War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportMar 9, 2011
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and
Issues for Congress
(name redacted)
Specialist in International Security
March 9, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R40156
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Summary
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched and led
military operations in Afghanistan in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe
haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda’s use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of
operations for terrorist activities. Many observers argue that in succeeding years, as U.S. and
world attention shifted sharply to the war in Iraq, the Afghan war became the “other war” and
suffered from neglect. The Obama Administration, however, has made the war in Afghanistan a
higher priority, by giving it early attention, regularly conducting strategy reviews, and making
significant additional commitments of civilian and military resources. By early 2011, senior
leaders, including the Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
General David Petraeus, were pointing to discrete progress on the ground, though noting that such
progress was still “fragile and reversible.”
In late 2010, NATO and the Afghan government agreed to pursue a key medium-term goal: the
transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans throughout the country by the end of
2014. The U.S. government has stated its intention to begin drawing down some U.S. forces from
Afghanistan in July 2011, and also to maintain a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan
beyond 2014.
Strategic vision for Afghanistan is still, many would argue, a work in progress. President Karzai
has consistently stressed the theme of “Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership.” President Obama
has consistently stressed the core goals of the United States: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat alQaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return. Yet for the U.S. government,
fundamental issues remain unresolved. These include
•
determining the minimum essential conditions required for Afghanistan itself to
be able to sustain stability with relatively limited international support;
•
defining the appropriate combination of U.S. efforts, together with other
international resources, over time, required to achieve those minimum
conditions; and
•
balancing U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region against
other imperatives, in a constrained fiscal environment.
This report, which will be updated as events warrant, describes and analyzes
•
the key players in the war in Afghanistan;
•
the strategic outlooks of the Afghan government, the U.S. government, and
NATO;
•
the threats to the security and stability of the Afghan state and its people;
•
the major facets of the current effort: security, governance and anti-corruption,
development, reconciliation and reintegration, and transition;
•
mechanisms in place to measure progress; and
•
critical issues that Congress may wish to consider further.
Congressional Research Service
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Contents
Overview ....................................................................................................................................1
Major Stakeholders ...............................................................................................................1
Current Dynamics .................................................................................................................1
Key Debates..........................................................................................................................2
Origins of the War.......................................................................................................................3
Prelude to War ......................................................................................................................3
Major Combat Operations .....................................................................................................4
Post-Taliban Developments .........................................................................................................5
Bonn Process ........................................................................................................................5
The Afghan People in Post-Taliban Afghanistan ....................................................................5
Strategy ......................................................................................................................................6
Afghan Strategy ....................................................................................................................6
U.S. Strategy.........................................................................................................................7
Post-9/11 Aims................................................................................................................7
Bush Administration Strategy..........................................................................................7
Obama Administration Strategy.......................................................................................8
COMISAF Initial Assessment .........................................................................................8
Fall 2009 Strategy Review ..............................................................................................9
December 2010 Afghanistan Pakistan Annual Review ................................................... 10
U.S. Strategy in 2011 .................................................................................................... 11
NATO Strategy ................................................................................................................... 11
The Threat ................................................................................................................................ 12
The Insurgencies ................................................................................................................. 13
Current Security Conditions .......................................................................................... 13
Taliban.......................................................................................................................... 14
Haqqani Network.......................................................................................................... 15
Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)..................................................................................... 15
“Criminal Patronage Networks” .......................................................................................... 16
Kabul Bank and National-Level Institutions .................................................................. 16
Sub-National-Level Powerbrokers................................................................................. 17
Ahmed Wali Karzai................................................................................................. 17
General Abdul Razziq ............................................................................................. 18
Governor Gul Agha Sherzai .................................................................................... 18
International Community Practices...................................................................................... 19
Structure of the International Effort ........................................................................................... 20
Leadership of the Effort ...................................................................................................... 20
Lead Nation Model ....................................................................................................... 20
Afghanistan Compact and UNAMA.............................................................................. 20
Kabul Process ............................................................................................................... 21
NATO ................................................................................................................................. 22
ISAF Creation and Legal Basis for Presence ................................................................. 22
ISAF Mandate............................................................................................................... 22
ISAF Geographic Expansion through Stages ................................................................. 23
ISAF Organization ........................................................................................................ 23
ISAF Joint Command (IJC)..................................................................................... 23
Congressional Research Service
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) ...................................................... 24
Regional Commands ............................................................................................... 24
ISAF Troop Contributors............................................................................................... 24
National Caveats ........................................................................................................... 25
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ....................................................................... 25
NATO Senior Civilian Representative ........................................................................... 26
U.S. Presence...................................................................................................................... 27
U.S. Forces ................................................................................................................... 27
U.S. Troop Numbers ............................................................................................... 28
Legal Basis for U.S. Force Presence........................................................................ 29
U.S. Government Civilians............................................................................................ 30
Civilian “Surge”...................................................................................................... 30
Senior Civilian Representatives............................................................................... 31
U.S. Civil-Military Integration ...................................................................................... 32
Civil-Military Integration Versus Division of Labor................................................. 32
Structure for Integration and Decision-Making ........................................................ 33
Civil-Military Planning ........................................................................................... 34
The Campaign........................................................................................................................... 34
Operation Omid .................................................................................................................. 35
Planning and Participation in Operation Omid............................................................... 35
Operation Moshtarek..................................................................................................... 35
Operation Hamkari ....................................................................................................... 36
Winter Campaign and 2011 Operations ......................................................................... 37
Timelines and Transition ..................................................................................................... 37
President Karzai’s Support for Transition ...................................................................... 38
Elaboration and Approval of the Transition Concept...................................................... 38
Transition Decisions...................................................................................................... 39
Security Efforts................................................................................................................... 39
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ..................................................................... 40
ANSF Target Endstrengths ...................................................................................... 40
Command and Control ............................................................................................ 42
Training the ANSF .................................................................................................. 42
Partnering with the ANSF ....................................................................................... 44
Operational Effectiveness........................................................................................ 45
Afghan Local Police...................................................................................................... 47
Counter-Terrorism Activities ......................................................................................... 49
Civilian Casualties: Afghan Concerns, ISAF Tactical Directives.................................... 49
Cooperation with Pakistan............................................................................................. 50
Pakistan’s Border Challenge.................................................................................... 51
U.S. Strategy and Policy.......................................................................................... 52
U.S. Drone Strikes .................................................................................................. 52
Tactical- and Operational-Level Cooperation........................................................... 53
Governance and Anti-Corruption Efforts ............................................................................. 54
Capacity-Building......................................................................................................... 56
Human Capital........................................................................................................ 56
Sub-National-Level Capacity-Building.................................................................... 57
Accountability—Afghan and International .................................................................... 57
Appointments and Removals................................................................................... 58
Shuras (Councils).................................................................................................... 60
“Supporting GIRoA”............................................................................................... 62
Congressional Research Service
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Changing International Community Practices .......................................................... 63
Development Efforts ........................................................................................................... 63
Integration of Development Efforts ............................................................................... 64
Afghanistan’s Future Economy: Opportunities and Requirements.................................. 65
Development Efforts at the Sub-National Level............................................................. 66
Development and Patronage Networks .......................................................................... 67
Reintegration and Reconciliation Efforts ............................................................................. 68
Afghan Government Views ........................................................................................... 68
U.S. Government Views ................................................................................................ 69
National Consultative Peace Jirga and High Peace Council............................................ 69
Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program ..................................................................... 69
Reconciliation Process .................................................................................................. 70
Metrics ..................................................................................................................................... 72
“1230” Reports on Security and Stability in Afghanistan ..................................................... 72
National Security Council “Metrics” Reports ...................................................................... 73
Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review ........................................................................... 74
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 75
“Success” in Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 75
Reconciliation..................................................................................................................... 76
Governance and Corruption ................................................................................................ 77
Transition............................................................................................................................ 77
Afghan National Security Forces......................................................................................... 78
Afghan Local Police............................................................................................................ 78
U.S. Troop Drawdowns....................................................................................................... 79
Long-Term Strategic Partnership ......................................................................................... 80
Economic Strategy .............................................................................................................. 80
Safe Havens in Pakistan ...................................................................................................... 81
Implications for NATO........................................................................................................ 81
Implications for U.S. Force Sizing....................................................................................... 82
Implications for Caring for Returning Veterans.................................................................... 82
Implications for U.S. Civ-Mil Integration............................................................................ 82
Additional Reports .................................................................................................................... 83
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan.................................................................................................... 84
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 84
Congressional Research Service
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Overview
The war in Afghanistan began with a U.S.-led military response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, designed to remove the Taliban-led regime and prevent future terrorist safe
havens. The war, currently in its 10th year, is now a multi-faceted joint, civil-military, combined
campaign, including a NATO-led military effort and substantial multi-lateral and bilateral civilian
initiatives, broadly aimed at ending the insurgent threat to the Afghan government and helping the
Afghan people lay the foundations for lasting stability.
Major Stakeholders
For the government of Afghanistan, the war is first of all an existential struggle for survival
against the Taliban and other insurgents, as well as a longer-term effort to establish sustainable
security and stability.
For the Afghan people, the war is only the latest proximate cause of instability and insecurity in
30 years of conflict and dislocation. Their daily lives are shaped by the hardships of providing for
their families in settings with very limited economic development and opportunity, intimidation
in some areas from insurgent groups, and frustration with the limited capacity and, sometimes,
corruption of official government structures.
For the major insurgent groups, the war is about achieving some combination of political power,
economic leverage, and radical Islamic cultural influence.
For the U.S. government—which leads the international military effort, provides substantial
civilian expertise, and plays a significant role in shaping the overall strategic direction—the war
in Afghanistan concerns helping ensure the security of both Afghanistan and the region, including
denying safe haven to terrorists, in order to establish a stable regional security balance and protect
U.S. national interests.
For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors
Pakistan and Iran, the war is critical because it may have a powerful impact on both security and
the balance of power and influence in the region. Pakistan in particular, which willingly or
otherwise provides safe haven to Afghan insurgent groups, has deeply vested interests in the
outcome of the conflict.
For individual member states of the NATO Alliance, the war may be about some combination of
defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing
NATO members, and demonstrating the relevance of the Alliance to 21st century global security
challenges.
Current Dynamics
Under the Obama Administration, the war in Afghanistan—after years of being perceived by
many as “the other war”—has become the focus of significantly greater leadership time and
attention, and the recipient of significantly greater resources. The U.S. government’s core goals
Congressional Research Service
1
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
for the war have remained unchanged since March 2009: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat alQaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return.1 In December 2009, following a
comprehensive strategic review, President Obama announced two decisions: to “surge” both
military and civilian personnel to Afghanistan, and to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from
Afghanistan, on a “conditions-based” basis, in July 2011.2
In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon Summit, the governments of the United States, the other
NATO Allies, and Afghanistan expressed support for the full transition of lead responsibility for
security to Afghans by the end of 2014. Allies also reaffirmed their “long-term commitment to a
better future for the Afghan people.”3 In December 2010, announcing the results of the
Administration’s Afghanistan Pakistan Annual Review, President Obama confirmed U.S.
commitment to both transition by 2014 and a long-term U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership.4
In early 2011, General David Petraeus, Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, in a letter to the ISAF troops, credited the hard work of the force,
together with its Afghan partners, for “halting a downward security spiral in much of the country
and to reversing it in some areas of great importance.”5 In his December 2010 speech, President
Obama recognized “considerable gains toward our military objectives,” but acknowledged that
they were still “fragile and reversible.”6
Key Debates
The U.S. government continues to face major strategic and operational decisions about its
engagement in the war in Afghanistan. Elements of the debate that continue to attract attention
include
•
refining U.S. national interests in Afghanistan and the region, and a desired endstate based on those interests;
•
determining which diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to adopt, what
resources to commit to support those approaches, and how those approaches
ought to evolve over time;
1
See Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27, 2009, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-andPakistan/. See also Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review, December 16, 2010,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/statement-president-afghanistan-pakistan-annualreview.
2
See Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, December
1, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forwardafghanistan-and-pakistan.
3
Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.
4
See Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review, December 16, 2010, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/statement-president-afghanistan-pakistan-annual-review.
5
“COMISAF Assessment,” Letter to ISAF, January 25, 2011, available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/
COMISAF/LTR%20To%20the%20Troops%20Jan%2025%202011.pdf.
6
See Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review, December 16, 2010, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/statement-president-afghanistan-pakistan-annual-review.
Congressional Research Service
2
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
•
helping marshal a coordinated application of international efforts in Afghanistan;
and
•
prioritizing the Afghanistan war versus other U.S. national security imperatives
in the context of a constrained fiscal environment.
Avenues available to Congress for exercising oversight of these issues include authorizing and
appropriating funding for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the region; shaping policy through
directive legislation; confirming senior administration officials with responsibility for the
Afghanistan effort; holding oversight hearings to assess policy formulation and execution; and
extending or adjusting Administration reporting requirements.
Origins of the War
While the proximate cause of the current war in Afghanistan was the set of terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the war takes place against the backdrop of three decades of tumultuous
Afghan history including communist rule, the Soviet invasion, civil war, and the repressive
Taliban regime.
Prelude to War7
In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to shore up a puppet communist
regime. During the 1980’s, armed Afghan resistance groups known as mujahedin waged war
against Soviet forces and their allies among the Afghan security forces.8 During that period, the
U.S. government, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), provided covert assistance to
mujahedin groups, working through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).
