strength may provide a benchmark that can be used to evaluate the
reasonableness of DOD requests for war funds along with other considerations. Although the
services develop war requests by evaluating specific funding requests from the field rather than
from a “top-down” approach, few would argue that changes in the number of deployed troop
levels play a major role in determining war costs.
Along with other adjustments, CRS estimates how costs in FY2009 and beyond would change
based on the number and operational costs of average Brigade Combat Teams in Afghanistan and
Iraq each fiscal year based on FY2008 data (see Appendix B and Table B-1). Operational costs
include military personnel and Operation and Maintenance (O&M).
33
DOD, FY2010 Request, pp. 4-11.
34
White House, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejune, North Carolina,
February 27, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/.
35
DOD, Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental: Summary Justification Material, April 2009, p. 13; [hereinafter, DOD,
FY2009 War Request] ; DOD, Fiscal Year 2010: Summary Justification, May 2009, p. 4-11; [ hereinafter, DOD,
FY2010 Request].
36
White House, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
February 27, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/.
37
NBC, “Interview with Secretary Gates,” Meet the Press, p. 3, March 1, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Factors other than changes in troop strength, of course, also affect costs, including one-time
expenses in the previous year that would be unlikely to be repeated, transfers of costs previously
funded in supplementals to DOD’s baseline budget, policy changes, lags in when savings from
withdrawals would occur, the timing of new demands, and programmatic changes only loosely
tied to troop levels (e.g. funds to train Afghan security forces).38
Adjustments Affecting FY2009
On April 9, 2009, the Obama Administration submitted a request for an additional $75.5 billion
for DOD for FY2009 Supplemental Overseas Contingency Operations, abandoning the “Global
War on Terror” label used by the Bush Administration. 39 This brings the total request for FY2009,
the current fiscal year, to $141.4 billion. For FY2010, the Administration has requested $130
billion in FY2010 for both wars.40
Based on these requests, the proposed FY2009 level would be $45.7 billion lower than the $187.1
billion enacted in FY2008. At first glance, this 24% decrease appears to substantially exceed the
1% decrease in troop levels between those two years. To estimate how FY2009 would change
compared to FY2008, several one-time decreases may be appropriate including:
•
$12.2 billion provided by Congress in FY2008 that DOD characterizes as not
related to war needs that would not be requested the following year, ranging from
C-17 transport aircraft added by Congress ($3.3 billion), base closure or BRAC
funding ($1.3 billion), and compensation for higher fuel prices for DOD’s
baseline program ($4.0 billion); 41
•
$16.8 billion for a largely one-time purchase of the full requirement for MineResistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in order to speed the delivery of
these vehicles considered to have greater protective qualities than High Mobility
Uparmored Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV);
•
a policy change by the new Administration that restores the definition of
reconstitution — the repair and replacement of war-worn equipment — to
procurement strictly to replace war losses and replenish supplies within the next
fiscal year, reducing war-related procurement by $27 billion; and
•
adjustments to troop levels for increases in Afghanistan and decreases in Iraq (see
Table 3).
38
See Appendix C and Table C-1 for widely used CBO projections of changes in costs based on changes in troop
levels.
39
OMB, FY2009 Supplemental Request, Estimate No.1,111th Congress, April 9, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/supplemental_04_09_09.pdf; White House, Press
Release, FY2009 Supplemental, April 9, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/press_releases/SummaryoftheFiscalYear2009SupplementalAppropriationsRequest/
40
DOD, FY2010 Request, May 2009.
41
DOD, “Status of Funds,” Table 2, "Appropriated Non-GWOT Funds," October 31, 2008; see DOD, FY2009 War
Request, pp.65- 69.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
With these adjustments, CRS estimates that DOD’s FY2009 war needs would total $133.1 billion
rather than the $141.1 billion, or $8.3 billion below the Administration’s request (see Table 3).
Table 3. Actual and Estimated DOD War Funding, FY2008-FY2012
in billions of dollars or percent change
Category
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
Enacted Level
187.1
65.9
NA
NA
NA
New Request
NA
75.5
130.0
50.0
50.0
Fiscal Year Total
187.1
141.4
130.0
50.0
50.0
Change from Prior Year
33.1
-45.6
-11.4
-80.0
0.0
Annual Percentage Change
9%
-24%
-8%
-62%
0%
Annual Percent Change in Troop Level
9%
-1%
-19%
-30%
-36%
Potential Adjustments to War Requests
DOD's Non-War Funding in Enacted Supplementala
12.2
-12.2
NA
NA
NA
One-Time MRAP Fundingb
16.8
-16.8
NA
NA
NA
Transfers to Baselinec
NA
NA
-8.0
NA
NA
NA
-26.8
NA
NA
NA
Changes in Troop Levels
NA
1.8
-7.7
-25.4
-22.1
Total Annual Adjustments
NA
-54.0
-15.7
-25.4
-22.1
NA
133.1
117.4
91.9
69.8
NA
-8.3
-12.6
41.9
19.8
Change in Reconstitution Policyd
War Baseline Adjusted for Non-War, MRAP, Transfers, Reconstitution,
and Troop Levels
Difference with Administration Request
Notes: NA = Not applicable. CRS projections in italics, see Table A-1 and sources above.
a.
The $12.2 billion identified by DOD as non-war costs includes items such as childcare centers and hospitals
added by Congress, base closure funds, adds for higher fuel costs for its baseline program; and C-17 and C130 aircraft added by Congress.
b.
Congress provided $16.8 billion to buy the entire requirement, at that time, for, MRAP vehicles.
c.
In FY2010, DOD transferred some items previously funded in the supplemental to its baseline program
including monies to increase the size of the Army, medical and family support, Section 1206 and Sec. 1207
funds to establish partnerships, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Organization funding, and enhancements
to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
d.
In FY2010, DOD changed its reconstitution policy to limit war-related procurement to replacement of
battle losses and replenishment of munitions; CRS calculated the effect by comparing DOD’s request for
reconstitution (excluding repair) in FY2009 and FY2008.
Sources: DOD, Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental: Summary Justification Material, April 2009, p. 66;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_
2009_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf; DOD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request: Summary Justification Material,
May 2009; DOD, “Status of Funds,” Table 2, "Appropriated Non-GWOT Funds," October 31, 2008; Joint Staff,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Boots on the Ground," Monthly Reports; Secretary Gates, Statement to the Senate
Appropriations Committee, June 9, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
For changes in troop strength, this estimate assumes that operational costs in FY2009 rise or fall
in proportion with changes in troop levels. Other programmatic changes may not be related to
troop levels. Increases could include:
•
the proposed $1.9 billion increase for the training for both Afghan and Iraqi
security forces;
•
additional demands for unmanned aerial vehicles or light-weight MRAPS;
•
an additional $300 million for Coalition Support; and
•
$400 million for the new Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.
At the same time, other areas may have lower costs in FY2009 as needs change or are
already met, including:
•
$400 million less for Military Construction; and
•
$800 million less for the Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund.42
DOD’s request makes adjustments for several of the changes outlined above and assumes small
changes in military personnel costs and the same level of Operation and Maintenance funding in
FY2008 as in FY2009.43
Potential Changes to DOD’s FY2010-FY2012 Requests
The Obama Administration requested $130 billion for war funding in its FY2010 budget that
Congress is considering along with DOD’s baseline request.44 The funding needed for that year
depends on not only changes in troop strength but other adjustments made by DOD.
In FY2010, according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, DOD transferred to its baseline
about $8 billion of programs previously funded in supplemental appropriations. Anticipating that
supplemental or war funding would be reduced, DOD transferred programs considered necessary
for DOD’s long-term requirements such as additional funding for increasing the size of the Army,
recruiting and retention, countering threats from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs),
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles), and “Global Train
and Equip” funds for countries facing terrorist threats.45
42
DOD, FY2009 War Request, p. 28, pp.41-49, p.32.
See Table 3, DOD, Overseas Contingency Operations Request, FY2009 Supplemental: Summary Justification
Material, April 2009;
43
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_200
9_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf
44
DOD, FY2010 Request, May 2009.
45
DOD, Transcript, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa,” April 16,
2009, pp. 2-3; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Because of these transfers, the FY2010 war request would be expected to be $8 billion lower than
in FY2009. In addition, CRS estimates that planned changes in troop levels would also reduce
requirements by an additional $7.7 billion for a total of $15.7 billion altogether. This could reduce
DOD’s requirement from $133 billion in FY2009 to $117 billion in FY2010, or almost $13
billion less than DOD has requested (see Table 3).
For FY2011 and FY2012, the Administration included planning figures of $50 billion each year
in its budget.46 Based on currently announced plans, CRS estimates that war costs could total $92
billion in FY2011 and $70 billion in FY2012. These levels would be $42 billion and $20 billion,
respectively, above the current planning figures. While other factors could affect costs, this
suggests future war requests are likely to change (see Table 3).
Potential Costs of Withdrawal
Some observers would argue that the assumption that war costs in Iraq will fall in tandem with
troop levels overlooks that some costs are likely to fall more slowly than others, and that there
may be additional costs associated with the withdrawal itself. Budgeteers sometimes assume that
in the short-term, only direct support costs (e.g., special pays, operating costs, meals, protective
gear) change with troop strength. Then once some threshold is reached, indirect costs (e.g., base
support, communication hubs) fall, and reductions will become proportional.
Current efforts to reduce and move U.S. troops outside major cities in Iraq, required by the
Security Agreement, may have already begun the consolidation process, which could reduce base
support costs sooner rather than later. 47 In fact, there is some evidence that base support costs are
already declining. In addition, the transfer of responsibility to Iraqi Security forces may also
reduce U.S. operating costs even before there are major declines in troop levels.
Other observers have suggested that the withdrawal process itself may entail additional costs.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has emphasized the complexity and need for
coordination and planning to re-deploy forces and equipment, but has not estimated costs
associated with a drawdown.48 Army leaders have testified frequently that the cost of “reset” or
repairing and replacing war-worn equipment could persist at the current annual level of $16
billion for two years after a withdrawal from Iraq though the specific rationale for this argument
is unclear.
For the past two years, the cost of repairing and replacing Army equipment has been $16 billion
each year, a cost covered in war funding received each year.49 About three-quarters of the Army’s
46
OMB, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, February 26, 2009, Table S-7;
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10-newera.pdf.
47
United States and Iraq, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary
Presence in Iraq,” November 17, 2008.
48
GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from
Iraq. GAO-08-930, September 10, 2008; http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO, 2009 Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-294SP, March 24, 2009; http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-294SP.
49
Army, “Army Reset Brief to Congressional Professional Staffers,“ 24 November 2008.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
equipment rotates with units each year, being repaired on its return to the United States. This
suggests that about one-quarter of unit equipment remains in-theater to be used by newly
deploying units (based on the value of the equipment).50 Once U.S. forces in Iraq fully withdraw,
this equipment would be returned to the United States for repair or replacement except for items
left behind for the Iraqis or transferred to Afghanistan.
