FY2027 NDAA: Reserve Component End-Strength

INSIGHTi

FY2027 NDAA: Reserve Component EndStrength

August 12, 2026

Background

In accordance with 10 U.S.C §115(a), Congress sets the maximum size (i.e., end-strength) of the active

and reserve components of the Armed Forces annually, typically in a National Defense Authorization Act

(NDAA). Congress also appropriates funds for the pay and benefits of these personnel.

End-strength specifically refers to the actual number of personnel in a branch on the last day of the fiscal

year (i.e., September 30). The enacted end-strength figures for an FY2027 NDAA would be for

September 30, 2027. Congress also periodically sets minimum end-strength levels for the Armed Forces,

which may be lower than or equal to the maximum authorized level. While Congress authorizes minimum

and maximum end-strengths, each military service manages its force through recruiting and retention

efforts to achieve an actual end-strength.

Typically, actual end-strength falls within the congressionally authorized minimum and maximum endstrengths. However, there are circumstances in which the actual end-strength may fall outside the

authorized range. For example, under 10 U.S.C. §115(f)(3), the Secretary of Defense (who is using

“Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025) may—

after determining “such action is in the national interest”—vary the end-strength of any of the services by

no more than 3%. Recruiting and retention shortfalls may cause one or more of the services to fall below

their minimum authorized strength.

Per 10 U.S.C. §10102, the reserve component provides “trained units and qualified persons available for

active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the

national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are

needed than are in the regular components.”

In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §113a(b)(2), the Secretary of Defense is required to submit end-strength

requests for the reserve component in an annual budget request to Congress. Congress is not bound by

these requests but considers them while deliberating end-strength levels. From FY2001 to FY2026,

Congress authorized end-strengths similar to the Pentagon’s requested numbers.

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The reserve component consists of the federal reserve forces of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,

and Coast Guard, as well as the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. The Space Force does not

have a reserve component. It is a single-component armed service with personnel serving in an inactive or

active-duty status (10 U.S.C. §20001). Either component of the National Guard may be mobilized under

federal or state authority and perform homeland security missions that may include responding to civil

unrest and natural disasters and guarding domestic airspace.

End-Strength Trends, FY2001-FY2027

Congress has varied authorized end-strengths over time in response to factors such as national security

priorities, budget constraints, and recruitment challenges (see Figure 1). In the report (S.Rept. 118-58)

accompanying the Senate-passed FY2024 NDAA (S. 2226 §411), the committee stated that it chose to

recommend lower end-strengths than requested for the Selected Reserve (i.e. the portion of the Reserve

Component that trains regularly and is frequently mobilized) because “legislating unreachable end

strength numbers would set the military services up for failure” by “encouraging quantity over quality in

recruiting.” It remains unclear whether incremental reductions in previous years may have stemmed in

part from this concern.

In other instances, Congress increased authorized end-strengths. For instance, in the FY2017 NDAA (S.

2943), Congress authorized an Army National Guard end-strength that was 8,000 personnel greater than

the number requested by the Defense Department.

Figure 1. End-Strength Trends, FY2001-FY2027

Figure is interactive in HTML report version.

Source: CRS analysis of Congress.gov for FY2001-FY2026 data. FY2027 data are from the President’s budget request.

Notes: FY2001-FY2026 data comprise authorized end-strengths from National Defense Authorization Acts. Coast Guard

Reserve, part of the Department of Homeland Security, is not shown.

FY2027 NDAA

The House-passed (H.R. 8800) and Senate committee-reported (S. 4784) versions of an FY2027 NDAA

contain end-strength figures identical to those requested by the executive branch (see Table 1).

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Table 1. FY2026 and FY2027 Reserve Component End-Strengths

Service

FY2026

Enacted EndStrength

President’s

Budget

Request

H.R. 8800

S. 4784

Change from

Enacted

FY2026 to

FY2027

Request

Army National

Guard

328,000

331,300

331,300

331,300

+3,300

Army Reserve

172,000

172,000

172,000

172,000

+0

Navy Reserve

57,500

56,500

56,500

56,500

-1,000

Marine Corps

Reserve

33,600

34,700

34,700

34,700

+1,100

Air National

Guard

106,300

107,400

107,400

107,400

+1,100

Air Force

Reserve

67,500

67,400

67,400

67,400

-100

Total

764,900

769,300

769,300

769,300

+4,400

Source: Congress.gov; Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Notes: Coast Guard Reserve, part of the Department of Homeland Security, is not shown.

Potential Issues for Congress

Consideration of the FY2027 NDAA may include discussions on reserve component end-strength.

Related issues Congress may debate may include the following:

•

•

•

•

•

•

Do the reserve forces possess sufficient end-strength to fulfill all mission requirements—

including domestic security and disaster relief activities?

How might U.S. security objectives in the Western Hemisphere or the Middle East

require adjustments to reserve component end-strengths?

What is the role of the reserve components in service-level restructuring projects (such as

the Marine Corps Force Design Initiative, the Army Transformation Initiative, or the

Navy’s “Golden Fleet”)?

To what extent are these requests informed by the services’ recruitment and retention

plans?

How might the reserve forces request affect the active component-reserve component

force mix and the Armed Forces’ capacity to meet current defense objectives?

Should requested funding levels be met or adjusted?

Author Information

Nicholas M. Munves

Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy

Congressional Research Service

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Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff

to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of

Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of

information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.

CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United

States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,

as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the

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