In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, and in April 1992, the Soviet-backed Afghan
regime in Kabul fell to mujahedin forces, which established a form of rule including a rotating
presidency. In November 1994, the ethnic Pashtun-dominated Taliban movement led by Mullah
Omar seized the city of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.9 In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul
and then retained control over much of the country until ousted by the U.S.-led military campaign
in 2001. Throughout its tenure, the Taliban continued to face armed opposition, in particular from
the Northern Alliance, a loose network dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks primarily from
northern Afghanistan. Key legacies of Afghanistan’s years of civil war, conflict, and oppressive
7
For background see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004); George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The
Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of our Times
(New York: Grove Press, 2003); Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and
Pakistan (New York: Vintage Departures, 2001); and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and
Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
8
The plural noun “mujahedin” (singular “mujahid”), borrowed from Arabic and now used in standard English, refers to
a group of Muslims waging “jihad,” or “a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty.” See “jihad,”
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2008, Merriam-Webster online, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/jihad; and “mujahideen,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2008, Merriam-Webster online, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mujahideen.
9
The term “Taliban,” in Pashto, is the plural of “talib” (student), which is derived from Arabic. See “Taliban,”
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2008, Merriam-Webster online, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/Taliban.
Congressional Research Service
3
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
rule included the deaths of over a million people, the displacement of millions more, the
proliferation of available weapons, and the destruction of key institutions and infrastructure.
Major Combat Operations
The immediate reason for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan was the linkage of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to al Qaeda, which had trained and operated under Taliban
protection in Afghanistan. In an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001,
President George W. Bush stated U.S. demands for Taliban action, warning: “The Taliban must
act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate.”10
On October 7, 2001, following the refusal of the Taliban regime to cease harboring al Qaeda, the
U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan, with the stated purpose of
disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and of attacking the military
capability of the Taliban regime. 11
In contrast to the lengthy, iterative preparations that preceded the launch of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the U.S. planning process for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan was
extremely condensed. The concept of operations was based on Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s vision of defense transformation, including the idea that a heavier reliance on cuttingedge technology and precision weaponry could make possible the deployment of smaller-sized
conventional ground forces.
Military operations were preceded and complemented by work by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) with Afghan opposition groups on the ground. Initial U.S. operations relied on the
use of special operations forces (SOF), enabled by air assets, working by, with and through
indigenous partners, in particular the Northern Alliance. Many U.S. defense experts regarded the
operations as an important demonstration of operational “jointness”—the ability of Military
Services to work together seamlessly. The United Kingdom and Australia also deployed forces to
support the major combat phase of operations, and dozens of other countries provided basing,
access and overflight permission. 12
10
The full list of demands included “Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in
your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign
journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training
camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate
authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer
operating.” See President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
11
See Statement by President George W. Bush, October 7, 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html.
12
The United Kingdom’s publicly stated campaign objectives included bringing Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda
leaders to justice; preventing them from posing a further terrorist threat; and ensuring that Afghanistan ceased to harbor
terrorists; in pursuit of the broader objective to “do everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international
terrorism.” See Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, “Defeating International Terrorism: Campaign Objectives,”
October 16, 2001, available at http://www.mod.uk. For a detailed discussion of the March 2002 Operation Anaconda,
which included SOF and conventional forces, coalition partners, and Afghan forces, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day
to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Books, 2005). For an analysis of the lessons of
Afghanistan operations for future warfighting, see Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications
for Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002.
Congressional Research Service
4
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
The demise of the Taliban regime came quickly. In November 2001, the Taliban fled Kabul, and
in December they left their stronghold, the southern city of Kandahar. It is generally understood
that in December 2001, key al Qaeda and Taliban leaders fled across the border into Pakistan.
Post-Taliban Developments
The major combat operations phase was regarded as a quick success by its Afghan protagonists
and their U.S. and other international partners, but the challenges were far from over. The new
Afghan leadership faced the profound political challenge of consolidating a fractious, scarred
state with very few resources. The new leaders also faced potential violent challenges, both from
resurgent al Qaeda and Taliban leaders who were defeated but not eliminated, and from Afghan
local powerbrokers, strengthened by years of battle-hardened autonomy and resistance, who
might be displeased by their own loss of influence in the emerging post-Taliban order.
Bonn Process
To fill the political void, in December 2001, in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations launched the
so-called Bonn Process by hosting the Bonn Conference. Participants included representatives of
four Afghan opposition groupings, and observers included representatives of neighboring and
other key countries including the United States. The resulting Bonn Agreement created an Afghan
Interim Authority to serve as the “repository of Afghan sovereignty” and outlined a political
process for producing a new constitution and choosing a new Afghan government. In contrast to
the model pursued in Iraq from 2003 to 2004, in Afghanistan there was no period of formal
occupation in which an international authority exercised sovereignty on behalf of the Afghans.13
In accordance with the provisions of the Bonn Agreement, a large meeting—a loya jirga—was
held in June 2002, at which Hamid Karzai was elected head of the new Afghan Transitional
Authority. A new constitution was adopted in January 2004; presidential elections, in which
Karzai was elected, were held in October 2004; and National Assembly elections were held in
September 2005.
The Afghan People in Post-Taliban Afghanistan
Afghan people have reportedly experienced post-Taliban Afghanistan in a variety of ways,
depending in part on their geographical home bases and their circumstances under Taliban rule.
For many Afghans, the end of the Taliban regime has meant an end to some specific forms of
repressive rule. For some, displaced from home by years of war and conflict, regime change has
meant an opportunity to return to their home villages. For Afghans in some areas, a growing
insurgent presence and the proximity of fertile fields for profitable poppy-growing have created
13
In accordance with the provisions of the Bonn Agreement, a large meeting—a “loya jirga”—was held in June 2002,
at which Hamid Karzai was elected head of the new Afghan Transitional Authority. A new constitution was adopted in
January 2004; presidential elections, in which Karzai was elected, were held in October 2004; and National Assembly
elections were held in September 2005. See the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, December 5, 2001, available at http://www.mfa.gov.af/
Documents/ImportantDoc/The%20Bonn%20Agreement.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
5
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
new sources of instability and fear. For Afghans across the country, regime change has not yet led
to any certainty about future prospects for stability.14
Strategy
“Strategy” is commonly understood to include a statement of objectives, or desired ends; the
ways and means designed to achieve those ends, prioritized by importance; and the roles and
responsibilities of key players in executing those ways and means.15
Strategy-making for Afghanistan is particularly complex for two main reasons. First, the process
is complicated by the range of major stake-holders acting in Afghanistan to achieve strategic
ends. These include—in addition to the insurgent groups—the Afghan government, NATO, the
U.S. government and other bilateral partners, and key regional leaders and neighboring states
including Pakistan. Each of these may have its own—or even competing sets of—interests and
priorities. Military strategy, in turn, is not easily separable from broader grand strategy for
Afghanistan, since security is essential for progress in other areas, and since military forces play
key supporting roles in non-security activities.
Second, the process is complicated by the wide range of activities many stake-holders undertake.
These include not only security but also, for example, civilian capacity-building, the rule of law,
and economic development. Those fields, in turn, are closely linked empirically—for example,
long-term development requires a relatively stable environment, and successful local law
enforcement efforts must be predicated on some form of rule of law.
Afghan Strategy
Arguably the most important strategic vision for the future of Afghanistan is the vision of
Afghans themselves. President Hamid Karzai’s own views are particularly salient since he leads a
very centralized, presidential state structure, and he has been the lead executive authority since
the end of the Taliban regime.
Over time, the consistent theme of President Karzai’s strategic vision for Afghanistan has been
Afghan sovereignty. At the January 2010 London Conference, co-hosted by the governments of
Afghanistan and the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, and with participation by
representatives of more than 60 states, President Karzai summarized this theme as “Afghan
leadership, Afghan ownership.”16
The theme of sovereignty has undergirded Karzai’s discussions of a wide range of specific issues,
from governance and development to security. For example, calling for bringing all international
and Afghan private security contracting companies under control and regulation by the Afghan
government, he stressed, “We must ensure the monopoly of the Afghan state over the use of
14
Communications from Afghan local community members in north, east, south, west Afghanistan, 2009, 2010.
It is a fundamental principle of military theory that war is driven by political goals of one kind or another. The
Prussian writer Carl von Clausewitz argued that policy “…will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their
violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.)
16
President Hamid Karzai, Opening Remarks, London Conference, January 28, 2010.
15
Congressional Research Service
6
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
force.”17 Calling for Afghan leadership of detention and prosecution activities, in his second
presidential inaugural speech in November 2009, he called these activities “the authority and
responsibility of the Afghan government.”18
U.S. Strategy
U.S. government strategy for Afghanistan has evolved over time from immediate military aims in
the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to a comprehensive strategy with multiple
components.
Post-9/11 Aims
When the U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan shortly after the 9/11
attacks, the stated U.S. aims were narrow: to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of
operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime. 19 The U.S.-led operations
quickly achieved those aims by removing the Taliban from political power.
Bush Administration Strategy
For the war in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration did not conduct a rigorous internal strategic
review or produce a formal written strategy along the lines of the November 2005 National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq.20 In general, most practitioners and observers agree that under the
Bush Administration, the war in Afghanistan largely took a back seat, in terms of leadership time
and attention, and resourcing, to the war in Iraq. Yet while no strategy was formally articulated,
the multi-faceted approaches adopted and resources committed, though limited, suggested an
effort broadly aimed at helping to stabilize the new, post-Taliban order.
Toward the end of the Administration, in September 2008, in a speech at the National Defense
University announcing the commitment of additional resources, President Bush gave a clear
characterization of the major facets of the effort. He stated that the 3,500 additional U.S. Marines
would deploy to Afghanistan, and that together with additional troops supplied by NATO Allies,
they would constitute a “quiet surge.” Those troops would be used “to provide security for the
Afghan people, protect Afghanistan’s infrastructure and democratic institutions, and help ensure
access to services like education and health care.” U.S. efforts would also include helping
Afghans develop additional security forces, and increasing the direct involvement of Afghan
tribes. More experts from U.S. government civilian agencies would be deployed to help Afghans
improve governance and to jumpstart the economy. And the United States would help Pakistan
“defeat Taliban and al Qaeda fighters hiding in remote border regions of their country.”21 What
President Bush did not include in this description of the effort in Afghanistan was a statement
about overarching U.S. goals and objectives.
17
Ibid.
President Hamid Karzai, Inaugural Speech (unofficial translation), November 19, 2009.
19
See Statement by President George W. Bush, October 7, 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html.
20
National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, November 2005.
21
President George W. Bush, Distinguished Lecture Program, National Defense University, September 9, 2008,
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080909.html.
18
Congressional Research Service
7
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Obama Administration Strategy
From the outset, the Obama Administration has indicated its intention to direct more leadership
time and attention to the war in Afghanistan. In his inaugural address, President Obama
mentioned the war, noting that the United States would help “forge a hard-earned peace in
Afghanistan.”22 Shortly afterward, he launched a comprehensive policy review, led by Bruce
Riedel of the Brookings Institution. Even before the review was completed, he approved the
deployed of approximately 17,000 additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan, based on requests that
had been submitted earlier by ISAF Commander (“COMISAF”) General David McKiernan.
In March 2009, President Obama announced the results of the policy review, noting that the
process had included consultations with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and of key
Allies and partners, as well as with some international organizations. The primary result, he
stated, was a “comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.” That close linkage of
U.S. strategy for the two neighboring countries was new, and it was underscored by the
appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to serve as Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP).
In the March 2009 speech, President Obama stated that the U.S. “core goal” was “to disrupt,
dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either
country in the future.” Key lines of activity, toward that end, were to include reversing the
Taliban’s gains; “promoting a more capable and accountable Afghan government”; growing and
training the Afghan National Security Forces; deploying civilian technical expertise to support
governance and economic development; and supporting a reconciliation process to pull all but the
“uncompromising core” of insurgent fighters off of the battlefield.23
COMISAF Initial Assessment
In May 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates requested the resignation of General David
McKiernan, who served simultaneously in the NATO role of ISAF Commander, and the U.S. role
of Commanding General of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. Secretary Gates stated that he sought “fresh
thinking” and “fresh eyes” for the mission.24 GEN McKiernan’s successor in both roles, General
Stanley McChrystal, was tasked by both the U.S. and NATO chains of command to conduct a
“60-day initial assessment” of the mission and the feasibility of accomplishing it. To do so, GEN
McChrystal invited a small team of outside experts to take a look at the overall strategy and
campaign, while ISAF staff teams conducted assessments of specific issues such as civil-military
integration, detention operations, civilian casualties, and strategic communications.25
22
President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
read_the_inaugural_address/.
23
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27,
2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-forAfghanistan-and-Pakistan/. See also the White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward
Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/AfghanistanPakistan_White_Paper.pdf, which uses somewhat different language to describe the goal and approaches.
24
Ann Scott Tyson, “Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan is Fired,” Washington Post, May 12, 2009.
25
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009. The author was part of the “small team of outside experts”.
Congressional Research Service
8
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
The final Initial Assessment report, submitted by GEN McChrystal under his own signature to
both chains of command was leaked to the Washington Post and published in redacted form.26 In
the assessment, GEN McChrystal characterized the situation in Afghanistan as “serious” and
noted that “the overall situation is deteriorating.” He argued forcefully that “failure to gain the
initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) ... risks an outcome
where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”
In order to gain the initiative, GEN McChrystal called for a “properly resourced”, comprehensive
counter-insurgency campaign. His assessment introduced several major innovations in thinking
about the campaign. First, he prioritized efforts to support responsive and accountable governance
equally with security efforts, stressing the Afghan people’s “crisis of confidence in the
government.” Second, he advocated raising the target endstrengths for the Afghan National
Security Forces substantially, to a total of 400,000 forces, and ensuring their effectiveness
through “radically improved partnership [with ISAF forces] at every level.” Third, he introduced
geographic prioritization of effort across Afghanistan as a whole—a significant change from past
approaches in which each part of the country was managed de facto as a “national” campaign led
by the Allied country with troops deployed there. And fourth, he stressed the need to change
ISAF’s operational culture in two key ways—to more closely interact with the population, and to
significantly improve internal unity of effort.