If the repair and replacement bill were proportional to the value of the equipment, the Army
would face an additional bill of about $5 billion to $6 billion to reset the equipment that has
remained in theater, well below Army estimates. At the same time, the annual bill for repairing
equipment that rotates with troops would be expected to decline as troop levels fall, offsetting
some of this additional expense.51 Similar factors would presumably apply to the other services.
Potential Questions About Troop Strength and Cost
In looking at the effect of changes in troop levels on cost, CRS took into account the following
questions:
•
How many and how quickly are increases and decreases in troop levels planned
for each fiscal year?
•
How many troops are being increased and decreased in-country?
CRS distributed all operational costs over the number of troops in-country and assumed that
troops in the region would fall at the same rate as those in-country, which is supported by past
changes (see Figure 5 and Figure 7).
To do a more precise estimate, additional information would be needed. These question include:
•
How did the number of troops in the region change?
•
How are changes in troop levels distributed among the services since the war cost
of an Army soldier in-country differs from a Navy sailor or Air Force pilot
operating from outside Afghanistan or Iraq?
•
How quickly will operational costs (Military Personnel and Operation &
Maintenance) adjust to decreases in the number of troops deployed to Iraq or
increases in Afghanistan, i.e. will some types of costs fall slower than others?
•
How large are additional costs associated with re-deploying troops, such as
sending troops and equipment home and repairing, replacing, or upgrading
equipment currently stored in theater?
50
The Army estimates that the value of all its equipment in-theater is about $42 billion including $12 billion that does
not rotate back and forth with troops; $11 billion of that equipment is in Iraq; Army response to CRS question,
February 18, 2009. Some equipment in this “theater-provided” equipment is swapped out each year so the composition
of the pool itself changes.
51
Army, “Army Equipment Reset Update to HAC-D,”28 March 06; this briefing estimates a decline in reset
requirements as forces are withdrawn over two years from $13 billion in FY2006 to $10 billion in FY2008 and $1.7
billion in FY2009.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
•
How large is any new investment to build or upgrade bases to support higher
levels of troops in Afghanistan, and are bases intended to be temporary or
permanent?
Thus far, DOD has provided only very general information about troop levels rather than the
number, location, or distribution among the services of troop levels which would help Congress
to evaluate its supplemental war requests. The FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act
requires that DOD provide separate budget displays for Afghanistan and Iraq as well as “include a
detailed description of the assumptions underlying the funding for the period covered by the
budget request, including the anticipated troop levels, the operations intended to be carried out,
and the equipment reset requirements necessary to support such operations.”52 These separate
budget displays and detailed assumptions are not included in DOD’s FY2009 Supplemental or the
FY2010 war requests.
Ways to Measure Troop Levels for the Afghan and
Iraq Wars
While CRS used Boots on the Ground or in-country troop levels to estimate future troop levels
and potential effects on war costs, these figures do not accurately capture the total demand for
troops for the Afghan and Iraq war because other troops deployed in the region are not included.
To get a better sense of changes in the total demand for troops since the 9/11 attacks, CRS
calculated average monthly strength for troops deployed for the Afghan and Iraq Wars using the
following five DOD data sources, which range from including only troops in-country to all those
deployed for OEF and OIF:
52
•
Boots on the Ground or (BOG) Report, a once-a-month headcount limited to
U.S. troops in-country that is compiled by the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) using inputs from the services;
•
Operations Report, a more inclusive monthly headcount collected by Central
Command, that counts service members under U.S. Central Command which
captures some, but not all, military personnel deployed for OEF or OIF (e.g.,
Special Operations Command is excluded).
•
Combat Pay Estimate, based on the funding for combat or Imminent Danger
Pay that is reported in DOD’s war cost reports and used in budget justification
materials;
•
Average Strength Report, a person-year estimate of all OEF and OIF military
personnel collected by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) based on its
Contingency Tracking System (CTS), which reflects service personnel records
and the beginning and ending dates of each service member’s deployment; and
•
Location Reports, a monthly DMDC count of all those deployed for OEF and
OIF that reports the country where service members are located.
Section 1502, P.L. 110-417.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Yet another demand for troops resulting from OEF and OIF operations is the activation of some
50,000 reservists to backfill some of the positions of deployed active-duty troops.53 Although
these reservists are not carrying out OEF and OIF missions, their activation would not have
occurred without those operations. Adding those troops to the 294,000 included in the Location
Report for December 2008 brings the total troops associated with OEF and OIF to 344,000, or
almost twice the level in the Boots on the Ground report for December 2008 (see Figure 1 and
Table D-1 and Table D-2).
Policy Issues Raised by Differences in Troop Counts
These different measures of troop strength for the Afghan and Iraq Wars raise several significant
policy and cost issues:
•
How will the Administration’s plan to increase troops in Afghanistan and
decrease forces in Iraq affect troops providing support in the region, i.e. will
forces in the region change in proportion to changes in combat troops?
•
What do war requests assume about reducing troops in-country as opposed to
reducing troops in the region, and are there interactions between the two?
•
How does the United States envision the overall U.S. military presence in the
region in terms of deployed troops and their locations?
A number of other questions arise for each individual operation including:
•
To what extent are increases in troop levels in Afghanistan dependent on
decreases in Iraq, taking into account all troops deployed?
•
What can we learn from the past about the effect of U.S. troop levels on the
likelihood that the U.S., its allies, and local security forces can quell violence in
Afghanistan or in Iraq?
Trends in Troop Levels From FY2002-FY2008 Using
Five Alternative Sources
Although there are wide differences in troop levels reported by these five DOD sources, trends
over time are similar (see Table 4 and Figure 2). Some of the differences between sources reflect
definitions — for example, Boots on the Ground Reports for Afghanistan and Iraq include only
those troops located within each country, whereas Operations Reports include some of the
military personnel providing support in the region.
Other differences reflect whether figures are headcounts taken once a month as opposed to
average strength which takes into account the number or days each member is deployed for OEF
53
CRS calculation based on data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, DRS 21198, “Average Number of
Members Deployed on Any Given Day By Service Component and Month/Year,” based on the Contingency Tracking
System,” January 2009.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
or OIF. These distinctions can have important implications for the cost and demand for troops. In
general, more comprehensive measures are more useful.
To get a better sense of monthly trends, CRS calculated averages for each DOD source
for each fiscal year rather than using the more commonly cited Boots on the Ground
figures which captures only a point in time. Using this method, average monthly troop
strength for both wars in FY2008 ranged from:
•
188,000 for DOD’s Boots on the Ground or troops deployed in Afghanistan and
Iraq;54
•
223,000 in the Central Command’s Operations Report including some but not all
troops deployed in the region, or 19% above the BOG total;
•
248,000 in average strength estimated from combat pay, or 32% above the BOG
total;
•
294,000 in the Defense Manpower Data Center average strength or 56% above
the BOG total; and
•
307,000 troops based on DMDC’s Location Report, or 64% above BOG figures;
(see Table 4).55
Table 4. Average Monthly Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, FY2002-FY2008: Five
DOD Sources
Rounded to hundreds
Average Monthly
Troop Level
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Percent
Change,
FY2004FY2008a
Boots on the Ground
5,200
78,100
145,800
162,900
161,500
172,000
187,900
29%
Operations Report
8,800
141,100
216,600
204,000
203,300
215,800
223,100
3%
Combat Pay
Estimateb
63,300
166,000
238,300
251,700
228,700
247,900
292,500
23%
Average Strength
with CRS Allocationc
83,400
237,600
232,700
255,000
262,500
274,500
293,600
26%
277,478
289,134
307,503
NA
Location Reportd
90,197
254,312
247,277
282,659
Sources: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) reports; Central Command,
“Operations Report;” Defense Finance Accounting Services (DFAS), “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution
Reports;” Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DRS 21198,”Average Number of Members Deployed on
any given day by Service Component and Month/Year,” January 2009; DMDC, DRS 11280, “Modified Location
Country Report,” December 2008, as of April 21, 2009.
54
CRS calculation based on monthly Department of Defense, “Boots on the Ground” reports (see Table 7 and Table
D-1).
55
The total of 307,000 for FY2008 is higher than the figure for December 2008 as shown in Figure 1 because the
number of troops declined in the fall as troops from Iraq were withdrawn after the surge.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Notes: CRS calculated monthly averages from BOG, Operations, Average Strength, DFAS, and Location
Reports for each fiscal year.
a.
CRS calculated change since FY2004 to exclude first year of combat for OEF or OIF.
b.
To estimate average strength from DFAS war reports, CRS divided the total amount reported for Combat
or Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) by the annual amount that each member receives.
c.
CRS estimated OEF and OIF allocations by applying percentage shares in the Operations Report to averages
produced by Defense Manpower Data Center, “DRS 21198 Report, Average Strength Deployed for OIF
and OEF,” as of December, 2008 Contingency Tracking System report.
d.
DMDC does not consider its location data in the Modified Location Country report to be reliable until
January 2005 because service members were often shown in their first location in the region rather than
their final deployment; after that time, a system was developed where members recorded each location
during their deployment. Total figures of OEF and OIF personnel are considered reliable by DMDC. Figures
in this table include 14,000 to 19,000 individuals in FY2006-FY2009 whose status is “Non-reportable,”
“Unknown,” or Miscellaneous where the services did not provide location data.
Generally, figures in Average Strength Reports are higher than once-a-month headcounts because
they include all military personnel providing theater support in the region, reflect the time
personnel are deployed, and capture those present throughout the month. It is not clear, however,
that these reasons are sufficient to explain the difference of over 100,000 between Boots on the
Ground and Average Strength Reports.
Like the average strength measure, Location Reports are also inclusive measures because they
capture all troops deployed at any point during a month. Location Reports are probably higher
than Average Strength Reports because military personnel who are in-country for short periods of
time are counted the same way as those present for the entire month.
There are also substantial differences by service between BOG and the more inclusive Average
Strength Reports. Average Strength Reports figures are about:
•
30,000 to 35,000 or over 20% higher for the Army;
•
13,000 to 20,000 or 60% to 90% higher for the Navy;
•
about 8,000 or about 30% higher for the U.S. Marine Corps; and
•
6,000 to 7,000 or over 25% higher for the Air Force.
Trends for both the Afghan and Iraq Wars
Despite these substantial differences in the number of military personnel who are counted, the
overall trends over time in troop levels are similar for the five DOD sources. Overall, troop levels
jumped sharply with the initiation of combat operations for the Afghan war starting in FY2002
and with the Iraq invasion in FY2003.
After that, troop levels generally remained fairly stable from FY2004-FY2006. The exception is
Combat Pay Estimates, which are somewhat erratic probably because of the unreliability in DOD
war cost reporting. 56 CRS included this measure because, if accurately reported, combat pay is a
56
GAO has issued several reports criticizing DOD for the unreliability of war costs reported in the Defense Finance
(continued...)
