FY2026 NDAA: Reserve Component End-Strength

INSIGHTi

FY2026 NDAA: Reserve Component EndStrength

February 6, 2026

Background

Under 10 U.S.C §115(a) Congress sets the maximum size (i.e., end-strength) of the active and reserve

components of the Armed Forces annually, typically in a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

Congress is also responsible for appropriating funds for the pay and benefits of these personnel.

End-strength specifically refers to the actual number of personnel in a branch on the last day of the fiscal

year (i.e., September 30). The enacted end-strength figures in the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2026 (FY2026 NDAA; P.L. 119-60) are for September 30, 2026. Congress also periodically

sets minimum end-strength levels for the Armed Forces, which may be identical to or lower than the

authorized end-strength. While Congress authorizes minimum and maximum end-strengths, each military

service manages its force, through recruiting and retention efforts, to achieve an actual end-strength.

Typically, this actual end-strength falls within the congressionally authorized minimum and maximum

end-strengths. However, there are circumstances in which the actual end-strength may fall outside the

authorized range. For example, under 10 U.S.C. §115(f)(3), the Secretary of Defense (who is now using

“Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025) may—

after determining “such action is in the national interest”—increase the end-strength of any of the services

above the authorized end-strength by up to 3%. Recruiting and retention shortfalls may cause one or more

of the services to fall below their minimum authorized strength.

The reserve component provides “trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the

armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may

require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the

regular components.” (This provision is codified at 10. U.S.C. §10102).

Under 10 U.S.C. §113a(b)(2), the Secretary of Defense is required to submit end-strength requests for the

reserve component in an annual budget request to Congress. Congress is not bound by these requests, but

from FY2001 to FY2025 authorized end-strengths similar to the Pentagon’s requested numbers.

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The reserve component consists of the federal reserve forces of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,

and Coast Guard, plus the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG). The Space

Force does not have a reserve component. It is a single-component armed service with personnel serving

in an inactive or active-duty status (10 U.S.C. §20001). The National Guard (ANG and ARNG) may be

mobilized under federal or state authority and performs homeland security missions that may include

responding to civil unrest and natural disasters and guarding domestic airspace.

End-Strength Trends, FY2001-FY2026

Congress has varied authorized end-strengths over time in response to factors such as national security

priorities, budget constraints, and recruitment challenges. In the report (S.Rept. 118-58) accompanying

the Senate-passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (FY2024 NDAA, S. 2226

§411), the committee stated that it chose to recommend lower end-strengths than requested for the

Selected Reserve because “legislating unreachable end strength numbers would set the military services

up for failure” by “encouraging quantity over quality in recruiting.” It remains unclear whether

incremental reductions in previous years may have stemmed in part from this concern.

Figure 1. Selected Reserve Component Authorized End-Strength FY2001-FY2026

Figure is interactive in HTML.

Source: CRS analysis of Congress.gov for FY2001–FY2026 data. FY2025 data are from President’s Budget Request.

Notes: FY2001-FY2026 data comprise authorized end-strengths from NDAAs. Coast Guard Reserve, part of the

Department of Homeland Security, is not shown.

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FY2026 NDAA

Table 1. FY2025 and FY2026 Reserve Component End-Strengths

Service

FY2025 Enacted

End-Strength

FY2026 President’s

Budget Request

FY2026 Enacted

End-Strength

Changes from

Enacted FY2025FY2026

Army National Guard

325,000

328,000

328,000

+3,000

Army Reserve

175,800

172,000

172,000

-3,800

Air National Guard

108,300

106,300

106,300

-2,000

Air Force Reserve

67,000

67,500

67,500

+500

Navy Reserve

57,700

57,500

57,500

-200

Marine Corps

Reserve

32,500

33,600

33,600

+1,100

776,300

764,900

764,900

-1,400

Total

Source: Congress.gov; Department of Defense (Department of War), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

(Comptroller). Coast Guard Reserve, part of the Department of Homeland Security, is not shown.

On December 18, 2025, President Trump signed the FY2026 NDAA (P.L. 119-60) into law, enacting the

end-strengths requested in his budget request (see Table 1).

Issues for Congress

During FY2026, Congress may conduct oversight of the services’ efforts to achieve enacted endstrengths.

As Congress considers a FY2027 NDAA, Congress may assess whether the Executive Branch’s endstrength requests align with Congress’s defense policy objectives.

Issues Congress may consider when evaluating reserve component end-strength requests include

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Do the reserve forces possess sufficient end-strength to fulfill all mission requirements—

including domestic security and disaster relief activities?

Do U.S. security objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean require adjustments to

reserve component end-strengths?

What is the role of the reserve components in service-level restructuring projects (such as

the Marine Corps Force Design Initiative, the Army Transformation Initiative, or the

Navy’s “Golden Fleet” )?

Do these requests reflect a realistic assessment of the services’ ability to recruit and retain

personnel?

Congress may also decide to adjust the end-strengths of the reserve component for a range of reasons:

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Congress may assess that a different active component-reserve component (AC/RC) force

mix would allow the Armed Forces to more effectively meet current defense objectives.

Congress may identify additional defense objectives that the Armed Forces could better

meet with a different AC/RC force mix.

Congress may adjust the AC/RC force mix for cost-saving purposes.

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Congress may choose to shift certain assets, missions, or capabilities from the active to

the reserve component (or vice-versa) and adjust end-strengths accordingly.

Congress may also choose to approve end-strengths that differ from or align with DOD requests.

Author Information

Nicholas M. Munves

Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff

to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of

Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of

information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.

CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United

States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,

as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the

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