Fall 2009 Strategy Review
In Fall 2009, the Obama Administration launched a wide-ranging review of strategy and resource
options for the war in Afghanistan. The review considered both GEN McChrystal’s Initial
Assessment, and a separate, classified set of “resource recommendations”—options for troop level
increases together with risks associated with each option—that he submitted. 27 At issue was the
need to balance achieving sufficient results to protect U.S. national interests with avoiding an
open-ended commitment. During the review, some U.S. government officials reportedly argued
for a narrow focus on counter-terrorism, including deploying a small additional number of
Special Operations Forces (SOF). Some others reportedly amended that view by supporting a
“CT-plus” approach, which called for some additional SOF together with some additional
emphasis on training the Afghan National Security Forces. Still others reportedly argued in favor
of a more comprehensive approach, more closely in line with the multi-faceted campaign
described in GEN McChrystal’s Assessment. 28
In December 2009, in a speech at West Point, President Obama announced the results of his
Administration’s strategy review. He confirmed that the U.S. core goal, articulated in March
2009, remained unchanged: “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.” He
described the main objectives of the effort: “deny[ing] al Qaeda a safe haven”; “revers[ing] the
Taliban’s momentum and deny[ing] it the ability to overthrow the government”; and
“strengthen[ing] the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can
26
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, available in redacted form from the
Washington Post at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?
sid=ST2009092003140.
27
Communications from ISAF and Administration officials, 2009. See also Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.
28
Communications from ISAF and Administration officials, 2009; and Obama’s Wars.
Congressional Research Service
9
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.” To these ends, he stated, the United States
would employ a military effort, launch a civilian “surge”, and work to further an “effective
partnership with Pakistan.”29
In the West Point speech, President Obama announced the deployment of an additional 30,000
U.S. troops, reportedly 10,000 fewer than the middle-range option presented by GEN
McChrystal. The President noted the expectation that NATO Allies and partners would increase
their own troop commitments.30 Some practitioners noted at the time that while relying on Allies
could conceivably yield 40,000 additional troops altogether, troop contributions from different
countries should not be regarded as completely fungible, given different formal caveats on their
activities, different capabilities, and the additional friction inherent in all coalition rather than
national operations.31
In the speech, President Obama also, for the first in the history of the war, established a partial
timeline. He stated that in July 2011, the United States would “begin the transfer of our forces out
of Afghanistan.” This measure was intended in part, he stated, to give Afghans a “sense of
urgency” about making progress. His explanation that “we will execute this transition
responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground,” did not clarify the scope or scale of
the drawdown slated to begin in July 2011, or the criteria that would be used to make those
determinations.
December 2010 Afghanistan Pakistan Annual Review
In June 2010, President Obama relieved his top commander on the ground, GEN McChrystal,
based on inflammatory comments reported by the Rolling Stone,32 and replaced him with General
David Petraeus, who had served until then as the Commander of U.S. Central Command, which
has responsibility for a broad region including Afghanistan. Unlike the arrival of GEN
McChrystal one year earlier, the arrival of GEN Petraeus did not trigger a top-to-bottom strategic
review, although the new COMISAF did gradually refine ISAF’s approaches. 33
In late 2010, the Obama Administration conducted the Afghanistan Pakistan Annual Review
(APAR), which was designed, according to Administration officials, to gauge progress in the
campaign rather than to re-evaluate the strategy. In a December 2010 speech, President Obama
announced the results of the review. He confirmed that the core goal remained unchanged—
“disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its
capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future”, and he pointedly contrasted that goal to
“nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation.” President Obama’s
characterization of the major elements of the effort was quite similar to his December 2009
characterization: targeting the Taliban; growing the Afghan National Security Forces; supporting
the “delivery of basic services, as well as transparency and accountability”; supporting an Afghan
29
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, West Point, New York, December 1, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
30
Ibid. and communications from ISAF officials, 2009. See also Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2010.
31
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009.
32
Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone, June 22, 2010.
33
Communications from ISAF officials, 2010. The author participated in that refinement.
Congressional Research Service
10
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
political process of reconciliation; and working with Pakistan to insist “that terrorist safe havens
within their borders must be dealt with.”
Characterizing progress on the ground, the President noted that “we are seeing significant
progress” against the core goal—that al Qaeda senior leadership was under more pressure, and
that “we are clearing more areas from Taliban control and more Afghans are reclaiming their
communities.” He cautioned, however, that “… the gains we’ve made are still fragile and
reversible.”
The speech included two new elements. First, President Obama affirmed the goal agreed to at the
November 2010 Lisbon NATO Summit, to move toward “a transition to full Afghan lead for
security that will begin early next year [2011] and will conclude in 2014.” The 2014 marker,
initially proposed by President Karzai and later embraced by NATO, was a marked addition to
U.S. strategy. Second, President Obama stressed that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan would
be enduring, in the form of a “new strategic partnership” to be elaborated in 2011, as a signal of
U.S. commitment. President Obama did not address the proposed content or expected resource
implications of that partnership.34
U.S. Strategy in 2011
In early 2011, the Obama Administration was reportedly at work on several related initiatives—
further refining a description of desired conditions that ought to pertain in Afghanistan in 2014,
and drafting a basic vision for the long-term U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership, to prepare for
talks with the Afghan government. A refined strategic partnership document would presumably
update the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership from 2005.35
NATO Strategy
NATO plays a central role in Afghanistan as the sponsor of ISAF. NATO strategy is articulated in
decisions and declarations by its political leadership body, the North Atlantic Council, and then
further reflected in classified NATO operational planning. As a multi-lateral organization, NATO
is both a collective and the sum of its parts. The U.S. government plays a significant leadership
role in both ISAF and NATO as a whole, and thus helps shape NATO and ISAF strategy and
approaches. At the same time, the United States and all other Allies may have national interests in
Afghanistan and the region that are not shared by all ISAF troop contributors.
At the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008, NATO issued a streamlined but clear strategic
vision for Afghanistan. That vision established four “guiding principles”: a firm and shared longterm commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive
approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and
increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan. The
document also included a “vision of success,” which is essentially a statement of objectives:
34
President Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review,” December 16,
2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/statement-president-afghanistan-pakistanannual-review. See also National Security Staff, “Overview of the Afghanistan Pakistan Annual Review,” December
15, 2010.
35
See Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, May 23, 2005.
Congressional Research Service
11
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
“extremism and terrorism will no longer pose a threat to stability; Afghan National Security
Forces will be in the lead and self-sufficient; and the Afghan government will be able to extend
the reach of good governance, reconstruction, and development throughout the country to the
benefit of all its citizens.”36 What this strategic vision did not provide was a clear articulation of
the specific ways and means ISAF would use to achieve those objectives.
In October 2009, at an informal ministerial meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Bratislava,
including the Defense Ministers of non-NATO troop-contributing countries, GEN McChrystal
briefed participants on the findings of his Initial Assessment. NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen noted “broad support from all ministers of this overall counterinsurgency
approach.”37 Participants in Bratislava also agreed on four priorities for the campaign in
Afghanistan: (1) focus upon the Afghan population; (2) enhance efforts to build the capacity of
the Afghan National Security Forces; (3) promote better Afghan governance; (4) engage more
effectively with Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly Pakistan. At the same session, the Ministers
approved a new strategic concept for the process of “transitioning” lead security responsibility to
Afghans. 38
In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon Summit, NATO articulated a clear strategic vision for
Afghanistan, expressing its support for: “a sovereign, independent, democratic, secure and stable
Afghanistan that will never again be a safe haven for terrorists and terrorism, and ... a better
future for the Afghan people.” Allies reaffirmed their “long-term commitment to Afghanistan,”
and NATO and the government of Afghanistan committed to a “robust, enduring partnership.”
That partnership would complement the work of ISAF and extend beyond it; specific cooperation
measures would be elaborated later, by mutual agreement.39
The Threat
Practitioners and observers suggest that Afghanistan faces critical challenges from more than a
single insurgency. The insurgencies themselves are multiple with varying degrees of cohesion,
various aims, various links to al Qaeda, and various ties across the border into Pakistan. Criminal
patronage networks—including drug lords, powerbrokers, and some government officials—
empower the insurgencies directly through funding and other forms of support, and indirectly by
alienating the Afghan people. Finally, many of the practices of the international community, over
time, have inadvertently empowered malign actors and frustrated the Afghan people, further
bolstering at least tacit support for the insurgencies.40
36
“Strategic Vision,” NATO, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-052e.html.
37
Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, “NATO Ministers Endorse Wider Afghan Effort,” October 23, 2009. Such support
from an informal defense ministerial does not, however, constitute political endorsement from the North Atlantic
Council.
38
NATO press release, “NATO Ministers agree on key priorities for Afghanistan,” The New York Times, October 23,
2009.
39
See Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease; andDeclaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership, November 20, 2010, available at
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/official-texts/Enduring%20Partnership%20NATOGIRoA%2020%20Nov%202010.pdf.
40
Communications from ISAF, U.S. Embassy, and Administration officials, 2009, 2010, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
12
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
The Insurgencies
The insurgent threat in Afghanistan is best characterized as a loose network that includes three
major insurgent groups—the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
(HiG)—most of whose members are Afghans.41 Each reportedly enjoys some facilitation from
foreign fighters, and some degree of safe haven in Pakistan for its senior leadership. The three
groups do not follow a single over-arching strategy. While all three utilize violence as a tool, the
primary aim is to control the Afghan population—whether through intimidation, the provision of
some services, or a combination thereof—and to drive coalition forces out of the country in order
to better exercise that influence. 42
The role of al Qaeda in the insurgency in Afghanistan is largely indirect, as a provider of funding,
facilitation, and some ideological support, and al Qaeda’s presence inside Afghanistan may be
quite limited. In January 2011, the Commander of ISAF’s Regional Command based in Kandahar
noted, “I know of no al Qaeda in Regional Command South.”43
Current Security Conditions
In general, the security climate in Afghanistan has tended to follow cyclical patterns, based on the
seasons. The spring poppy harvest season draws some workers-for-hire away from the
insurgency; insurgent leaders, who profit from the poppy crop, support this pattern. The
forbidding winter cold makes movement and many activities harder, and usually finds some
insurgents recuperating across the border in Pakistan. The warmer spring weather provides an
opportunity for insurgents to attempt operations. Given the cyclical patterns, changes in security
trends are best evaluated by year-to-year rather than month-to-month comparisons.
Recent years, by all accounts, have witnessed an upswing in security incidents. Many
practitioners date the growing violence from mid-2006, when NATO assumed security
responsibility first for southern, and then for eastern Afghanistan. Minister of Defense Wardak,
for example, noted that in 2006 the insurgents “came on in a big way,” and suggested that their
intent had been to weaken political will in NATO capitals.44
As of Fall 2010, the Department of Defense reported that “overall kinetic events [were] up 300
percent since 2007, and up an additional 70 percent since 2009.”45 In early 2011, officials and
41
For background about insurgent groups in Afghanistan, see Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).
42
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009, 2010. See also General Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial
Assessment, August 30, 2009, available in redacted form from the Washington Post at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=
ST2009092003140.
43
DoD News Briefing with Major General James Terry and Senior Civilian Representative Henry Ensher, Regional
Command-South, January 13, 2011, available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4754.
Reports persist of some al Qaeda presence. For example, the Long War Journal reported, on the basis of a martyrdom
statement, the death in Afghanistan of a senior al Qaeda communications operative, Bekkay Harrach, a German
national affiliated with both al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. See Bill Roggio, “Senior German al
Qaeda Leader Killed in Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, January 19, 2011, available at
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/01/senior_german_al_qae.php.
44
Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008.
45
See Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
13
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
observers noted that as insurgent networks increasingly came under pressure and were disrupted
by the stronger operational tempo of Afghan and coalition military operations, insurgent groups
were seeking ways to make a more spectacular impact. It was reported that over a four-week
period ending in February 2011, 116 Afghan civilians had been killed in seven suicide attacks,
ranging from Nangarhar province in the east, to Kandahar in the south, to Faryab in the north.46
ISAF officials expected such high-profile attacks, including assassination attempts against
government officials and community leaders, to continue. 47
Taliban
The Taliban itself, Afghan and ISAF officials note, is more a network than a single organization.48
The Taliban emerged from the Afghan civil war of the early and mid-1990’s, and then the
organization ruled Afghanistan from its capture of Kabul in 1996 until its defeat in 2001. Mullah
Mohammed Omar, the de facto head of state during Taliban rule, is generally assumed to be alive
and leading the organization from Pakistan. In July 2010, he reportedly released guidance to his
“force”, calling on them to fight coalition forces to the death; to capture or kill Afghans, including
women, who support the Afghan government or the coalition; to actively recruit workers with
access to coalition facilities; and to acquire more heavy weapons.49
The group is often referred to as the Quetta Shura Taliban, after the city in Pakistan that serves as
home to its leadership council. 50 The Taliban reportedly receives support from some current
and/or former Pakistani officials, including members of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
(ISI), in the form of logistics, medical, and training assistance. 51
In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s central geographical focus is their “spiritual home”, Kandahar, but
they reportedly maintain a “shadow governance” presence in most or all of Afghanistan’s
provinces. The apparent purpose of the shadow governments is to deepen their control over the
population, in part by providing some basic services such as rapid justice and by capitalizing on
popular disaffection with the current government.52
(...continued)
submitted in accordance with §1230 of P.L. 110-81, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 as
amended. The report is current through September 30, 2010.