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
good measure of average strength and is often used by the services in its budget justification
materials, including the current FY2009 Supplemental.
Figure 2. Average Monthly Troop Levels for the Afghan and Iraq Wars,
FY2002-FY2008: Five DOD Sources
In thousands
340
320
300
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
Boots on the Ground
Operations Report
Average Strength Report
Location Report
2006
2007
2008
Combat Pay Estimate
Sources: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) reports; Central Command,
“Operations Report;” Defense Finance Accounting Services (DFAS), “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution
Reports;” Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DRS 21198, “Average Number of Members Deployed on
any given day by Service Component and Month/Year,” January 2008; DMDC, DRS 11280, “Modified Location
Country Report ,” December 2008.
Notes: CRS calculated monthly averages from the BOG, Operations, Average Strength and Location reports for
each fiscal year. To estimate average strength from DFAS war cost reports, CRS divided the total amount
reported for Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) by the annual amount that each member would receive.
In FY2007 and FY2008, overall troop levels increased moderately in response to the troop surge
in Iraq announced by former President Bush in January 2007 and continued increases in troop
levels in Afghanistan (see Table 4 and Figure 2).
(...continued)
Accounting System (DFAS), “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports;” see GAO, Global War on Terrorism:
DOD Needs to More Accurately Capture and Report the Costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom, GAO-09-302, March 17, 2009, p. 8; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09302.pdf.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Allocating Troops Between the Afghan and Iraq Wars
Despite the wide differences among DOD sources in the number of troops deployed for OEF and
OIF since FY2002, the allocation of troops between the two operations is similar. Before the
invasion of Iraq in March 2003, all troops deployed in the theater were allocated to OEF.
Since then, CRS found that the split for troops between the two operations was generally about
88% to 90% for the Iraq war and 10% to 12% for the Afghan war over the last several years based
on an analysis of three DOD sources, the Joint Staff’s Boots on the Ground, Central Command’s
Operations Reports, and DMDC’s Location Report (Figure 3 and Figure 4).
Figure 3. Share of Deployed Troops for Iraq in Boots on the Ground and Operations
Reports, FY2003-FY2008
100%
95%
91%
90%
91%
90%
90%
88%
87%
89%
87%
89%
86%
87%
84%
85%
80%
75%
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
Iraq Boots on the Ground
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
OIF Operations Report
Sources: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “Boots on the Ground Reports,” Summary Table, September
2001-October 2008; Central Command, “Operations Report,” September 2001-November 2008.
Notes: CRS calculations of shares from sources above. The “Operations Report” includes all personnel for OEF
and OIF who are assigned to the U.S. Central Command including personnel in-country and some of those in
neighboring areas.
Roughly, six or seven of every eight troops have been dedicated to the Iraq War and one or two of
every eight to the Afghan war. While troop levels increased in Iraq during the surge or temporary
buildup of troops in 2007 and 2008, troop levels also rose in Afghanistan so that the percentages
remained similar to previous years (see Table 4 and Table 5 and Figure 3 and Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Share of Deployed Troops for Afghanistan in Boots on the Ground and
Operations Reports, FY2002-FY2008
110% 100% Both
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
13%
9%
10%9%
12%10%
13%11%
14%11%
16%13%
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
0%
FY2002
Afghanistan Boots on the Ground
OEF Operations Reports
Sources: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “Boots on the Ground Reports,” Summary Table, September
2001-October 2008; Central Command, “Operations Report,” September 2001-November 2008.
Notes: CRS calculations of shares from sources above. The “Operations Report” includes all personnel for OEF
and OIF who are assigned to the U.S. Central Command including personnel in-country and some of those in
neighboring areas.
CRS also calculated OEF and OIF troop shares using DMDC’s Location Reports and guidelines
developed primarily by the Joint Staff and Central Command that designate particular countries
as part of OEF or OIF. This count showed the same proportions as the Boots on the Ground and
Operations Report of about 12% for OEF and 88% for OIF for FY2006-FY2008.57
While allocating personnel to an operation by country has certain limitations because some
military personnel in a particular country may support either or both OEF and OIF, personnel in
particular countries generally support only one operation (see Box 1).
Although JCS and Central Command have adopted guidelines for their own reporting that assign
personnel to OEF and OIF by location, the Comptroller in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has not set specific guidelines for the Services about how or whether to use location as a way to
assign war costs for military personnel. Because there is not a single standard for assigning
personnel or other war costs to OEF or OIF, troop and cost allocations may not match.
This appears to reflect the assumption in DOD’s financial regulations that “Ultimately, each DOD
Component is responsible for the accuracy and completeness of financial information in the
reports which present the financial effects of its operations.”58 Thus while the Comptroller’s
57
For FY2006-FY2008, troops in OEF locations composed 11%, 12% and 14% of the total for both operations, with
OIF troops making up 89%, 88% and 86%. DMDC considers its location data reliable only from January 2005 forward
so CRS did not compute shares for the earlier years; in computing shares, CRS excluded about 15,000 military where
DMDC cannot determine locations.
58
DOD Regulation 7000.14-R, Volume 6A, Chapter 2, November 2008;
(continued...)
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
office works with the services to improve the accuracy of war cost reporting, and requires that
each service develop and justify its method, it has not issued policy guidelines or regulations that
would ensure commonality.
Troop Levels for the Afghan War Since October 2001
After initial combat operations in FY2002 were complete, troop levels for the Afghan war
increased steadily from FY2003 to FY2008 though the pace of increases varies among DOD
sources. The lowest DOD figure, Boots on the Ground, tripled from an annual average of 10,400
in FY2003 to 30,100 in FY2008 while the more inclusive estimate, average strength, doubled
from 21,000 in FY2002 to 42,000 in FY2008 (see Table 5 and Figure 5.).
These changes in troop levels in the Afghan war appear to reflect several stages of military
operations:
•
initial combat operations supporting the Northern Alliance that resulted in the
overthrow of the Taliban forces by November 2001;
•
relatively low-level U.S. operations against the remaining Taliban insurgents
from FY2003 – FY2006; and
•
adoption of a counter-insurgency approach in response to increasing levels of
violence in 2006 as the Taliban regrouped and adopted the suicide and
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) tactics of Iraqi insurgent groups.
Initial Combat Operations
The Afghan War, or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), began on October 7, 2001 with U.S.
troops launching air strikes and Special Operations forces supporting operations by the Northern
Alliance against Taliban forces in response to the 9/11 attacks. President Bush announced that
major combat operations were complete with the overthrow of the Taliban regime in November
2001. Under UN sponsorship, a transition government was formed, succeeded by an elected
government on November 3, 2004.59
During FY2002, the first year of the war, an average of 5,200 troops were deployed in
Afghanistan according to Boots on the Ground figures, the report capturing troops most likely to
face combat. For that same year, the Operations Report, which includes some but not all support
troops in neighboring areas, shows an average of 8,800 troops. The higher figure in the
Operations Report also more accurately shows the initial troop buildup beginning in October
2001 rather than in January 2002 as shown in the BOG reports.
(...continued)
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/fmr/06a/06a_02.pdf
59
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted),
February 9, 2009, p.6-p.7.
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Neither of these headcounts of 5,200 in the Boots on the Ground Report or 8,800 troops in the
Operations Report capture all troops deployed to launch Operation Enduring Freedom,
particularly Air Force and Navy personnel operating offshore or outside of Afghanistan. A CRS
allocation of the Average Strength Report suggests that some 83,400 troops participated in OEF in
FY2002, including 33,000 Navy personnel on ships, and 30,000 Air Force personnel. The
Operations Report shows only 100 Navy personnel and 2,000 Air Force personnel (see Table 5
and Figure 5).60
Table 5. Average Monthly Troop Levels in the Afghan War, FY2002-FY2008:
Five DOD Sources
Rounded to hundreds
Average Monthly
Troop Levels
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Percent
Change,
FY2004FY2008a
Boots on the Ground
5,200
10,400
15,200
19,100
20,400
23,700
30,100
98%
Operations Report
8,800
12,500
19,700
19,600
22,000
24,600
30,000
52%
Combat Pay
Estimateb
63,300
42,800
32,600
49,700
31,300
16,900
55,700
71%
Average Strength
with CRS Allocationc
83,400
21,100
21,100
24,500
28,400
31,300
42,500
101%
NR
NR
NR
NR
28,663
32,160
40,951
NR
Location Reportd
Sources: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) reports; Central Command,
“Operations Report;” Defense Finance Accounting Services (DFAS), “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution
Reports;” Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DRS 21198, “Average Number of Members Deployed on
any given day by Service Component and Month/Year,” January 2009; DMDC, DRS 11280, “Modified Location
Country Report ,” as of December 2008, April 21, 2009.
Notes: NR = Not Reliable (see note d. below). CRS calculated monthly averages from the BOG, Operations,
DFAS, Average Strength and Location reports for each fiscal year.
CRS calculated annual averages from the monthly Joint Staff BOG and Operations reports.
a.
CRS calculated change since FY2004 to exclude the first year of combat for either operation.
b.
To estimate average strength from DFAS war reports, CRS divided the total amount reported for Imminent
Danger Pay (IDP) by the $2,700 that each member receives per year.
c.
CRS estimated OEF average strength by applying the shares in Operations Reports to monthly averages for
each fiscal year in Defense Manpower Data Center, DRS 21198 Report, “Average Strength Deployed for
OIF and OEF,” as of January 2009 based on the Contingency Tracking System.
d.
FY2002-FY2005 are not included because DMDC does not consider location data in its Modified Location
Country Report to be reliable until January 2005 because service members often were shown in their first
location in the region rather than in their actual deployment. After that time, a system was developed
where members recorded each location. In April 2009, DMDC “scrubbed” the data to eliminate doublecounts of members who were deployed more than once in one or multiple locations within the same
60
CRS calculated average monthly strength figures for OEF and OIF by OEF shares in the Joint Staff’s “Operations
Reports;” see Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), “DRS 21198, Average Number of Members Deployed on any
given day by Service Component and Month/Year as of December 2008,” and Joint Staff, “Operations Report.”
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
month; this eliminated all but 400 in duplications. CRS allocated countries to OEF based primarily on
guidelines developed by the Joint Staff and Central Command (see Box 1).
Troop Levels Grow Steadily From FY2003-FY2006
After initial combat operations were complete in November 2001, troop levels for the Afghan
War grew gradually but steadily. Boots on the Ground headcounts increase by about 5,000 troops
a year between FY2003 and FY2005, then inch upward to 20,400 in FY2006. According to the
more inclusive Operations Report, OEF troop levels rose from 12,500 in FY2003 to almost
20,000 by FY2004, remaining at about that level for the next two years (Table 5 and Figure 5).
