Regulating State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement Actions to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS)

Regulating State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement Actions

to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS)

July 29, 2026

The use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS, or drones) has

increased for commercial and recreational purposes; so too have

concerns about their potential public safety and security risks.

Since 2018, federal law enforcement agencies within the U.S.

Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) have had counter-unmanned aircraft systems

(C-UAS) authorities to respond to threats from malicious

drones. More recently, through the SAFER SKIES Act, included

in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

(FY2026 NDAA; P.L. 119-60), Congress extended similar

authorities to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law

enforcement and correctional agencies. These authorities are

conditioned on compliance with training and certification

requirements, outlined in a recently released July 2026 Interim

Final Rule (IFR) issued jointly by DOJ and DHS: Counter-UAS

Authority for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law

Enforcement and Correctional Agencies (hereinafter, “July 2026

IFR”). This In Focus provides an overview of potential threats

from malicious drones; authorities granted to federal and SLTT

agencies; training and certification requirements included in the

July 2026 IFR, and issues that Congress may consider regarding

the regulation of SLTT agencies’ C-UAS activities.

Concerns about Malicious Drones

UAS may pose unique public safety or security risks. Some

have warned, for instance, that drones can be used as

reconnaissance tools for malicious actors “because they can fly

past bollards, checkpoints, and other security mechanisms.” For

example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has

noted that transnational criminal organizations use drones to

surveil and evade border officials. Drones have also been used

to drop illicit drugs and other contraband into jails or prisons.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example, notes that criminal

networks deliver illicit drugs, weapons, cell phones, and other

contraband to inmates via drones and that these drone incursions

are increasing. Yet another concern involves potential use of

drones to “drop a bomb, shoot firearms, or spray a poison gas

over large crowds of people” at a public event.

Various federal criminal laws have historically limited law

enforcement’s C-UAS options. For instance, criminal

surveillance laws, like the Wiretap Act and Pen/Trap Statute,

may be implicated when law enforcement intercepts signals or

communications to detect, identify, monitor, track, or

communicate with a drone and its operator. Certain mitigation

techniques, such as jamming (e.g., blocking or interfering with

signals and communications), spoofing (e.g., modifying

signals), and hacking (e.g., accessing a drone’s

communications), may run up against laws concerning

communication lines, stations, or systems; interference with

satellite operations; and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

And law enforcement attempts to disrupt, disable, or destroy a

drone may implicate federal laws that prohibit destroying or

seizing an aircraft.

Expanding Law Enforcement’s Toolkit

In response to concerns about malicious drones, policymakers

have taken steps to expand law enforcement’s ability to engage

in C-UAS activities—including detecting, identifying,

monitoring, tracking, communicating with, and disrupting or

disabling suspicious or malicious drones.

Federal Law Enforcement

The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 (Division H

of P.L. 115-254; 6 U.S.C. §124n) granted DOJ and DHS certain

C-UAS authorities to protect covered facilities and assets from

malicious drones. In doing so, it provided them with relief from

possible violations of certain federal criminal laws when

engaging in specified counter-UAS activities, such as detecting,

identifying, and tracking drones and disabling, seizing, or

destroying them. The SAFER SKIES Act amended 6 U.S.C.

§124n to authorize these agencies to take such actions, not just

for covered facilities and assets, but when “necessary to enforce

the law, protect the public, or to mitigate a credible threat that

an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft poses to the

safety or security of a covered facility or asset.”

SLTT Law Enforcement

Through the SAFER SKIES Act, Congress also granted SLTT

law enforcement and correctional agencies authority to engage

in actions to counter potential UAS threats. This authority is

contingent on these entities undergoing DOJ training and

certification. DOJ, in coordination with DHS, the U.S.

Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT), is required to develop regulations for this

training and report to Congress on SLTT agencies’ C-UAS use.

DOJ—along with DHS, DOD, DOT, the Federal

Communications Commission, and the National

Telecommunications and Information Administration—is also

required to maintain a list of authorized C-UAS systems and

technologies that may be used by SLTT agencies. The SAFER

SKIES Act also expanded the purpose areas of two criminal

justice grant programs—the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice

Assistance Grant (JAG) Program and the Community Oriented

Policing Services (COPS) Program—to allow SLTT law

enforcement recipients to use funds to purchase and operate

approved C-UAS technology.

National Schoolhouse for C-UAS

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) runs DOJ’s C-UAS

training and certification program through the National C-UAS

Training Center (NCUTC), a national schoolhouse established

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Regulating State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement Actions to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS)

at the FBI’s campus at Redstone Arsenal, AL. Before enactment

of the SAFER SKIES Act and final DOJ training and

certification, the NCUTC trained SLTT officers deputized to

serve on FBI C-UAS task forces. DOJ and DHS recently issued

the July 2026 IFR, outlining the training and certification to be

carried out at the NCUTC.