46
Alissa Rubin, “Taliban Bet on Fear Over Brawn as Tactic,” The New York Times, February 27, 2011.
47
Communications from ISAF officials, 2011.
48
On the Taliban in general, see Major Shahid Afsar, Pakistan Army, Major Chris Samples, U.S. Army, and Major
Thomas Wood, U.S. Army, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” Military Review, vo. 88, no. 3 (May-June
2008).
49
See Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010; and
Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Mullah Omar Orders Taliban to Attack Civilians, Afghan Women”, The Long War
Journal, July 28, 2010, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/mullah_omar_orders_t.php.
50
See Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, “Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace
and Reconciliation,” United States Institute of Peace, September 2008. Stanekzai, who held a fellowship at the U.S.
Institute of Peace, was previously a senior GIRoA official.
51
See Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).
52
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, available in redacted form from the
Washington Post at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?
sid=ST2009092003140.
Congressional Research Service
14
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Haqqani Network
The Haqqani network (HQN) is closely associated with the Taliban and falls under the broad
umbrella of its Quetta-based leadership, but it also maintains a distinct identity and organizational
cohesion.53 HQN was long led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, who fought as a mujahedin leader against
Soviet forces, receiving substantial assistance from the CIA by way of Pakistan’s ISI.54 When the
Taliban came to power, he joined the government as a Minister but retained a separate power base
in his home Zadran district and tribe, east of Kabul. His son Sirajudin has reportedly assumed
day-to-day leadership of the organization while Jalaluddin maintains an advisory role.
The Haqqani network reportedly utilizes a base of operations in North Waziristan, part of
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan. ISAF
officials believe that HQN uses the base to plan and launch attacks targeting Afghan and coalition
forces inside Afghanistan. Pakistani forces have long been unwilling, or unable, to take military
action against HQN in North Waziristan.55
The Haqqani network’s primary geographical focus inside Afghanistan is the eastern provinces of
Paktia, Paktika and Khowst—the traditional Zadran tribal homeland. HQN has been able to use
these areas as launching pads to carry out violence in the approaches to Kabul and in Kabul city
itself.56 HQN reportedly enjoys closer ties with al Qaeda than the other major Afghan insurgent
groups. Some recent reports suggest emerging close links between HQN and Lashkar-e Taiba, the
Pakistani terrorist group responsible for the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai and expert in
orchestrating complex suicide attacks.57
Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)
The third major Afghan insurgent group is Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), named after its
leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who led mujahedin fighters against Soviet forces. At that time, his
organization, then known as the Hezb-e Islami, received substantial aid from the U.S.
government, which reportedly considered him a key ally. He twice held the title of Prime Minister
during the early 1990’s civil war period, before seeking refuge in Iran when the Taliban came to
power. Hekmatyar later re-emerged in Afghanistan as the leader of the HiG insurgent group.
Like the other groups, the HiG enjoys safe haven across the border in Pakistan. The HiG’s
primary geographical focus inside Afghanistan is in the northeast, in Nangarhar, Kunar, and
Nuristan provinces, areas rich in timber and gem resources that the HiG is interested in
exploiting. Unlike the other two groups, the HiG maintains a political wing including affiliates
who serve in the Afghan government. The HiG has leaned forward in exploring potential
reconciliation opportunities, including putting forward to the Afghan government a 15-point
53
For an excellent description and analysis of the Haqqani Network, see Jeffrey A. Dressler, The Haqqani Network:
From Pakistan to Afghanistan, Institute for the Study of War, October 2010.
54
For background about Haqqani, see Jay Solomon, “Troubled Border: Failed Courtship of Warlord Trips up U.S. in
Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2007.
55
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009, 2010.
56
Dressler; and Communications from ISAF officials, 2009, 2010.
57
See Alissa J. Rubin, “Taliban Bet on Fear over Brawn as Tactic,” The New York Times, February 27, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
15
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
peace proposal.58 The HiG’s relations with the Taliban are sometimes fraught—affiliates of the
two groups have clashed in a struggle for influence in northeastern Afghanistan.59
“Criminal Patronage Networks”
Practitioners and observers suggest that a significant challenge to Afghanistan’s prospects for
future stability is posed by “criminal patronage networks”, broadly understood to be loose
networks linking powerbrokers, criminal bosses, and some government officials, at the national
and sub-national levels, which skim state revenues and distribute patronage and largesse
selectively. In some cases they may fund the insurgencies directly. They also fuel the insurgencies
indirectly by alienating the Afghan people, who may then choose to give their active or tacit
support to insurgents.60
In his 2009 Initial Assessment, then-ISAF Commander GEN McChrystal recognized the
deleterious impact that powerbrokers were having on stability. He stressed the “unpunished abuse
of power by corrupt officials and powerbrokers” as a key contributing factor to the Afghan
people’s “crisis of confidence” in the Afghan government. He described that crisis as one of the
two elements, together with the insurgencies, of the threat to the overall mission.61
By Summer 2010, ISAF officials and other members of the international community had begun to
think of the challenge posed by powerbrokers in terms of networks—linked sets of relationships
used to foster and exercise power and influence. That growing understanding was facilitated by
both a broader definition of the “threat” to the overall effort, and the availability of more and
better analytical tools for teasing out key relationships. For example, the Afghan Threat Finance
Cell (ATFC), which reports to both U.S. Embassy Kabul and the Commander of U.S. ForcesAfghanistan, has made substantial contributions to current understanding.62 In his January 2011
letter to the troops, ISAF Commander GEN Petraeus argued that in order to build on security
gains made in 2010, “we will have to expand our efforts to help Afghan officials implement
President Karzai’s direction to combat corruption and the criminal patronage networks that
undermine the development of effective Afghan institutions.”63
Kabul Bank and National-Level Institutions
One critical question is the extent to which criminal patronage networks extend their reach into
the highest levels of the Afghan government. In a recent article in The New Yorker, Dexter Filkins
argued that “it’s no longer enough to say that corruption permeates the Afghan state. Corruption,
58
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009, 2010.
See Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010
60
Communications from ISAF, U.S. Embassy, and Administration officials, 2010, 2011.
61
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, available in redacted form from the
Washington Post at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?
sid=ST2009092003140.
62
Communications from ISAF officials, 2010.
63
General David Petraeus, COMISAF Assessment, letter to ISAF dated January 25, 2011, available at
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/COMISAF/LTR%20To%20the%20Troops%20Jan%2025%202011.pdf.
59
Congressional Research Service
16
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
by and large, is the Afghan state... The Afghan government does not so much serve the people as
it preys on them.”64
A recent focus of particular concern has been Kabul Bank. The Bank faces allegations that some
seven hundred million dollars are missing from the bank, and that those funds were used to buy
property in Dubai and to purchase political patronage through “campaign contributions” to senior
Afghan officials. Kabul Bank is of interest and concern in part because the U.S. government has
used it to channel funding to pay some Afghan salaries, including for members of the Afghan
National Security Forces. Of potentially greater concern are the Bank’s links with Afghanistan’s
political leadership: its key shareholders include close relatives of Afghanistan’s senior-most
officials, and the Bank’s “campaign contributions,” some allege, were directed toward some
senior officials of the Afghan government.65
Sub-National-Level Powerbrokers
Many practitioners and observers agree that patronage networks are alive and well at sub-national
levels, where opportunities for access to revenue streams include international border crossings,
as well as the contracts let and the assistance programs supported by the international
community.66 In the pervasive exercise of “influence” at sub-national levels, it is not always clear
whether the law has been violated. But the influence exercised raises tough questions for the
international community about the appropriate balance between getting things done by working
closely with those Afghans who can produce results, and crafting an Afghan system that the
Afghan people will accept. Some observers suggest that since the leverage that local
powerbrokers are able to exert depends at least in part on the patronage, access, and resources
they receive from higher levels of the Afghan system, the challenges—and possible remedies—
cannot easily be locally circumscribed.
Ahmed Wali Karzai
Perhaps the most prominent “powerbroker”, in the literal sense of the term, has been Ahmed Wali
Karzai (AWK), President Karzai’s half-brother. AWK’s official position as the head of the
Provincial Council of Kandahar province does not convey significant authority or resources on its
own, but his personal influence, by all accounts, is quite extensive. AWK has faced allegations of
involvement in the poppy trade, of maintaining his own private militia, of illegally seizing land,
of orchestrating profitable monopolies over business sectors including private security contracting
and long-distance trucking, and of exercising undue influence over government appointments
within the province. His largesse, it is claimed, benefits some but explicitly leaves others out and
may be serving to exacerbate inter-tribal tensions.67
64
Dexter Filkins, “Letter from Kabul: The Great Afghan Bank Heist,” The New Yorker, January 31, 2011.
Ibid, and communications from ISAF officials, 2010 and 2011.
66
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009, 2010, 2011.
67
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009, 2010, 2011. For background, see Carl Forsberg, Power and Politics in
Kandahar, Institute for the Study of War, April 21, 2010. See also Joshua Partlow, “Ahmed Wali Karzai, an Ally and
Obstacle to the U.S. Military in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, June 13, 2010, and Kim Sengupta, “Ahmed Wali
Karzai: The Stories are Very Hurtful. The Only Thing I Haven’t Been Accused of is Prostitution,” The Independent,
October 4, 2010.
65
Congressional Research Service
17
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
At the same time, AWK is widely regarded as someone who can get things done—a view attested
to by the long lines of Afghan petitioners usually to be found at his doorstep. Reportedly, he has
also long enjoyed a close relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency. And to date, little if
any formal evidence of wrong-doing has been put forward. As the focus of the combined Afghan
and international campaign, including support to governance as well as security, shifted to
Kandahar province in 2010, the international community was forced to wrestle with the extent to
which AWK could serve as a factor of stability, and the extent to which the Afghan people would
be likely to accept that role.68
General Abdul Razziq
General Abdul Razziq—until recently “Colonel”—is the Afghan Border Police commander in
Spin Boldak, Kandahar province, at the border crossing with Weesh Chaman, Pakistan. Most
observers agree that Razziq enjoys the patronage of Provincial Council Chairman Ahmed Wali
Karzai; that he has profited mightily by skimming state revenues at the border crossing; and that
he ensures the loyalty of his own border police forces through patronage and by filling the ranks
with members of his own Achekzai tribe. Many international civilian and military practitioners
have long regarded him as a “thug”—the Washington Post quoted one civilian official as saying,
“Razziq is the poster child for all that is wrong with Afghanistan’s government.”69 By some
accounts, many Kandaharis are afraid of him. 70
Yet in 2010, AWK paved the way for Razziq and his forces to play a key role leading clearing
operations in and around Kandahar city. ISAF officials noted that in those military operations,
Razziq was clearly getting things done. Said one U.S. officer, according to the Wall Street
Journal: “Now the first priority is to beat the Taliban. Once this is done, we can shift our
attention to these illicit actors. Razziq can beat the Taliban.”71 The challenges for the international
community include whether, and if so to what extent, to rely on this opportunistic partnership;
and whether, if expediency proves to be the trump card in the current debate, it will be possible
later on to curb any of Razziq’s behavior that is not based on the rule of law.
Governor Gul Agha Sherzai
Some practitioners and observers regard as equivocal the behavior and likely impact on long-term
stability of Governor Gul Agha Sherzai of Nangarhar Province. Sherzai, originally from
Kandahar, enjoys President Karzai’s personal patronage. Many observers suggest that Sherzai has
been a dynamic leader—rallying his fellow Governors of nearby Laghman, Kunar and Nuristan
provinces to pursue common interests, and organizing with them a broad Peace and
Reconciliation Jirga aimed at reaching out to former fighters and offering them opportunities to
rejoin peaceful society. Sherzai has reportedly distributed patronage to a fairly wide circle of
recipients, but still selectively, drawing on revenues generated at the Torkham Gate border
crossing with Pakistan, and on the drug labs that remain open despite the elimination of virtually
68
Ibid.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “The Afghan Robin Hood,” Washington Post, October 4, 2010.
70
Conversations with Kandaharis, 2010.
71
Yaroslav Trofimov and Matthew Rosenberg, “In Afghanistan, U.S. Turns “Malignant Actor” into Ally,” Wall Street
Journal, November 18, 2010.
69
Congressional Research Service
18
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
all poppy growing in the province72. Some of Sherzai’s actions have appeared to some observers
to contravene the rule of law. But a number of senior civilian and military U.S. officials working
in the region have argued that Sherzai “gets things done”, and that he is a “force of stability.”73
International Community Practices
Both practitioners and outside observers have increasingly recognized the many ways in which
the practices of the international community in Afghanistan directly or indirectly fuel the
insurgency. Through inattentive contracting and programming practices, international funds
apparently have been channeled into the hands of local powerbrokers, who may pocket some of
the money or use the opportunity to distribute jobs and other forms of patronage to bolster their
own influence. The perceived unfairness of both kinds of behavior, in turn, tends to alienate the
Afghan people.
ISAF Commanders have recognized the nature and gravity of the problem. In his Initial
Assessment, GEN McChrystal described the problem of corruption and added, “ISAF errors have
further compounded the problem,” and he noted that this “generate[s] recruits for the insurgent
groups.”74 In his recent letter to the ISAF troops, GEN Petraeus stated that in order to help
Afghan officials counter corruption, “we will need to pursue initiatives to ensure that our
contracting and procurement activities are part of the solution rather than a continuing part of the
problem.”75
The problems have attracted the attention of Members of Congress. In a report issued in June
2010, a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform examined
the sizable contract known as “host nation trucking” (HNT) supporting the U.S. supply chain in
Afghanistan, in which prime contractors are responsible for providing security. The
Subcommittee found that the “principal private security subcontractors on the HNT contract
[were] warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders” who were effectively running
protection rackets.76
In a report issued in September 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee assessed the role of
private security contractors in Afghanistan by examining several case studies in great detail. The
Committee concluded that U.S.- and UN-funded contracts were directly benefiting Afghan
warlords and that those warlords, in turn, had been “linked to anti-coalition activities, murder,
bribery, and kidnapping.”77
72
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009, 2010.