Because the Operations Report includes some military personnel in neighboring countries, these
figures would be expected to be higher than Boots on the Ground reports, and generally OEF
troop levels are between 1,000 to 5,000 higher than Boots on the Ground reports. This pattern is
reversed for several months in FY2008, however, apparently because DOD changed the
definition of personnel covered in the BOG report (see Table 5 and Appendix D and Table
D-1).61 These variations suggest a need for better definitions that would clarify who is and is not
counted as part of OEF and OIF.
Figure 5. Average Monthly Troop Levels for the Afghan War,
FY2002-FY2008: Five DOD Sources
90
In thousands
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
Boots on the Ground
Operations Report
Average Strength
Location Report
FY2007
FY2008
Combat Pay Estimate
Sources: Joint Staff, “Boots on the Ground Reports”, Summary Table, Sept. 2001-October 2008; Central
Command, “Operations Report,” September 2001- November 2008; Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
DRS Report 21198, “Average Number of Members Deployed on Any given Day, by Service Component and
61
Joint Staff, Memo in response to CRS questions,” April 20, 2009.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Month/Year,” (computed by dividing the days deployed per month by the number of days in the month), January
2009; DMDC, DRS 11280, “Modified Location Country Report.” December 2008.
Notes: CRS calculated monthly averages from the BOG, Operations, DFAS, Average Strength, and Location
reports for each fiscal year. To estimate average strength from DFAS war cost reports, CRS divided the total
amount reported for OEF Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) by the $2,700 that each member would receive per year.
CRS estimated the average strength for OEF by applying the percentage shares for each fiscal year in the
Operations reports to the monthly averages reported in DMDC’s Average Strength Report. Location Report
figures for FY2002-FY2005 are not included because DMDC does not consider location data in its Modified
Location Country Report to be reliable until January 2005 because service members often were shown in their
first location in the region rather than in their actual deployment. After that time, a system was developed where
members recorded each location. In April 2009, DMDC “scrubbed” the data to eliminate double-counts of
members who were deployed more than once in one or multiple locations within the same month; this
eliminated all but 400 in duplications. CRS allocated countries to OEF based primarily on guidelines developed by
the Joint Staff and Central Command (see Box 1).
To capture all troops providing theater-wide support in the region or engaged in other OEF
counter-terror operations, CRS applied the shares shown in the Operations Report to the more
complete figures compiled in the Average Strength Reports. Because the Average Strength
Reports reflect each service’s reporting of benefits received and deployment dates, it is likely to
be a more accurate measure of troop strength.
At the same time, the similarity in OEF and OIF shares shown in BOG, Operations and Location
Reports, suggests that applying shares to the Average Strength Reports would be a fairly reliable
way to estimate OEF and OIF troop strength. According to this Average Strength estimate, OEF
troops grew from 21,100 in FY2003 to 28,400 in FY2006 and 42,500 in FY2008. The Location
Report shows similar figures (see Table 5).
CRS also estimated troop levels by using Combat Pay reported in DOD’s “Supplemental & Cost
of War Reports.” The sharp changes from year-to-year suggest that allocations between OEF and
OIF may not be reliable, a criticism raised by GAO (see Table 5 and Figure 5).62 CRS includes
this estimate despite its apparent inaccuracy because strength and combat pay would be expected
to be consistent, and DOD uses this measure in its justification material for the FY2009
Supplemental.63
Further Increases As Violence Rises After 2006
In 2006 and 2007, the level of violence in Afghanistan grew as Taliban insurgents adopted the
suicide attacks and roadside bombing of insurgents in Iraq.64 The renewed increase in troop levels
in FY2006 and FY2007 appears to follow higher levels of violence as measured in:
62
See GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to More Accurately Capture and Report the Costs of Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, GAO-09-302, March 17, 2009, p. 8;
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09302.pdf.
63
Department of Defense, FY 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Air Force Military Personnel, p. 18 and 24;
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090410-048.pdf.
64
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted);
CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
•
the number of security incidents and attacks, collected by DOD, the United
Nations, and Central Command;
•
attacks on non-combatants collected by the State Department;
•
number of incidents involving IEDs and roadside bombs;
•
number or suicide bombings; and
•
number of U.S. and civilian casualties.65
All the different measures show increases in OEF troop strength in FY2007 and FY2008. After
the modest increases in the prior two years, headcounts in both Boots on the Ground and the
Operations Report rose by 10,000 between FY2006 and FY2008, reaching over 30,000.
These figures probably do not capture all deployed troops. The more comprehensive Average
Strength and Location Reports show an increase from 28,000 in FY2006 to 42,000 in FY2008, or
roughly 5,000 more troops each year. (see Table 5).66
Since May 2008, in response to a congressional reporting requirement, DOD has included figures
showing monthly headcounts for OEF as well as military personnel in Afghanistan in its Boots on
the Ground report.67 For the last several months of FY2008, this new OEF figure shows an
average of 47,790 for OEF, higher than either the Average Strength and Location Reports, and
almost 18,000 above in-country headcounts.68 The reasons for these higher figures, submitted by
the services, are not apparent (see Table 5).
If these new DOD figures better reflect current OEF troop levels, then total troops for the Afghan
War, including U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan, and U.S. troops in the region, would
average 97,000 in FY2009. That total could grow to about 110,000 by the following year.69
Seasonal Variations
While average monthly troop levels may more accurately reflect strength levels, once-a-month
headcounts may better capture buildups and draw downs within a year as well as some longerterm trends. For example, between January and September 2002, troop levels shown in the
Operations Report more than doubled from 4,100 to 10,400 as U.S. forces grew during initial
65
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Anthony H. Cordesman, “Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising
Threat,” September 14, 2008.
66
Before FY2006, DMDC does not consider the locations in its Location Country Report to be accurate because
service members were sometimes recorded only in their original location, for example, in Kuwait, even if they were en
route to Iraq. Since January 2005, DMDC has collected location data based on a system where members swipe cards in
each country that they enter. CRS allocations of Average Strength to OEF and OIF are similar to DMDC’s Location
Country Reports for FY2006-FY2008.
67
H.Rept. 110-279, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2008, July 30, 2007, p. 27.
68
CRS calculation of Average Strength Report compared to figures shown in Joint Staff, monthly Boots on the Ground
reports for May, June, July, August, September, and December 2008; DOD has not released the reports for October and
November 2008.
69
CRS calculations based on DOD, Boots on the Ground Reports, May 2008-September 2008, and sources listed in
Table 3.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
combat operations. Despite month-to-month variations, a clear upward trend emerges for OEF in
the Boots on the Ground and Operations Reports headcounts (see Figure 6 and Table D-1).
During FY2003, U.S. troop levels hovered between 11,000 and 13,000 from month to month.
Monthly variations may reflect seasonal variations and planned operations. For example, troop
levels temporarily spiked in the fall and winter of 2003 and 2004 when the U.S. and Afghan
forces conducted several operations against Taliban insurgents – Mountain Viper (August 2003),
Operation Avalanche (December 2003) and Operation Mountain Storm (March-July 2004). In
FY2004, troop levels grew to around 20,000 while the U.S. and Afghan troops continued
operations against remaining Taliban insurgents at relatively low levels. 70
Typically, troop levels have increased for several months of the year -- sometimes early in the
year in order to prepare for spring Taliban offensives when the weather is better. Between
FY2003 and FY2008, troop levels generally rose in the winter and spring, then declined slightly
in the summer and fall, settling back at somewhat higher troop levels each year (see Figure 6 and
Table D-1).
Figure 6. Monthly Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan and
Troops Deployed for OEF Operations, September 2001-November 2008
In thousands
Sep 01
Dec 01
Mar 02
Jun 02
Sep 02
Dec 02
Mar 03
Jun 03
Sep 03
Dec 03
Mar 04
Jun 04
Sep 04
Dec 04
Mar 05
Jun 05
Sep 05
Dec 05
Mar 06
Jun 06
Sep 06
Dec 06
Mar 07
Jun 07
Sep 07
Dec 07
Mar 08
Jun 08
Sep 08
38
36
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
OEF Operations Reports
Linear (BOG Reports in Afghanistan)
BOG Reports in Afghanistan
Source: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), "Boots on the Ground Summary Table" provided to CRS,
September 2008; Central Command, "Operations Report," September 2001-November 2008.
Notes: Trend line inserted by CRS. Boots-On-the-Ground” captures deployed military personnel in-country
while OEF also includes military personnel in the region that support that operation and are assigned to Central
Command. DOD did not send Congress BOG reports for October and November 2008.
70
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted).
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
After falling by several thousand in the fall of 2006, U.S. troop levels rose to over 25,000 the
following spring and summer as the situation in Afghanistan worsened. After a brief decline in the
fall of 2007, troop levels resumed their upward climb reaching about 33,600 in the spring and
summer of 2008 where they remained for the rest of the fiscal year (see Figure 6 and Table D-1).
Troops from Other Countries
Just as U.S. troop levels have risen since 2006, contributions from other NATO countries have
also increased. Average troop levels from NATO countries other than the United States have
grown from about 20,000 in FY2007 to 28,000 in FY2008, and 31,000 in FY2009 thus far.71
While the United States has requested additional troops from NATO countries, increases are
likely to be small.
Troop Levels for the Iraq War Since the March 2003 Invasion
In the fall of 2002, the United States began to build up troop levels in the Gulf region in
preparation for the invasion of Iraq that took place in late March 2003. After peaking in the spring
and summer of 2003, troop levels then fell rapidly.
Between FY2004 and FY2006, average troop levels reached a steady-state of about 130,000 to
140,000 on the ground in Iraq and from about 210,000 to 230,000 for OIF as a whole according
to estimates of DOD average strength.
During the surge in troops initiated by President Bush in January 2007 and continuing through
much of FY2008, troop levels in Iraq increased somewhat more steeply — from 140,000 to
158,000 in-country and from 233,000 to 248,000 (see Table 6 and Figure 6).
Changes in troop levels in Iraq appear to be loosely related to changes in military strategy
including:
•
a quick peak for the invasion itself followed by a rapid drawdown;
•
limits on troop strength reflecting the military strategy endorsed by General
Abizaid, the commander in-country, to minimize military presence in order to
prevent insurgents from using the U.S. occupation as a way to gain popular
support;72
•
a shift in the U.S. strategy in October 2005 announced by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice to “clear, hold, and build” so as to “clear areas from insurgent
control,” that would gradually be implemented as U.S. troops moved out of large
bases to work more closely with Iraqi forces;73 and
71
CRS calculated fiscal year averages based “Placemat” exhibit entries for various months on International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), Factsheet, Placemat; http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html.
72
CRS Report RL34387, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress, by
(name redacted); http://apps.crs.gov/products/rl/pdf/RL34387.pdf.
73
As quoted in Ibid, p 59.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
•
the surge in troops announced by President Bush in January 2007 that
temporarily increased the number of troops by 30,000 and the number of Brigade
Combat Teams from 15 to 20 in order to implement the new counter-insurgency
policy to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods.