Training, Certification, and Implementation

Among other provisions, the July 2026 IFR outlines two types

of certification for SLTT agencies engaged in C-UAS activities:

(1) Detection and Warning and (2) Mitigation. It specifies that

officers and employees (but not contractors) may receive

certification to conduct C-UAS activities and may engage in

mutual aid and regional C-UAS support of other agencies. The

NCUTC maintains a certification database, and only certified

personnel may exercise the C-UAS authorities.

Detection and Warning Certification. This certification course

involves training on activities to detect, identify, monitor, or

track a UAS, or to warn the operator. It does not involve

mitigation efforts to disrupt, seize control of, disable, damage,

or destroy a UAS. This certification is obtained after a law

enforcement or correctional officer completes an online

curriculum and passes a post-course assessment through the

NCUTC training portal.

Mitigation Certification. This certification includes a twoweek residential training course for SLTT officers on activities

to disrupt, seize control of, disable, damage, or destroy a UAS.

An abbreviated program is available for those operating only at

correctional facilities. The July 2026 IFR indicates that the

mitigation course includes “instruction on the legal, operational,

and technological aspects of C-UAS operations…including

[Federal Aviation Administration] coordination and airspace

procedures, spectrum coordination requirements, real-time air

traffic control notification procedures, FBI and DHS notification

requirements, and the operational use of authorized mitigation

technologies.” Personnel engaging in mitigation actions must

determine (using a totality of the circumstances standard) that a

credible threat exists before taking any action, and any action

taken must be proportionate to the threat.

Agency Implementation Policy. Any SLTT agency conducting

C-UAS activities under the July 2026 IFR must adopt an agency

implementation policy that, among other provisions, designates

an Agency Approving Official and authorized personnel to

engage in C-UAS activities, details tactical procedures for CUAS operations, contains public notification provisions, and

outlines procedures for data handling, retention, and

dissemination. Agencies engaging only in detection and warning

activities need not include details of tactical C-UAS procedures.

Each agency must annually attest to their implementation policy

through the NCUTC portal.

Authorized Technologies Lists. There are two lists to which

agencies exercising C-UAS authorities under the July 2026 IFR

must adhere. The IFR notes that “the Authorized Technologies

List identifies the technology categories authorized for SLTT

law enforcement and correctional agency C-UAS operations.

The Authorized Systems List identifies specific systems, at the

make and model level, that have completed interagency

evaluation within those technology categories and stated

operating restrictions.”

C-UAS Operations Plan and Coordination. Each mitigation

operation or detection and warning operation conducted under

the July 2026 IFR must be authorized by a C-UAS Operations

Plan signed by an Agency Approving Official. This is an

event/operation-specific document. However, facilities with

ongoing operations, such as correctional facilities and critical

infrastructure sites, may receive a standing approved plan for up

to 365 days. Each plan must contain specified information on

the operation and a risk-based assessment of engaging in the CUAS activities. Additionally, before conducting any mitigation

operation, an SLTT agency must submit an advance notification

document through the NCUTC portal, identifying certain details

about the operation. Any SLTT agency activating a C-UAS

system for mitigation must notify the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) within five minutes for real-time

coordination.

Privacy and Civil Liberties. The July 2026 IFR requires SLTT

agencies and personnel to comply with certain privacy and civil

liberties protections when exercising the C-UAS authorities. For

example, the IFR specifies that no C-UAS authority may be

used “solely to seize, monitor, deter, interfere with, or disrupt

individuals exercising rights protected by the First

Amendment.”

C-UAS Reporting. Within 48 hours after taking a mitigation

action or confiscating a UAS under the authority of 6 U.S.C.

§124n, an agency must report relevant information, including

operational effects, statistics, and unintended consequences,

through the NCUTC portal. Each SLTT agency engaging in CUAS actions under the July 2026 IFR must also provide a semiannual report covering data on all C-UAS operations, not just

mitigation actions.

Policy Considerations

DOJ and DHS opened the July 2026 IFR to public comment on

several aspects, including on data retention requirements and

“whether [C-UAS] certifications should expire, the length of

their validity period, and the requirements for renewal.” In

addition to examining how the IFR may be amended for the

final rule, Congress may look to relevant issues not addressed in

the IFR. For instance, Congress may examine the FBI’s capacity

to train SLTT agencies applying for the two certification

programs. As of July 1, 2026, the NCUTC had trained 61

officers across 46 agencies. The NCUTC had previously

prioritized training officers in cities hosting FIFA World Cup

events, and Congress may examine future training priorities.

They may also look at potential barriers to SLTT agency

participation in the training and certification programs. For

example, the online NCUTC detection and warning certification

is offered at no cost to participating law enforcement and

correctional officers. However, Congress may examine whether

cost adversely affects SLTT agencies’ ability to attend the twoweek residential mitigation training and certification program

and explore paths (in addition to DHS’s C-UAS Grant Program)

to financially support agencies’ participation.

Kristin Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security

https://crsreports.congress.gov

IF13279

Regulating State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement Actions to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS)

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