Communications from ISAF and U.S. Embassy officials, 2009, 2010.
74
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, available in redacted form from the
Washington Post at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?
sid=ST2009092003140.
75
General David Petraeus, COMISAF Assessment, letter to ISAF dated January 25, 2011, available at
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/COMISAF/LTR%20To%20the%20Troops%20Jan%2025%202011.pdf.
76
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S.
House of Representatives, Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, Report
of the Majority Staff, June 2010.
77
Senate Armed Services Committee, Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in
Afghanistan, September 28, 2010, p.ix.
73
Congressional Research Service
19
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Structure of the International Effort
Over time, since the removal of the Taliban regime, the complex and multi-faceted international
effort in Afghanistan has evolved in scope, scale, participation, and focus.
Leadership of the Effort
Afghanistan, which lacks sufficient institutional, material, and human resources to make
substantial progress on its own, relies deeply on the international community to provide support.
Over time, there have been changes in both leadership responsibility for international community
efforts, and the balance of responsibilities between the international community and the Afghan
government.
Lead Nation Model
The “lead nation” model of international assistance to Afghanistan was adopted at a donors’
conference held in Tokyo in early 2002. Five countries each agreed to assume lead coordination
responsibility for assistance to a single area of security-related Afghan administration: the United
States for the army, Germany for the police, Italy for the judiciary, the United Kingdom for
counternarcotics, and Japan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of
militias.
Afghanistan Compact and UNAMA
The Afghanistan Compact, a formal statement of commitment by the Afghan government and the
international community, finalized in January 2006, shifted responsibility from lead nations to
Afghanistan itself, with international support. The premise was a shared Afghan and international
vision of Afghanistan’s future, including the commitment of the international community to
“provide resources and support” to realize that vision. The Compact established three broad
pillars of activity for future efforts—security; governance, the rule of law and human rights; and
economic and social development. In order to “ensure overall strategic coordination of the
implementation of the Compact,” the document established the Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board (JCMB) process, co-chaired by an Afghan government representative and the
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who leads the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). 78
UNAMA was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1401 (2002) on March 28, 2002.
The mandate is renewed annually. The current mandate emphasizes UNAMA’s lead coordination
for civilian assistance efforts; it states that UNAMA and the SRSG “will continue to lead the
international civilian efforts,” and that as JCMB co-chair, will promote “…more coherent support
by the international community to the Afghan government’s development and governance
priorities.” Concerning military efforts, the mandate states that UNAMA and the SRSG will
“strengthen cooperation with ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative at all levels ...
in order to improve civil-military coordination ... and to ensure coherence between the activities
78
See The Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success, London Conference on Afghanistan, London, January 31February 1, 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
20
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
of national and international security forces and of civilian actors in support of an Afghan-led
development and stabilization process.”79
In practice, UNAMA has sometimes faced criticism for its inability to provide comprehensive
coordination of all international community efforts in non-security areas, from prioritization to
synchronized execution.80
Kabul Process
Many practitioners and observers agree that those best placed to coordinate international
community efforts—to firmly establish a single set of priorities—are the Afghans themselves. At
his second presidential inauguration, President Karzai announced, “... we are seeking a new
cooperation framework with the international community. This cooperation will be based on
Afghan ownership.... Afghans will have the central role in prioritizing, designing and
implementing development projects.”81 The new “Kabul Process”—deliberately borrowing its
name from the earlier “Bonn Process”—is considered to date from that inauguration. 82
The basic premise of the Kabul Process, as President Karzai stated in his speech at the January
2010 London Conference, is “Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership.”83 As the London
Conference Communiqué confirmed, the Process is intended to include stronger Afghan
leadership aimed at securing, stabilizing and developing the country, drawing more heavily on
Afghan institutions and resources to meet the needs of the people.84
The complement to the updated Afghan role was a redefined role for the international community,
stressing “partnership” and “support.” The Communiqué of the July 2010 Kabul Conference
described the two roles this way:
To achieve success in Afghanistan, the partnership between the Afghan Government and the
international community should be based on the leadership and ownership of the Afghan
Government, underpinned by its unique and irreplaceable knowledge of its own culture and
people. This partnership should include coherent support by the international community,
lending its resources and technical knowledge to the implementation of Afghan-defined
programmes.85
79
See S/RES/1917 (2010), March 22, 2010, which extended the mandate of UNAMA for one year.
Communications from ISAF officials, international diplomats based in Kabul, 2008, 2009, 2010.
81
President Hamid Karzai, Inaugural Speech (unofficial translation), November 19, 2009.
82
Communications from Karzai advisor, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, 2009, 2010.
80
83
Statement by His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, London International
Conference on Afghanistan, January 28, 2010. Karzai began his London remarks by noting, “This conference offers us
the opportunity to discuss the way forward toward an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned initiative that ensures peace and
stability in Afghanistan and its surroundings.”
84
London Conference Communiqué, “Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International Partnership”, January
28, 2010.
85
Kabul Conference Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, July 20, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
21
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
NATO
NATO plays a substantial role in Afghanistan by providing the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), and through the political role of the NATO Secretary-General and his personal
representative in Afghanistan, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative.
ISAF Creation and Legal Basis for Presence
ISAF itself had been established in the wake of the Bonn Conference in December 2001, to help
provide security to support the fledgling new Afghan regime. The legal basis for the ISAF
presence in Afghanistan was a United Nations mandate, under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. A UN Security Council Resolution authorized the establishment of ISAF to “assist…in
the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.”86 That mandate was based on the
specific appeal for such a force in the December 2001 Bonn Agreement.87 The United Kingdom
agreed to lead the force initially, and then it was led by a series of lead nations until mid-2003.88
In January 2002, the Interim Authority of Afghanistan signed a Military Technical Agreement
with the newly formed ISAF.
NATO assumed responsibility for the ISAF mission on August 9, 2003. ISAF represents NATO’s
first significant out-of-area deployment, and it is viewed by many observers as a key test for the
Alliance—a measure of both its current capabilities and its possible future relevance. On
September 12, 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO had, for the first time,
invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which confirms the commitment of the allies to
collective self-defense in the event of armed attack on any party to the treaty.89 That action helped
clear the way for future NATO operations in Afghanistan.
In October 2003, the UN Security Council authorized an expansion of the ISAF mandate to
include supporting the Afghan government in maintaining security outside Kabul and its
environs, and providing security to support the accomplishment of other objectives outlined in the
Bonn Agreement.90 The current UN mandate extends the authorization of ISAF for a period of 12
months beyond October 13, 2010.91
ISAF Mandate
ISAF’s current mission statement states:
86
S/RES/1386 (2001), December 20, 2001.
See Annex I, “International Security Force,” Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, Germany, December 5, 2001, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.af/Documents/ImportantDoc/The%20Bonn%20Agreement.pdf. The Agreement states: “This force
will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be
progressively expanded to other urban centers and areas.”
88
The UK was followed by Turkey, and then Germany, see S/RES/1413 (2002), May 23, 2002, and S/RES/1444
(2002), November 27, 2002.
89
See Article 5, The North Atlantic Treaty, signed April 4, 1949, Washington, DC, available at http://www.nato.int/
docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
90
S/RES/1510 (2003), October 13, 2003.
91
UNSCR 1943 (2010), October 13, 2010.
87
Congressional Research Service
22
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts
operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the
growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and
facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide
a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.92
ISAF Geographic Expansion through Stages
ISAF, initially mandated to support Afghan efforts to secure Kabul and its immediate environs,
expanded its geographical scope in four stages. During Stage 1, completed on October 1, 2004,
ISAF expanded to the north of Kabul, assuming responsibility for a German-led Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) and establishing new PRTs. In Stage 2, completed in September
2005, ISAF expanded to the west. In Stage 3, completed on July 31, 2006, ISAF assumed
responsibility for southern Afghanistan. In Stage 4, completed on October 5, 2006, ISAF assumed
control of U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan, making ISAF’s responsibility to support
security contiguous and complete throughout the country.93
ISAF Organization
ISAF is led by a four-star combined headquarters, based in Kabul and headed by U.S. Army
General David Petraeus. NATO’s North Atlantic Council provides political direction for the
mission. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), based in Mons,
Belgium, and led by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), U.S. Navy Admiral James
Stavridis, provides strategic command and control. NATO’s Joint Force Command Headquarters,
which is based in Brunssum, The Netherlands, and reports to SHAPE, provides “overall
operational control,” including many administrative responsibilities. ISAF itself, which reports to
SHAPE through Joint Forces Command-Brunssum, exercises “in-theater operational command.”
This arrangement, including two levels of operational headquarters, is somewhat unusual.
ISAF Joint Command (IJC)
One of the major conclusions of GEN McChrystal’s 2009 Initial Assessment was that both unity
of command within ISAF, and unity of effort throughout the international community in
Afghanistan, needed to be improved. One major step in that direction was the creation, in October
2009, of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), a three-star-led operational-level headquarters that falls
under ISAF itself. The rationale for creating the IJC was that doing so would allow the ISAF
four-star headquarters to look “up and out”—that is, to focus on strategic-level concerns,
including partnership with senior Afghan leaders, relationships with neighboring states including
Pakistan, civil-military coordination at the national level, and communications with troopcontributing national capitals and NATO headquarters. The IJC, meanwhile, would look “down
and in”—it would be able to lead day-to-day operations throughout the country, while focusing
on partnerships with Afghan and international counterparts.94
The IJC has been led since its inception by Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, U.S. Army.
92
Available at ISAF website, http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html.
See “History” on the ISAF website, http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html.
94
Communications from ISAF and IJC officials, 2009.
93
Congressional Research Service
23
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
The current IJC mandate states:
In full partnership, the combined team of Afghan National Security Forces, ISAF Joint
Command and relevant organizations conducts population-centric comprehensive operations
to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas, and supports improved governance and
development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for
sustainable peace.95
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)
In November 2009, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), was established in order
to strengthen NATO’s assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). NTM-A, like
the IJC, reports to ISAF. It has been led since its inception by Lieutenant General William
Caldwell, U.S. Army, who is dual-hatted as the Commanding General of the U.S. organization,
the Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A).
The NTM-A mission statement says:
NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with NATO nations and partners, international
organizations, donors and non-governmental organizations, supports the government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the ANSF, develops leaders,
and establishes enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable, Afghan-led security.96
Regional Commands
In Afghanistan, ISAF oversees six contiguous Regional Commands (RC), most led by a two-star
General Officer: RC-Capital, led by Turkey; RC-East, based at Bagram Air Field, led by a U.S.
Army Division headquarters; RC-South, based in Kandahar province, also led by a U.S. Army
Division headquarters; RC-Southwest, based in Helmand province, led by a U.S. Marine
Expeditionary Force-forward; RC-West, based in Herat province, led by Italy; and RC-North,
based in Balkh province, led by Germany. Troop contingents from other Allies, and from some
non-NATO partners, serve under these Regional Commands.
ISAF Troop Contributors
As of February 3, 2011, ISAF included approximately 132,000 troops from 48 countries,
including NATO Allies and non-NATO partners.97 From the outset, NATO has struggled to secure
sufficient troop contributions, with the appropriate capabilities, for ISAF. One consideration for
potential troop contributors is cost—NATO’s long-standing practice, “costs lie where they fall,”
typically means that countries pay their own costs when they contribute troops to a mission such
as Afghanistan. Another consideration is the need for domestic political support.
95
Available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/isaf-joint-command/index.php.
Available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/nato-training-mission-afghanistan/index.php.
97
International Security Assistance Force “Placemat” dated February 3, 2011, available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/
images/stories/File/Placemats/3%20Feb%202011%20Placemat-REVISED.pdf.
96
Congressional Research Service
24
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
National Caveats
From the outset, ISAF operations have been constrained by “national caveats”—restrictions that
individual troop-contributing countries impose on their own forces’ activities. These restrictions
are classified. According to the Department of Defense, as of April 2010, 27 ISAF troop
contributors had placed caveats of some kind on their contingents; of those caveats, 20 imposed
limitations on operating outside of originally assigned geographic locations.98
Caveats tend to be informed by domestic political constraints—a government may consider, for
example, that only by limiting its troops’ activities, and hedging against taking casualties, can it
guard against strong popular domestic opposition to its troop contribution. As a rule, troopcontributing countries state their caveats explicitly; but additional constraints may surface when
unanticipated requirements arise and contingents seek additional guidance from their capitals.
National caveats tend to frustrate commanders on the ground because they inhibit commanders’
freedom to apportion forces across the battlespace—to move and utilize forces freely. With
caveats, the “whole” of the international force, as some observers have suggested, is less than the
sum of its parts. Even more damaging, ISAF officials note, is the impact caveats can have on
ISAF’s relationship with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) partners. For example, ISAF
advisory teams that are unable to accompany ANSF counterparts on offensive operations quickly
lose both the Afghans’ respect, and their own ability to shape and mentor the Afghan forces.