Initial Combat Operations
While Boots on the Ground headcounts show average strength of 67,00 in FY2003, other
measures that capture Navy and Air Force personnel outside Iraq show strength levels that are
almost two or three times as high (see Table 6 and Figure 7).
Month-to-month headcounts show the buildup for initial combat operations, followed by a fairly
rapid draw down. Troop levels for the invasion peaked at 149,000 according to DOD’s Boots on
the Ground reports while troop levels for OIF reached a highpoint of 285,000 in April 2003 —
almost twice as high as the number of U.S. troops in-country (see Table D-2).
Troop levels in Iraq itself may not have reached the 285,000 peak deployed in the region partly
because many U.S. troops who were en route, at sea, or deployed to Kuwait may not have been
sent into Iraq. For example, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks decided to turn back the 1st
Cavalry Division, which had been scheduled to enter Iraq.74 Although monthly averages smooth
out the peaks and valleys of the invasion and its aftermath, the OIF Operations Report for
FY2003 is still twice as high as the Boots on the Ground (see Table 6).
Table 6. Average Monthly Troop Levels in the Iraq War, FY2002-FY2008:
Five DOD Sources
Rounded to hundreds
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
Percent
Change,
FY2004FY2008a
Boots on the Ground
0
67,700
130,600
143,800
141,100
148,300
157,800
21%
Operations Report
0
128,600
196,900
184,400
181,300
191,200
193,100
-2%
Combat Pay
Estimateb
0
123,200
205,700
202,000
197,400
231,000
236,800
15%
Average Strength
with CRS Allocationc
0
216,500
211,600
230,500
234,100
243,200
251,100
19%
NR
NR
NR
NR
229,587
242,531
252,126
NR
Average Annual
Troop Level
Location Reportd
Source: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) reports; Joint Staff, “Operations
Report;” Defense Finance Accounting Services (DFAS), “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports;”
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DRS 21198, “Average Number of Members Deployed on any given
day by Service Component and Month/Year,” January 2009; DMDC, DRS 11280, “Modified Location Country
Report,” December 2008.
74
CRS Report RL34387, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress, by
(name redacted), December 15, 2008, p. 36.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Notes: NR = Not Reliable (see note d. below). CRS calculated monthly averages from the BOG, Operations,
DFAS, Average Strength and Location reports for each fiscal year.
a.
CRS calculated change since FY2004 to exclude first year of combat for either operation.
b.
To estimate average strength from DFAS war reports, CRS divided the total amount reported for Imminent
Danger Pay (IDP) by the annual amount that each member would receive.
c.
CRS estimated OEF and OIF allocations by applying shares in Joint Staff's Operations Report to DMDC’s,
DRS 21198 Average Strength Report.
d.
Figures are not available before FY2006 because DMDC does not consider its Modified Location Country
report to be reliable until January 2005 as service members often were shown in their first location in the
region rather than in their actual deployment; since that time, service members swipe a card upon arrival in
each location. In response to a CRS request, DMDC “scrubbed” the data to eliminate double-counts of
members who were deployed more than once within a month either in one location or multiple locations.
After former President Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq on May 1, 2003, troop
levels in Iraq dropped from the invasion peak of 149,000 to 130,000 in September 2001. OIF
troop levels fell from 285,000 in April to 170,000 in October 2003. The gap between those in Iraq
and those part of the OIF operation narrowed from 140,000 during the invasion to 40,000 by that
summer, possibly because of the re-deployment of forces (see Table D-2).75
In March 2004, OIF troop levels spiked again to 270,000 compared to 120,000 in Iraq for reasons
that are not clear. One possibility is that additional troops may have been deployed to the region
in anticipation of problems with the transfer of power from the U.S. occupation force to an Iraqi
government by June 30, 2004.76
Based on the Average Strength estimate, troop levels for OIF reached about 216,000 in FY2003,
considerably higher than either headcount measure, probably because this approach captures
troops outside Iraq. The estimate for OIF based on Imminent Danger Pay may be unreliable
because of inaccurate war cost reporting (see Table 6 and Figure 7).
Troop Levels Plateau From FY2004-FY2006
From FY2004 through FY2006, average troop levels for the Iraq War changed little under all
measures, generally varying by several thousand to about 10,000 from year to year. While Boots
on the Ground headcounts grew from 130,600 to 141,100, the Operations Report for OIF fell
from 196,900 to 181,300 in those years for reasons that are unclear. The OIF share of average
strength rose by over 20,000, from 211,600 in FY2004 to 234,100 in FY2006 (see Table 6).
The gap between Boots on the Ground and the Average Strength estimate ranged from about
70,000 in FY004 to 90,000 in FY2006. This gap probably reflects the buildup of in-theater
support as the war continued. For OIF, the major regional support and headquarters countries
include about:
•
45,000 to 50,000 in Kuwait;
75
These generalizations are based on looking at individual country deployments in Defense Manpower Data Center
Report DRS 11280, “Number of Members Deployed By Country by Month,” June 30, 2008.
76
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name redacted).
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
•
16,000 to 20,000 on ships afloat;
•
9,000 to 10,000 in the Qatar headquarters base;
•
2,000 in the United Arab Emirates;
•
4,000 in Bahrain, a Navy regional headquarters; and
•
500 to 600 in Saudi Arabia.77
Figure 7. Average Monthly Troop Levels for the Iraq War, FY2002-FY2008:
Five DOD Sources
In thousands
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
Boots on the Ground
Operations Report
Average Strength
Location Report
FY2007
FY2008
Combat Pay Estimate
Sources: Joint Staff, “Boots on the Ground Reports”, Summary Table, Sept. 2001-October 2008; Central
Command, “Operations Report,” September 2001- November 2008; Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
DRS Report 21198, “Average Number of Members Deployed on Any given Day, by Service Component and
Month/Year,” (computed by dividing the days deployed per month by the number of days in the month), January
2009; DMDC, DRS 11280, “Modified Location Country Report.” December 2008.
Notes: CRS calculated monthly averages from the BOG, Operations, DFAS, Average Strength, and Location
reports for each fiscal year. To estimate average strength from DFAS war cost reports, CRS divided the total
amount reported for OEF Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) by the $2,700 that each member would receive per year.
CRS estimated the average strength for OEF by applying the percentage shares for each fiscal year in the
77
CRS calculations of fiscal year averages for FY2006 and FY2007 based on DMDC, “DRS 11280, Modified Stinson
Country Report,” December 2008. According to “business rules” developed by the Joint Staff, troops dedicated to OIF
include the following countries: Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain; Joint Staff, September 5, 2008 email
communication to CRS.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Operations reports to the monthly averages reported in DMDC’s Average Strength Report. Location Report
figures for FY2002-FY2005 are not included because DMDC does not consider location data in its Modified
Location Country Report to be reliable until January 2005 because service members often were shown in their
first location in the region rather than in their actual deployment. After that time, a system was developed where
members recorded each location. In April 2009, DMDC “scrubbed” the data to eliminate double-counts of
members who were deployed more than once in one or multiple locations within the same month; this
eliminated all but 400 in duplications. CRS allocated countries to OIF based primarily on guidelines developed by
the Joint Staff and Central Command (see Box 1).
While troop levels were relatively stable --- hovering around 140,000 in Iraq itself and around
230,000 for OIF, the number of security incidents per week grew from about 500 in March 2005
to about 900 in September 2005. After the Samarra mosque bombing in March and April of 2006,
security incidents rose more steeply to 1,000 per week, almost twice the level of the previous
year.78
Troop Surge in FY2007 and FY2008
By October 2006, weekly security incidents in Iraq reached 1,400, peaking at close to 1,600 in
June 2007.79 In reaction, then-President Bush announced in January 2007 that there would be a
surge in the number of troops deployed to Iraq, an increase of 30,000 or five brigade combat
teams over the next several months.
Because the Army plans deployments six to 12 months in advance in order to prepare and train
units, the services have limited options to increase troop levels quickly in reaction to a
deteriorating situation. One option, unpopular with the troops but which was used during the
surge is to extend the tours of troops already deployed or to assign specialized troops for short
assignments.
To carry out this troop increase, Secretary Gates formally extended tour lengths for all active-duty
Army units in-country and those slated to deploy from 12 to 15 months, and coupled that
extension with an assurance that troops would have 12 months “dwell time” at home between
tours.80
Because the increase in troop levels took place gradually over seven months and then was
gradually reversed over the next ten months, average monthly troop strength for the Iraq War
does not show an increase of 30,000. Between FY2006 and FY2007, average troop strength grew
from 234,000 to 243,00 or by 9,000 for the year. Because the drawdown was also gradual with
higher troop levels maintained for most of the fiscal year, the monthly average in FY2008
reached 251,000 or about 7,000 more than the previous year (see Table 6 and Figure 7).81
78
See Figure “Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends, January 3, 2004-February 28, 2009, in Measuring Stability
and Security in Iraq, March 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense supplemental
Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, P.L. 110-252), p. 18;
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Measuring_Stability_and_Security_in_Iraq_March_2009.pdf.
79
Ibid.
80
Department of Defense, Press Transcript, “Secretary Gates at the Pentagon,” April 11, 2007;
http://www.defenselink.mil/faq/comment.html.
81
This excludes the probably unreliable estimate based on Imminent Danger Pay.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
In April 2008 as the number of Brigade Combat Teams was falling from 20 to 15, President Bush
announced that the Army would return to 12 month tours.82 DOD withdrew one additional
Brigade Combat Team from Iraq in the fall of 2008, bringing the total to 14 BCTs as of FY2009
and deployed an additional combat brigade of about 9,000 troops to Afghanistan in January 2009.
Further troop increases are underway in Afghanistan.
Changes from Month-to-Month
While Boots on the Ground figures do not capture all personnel dedicated to OIF operations,
these are the figures, along with the number of Army Brigade Combat Teams, that are typically
cited by policy makers in describing changes in troop levels. Although monthly reports give the
most up-to-date information, the variations from month-to-month tend to reflect rotation patterns
rather than military plans with increases in the fall and winter generally offset by decreases in the
following months in Iraq (see Figure 8).
Figure 8. Monthly Boots on the Ground (BOG) in Iraq and Troops Deployed for OIF
Operations, March 2003-November 2008
OIF: Operations Report
Sep 08
Jun 08
Mar 08
Dec 07
Jun 07
Sep 07
Mar 07
Dec 06
Jun 06
Sep 06
Mar 06
Dec 05
Jun 05
Sept 05
Mar 05
Dec 04
Jun 04
Sep 04
Mar 04
Dec 03
Sep 03
Jun 03
Mar 03
in thousands
300
290
280
270
260
250
240
230
220
210
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
BOG Reports in Iraq
Sources: Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Summary Table,” September 2008; Central Command, "Operations
Report," September 2001-November 2008.
Notes: “Boots-On-the-Ground” captures deployed military personnel in-country while OIF also includes
military personnel in the region who support that operation and are assigned to Central Command. DOD did
not send Congress BOG reports for October and November 2008.
