FY2022 NDAA: Active Component End-Strength

Congressional research reportJan 4, 2022

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FY2022 NDAA: Active Component EndStrength

Updated January 4, 2022

Background

The term end-strength refers to either the authorized or actual personnel strength of a specified branch of

the military on September 30th of a given year (i.e., the last day of the fiscal year).

Each year, in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress sets an authorized end-strength

for active component personnel in each of the armed forces. The term authorized strength means “the

largest number of members authorized to be in an armed force, a component, a branch, a grade, or any

other category of the armed forces” (10 U.S.C. §101(b)(11)). Authorized end-strengths are maximum

strength levels on September 30th, the end of the fiscal year. Congress also periodically sets minimum

end-strength levels for the active component, which may be identical to or lower than the authorized endstrength.

While Congress authorizes minimum and maximum end-strengths, each military service manages its

force, through recruiting and retention efforts, to achieve an actual end-strength. The actual end-strength

is the number of individuals who are members of a given armed force on September 30th. Normally, this

actual end-strength falls within the congressionally authorized minimum and maximum end-strengths.

However, there are circumstances in which the actual end-strength may fall outside the authorized range.

For example, under 10 U.S.C. §115(f), the Secretary of Defense can increase the active component endstrength of any armed force above the authorized end-strength by up to 3%. On the other hand, recruiting

and retention shortfalls may cause one or more of the armed forces to fall below their minimum

authorized strength.

Congress varies the authorized end-strengths over time in response to various factors, such as national

security priorities, force structure changes, and budgetary constraints. For example, from FY2001FY2011, in response to the demands of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Congress substantially increased the

authorized strength of the Army and Marine Corps. Then, from FY2011-FY2016, Congress reversed

those increases in light of the withdrawal of most U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, the drawdown of U.S.

forces in Afghanistan beginning in 2012, and budgetary constraints.

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Figure 1 below depicts changes the actual end-strength of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force

from FY2001-FY2021. The Air Force line includes Space Force personnel for FY2020-FY2021.

Figure 1. Actual End-Strength of Active Component Armed Forces, FY2001-FY2021

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, at https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports.

FY2022 NDAA

The Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget requested end-strengths of 485,000 for the Army, 346,200 for

the Navy, 178,500 for the Marine Corps, 328,300 for the Air Force, and 8,400 for the Space Force. In

comparison to FY2021 authorized end-strengths, these requests represented decreases for the Army (900), Navy (-1,600), Marine Corps (-2,700), and Air Force (-5,175), plus an initial Space Force request of

8,400.

In the FY2020 NDAA, Congress authorized the establishment of the United States Space Force, a new

armed force within the Department of the Air Force. At first, Air Force strength authorizations were used

to assign personnel to the Space Force. However, the FY2021 NDAA conference report (H.Rept. 116617) stated, “The conferees expect the Department of the Air Force to submit a formal request and

justification for [U.S. Space Force] end strength to the congressional defense committees as part of the

President’s Department of Defense budget request for fiscal year 2022.” As a result, the President’s

FY2022 budget request asked for a Space Force end-strength authorization of 8,400.

The initial House-passed version of the FY2022 NDAA, H.R. 4350, sought end-strengths that were

identical to the Administration request. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported version, S. 2792,

sought end-strengths that were identical to the Administration request for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,

and Space Force, but a higher end-strength for the Air Force (+920 compared to the Administration

request).

The enacted version of the FY2022 NDAA, S. 1605 (P.L. 117-81), authorized end-strengths identical to

the Administration’s request for the Army, Marine Corps and Space Force, but higher end-strengths for

the Navy (+720) compared to the Administration request) and Air Force (+920).

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See Table 1 for a comparison of active component end-strength authorizations in the three versions of the

FY2022 NDAA discussed above.

See Table 2 for a comparison of the FY2021 congressionally authorized end-strengths, the FY2022

President’s budget request, and the FY2022 congressionally authorized end-strengths.

Table 1. Comparison of FY2022 NDAA Active Component End-Strength Provisions

H.R. 4350

S. 2792

P.L. 117-81

House Passed

SASC Reported

Enacted

Sec. 401 would have authorized a

total active duty end-strength of

1,346,400 as of September 20, 2022,

including:

485,000 for the Army

346,200 for the Navy

178,500 for the Marine Corps

328,300 for the Air Force

8,400 for the Space Force

Sec. 401 would have authorized a

total active duty end-strength of

1,347,320 as of September 20, 2022,

including:

485,000 for the Army

346,200 for the Navy

178,500 for the Marine Corps

329,220 for the Air Force

8,400 for the Space Force

Sec. 401 authorizes a total active duty

end-strength of 1,348,040 as of

September 20, 2022, including:

485,000 for the Army

346,920 for the Navy

178,500 for the Marine Corps

329,220 for the Air Force

8,400 for the Space Force

Table 2. Comparison of FY2021 and FY2022 Active Component End Strength

FY2021 Authorized, FY2022 President’s Budget Request, FY2022 Authorized

FY2021

Authorized

(P.L. 116-283)

FY2022

President’s

Budget

Request

Difference

Between

FY2021

Authorized and

FY22 Budget

Request

Army

485,900

485,000

-900

485,000

-900

Navy

347,800

346,200

-1,600

346,920

-880

Marine Corps

181,200

178,500

-2,700

178,500

-2,700

Air Force

333,475

328,300

-5,175

329,220

-4,255

Space Force

n.a.*

8,400

+8,400

8,400

+8,400

Total

1,348,375

1,346,400

-1,975

1,348,040

-335

Service

FY2022 NDAA

Authorized

(P.L. 117-81)

Difference

Between

FY2021

Authorized and

FY2022

Authorized

Notes: The FY2021 NDAA did not specify an authorized end-strength for the Space Force, but the FY2022 President’s

Budget Request lists the Space Force’s FY2021 end-strength as 6,400. This appears to reflect the projected actual endstrength number for the Space Force rather than the authorized end-strength (see discussion above).

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Author Information

Lawrence Kapp

Specialist in Military Personnel Policy

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff

to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of

Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of

information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.

CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United

States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,

as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the

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IN11780 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

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