Afghan Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak stated that ISAF training teams “don’t have the
same quality” as their U.S. counterparts.99 U.S. senior military officials in Afghanistan have noted
that the ANSF appreciate their U.S. counterparts because “we drink from the same canteen.”100
The U.S. government has consistently urged ISAF troop contributors to drop or ease their
national caveats, with some success.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
Provincial Reconstructions Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan grew out of a U.S. military initiative in
late 2002. In general, PRTs help Afghan provincial governments develop the capacity and
capabilities to govern, provide security, ensure the rule of law, promote development, and meet
the needs of the population. 101 As ISAF’s area of responsibility expanded geographically, it
assumed responsibility for PRTs in each new area. As of early 2011, ISAF maintains PRTs in 28
of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, including two new contributions provided within the past year: the
South Korean-led PRT in Parwan province, and the Turkish-led PRT in Jowzjan. 102
PRTs vary greatly in size, composition, and focus. The Swedish-led PRT based in Balkh province,
for example, is primarily a Swedish military unit, augmented by a small handful of U.S. and
98
99
See Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010.
Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008.
100
General David McKiernan and other U.S. officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. One additional
consequence of national caveats is a tendency for U.S. troops in Afghanistan to regard ISAF with a degree of humorous
skepticism—“ISAF,” the line goes, stands for “I Stop At Four,” or alternatively, “I Saw Americans Fighting.”
101
See “Fact Sheet: Making Afghanistan More Secure with Economic and Reconstruction Assistance,” White House,
September 26, 2008, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080926-16.html.
102
International Security Assistance Force “Placemat” dated February 3, 2011, available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/
images/stories/File/Placemats/3%20Feb%202011%20Placemat-REVISED.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
25
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Finnish civilian experts, which has conducted various training and partnering activities with
Afghan security forces. It is based in the capital city of Balkh, Mazar-e Sharif, separate from the
headquarters of ISAF’s German-led Regional Command-North. In contrast, the two Turkish-led
PRTs, based in Wardak and Jowzjan provinces, are civilian organizations led by diplomats from
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which focus primarily on relationships with provincial
political leadership and visible reconstruction projects—some of which they have painted bright
red to match the color of the Turkish flag. Perhaps the largest PRT is the British-led team based in
Helmand province, where the UK has long had a significant civilian and military presence. The
PRT is led by a UK senior civilian and includes a large staff from multiple UK agencies, as well
as some U.S. government civilian personnel. It is co-located with the Helmand-based UK military
contingent, to facilitate integration of effort. The PRT in Uruzgan province, also in Regional
Command-South, is the only one without a single national lead. After the drawdown of Dutch
forces from Uruzgan, an agreement was reached to re-organize that PRT under the ISAF flag,
with contributions from the Netherlands, the United States, and Australia.
U.S.-led PRTs have undergone substantial evolution in the last several years. As originally
created, they were primarily military organizations, led by either an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel
or a Navy Commander, and reporting to the nearest U.S. battlespace owner. They typically
included between 80 and 120 total personnel, including Civil Affairs troops and support staff.
Each PRT usually featured one representative each from the Department of State, the Agency for
International Development (AID), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA). Today, each U.S.
PRT has a U.S. government civilian lead, as well as a military PRT commander, and the civilian
staffs have been significantly augmented. U.S. government civilians also serve on the staffs of
non-U.S.-led PRTs throughout the country.
Practitioners and observers variously evaluate the successes of PRTs to date. Some argue that
while PRTs have carried out useful work, they have not been resourced sufficiently to meet
requirements. This may be particularly true for some Allies, for example Lithuania, that have
fewer resources available in general for international assistance efforts. Others, including senior
Afghan officials, have argued that PRTs do not coordinate their efforts sufficiently with Afghan
authorities. In November 2008, during a visit to Kabul by a U.N. Security Council delegation,
President Karzai claimed that PRTs were setting up “parallel governments” in the countryside, a
claim he subsequently repeated.103 In February 2011, at the Munich Security Conference,
President Karzai called for the speedy dismantling of the PRTs, on the grounds that they serve as
an impediment to the extension of Afghan authority. 104 Other Afghan officials have reportedly
expressed that international resources channeled through PRTs are frequently “lost” amidst
multiple layers of contractors and subcontractors before they reach the Afghan people. 105
NATO Senior Civilian Representative
The NATO Alliance is directly represented in Kabul by a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR),
who serves as the personal representative of the NATO Secretary-General. The NATO SCR has
no formal relationship with the ISAF Commander or headquarters, other than coordination. In
103
Associated Press, “Afghan President Complains U.S., NATO Aren’t Succeeding,” Foxnews.com, November 26,
2008.
104
Judy Dempsey, “Karzai Seeks End to NATO Reconstruction Teams,” The New York Times, February 6, 2011.
105
ISAF officials, and Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan,
November 2008, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
26
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
past years, the NATO SCR focused primarily on Afghan political developments and on reporting
up to NATO’s political leadership.
That dynamic changed with the appointment, in February 2010, of a new NATO SCR,
Ambassador Mark Sedwill, who had served formerly as the UK Ambassador to Afghanistan.
While the formal terms of reference for the job were not changed, with NATO, UK, and U.S.
encouragement, Ambassador Sedwill and then-ISAF Commander GEN McChrystal forged a
much closer partnership than had pertained in the past. The two took important briefings together,
held some key meetings with senior Afghan officials together, and conducted some travel around
the country together. They also coordinated their presentations for their respective NATO chains
of command. Together, the two fostered more effective integration of effort among key
international actors—UNAMA, the European Union, and a handful of key Embassies—by
bringing together the leaders of these organizations frequently in a small group format.106
In February 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced the decision to
appoint Ambassador Simon Gass, currently serving as the UK Ambassador to Iran, to succeed
Ambassador Sedwill as NATO SCR in Afghanistan. 107
U.S. Presence
Over the past several years, with the surge of both military forces and civilian personnel, the U.S.
government footprint on the ground in Afghanistan has grown substantially. At the same time,
both military and civilian command and control arrangements, and modalities for civil-military
coordination, have also changed significantly.
U.S. Forces
As the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan grew and changed, the unilateral U.S. footprint
adapted accordingly. During major combat operations in 2001, the U.S. military established a
special operations forces (SOF) presence in Afghanistan, reporting directly to U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). By early 2002, some U.S. conventional forces, including a twostar U.S. Army Division Headquarters, had flowed into Afghanistan, but the footprint remained
light—only one brigade combat team (BCT)—until early 2007.
In October 2003, a U.S.-led three-star Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) was
established in Kabul. CFC-A oversaw two U.S.-led two-star commands that also included
coalition partners—a training command for the ANSF; and a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)
built around a U.S. Army Division headquarters, leading conventional forces in eastern
Afghanistan. CFC-A served until ISAF assumed security responsibility for all of Afghanistan, and
was then deactivated, in February 2007. Following the deactivation of CFC-A, its subordinate
ANSF training command, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
began reporting directly to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and its subordinate CJTF
assumed a dual U.S./NATO reporting chain, to CENTCOM for U.S. issues and to ISAF in its
NATO capacity as Regional Command-East.
106
107
Communications from ISAF, U.S. Embassy, UK Embassy, and UNAMA officials, 2010.
See http://www.acus.org/natosource/nato-appoints-new-senior-civilian-representative-afghanistan.
Congressional Research Service
27
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
In October 2008, the Department of Defense activated United States Forces-Afghanistan
(USFOR-A), a new four-star headquarters designed to streamline command and control for U.S.
forces operating in Afghanistan. The ISAF Commanding General, then GEN McKiernan, was
dual-hatted as the USFOR-A Commanding General. Today, the USFOR-A Commanding General
has “operational control” of U.S. conventional forces operating at ISAF’s Regional Commands,
of the U.S. training mission CSTC-A, and of some U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF); he has
a “tactical control” relationship with some other U.S. SOF.
As the head of ISAF, General Petraeus reports up the NATO chain of command to SACEUR
Admiral James Stavridis; as the head of USFOR-A, he reports to the Commanding General of
CENTCOM, General James Mattis.
U.S. Troop Numbers
According to the Joint Staff, as of January 1, 2011, there were 96,700 U.S. military personnel
serving in Afghanistan. Of those, 78,400 were assigned to ISAF, while the rest were serving
under the U.S. flag.108 Major U.S.-provided headquarters units include the 101st Airborne
Division, serving as the nucleus of Regional Command-East; the 10th Mountain Division, serving
as the nucleus of Regional Command-South; and I Marine Expeditionary Force-Forward, serving
as the nucleus of Regional Command-Southwest. 109
U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan have grown significantly over time. In December 2006, U.S.
forces included only one Brigade Combat Team. In early 2007, an additional BCT was added, by
extending the tour of the 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division (3/10) by 120 days, flowing in its
originally scheduled replacement, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, on schedule, and later
replacing 3/10 with the 173rd Airborne BCT.110 In January 2008, the Department of Defense
announced that President Bush had approved an “extraordinary, one-time” deployment of 3,200
additional Marines to Afghanistan.111 Those forces did redeploy in November 2008, but were
replaced by a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), including 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine
Regiment, plus additional logistics and air support.
It was not until 2009 that the U.S. footprint began to grow substantially, including a Combat
Aviation Brigade that had been approved by the Bush Administration in December 2008;
approximately 17,000 troops approved by President Obama in February 2009; and some 30,000
further troops approved as a result of the Obama Administration’s strategic assessment that fall.112
108
Joint Staff, “Boots on the Ground” Information Paper, February 8, 2011. The Joint Staff noted: “The overlap of
transitioning force, short-duration temporary duty personnel, U.S. forces assigned to DoD combat support agencies,
and other forces not operationally assigned and therefore unavailable to the Commanding General are excluded.” ISAF
noted that as of February 3, 2011, there were 90,000 U.S. personnel serving in ISAF; the difference reflects not a
substantial increase in U.S. forces during January 2011, but rather the different personnel accountability systems used
by ISAF and DoD. See International Security Assistance Force “Placemat” dated February 3, 2011, available at
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/3%20Feb%202011%20Placemat-REVISED.pdf.
109
For a full description of U.S. and ISAF major units currently deployed, see Wesley Morgan, “Afghanistan Order of
Battle,” Institute for the Study of War, February 2011, available at http://www.understandingwar.org/files/
AfghanistanOrbat_Feb11.pdf.
110
See Matthew Cox, “10th Mountain Brigade Extended in Afghanistan,” Army Times, January 25, 2007.
111
See Ann Scott Tyson, “3,200 Marines to Deploy to Afghanistan in Spring,” Washington Post, January 16, 2008.
112
See Department of Defense, “DoD Announces Afghanistan Force Deployment,” December 22, 2008, available at
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12406; Department of Defense, “DoD Announces Afghanistan
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
28
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Legal Basis for U.S. Force Presence
Two separate sets of arrangements are in place, for ISAF and for U.S. forces deployed under U.S.
command, to provide a legal basis for the presence of those forces in Afghanistan.
In 2002 and 2003, U.S. Embassy Kabul and the Afghan Ministry for Foreign Affairs exchanged
diplomatic notes, which together constituted a formal agreement. The notes, which remain in
force, confirmed that military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense shall be
accorded a status equivalent to that of Embassy administrative and technical staff under the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The notes also addressed freedom of movement,
licenses, the wearing of uniforms, the use of vehicles, exemption from taxation, and imports and
exports. They confirmed U.S. criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. 113
Some of the basic provisions of that exchange of notes were reconfirmed by a Joint Declaration
signed by President Karzai and President Bush, in May 2005, in which the two countries
committed themselves to a strategic partnership with the goal of “strengthen[ing] U.S.-Afghan
ties to help ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security, democracy and prosperity.” The Declaration
confirmed the bilateral intent to work together closely on a range of activities including, in the
security sector: training the Afghan National Security Forces, security sector reform,
counterterrorism operations, counternarcotics programs, intelligence-sharing, border security, and
strengthening ties with NATO. The Declaration included the specific, practical commitment that
U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan would continue to have access to Bagram Air Base
“and facilities at other locations as may be mutually determined,” and that U.S. and coalition
forces would continue to enjoy freedom of action to conduct military operations “based on
consultations and pre-agreed procedures.”114
Over time, the Afghan leadership has expressed interest in making sure that ISAF- and U.S.-led
forces coordinate their operations with the ANSF and with each other. For example, the 2006
Afghanistan Compact, the basic framework for international community engagement in
Afghanistan in all sectors, stated that all U.S. “counter-terrorism operations will be conducted in
close coordination with the Afghan government and ISAF.”115
In August 2008, President Karzai called for a review of the presence of all foreign forces in
Afghanistan and the conclusion of formal status of forces agreements. 116 He issued the call during
(...continued)
Force Deployment,” February 17, 2009, available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12493;
and President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, West Point, New York, December 1, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
113
See “Diplomatic Note No.202,” Embassy of the United States of America, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 26, 2002;
“Note, Document No.791,” Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fifth Political
Department, December 12, 2002; and “Note, Document No.93,” Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, American and Canada Political Affairs Department, May 28, 2003. See also Karen DeYoung, “Only a
Two-Page ‘Note’ Governs U.S. Military in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August 28, 2008.
114
See Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, May 23, 2005, available at available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050523-2.html.
115
The Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success, London Conference on Afghanistan, London, UK, February 1,
2006, available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf.
116
See Karen DeYoung, “Only a Two-Page ‘Note’ Governs U.S. Military in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, August
28, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
29
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
the heated U.S.-Iraqi negotiation process aimed at achieving a status of forces-like agreement,
and just after U.S. airstrikes in Azizabad, Afghanistan, had apparently produced a number of
civilian casualties. In January 2009, GIRoA reportedly sent a proposed draft agreement to NATO,
which outlined terms and conditions for the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan. 117 Officials
have suggested that U.S.-Afghan talks designed to update the bilateral strategic partnership,
scheduled for 2011, may consider revising the legal basis for the presence of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan.118
U.S. Government Civilians
In recent years, the U.S. government civilian presence in Afghanistan has grown substantially in
numbers of personnel, numbers of participating U.S. government agencies, and the reach of its
footprint on the ground. In addition, new measures have been introduced to better organize the
U.S. government effort internally. Of course, U.S. civil-military efforts do not take place in a
vacuum—they are linked in most locations and at most levels with efforts by Afghan civilian and
security officials, and with efforts by Allies and partners.