During the surge, the number of troops for the Iraq War grew by 30,000 from 138,000 to 169,000
in Iraq itself and from 185,000 to 219,000 for OIF between February and September 2007 (see
82
Washington Post, “Bush to Cut Army Tours to 12 Months,” by Peter Baker and Jonathan Weisman, April 10, 2008.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Table D-2). By June 2007, with most of the first new troops in place, the military launched a
series of operations to clear insurgents from other areas.83
Between September 2007 and September 2008, this increase was gradually reversed with troop
levels falling from 169,000 to 147,000 in Iraq itself and from 219,000 to 181,000 for the
operation as a whole (see Figure 8 and Table D-2).
Using Different Troop Strength Figures
For those most concerned about the number of troops present in Afghanistan or in Iraq at a point
in time or those most likely to be exposed to combat, Boots on the Ground Reports may be the
best measure. On the other hand, these reports do not capture Navy and Air Force personnel
operating from outside Afghanistan or Iraq, troops providing regional support for the Afghan or
Iraq Wars or troops not present on the day of the head count.
While the Operations Report gives a more complete picture of those involved in OEF and OIF
than the BOG Reports because it includes some personnel deployed outside of Afghanistan and
Iraq, it excludes personnel who are not assigned to Central Command, and also has the limitations
of once-a-month headcounts.
To capture the full demand for manpower, a key factor in estimating costs, Average Strength
Reports—which measure person-years—may be the best measure because they capture not only
all deployed troops in each fiscal year but also how long each one stays, as well as short-term
tours (e.g., Air Force personnel flying mission, personnel assigned for special tasks). DOD
routinely uses average strength in its budgeting for military personnel. On the other hand, the
Average Strength Reports do not allocate service members between OEF and OIF, requiring CRS
to estimate those allocations using other DOD figures.
While Location Reports capture all deployments for OEF and OIF, these reports are not reliable
for each operation prior to FY2006, a disadvantage in looking for trends over time.84
If DOD were to require that the services followed a standard set of guidelines about allocating
military personnel between OEF and OIF, measures of troop strength would be more reliable and
consistent. That, in turn, would give Congress and DOD better tools to assess troop demands for
the Afghan and Iraq Wars, as well as the effects of changes in troop levels.
Few would dispute that changes in troop levels have a significant effect on war costs, whichever
measure is used. The following section discusses potential ways that troop levels may be used to
assess future war cost requests.
83
84
Ibid, p. 65-p.66.
The DMDC “scrub” of the data eliminated all but 400 in double-counting.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Service Roles and Readiness Concerns
Many observers and military spokesmen have raised concerns about frequent deployments of
units for the Afghan and Iraq Wars, characterizing the Army, in particular, as “stressed” or
“almost broken.” Long and frequent deployments are cited as harming readiness not only because
of effects on morale, but also because of the effects on having other units available and ready if
another crisis arises. Although how often a unit is deployed is one way to look at the burden, it is
useful to look at the effect on service members because the make-up of a unit changes between
deployments as individuals leave for other assignments, or retire and are replaced by new
personnel.
Concern has focused primarily on the Army, both active-duty, guard, and reserve units. Reflecting
the ground focus of both wars, Army troops (active-duty, National Guard, and Reserves) made up
61% of all OEF and OIF troops in FY2008 with Marine Corps troops contributing another 12%.
The remaining 27% are split between the Navy (15%) and the Air Force (12%) (see Figure 9).
Overall, active-duty forces made up 80% and reserve forces 20% of average strength during
FY2008. For example, 47% were active-duty Army, 10% Army National Guard, and 5% Army
Reserve. The Air Force made up another 12%, the Marine Corps another 12%, and the Navy
15%, almost all active-duty personnel (see Figure 9).
Figure 9. Service and Component Shares of OEF and OIF Troops in FY2008
As percent of total average strength
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, DRS 21198,”Average Number of Members Deployed on Any Given
Day, by Service Component and Month/Year,” January 31, 2009; Defense Manpower Data Center, DRS 26354
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
“Average Military Strength by Service/Component and Fiscal Year, FY2001-FY2008; February 9, 2009 from
Active Duty and RCCPDS Master Files.
Notes: CRS calculations based on sources above.
Measuring the Burden of Deployment
Looking at the share of each service and component that is deployed gives one measure of the
burden of deployment. Active-duty forces had substantially higher deployment rates than
reservists. Of the 2.2 million active-duty and reserve U.S. military personnel serving in FY2008,
some 12% or 260,000 troops were deployed for OEF and OIF based on average strength reports.
Overall, some 17% of active-duty forces are deployed compared to 7% of reserve forces (see
Table 7).
The highest deployment rate is for Army active-duty forces where over one-quarter are deployed
(26%). Some 7% of Army National Guard and Army Reserve strength are deployed, similar to the
overall rate for reservists.
Deployment rates are lower for the other services including:
•
16% for the Marine Corps;
•
12% for the Navy; and
•
8% for the Air Force (see Table 7).
Deployment rates for reserves in the other services were generally half or less than the rate for
active-duty forces. For example, about 7% of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve
were deployed compared to 26% for active-duty Army in FY2008. Similarly, 4% of the Air Force
Guard and Air Force Reserve were deployed compared to 8% for active-duty (see Table 7).
Table 7. Percent of Each Service Deployed for OEF or OIF in FY2008
By Service and By Component
Average
Strength
Deployed
Total Strength
Percent Deployed
Total
261,501
2,235,100
12%
Active-Duty
232,563
1,367,316
17%
National Guard
32,803
463,910
7%
Reserves
25,068
370,813
7%
284
48,957
1%
Army Total
177,936
1,076,168
17%
Active-Duty
135,873
524,124
26%
National Guard
28,843
357,604
8%
Reserves
13,220
194,440
7%
Navy Total
43,318
397,494
11%
Active-Duty
39,029
327,732
12%
Coast Guard
By Service and Component
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Average
Strength
Deployed
Total Strength
Reserves
4,289
69,762
6%
US Marine Corps Total
36,490
228,665
16%
Active-Duty
31,415
190,593
16%
Reserves
5,075
38,072
13%
Air Force Total
32,690
499,712
7%
Active-Duty
26,246
324,867
8%
National Guard
3,960
106,306
4%
Reserves
2,484
68,539
4%
By Service and By Component
Percent Deployed
Sources: Defense Manpower Data Center, DRS 21198,”Average Number of Members Deployed on Any Given
Day, by Service Component and Month/Year,” January 31, 2009; Days Deployed per month is divided by number
of days in the month; and DMDC, DRS 26354, “Average Military Strength by Service/Component and Fiscal
Year, FY2001-FY2008,” February 9, 2009.
Notes: CRS calculations based on sources above.
Deployment rates alone, however, do not capture the full impact of OEF and OIF on the services.
In addition to those currently deployed, other troops are preparing or “training up” to deploy or
recovering from a recent deployment. Taking those troops into account suggests that roughly
twice as many troops are affected by OEF and OIF as the number deployed. In the case of the
active-duty Army, probably half of the active-duty Army is either deployed, undergoing intensive
training to deploy, or recovering from a deployment, and about one-third in the case of the activeduty Marine Corps.85 The large share of the Army active-duty forces dedicated to OEF and OIF
presumably underlies concerns about the Army’s readiness to carry out other operations should
they arise.
85
This assumes a six-month intensive “training-up” period, and a six-month recovery period.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Appendix A. Actual and Estimated Troop Levels in
Afghanistan and Iraq, FY2007-FY2012
CRS estimated average monthly troop levels in Afghanistan and in Iraq for FY2009-FY2012
based on the announcements made by the White House on February 17, February 27, and March
27, 2009, and Department of Defense press releases and conferences. 86 Where future levels have
not been identified, CRS made the conservative assumptions described below.
According to these announcements, the Administration is deploying 21,000 more troops to
Afghanistan in FY2009. These troops are in addition to a combat brigade with support of about
9,000 that was approved by President Bush in December 2008. Together, this would increase
troop levels in Afghanistan by 30,000 by the end of FY2009. Because Department of Defense
Secretary Gates suggested that increases beyond that are unlikely, CRS assumes continuation of
that level through FY2012 in this table.
In the case of Iraq, the Administration plans to reduce troops in Iraq by two Brigade Combat
Teams in FY2009 by not replacing two brigades coming home in June 2009. In addition, several
smaller units were withdrawn between December 2008 and April 2009.87 DOD is also planning to
downsize some replacement units.
According to Administration statements, troop levels in Iraq would decline to 35,000 to 50,000 by
August 31, 2010, which CRS estimates as 45,000 troops or 5 BCT-equivalents (roughly the
midpoint). These troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2011 as required by the Security
Agreement between the United States and Iraq.
Conservatively, CRS assumes that these U.S. troops remain in-country until the last five months
of 2011, the latest possible date that would meet the December 31, 2011 deadline for the
withdrawal of all U.S. troops in the U.S.- Iraq Security Agreement. Based on that assumption,
two BCTs would be withdrawn at the end of FY2011 (August and September 2011) and three in
the first quarter of FY2012 (October – December 2011).88
Based on these plans, CRS set up a schedule that estimates how long BCTs will be in-country.
Taking into account the number of troops and their time in-country, CRS calculates the number of
weighted average Brigade Combat Team equivalents in Afghanistan and Iraq in each fiscal year
86
Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan,” February 17, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/.White House, “Responsibly
Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/.
87
Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Monthly “Boots on the Ground Reports,” December 1, 2008 and April 1, 2009.
88
Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan,” February 17, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/.White House, “Responsibly
Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/.
Congressional Research Service
44
Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
in Table A-1. CRS assumes that each BCT has 9,000 troops, 1,000 less than the Army’s planning
assumption in order to reflect the fact that Marine Corps units are generally smaller.
The schedule also assumes that troops are added or withdrawn at the end of each month, and that
all Navy and Air Force troops in-country are providing support to Army and Marine Corps. This
schedule does not reflect changes in the number of troops deployed to countries in the region or
related operations.