Civilian “Surge”
Many practitioners and observers had long suggested that the capacity-building challenges in
Afghanistan required additional international civilian expertise, as well as the effective
integration of such expertise with military efforts.
In 2008, ISAF commanders argued that a stronger commitment to build responsive capacity was
required because it was governance, more than security or development, that was lagging in
Afghanistan. Then-RC-East Commanding General, Major General Schloesser, argued, “We need
an interagency surge!”119 Senior officials from other Allied countries within ISAF echoed this
argument—in November 2008, then-RC-North Commanding General, German Major General
Weigt, argued that he needed “civilian advisory teams,” as analogues to the military training
teams working with Afghan forces. “The main problem for me,” he stated,” is not security, but
deficits in governance.”120 Outside experts too stressed the need for additional civilian expertise.
In December 2008, Sarah Chayes wrote that the problem of governance in Afghanistan was
particularly acute, and she argued, “Western governments should send experienced former
mayors, district commissioners and water and health department officials to mentor Afghans in
those roles.”121
In late 2008, U.S. Embassy Kabul outlined a proposal for a “civilian surge” to support provincialand district-level governance in Afghanistan. Spearheaded by then-Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the initiative, also known as
the “civilian uplift”, grew quickly. During 2009, the number of U.S. civilian personnel under
Chief of Mission authority in Afghanistan increased from about 300 to nearly 1,000. By early
117
See Associated Press, “Afghanistan Seeks More Control of NATO Troops,” Los Angeles Times, January 21, 2009.
Communications from Administration officials, 2010, 2011.
119
MG Jeffrey Schloesser, Interview, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008.
120
MG Weigt, Interview, Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, November 2008.
121
Sarah Chayes, “Clean up the Afghan Government, and the Taliban will Fade Away,” Washington Post, December
14, 2008.
118
Congressional Research Service
30
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
2011, according to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, there were more than 1,100 civilian experts
from nine federal agencies serving in Afghanistan.122
The additional civilians have come from multiple U.S. government agencies—the Department of
State, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Department of Agriculture
(USDA), which have long provided some personnel to serve at PRTs, but also the Departments of
Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security and others. Some are reinforcing the staff of U.S. Embassy
Kabul, including serving in “growth” areas such as rule of law; others are deploying to the field to
serve at Regional Commands, at PRTs, or close to local communities at District Support Teams
(DSTs).
U.S. civilian agencies have faced significant challenges in meeting the full demand for civilian
expertise, a pressure that reportedly continued in early 2011. Unlike the military, most civilian
agency personnel are not readily deployable—their full-time jobs are not, effectively, preparation
for deployment, but rather full-time concerns in their own right; and civilian agencies do not
typically maintain a personnel “float” that can easily backfill positions for others who are
deploying.
Agencies have explored a variety of solutions to meet the requirement in Afghanistan. USDA, for
example, has made deployment opportunities available not only to members of its Foreign
Agricultural Service, whose members do regularly serve overseas, but also to staff of USDA as a
whole. Both State and AID rely very heavily on temporary hires, including State’s “3161” system
of contracting, and AID’s “Foreign Service Limited” appointments.123
Perhaps not surprisingly, the results are a mixed bag. Ideally, U.S. government civilians would
bring to their deployments three forms of expertise: technical expertise in their fields; familiarity
with the programs and culture of their home organization; and knowledge of Afghanistan. While
technical expertise is the norm, new hires are unlikely to be familiar with their new organization,
and most new and old hires have little or no prior experience in Afghanistan.124 Moreover,
looking ahead, much of the accumulated Afghanistan experience of temporary hires is likely to be
lost, because there are few if any ready mechanisms for bringing temporary hires on board as
permanent agency staff.
Senior Civilian Representatives
In 2009, a significant change was introduced by the creation of U.S. “Senior Civilian
Representative” (SCR) positions and a streamlined chain of command for all U.S. civilians
working under Chief of Mission authority—that is, for the U.S. Ambassador in Kabul.125 At each
level—Regional Command, Brigade, provincial, and district—one of the U.S. civilians, usually
the highest in seniority regardless of home agency, is designated the SCR. All other U.S. civilians
on that team or in that command report to the SCR. The SCR, in turn, is responsible for reporting
122
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the Launch of the Asia Society’s Series of Richard C. Holbrooke
Memorial Addresses,” Asia Society, New York, NY, February 18, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2011/02/156815.htm.
123
Communications from State, AID, USDA officials, 2009, 2010.
124
Communications from State, AID officials, 2009, 2010, 2011.
125
The U.S. and NATO both use the term “Senior Civilian Representative” but their respective personnel serving in
SCR posts have no formal relationship to one another.
Congressional Research Service
31
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
up to the next higher level. The change was designed to “raise the profile” of the civilian effort, to
put civilian efforts on par with those of the military, and to ensure better unity of effort among
civilian agencies.126
The structure marks a change from the familiar past role of State Department Political Advisors
(POLADs), based at State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. POLADs typically played an
advisory role to the military commander—effectively serving as the commander’s (senior) staff
rather than counterpart. During the war in Iraq, the State Department found it challenging to meet
the requests of military commanders at all levels for POLADs; the Department of Defense
obliged by hiring civilians with political-military backgrounds to serve in analogous advisory
capacities.127
The SCR structure has reportedly created some tensions among U.S. civilian agencies, as many
personnel in “field” position continue to reach back directly to their home organizations in Kabul
or back in Washington in addition to utilizing the SCR chain. That dynamic is not surprising—
field personnel, particularly if they are new to their home organizations, may need ongoing
familiarization with agency programs; they may want to remain in direct contact with a view to
future assignments; and they may seek support if and when disagreements about policy or
approaches arise within their inter-agency team on the ground.128
U.S. Civil-Military Integration
Some observers have suggested that Afghanistan might be a useful test case for an integrated,
balanced application of all instruments of U.S. national power.129 Practice in Afghanistan to date
highlights some remarkable innovations in civil-military integration but also the persistence of
stubbornly distinct cultures that do not necessarily give each other the benefit of the doubt. Some
military practitioners in Afghanistan still tend to regard civilian efforts as “too slow,” while some
civilian practitioners still tend to regard with concern a perceived military tendency to “charge
ahead.”130
Civil-Military Integration Versus Division of Labor
The significantly larger U.S. military and civilian presence in Afghanistan, together with more colocation of U.S. civilian and military officials working in a given location, has, practitioners
suggest, underscored the need for both strong integration and clear division of labor.131
On the ground, civilian and military practitioners have frequently crafted innovative arrangements
for better integrating their efforts. One illustration of arrangements that foster greater integration
126
Communications from ISAF and U.S. Embassy Kabul officials, 2009, 2010.
The author was one of those DoD Political Advisors during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
128
Communications from State, AID, USDA field personnel, 2009, 2010.
129
See for example “Afghanistan: Winning the War. Problems, Solutions, and Critical Decisions for the Next
Administration,” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Washington DC, December 4, 2008, panel discussion
video transcript available at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
11784099&Itemid=385.
130
Communications from civilian and military officials, 2009, 2010, 2011.
131
Communications from ISAF and U.S. Embassy officials, 2009, 2010.
127
Congressional Research Service
32
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
is the “Board of Directors” concept created and practiced, through several rotations, by the U.S.
Army Brigade and its civilian counterparts responsible for efforts in Paktia, Paktika and Khowst
provinces (“P2K”). In that arrangement, the civilian and military leaders collectively take briefs
from their civilian and military subordinates on the full range of topics—security, governance,
and development. They collectively brief their higher headquarters—the Commander of Regional
Command-East and his SCR counterpart. And senior leaders of the Board travel together
throughout their area of responsibility. Board members have indicated that as a rule, the Brigade
Commander makes decisions in the security arena; civilian officials make decisions in the arenas
of governance and development; and group consultation on the full spectrum of issues is common
and facilitated by the scheduled of shared briefings. 132
In some cases, the strongly enhanced civilian presence and the growth of SCR-led civilian teams
as counterparts to military commands has had a different impact, fostering a sharp division of
labor between the two. Some military staffs have been eager to hand off responsibilities in nonsecurity arenas to civilians—an “over to you” approach. Meanwhile, some civilian teams have
been eager to assume undisputed leadership of those efforts.133 Too strong an emphasis on
division of labor can leave gaps in understanding and approach between military and civilian
officials, and can draw the military’s focus away from their critical supporting roles in
governance and development activities.
Structure for Integration and Decision-Making
Several years ago, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) deployed a handful of civilian planners to Afghanistan to help the U.S.
Embassy and U.S. military forces craft more effective modalities for cooperation. Their efforts
helped to establish a senior-level civil-military forum, the Executive Working Group (EWG),
intended to serve as a civil-military decision-making body with the authority to issue guidance.
Its initial stated mission was to “unify U.S. Government efforts in Afghanistan through
coordinated planning and execution” across four lines of operation—security, governance,
development, and information. Original members of the U.S.-only forum included senior leaders
from the U.S. Embassy, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and some ISAF Regional Commands. The
EWG was supported by a standing secretariat and planning body, the Integrated Civilian-Military
Action Group (ICMAG), established in late 2008.
Today, the Executive Working Group continues to function, with participation expanded to
include the leaders of additional staff sections from the U.S. Embassy and ISAF, as well as Senior
Civilian Representatives from the Regional Commands. The EWG is supported by a growing
series of Working Groups focused on specific issues, such as borders; Working Group
membership may now include non-U.S. personnel. The whole structure feeds up into a regularly
convening forum of ISAF and Embassy senior leadership.
The architecture alone—designed and elaborated on the ground in Afghanistan—represented a
significant step toward closer civil-military integration. In practice, while there have been few
impediments to regularly convening the participants at each level, the system—not unlike the
Washington-based National Security Council system—has not always generated decisions in a
132
133
Communications from civilian and military practitioners in P2K, 2008, 2009, 2010.
Communications from civilian and military practitioners, 2009, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
33
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
timely fashion. “Discussing” issues, some participants say, is more common that resolving
them. 134
Civil-Military Planning
U.S. civil-military planning in Afghanistan has had several key jumpstarts in recent years. In
2008 and 2009, drawing on the planning resources of the ICMAG, and capitalizing on the more
frequent interaction that the EWG process fostered, the U.S. Embassy and USFOR-A crafted the
first civil-military campaign plan in Afghanistan. The Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign
Plan for Support to Afghanistan was published in August 2009, under the signatures of both U.S.
Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and USFOR-A Commanding General GEN McChrystal.135 The 40page document laid out 11 “transformative effects”—areas for combined civil-military effort such
as justice, governance, agriculture, and reintegration. The paper did not articulate a
comprehensive strategic vision for Afghanistan itself, or prioritize or sequence the efforts it
prescribed. Some practitioners stressed that the primary achievement of the strategy was further
fostering the practice of civil-military planning.136 In late 2010, efforts were reportedly underway
to update the U.S. Civil-Military Campaign Plan in order to better synchronize it with the ISAF
campaign plan, which was undergoing its usual annual update. 137
Meanwhile, the October 2009 stand-up of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), NATO ISAF’s threestar operational-level headquarters, created a natural planning partner for Embassy officials
focused on governance and development efforts at sub-national levels. The IJC extended an open
invitation to U.S. Embassy officials—as well as to partners from other key Embassies and from
UNAMA—to participate in planning efforts. In 2009 and throughout 2010, extensive planning for
the “main effort” operations in Helmand province, and later in Kandahar province, as well as for
refining civil-military support to key districts across Afghanistan, provided opportunities for
collaboration. Over time, Embassy participation in these planning activities increased
substantially. The critical challenge faced by the U.S. Embassy in participating fully in these
activities was a lack of dedicated personnel. Those officials best able to speak authoritatively
about plans in a particular sector were typically occupied working full-time on that set of issues,
so while they were available for decision-making meetings, they were not typically available for
full-time, long-term planning efforts. Civilian planners provided to the Embassy by S/CRS,
serving in the Political-Military section, contributed substantially to these efforts.138
The Campaign
The overall campaign broadly aimed at the stabilization of Afghanistan is multi-faceted in both
participation and focus. The campaign is joint, combined, and civil-military, and includes
governance, development and security efforts. It addresses conflict settlement as well as current
counter-insurgency and stabilization efforts—including the transition process by which Afghans
134
Communications from civilian and military participants, and participant observation, 2009, 2010.
U.S. Embassy Kabul and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military
Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, August 10, 2009.
136
Communications from civilian and military practitioners, and participant observation, 2008, 2009.
137
Communications from ISAF officials, 2010.
138
Communications from ISAF and Embassy officials, 2009, 2010.
135
Congressional Research Service
34
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
assume lead responsibility for security, and the twin processes of reintegration and reconciliation
which may bring former insurgents at all levels back into peaceful Afghan society. In general, the
campaign is Afghan-led, particularly in the sense of priority-setting.
Operation Omid
Operation Omid (“hope”) is the joint, combined, and civil-military operational-level operation
designed to implement the campaign plan across Afghanistan over time. Its main points of
emphasis draw on the major themes of GEN McChrystal’s 2009 Initial Assessment, which were
later captured in the 2009 revision of the ISAF campaign plan: geographical prioritization across
the theater, based on population centers, commerce centers, and trade routes; and full integration
of security, governance, and development efforts in those prioritized locations.139 Its most
important contribution, according to IJC Commander LTG Rodriguez, was to “focus and
synchronize efforts.”140
Planning and Participation in Operation Omid
In 2009, during the months before the stand-up of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), future IJC staff
officers, directed by then-future IJC Commander LTG Rodriguez, began laying out operationallevel plans to support the strategic-level ISAF campaign. From the start, they reached out to
Afghan counterparts at the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, fully engaging them in a
combined planning effort—and helping “create” new Afghan planners when Afghan experience
was lacking. As these efforts got underway, future IJC staff also reached out to the U.S. Embassy,
and to several other key international civilian partners including the UK Embassy and UNAMA,
to seek input and, as much as possible, full participation. The results of these early joint,
combined and civil-military planning efforts was the first Operation Omid plan, signed by both
Afghan and ISAF officials.
Over the next year, through a succession of operations in specific areas, the multi-faceted
planning effort grew to include Afghan civilian as well as security ministry officials; Afghan
civilian officials from the provincial and district levels; Afghan police and army commanders;
and their respective civilian and military counterparts from the international community.
The Operation Omid plans underwent their first revision in late 2010.
Operation Moshtarek
The first major test of the broad Operation Omid plans was Operation Moshtarek (“together”).
Moshtarek focused on the six central districts of Helmand province—the central Helmand River
valley. Helmand, like Kandahar province next door, is heavily Pashtun-populated. Helmand long
139
Communications from ISAF and IJC officials, and participant observation, 2009, 2010. See also General Stanley
McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, available in redacted form from the Washington Post
at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=
ST2009092003140.
140
See DoD News Briefing with LTG Rodriguez, February 1, 2011, available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4764; and Matthew Green, Interview with General David Petraeus, Financial Times,
February 7, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
35
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
served as a key “breadbasket” for the region, and as a significant source of poppy-growing and
revenue-generation for the Taliban. The six districts were chosen due to their relatively dense
population concentration, and their importance for commerce routes linking the province’s key
agricultural areas to the center of commerce, the capital Lashkar Gah, and then on to Kandahar
next door.141
Planning efforts encompassed all levels of government—Kabul-based Ministers from both
civilian and security ministries; Governor Mangal of Helmand province; Afghan army and police
regional commanders; and international counterparts. Plans were rehearsed using a series of
combined, civil-military backbriefs.142
Shaping operations for Moshtarek included targeted operations by Special Operations Forces, as
well as significant governance activities including identifying Afghan officials to serve at the
district level and fostering more inclusive district-level councils to help give local populations a
stronger voice. President Karzai personally gave his approval for the launch of “clearing”
operations, carried out by combined Afghan, U.S. and UK forces. Officials noted that the
operation was quickly successful in clearing the area of Taliban fighters; the process of
establishing governance—forming local citizens’ councils and filling district-level government
positions—proceeded more slowly.143
Operation Hamkari
The second large-scale manifestation of Operation Omid was Operation Hamkari (“cooperation”)
in Kandahar province next door, based on the same model of “shaping” key areas by engaging
with local councils and identifying competent personnel to serve as government officials;
“clearing” insurgent strongholds; and “holding” those areas with a combination of Afghan and
international forces and emerging Afghan civilian leadership.144
Kandahar province presented some greater challenges than had Helmand. It is the spiritual home
of the Taliban, and Taliban leaders and fighters had long made use of safe havens in districts
adjacent to Kandahar city, including Zhari, Panjwai, and parts of Arghandab. In contrast to the
relatively strong and balanced political leadership by Governor Mangal in Helmand, political
power in Kandahar was far more narrowly channeled through the hands of key powerbrokers
including President Karzai’s half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Chairman of the Provincial
Council. Beneficial or otherwise, his strong de facto authority reportedly was not exercised
evenly, resulting in deeply unequal opportunities for political and economic participation. In the
view of some practitioners, the imperative to temper any of his activities that did not benefit all
the Afghan people clashed with the imperative to accomplish the mission. 145
141
Communications from ISAF, U.S. Embassy, UK, and Afghan officials, and participant observation, 2009, 2010.
Communications from ISAF, U.S. Embassy, UK, and Afghan officials, and participant observation, 2009, 2010.
143
Communications from ISAF, U.S. Embassy, UK, and Afghan officials, and participant observation, 2009, 2010.
144
Communications from ISAF officials, 2009 and 2010. Afghan officials initially expressed concerns about the use of
the term “operation”, arguing that it narrowly connoted kinetic activities rather than broader stabilization activities
including governance and development. English-speaking practitioners found it extraordinarily difficult to write and
especially talk about an effort that had no associated noun (on the premise that hamkari is more of a descriptor).
145
Communications from ISAF, U.S. officials, 2009, 2010.
142
Congressional Research Service
36
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Planning efforts for Hamkari were even more robust than for Moshtarek, including pre-briefs to
President Karzai, and a joint, video-teleconferenced pre-brief to Presidents Karzai and Obama
together. President Karzai personally conducted shaping activities—meeting with large and small
gatherings of key community leaders in Kandahar to seek their support.
As of early 2011, ISAF officials credited the combined operation to date with significantly
disrupting insurgent networks around Kandahar city, and with laying the foundations for future
responsive governance through the establishment of an Afghan civilian government presence,
including ministry representatives, at the district level. LTG Rodriguez noted that in January
2011, in Arghandab district just north of the city, a new district governor, a new police chief, and
16 government employees were working at the district center.146
Winter Campaign and 2011 Operations
In early 2011, ISAF and its Afghan partners were conducting a “winter campaign”, designed to
harden areas cleared of a Taliban presence by strengthening Afghan security force and civilian
governance presence and activities, and by further fostering representative local councils that help
the Afghan people hold their officials accountable. Officials expect that the spring fighting season
will bring more concerted Taliban attempts to reassert influence and reclaim territory.
In early 2011, looking ahead at the rest of the year, ISAF and its Afghan partners planned to focus
on expanding the “security bubbles” in Central Helmand and Kandahar, including connecting
them with each other and extending them out to the border with Pakistan, to facilitate freedom of
movement and trade. They also planned to expand the security bubble around Kabul city south
into Wardak and Logar provinces, and east into Nangarhar province. 147
In eastern Afghanistan, in Paktia, Paktika and Khowst provinces, officials planned to focus on
continuing to decimate the Haqqani network, challenging their freedom of movement across the
border from Pakistan into the traditional Zadran tribe. In northern Afghanistan, plans included
reducing the strength of a growing Taliban presence, particularly in Baghlan province. In western
Afghanistan, the city of Herat, already home to a robust socio-economic life and little threatened
by violence, was a good candidate, LTG Rodriguez observed, for early transition.148
Timelines and Transition
In his December 2009 West Point speech, President Obama firmly established the “July 2011”
marker, yet many practitioners and observers expressed some confusion about what changes were
expected at that time, and what relationship “July 2011” was likely to have to the rest of the
campaign. The development of debates and then activities concerning the process of
“transition”—rooted in both President Karzai’s stated policy positions and long-standing NATO
146
See DoD News Briefing with LTG Rodriguez, February 1, 2011, available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4764.
147
See DoD News Briefing with LTG Rodriguez, February 1, 2011, available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4764; and Matthew Green, Interview with General David Petraeus, Financial Times,
February 7, 2011.
148
See DoD News Briefing with LTG Rodriguez, February 1, 2011, available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4764; and Matthew Green, Interview with General David Petraeus, Financial Times,
February 7, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
37
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
plans—has provided a broader context, extending out until the end of 2014, for the “July 2011”
marker.
President Karzai’s Support for Transition
Under the rubric of further extending the exercise of Afghan sovereignty, President Karzai
introduced the basic tenets of “transition” that now shape NATO and U.S. strategic thinking and
planning. As part of his second inaugural address in November 2009, he stated that “within the
next three years” Afghanistan would “lead and conduct military operations in the many insecure
areas of the country.” He added that within five years, Afghan forces would “take the lead in
ensuring security and stability across the country.”149 President Karzai repeated these statements
at the January 2010 London Conference in even more powerful language: “We will spare no
effort and sacrifice to lead security of our country within the next five years all over
Afghanistan.”150
Elaboration and Approval of the Transition Concept
The term “transition” has roots in formal NATO planning documents. Over the course of the past
two years, through combined Afghan and international efforts, the concept of transition has been
refined significantly. “Transition” is the name of Phase IV of NATO’s operational plans for
Afghanistan, during which lead security responsibility transitions from the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Parts of Afghanistan
that have not entered Phase IV remain in Phase III, “Stabilization.”
On October 23, 2009, NATO Defense Ministers, meeting in Bratislava, approved a Strategic
Concept for Phase IV “Transition.” That step gave ISAF the go-ahead to work with Afghan
partners to codify the process.
In the official Communiqué of the January 2010 London Conference on Afghanistan, conference
participants supported the decision by NATO’s political governing body, the North Atlantic
Council (NAC), to develop, before the Kabul Conference scheduled to be held that summer, “a
plan for phased transition to Afghan security lead province by province, including the conditions
on which transition will be based.” Participants stressed their “shared commitment to create the
conditions to allow for transition as rapidly as possible.” The London Conference Communiqué
introduced a timeline: a “number of provinces” would transition to ANSF lead “by late 2010 or
early 2011, with ISAF moving to a supporting role in those provinces.”151
In April 2010, at the informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn, Estonia,
participants agreed on conditions that would need to be met before any given area could
transition. As discussed in Tallinn, the term “transition” still referred to a change in security
responsibilities, but the scope of decision-making criteria was explicitly broadened to include
governance and development factors, as well as security-related considerations. The premise was
149
150
Ibid.
President Hamid Karzai, Opening Remarks, London Conference, January 28, 2010.
151
“Afghanistan: The London Conference, 28 January 2010, Communiqué, Afghan Leadership Regional Cooperation
International Partnership,” paragraph 11, available at http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/central-content/afghanistan-hmg/
resources/pdf/conference/Communique-final.
Congressional Research Service
38
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
that a stable broader environment would be necessary to ensure durable security. The Tallinn
meeting launched a series of follow-on consultations in Kabul among Afghan officials, the NATO
Senior Civilian Representative, ISAF leaders, and representatives of key Allied troop-contributing
nations. The talks focused on elaborating a concept paper for Inteqal (which means “transition” in
both Dari and Pashto).152
The July 2010 Kabul Conference confirmed several key outcomes of the Inteqal consultations.
Participants endorsed the Afghan government’s broad plan for phased transition, including
establishing a decision-making process led by the Afghan government and the NAC, and they
confirmed the goal of announcing, by the end of 2010, that transition was “underway.”153
At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the transition “way forward” was formally
announced. The Summit Declaration stated that the transition process was “on track to begin in
early 2011.” Afghan forces would “be assuming full responsibility for security across the whole
of Afghanistan” by the end of 2014.154
Transition Decisions
ISAF officials have stressed that several key principles will guide transition decision-making:
each transition decision will be conditions-based; transition will signal the start of a progressive
shift in the role of the international community from supporting to mentoring to enabling to
sustaining; transition must be irreversible; and transition will be based on the capabilities of the
civilian Afghan government as well as the ANSF. The concept was broadened to allow for the
transition of districts and even institutions, in addition to provinces.155
In Kabul, the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) was tasked with conducting
assessments and formulating recommendations, on a rolling basis, concerning the timelines for
transitioning geographic areas and institutions. In February 2011, at the Munich Security
Conference, President Karzai stated that he expected to announce the first tranche of provinces
for transition on March 21, 2011.156
Security Efforts
Security efforts including counter-terrorism, combined clearing operations, and growing the
Afghan National Security Forces are widely regarded as critical to the success of the overall
campaign. To the extent that differences of opinion emerge, among practitioners and observers
who believe in general that a campaign should be carried out, those differences concern the
relative importance of security versus other efforts, and the most appropriate timing and
sequencing of security efforts and other elements of the campaign.
152
Information from ISAF and NATO personnel, April 2010.
153
Kabul Conference Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, July 20, 2010, paragraph 19,
available at http://www.mfa.gov.af/FINAL%20Kabul%20Conference%20%20%20Communique.pdf.
154
NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.
155
Communications from ISAF officials, June-October 2010.
156
“Karzai Insists on Security Transition by Spring,” TOLO News, February 9, 2011, available at
http://www.tolonews.com/en/goftman/1824-karzai-insists-on-security-transition-by-spring.
Congressional Research Service
39
War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
Most would agree that growing sufficient capacity and capability in the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) is essential to the overall campaign, in order to support the process of
transitioning lead responsibility for security to those Afghan forces. Decades of war,
displacement, and mismanagement, followed by the ousterof the Taliban regime, left Afghanistan
without organized, functioning security forces or equipment, so rebuilding the ANSF has been a
challenge as well as a high priority of the post-Taliban international assistance effort.
The ANSF consists of the Afghan National Army (ANA), which falls under the Ministry of
Defense; and the Afghan National Police (ANP), which falls under the Ministry of Interior.
Afghanistan’s third so-called security ministry is the National Directorate of Security (NDS),
which is Afghanistan’s intelligence agency.
The ANA consists primarily of ground forces. As of early 2011, the ANA had six ground forces
Corps Headquarters—the 201st Corps near Kabul, the 203rd Corps in Gardez in the east, the 205th
Corps in Kandahar in the south, the 207th Corps in Herat in the west, the 209th Corps in Mazar-e
Sharif in the north, and the newest Corps, the 215th in Helmand in the southwest. ANA “Corps”
follow the European model, in which a Corps is a two-star headquarters, whose subordinate units
are brigades—much like a U.S. Army Division.
The ANA also includes the ANA Air Force (ANAAF), known until June 2010 as the ANA Air
“Corps.” While the ANAAF remains part of the ANA, the change in nomenclature recalls
Afghanistan’s tradition, dating back to 1924, of maintaining an independent air force. By the
1980’s,
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.