To check the validity of this approach, CRS used this method to estimate troop levels in Iraq in
FY2007 and FY2008 and then compared the estimate with reported BOG figures. The CRS
estimates were close to reported average monthly Boots on the Ground. Estimates for FY2009FY2012 build on the reported numbers of Boots on the Ground as of September 1, 2008, close to
the beginning of FY2009 (see Table A-1).89
Table A-1. Estimating Troop Strength in Afghanistan and Iraq, FY2007-FY2012
Using Weighted Average Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Equivalents. Estimates in Italics
Schedule for Troops InCountry: Assumes End-ofMonth Deployments and
Withdrawals
No. of
BCTsa
No. of
Months in
Country
Multiply
BCTs by
Months
Divide by
12 for
monthly
weighted
average
Annual
Change in
Weighted
Average/
No. of
Troops
Percent
Annual
Change
1.4
9%
TROOPS IN IRAQ IN 2007: SURGE
15 BCTs for full fiscal year
15
12
180
15.0
1 BCT added in Feb. 07
1
7
7
0.6
1 BCT added in Mar. 07
1
6
6
0.5
1 BCT added in Ap. 07
1
5
5
0.4
1 BCT added in May 07
1
4
4
0.3
1 BCT added in June 07
1
3
3
0.3
Estimated BCTs in Iraq
20
17.1
Estimated Troops in Iraq in
FY2007
153,750
12,650
9%
Reported Average Monthly
Boots on the Ground
148,292
7,192
5%
5,548
NA
NA
.4
16%
3,241
16%
Estimate vs. Reported
TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN IN FY2007: REPORTED
Afghanistan BCT-equivalentsb
Reported Troops in
Afghanistan
2.6
12
31.5
2.6
23,658
BCTs AND TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN IN FY2007
89
DOD did not send Congress Boots on the Ground Reports for October 1 and November 1, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
45
Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Schedule for Troops InCountry: Assumes End-ofMonth Deployments and
Withdrawals
No. of
BCTsa
Estimated BCTs in Iraq and
Afghanistan
22.6
No. of
Months in
Country
Multiply
BCTs by
Months
NA
NA
Divide by
12 for
monthly
weighted
average
Annual
Change in
Weighted
Average/
No. of
Troops
Percent
Annual
Change
19.7
1.8
10%
Estimated Troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan in FY2007
177,408
15,891
10%
Reported Average Annual
Boots on the Ground
171,950
10,433
6%
5,468
NA
NA
Estimate vs. Reported
TROOPS IN IRAQ IN FY2008: GRADUAL DRAWDOWN FROM SURGE
Surge: 20 Brigade Combat
Teams (BCTs) in-place from
Oct. 2007 until Mar. 2008
20
1 BCT in Iraq for 6 months,
withdrawn in March 2008 and
not replaced
1
6
6
0.5
1 BCT in Iraq for 7 months,
withdrawn in April 2008 and
not replaced
1
7
7
0.6
1 BCT in Iraq for 8 months,
withdrawn in May 2008 and
not replaced
1
8
8
0.7
1 BCT in Iraq for 9 months,
withdrawn in June 2008 and
not replaced
1
9
9
0.8
1 BCT in Iraq for 10 months,
withdrawn in July 2008 and not
replaced
1
10
10
0.8
1 BCT in Iraq for 11 months,
withdrawn in Aug. 2008 and
not replaced
1
11
11
0.9
14 BCTs in Iraq for 12 months
14
12
168
14.0
Estimated BCTs
14
18.3
1.2
7%
Estimated Troops in Iraq in
FY2008
164,250
10,500
7%
Reported Average Monthly
BOG
157,775
9,483
6%
6,475
NA
NA
Estimate vs. Reported
BCTs AND TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN IN FY2008
Afghanistan BCT-equivalentsb
Reported Troops in
Afghanistan
Congressional Research Service
3.3
12
40
3.3
30,142
0.7
6,484
27%
27%
46
Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Schedule for Troops InCountry: Assumes End-ofMonth Deployments and
Withdrawals
No. of
BCTsa
No. of
Months in
Country
Multiply
BCTs by
Months
Divide by
12 for
monthly
weighted
average
Annual
Change in
Weighted
Average/
No. of
Troops
Percent
Annual
Change
1.9
10%
TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN IN FY2008
Estimated BCTs
17.3
21.6
Estimated Troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan in FY2008
194,392
16,984
10%
Reported Average Annual
Boots on the Ground: Both
187,917
15,967
9%
6,475
NA
NA
Estimate vs. Reported:
Both
TROOPS IN IRAQ IN FY2009: ESTIMATE OF OBAMA PLANc
146,000 Boots on the Ground
in-country, or 16 average
BCTs, as of Sept. 2008c
16
Decrease of 9,000 troops
without replacement from Dec.
2008-April 2008 based on
BOG reports; in-country for
about six monthse
1
6
6.1
.5
2 BCTs in Iraq for 9 months,
withdrawn in June 2009, and
not replaced
2
9
18
1.5
Downsizing in replacement
unitsf
.5
6
3.0
.3
13 BCTs in Iraq for 12 months
13
12
154
12.8
No further withdrawals until
after Dec. 09 elections
Estimated BCTs
12.8
15.1
Estimated Troops in Iraq in
FY2009
135,600
-2.5
-27,175
-14%
-14%
TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN IN FY2009: BUSH AND OBAMA INCREASES
33,450 Boots on the Ground
in-country or 3-4 average
BCTs in place as of Sept. 1,
2008 b
3.7
12
44.6
3.7
Bush approves deployment of
additional BCT with support in
Jan. 2009
1.0
9
9.0
0.8
Obama adds 8,000 Marines in
Mar. 2009
0.9
7
6.2
0.5
Obama adds 4,000 trainers in
May 2009
0.4
4
1.8
0.1
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Schedule for Troops InCountry: Assumes End-ofMonth Deployments and
Withdrawals
No. of
BCTsa
Obama adds 9,000 troops in
June 2009
1.0
Estimated BCTs
7.1
No. of
Months in
Country
6
Multiply
BCTs by
Months
Divide by
12 for
monthly
weighted
average
6.0
0.5
Annual
Change in
Weighted
Average/
No. of
Troops
Percent
Annual
Change
2.3
68%
5.6
Estimated Troops in
Afghanistan in FY2009
50,700
20,558
68%
ESTIMATED BCTs AND TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN IN FY2009
Estimated BCTs: Both
20
20.7
Estimated Troops in FY2009:
Both
186,300
-.2
-1,617
-1%
-1%
IRAQ IN FY2010: DECREASE TO 45,000 BY AUGUST 31, 2010
Assumes 13 average BCTs incountry as of Oct. 2009, with
withdrawals beginning after
Dec. 2009 elections until
45,000 troops or 5 average
BCTs by August 31, 2010 as
announced by President
Obama on Feb. 27, 2009g
13
1 BCT in Iraq for 4 months,
withdrawn in January 2011, and
not replaced
1
4
4.0
.3
1 BCT in Iraq for 5 months,
withdrawn in Feb. 2011, and
not replaced
1
5
5.0
0.4
1 BCT in Iraq for 6 months,
withdrawn in Mar. 2011, and
not replaced
1
6
6.0
0.5
1 BCT in Iraq for 7 months,
withdrawn in April 2011, and
not replaced
1
7
7.0
0.6
1 BCT in Iraq for 8 months,
withdrawn in May 2011, and
not replaced
1
8
8.0
0.7
1 BCT in Iraq for 9 months,
withdrawn in June 2011, and
not replaced
1
9
9.0
0.8
1 BCT in Iraq for 10 months,
withdrawn in July 2011,and not
replaced
1
10
10.0
0.8
1 BCT in Iraq for 11 months,
withdrawn in August 2011, and
not replaced
1
11
11.0
0.9
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Schedule for Troops InCountry: Assumes End-ofMonth Deployments and
Withdrawals
No. of
BCTsa
5 BCTs in Iraq for 12 months
5
Estimated BCTs
No. of
Months in
Country
12
Multiply
BCTs by
Months
Divide by
12 for
monthly
weighted
average
57.7
4.8
5.0
9.8
Estimated Troops in Iraq in
FY2009
88,300
Annual
Change in
Weighted
Average/
No. of
Troops
Percent
Annual
Change
-5.3
-35%
-47,300
-35%
AFGHANISTAN IN FY2010: NO CHANGE
7 BCTs in-place as of Oct.
2009
7
12
84.6
7.1
No change
0
0
0
0
0
0%
7.1
1.4
25%
Estimated BCTs
Estimated Troops in
Afghanistan in FY2010
63,40
12,750
25%
ESTIMATED BCTs AND TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN IN FY2010
Estimated BCTs
12
16.9
Estimated Troops in FY2010:
Both
151,750
-3.8
34,550
-19%
19%
IRAQ IN FY2011: ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS
Assumes 45,000 troops in
October 2010 with
withdrawals beginning in the
last two months of the fiscal
year to meet US-Iraq Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA)
requirement that all U.S. forces
are of Iraq by the end of
calendar 2011
5
1 BCT in Iraq for 10 months,
withdrawn in July 2011
1
10
10.0
0.8
1 BCT in Iraq for 11 months,
withdrawn in Aug. 2011
1
11
11.0
0.9
3 BCTs for 12 months
3
12
36.0
3.0
Estimated BCTs
3.0
4.8
Estimated Troops in Iraq in
FY2010
42,750
-5.1
-52%
-45,550
-52%
0
0%
AFGHANISTAN IN FY2011: NO CHANGE
Assume BCTs the same as in
FY2010
No change
Estimated BCTs
Congressional Research Service
7.1
12
84.6
7.1
0
0
0
0
7.1
49
Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Schedule for Troops InCountry: Assumes End-ofMonth Deployments and
Withdrawals
No. of
BCTsa
No. of
Months in
Country
Multiply
BCTs by
Months
Estimated Troops in
Afghanistan in FY2010
Divide by
12 for
monthly
weighted
average
Annual
Change in
Weighted
Average/
No. of
Troops
63,350
Percent
Annual
Change
0
0%
-5.1
-30%
ESTIMATED BCTs AND TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN IN FY2011
Estimated BCTs
10
12
120.0
Estimated Troops in FY2011:
Both
11.8
106,200
-45,550
-30%
IRAQ IN FY2012: FINAL WITHDRAWAL TO MEET SECURITY AGREEMENT
3 BCTs in Iraq at beginning of
year
3
1 BCT in Iraq for 1 month,
withdrawn end of Oct. 2011
1
1
1.0
0.1
1 BCT in Iraq for 2 months,
withdrawn end of Nov. 2011
1
2
2.0
0.2
1 BCT in Iraq for 3 months,
withdrawn end of Dec. 2011
1
3
2.4
0.2
Estimated BCTs
0
0.5
Estimated Troops in Iraq in
FY2012
4,050
-4.3
-38,700
-91%
-91%
AFGHANISTAN IN FY2012: NO CHANGE
Assume BCTs the same as in
FY2010
7
Estimated BCTs in Afghanistan
in FY2012
7
12
Estimated Troops in
Afghanistan in FY2012
84.6
7.1
7.1
63,450
0.0
0%
0
0%
ESTIMATED BCTs AND TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN IN FY2012
Estimated BCTs in Iraq and
Afghanistan in FY2012
7
Estimated Troops in FY2012:
Both
7.5
67,500
-4.3
-38,750
-36%
-36%
Sources: White House, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, February 27, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/; White House, “Statement by the
President on Afghanistan,” February 17, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-thePresident-on-Afghanistan/; White House, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” March 27, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-NewStrategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Monthly “Boots on the Ground Reports;”
DOD Press releases and conferences where troop plans are discussed, 9-15-08, 10-1-08, 12-2-08,12-18-08, 1222-08, 1-8-09, 1-29-09, 2-18-09, 3-1-09, 3-29-09, 5-3-09; see http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/.
Notes: CRS calculations based on sources listed above.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
a.
CRS defines an average Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as having 9,000 troops including both combat and
support elements. This figure reflects the Army assumption of 10,000 troops for a BCT adjusted to take
into account that some Marine units are smaller.
b.
CRS estimated average BCTs based on monthly average figures reported in Boots on the Ground reports.
c.
CRS uses reported Boots on the Ground for September 1, 2008 as the starting point for estimates for
FY2009-FY2012; DOD did not send its Oct. 1, 2008 report to Congress.
d.
Includes combat brigade, 2,800 from the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade and other support troops.
e.
Department of Defense, “Boots on the Ground Reports,” December 2008 and April 2009.
f.
CRS estimate assuming an overall decrease of 4,500 troops for half of the year, based on discussion with
DOD officials.
g.
White House, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” Speech by President Obama at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, February 27, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/.
Congressional Research Service
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Appendix B. The Cost of an Average Brigade
Combat Team: FY2005 and FY2008
To estimate future war costs, budgeters typically look to past experience, and then make
adjustments for changes in troop levels, new requirements, savings in infrastructure costs already
covered or one-time expenses, or pricing changes. To estimate the effect of increases and
decreases in troop strength, CRS used the cost of an average Brigade Combat Team in FY2008.
Between FY2005 and FY2008, overall war costs rose more rapidly than increases in the number
of troops in-country so the cost of an average BCT has risen. This reflects both higher operational
costs, and particularly rapid growth in investment spending. In some cases, such as the rise in
investment spending, the Administration’s new policy to limit war-related procurement to
replacement of war losses and replenishment, is likely to reduce future costs. In other cases, such
as the rise in infrastructure spending in Iraq, it is not clear whether to expect that experience to be
duplicated in Afghanistan.
Because the Administration only provided information about future changes in the number of
troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, CRS spread all war costs over the number of troops in-country.
This essentially assumes that changes in the number of troops in-country will be matched by
proportional changes in troops in the region, which may or may not be the case. While it is likely
that Navy and Air Force personnel who support ground operations, and some of the Army support
personnel in Kuwait would change in tandem with changes in forces in-country, other
headquarters personnel may not change proportionately.
Definition of War Costs
War requests cover funding intended to cover the incremental or additional costs tied to paying
and deploying U.S. military personnel to a war zone. For military personnel, this has included:
•
the costs of special pays like Imminent Danger Pay and Separation Allowances;
•
recruiting and retention bonuses;
•
activating reservists (paying full-time rather than part-time salaries and benefits);
and
•
growing the size of the Army and Marine Corps.
Some of these expenses, like “growing the force” are to be transferred to DOD’s baseline budget
in FY2010, reducing war costs. Recruiting and retention bonuses could also be transferred and are
likely to be lower because of the recession.
For Operations and Maintenance (O&M), war costs include:
•
transporting personnel and equipment to and from the war zone;
•
higher operating tempo in a war zone;
•
repairing war-worn equipment;
•
providing force protection gear to personnel;
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
•
setting up and operating communication and intelligence assets; and
•
building, maintaining and providing security at bases.
For procurement and Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) war costs have
included the following types of items:
•
replacement and upgrading of a wide range of war-worn equipment, defined
broadly to include replacement with new weapon systems and upgrading of
current systems already part of DOD’s modernization plans (e.g. F-22s, Stryker
brigades);
•
equipment to accelerate the Army’s plans to convert to more standardized
modular units and the Marine Corps’ plans to restructure its units;
•
equipment for additional units in the Army and Marine Corps as part of DOD’s
“Grow the Force” initiative;
•
new and upgraded force protection equipment based on experience in the field
(e.g. Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAPs and up armored High
Mobility Wheeled Vehicles, or HMMWVs); and
•
RDT&E related to war-related threats such as Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs).
In its FY2009 Supplemental Request, DOD significantly changed its definition of reconstitution,
restoring the traditional criteria which limited procurement to replacement of war losses and
replenishment of war munitions and stocks. This resulted in a halving of DOD’s procurement
request in FY2009. 90
For military construction, war costs include not only building and upgrading bases in Afghanistan
with new air strips, generating and water purification plants, and other structures, but also
building roads.
Changes in Afghanistan Costs Between FY2005 and FY2008
Between FY2005 and FY2008, average monthly troop strength in Afghanistan rose by 58% while
overall Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) war costs almost doubled from $14.6 billion to $27.5
billion.91 Because costs outstripped the rise in troop levels, the average cost of a BCT in
Afghanistan rose by 19% from $6.9 billion to $8.2 billion (see Table B-1).
Operational costs in Afghanistan — covering both military personnel and Operation &
Maintenance (O&M) — rose less rapidly than investment costs. The 10% increase in overall
operational costs reflects an increase of almost 50% in O&M costs offset by an 8% decrease in
90
In addition, the FY2009 request did not include the one-time buy in Fy2008 of the entire requirement for the original
versions of MRAP vehicles, costing $16.8 billion.
91
The Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS), “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports,” September
2005 and September 2008, Operation Enduring Freedom.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
military personnel costs. The decline in average personnel costs in FY2008 may reflect less
reliance on activating reservists, the largest single personnel cost.92
Table B-1. Average Cost per Brigade Combat Team- Equivalent in Afghanistan and
Iraq, FY2005 and FY2008
AFGHANISTAN
TROOP LEVELS
Monthly Average Boots on the Ground
FY2005
FY2008
19,058
30,142
Change From
FY2005-FY2008
58%
COST IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Military Personnel
1.6
1.5
-8%
Operation & Maintenance
3.2
4.7
47%
Total Operational Costa
6.5
7.2
10%
Total Investment Costb
0.4
1.0
173%
TOTAL
6.9
8.2
19%
IRAQ
TROOP LEVELS
Monthly Average Boots on the Ground
FY2005
FY2008
Change From
FY2005-FY2008
143,800
157,775
10%
COST IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Military Personnel
0.7
0.8
9%
Operation & Maintenance
2.6
3.9
48%
Total Operational Costa
3.5
4.8
38%
Total Investment Costb
1.1
2.4
118%
TOTAL
4.6
7.2
57%
Sources: Defense Finance Accounting Service, "Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports," FY2005 and
FY2008; Joint Staff, "Boots on the Ground" monthly reports.
Notes: CRS calculations of average annual troop levels based on monthly reports and average cost per brigade
combat team equivalent of 9,000 troops.
a.
Operational Cost includes intelligence.
b.
Includes Procurement, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, and Military Construction.
92
The Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS), “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports,” show a 44%
increase from $1.8 billion to $2.6 billion in the cost of activating reservists between FY2005 and FY2008 for OEF in
the September end-of-year reports.
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
In Afghanistan, O&M costs more than doubled for combat-related expenses (e.g. fuel and spare
parts, depot maintenance) and trebled for base support costs, increasing far more rapidly than
troop strength.93 Increases in operating tempo costs may reflect the U.S. response to rising levels
of violence while higher support costs may reflect the build-up of infrastructure in-country. It is
not clear whether average costs will continue to rise or fall as the number of troops in-country
increases.
Investment costs for replacing and upgrading equipment also more than trebled in the past three
years, which may reflect the expanded definition of war-related costs more than changes in the
operating tempo (see discussion of reconstitution below).
Changes in Iraq Costs Between FY2005 and FY2008
Between FY2005 and FY2008, average monthly troop strength in Iraq grew by 10% in Iraq while
the average cost of deploying a BCT rose by 72%. The average cost of a BCT in Iraq rose from
$4.6 billion to $7.2 billion, a 57% increase, a steeper increase than in Afghanistan (see Table
B-1).
Like Afghanistan, overall average operating costs in Iraq rose by about 40% though both military
personnel and O&M costs grew faster than troop strength. Unlike Afghanistan, average military
personnel costs also increased, primarily because of the cost of growing the size of the Army and
Marine Corps (no longer considered a war cost, transferred to DOD’s FY2010 baseline budget).
O&M costs in Iraq grew at about the same rate as in Afghanistan – about 50%, with growth
concentrated more in support than combat-related operating expenses. For example, the cost of
base support rose by 41% while troop strength grew by 10%.
Most dramatically, investment costs doubled over three years, again more a reflection of a redefinition of war-related reconstitution rather than more intense wartime operating tempo (see
discussion below).
Future War Costs
There are a variety of possible explanations for increases in average costs — higher benefits for
deployed personnel, differences in combat intensity, rising spending to repair equipment,
substantial support costs for large, well-developed bases, or expanded definitions of
reconstitution.94 Some of these increases may continue in the future and some may not.
93
CRS calculations based on DFAS, “Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports,” September 2005 and
September 2008, OEF.
94
CRS, Statement of (name redacted) before the House Budget Committee, “The Rising Cost of the Iraq War,” October
24, 2007; http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/10.24Belasco_testimony.pdf; CBO, Letter to Senator Conrad,
“Analysis of the Growth in Funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere in the War on Terror,” February 11, 2008;
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8971/02-11-WarCosts_Letter.pdf; CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by (name redacted).
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Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012
Dramatic Growth in Reconstitution Costs Ends
The steepest increase in costs has been in investment accounts, particularly procurement, where
the definition of resetting or reconstituting units after their war-related deployments was
substantially changed between 2004 and 2008. These changes led to a dramatic increase in warrelated procurement from $5 billion in to $7 billion in FY2004 to $45 billion in FY2008.CBO,
GAO, CRS, and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) have all questioned
whether much of this funding in supplemental appropriation acts for procurement, in fact,
reflected war-related needs. 95
Beginning in 2005, the definition of war-related procurement was broadened to include paying
for the conversion and upgrading of Army and Marine Corps units to a new modular or more
standardized composition. In FY2005 and FY2006, DOD requested and received $5 billion each
year for these restructuring initiatives underway before the Afghan and Iraq wars. The services
argued that these changes would make rotations easier because of the greater similarity among
units though the impact appears to be small. 96
A further expansion in the definition of war-related procurement also occurred in 2006 when the
services were given new guidance that permitted them to include in war requests items needed for
the “long war” and not be “strictly limited to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF).”97 This made it easier for the services to request and receive funding for
new and upgraded equipment rather than to replace war losses or replenish munitions or other
war stocks. DOD also changed its traditional guidance that limited reset or reconstitution to
restoring units to their pre-war condition (e.g. with replacements for war losses) to upgrading
equipment to meet new threats.
In a study of the Army’s reset , CBO estimated that more than 40% of the Army’s reset funding
was not, in fact related to the repair and replacement of war-worn equipment. 98 A December 2008
CSBA study concluded that the adoption of the “long war” framework for evaluating war-related
requirements “allows the Services to include virtually anything in their request for war-related
95
CBO, Replacing and Repairing Equipment Used In Iraq and Afghanistan: The Army's Reset Program by Frances M.
Lussier, Sep
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